East Asia

https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-018-9290-9

Asia’s Security Triangles: Maritime Minilateralism

in the Indo-Pacific

Troy Lee-Brown 1

Received: 24 January 2018 / Accepted: 8 May 2018

# Springer Science+Business Media B.V., part of Springer Nature 2018

Abstract Since the early years of the twenty-first century, a number of key regional
governments have consciously chosen to alter the way they talk about the region, and
have now largely shifted from using the ‘Asia-Pacific’ to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct.
But after three decades of utilising the ‘Asia-Pacific’ concept, why has this been the case
and how might this shift in geographical conceptualisation alter the strategic framework
of the region? This paper argues that the ‘Indo-Pacific’ is a regional reconceptualisation
utilised by Japan, Australia, India and the USA to address deficiencies in Asia’s
maritime security and institutional architecture, which are being simultaneously influ-
enced by a more assertive Chinese posture and waning U.S. influence. Additionally, the
Indo-Pacific concept has developed in tandem with a transformation in the regional
security architecture. The utilisation of maritime minilateralism between Japan, India,
Australia and the USA supplements Asia’s bilateral American alliances, with an array of
trilateral security dialogues or ‘security triangles’. The Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific shift
is really an instance of an emerging minilateral security regionalism, rather than the
predominant forms of bilateral and multilateral security and economic regionalism that
have dominated Asia in recent decades.

Keywords Indo-Pacific . Regionalism . Minilateralism . Security architecture .

Maritime Asia

BThe world’s center of gravity is shifting to the heart of the Indo-Pacific. The U.S.
and India – with our shared goals of peace, security, freedom of navigation, and a
free and open architecture – must serve as the eastern and western beacons of the
Indo-Pacific. As the port and starboard lights between which the region can reach
its greatest and best potential.^

* Troy Lee-Brown
argo99@iinet.net.au

1
School of Social Sciences, University of Western Australia, Crawley, WA, Australia
 East Asia

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, ‘Remarks on Defining Our Relationship with
India for the Next Century’. October 18, 2017. CSIS, Washington D.C. [52]

Introduction

The ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct looks to have ceased its period of emergence and has now
come to the fore, as the predominant regional descriptor for the four main advocates of
the concept. For Japan, Australia, India and now the USA, it is rapidly replacing the
term ‘Asia-Pacific’, which has served as the regional name of choice since the late
1980s. In his October 2017 speech in Washington, U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson
explicitly utilised the construct to outline the United States’ Asia strategy, perhaps more
so than any previous high level U.S. official before him [52]. However, in conjunction
with Tillerson’s ‘eastern and western beacons’ that signify India and the USA, the
regional concept has also gradually been evolving in Japan and Australia too. The
northern beacon Japan has been at the forefront of establishing the construct since the
mid-2000s, and the southern beacon Australia was the first country to officially utilise
the terminology in its 2013 Defence White Paper [5, 20]. In line with Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2012 ‘Democratic Security Diamond’, these four democracies
have been the leading advocates in the establishment of an Indo-Pacific region [3]. But
why have these four key regional governments consciously chosen to alter the way they
talk about the region and shifted from using concepts such as the ‘Asia-Pacific’ to the
‘Indo-Pacific’? And after three decades of utilising the ‘Asia-Pacific’, how might this
shift in geographical conceptualisation alter the strategic framework of the region?
This paper is primarily concerned with security regionalism and the self-conscious
attempt to create politically defined and organised regions, whereby institutions are a
key manifestation of this goal. Therefore, it will initially focus on the politically
deliberate creation of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct, before analysing the corresponding
materialisation of its associated, minilateral-based institutions. In particular, the emer-
gence of a series of trilateral security dialogues or ‘security triangles’, which are being
institutionalised by its four predominant advocates and give the construct a specific
shape, purpose and direction. The ‘Indo-Pacific’ is a regional reconceptualisation
utilised by Japan, Australia, India and the USA to address deficiencies in Asia’s
maritime security and institutional architecture, which are being simultaneously influ-
enced by a more assertive Chinese posture and waning US influence. Strategically, the
four main advocates of the construct are building an emerging minilateral architecture
around the Indo-Pacific conceptualisation, which supplements Asia’s bilateral Ameri-
can alliances with an array of trilateral security dialogues or ‘security triangles’. In a
tangible sense, it maintains that the Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific shift is really an
instance of an emerging minilateral security regionalism, rather than the predominant
forms of bilateral and multilateral security and economic regionalism that have dom-
inated Asia in recent decades.
This paper will first look at the reconceptualisation of the region by unpacking the
genesis of the Indo-Pacific concept and also briefly review some of the predominant
conceptualisations of the construct in the associated literature. It will then seek to build
a viable analytical framework via a discussion of the concept of ‘minilateralism’ and
‘three-tier approach’, before more specifically unpacking the recent utilisation of
East Asia

