REPORT_RECEIYEAR REPORT_NUMSUPPLEMENTREPORT_TYPEOPERATOR_IDNAME

12/22/2018 2018 20180003 31395 ORIGINAL 32152 SABINE PASS L

4/4/2017 2017 20170001 15020 SUPPLEMENTA 32561 ECOELECTRICA
5/6/2014 2014 20140002 15014 SUPPLEMENTA 39054 WILLIAMS PAR
2/21/2018 2018 20180001 31928 SUPPLEMENTA 32152 SABINE PASS L
6/24/2016 2016 20160001 15016 ORIGNAL FINA 15329 PEOPLES GAS
8/19/2014 2014 20140003 15005 ORIGNAL FINA 4070 EAST TENNES
11/28/2012 2012 20120001 15002 SUPPLEMENTA 13840 NORTHWEST N
2/20/2015 2015 20150002 15008 SUPPLEMENTA 32206 FREEPORT LNG
12/30/2015 2015 20150004 15012 SUPPLEMENTA 13840 NORTHWEST N
9/21/2017 2017 20170002 31840 SUPPLEMENTA 3411 DISTRIGAS OF
2/13/2015 2014 20150001 15017 SUPPLEMENTA 8160 INTERMOUNTA
3/13/2019 2019 20190002 31782 ORIGNAL FINA 8160 INTERMOUNTA
2/11/2019 2019 20190001 31638 ORIGINAL 32074 SUMMIT NATU
1/29/2014 2013 20140001 15015 SUPPLEMENTA 13750 NORTHERN NA
9/24/2018 2018 20180002 30972 ORIGNAL FINA 13750 NORTHERN NA
OPERATOR_STOPERATOR_C OPERATOR_STOPERATOR_POLOCAL_DATETIDATE NRC_RPT_NU
700 MILAM STHOUSTON TX 77002 ### 11/23/2018 123287
RD 337, KM 3PENUELAS PR 624 ### 3/7/2017 1172670
ONE WILLIAMTULSA OK 74172 ### 3/31/2014 1078325
700 MILAM STHOUSTON TX 77002 ### 1/22/2018 1202595
200 E RANDOLCHICAGO IL 60601 ### 4/20/2016 1145755
5400 WESTHEHOUSTON TX 77056 ### 7/27/2014 1090405
220 N.W. SEC PORTLAND OR 97209 ### 11/4/2012 1029623
333 CLAY STR HOUSTON TX 77002 ### 2/19/2015 1108577
220 N.W. SEC PORTLAND OR 97209 ### 12/13/2015 1135692
18 ROVER ST EVERETT MA 2149 ### 9/20/2017 1191070
555 SOUTH CO BOISE ID 83709 ### 12/18/2014 DO NOT KNOW NRC REPOR
555 SOUTH CO BOISE ID 83709 ### 2/27/2019 1238769
7810 SHAFFERLITTLETON CO 80127 ### 1/11/2019 1235155
1111 SOUTH 1OMAHA NE 68124 ### 12/31/2013 1069801
1111 SOUTH 1OMAHA NE 68124 ### 9/4/2018 1223643
 NRC_RPT_DATUNINTENTIONINTENTIONALEMERGENCY_RESULTED_F RESULTED_FRCOMMODITY_
### YES NO NO NO LNG (LIQUEFIED NATURAL
### NO NO YES NO NO RELEASE OF COMMODITY INV
### YES NO NO NO NATURAL GAS WHILE BEIN
### YES NO NO NO LNG (LIQUEFIED NATURAL
### NO NO YES NO NATURAL GAS WHILE BEIN
### YES NO NO NO NATURAL GAS WHILE BEIN
### NO NO YES NO OTHER COMM
### YES NO YES NO NATURAL GAS WHILE BEIN
### NO NO YES NO NO RELEASE OF COMMODITY INV
### NO NO NO YES Arc Flash NO RELEASE OF COMMODITY INV
O NOT KNOW NRC REPORYES NO YES NO NATURAL GAS WHILE BEIN
### NO NO YES NO NO RELEASE OF COMMODITY INV
### YES NO NO NO LNG (LIQUEFIED NATURAL
### YES NO NO NO NATURAL GAS WHILE BEIN
### YES NO YES NO NATURAL GAS WHILE BEIN
 COMMODITY_UNINTENTIONINTENTIONALVOLUME_TO_FATALITY_INDNUM_EMP_FAT
NUM_CONTR_F
NG (LIQUEFIED NATURAL 2.01 1500 0.6 NO
O RELEASE OF COMMODITY INVOLVED NO
ATURAL GAS WHILE BEIN 14000 154200 0 NO
