Consti 2 Doctrines Complete

ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - LIST OF CASES (AS OF 04 APRIL 2017)

[2016-17]
ARTICLE III - BILL OF RIGHTS
Primacy of Human Rights and Enforcement
*Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR 104768, July 21, 2003 (Bill of Rights after EDSA revolution)
 During the interregnum between the EDSA revolution and the issuance of the revolutionary
government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility for the
State’s good faith compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which remained in effect during
the interregnum. The customary principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda is being enforced.
o Thus, everyone’s rights are still protected against
 Thus, despite the Constitution being inoperative, everyone’s rights are still protected by both
ICCPR and UDHR such as right against unlawful searches and seizures.
Mijares v. Ranada, GR 139325, April 12, 2005 (Alien Tort Act)

 The excessively high filing fees cannot preclude a party from enforcing a foreign judgment in our
jurisdiction. While there are no specific rules governing the enforcement of foreign judgments, the
same is mandated by the generally accepted practice in international law (GAPIL) found in
our Constitution through the doctrine of incorporation to protect the "reasonable
expectations and demand of the parties." It is absurd that a filing fee deny this justice to the
parties on the basis of high filing fees, especially in our country with the low-income of Filipinos.
 The filing fees are determined through the subject matter of the suit which in this case was the
enforcement of the foreign judgment itself and not the tortious act from which it arose. It does not
matter if the damages can actually be computed.
SECTION 1.
Candelaria: the general rule is that aliens can invoke the bill of rights. However, such provisions such as
the right to public information is not afforded to aliens. The exception to the exception if there is an
international law which provides such rights to the aliens.
Hierarchy of Rights
*Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Org. v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc., 51 SCRA 189,
June 5, 1973 (hierarchy of rights)
 Despite the Bill of Rights also protecting property rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. In the hierarchy of civil liberties/rights, the right of free expression
and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are the essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions.
o If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a
useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield
against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs—political, economic or otherwise.
 The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere
reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or
purpose—that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive—would suffice to
validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights.
Due Process: In General
*Tupas v. CA - 193 SCRA 597, February 6, 1991 (late petition)

 It is not true to suggest that enforcing procedural rules should never be permitted if they, in effect,
prejudice substantive rights, as in the petitioner’s case in a lost to appeal.
 Procedural rules are intended to ensure orderly administration of justice and protection of
substantive rights. Both substantive and procedural rights are guaranteed by due process. They
complement each other. In case there is discrepancy between both due processes, substantive
due process is given more weight.
o In this case, the Court did not find the counsel exceptionally inept or motivated by
bad faith or excusably misled by the facts that would warrant the relaxing of
procedural laws. It seems to be that the petitioners slept on their rights.
 The parties represented by their counsel are GENRALLY BOUND by the acts of their counsel
INCLUDING the mistakes of such.
o Observance of both substantive and procedural rights is equally guaranteed by due
process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute
or a rule of court.
Mortel v. Kerr, 685 SCRA 1

 1) Where the prejudice to a party due to the gross negligence of his counsel is so serious as
to deny the litigant, who otherwise has a good cause, his day in court, the litigation may be
reopened.
 2) When the party failed to present his case due to the gross negligence of his counsel, the
same may be reopened to allow the party to present his side.
 3) A court may suspend its own rules or except a case from them in order to serve the ends of
justice, as the litigation is primarily a search for truth and a liberal interpretation of court rules is
given in order that parties may have the fullest opportunity to produce the truth.
Asilo v. People – 645 SCRA 41 (deprivation of property without due process; demolition)
 Requirement of Hearing -- No case was even filed by the municipality for unlawful detainer. In a
sense, the demolition was decided summarily, and without due process. It is clear from Section
10 (d), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court that when the property is subject to execution, it may not be
demolished except upon special order of the court for demolition after due hearing. To violate the
requirement of hearing would constitute an invasion on the individual's property rights without
due process of the law
I. Procedural Due Process
A. Judicial Proceedings
1. In General
*Banco Espanol v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 (jurisdiction over person)

 There two types of jurisdiction.
o a. jurisdiction over the person = acquired by voluntary appearance in court or by coercive
power of legal process
o b. jurisdiction over the property = by seizure of property under legal process or from the
institution of legal proceedings under special provisions of law.
 Kind of Action
o In Rem – binds the whole world. Notice to the public must be given through at least public
newspaper.
o In Personam – [only binds the parties] the parties must be names. Actual notice must be
given.
o Quasi in Rem – Property alone is responsible for claim in a proceedings, but the
individual is still named as defendant (unlike in rem no need to name parties).
 Notice to the defendant in this case is NOT absolutely essential.
 Presumption of regularity. That upon notice to the property, there is notice to the
individual.
 Publication is already deemed sufficient for procedural due process.
 Requirements of Due Process in a Judicial Proceeding (CJOJ)
o 1) Court or tribunal with judicial power to hear and determine the cases.
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o 2) Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person or property
o 3) Opportunity to be heard
o 4) Judgment rendered upon a lawful hearing.
 In an action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, some notification of the proceedings
must be given to the defendant. Under statutes generally prevailing, this notification commonly
takes the form of publication in a newspaper of general circulation and the sending of notice, by
mail, by which means the owner is admonished that his property is the subject of judicial
proceedings. The provisions of law providing for notice of this character must be complied with.
o In an action to foreclose a mortgage against a nonresident, some notification of the
proceedings must be given to the defendant. Under statutes generally prevailing, this
notification commonly takes the form of publication in a newspaper of general circulation
and the sending of notice, by mail, by which means the owner is admonished that his
property is the subject of judicial proceedings. The provisions of law providing for notice
of this character must be complied with.
2. Aspects of the Proceedings
State Prosecutors v. Muros 236 SCRA 505

 Personal knowledge of a judge without a law that is published is NOT BINDING. One must still
follow the current law in place.
 Requisites of Judicial Notice (CAJ):
o 1) The matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
o 2) Authoritatively settled;
o 3) Known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Court
Moldex v. Villabona - 675 SCRA 615 (chance to respond)

 In this case, the petitioners were not able to present their evidence without attributing the cause
to them. It was the attorney of the respondent who absent. Thus, the petitioners were not able to
present their evidence. This is not considered at a waiver to be heard because the petitioners
were not able to present evidence/given the chance to be heard through their witnesses.
Galvez v. CA 237 SCRA 685

Martinez v. CA 237 SCRA 575
Espeleta v. Avelino 62 SCRA 395
Rabino v. Cruz 222 SCRA 493
Ysmael v. CA 273 SCRA 165
Carvajal v. CA 280 SCRA 351
People v. Castillo 289 SCRA 213
Cosep v. Peo. 290 SCRA 378
People v. Galleno 291 SCRA 761
Oil v. CA 293 SCRA 26
Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan GR 125498 Feb. 18, 1999
People v. Hui 338 SCRA 2000
People v. Cabiles 341 SCRA 2000F
Gozum v. Liangco 339 SCRA 253
Soriano v. Angeles 339 SCRA 253
Villanueva v. Malaya 330 SCRA 278
Almendras v. Asis 330 SCRA 69
Dayot v. Garcia 353 SCRA 280
People v. Hapa GR 125698 July 19, 2001
Aguirre v. People GR 144142 August 23, 2001
Puyat v. Zabarte 352 SCRA 738
Baritua v. Mercader 350 SCRA 86
Barbers v. Laguio 351 SCRA 606
People v. Herida 353 SCRA 650
People v. Medenilla GR 1311638 Mar. 26, 2001
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People v. Rivera GR 139180 July 31, 2001
People v. Basquez GR 144035 Sept. 27, 2001
Cooperative Development v. DOLEFIL GR 137489 May 29, 2002
Garcia v. Pajaro GR 141149 July 5, 2002
Briaso v. Mariano, GR 137265, Jan. 31, 2003
Macias v. Macias, GR 1461617, Sept. 3, 2003
Albior v. Auguis, AM P-01- 1472, June 6, 2003
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR 152154, Nov. 18, 2003
Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, 422 SCRA 649
People v. Larranaga, 421 SCRA 530
R. Transport v. Philhino 494 SCRA 630
Trans Middle East v. Sandiganbayan 499 SCRA 308
Uy v. First Metro 503 SCRA 704
Deutsche Bank v. Chua 481 SCRA 672
People v. Santos 501 SCRA 325
Victoriano v. People 509 SCRA 483
Santos v. DOJ 543 SCRA 70
DBP v. Feston 545 SCRA 422
Ruivivar v. OMB 565 SCRA 324
Borromeo v. Garcia 546 SCRA 543
Cesa v. OMB 553 SCRA 357
DAR v. Samson 554 SCRA 500
Hilario v. People 551 SCRA 191
Pastona v. CA 559 SCRA 137
Bibas v. OMB 559 SCRA 591
Espina v. Cerujano 550 SCRA 107
Geronga v. Varela 546 SCRA 429
OMB v. Magno GR 178923, Nov. 27, 2008
Avenido v. CSC 553 SCRA 711
Romuladez v. COMELEC 553 SCRA 370
Multi-Trans Agency v. Oriental 590 SCRA 675
Siochi v. BPI, GR 193872, October 18, 2011
Catacutan v. People 656 SCRA 524
Mortel v. Kerr 685 SCRA 1 (clear violation and errors of counsel)
Gravides v. COMELEC 685 SCRA 382 (error of counsel)
Tua v. Mangrobang 714 SCRA 248 (TPO)
3. Publicity and T.V. Coverage
People v. Roxas – 628 SCRA 378 (media does not affect impartiality of a case)
 Media coverage (or presence of DOJ secretary) is GENERALLY allowed:
o 1) Mere exposure to publicity does not necessarily affect impartiality of judge in a case.
o 2) Person alleging must have direct proof of the media’s, NOT just a mere possibility
o 3) The public cannot be excluded, especially when the issue is of public interest.
Perez v. Estrada A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC Sept. 13, 2001 (Estrada’s plunder case media coverage)
 Exception to the general rule above:
o Estrada showed that live media coverage of impeachment trial will only pave the way for
so-called “expert commentary which can trigger massive demonstrations aimed at
pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. It was of great
public interest.
 Real time broadcast was disallowed, however the audio-visual recording was still permitted, on
restricted grounds that:
o 1) Trial shall be recorded in its entirety except parts that the Sandiganbayan may
determine
o 2) Cameras and audio devices shall be placed in inconspicuously inside the courtroom
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o 3) No live broadcasting
o 4) Sandiganbayan or its division will regulate the audio-visual recording
o 5) The recording, simultaneous to its broadcast, shall be deposited to the national
Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation
 Audio-visual recoding is still allowed because it is a way of:
o 1) Documenting the case, being a vital concern of the people
o 2) Confirming stenographic notes
o 3) Education and civic training of the people
o 4) Its accuracy may be better checked compared to an ordinary document
Webb v. de Leon 247 SCRA 652 (rape case, media)