‘trilateralisation’ and ‘security triangles’. It will finally apply this framework to help
understand nascent forms of regional minilateralism, which have formed in tandem
with the Indo-Pacific concept and in particular, the emergence of three security-based
trilateral dialogues between the key advocates of the construct.

Rethinking the Region: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific

As witnessed in the 1980s and throughout the latter gestation period of APEC, the
terms ‘East Asia’ and the ‘Asia-Pacific’ invoke very different regional concepts. How a
region is defined is inseparable from notions of power and it essentially decides who is
included and who is excluded, as well as where the key hubs of regional power reside.
In a political sense, the ‘Asia-Pacific’ concept heralds from the 1960s when it was
promoted by Japan, Australia and later the USA as a way of linking interests in East
Asia with the broader Pacific region [23, 48]. Therefore, the terms ‘East Asia’ and
‘Asia-Pacific’ held very different meanings for the region’s states, and each term will be
instructive in the way divergent nations tend to strategically and economically approach
the region. Early in this century, Buzan and Waever foresaw an ‘Asian Regional Super
Complex’ forming, where broad yet common regional security externalities were
beginning to entangle South, Southeast and East Asian interests [14]. In a sense, the
‘Indo-Pacific’ is a reconceptualisation of the Asian region, whereby it expands the
strategic system by stretching it across two oceans from the Western Pacific to the
Indian Ocean [37]. For many, the core of the Indo-Pacific concept is the need for some
of the region’s states to successfully navigate the dynamic changes, which were
increasingly occurring in Asia’s balance of power since the early part of the century.
Although Australia, India and the USA have also embraced the construct, Japan and
its Prime Minister Shinzo Abe have played a significant role in the reconceptualisation
of the region as the Indo-Pacific. In addition to perceived limitations in the Asia-
Pacific’s bilateral and multilateral security framework, other unique factors have also
led Japan to attempt to reformulate its security sphere. Japan’s precarious strategic
environment, dependence on energy imports, antagonistic history with China and its
‘abnormal’ security dependency on the USA, have all caused Japan to seek out a like-
minded regional power in India as a form of security hedge [25]. It was Japanese and
Indian rapprochement beginning in the early 2000s, which became the catalyst for the
birth of the nascent Indo-Pacific concept. Whilst amicability between the two states has
existed since Indian independence, the Japanese-Indian strategic relationship has only
recently blossomed since the turn of the century. Shinzo Abe wrote in his 2006 book
Towards a Beautiful Country that Bit would not be a surprise if in another 10 years,
Japan–India relations overtake Japan–US and Japan–China ties^ [1]. It was Japanese
rapprochement with India, which became a core facilitator in Japan’s reorientation of
the region as the strategic conflux of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Beginning in the mid 2000s, there was a sequence of interrelated government
announcements most notably from Japan, which begun promulgating the Indo-
Pacific as a distinct strategic domain. Although other key states such as India, Australia
and the USA were also crucial in constructing the new regional concept, it was
Japanese Prime Minister Abe who came to power on September 26, 2006, which
really drove its early development. Japan’s vision was twofold; it was based on
 East Asia

geographically conceptualising a new regional strategic ‘arc’ but also crucially, it