NG (LIQUEFIED NATURAL 825 0 245 NO
ATURAL GAS WHILE BEIN 325.2 0 0 NO
ATURAL GAS WHILE BEIN 1 0 0 NO
CO2 230 NO
ATURAL GAS WHILE BEIN 1711 NO
O RELEASE OF COMMODITY INVOLVED NO
O RELEASE OF COMMODITY INVOLVED NO
ATURAL GAS WHILE BEIN 185 0 0 NO
O RELEASE OF COMMODITY INVOLVED NO
NG (LIQUEFIED NATURAL 730 NO
ATURAL GAS WHILE BEIN 1 0 0 NO
ATURAL GAS WHILE BEIN 0 10000 0 NO
NUM_ER_FATA
NUM_GP_FATA
FATAL INJURY_IND NUM_EMP_INNUM_CONTR_I
NUM_ER_INJU
0 NO
0 NO
0 YES 1 0 0
0 NO
0 NO
0 NO
0 NO
0 NO
0 NO
0 NO
0 NO
0 NO
0 NO
0 NO
0 NO
NUM_GP_INJU
INJURE SHUTDOWN_D
SHUTDOWN_ESHUTDOWN_D RESTART_DATSTILL_SHUTD
0 YES ### ###
0 YES ### ###
0 1 YES ### ###
0 NO FACLITY UTILIZED THE UNAFFECTED LNG STORAGE TAN
0 YES ### ###
0 YES ### ###
0 YES ### ###
0 YES ### ###
0 YES ### ###
0 NO TWO SEPARATE ELECTRICAL FEEDS
0 YES ### YES
0 YES ### ###
0 NO LEAK WAS ON AN ISOLATED STORAGE TANK. NO DAMAGE
0 YES ### YES
0 YES ### ###
IGNITE_IND EXPLODE_INDNUM_PUB_EVNUM_OPER_AFACILITY_NA NPMS_LNG_IFACILITY_STA
NO NO 0 0 SABINE PASS 32152 IN SERVICE
YES NO 0 0 ECOELECTRIC 1 IN SERVICE
YES YES 150 18 Plymouth LNG Peak ShavingIN SERVICE
NO NO 0 0 SABINE PASS 32152 IN SERVICE
NO NO 0 0 LNG PLANT 14 IN SERVICE
NO NO 0 0 Kingsport LNGKingsport LN IN SERVICE
NO NO 0 0 NEWPORT LNG NEWPORT IN SERVICE
NO NO 0 50 FREEPORT LNG 1 IN SERVICE
NO NO 0 0 GASCO LNG PGASCO IN SERVICE
NO YES 0 0 Everett Marine LNG TerminaIN SERVICE
NO NO 0 0 NAMPA LNG FA NAMPA LNG IN SERVICE
NO NO 0 0 NAMPA LNG FA NAMPA LNG IN SERVICE
NO NO 0 0 Lebanon LNG IN SERVICE
YES NO 0 0 Portable tanker and vaporizIN SERVICE
NO NO 0 0 GARNER LNG 1 IN SERVICE
FACILITY_LAT FACILITY_LONFACILITY_STATFACILITY_LIQ FACILITY_NU FACILITY_TOTFACILITY_SO
LA 749 0 750
PR 119 2 186
WA 0 0 300
LA 2527 0 2513
IL 10 0 10
36.44537113 -82.5223425 TN 0 0 348000
44.62425232 -124.026695 OR 6 0 6
TX 0 0 1800
OR 120 3 120
MA 91 2 715
ID 5 0 5
ID 4 0 5
MO 0 2 6 YES
MN 1025 1 6000 YES
IA 100 2 150
FACILITY_SO FACILITY_SO FACILITY_SO INTER_INTRAFACILITY_NU FACILITY_VOLUME_STORAGE
YES INTERSTATE 5 901707
YES INTERSTATE 1 776728
YES INTERSTATE 2 344309
YES INTERSTATE 5 333031
YES INTRASTATE 2 313358
YES INTERSTATE 1 252000
YES INTRASTATE 1 165000
YES INTERSTATE 2 160000
YES INTRASTATE 1 106750
YES INTERSTATE 2 97000
YES INTRASTATE 1 94000
YES INTRASTATE 1 60848
INTRASTATE 6 1079
INTERSTATE 2 234
YES INTERSTATE 1 100
Storage, gallons Storage, MMCF gas FACILITY_TY FACILITY_TY
37871694 3038 YES
32622576 2617 YES
14460978 1160 YES
13987302 1122 YES
13161036 1056 YES
10584000 849 YES
6930000 556 YES
6720000 539 YES
4483500 360 YES
4074000 327 YES
3948000 317 YES
2555616 205 YES
45318 4
9828 1
4200 0 YES
FACILITY_TYP FACILITY_TY SUB_MOBILE_SUB_MOBILE_FACILITY_TYP FACILITY_TYP FUNCTION_M
YES