People v. Teehankee 249 SCRA 54 (murder of Hultman, media coverage)
People v. Sanchez GR 121039-45 Jan. 25, 1999
People v. Sanchez GR 121039 Oct. 18, 2001
Perez v. Estrada A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001
People v. Roxas – 628 SCRA 378
B. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration
1. In General; administrative due process
*Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 Phil. 635 (due process in administrative proceedings)

 Administrative proceedings are NOT bound by technical rules and legal forms that are found
in court, but it cannot disregard the fundamental and procedural requirements of due process.
 Due process Requirements in an Administrative or Quasi-Judicial Proceeding
o 1) Right to a hearing including the right to present case and submit evidence
o 2) Tribunal must consider evidence presented
o 3) Evidence must something to support itself
o 4) Evidence must be substantial – that a reasonable mind can accept as adequate to
support the conclusion.
o 5) Decision must be based on evidence presented or at least contained in the record
o 6) The tribunal or body must act on its own independent consideration – not simply
accepting the views of a subordinate’s decision, and
o 7) Board or body must render its decision in a manner where parties can know the
various issues and reasons for the decision
*Shu v. Dee 723 SCRA 512 (NBI without judicial or quasi-judicial power)
 Since the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, we find that no denial of the respondents’
due process right could have taken place; the NBI’s findings were still subject to the prosecutor’s
and the Secretary of Justice’s actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause.
 The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. What the law prohibits is not
the absence of previous notice but its absolute absence and lack of opportunity to be heard.
Sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process exists when a party is given a chance
to be heard through his motion for reconsideration.
o In the present case, we do not find it disputed that the respondents filed with the
Secretary of Justice a motion for reconsideration of her resolution. Therefore, any initial
defect in due process, if any, was cured by the remedy the respondents availed of.
Dazon v. Yap – 610 SCRA 19
2. Judges and Disciplinary Process
OCA v. Pascual 259 SCRA 604

Valenzuela v. Bellosillo 322 SCRA 536
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3. Aspects of the Proceedings
*GMA v. COMELEC 734 SCRA 88

 For failing to conduct prior hearing before coming up with Resolution No. 9615, said Resolution,
specifically in regard to the new rule on aggregate airtime is declared defective and ineffectual.
o While it is true that the COMELEC is an independent office and not a mere administrative
agency under the Executive Department, rules which apply to the latter must also be
deemed to similarly apply to the former, not as a matter of administrative convenience but
as a dictate of due process. And this assumes greater significance considering the
important and pivotal role that the COMELEC plays in the life of the nation.
o It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in
nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, upon the
other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means
that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but
substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the
agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and
effect of law.
Lumiqued v. Exevea 282 SCRA 125

Fabella v. CA 282 SCRA 256
Joson v. Exec. Sec. 290 SCRA 279
Busuego v. CA GR 95325 Mar. 11, 1999
CSC v. Lucas GR 127838 Jan. 21, 1999
NPC v. Bernabe 332 SCRA 74
Summary Dismissal v. Torcita 330 SCRA 153
Velayo v. Comelec 327 SCRA 713
Ramoran v. Jardine 326 SCRA 208
Immam v. Comelec 322 SCRA 866
Villarosa v. Comelec GR 133927 Nov. 29, 1999
Go v. Comelec GR 147741 May 10, 2001
Mollaneda v. Umacob GR 140128 June 6, 2001
Cruz v. CSC GR 144469 Nov. 27, 2001
Codilla v. De Venecia GR 150605 Dec. 10, 2002
Associated Communications v. Dumlao GR 136762 Nov. 21, 2002
Villarosa v. Pomperada, AdminCase No. 5310, Jan. 28, 2003
Alauya v. Comelec, GR 152151-52, Jan. 22, 2003
Spouses Casimiro v. CA, 136911, Feb. 11, 2003
Sy v. CA, GR 147572, Feb. 27, 2003
Namil v. Comelec, GR 15040, Oct. 28, 2003
Bautista v. Comelec, GR 154796- 97, Oct. 23, 2003
Office of OMB v. Coronel 493 SCRA 392
Erece v. Macalingay 552 SCRA 320
Marcelo v. Bungubung 552 SCRA 589
SEC v. Interport 567 SCRA 354
Calinisan v. Roaquin 630 SCRA
456 IBP v. Atienza 613 SCRA 518
Domingo v. OMB 577 SCRA 476
Zambales v. Castillejos 581 SCRA 320
OMB v. Evangelista 581 SCRA 350
Phil Export v. Pearl City 608 SCRA 280
OMB v. Reyes 658 SCRA 626
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary 677 SCRA 408
Arroyo v. DOJ 681 SCRA 181 (fact-finding and joint committee)
Jalosjos v. COMELEC, GR 205033, June 18, 2013 (motu propio issuance of COMELEC Resolution)
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Posadas v. Sandiganbayan, GR 168951 and 169000, July 17, 2013 (denial of MR)
Gundayao v. COMELEC, GR 205233, Feb 18, 2014
Coalition v. COMELEC, 701 SCRA 786
Miro v. Mendoza, 710 SCRA 371
DOH v. Phil. Pharmawealth, 691 SCRA 421
Apo Cement Corporation v. Mingson 740 SCRA 383
4. Extradition Proceedings
Candelaria: Distinguish between the right to bail under this part and Section 13.
*Gov’t. of Hongkong v. Olalia, GR 153675 April 19, 2007

 A person who extradition proceedings is filed against is:
1) NOT entitled to notice and hearing before the issuance of a warrant
a) Notice would defeat the purpose of the arrest. Guilt is not adjudge during
these proceedings
2) Entitled to notice and hearing during the proceedings
3) Bail/provisional liberty – not generally given, but may be given under special
circumstances
a) When the extraditee is not a flight risk
b) Special Humanitarian considerations
c) Extraditee does NOT pose a danger to the community.
 There is no constitutional provision prohibiting an extraditee from exercising his right to apply for
bail. However, the extraditee must prove he is not a “high flight risk” through “clear and
convincing evidence” for bail to be considered.
o Extradition and deportation are both administrative proceedings where the innocence of a
person is not an issue. Deprivation of bail, as allowed in Sec. 13, Art 3 is only for those
in criminal proceedings charged with crimes to which the law attached the penalty of
reclusion perpetua or higher.
*Gov’t of Hongkong v. Munoz, G.R. No. 207342, August 16, 2016.

 Doctrine 1: There is no duty to extradite in international law.
 Doctrine 2: For a person to be extradited, such person’s crime/s must be 1) listed under the
extradition treaty and 2) it must be similarly punishable here in the Philippines.
 Candelaria: When does a person have the right to the papers? DFA [No]  DOJ [No]  RTC
[Yes]
 The right of a state to successfully request the extradition of a criminal offender arises from a
treaty with the requesting state.
o Candelaria: There is no international law which mandates extradition to be made, other
than treaty obligations.
 For purposes of the extradition of Muñoz, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)
as the requesting state must establish the following six elements, namely:
o (1) there must be an extradition treaty in force between the HKSAR and the Philippines;
o (2) the criminal charges that are pending in the HKSAR against the person to be
extradited;
o (3) the crimes for which the person to be extradited is charged are extraditable within the
terms of the treaty;
o (4) the individual before the court is the same person charged in the HKSAR;
o (5) the evidence submitted establishes probable cause to believe that the person to be
extradited committed the offenses charged; and
o (6) the offenses are criminal in both the HKSAR and the Philippines (double
criminality rule).
 Doctrine: Under the double criminality rule, the extraditable offense must be criminal under the
laws of both the requesting and the requested states. This simply means that the requested state
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comes under no obligation to surrender the person if its laws do not regard the conduct covered by
the request for extradition as criminal
o Candelaria: It does not need to be exactly the same offense but an analogous ones will
suffice.
 Although the crime of conspiracy to defraud was included among the offenses
covered by the RP-Hong Kong Agreement, and the RTC and the CA have agreed
that the crime was analogous to the felony of estafa through false pretense as
defined and penalized under Article 315(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
 Yet, because the offense of accepting an advantage as an agent charged against
him in the HKSAR is one that deals with private sector bribery, the conditions for
the application of the double criminality rule are obviously not met. Accordingly,
the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent must be dropped from the
request for extradition.
 The Philippines does not have an analogous private sector bribery.
Sec. of Justice v. Lantion 343 SCRA 377

Cuevas v. Munoz GR 140520 Dec. 18, 2000
Gov’t. of U.S.A v. Purganan GR 148571 Sept. 24, 2002
Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, 483 SCRA 290
5. Arbitration
*RCBC v. Banco de Oro 687 SCRA 583

 A review brought to the Supreme Court under the Special Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
Rules is not a matter of right. Rule 19.36 of said Rules specified the conditions for the exercise of
this Court’s discretionary review of the Court of Appeal’s decision
o Rule 19.36. Review discretionary.―A review by the Supreme Court is not a matter of
right, but of sound judicial discretion, which will be granted only for serious and
compelling reasons resulting in grave prejudice to the aggrieved party. The
following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court’s discretion, indicate the
serious and compelling, and necessarily, restrictive nature of the grounds that will warrant
the exercise of the Supreme Court’s discretionary powers, when the Court of Appeals:
a. Failed to apply the applicable standard or test for judicial review prescribed in
these Special ADR Rules in arriving at its decision resulting in substantial prejudice to
the aggrieved party;
 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is encouraged by the court in order for parties to settle
disputes amicably before going to court, in order for dockets to unclogged, achieve a speedy and
impartial justice for the parties. It shall be subject to the rules of international arbitration and the
Arbitration law in effect in the Philippines.
o In an ADR, the arbitrators must remain impartial. The common meaning of "partiality" is
the inclination to favor one side. “Evident partiality” is found when a reasonable person
would conclude that the arbitrator was partial to one party in the arbitration.
o In the case of RCBC, Chairman Baker gave both parties Matthew Secomb’s article,
considering the attendant circumstances, is indicative of partiality such that a reasonable
would have concluded that he was favoring RCBC. Chairman Baker also exhibits strong
inclination to grant relief to RCBC notwithstanding his categorical ruling that the
Arbitration Tribunal "has no power under the ICC Rules to order the Respondents to pay
the advance on costs sought by the ICC or to give RCBC any relief against the
respondent's refusal to pay.
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C. Academic Discipline
1. In General
*ADMU v. Capulong 222 SCRA 644 (fraternity)