outlined the characteristics of the future membership of its institutions via a focus on
shared values and interests. In 2006, Japanese Foreign Minister Aso enshrined BJapan’s
enthusiasm for building an ‘arc of freedom and prosperity’ around the outer rim of the
Eurasian continent through diplomacy that emphasizes values… of freedom, democ-
racy, and respect for human rights and the rule of law^ [5]. For Japan, it wasn’t just
about conceptualising a ‘new arc’ as a strategic sphere, it was also about cementing the
core relationships between Japan and its key security partners and allies based on
common interests and values.
Simultaneously in 2006–07, there were also a series of important establishments and
notable upgrades in the security relationships between Japan and each of India,
Australia and the USA. In March 2006, the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD)
between Japan, Australia and the USA was upgraded to the ministerial level when
Condoleezza Rice and Taro Aso joined Alexander Downer in Sydney for the inaugural
dialogue [53]. In December 2006, Indian Prime Minister Singh visited Shinzo Abe in
Japan and in a joint statement titled ‘Towards Japan-India Strategic and Global
Partnership’, they decided to Breinforce the strategic orientation of the partnership^
[32]. In March 2007, Abe visited Australian Prime Minister John Howard, where they
signed a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) signalling Bstronger bilat-
eral collaboration in intelligence-sharing, force interoperability and joint planning for a
variety of transnational security contingencies^ [53]. Soon after in April 2007, these
new measures began to demonstrably play out when the inaugural trilateral naval
exercises were held in the Western Pacific between India, Japan and the USA. These
nascent naval exercises would prove to be indicative of even greater things to come
later that year in the Indian Ocean.
In August 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Abe addressed the Indian parliament in his
now famous ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ speech, where he said that Bby Japan and
India coming together in this way, this ‘broader Asia’ will evolve into an immense
network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the U.S. and
Australia^ [2]. At the same time, the India-USA annual joint-naval exercise Malabar
was radically expanded into a broad-based multilateral exercise held in the Bay of
Bengal and now also involving Japan, Australia and Singapore. These strategic and
military developments were viewed in some quarters as being a nascent security
alliance between India, Australia, Japan and the USA and aimed directly at balancing
a rising China [12]. Under immense pressure from China and due to the individual
strategic reasoning of the participant states, particularly Australia and India, the Quad-
rilateral initiative lapsed over the course of latter 2007 and early 2008 [51]. Following
the withdrawal of India and Australia, the USA also downplayed the significance of the
initiative and its original architect, Shinzo Abe, who left office due to illness on
September 26, 2007 [18]. The end of Abe’s short reign as Japanese Prime Minister
was to mark the beginning of a period of relative inactivity regarding the Indo-Pacific
construct and less dynamic strategic developments between Japan, India, Australia and
the USA.
After exactly 5 years, Abe again assumed the office of Prime Minister of Japan on
September 26, 2012 and immediately began reinvigorating the geographical concept. In
a piece titled ‘Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond’, Abe Benvisage[d] a strategy
whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the USA state of Hawaii form a diamond to
East Asia

safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the
western Pacific^ [3]. The rehashing of Abe’s ‘confluence of two seas’ as a ‘democratic
security diamond’, again highlighted the shared values and interests of key security
partners and orchestrated how such a concept might tangibly play out in a strategic
sense. To be sure, the USA, Australia and India also warrant mention in this context
because they also hold similar assumptions that underpin the Indo-Pacific concept. The
USA has increasingly embraced the terminology since former Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton first utilised the expanded formulation of ‘Indo-Asia-Pacific’ when referring to
the region [19]. For Australian defence and foreign affairs officials, the recent adoption
of the Indo-Pacific concept expands Australia’s strategic scope to its periphery and
reinforces its claim as an Indian Ocean state [20, 21]. Following on from proceeding
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Narendra Modi is also a champion for the
concept and argued that ‘a strong India-US partnership can anchor peace, prosperity
and stability from Asia to Africa and from Indian Ocean to the Pacific’ [40]. The
geographical concept has now gathered momentum in the official language of these
four regional states, but what does the construct imply analytically?
There now exist many differing conceptions about what the Indo-Pacific represents
and how it is tangibly materialising. Following on from Phillips’ typology, which
loosely categorises the divergent approaches to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct, we can
prioritise four main understandings of the concept [46]. To begin, there are those who
argue that the connection between the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean is still too
tenuous to justify a reinterpretation of the region’s strategic environment. This is based
primarily on the concept covering an unworkable geographical expanse [55], South
Asia and East Asia remaining two distinct strategic systems [46, 54], and not enough
attention being paid to continental Asia and Chinese activity in that area [11]. Next,
there is a functionalist approach that places a priority on pursuing cooperation in
maintaining the integrity of maritime sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and
encouraging greater economic connectivity between East Asia and the Indian Ocean
[33]. A third viewpoint sees the Indo-Pacific in pure balance of power terms and
interprets the concept in light of increasing strategic competition between a rising China
with the USA and some of its allies [7, 45]. Finally, the Indo-Pacific is viewed as a
concert of power system, where there is greater scope for interdependence between the
three great regional powers of China, India and the USA [37]. For those analysts that
concur with the growing validity of the Indo-Pacific, the balance of power understand-
ing of the geographical concept remains prominent in the literature.
This article now seeks to form an understanding of how the Indo-Pacific construct
might be tangibly materialising in the region. It will endeavour to add to the existing
literature on the Indo-Pacific, by assessing how the construct is connected to some of
the nascent security architecture, which has formed since the concept began to take
shape more than a decade ago. As Wilson (this issue) makes clear, in a multilateral
sense, the Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific turn implies an economic to security shift in the
region. Whereby its proponents seek to form a type of informal security alliance, which
aims to curb growing Chinese assertiveness, particularly in the maritime realm. This
paper seeks to extend that argument by implying that the Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific
shift is also an instance of minilateral security regionalism, rather than the predominant
forms of bilateral security and multilateral security and economic regionalism, which
have dominated Asia in recent decades. Therefore, two questions arise: how is the Indo-
 East Asia

Pacific construct taking shape in terms of the evolving security architecture in the
region? And what does a minilateral regional architecture look like, in terms of
maritime security cooperation between the proponents of the Indo-Pacific construct?

Asia’s Maritime Minilateralism and Emerging Security Triangles

The rise of China coupled with unpredictability regarding the ongoing U.S. commit-
ment to Asia, has led some regional states to question the ongoing viability of the
existing security architecture. Whilst the term ‘architecture’ is often used to describe the
machinations of a regional security system, its meaning is often difficult to assess due
to vague definitions and the assumption that it is a self-evident term [30]. The term
‘architecture’ refers to a group of institutions and mechanisms that help provide the
necessary means for cooperation. Regional architecture can be thought of as a coherent
web of actors brought together in bilateral and multilateral engagements via institutions
and organisations that collectively seek prosperity and security [10]. To be sure in terms
of security, the so-called ‘San Francisco system’ has served Asia reasonably well since
the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference [17]. Unlike Europe’s multilateral security
community NATO, the USA determined that Asia’s security was to be obtained via
bilateral relationships between some key Asian states on the rim, but built around an
undeniably American core. In more recent times, US allies such as Japan and Australia
have begun to strategize a model of broader regional alignment and to lessen a narrow,
overreliance on the hub and spoke system [53]. Over the previous decade, Australia and
Japan have entered into trilateral engagements with long-term allies, but also added
new partners like India and forged a whole raft of new strategic partnerships with
likeminded regional states [35, 43].
At this juncture, a key question presents, as to why would minilateralism be more
efficacious than multilateralism in navigating growing security limitations in the
region? If multilateral institutions are broadly viewed as forming around notions of
identity [4], interests [31] and power [36], then Indo-Pacific minilateralism can con-
ceivably be interpreted as based on a shared identity (Abe’s democratic security
diamond), common interests (maritime security) and power (secondary powers India
and Japan attempting to check rising Chinese power). In any of these contexts,
minilateralism can be assessed firstly, through the size of its membership as the efficient
solution to collective action problems, but also in terms of select members coalescing
around narrowly defined common interests and identity. In the first instance, it can be
seen as a targeted ‘magic number’ approach that contends that the least number of
actors, can have the greatest impact on problem solving in a group dynamic [44]. In the
second instance, minilateralism is essentially viewed as multilateralism; however, it is
carried out by a group of actors that deliberately limit the membership, via the
nomination of the approved collective activity or identity. Attina contends that Bin
cases in which multilateral solutions fail to be applied to common problems because
agreement among the system members has been unachievable, minilateralism is ap-
praised by its supporters as the only useful and efficient instrument available to forward
multilateral goals^ [6]. In essence, minilateralism can overcome barriers to solving
collective action problems by insisting on a fewer number of actors, but also impor-
tantly, via a narrower convergence of political interests and identity.
East Asia