YES

YES

YES

YES YES
YES YES
SUB_MARINESUB_MARINE_FUNCTION_STSUB_STORAGESUB_STORAGFUNCTION_STFUNCTION_VE
YES YES YES YES
YES YES
YES YES
YES YES YES YES
YES YES
YES YES
YES YES
YES YES
YES YES
YES
YES YES YES
YES YES
YES YES
YES
YES YES
FUNCTION_NIFUNCTION_SPITEM_INVOLVITEM_INVOLVEST_COST_OPEST_COST_P EST_COST_E
COLD BOX 0 175000 0
PUMP 0 0 0
IN-PLANT PIPING 71300 40790000 190000
STORAGE TANK/VESSEL 0 34000000 9500
IN-PLANT PIPING 0 0 0
RELIEF VALVE 0 84500 0
OTHER Plant Control 0 10000 0
FLANGE/GASKET 0 25 0
EMERGENCY SHUT-OFF VALV 0 22829 5000
OTHER Electrical sub 0 150000 0
WELD 0 100000 300
COMPRESSOR 0 5000 0
RELIEF VALVE 5000 0 2450
RELIEF VALVE 0 1000 0
VAPORIZER 0 500 0
EST_COST_OTEST_COST_OTEST_COST_GAEST_COST_INPRPTY CCS_IN_PLACCCS_OPERATI
0 7 4959 179966 YES YES
80 ABC Fire Extin 0 0 80 YES YES
4698000 Purification s 80960 672800 46503060 YES YES
0 2775 0 34012275 YES YES
0 823 0 823 YES YES
0 4 0 84504 YES YES
0 0 0 10000 YES YES
0 4771 0 4796 YES YES
0 0 0 27829 YES YES
0 0 0 150000 YES YES
2000 crane to rem 555 0 102855 YES YES
5000 Oil testing an 0 0 10000 YES YES
0 9018 0 16468 NO
0 500 0 1500 NO
0 0 42 542 YES YES
CCS_FUNCTIOACCIDENT_IDEACCIDENT_DEEMPLOYEE_DR
NUM_EMPLOYNUM_EMPLOYCONTRACTOR
YES LOCAL OPERATING PERSONNO NO
YES FLAME DETECTORS NO NO
YES LOCAL OPERATING PERSONYES 16 0 NO
YES LOCAL OPERATING PERSONNO NO
YES LOCAL OPERATING PERSONYES 2 0 NO
YES LOCAL OPERATING PERSONNO NO
NO OTHER COMPUTERIZENO NO
YES COMPUTERIZED CONTROL SYS
NO NO
YES COMPUTERIZED CONTROL SYS
NO NO
YES LOCAL OPERATING PERSONNO NO
YES COMPUTERIZED CONTROL SYS
NO NO
YES LOCAL OPERATING PERSONNO NO
LOCAL OPERATING PERSONNO NO
LOCAL OPERATING PERSONNO NO
YES COMPUTERIZED CONTROL SYS
NO NO
NUM_CONTRA
NUM_CONTRA
CAUSE CAUSE_DETAIINTERNAL_EXNATURAL_FORNF_OTHER_DE
EQUIPMENT FNON-THREADED CONNECTION FAILURE
INCORRECT OOTHER INCORRECT OPERATION
INCORRECT OOTHER INCORRECT OPERATION
OTHER INCID MISCELLANEOUS
INCORRECT OVALVE LEFT OR PLACED IN WRONG POSITION, BUT NOT RESULTING IN A TA
NATURAL FORHIGH WINDS HIGH WINDS
EQUIPMENT FOTHER EQUIPMENT FAILURE
EQUIPMENT FOTHER EQUIPMENT FAILURE
OTHER OUTSIDAMAGE BY CAR, TRUCK, OR OTHER MOTORIZED VEHICLE/EQUIPME
OTHER INCID MISCELLANEOUS
MATERIAL FAICONSTRUCTION-, INSTALLATION-, OR FABRICATION-RELATED
EQUIPMENT FPUMP/COMPRESSOR OR PUMP/COMPRESSOR-RELATED EQUIPMENT
INCORRECT OSTORAGE TANK OR PRESSURE VESSEL ALLOWED OR CAUSED TO OVERFILL O
EQUIPMENT FMALFUNCTION OF CONTROL/RELIEF EQUIPMENT
EQUIPMENT FOTHER EQUIPMENT FAILURE
 PARTY_TYPE OUTSIDE_FOROSF_VEHICLEOSF_HURRICAOSF_TROPICAOSF_TORNADOSF_HEAVY_R

ON, BUT NOT RESULTING IN A TANK, VESSEL, OR SUMP/SEPARATOR OVERFLOW OR FACILITY OVERPRESSURE

ORIZED VEHICLE/EQUIPMEDAMAGE BY CTHIRD PARTY

ICATION-RELATED
SOR-RELATED EQUIPMENT
WED OR CAUSED TO OVERFILL OR OVERPRESSURE
 OSF_OTHER_ OSF_OTHER_W
OSF_INTENTI OSF_INTENTI OSF_INTENT_OSF_OTHER_DPWJF_FIELD_