 The due process clause is complied with in the academic setting (disciplinary sanctions in
academic situations):
o 1. students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;
o 2. students have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of
counsel, if desired;
o 3. informed of the evidence against them;
o 4. right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
o 5. evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
*Go v. Colegio de San Juan de Letran 683 SCRA 358

 Doctrine 1: The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-
examination is not an essential part thereof.
 Doctrine 2: In DLSU v. CA, there is NO denial of due process when students are not allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses against them
 SC said that in ADMU v. Capulong, it already held that Guzman v. NU and NOT Ang Tibay, is the
authority on the procedural rights of students in disciplinary cases.
 The right to establish disciplinary rules is consistent with the mandate in the Constitution for
schools to teach discipline; in fact, schools have the duty to develop discipline in students.
Corollarily, the Court has always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions
on students who violate disciplinary rules.
o Letran’s rule prohibiting its students from joining frats is a reasonable regulation, not only
because of the reasons stated in the DECS Order but also because of the adult-oriented
activities often associated with frats. Besides, Letran’s penalty for violation of the rule is
clearly stated in its enrollment contracts and in the Students Handbooks.
Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), 751 SCRA 469 [academic
discipline also applies in military academies in the Philippines]
 Facts: First Class Cadet Cudia was penalized by the PMA for having lied about the cause of his
tardiness during a lesson examination. He was dismissed after having been found guilty by the
PMA, pursuant to the Honor Code. Issue: Was there a valid dismissal? -- Yes
 The schools’ power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom
and that “the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those
pertaining to student discipline ....” Thus, schools have the right to impose disciplinary
sanctions which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate
disciplinary rules.
 As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor
Code and the Honor System in particular.
 Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The PMA Honor Code
explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted to investigate a cadet’s honor
violation need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. There is aversion to
undue judicialization of an administrative hearing in the military academy.
Angeles v. Sison 112 SCRA 26

Malabanan v. Ramento 129 SCRA 359
Guzman v. NU 142 SCRA 699 (due process in academic discipline)
Alcuaz v. PSBA 161 SCRA 7
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Non v. Judge Dames 185 SCRA 523
U.P. v. Ligot-Telan 227 SCRA 342
D. Deportation Proceedings
1. In General
*Lao Gi v. CA 180 SCRA 756

 Due process must be observed in deportation cases. Although it is not in the nature of a criminal
action, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the
freedom and liberty of a person, the due process rights should not be denied.
 Standards for deportation proceedings:
o Charges against the alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of.
o PI must be conducted to determine if there is sufficient cause to charge the respondent
with deportation.
o Rules of Criminal Procedure should be followed.
o Private prosecutors are not allowed to intervene.
 Refugees are not covered by these standards.
Domingo v. Scheer, 421 SCRA 468
E. Regulations: Fixing of Rates and Regulation of Profession
1. Rates
Standards for regulation of rates:

1) Notice and Hearing (important for quasi-judicial bodies because without it the court would
lack jurisdiction). (Banco vs. Filipino)
2) Rates must be reasonable and just (may be implied). (Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz)
3) Rate must not be confiscatory and oppressive. (Globe vs. NTC)
Government bodies have 2 powers:

1) Quasi-judicial – applies exclusively to a specific entity or person. Any change must be made
after due notice and hearing (Philcomsat v Alcuaz)
2) Quasi- Legislative – General, which will affect everybody in a certain class. No prescribed form
of notice, hearing
*Maceda v. ERB 199 SCRA 454 (fixing rates)

 Doctrine: Procedures in reception of evidence is relaxed in administrative bodies, such as the
ERB, which in matters of rate or price fixing, is considered as exercising quasi-legislative, not
quasi-judicial, function. As such, as an administrative agency, it is not bound by the strict or
technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings.
o Thus in this case, the ERB has the prerogative on what order of proceeding it wants to
conduct as long as it complies with the fundamental requirements of due process in a
hearing. It can directly examine all witnesses first before allowing the defense to cross-
examine them afterwards.
Radiocom v. NTC 184 SCRA 517

 The Public Service Commision (now NTC) is empowered to provisionally approve rate of utilities
without need of a prior hearing (Republic v Medina). The rates however are still subject to a final
hearing.
o Temporary rate fixing is not exempt from the requirements of due process -
- A temporary rate may be fixed, but a notice and hearing is still required, as well
as the reasonableness of the temporary rate fix, pending the outcome of the
application for license/authority to operate. (Philcomsat vs. Alcuaz)
10
 As to the required notice, it is impossible for the respondent to give personal notice to all parties
affected, not all of them being known to it. More than that, there is no dispute that the notice of
hearing was published and as admitted by petitioners, one of them received the notice which in
turn informed the others. In fact, the petitioners have timely opposed the petition in question, so
that lack of notice was deemed cured. Requirement for notice of hearing is publication.
Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218

Globe Telecom v. NTC, 435 SCRA 110 (substantial evidence from prior ruling)
2. Profession
*Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31 (pilot)

 A professional license becomes a property right after its issuance. It cannot be taken away
without due process, notice or hearing. Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a
property right.
o Licensure is “the granting of license especially to practice a profession.” It is also “the
system of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with established
standards.” A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to
carry on a business or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.
o Continued possession of a license to practice a profession is essential to the pursuit of a
livelihood, thus it takes the nature of a property right. The pre-evaluation cancellation of a
license primarily makes it constitutionally infirm. The requirements of notice and hearing
must still be present in the regulation of a profession, such as in in the cancellation of
one's license to practice a profession. In this case there was no chance to be heard.
 As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be
said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence
of due process.
o Notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural due process, are
essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function, but in the
performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and
regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and
hearing.
F. Dismissals, Suspensions, Reinstatements, etc. …
1. Dismissal in Government Boards and Commissions
Abalos v. CSC -196 SCRA 81

GSIS v. CSC - 201 SCRA 661
Macayayong v. Ople - 204 SCRA 372
Gonzales v. CSC - 226 SCRA 66
Go. v. NPC - 271 SCRA 447
CHR v. CSC - 227 SCRA 42
Uy v. COA - 328 SCRA 607
Lameyra v. Pangilinan - 322 SCRA 117
NPC v. Zozobrado - 487 SCRA 16
PAGCOR v. CA, GR 185668, December 13, 2011
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2. Dismissal in Private Sector
*Salaw v. NLRC - 202 SCRA 7

 Candelaria: Labor Code expressly provides for the right to counsel. Then it will fall under Article
III, Section 1 of the Constitution.
 Candelaria: Counsel is not a requirement in a civil case (only mandated in criminal cases) – but
being denied one’s right to a counsel is prohibited under substantive due process. Thus, evidence
derived from a confession w/o a counsel when the one confession wanted a counsel is
inadmissible.
 The Bill of Rights is not where one attains rights against a private sector. The Bill of Rights is
Rights of People construed against the government. One attains rights against a private sector
such as dismissal from the NLRC (statutory due process).
 Twin Requirements for dismissal:
o 1) Employer must a valid reason to dismiss and employee
o 2) The employee must be given opportunity to be heard – due process.
 Under the twin notice requirement, the employees must be given two (2) notices before their
employment could be terminated:
o (1) a first notice to apprise the employees of their fault, and
o (2) a second notice to communicate to the employees that their employment is being
terminated, and in between the first and second notice, the employees should be given a
hearing or opportunity to defend themselves personally or by counsel of their choice.
Hellenic v. Siete - 195 SCRA 179

Conti v. NLRC, GR 119253 April 10, 1997
Aparente v. NLRC, GR 117652
Lopez v. Alturas - 647 SCRA 566
3. Preventive Suspension
Alonzo v. Capulong - 244 SCRA 80

Castillo – Co v. Barbers 290 SCRA 717
Bacsasar v. CSC - 576 SCRA 787
Carabeo v. CA 607 - SCRA 394
G. Ordinance/Statute/Memo Cir./Rules
*People v. Nazario 165 SCRA 186 (“manager”, void for vagueness)

 As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and difference as to its
application."
 It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
o (1) It violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
o (2) It leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
In no way may the ordinances at bar be said to be tainted with the vice of vagueness. It is
unmistakable from their very provisions that Nazario falls within its coverage. In this case, the
term “manager” is not vague because it is includes those that operates and manages a fishpond.
o As the actual operator of the fishponds, he comes within the term "manager." He does
not deny the fact that he financed the construction of the fishponds, introduced fish fries
into the fishponds, and had employed laborers to maintain them. While it appears that it
is the National Government which owns them, the Government never shared in the
profits they had generated. It is therefore only logical that he shoulders the burden of tax
under the said ordinances.
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o Suffice it to say that as the actual operator of the fishponds in question, and as the
recipient of profits brought about by the business, the Nazario is clearly liable for
the municipal taxes in question. He cannot say that he did not have a fair notice of
such a liability to make such ordinances vague.
*Estrada v. Sandiganbayan GR 148560 Nov. 19, 2001 (plunder, void for vagueness)
 Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine states that “a statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must necessarily guess its
meaning and difference as to its application."
o 1) A statue is not rendered void and uncertain merely because general words are used
therein, or because of the employment of words without defining them. The legislature
need not define every single word in enacting legislation. A statue is not guilty of
vagueness as long as the legislative intent is clear
o 2) The doctrine has been commonly formulate to determine whether a statute
establishing a penal offense is with sufficient definiteness so as to accord persons of
common intelligence/common understanding fair warning of what conduct it seeks to
penalize.
o 3) The doctrine does not apply to legislation that are merely couched in imprecise
language but which nonetheless specific a standard, though defectively phrased may be
"saved" by proper construction.
 Overbreadth Doctrine decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."
 A Facial Challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statue and to one which is overbroad
because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.
 The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes
o This rationale does not apply to penal statues. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for
this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech.
 Ruling: The law is valid. The Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. The
provision sufficiently provides for the elements.
 Offender is a public officer who amassed or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of the following overt acts; that aggregate amount is at least 50million.
o Combination = result or product of combining
o Series = a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in
spatial and temporal succession
o Pattern = combination or series of overt criminal acts
Francisco v. CA - 199 SCRA 595