The use of minilateralism can also successfully compliment the established regional
architecture of intertwined bilateralism and multilateralism. In seeking to address
deficiencies in Asia-Pacific politics, Sahashi has developed a ‘three-tier approach’ that
seeks to resolve limitations apparent in bilateral strategic interactions (1st tier) and
weaknesses inherent in regional multilateralism (3rd tier) [50]. He does this via the
introduction of a second tier that consists of needs-based, practical security arrange-
ments. Following this model, the US bilateral alliance system is developed into a more
complex, ad-hoc web of minilateral networks, which can effectively collaborate in
response to a particular issue area and to gap-fill inadequacies in regional security
cooperation. Instructively, the second tier works through two cooperative processes;
first by networking relevant capabilities specific to a certain issue, and secondly, by
establishing the security dialogues required to successfully orchestrate the combined
capabilities to the policy initiative [50]. For some, the regional response to the 2004
Asian Tsunami served as the blueprint for this new form of issue-based minilateralism.
In practical terms, Grossman argues that the 2004 Tsunami Core Group was an ‘ad hoc
coalition that ignored traditional groupings…. [and which] pulled [Australia, India,
Japan and the US] together simply because they were the ones with the resources and
the desire to act effectively and quickly’ [27]. As will soon be apparent, this combina-
tion of security dialogues coupled with issue specific capability networking, is remi-
niscent of recent trilateral endeavours in the Indo-Pacific.
In 2016 at the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore, U.S. Secretary of Defence Ashton
Carter outlined the ‘Principled Security Network’, which would allow the USA to
better manage regional challenges. Carter pinpointed the need to deepen and develop
‘spoke to spoke’ relationships, so that they would give an extra layer to the US hub and
spoke, alliance system [16]. Additionally, he discussed the importance of
‘trilateralisation’ between allies such as Australia and Japan, but also with new security
partners, such as India. Whilst the US-Japan-India trilateral currently has a relatively
low profile, there is a growing belief in the USA that India is the pivotal component in
its principled security network approach [38]. In the context of this nascent trilateral
dialogue, minilateralism is less cumbersome than multilateral groupings and is becom-
ing the preferred way for the USA to build consensus with partners and allies [49].
With regard to external balancing, Green argues that the Btrilateralization of alliances or
strategic partnerships helps to enhance the weaker legs of the triangle, particularly
between Japan and Australia or Japan and India, where the United States’ role is often
as matchmaker between two natural allies that are yet to form close strategic ties^ [26].
In response to changes in the regional balance of power, maritime issues and ineffective
multilateralism, Indo-Pacific trilateral security dialogues offer an efficient, needs-based
mechanism that broadens the security architecture and is built around shared values and
converging interests.
For some regional states that cannot pursue their security interests via the existing
bilateral and multilateral institutions, trilateral security dialogues provide a forum for
problem-solving, hedging and norm building. In ‘Strategic Asian Triangles’ Michael
Green has specifically analysed why trilateralism makes strategic sense in contempo-
rary Asia [26]. To begin, some Asian states are cognisant of the deficiencies in the
region’s multilateral institutions, in terms of efficacy and consensus on a mandate. They
also concede the disparate notions that exist, regarding a suitable multilateral frame-
work for the region. Additionally, trilateralism is driven by deficiencies in the USA
 East Asia

system of bilateral alliances in the region, but importantly trilaterals are still viewed as
being compatible with existing or future multilateral institutions. Finally, for some of
the larger powers undergoing increased strategic competition, regional trilateralism
produces greater confidence by enhancing their strategic ties and standing. However,
this is not at the expense of the security and economic relationships with other
neighbouring states. Green essentially argues that Asian-based Btrilateralism is produc-
ing greater security and stability than mistrust and competition^ [26]. Functioning
within the prevailing architecture of bilateral partnerships and multilateral institutions,
strategic security triangles can produce a moderate type of hedging, which lessen the
security dilemma and can increase the efficacy of multilateral institutions.