RPRESSURE

YES
PWJF_METALLPWJF_OTHER_PWJF_STILL_ PWJF_FAILURPWJF_INSULAEQ_FAILURE_EQ_FAILURE_D
NON-THREADED CONNECTIO

OTHER EQUIPPLANT CONTR

OTHER EQUIPFLANGE GASKE

CONSTRUCTION-, INSTALLATION-, OR FABRICATION-RELATED

PUMP/COMPRESSOR OR PU

MALFUNCTION OF CONTROL
OTHER EQUIPVAPORIZER S
 EQ_LOW_TEMEQ_INSULATI OPERATION_TOPERATION_DRELATED_INARELATED_NO_RELATED_FAI
NO NO
OTHER INCORINADEQUATE YES
OTHER INCORINADEQUATE YES

VALVE LEFT OR PLACED IN WRONG POSITYES

NO NO
NO NO

ICATION-RELATED
NO NO
STORAGE TANK OR PRESSURE VESSEL ALLOWED OR CAYES
NO NO
NO NO
RELATED_OTHOPERATION_ROTHER_TYPE MISC_DETAILSUNKNOWN_SU PREPARER_N PREPARER_TIT
MICHAEL J. MLEAD COMPLI
OSCAR CEDE LNG TERMIN
JARED ELLSWMANAGER PIP
MISCELLANEOSEE PART G FOR FULL DESC MICHAEL MYELEAD COMPLI
SHAWN BARTECOMPLIANCE S
DWAYNE TES SENIOR TECH
ANDREA SCOTCOMPLIANCE S
MICHAEL STE REGULATORY
SAMANTHA BCODE COMPLIA
MISCELLANEOOVERHEATING OF NATIONAMARK SKORDIMANAGER OF
CRAIG CHAPI DIRECTOR - E
GREG WATKINMANAGER POL
TYLER DAVIS REGULATORY A
JOHN GORMLSR. CORROSIO
JOHN A GORMSR. CORROSION
PREPARER_EMPREPARER_TEPREPARER_FAPREPARED_DAAUTHORIZER AUTHORIZER_AUTHORIZER_
michael.myer 8323122700 12/22/2018 PAUL NIELSO MANAGER REG7133755595
oscar.cedeno 787-487-6042787-836-2250 12/6/2017 CARLOS REYE CO-PRESIDEN787-836-2840
jared.ellswor 8015846539 3/25/2016 JARED ELLSWMANAGER PIP8015846539
michael.myer337-569-7234 4/5/2019 AARON STEP VICE PRESID 3375697726
srbartels@peo312-240-5421 6/24/2016 TOM WEBB COMPLIANCE312-240-4650
deteschendor713-627-5573713-386-4468 8/19/2014 RICK KIVELA DIRECTOR OP713-627-6388
a3s@nwnatur503-226-4211 12/18/2012 KERRY SHAMPMANAGER CO503-226-4211
mstephenson@ 979-415-8728979-415-8733 2/20/2015 MICHAEL JOHDIRECTOR REG979-415-8720
s7b@nwnatur5032264211 1/5/2016 JOE S. KARNE SENIOR MANA5032264211
mark.skordin 617-381-8554617-381-5654 3/25/2019 MARK SKORDIMANAGER OF617-381-8554
craig.chapin@208-377-6142 9/21/2016 CRAIG CHAPI DIRECTOR - E 208-377-6142
greg.watkin 208-377-6032 3/13/2019 GREG WATKINMANAGER POL 208-377-6032
tdavis@summit 207-781-1200 2/11/2019 KEITH LINCOLVICE PRESIDE207-781-1200
john.gormle 402-398-7494 4/25/2016 THOMAS CORDIRECTOR OF 402-398-7715
john.gormle 4023987494 - 9/24/2018 THOMAS CORVP PIPELINE 4023987715
AUTHORIZER_NARRATIVE
paul.nielson During Train 5 commissioning at Sabine Pass LNG on 23 November, 2018 at 07:55 am, site personnel o
creyes@ecoelOn Tuesday, March 7th, 2017 at 15:35:58hrs, LNG Terminal Emergency Shutdown #1 was triggered du
jared.ellswor At approximately 08:19 PDT the Plymouth LNG facility experienced an internal detonation resulting in
aaron.stephe On Monday, January 22nd, 2018 a small LNG release was observed at the base of the southeast side o
tjwebb@peopl Valve configuration on a transmission line outside of the LNG plant was changed to increase flow in th
rwkivela@speAfter a tornado disrupted electric power transmission to the East Tennessee LNG facility in Kingsport,
kfs@nwnaturaOn Sunday November 4, 2012 at approximately 2:30pm PST an event occurred at NW Natural's Newpo
mjohns@freep While conducting valve testing / maintenance on a pressurized natural gas line ~ 1100 PSI of pressure
jsk@nwnaturaAt approximately 8:49am on December 13th, 2015 NW Natural was notified of a significant fire close t
mark.skordin Failure of the 23 KV utility connection at the busbar within substation SS-1. A section of National Grid
craig.chapin@A weld on one of the tubes within the Economizer failed (pulled apart) leaking ~ 600 psig methane gas
greg.watkins A Liquefaction Emergency Shutdown (LES) was initiated the morning of February 27, 2019 after the LN
klincoln@sumPrometheus Energy Group, Inc. ('Prometheus') provides mobile liquefied natural gas ('LNG') supply, sto
thomas.correOn Tuesday, December 31, 2013 at approximately 0700 CST a flash fire occurred during liquified natur
thomas.correOn September 3, 2018, at 2230 communications was lost between the HMI and NNG-GARN-CTRLS-SW
18 at 07:55 am, site personnel observed small amounts of LNG hitting the ground near the northwest corner of the methane co
y Shutdown #1 was triggered due to the activation of Flame Detector 1LNG-AE-2016C at the top of the LNG Tank. The event hap
internal detonation resulting in rapid overpressure and subsequent failure of portions of the LNG1 purification and regeneratio
the base of the southeast side of Tank S-103 by operating field personnel. All LNG released from the outer tank shell was conta