Misamis Or. v. DOF - 238 SCRA 63
People v. de la Piedra - 350 SCRA 163
H. Motion for Reconsideration
Ylaya v. Gacott - 689 SCRA 452

 The failure to cross-examine the complainant is not sufficient ground to support the claim that the
Atty. Gacott was not afforded due process. The respondent was heard through his pleadings, his
submission of alleged controverting evidence, and his oral testimony during the October 6, 2005
mandatory conference. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. The requirements of due process are satisfied
where the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand.
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 Moreover, any seeming defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of a motion
for reconsideration. The respondent was allowed to file a motion for reconsideration supported by
his submitted evidence, which motion the IBP considered and ruled upon in its Resolution.
Medenilla v. CSC - 194 SCRA 278

Mendiola v. CSC - 221 SCRA 295
Rodriguez v. Proj. 6 - 247 SCRA 528
Lazo v. CSC - 236 SCRA 469
Salonga v. CA - 269 SCRA 534
Bernardo v. CA - 275 SCRA 413
Casuela v. Ombudsman - 276 SCRA 635
Cordenillo v. Executive Secretary - 276 SCRA 652
Chua v. CA - 287 SCRA 33
De la Cruz v. Abelle - 352 SCRA 691
Rodriguez v. CA, GR 134275 August 7, 2002
Gonzales v. CSC - 490 SCRA 741
Berboso v. CA - 494 SCRA 583
Pontejos v. Desierto - 592 SCRA 64
NAECOR v. ERC - 653 SCRA 642
Imperial v. GSIS - 658 SCRA 497
Arroyo v. Rosal Homeowners - 684 SCRA 297
Moldex v. Villabona - 675 SCRA 615 (motion for reconsideration not allowed)
I. Suretyship
Stronghold Insurance v. CA - 205 SCRA 605

 Principal-Surety relationship -- It has been held that the notice to the principal is a notice to the
surety itself, the surety stipulated to answer for whatever decision might be rendered against the
principal. If it did not intevervene as a co-defendant, it cannot complain now.
 Stipulation of surety to answer liabilities is not a virtual waiver of the right to be heard. --
The right to a hearing is not absolute. It may be waived as long as the party is given the
opportunity to be heard. Due process is not violated when a party chose, for whatever reason, not
to be heard. Where he chooses to remain silent when he has the right to speak, the cannot later
on complain that he was unduly silenced.
J. Tariff and Customs Code
*Feeder v. CA - 197 SCRA 842

 Doctrine 1: The assistance of a counsel, while desirable, is not indispensable unless required by
Statute or the Constitution. Exception is made in the charter only during the custodial
investigation of a person suspected of a crime and during the trial of the accused.
o In other proceedings, however, the need for the assistance of counsel is not as urgent
nor is it deemed essential to their validity. There is nothing in the Constitution that says a
party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that
without such representation he will not be bound by such proceedings.
o Since the forfeiture proceeding is not criminal in nature, the assistance of a
counsel is not deemed essential. Thus, due process in this respect was not
violated.
o Thus, the fact that the testimonies of Deposa and Torres were given without the
assistance of counsel may not be considered an outright violation of their constitutional
right to be assisted by counsel.
 Doctrine 2: A corporate entity (such as the petitioner) has no personality to invoke the right to
presumed innocent, which right is only available to an individual who is accused in a crime.
Thus the lawful deprivation of property is allowed by law.
 Doctrine 3: Only substantial evidence is required as it is a civil case and not a criinal case.
14
K. Appeal
Diona v. Balergue - 688 SCRA 22

 During instances of default, the party who is in default seems to be admitting to the claims of the
other party. It would be a denial of due course that the party in default already accepted the terms
of the claimant, but the court would be giving an award higher than what is prayed for. If the party
in default knew the court would give something higher than prayed for, the party in default might
have adduce evidence against the claims of the claimants.
 Rules of Court provide that during instances of default, the court:
o 1) Cannot give greater than what is prayed for
o 2) Cannot grant what is not prayed for
Alba v. Deputy Ombudsman - 254 SCRA 753

Telan v. CA - 202 SCRA 534
Aris v. NLRC - 200 SCRA 246
Rivera v. CSC - 240 SCRA 43
Singson v. NLRC - 274 SCRA 358
Building Care v. Macaraeg - 687 SCRA 643
L. Closure Proceedings
*CB v. CA 220 SCRA 536 (relative constitutionality)

 A previous hearing is nowhere required in Sec. 29 nor does the constitutional requirement
of due process demand that the correctness of the Monetary Board's resolution to stop
operation and proceed to liquidation be first adjudged before making the resolution effective. It is
enough that a subsequent judicial review be provided. It does not require a previous hearing
before the Monetary Board can implement its resolution closing a bank, since its action is subject
to judicial scrutiny as provided by law.
 Due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to
be heard may be subsequent to the closure.
o This "close now and hear later" scheme is grounded on practical and legal considerations
to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the bank's assets and as a valid exercise of police
power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders and the general public.
o One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would be the
order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped
out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking community.
Rural Bank v. CA 162 SCRA 288

Phil. Merchants v. CA GR 112844 June 2, 1995
M. Biddings
Concerned Officials v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502
N. UDHA – R.A. 7279; Squatting; Procedure for relocation; summary abatement
*Perez v. v. Madrona 668 SCRA 696 (not nuisance per se)

 Doctrine: Unless a thing is a nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial
intervention.
o Nuisance per se -- subject to police power, and can be summarily abated without need
of a court order because it affects the safety of persons, property and public generally.
Despite not having a court order one can be deprive of right to property because the
general welfare of all is considered priority.
o Nuisance per accidens -- does not pose an immediate threat to public safety. Summary
abatement without judicial intervention is not warranted. Because it is not an immediate
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threat to public safety, a fair trial on whether the person may be deprived of the right to
property must be instituted first. The right to be heard is mandated.
 By its nature, a fence is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community; Not being a
nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its summary abatement without judicial
intervention is unwarranted.
O. Cancellation of Property Rights/Privileges
*American Inter-Fashion v. OP 197 SCRA 409

 General Rule: a license is deemed merely a privilege withdrawable when public interests require
its withdrawal.
 Exception: a mere privilege, however, may evolve into some form of property right protected by
due process, as for instance when a privilege, in this case an export quota, 1) has been enjoyed
for so long (1977-1984), 2) has been subject of substantial investment, and 3) has become
the source of employment for thousands.
o Thus, in the case of Mabuhay Textile Mills Corporation v. Ongpin (141 SCRA 437, 450
[1986]), we stated: “In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the chance to
present its side before its export quota allocations were revoked and its officers
suspended. While it is true that such allocations as alleged by the Board are mere
privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, these privileges have been
accorded to petitioner for so long that they have become impressed with property rights
specially since not only do these privileges determine the continued existence of the
petitioner with assets of over P80,000,000.00 but also the livelihood of some 700 workers
who are employed by the petitioner and their families.
*British American Tobacco v. Camacho 562 SCRA 511 and (MR) 585 SCRA 36 (expansive tax
category)
 Where there is a claim of breach of the due process and equal protection clauses, considering
that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for proof of such
persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the
presumption of validity must prevail.
 The classification freeze provision addressed Congress’s administrative concerns in the
simplification of tax administration of sin products, elimination of potential areas and corruption in
tax collection, buoyant and stable revenue generation, and ease of projection of revenues.
Consequently, there can be no denial of equal protection of the laws since the rational-
basis test is amply satisfied.
 Generally the judiciary will defer to the legislature unless there is discrimination a “discrete and
insular” minority, or infringement of a “fundamental right.” Test/Standards (Strict Scrutiny,
Rational Basis Standard, Heightened or Immediate Scrutiny) Consequently, two standards of
judicial review were establish:
o 1) Strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political
process
o 2) The Rational Basis Standard of review for economic legislation.
o A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted
for evaluating classifications based on gender and legitimacy
 The SC has often applied the RATIONAL BASIS TEST mainly in analysis of equal protection
challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally
further a legitimate governmental interest. Under the rational basis test, it is sufficient that the
legislative classification is rationally related to achieving some legitimate State interest.
 Whereas in applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling rather than
substantial, governmental interest, and on there is an absence of less restrictive means for
achieving that interest. In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinance, strict scrutiny refers to
the standard for determining the quality and the mount of governmental interest brought to justify
the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws
16
dealing with the regulation of speech, gender or race as well as other fundamental rights such as
suffrage, judicial access and interstate travel.
 Strict scrutiny is a form of judicial review that courts use to determine the constitutionality of
certain laws. To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must have passed the law to further a
"compelling governmental interest," and must have narrowly tailored the law to achieve that
interest.
ABAKADA v. Ermita 469 SCRA 1 (E-VAT Law)

 The input tax is not a property or property right within the constitutional purview of the due
process clause. A VAT-registered person’s entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere
statutory privilege. The right to credit input tax as against the output tax is clearly a privilege
created by law, a privilege that also the law can remove, or in this case, limit.
Alliance of DFLO v. Laguesma 254 SCRA 565

DPWH v. Spouses Tecson, GR 179334, July 1, 2013 (deprivation of property without expropriation
proceeding)
P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation - Ombudsman
Roxas v. Vasquez GR 114944 June 19, 2001