Security Triangles in the Indo-Pacific

The recent materialisation of trilateral dialogues between Japan, Australia, India and the
USA have occurred over a similar timeframe, as the emergence of the Indo-Pacific
concept. So, why have these trilateral dialogues emerged over the previous decade?
One line of thinking is that the core reasoning behind the recent promotion of trilateral
dialogues in the Indo-Pacific, is the need to reinforce the established U.S. alliance
system in the wake of a more assertive China, particularly with close allies Japan and
Australia. In addition, trilateralism allows greater and more rapid strategic convergence
with India and the aforementioned Indo-Pacific states. Satoru Nagao views these
overlapping trilaterals between Japan, Australia, India and the USA as an emerging
form of ‘mini-multilateralism’ and as a ‘new alliance system’ for the region [43]. In
order to fully grasp the following empirical case studies, a brief recount of the
proceeding analytical framework is warranted. In viewing the efficacy of the following
three trilateral dialogues, firstly, the Indo-Pacific construct represents needs-based,
practical endeavours focused on shared values and common interests. At a practical
level, trilateral cooperation promotes greater intelligence sharing, interoperability and
expands joint military exercises between the four states from the bilateral to the
minilateral level. The concept of minilateralism introduces ‘magic number’ problem
solving, but also importantly allows a narrower convergence of political interests and
common identity by member states. In addition, Sahashi’s ‘three-tier’ approach takes
this analysis a step further, by highlighting how minilateralism represents an effective
gap-filling exercise, in plugging inadequacies that exist between bilateral and multilat-
eral institutions. Green’s ‘security triangles’ analysis contributes the notion that
trilateralism not only fills the gap but does so in an efficacious manner, which builds
the confidence of members but not at the expense of non-member states, lessening the
security dilemma.

United States-Japan-Australia: Long-Term Allies and the Trilateral Strategic

Dialogue

The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) is a series of high-level ministerial meetings

between the USA, Japan and Australia. Although it began at a senior level in 2002, the
grouping gathered real momentum following the 2005 decision to upgrade the TSD to
the ministerial level. In the main, the USA wanted greater involvement from its regional
East Asia

allies to help fight the ‘war on terror’ and stem nuclear proliferation, and in return,
Australia and Japan viewed the TSD as a way of further ensuring continued US
strategic involvement in the region [53]. However, the TSD was also a way for Japan
and Australia to broaden the regional architecture based on common interests. Tow
argues that Bthese measures were strengthened at the same time as both Australia and
Japan were moving to coordinate closer security ties with the United States as ‘more
equal’ allies rather than as mere ‘spokes’ taking orders from an American ‘hub’^ [53].
The TSD was a mechanism that forged closer strategic ties between Australia and
Japan, but importantly it also served as a blueprint for a further spoke to spoke
relationships as part of the regional architecture [42]. Evidently in March 2007, Prime
Minister Howard and Prime Minister Abe signed a Joint Declaration on Security
Cooperation that heralded heightened collaboration in intelligence-sharing and force
interoperability, and in December 2008, they reaffirmed an Action Plan to further
upgrade intelligence sharing and expand joint military exercises [53].
Over the past decade, the US-Japan-Australia trilateral dialogue has witnessed closer
coordination in the policy realm, but also greater levels of functional cooperation in the
Indo-Pacific. In July 2016, Foreign Ministers Fumio Kishida and Julie Bishop and
Secretary of State John Kerry met in Laos for the sixth ministerial meeting of the TSD,
where they welcomed the growing impact of the trilateral strategic partnership [9]. The
three ministers underlined the importance of the rules-based maritime order in the
Indian Ocean and the Asia-Pacific. They also reiterated the importance of the TSD in
developing closer policy coordination, but also underlined the necessity of deepening
levels of practical cooperation to help ensure a prosperous, stable and peaceful future
for the region. In a practical sense, it demonstrably plays out with the expansion of
USA-Japan Exercise Cope North in 2012 to include Australia and South Korea, and
also broadening the US-Australian exercise Talisman Sabre in 2015 to include Japan
and New Zealand. In Singapore in 2015, the TSD underlined the ‘value of multilateral
cooperation in response to regional contingency… [and] confirmed that the three
countries are to continue to enhance practical trilateral defense cooperation’ [8]. The
TSD is continuing to develop into an efficacious form of minilateralism, which
adequately addresses common concerns regarding maritime issues in both the policy
and practical spheres.