s changed to increase flow in the pipeline which the LNG outlet also fed into. An increase in pressure that accompanied the inc
essee LNG facility in Kingsport, Tennessee, the generator at the facility did not immediately activate. The compressor stopped
occurred at NW Natural's Newport LNG Storage Plant located at 1702 Yaquina Bay Rd in Newport, Oregon. The plant was opera
gas line ~ 1100 PSI of pressure was released from a failed flange gasket that was positioned behind a blind flange on a plant na
otified of a significant fire close to the Portland LNG Plant located at 7900 NW Saint Helens Rd., in Portland. A semi-truck with a
SS-1. A section of National Grid overhead conductor developed a hotspot, overheated, dropped onto the switchgear, and then
) leaking ~ 600 psig methane gas into the enclosed area of the Economizer. Boxed area of Economizer filled with gas and ruptur
f February 27, 2019 after the LNG Plant Operators discovered a leak on an oil hose going into the datum cycle gas compressor.
ed natural gas ('LNG') supply, storage, and vaporization equipment and related services to Summit Natural Gas of Missouri, Inc.
occurred during liquified natural gas delivery operations at the Benson, Minnesota town border station. Information indicates
HMI and NNG-GARN-CTRLS-SW-G, which is the communication for the Vaporizers and LNG Pumps. Two Vaporizers were runni
hwest corner of the methane cold box. Personnel immediately communicated this observation to the control board operator an
of the LNG Tank. The event happened while O&M personnel was working in the replacement of LNG Pump P-101C. While the p
G1 purification and regeneration system, including in plant piping and an adsorber vessel, causing damage to adjacent building
m the outer tank shell was contained in the secondary containment. The LNG vaporized and dispersed. Tank S-103 was promptly
ssure that accompanied the increase in flow in the pipeline caused the outlet of the LNG plant to back up, lifting relief valves w
vate. The compressor stopped which caused pressure to rise in the LNG tank and natural gas vented through the associated rel
t, Oregon. The plant was operating in Liquefaction Mode and experienced an unplanned shutdown of its liquefaction process.
hind a blind flange on a plant natural gas handling system. There were no personnel in the immediate vicinity of the release and
n Portland. A semi-truck with a tanker full of fuel traveled off Highway 30 colliding with a rail car causing the fire immediately a
d onto the switchgear, and then to ground. This event had the potential to create a voltage differential between the switchgear
omizer filled with gas and ruptured resulting in damage to the top and side of the box. The leaking gas resulted in a low pressur
e datum cycle gas compressor.
mit Natural Gas of Missouri, Inc. ('SNGMO' or 'Summit'). The services that Prometheus provides to Summit include deploying a
r station. Information indicates the cause of the flash fire was a catastrophic failure of a fuel run regulator located on the vapori
mps. Two Vaporizers were running at the time, 50 MMscfd each, and shut down due to the loss of communication. It was found
 to the control board operator and an orderly shutdown of Train 5 was conducted via the normal Shut Down Process. Initially, t
f LNG Pump P-101C. While the pump was being removed from the tank column and traveling to its transportation frame, suppo
ing damage to adjacent buildings and equipment. Debris from the rupture penetrated the outer wall of one of two LNG storage
persed. Tank S-103 was promptly removed from operational LNG service. Third-party experts performed a Root Cause Failure A
to back up, lifting relief valves within the LNG plant. Timeline: 11:30 AM: Station valve reconfiguration begins in an attempt to
ented through the associated relief valve until the generator switched on and compressor returned to service.
own of its liquefaction process. On-site personnel responded appropriately and returned the plant to Hold Mode and verified s
ediate vicinity of the release and the system was shut down immediately by operations by utilizing and ESD (Emergency Shut Do
ar causing the fire immediately adjacent to the property. The vehicle fire disrupted the primary power to the facility which resu
rential between the switchgear enclosure and the live switchgear bus large enough to initiate a flashover between the switchge
ng gas resulted in a low pressure alarm on the CO2 purification tower. Operators arrived on site and activated the liquefaction e