Ocampo v. Ombudsman 322 SCRA 17
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148468, Jan. 28, 2003
Estrada v. ombudsman, GR 212140, January 21, 2015
17
II. Substantive Due Process
*United States v. Toribio - 15 PHIL. 85 (read with Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court) (carabao
slaughterhouse)
 The law prohibits the slaughtering for human consumption or killing of any large cattle except upon
permit of the municipality. The violator shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more
than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by imprisonment for not less than one month
nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court.
o The SC finally held that in this case, there was a reasonably necessary limitation on
private ownership to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals
by slaughter by improvident owners.
o It was an established fact that the petitioner was DENIED the permit because the carabao
was still indeed fit for public use, and the slaughtering of such carabao would be
detrimental to the public.
 The determination of the legislature on what is a proper exercise of police power is subject to the
supervision of the Courts. With the need to preserve large cattle, it is constitutional that the law
that prohibits slaughter of carabaos without a permit from the municipal treasurer.
 Eminent domain is the right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public
use, whenever public exigency requires it, and which can be done only on condition of providing
for a reasonable compensation.
 Police power is power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish
all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall
judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth and of the subjects of the same.
*Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court - 148 SCRA 659 (transport of carabao)

 Lawful Subject: The ban on slaughter of carabaos is directly related to public welfare.
o There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at
least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or
breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.
 Unlawful means: The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as
amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed
to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through
dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
 Ruling: The method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law, and it is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned
and punished. There is no connection in the general protection of carabaos and outright
confiscation without being heard.
 Doctrine: The interest of the public being protected is the extinction of the carabaos because of
slaughtering. Unlike in Toribio, the law only protects the carabaos from being killed. In this case,
the carabaos are being illegally confiscated.
*Churchill v. Rafferty - 32 PHIL. 580 (read with People v. Fajardo) (billboards as nuisance)
 If a law relates to the public health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welf are of the community,
it is within the 'scope of the police power of the State. Within such bounds the wisdom,
expediency, or necessity of the law does not concern the courts.
 Standards of Police Power of the STATE
o 1) Lawful Purpose – for the general welfare of the community
 Whether social, economic, or general welfare of the people is menaced, there is
legal justification for the exercise of the police power; and the use of private
property may be regulated or restricted to whatever extent may be necessary to
preserve inviolate these declared essentials to the wellbeing of the public.
18
o 2) Lawful Method – reasonable, non-oppressive and non-arbitrary means and methods
employed in connection to the accomplishment of the purpose.
 Ruling: The state may remove “billboards which contain offense to sight or smell” because the
general welfare and safety of the drivers on the highway may be jeopardized. They may look at the
billboard and not concentrate on the road.
 Doctrine: Police power cannot interfere with private property for purely aesthetic purposes for the
municipality (People v. Fajardo). But where the act is reasonably within the consideration of and
care for the PUBLIC HEALTH SAFETY OR COMFORT, it should be disturbed by the Courts.
o Those courts being of the opinion that statutes which are prompted and inspired by
esthetic considerations merely, having for their sole purpose the promotion and
gratification of the esthetic sense, and not the promotion or protection of the public safety,
the public peace and good order of society, must be held invalid and contrary to
constitutional provisions holding inviolate the rights of private property.
*People v. Fajardo - 104 PHIL. 443 (not allowed to build on his lot as it covers the view from plaza)
 An ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, if it operates to permanently deprive owners of the
right to use their property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a
taking of appellant’s property without just compensation.
o When action is unreasonable, it amounts to the State exercising its the power of
Eminent Domain without paying compensation. Exercising the power of eminent
domain without compensation is unlawful.
 Aesthetic concerns are not enough ground to justify state interference. However, when it is
connected to public health, safety, and morals, the regulation of private property used for
advertising (ie. Billboards) is justified.
*Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operator v. City of Manila - 20 SCRA 849 (read with City of Manila v.
Laguio; White Light v. City of Manila) (curb immortality; license fee)
 Doctrine 1: Valid exercise of Police Power- The police power of the state where police power is
defined as the “power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety, and general welfare of the people.”
 Doctrine 2: An ordinance may be considered invalid
o 1) It fails to state any policy to guide or limit the mayor’s discretion
o 2) It expressed no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit
o 3) It enumerates no condition for its grant or refusal
o 4) Lacks Standards, conferring upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power.
 Doctrine 3: An ordinance enjoys a presumption of constitutionality which can be overturned
only by showing evidence. However, the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals
 Ordinance in Question: The ordinance provides an increase in license fee for motels. The
purpose is to curb immorality as motels are being used for adultery, prostitution and fornication.
 Lawful Subject -- The stated purpose of the said ordinance is to curb immorality. Motels
contribute to a great part in the rise of adultery, prostitution and fornication because of the
clandestine entry and exit they provide. Hence there is a public need which needs to be
addressed.
 Lawful Means -- The means employed are reasonably necessary. It has been held that license
fees can be imposed as a form of regulation (police power). No evidence was presented, only a
stipulation of facts, was presented. There being no evidence that shows the ordinance is
unconstitutional, it should be held as constitutional.
 Ruling: The ordinance is a valid exercise of police power.
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*White Light v. City of Manila 576 SCRA 416 (wash up rates)
 Ordinances must conform to the following substantive requirements for it to be considered
valid:
o It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
o It must not be unfair or oppressive
o It must not be partial or discriminatory
o It must not prohibit but it may regulate trade
o It must be general and consistent with public policy
o It must not be unreasonable
 Police Power -- A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police power
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded.
o More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise
of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites,
the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
o It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded
 Ordinance in Question: The ordinance that sanctions any person or corporation who 1) will
allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or 2) by renting out of
rooms more than twice a day.
 Lawful Subject: The ordinance may be trying to protect people from prostitution, fornication, etc.,
but it is an oppressive way of doing such.
 Unlawful Means: Wash-up rates are reasonable on the aspect that people may sometimes just
need to use a motel because it is brown-out to charge their phones and the like.
 Ruling: Thus, the ordinance that sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the
admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than
twice a day is deemed to be unconstitutional.
o Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers
through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the
strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and
other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those
engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact
collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of
the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
*City of Manila v. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308 (sauna, massage parlors, night clubs)
 Doctrine 1: An ordinance may regulate trade or a craft but it could never prohibit a law trade
such as operating an inn despite the possibility of having illicit matters done as seen in Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operator v. City of Manila.
 Doctrine 2: The ordinance, which permanently restricts the use of property, that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose, goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking
of property without just compensation.
 Ordiance in Question: An ordinance, which prohibited the operation of establishments, in the
Ermita-Malate area, that are engaged in certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and
facilities where women were being used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the
community, annoy inhabitants, adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.
20
 Lawful Subject -- The ordinance may be trying to protect people from prostitution, fornication,
etc., but it is an oppressive way of doing such.
 Unlawful Means -- The directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the
establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the
owner converts his establishment to accommodate an “allowed” business, the structure which
housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust.
o The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three (3)
months from its approval within which to “wind up business operations or to transfer to any
place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of
business allowable within the area.”
 Ruling: The ordinance, which permanently restricts the use of property, that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose, goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking
of property without just compensation. It is intrusive of private property rights of individuals.
Further, the ordinance lacks a set of standards that will guide the petitioner’s actions. It confers
upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments.
*Balacuit v. CFI - 163 SCRA 182 (discount to children in movie house)

 Rule that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are
subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by local
government.
o Thus, in People v. Chari, an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run
cinematographs from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as
constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power.
o Still in another case, the validity of an ordinance of the City of Bacolod prohibiting
admission of two or more persons in movie-houses and other amusement places with the
use of only one ticket was sustained as a valid regulatory police measure not only in the
interest of preventing fraud in so far as municipal taxes are concerned but also in
accordance with public health, public safety, and the general welfare.
 In order for the police power to be valid it should be grounded on a.) public interest and welfare,
b.) and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
 Ordinance in Question: Ordinance No. 640 penalizing any person, group of persons, entity or
corporations engaged in business of selling admission tickets to any movie or other public
exhibitions, games, contest to require children between seven (7) and twelve (12) to pay full
payment of tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of the said ticket, held
unreasonable and not justified by any necessity for public interest;
 Lawful Purpose -- The evident purpose of the ordinance is to unburden the parents who have to
shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children to theaters.
 Unlawful Means -- The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of
earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it.
 Ruling: The ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of
petitioners.
 *Note* It is not unconstitutional or wrong when an establishment on its own accord to give
discounts to children. You cannot just force an establishment to prove such benefits.
*Magtajas v. Pryce Properties – 234 SCRA 255 (local ordinance against PAGCOR)
 Doctrine: Games of chance under PAGCOR are allowed by law, and they are not prohibited
under the LGC. An ordinance cannot serve to impliedly repeal a statute (LGC).
 Ruling: Gambling in Casinos, being a trade allowed by law, cannot be prohibited by an ordinance
from entering into Cagayan de Oro just. It is not as well against public policy because it is
generally accepted by all. It is just the municipality of Cagayan de Oro does not want to have a
casino by PAGCOR.
21
*Bennis v. Michigan - No. 94-8729 March 4, 1996 (confiscated car)
 Act performed – The State of Michigan abated a car owed by the Bennis couple after it was
declared a public nuisance for being the place where Mr. Bennis was caught having sex with a
prostitute in public. Tina Bennis challenged this since, claiming that she did not know that the car
would be used for such purpose. She claims that she was denied due process.
 Lawful Purpose -- The purpose of the indecency law is to deter illegal activities leading to the
deterioration of the neighborhood and to unsafe streets.
 Lawful Means – The forfeiture of the object used in criminal action. Such forfeiture is used as a
deterrence and prevention of illegal usage of property.
 Ruling: Tina Bennis was afforded due process of law. She was given notice and the right to be
hear in a trial. The acts of the possessor (the husband) bind the owner. The Michigan police
properly acquired the car for it was used in a criminal action (violation of the indecency law) done
by the husband which is a police power granted to the State. Such forfeiture is used as a
deterrence and prevention of illegal usage of property.
*Cruzan v. Dir. Missouri - No. 88-1503 June 25, 1990 (informed euthanasia)
 Facts: Nancy Cruzan was involved in a car accident, which left her in a “persistent vegetative
state.” After it became clear that Cruzan would not improve, her parents requested that the
hospital terminate the life-support procedures the hospital was providing. The hospital and
subsequently the State court refused to comply. The issue is: Did Missouri’s procedural
requirement for clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent person’s desire to terminate life
support before it is terminated violate the Constitution?
 Held: There is no violation of substantive due process. The right to terminate life-sustaining
treatment of an incompetent, if it is to be exercised, must be done for such incompetent by a
surrogate. Missouri’s interest in the preservation of life is unquestionably a valid State interest. The
Due Process Clause protects an interest in life as well as a right to refuse life-saving treatment.
Missouri may legitimately safeguard these personal decisions by imposing heightened evidentiary
requirements. Moreover, even when available, family members will not always act in the best
interests of a patient. The State is entitled to safeguard against such abuses.
*Chavez v. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534 (right to bear arms)