USA-Japan-India: Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean

The second Indo-Pacific trilateral dialogue to develop was the US-Japan-India group-
ing. In December 2011, the three states held their first official trilateral meeting at the
U.S. State Department, in what has eventually become an increasingly robust trilateral
dialogue [49]. In September 2015, the trilateral was upgraded from the official to the
political, when John Kerry hosted the inaugural US-Japan-India Trilateral Ministerial
dialogue. The meeting highlighted the growing convergence of their interests in the
Indo-Pacific and also underscored the importance of international law, peaceful settle-
ment of disputes, freedom of navigation and unimpeded lawful commerce in the region
[22]. Whilst this trilateral has encouraged greater strategic convergence between the
three maritime states, the role of the Japanese as a trusted partner of both India and the
USA, has also generated closer bilateral strategic partnerships. Increased cooperation
with Japan has now become a vital component in the rapidly evolving India-US
 East Asia

bilateral relationship [24]. Greater levels of strategic convergence, both minilaterally

and bilaterally between the three states, have transformed the extent of their military
enmeshment in the Indo-Pacific.
The US-Japan-India trilateral dialogue has seen a significant increase in strategic
policy coordination, but it has also witnessed greater levels of practical trilateral
cooperation. By enhancing the political aspect of the trilateral, the practical relationship
was also given a boost in 2015, with India’s agreeance that Japan should be included as
a permanent participant in the annual Malabar naval exercises [47]. The Indian decision
to allow Japan into Malabar, significantly enhances India’s leadership role in the region
and assists in the evolution of the trilateral relationship [38]. If the Indo-Pacific is
conceived as a strategic arc that connects the Pacific and Indian Oceans, then the
practical use of maritime-based trilaterals can only assist in addressing issues of
common interest. Miller argues that the US-Japan-India trilateral can be used as a
regional bulwark that thwarts China’s ambitions to control the maritime domain in East
Asia and the Indian Ocean, with the grouping being Bsignificant because it helps to
connect US alliances and partnerships in East Asia with a South Asian anchor in India^
[38]. In this context, minilateralism not only broadens the architecture by allowing
Indo-Pacific states to effectively hedge and also allow the USA to burden share, but it
also stretches the effectiveness of Sino naval capacity. Patrick Cronin contends that the
trilateral forms part of the US goal of increased burden sharing by bringing BIndia into
East Asia and Japan into the Indian Ocean and it does that at a very low cost to the
United States^ [quoted in 49].

India-Japan-Australia: An Evolution in Indo-Pacific Trilateralism

The most recent and perhaps most important evolution in Indo-Pacific trilateralism, is
the Australia-Japan-India grouping, which strikingly does not include the USA [43].
Strategic cooperation between India, Japan and Australia goes back to the 2007 Quad-
rilateral Security Dialogue, but after considerable protest from Beijing, the grouping was
indefinitely shelved. In June 2015, high level foreign affairs officials from the three
countries held the initial trilateral dialogue in New Delhi. The 2015 meeting focused on
common concerns about regional maritime security, including freedom of navigation in
the South China Sea and China’s island building, but also activity in the Indian Ocean
and discussed the possibility of future joint exercises [29]. Evidently, the focus was
predominantly on China, whereby Australian official Peter Varghese claimed that ‘it’s
the pace and the scale of China’s reclamation which is causing some anxiety in the
region’ [quoted in [28]]. At this early juncture, the India-Japan-Australia trilateral is still
intended to support the US presence in the Indo-Pacific and to reinforce the ongoing
validity of the established, rules-based regional order. But with time, the grouping could
become an important piece in the emerging Indo-Pacific architecture. Lang argues that
Bwhile the three nations already have many good reasons to cooperate, a coalition of
like-minded Asia-Pacific maritime democracies would also act as a balance against
China, further complicate China’s strategic calculus and encourage Beijing to engage as
a responsible stakeholder in the stable and open regional order’ [35].
In April 2017, the third India-Japan-Australia Trilateral Dialogue Senior Officials
Meeting was held in Canberra. The meeting was still convened at the vice-ministerial
level and discussed a wide range of issues, including regional affairs in the Indo-Pacific
East Asia