to Summit include deploying a multi-trailer configuration consisting of trailer-mounted storage and vaporization, and providing
regulator located on the vaporizer trailer. The regulator failure caused multiple relief valves to exhaust gas to the atmosphere w
of communication. It was found that the outlets of the vaporizers going into pipeline were getting extremely cold. The ESD valv
 Shut Down Process. Initially, this event was considered to be a Safety-Related Condition (SRC) and timely reported to PHMSA
its transportation frame, supported by the LNG Tank Top Crane, O&M personnel noticed a small fire in the bottom suction notc
r wall of one of two LNG storage tanks. Natural Gas vented from the vapor space between the inner and outer walls of the stora
erformed a Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA) of the event. The RCFA determined that transient flow though the bottom fill con
guration begins in an attempt to mitigate the frost heaving 11:55 AM: Mahomet Line #2 pressure begins to increase due to va
ed to service.
ant to Hold Mode and verified safe conditions. There was a small cycling release of CO2 from a vessel through its relief valve fo
ng and ESD (Emergency Shut Down) button pull station. No injuries occurred. The in-plant alarm system functioned by soundin
power to the facility which resulted in the activation of the ESD at approximately 8:54am. NWN first responder arrived on site
flashover between the switchgear bus and enclosure.
and activated the liquefaction emergency shutdown. It should be noted a SRC Report was filed on 12-23-14 in lieu of an Incid

and vaporization, and providing NFPA-compliant equipment with power that is integrated to deliver automated operations and
exhaust gas to the atmosphere which was ignited by the water/glycol heater burners located on the vaporizer trailer. Two emplo
ng extremely cold. The ESD valves did not shut automatically which could have allowed LNG into the pipeline. The team then s
 and timely reported to PHMSA on November 30, 2018. After removal of perlite insulation from the coldbox, it was determined
l fire in the bottom suction notch of the pump. Immediately, EcoElectrica Maintenance Technicians proceeded to extinguish the
ner and outer walls of the storage tank but did not ignite. Station personnel immediately executed an ESD of the facility. Of 5
flow though the bottom fill connection caused LNG to enter the tank annular space (space between the inner tank wall and ou
sure begins to increase due to valves 354 and 471 being left open during the reconfiguration 11:59 AM: LNG Facility relief valv

vessel through its relief valve for a period of about 20 minutes. Further research over the next 24 hours confirmed the primary
m system functioned by sounding gas release and evacuation alarms and all personnel left the area and mustered in designated
WN first responder arrived on site at 10:12am and activated back up power. Minor damage was experienced at the control room

d on 12-23-14 in lieu of an Incident Report given the information and situation at that time. This Incident Report is being subm

liver automated operations and safety controls that includes methane and fire protection. The incident occurred on 1/11/201
the vaporizer trailer. Two employees were examined at a nearby hospital and released back to full duty. They both had sunburn
o the pipeline. The team then saw that the LNG Pumps did not shut off and were still running. The manual valves on the Vapor
m the coldbox, it was determined that a transition joint on a heat exchanger was the source of the leak and repair cost was estim
ans proceeded to extinguish the fire using portable ABC fire extinguishers located at the LNG Tank Top Platform. No personnel w
uted an ESD of the facility. Of 5 employees taken to the hospital for evaluation, 4 employees were treated and released and 1 e
ween the inner tank wall and outer tank shell) above the inner tank lip during filling of the inner tank, which resulted in a "temp
1:59 AM: LNG Facility relief valves begin to open 11:59 AM: LNG Facility Emergency Shut Down System activated 12:06 PM

24 hours confirmed the primary cause of the event as the failure of an Allen-Bradley PLC-5/40E processor board. This PLC was p
area and mustered in designated locations until the situation stabilized and the all-clear horn was sounded. The flange was inspe
experienced at the control room building due to the fire. None of the critical infrastructure or operational systems of the LNG p

s Incident Report is being submitted at this time in addition to the SCR Report based on the recommendation of our Idaho PUC

incident occurred on 1/11/2019 at facilities located in Lebanon, Missouri. Events and mechanisms giving rise to the release inc
ull duty. They both had sunburn like injuries. Northern had placed this temporary / portable LNG tanker and vaporizer tailer a
The manual valves on the Vaporizers were shut in to ensure no LNG would get into the pipeline. At 2250 the A and C LNG Pump
he leak and repair cost was estimated to likely exceed $50,000, therefore an NRC telephonic incident report was filed (NRC Repo
nk Top Platform. No personnel was injured or equipment damaged during the incident. At 15:37hrs (two minutes later), a LNG S
re treated and released and 1 employee was admitted for burn injuries and released several days later. A third party investiga
tank, which resulted in a "temperature excursion" as discussed below, and caused the release of LNG from Tank S-103 during t
wn System activated 12:06 PM: LNG ESD alarm cleared 12:25 PM: Plant manager notified of incident 12:45 PM: National R