 A license, authorizing a person on certain privileges, is neither a property nor a property right
[Tan v. Director of Forestry]. However, when a license is for a livelihood purpose, itis considered
as property rights [Corona v. UHPAP].
o The Court ruled that the right to bear arms is not a constitutional right but a mere
statutory privilege which can be revoked by the State.
o For the sake of argument that it is a property right, all property rights are still subject to
the regulation for the common good and welfare of all. The revocation of firearms
licenses has long been held to be a valid exercise of police power by the PNP Chief.
*GSIS v. Montescarlos, 434 SCRA 441 (survivorship pension claim)

 Questioned Act: Under the proviso, even if the dependent spouse married the pensioner more
than three years before the pensioner’s death, the dependent spouse would still not receive
survivorship pension if the marriage took place within three years before the pensioner qualified
for pension.
 Lawful Purpose -- The classification seeks to prevent conscious adverse risk selection of
deathbed marriages where a terminally ill member of the pension system marries another so that
person becomes eligible for benefits.
 Unlawful Means -- The requirement the marriage should take place three years before the
pension is unconstitutional. It confiscates pensions and other benefits, which are property rights
without the opportunity to be heard. The sole beneficiary of the government employee is being
deprived of the pension due to her.
 Ruling: The Supreme Court says that it thinks what the law is trying to avoid is deathbed
marriages; however, it does not see why the proviso reckons the three-year prohibition from the
date the pensioner qualified for pension and not from the date the pensioner died.
22
o Note: It will be more sound to have it from death. As the pensior could live for more than
30 years after getting the pension. As opposed to one who died within 30 days after the
pension but survivor got married with the pensioner 3 years and 1 day before the latter
was eligible for pension
*Chavez v. COMELEC, 437 SCRA 415 (candidate billboards)

 Questioned Act: Petitioner, assails the validity of Section 32 of COMELEC Resolution No. 6520
which mandates the removal of posters, streamers, paintings and other advertisements showing
the image and name of the candidate within 3 days after the effectivity of its IRR. The billboards
gave the petitioner an unfair advantage over other candidates as they became political in
nature.
o Moreover, prior to the effectivity of the Resolution, petitioner has already entered into
formal agreements with certain establishments to endorse their products (clothing, plastic
products, games and amusement parlors). Petitioner also filed his candidacy as a
senator.
 Lawful Purpose: Its primary objectives are to prohibit premature campaigning and to level the
playing field for candidates of public office, to equalize the situation between popular or rich
candidates, on one hand, and lesser-known or poorer candidates, on the other, by preventing the
former from enjoying undue advantage in exposure and publicity on account of their resources and
popularity.
o The subject billboards, while not announcing his candidacy, is a form of an election
campaign under the Omnibus Elections Code since it has the effect of indirectly soliciting
votes. It is true that when petitioner entered into the contracts or agreements to endorse
certain products, he acted as a private individual and had all the right to lend his name and
image to these products. However, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for Senator,
the billboards featuring his name and image assumed partisan political character because
the same indirectly promoted his candidacy.
 Lawful Means: Ordering the removal of the billboards is a reasonable method to ensure that
some candidates, including the petitioner, do not get an unfair advantage over other candidates in
terms of exposure and publicity.
 Ruling: It is a valid exercise of police power. The COMELEC was acting well within its scope of
powers when it required petitioner to discontinue the display of the subject billboards. If the subject
billboards were to be allowed, candidates for public office whose name and image are used to
advertise commercial products would have more opportunity to make themselves known to the
electorate, to the disadvantage of other candidates who do not have the same chance of lending
their faces and names to endorse popular commercial products as image models.
 Notes:
o The COMELEC is expressly authorized to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all media communication or information to ensure equal opportunity, time and
space. By regulating the use of election propaganda materials, the COMELEC is merely
doing its duty under the law. Under Sections 3 and 13 of the Fair Elections Act, all election
propaganda are subject to the supervision and regulation by the COMELEC
o Time and again, this Court has said that contracts affecting public interest contain an
implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the exiting legal order. Police
power can be activated at anytime to change the provisions of the contract, or even
abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will
not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the
paramount police power.
 The resolution is not a violation of the non-impairment of contract clause. It has been held that the
non-impairment clause must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the Government.
23
*Lucena Grand Terminal v. JAC Liner, 452 SCRA 174 (exclusive franchise)
 Questioned Ordinance: Lucena City promulgated Ordinance No. 1631 granting the petitioner
exclusive franchise of terminals in the city and Ordinance No. 1778 which prohibited the entrance
of buses and jeepneys from entering the city and declared inoperable all terminals in the city. JAC
Liners assails the validity of the ordinance.
 Lawful Purpose -- The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of
relieving traffic congestion in the City of Lucena, which involve public interest warranting the
interference of the State, making the first requisite for the proper exercise of police power
present.
 Unlawful Method -- The Court ruled that the city of Lucena did not properly exercise police
power when it enacted the assailed ordinances. According to the SC, the ordinances were
overbreadth because the purpose that the city sought to be achieved could be attained by
reasonable restriction rather than absolute prohibition and granting of exclusive franchise only to
one company.
 Ruling: Though there is a lawful subject which is the easing of traffic congestion in the city. It is
not the terminals, but the indiscriminate loading and unloading which impedes traffic due to
the lack of space in the terminals Terminals were not an obstacle but a legitimate business.
Thus issuing of exclusive franchise to only one terminal is a violation of substantive due process
of businesses to put up their own terminals.
o If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload
passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications
for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied
those which are unable to meet the specifications. In the subject ordinances, however,
the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even
entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are
barred from operating at all.
*Bayan v. Ermita, GR 169848, April 25, 2006 (no permit, no rally)

 Doctrine: BP 880 is a valid exercise of police power. It does not restrain the exercise of the right
to peaceful assembly. It merely regulates where, when and manner the peaceful assembly
would be conducted. Moreover, the permits to rally CANNOT be DENIED unless there is
clear and present danger to public safety, morals or health. Thus the method employed was
also reasonable.
o B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that
simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies, which refer to the
content-neutral regulation of the manner of holding public assemblies.
o A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of
public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not
make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise
they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion,"
"protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since
they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of
grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided.
Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is
independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
o Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
o Alternative (in case Dean asks) of the rallyists who do not wish to obtain license: freedom
parks. This is provided for in Sec. 15 of the assailed law, where no prior permit is needed
for peaceful assembly and petition at any time.
24
*KMU v. Dir. Gen. 487 SCRA 623 (uniform ID system)
 On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the
data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of
government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality
of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative
safeguards.
o The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by
government entities. Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS,
Philhealth, and LTO cannot perform effectively and efficiently their mandated functions
under existing laws. Without a reliable ID system, GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and similar
government entities stand to suffer substantial losses arising from false names
and identities. The integrity of the LTOs licensing system will suffer in the absence of a
reliable ID system.
o With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data
collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated as strictly confidential under
Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential but also personal
matters. The data treated as strictly confidential under EO 420 being private matters and
not matters of public concern, these data cannot be released to the public or the press.
*Mirasol v. DPWH 490 SCRA 318 (motorcycle prohibition)

 The test of constitutionality of a police power measure is limited to an inquiry on whether the
restriction imposed on constitutional rights is reasonable, and not whether it imposes a restriction
on those rights
o The means by which the government chooses to act is not judged in terms of what is
“best,” rather, on simply whether the act is reasonable—reason, not scientific exactitude,
is the measure of the validity of the government regulation.
o The use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of
the police power of the State. A toll way is not an ordinary road—the special purpose for
which a toll way is constructed necessitates the imposition of guidelines in the manner of
its use and operation.
 It is a valid exercise of police power because the use of public highways by motor vehicles
is a valid subject of regulation.
o The means are reasonable (setting a requirement of 400 CC for motorcycles before
they can access the Limited Access Highways) in safeguarding the people who
use the toll ways and to prevent accidents.
o There is nothing oppressive in being required to take a bus or drive a car instead of one’s
scooter, bicycle, calesa, or motorcycle upon using a toll way.
 Not all motorized vehicles are created equal—real and substantial differences exist between a
motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those
prohibited from plying the toll ways
o A 16-wheeler truck is substantially different from other light vehicles. The first may be
denied access to some roads where the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be
reasonably differentiated from newer models.
o We find that real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms
of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll
ways. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a
motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck.
o The most obvious and troubling difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is
less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheeled vehicle.
 The Court said that the right to travel does not entitle a person to the best form of transport or to
the most convenient route to his destination (convenient is the toll way but there are other ways to
reach the destination). The obstructions found in normal streets, which petitioners (probably
motorcycle users) complain of are not suffered by them alone.
25
*Parreno v. COA 523 SCRA 390 (pension banned for US citizen)
 It is only upon retirement that military personnel acquire a vested right to retirement benefits.
o Hence, petitioner’s retirement benefits were only future benefits and did not constitute a
vested right. Before a right to retirement benefits or pension vests in an employee, he
must have met the stated conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of employment,
age, and length of service. It is only upon retirement that military personnel acquire a
vested right to retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever
they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law.
o The petitioner during the time the law on retirement benefits was changed to exclude
Filipinos who lose their Filipino citizenship. There was no vested right yet because the
petitioner was still in service during the time the law was changed.
o An AFP retiree who lost his retirement benefits as a result of his naturalization in some
other country will be entitled to receive his monthly pension should he reacquire his
Filipino citizenship since he will again be entitled to the benefits and privileges of Filipino
citizenship reckoned from the time of his reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.
*St. Luke’s v. NLRC 517 SCRA 677 (regulation of profession)