and future trilateral cooperation [39]. Whilst encouraging thus far, there are many
voices in New Delhi, Tokyo and Canberra’s foreign policy communities, who think
this trilateral can go much further and serve as an example to other regional states. For
some, the India-Japan-Australia trilateral can serve as a prototype for the emerging
Indo-Pacific architecture of informal, self-selecting middle power coalitions,
cooperating on strategic issues and that do not include the USA or China [41]. Whilst
interests align in the India-Japan-Australia grouping, there has been a relative lack of
action on the practical level in comparison to the other trilateral initiatives. Lang argues
that ‘military-to-military contacts are a practical and tangible trilateral pursuit [and]
given their strategic maritime locations across the Asia– Pacific, cooperation between
Australia, Japan and India should focus on exercises at sea between the RAN, the Japan
Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Indian Navy (IN)’ [34]. The 2017
Malabar Exercises may well have been a good place to forge this nascent naval
cooperation, although Australia was not invited to participate, and this military-to-
military component between the three states should be pursued at the earliest possible
opportunity.
In addition, the only trilateral that has not developed between the four core Indo-
Pacific states is a possible US-India-Australia grouping, and at this stage, it has not
been seriously proposed. Since 2000, the relationships between India with both the
USA and Australia have largely developed in tandem with one another, but in
practicality the development is occurring in separate silos. As exemplified by the role
of Japan in forging a closer US-Indian partnership, trilateral cooperation with the USA
can also help further establish India and Australia as regional security partners, driven
by common identity and interests. In a tangible sense, Indian Ocean facility sharing
arrangements could see India have access to facilities on the Cocos Islands and
Australia to Indian facilities in the Andaman Islands, with both countries now sharing
new US designed anti-submarine warfare platforms such as the Boeing P-8 maritime
aircraft [13]. Following on from Mohan and Medcalf’s thinking, another step would be
to begin developing these trilateral mechanisms that also incorporate other Indo-Pacific
states [41]. An India-Indonesia-Australia trilateral under the auspices of the Indian
Ocean Rim Association, or even informally with a remit of non-traditional issues, could
also be a future enterprising regional minilateral initiative.

Conclusion

The ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct is still best conceived as a reconceptualisation of the

region by Japan, Australia, India and the USA in order to address apparent deficiencies
in Asia’s maritime security. In a region experiencing a transition in great power
relations, combined with significant maritime territorial disputes and the inability of
multilateral institutions to solve them, regional states will continue to seek an alterna-
tive way forward. In order to successfully navigate these issues, Japan has led the push
to construct a broader Indo-Pacific strategic system, which hedges against an overre-
liance on the USA by engaging Australia and newer strategic partners such as India.
Buzan argues that there is a Bhigh probability that the hedging security dynamics that
are driving the emergence of the Asian super-complex are going to get stronger, and
that the interplay between a declining US superpower and local Asian responses to a
 East Asia

rising Chinese great power will define what the emergent Asian super-region will look
like^ [15]. The maritime arc running from Japan south to Australia and then west across
to India, is geographically indicative of the emergence of an Indo-Pacific super-
complex. But the Indo-Pacific construct not only defines a geographical entity, it also
defines its probable membership based on shared values and common interests. Over
the previous decade, a networked minilateral architecture has emerged around the Indo-
Pacific conceptualisation, which transforms the existing US bilateral system by
complimenting it with an array of trilateral groupings between Japan, Australia, India
and the USA. Strategically, the four main advocates of the construct are building an
emerging minilateral architecture around the Indo-Pacific conceptualisation, which
supplements Asia’s bilateral American alliances with an array of trilateral security
dialogues or ‘security triangles’. The development and structure of the US-Japan-
Australia, US-Japan-India and Japan-India-Australia trilateral dialogues, are all char-
acteristic of this emerging, maritime-focused minilateral architecture. In a practical
sense, the Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific shift indicative of an emerging minilateral
security regionalism, which hedges against a more assertive Chinese posture by
developing greater burden-sharing by the US’s Asian security partners.

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