processor board. This PLC was programmed as the control PLC for the plant liquefaction process. A replacement PLC was procu
s sounded. The flange was inspected and found to be in good order, the gasket was replaced and the system was put back into s
perational systems of the LNG plant was damaged. Portland General Electric repaired the primary power December 15, 2015

ommendation of our Idaho PUC regulator. Monthly reports are being submitted to Jerry Kenerson at jerry.kenerson@dot.gov p

ms giving rise to the release incident appear to be as follows. On 1/11/2019, at 10:00 am CST, an employee of the trucking com
NG tanker and vaporizer tailer at the Benson, Minnesota town border station as a contingency while work was being conducted
At 2250 the A and C LNG Pump Emergency-Stop buttons were pushed. The team proceeded to bypass fire and gas and start a
 dent report was filed (NRC Report # 1232687). The heat exchanger where the leak was identified was operating at normal flow
hrs (two minutes later), a LNG Sendout pump was returned to operation and at 15:41hrs LNG vaporization process was reestab
ys later. A third party investigation firm was contracted to document the incident location and manage all evidence. Various c
of LNG from Tank S-103 during the incident. A "temperature excursion" is defined as a time when one or more temperature sen
incident 12:45 PM: National Response Center notified and NRC report #1145755 generated 12:57 PM: Illinois Commerce C

s. A replacement PLC was procured and delivered to the plant on Wednesday November 7, 2012. The liquefaction PLC program
d the system was put back into service on the same day. Reports were filed or notifications were made with FERC, NRC, PHMSA
mary power December 15, 2015 at 1:00pm. NW Natural is reporting the incident due to LNG Emergency Shut Down.

on at jerry.kenerson@dot.gov providing updated information as a new Economizer is being built and installed.

an employee of the trucking company with which Prometheus contracts for delivery service, Texas Gas Transport ('TGT'), arrived
while work was being conducted upstream at the Alexandria, Minnesota compressor station. The tanker and vaporizer had been
o bypass fire and gas and start a blow down of the vaporizers, to minimize the risk of LNG getting into the carbon steel piping of
 d was operating at normal flows, temperatures, and pressures at the time of and prior to the discovery of the leak. A Root Ca
aporization process was reestablished and terminal recovered for normal operation. The root cause of the ignition was a stati
d manage all evidence. Various consultants were engaged in the completion of an incident investigation. The investigation dete
n one or more temperature sensors in the annular space of a tank (i.e., "leak detection" sensor) records a negative and continu
12:57 PM: Illinois Commerce Commission notified 1:43 PM: Estimated gas release calculated to be 325,200 SCF 3:10 PM:

2. The liquefaction PLC program was reloaded into the new processor and its functionality was verified that same day. The plan
e made with FERC, NRC, PHMSA, Brazoria County Community Awareness and Environmental Response and the City of Quintana
mergency Shut Down.

t and installed.

as Gas Transport ('TGT'), arrived at the site to refill a storage trailer ('ACT1'). Prior to beginning the transfer of LNG through ACT1
e tanker and vaporizer had been connected to the Benson town border station since 12/27/2013 but wasn't in-service until the
g into the carbon steel piping of pipeline. The fire and gas is bypassed to prevent an unexpected ESD. While the vaporizers were
scovery of the leak. A Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA) conducted by Bechtel and their equipment supplier is in progress to
cause of the ignition was a static electricity discharge. After a Nitrogen purge of more than 12 hours, the pump was ready to be
tigation. The investigation determined the leading cause was the presence of a fuel/air mixture remaining in the system follow
) records a negative and continued deviation relative to the normal trending with ambient temperature and the sensor's immed
d to be 325,200 SCF 3:10 PM: Shift Operator and Assistant Shift Operator sent for post-incident drug and alcohol testing 3:20

verified that same day. The plant was declared back in service by noon Wednesday November 7, 2012.
sponse and the City of Quintana.