 Though Maribel Santos has the right to security of tenure, this can be validly regulated by police
power. The law requires the licensing of x-ray professionals (lawful method) in order to
safeguard public health and safety (lawful subject) because of the deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance, being a highly technical job.
*MMDA v. Viron 530 SCRA 341 (power of MMDA)

 MMDA is an administrative, coordinating and policy setting body coordinating with various
national government agencies which has NO POLICE POWER.
o Despite the existence of the EO, MMDA cannot issue a resolution to remove the bus
terminals
 Assuming in arguendo that police power may be delegated to the MMDA, the closure of the bus
terminals is not a reasonable method to decongest traffic (reasonable purpose). Other more
reasonable methods might be more effective and reasonable.
 Note: A bus company’s certificate of public convenience confers no property right, and are mere
licenses or privileges which must yield to legislation safeguarding the interests of the people.
*Sec. of DND v. Manalo 568 SCRA 42 (amparo)

 Writ of amparo is issued to one whose right to security, life, and liberty is violated. It is not
an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.
 An amparo petition only requires substantial evidence and the testimony of the victims will be
given great weight. The amparo reliefs given (i.e. order directing petitioners to give all reports of
the investigation; disclose present assignment of captors; and to produce all medical records
while in captivity) were reasonably necessary to protect the Manalo brothers.
 The writ of amparo was properly given because there is still a threat to the life and liberty
of the Manalo brothers since their captors remain at large. The right to security is the right of
enjoyment of life. The continuing threat on the life of the Manalo brothers is apparent. This
threat vitiates their free will because they are forced to limit their movements and activities.
*Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo 630 SCRA 211 (writ of amparo/habeas corpus)

 The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and by
this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition;
The doctrine is used to pinpoint liability
o The doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability
and by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an
amparo petition.
26
o The inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo proceeding
does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the
ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect
acquiescence; Commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command
responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.
 The Writ of Amparo on returning the belongings and the inspection of Fort Magsaysay were
denied because the abductors, as well as the alleged place of confinement, were never proven by
the petitioners. The Writ of Amparo is for the purpose of safeguarding the right to life,
liberty and security and not determining the liabilities.
 The writ of habeas data is a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy most especially
the right to informational privacy of individuals. It can only be issued after showing
substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of right to privacy in life, liberty or
security. It was also denied because it was not proven Gen. Palparan and Alcover did have in
their possession videos and photos related to the alleged CPP-NPA ties of Roxas. The SC
instructed the CHR to lead the further investigation of the case.
*Meralco v. Lim 632 SCRA 195 (writ of habeas data)

 DOCTRINE: Generally, the writ of habeas data rule is designed to protect by means of judicial
complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is
meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus
safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against
abuse in this age of information technology. The writ of habeas data will NOT issue to: (1) protect
purely property/commercial concerns, or (2) when the grounds are vague or doubtful.
o Habeas data is designated to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy,
honor, information and freedom of information of an individual. The writ of habeas data
directs the issuance only against public officials or employees, or private
individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting or strong of data or
information regarding an aggrieved party's person, family or home. MERALCO is
not engage in such activities.
o Habeas data will not be issued to protect purely property or commercial concerns.
The NLRC has jurisdiction over the case at bar. Habeas data is an inappropriate remedy
when an employee wants to know of the reasons for her transfer.
*Remman Enterprises v. Professional Regulatory Board, GR 197676, Feb 4 , 2014 (real estate
developer’s right to dispose property)
 DOCTRINE: No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, business or trade is a
legitimate subject of police power particularly when it affects legitimate governmental functions,
preservation of the State, public health, welfare and public morals.
o It has long been held that police power can regulate a profession. The law which
requires the exam before one can become a broker; requires licensed broker to be head
businesses which involves selling of land, and the registration of partnerships and
corporations and submitting names of duly licensed brokers.
o The legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of real
estate practitioners by increasing their competence and raising ethical standards
as real property transactions are “susceptible to manipulation and corruption,
especially if they are in the hands of unqualified persons working under an ineffective
regulatory system.” The new regulatory regime aimed to fully tap the vast potential of the
real estate sector for greater contribution to our gross domestic income, and real estate
practitioners “serve a vital role in spearheading the continuous flow of capital, in boosting
investor confidence, and in promoting overall national progress.”
 There is substantial distinction between real estate developers and those who own the property
and decide to sell them. Real estate developers do this job for a living while the exempted ground
just wants to sell their property. It is a profession against one’s right to dispose property.
27
*Disini v. Secretary of Justice, GR 203335, Feb 18, 2014 (Cybercrime Law)
 The Court states that “aiding or abetting” with respect to libel is unconstitutional because it suffers
from the overbreadth doctrine. The terms “aiding or abetting” constitutes a broad sweep that
generates a chilling effect on those who express themselves through cyber space. A person
“liking” a post can constitute aiding or abetting with respect on libel even if the person does not
intend such. Thus, it was struck down for being unconstitutional.
 Prohibiting Unsolicited Commercial Communications, commonly known as spam, is also
unconstitutional because it curtails a person’s freedom to read his own mails. Unsolicited
advertisements are still legitimate forms of expression.
 Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data is unconstitutional because it infringes on a person’s right
to informational privacy, or the privacy not to have private information disclosed and the right to
live freely without surveillance. This provision empowers law enforcement authorities, “with due
cause”, to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic data in real-time. This “due
cause” does not describe the purpose for which the data will be used. The authority this provision
gives law enforcement authorities is too sweeping and lacks restraint.
 Blocking Access to Computer Data is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of expression and against unlawful search and seizure. Under this
provision, the government, in effect, can seize and place computer data under its control and
disposition without a warrant. It only requires an order from the DOJ to restrict or block access to
such computer data. An order from the DOJ cannot substitute a warrant.
 Being punished for the same crime twice is also unconstitutional. Only Online Libel and
Online Child pornography is held to be unconstitutional because it punishes the same act (the
elements of libel and child pornography are the same); thus it constitutes double jeopardy. The
other crimes were held constitutional.
*Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014 (RH Law void for vagueness)
 A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its
application. It is repugnant to the Constitution specifically the Bill of Rights in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons; especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice
of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
o The term "knowingly" is vague in the context of the law because it does not say how
much information the offender must have regarding those programs and services as to
charge with an obligation to impart it to others and be penalized if he "knowingly" fails to
do so. The depth of a person's information about anything varies with the circumstances.
o One who merely reads about those programs and services, like a private hospital nurse
who receives a letter offering free program on birth control, would know little of the
detailed contents of that program and the competence of those who will run it. But since
the law also fails to state what the term "information" means, that private nurse could be
charged with "knowingly" withholding information about the birth control program she
learned from reading mails if she does not disseminate it to others.
o Another element of the offense is that the health care service provider must knowingly
withhold or restrict dissemination of the information that he has. It fails to state, however,
to whom he has an obligation to make a disclosure. It also gives him no discretion to
decide to whom such information would be suitable and to whom not.
o The health care service provider would be vulnerable to charges of violation of the law
where he is denied the chance to know before hand when the obligation to disclose
presents itself.
28
*Garcia v. Drilon – 699 SCRA 352
 Doctrine: The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to
due process.
o Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant
to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already
have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented.
o It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due
process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is
protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and
security.
 R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the
right to due process.
o The issuance of the TPO before a hearing was conducted is valid because of the need of
the circumstances. The accused was still given the right to be heard EVEN IF it was
only after the issuance of the TPO. It is not a criminal judgment requiring the right
to be heard due process in the instant. It is only a provisional remedy which may
be issued while the hearing is conducted after (similar with De lima v. Gatdula).
o The opportunity to be heard can be either through oral arguments or pleadings.
There are instances where the law itself allows the hearing to be allowed after the
issuance because of necessity.
*Caram v. Segui – 732 SCRA 86 (adoption not subject to amparo)
 Doctrine: SC said Writ of Amparo is limited to extra-legal killings and enforced
disappearances or threats thereof. There was neither extra-legal killing nor enforced
disappearance in this case since the whereabouts of Baby Julian is well known to Christina
(elements of enforced disappearance lacking).
 Elements of enforced disappearances: [3rd and 4th lacking here]
o 1. that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
o 2. that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization;
o 3. that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
o 4. that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.
*Mison v. Gallegos – 760 SCRA 363 (writ of amparo)

 Ruling: The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life,
liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
o “Extralegal killings” are “killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings.” On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are
“attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by
a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or
indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.”
o Ku’s circumstance does not come under the statutory definition of an enforced or
involuntary disappearance. Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no refusal
on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to give
information on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the BI had any intention
to remove Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged time. However, that even
before his arrest, deportation charges against him were already duly filed and ruled upon
29
by the BI. As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTC’s grant of the privilege of the
writ of amparo was improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts were never
concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were unfounded and
unsubstantiated.
*Zarate v. Aquino III, GR 220028, November 10, 2015 (writ of amparo/habeas data)
 Habeas data is remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. The writ provides
a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particular in
instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. This requires substantial evidence.
o The information contained in the lists is only their names, positions in their respective
organizations, and their photographs. All these data are of public knowledge and are
readily accessible even to civilians. Thus, there is no violation of his right.
National Dev’t Co. and New Agrix v. Phil Vet. Bank - 192 SCRA 257 (dissolved mortgages)
 The extinction of mortgage and other liens owned by legitimate creditors of AGRIX constitutes a
taking without due process. The mortgages and loans are purely private and have not been
shown to affect the interest of the general public; therefore, there was no cause to deprive the
private individuals of vest property rights. Outright confiscation of property without NOTICE and
HEARING is invalid. IF there is a taking, there must be a JUST COMPENSATION.
ACCFA v. CUGCO - 30 SCRA 649 (fringe benefits; collective bargaining agreement) Agustin v. Edu - 88
SCRA 195 (Early Warning Device)
 Despite providing in the Labor Code, unions are allowed to strike to collectively bargain with its
employers on the condition of employment, wages, rights, fringe benefits. Employees employed
in governmental functions of the Government including but not limited to governmental
corporations, are not allowed to strike for the purposes of securing changes or modification in
their terms and conditions of employment. Government workers are not allowed to strike. This
is a police power measure to affirm the laissez faire system (minimum government
interference in economic activities).
 The court held that the labor union was not entitled to certification of election because such
certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect
to terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive
economic weapon.
Maranaw Hotel v. NLRC – 238 SCRA 190 (illegal dismissal; right to appeal)
 In Aris (Phil) Inc. v. NLRC, the court sustained the constitutionality as an exercise of the police
power of the state and further ruled that since appeal is a privilege of statutory origin, the law may
validly prescribe limitations or qualifications thereto to provide relief to the prevailing party in the
event an appeal is interposed by the losing party.
 In art 223 of the Labor Code, the execution pending appeal is granted; the employee
concerned shall be admitted back to work under the terms and conditions prevailing prior to his
dismissal or separations. However, the employer is granted the option to merely reinstate the
employee in the payroll. The relief is the wages the employee would be earning.
 It must be stressed however, that although the reinstatement aspect of the decision is
immediately executory, it does not follow that it is self-executory. There must be a writ of
execution which may be issued motu propro or on motion of an interest party.
30
Montesclaros v. Comelec, GR 152295, July 7, 2002 (Sk election postponed)
 Also petitioners contend that SK membership is a property right and therefore the chance to sit in
as SK members is lost is wrong because of the moving from May 6, 2002 to July 15, 2002. Some
of them would be turning 20 and thus not be able to run for SK members. Public office is not a
property right but a public trust. No one has a vested right to hold or expectancy of
holding public office.
People v. De la Piedra, 350 SCRA 163 (illegal recruitment)