he transfer of LNG through ACT1 top-fill valve using the pressure-transfer method, the TGT employee failed to examine the othe
3 but wasn't in-service until the morning of 12/31/2013. The water bath heaters on the vaporizer trailer were lit but LNG was no
d ESD. While the vaporizers were blowing down a pilot relief valve blew inside the vaporizer building. The pilot relief is very nea
pment supplier is in progress to identify failure mechanisms and confirm corrective actions. Additional information will be subm
ours, the pump was ready to be removed from its well. Due to strong gust of winds, prior to lifting the pump, a polypropylene
e remaining in the system following maintenance activities. The fuel/air mix then auto-ignited within the system piping upon sta
erature and the sensor's immediately previous readings. The Direct Cause of temperature excursions, including the Tank S-103
t drug and alcohol testing 3:20 PM: Randy Stewart with ICC arrived at Manlove Field for investigation PGL considers this in

loyee failed to examine the other valve positions, and consequently he failed to place them into the proper, closed position. As
er trailer were lit but LNG was not being delivered. On 12/31/2013, the pipeline gas pressure was low enough to test the LNG de
ding. The pilot relief is very near a gas detector head. The team member in the control room announced over radio that everyo
ditional information will be submitted when the RCFA is complete.
ng the pump, a polypropylene rope was tied to one of the stands of the bottom suction notch as an aid to control pump movem
thin the system piping upon startup when the flammable mixture entered the inlet of a salt bath heater.
rsions, including the Tank S-103 leak on January 22, 2018, was a transient operational condition that caused a sudden increased
tigation PGL considers this incident closed, but will report quarterly on it until all the ICC and PHMSA questions have been an

the proper, closed position. As LNG began to enter ACT1 the pressure-building coil began to vaporize LNG. As the LNG was bei
s low enough to test the LNG delivery. The delivery was just beginning to come on when the regulator failed and the flash fire o
nounced over radio that everyone needed to get in the control room. The ESD button was then manually pushed at 2339. Aft
as an aid to control pump movements while being transferred from the well to the transportation frame. During this maneuver

that caused a sudden increased LNG flow through the Bottom Fill. This transient condition preceded all temperature excursion
PHMSA questions have been answered.

porize LNG. As the LNG was being filled through the top of the tank, the pressure increase inside the trailer was minimal, and t
gulator failed and the flash fire occurred. The town of Benson, Minnesota was never in danger of losing natural gas service.
manually pushed at 2339. After the vaporizers were blown down, the PLC cabinet was opened and the Ethernet Switch (NNG
n frame. During this maneuver the technician attending the pump was using skin gloves while the propylene rope was being co

ceded all temperature excursions, in which a sudden and large influx of LNG and/or two-phase flow was directed from the 36-in

e the trailer was minimal, and the TGT employee failed to observe the increasing pressure in ACT1. The TGT employee complete
f losing natural gas service.
d and the Ethernet Switch (NNG-GARN-CTRLS-SW-G) was found to be covered in water. Most likely from the humidity in the va
he propylene rope was being controlled with his hands creating friction between the two materials. The gloves' material (leathe

ow was directed from the 36-inch diameter Bottom Fill piping and into the 56-inch diameter funnel of the Bottom Fill downcom

T1. The TGT employee completed the LNG transfer and left the site at 11:00 am CST. After the fuel transfer was complete and th

kely from the humidity in the vaporizer building. The unit did not appear to be powered up. After sometime of attempting to ge
ials. The gloves' material (leather) in contact with the rope (Polypropylene) gave rise to accumulations of electric charge that wa

nnel of the Bottom Fill downcomer. This transient flow would likely overwhelm the funnel, resulting in overflow/ejection of LNG

uel transfer was complete and the TGT employee had left the site, the pressure in ACT1 reached the relief pressure of 70 psig. T

er sometime of attempting to get corporate on the phone through the company's conference bridge another employee arrived
ations of electric charge that was released suddenly in electrostatic discharges with sufficient energy to ignite the flammable ga

ting in overflow/ejection of LNG/two-phase material from out of the top of the funnel. Due to the funnel design characteristics

the relief pressure of 70 psig. The ACT1 pressure-building coil continued to receive LNG after the pressure relief valves ('PRVs')

idge another employee arrived on site to investigate the switch. That employee found that the switch now had a couple lights i
nergy to ignite the flammable gas mix present at the pump notch. The first step on the ignition is the production of a spark that

he funnel design characteristics and proximity to the tank inner wall (5-feet 2-inches away), some of this overflow or "splashing

he pressure relief valves ('PRVs') began to vent gas, overwhelming the pressure-building coil. As a result, liquid and gas began fee

switch now had a couple lights illuminated. He proceeded to remove power and power back up the switch. It then began to fun
 s the production of a spark that instantly generates IR light (Corona effect) that was captured by the flame detector which trigge

me of this overflow or "splashing" LNG/two-phase material was directed towards a gap between the top of the tank inner wall an

a result, liquid and gas began feeding to the open PRV circuit. Methane Detector 6 ("MD-6"), located on an adjacent storage trai

p the switch. It then began to function normally. Inspectors from the Iowa Utilities Board visited the plant on September 7, 2018
the flame detector which triggered the ESD #1.

the top of the tank inner wall and below the suspended deck, thus allowing LNG through the gap and into the tank annular spa

ated on an adjacent storage trailer, detected increased atmospheric methane concentrations, and triggered an automatic shutd

the plant on September 7, 2018 to examine the vaporizers and communications enclosure.