 Doctrine: An act or provision of law cannot be considered as vague, despite being obscure on its
face if it can be saved by proper statutory construction.
o Article 12 of the Labor Code was being assailed for being void for vagueness which
violates the right to due process.
Pilipinas Kao v. CA, GR 105014, Dec. 18, 2001 (unpublished manual of operations)
 BOI made a decision which it did not state the facts and reasons for the reduction, contrary to its
own rules and the law. The rules of BOI and law of the land requires that “Every decision must
express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it was based” – INCLUDING quasi-
judicial and administrative bodies.
 The Manual of Operations was not published; thus; the MO which reduced the tax credits is void.
Generally, internal rules need not be published, but if it affects the rights of the public, publication
is deemed necessary. Publication is a constructive notice, an essential element of due process.
Philsa v. Sec. of DOLE, GR 103144, Apr. 4, 2001 (unpublished illegal exaction memo)
 The factual findings of POEA were found by the Court as correct. However, Philsa cannot be held
liable liable for illegal exaction under Memorandum Circular No. 2 since this was not published.
Publication is a requirement of due process. The SC still suspended Philsa for 6 months
because it was guilty of contract substitution and unlawful deduction of salary.
ABAKADA v. Ermita, 469 SCRA 1 (input taxes)

 The input tax is not a property or property right within the constitutional purview of the due
process clause. A VAT-registered person’s entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere
statutory privilege. The right to credit input tax as against the output tax is clearly a privilege
created by law, a privilege that also the law can remove, or in this case, limit.
Beltran v. Secretary of Health, 476 SCRA 168 (commercial blood bank phased out)
 This is a valid exercise of police power. The law aimed to provide safe blood for the people and to
safeguard against the spread of transfusion-related illnesses because people are donating blood
for money despite not bet physically fit to commercial blood banks. Public health has been held
to be a valid subject for the exercise of police power. Phasing out commercial blood banks is
a reasonable method because it allows the government to better ensure that the blood available
to the public will be safe and of high quality. Individual interests of the blood bank owners must
give way to public welfare.
Ong v. Sandiganbayan, 470 SCRA 1 (ill-gotten wealth; spouse)

 The forfeiture to the State of property of a public official or employee partakes of the nature of a
penalty and proceedings for forfeiture of property, although technically civil in form, are deemed
criminal or penal. Preliminary investigation may not be a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution but a mere statutory privilege, it is nonetheless considered a component of due
process in criminal justice.
o The Court also ruled that Ong should have been notified of the subpoenas issued to
SGV, Allied Bank and the BIR. Although there is no indication on record that clarificatory
hearings were conducted pursuant to the subpoenas, Ong is entitled to be notified of
the proceedings and to be present thereat. The fact that he was not so notified is a
denial of fundamental fairness which taints the preliminary investigation.
31
Carlos v. DSWD 526 SCRA 130 (tax credits and tax deductions)
 The ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. The rapid increase in the population of BF
Paranaque necessitated the conversion of the said streets to commercial areas. Besides, the
streets were already commercialized even before the ordinance was enacted. Police power is
SUPERIOR to the non-impairment clause of contracts.
SJS v. Atienza 545 SCRA 92 (oil depots)

 There is no legal impediment in the closing down of the Pandacan Terminals. It is a valid exercise
of police power because the removal of highly dangerous fuels near residential areas (lawful
method) is a valid way of safeguarding the health and safety of the general public (lawful subject).
The oil companies contend that is a deprivation of their property rights; however, the right to life is
superior to the rights to property.
 Furthermore, since police power is used, just compensation is not necessary. Such is a
requirement only in the exercise of eminent domain.
BANAT v. COMELEC 595 SCRA 477 (salary for poll watchers)

 The non-impairment clause only applies if there is a perfected contract. At the time of the
enactment of the law, there were still no perfected contracts between the poll watchers and the
parties. Therefore, no obligation will be impaired.
 Furthermore, this (poll watchers of dominant majority and dominant minority parties shall be given
a fixed per diem of P400) is still a valid exercise of police power. The role of poll watches is
vested with public interest which can be regulated by Congress in the exercise of police power.
Giving the poll watchers fair and equitable compensation promotes general welfare.
Southern Hemisphere v. ATC 632 SCRA 146 (as-applied doctrine)

 There is no justiciable issue. Petitioners do not have locus standi. None of the petitioners face
any charges under RRA 9372. The Court will not take judicial notice of alleged tagging of
petitioners by the military because the requisites are incomplete. Transcendental importance
would normally give standing to petitioners, but penal legislation belongs to a different genus with
regard to constitutional litigation. Locus standi is placed under closer judicial scrutiny – nothing
charged or maybe charged against them. Taxpayer suit would not also provide standing because
there is no disbursement of public funds.
 Facial challenges void for vagueness and overbreadth are not applicable for RA 9372 because
those are applicable only for free speeches. The "as-applied" doctrine is used for assailing
constitutionality of penal laws. It considers only extant facts affecting real litigants.
Pollo v. Karina Constantino, GR 181881, October 8, 2011 (right to privacy)

 Pollo's right to privacy was not tarnished and that the search was legal and reasonable in his
computer at the CSC. There were reasonable grounds for the search because of the anonymous
letter of anomalies of misconduct by the petitioner. Furthermore, in the absence of allegations of
having expected privacy in his computer, it is negated the CSC policy of regulating its employees’
computers. The search will be permissible in its cope when the measures adopted are
reasonably related to objectives of the search (finding if petitioner has anomalies in his
computer) and not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the act [misconduct].
 The Court ruled that one’s right to privacy is based on standard of reasonable necessity of
privacy under all circumstances. A recent case was resolved that one’s right to privacy is
based on how personal it is. (Facebook posts open to friends can be accessed by that person’s
friends).
Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s Collage, GR 161107, March 12, 2013

 The school had parking space for those going inside the school. There was no need to give
parking space for those going inside the school outside the school. The Supreme Court stated
that the purpose of moving the fence back by 5 meters seemed to be give free parking space
to the citizen outside the school. The Court stated that this is not an exercise of police power, but
32
of power of eminent domain. The power of eminent domain involves the power of the
government to take private property for public use. There should be compensation for
such taking.
 The requirement of the 80% see through fence was also held unconstitutional because the Court
in a long line of jurisprudence (People v. Fajardo) ruled that the government cannot use police
power for aesthetical purposes. It is also encroaches upon the right of privacy of the school for
the nuns living in the school. The nuns would be seen from the outside. The petitioner also has
not shown how it would lessen the number of crimes by having a see-thru fence.
Legaspi v. City of Cebu, GR 159110, December 10, 2013 (immobilizing of car)

 The Court states that the ordinance proving the clamping of vehicle tires when illegally parked
even for the short while is constitutional. The Court states that its lawful purpose is to prevent
congestion of traffic in which one of the causes are the parked cars. The means would be the
clamping of car tires until the fine is paid. Furthermore, the owner of the car can file a protest in
which they can remove the clamp without paying for anything.
U.E. v. Pepanio – 689 SCRA 250

 The dismissal of the respondents was held to be constitutional. The probationary appointments
given to the respondents provided an ample amount of time to comply with the minimum
postgraduate qualification. They could not have acquired that regular status without first
complying with the minimum postgraduate qualification as mandated in the University’s Policy
and Collective Bargaining Agreements and the DECS’s orders and manual. The law provided that
teachers who are probationary may be replaced with more qualified teachers. The
educational requirement for tertiary education is not unreasonable. The operation of educational
institutions is of public interest and it is the government’s duty to ensure the quality of such.
Nagkakaisang Maralita v. Sitio – 697 SCRA 359

 The handwritten addendum of President Marcos, making Western Bicutan an alienable land, was
held not to be effective with the lack of publication (Tanada v. Tuvera). *note* a Presidential
Decree cannot be repealed by a mere Presidential Proclamation.
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. CA – 260 SCRA 319 (OFW deployment ban)
Dans v. People – 285 SCRA 504 (right to counsel)
Ople v. Torres – 293 SCRA 141 (read with KMU v. Dir. Gen.) (national ID system)
Tan v. People – 290 SCRA 117 (lumber)
Cruz v. Flavier, GR 135385, December 6, 2000 (IPRA; regalia doctrine)
Smith Kline v. CA, GR 121267, Oct. 23, 2001 (pharmaceutical patent)
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148560, Nov. 19, 2001 (plunder, void for vagueness)
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371 (corruption; no preliminary investigation)
Esponcilla v. Bagong Tanyag 529 SCRA 654 (member beneficiaries)
BF v. City Mayor 515 SCRA 1 (reclassification to commercial zones)
Perez v. LPG 531 SCRA 431 (penalty on per cylinder basis)
SJS v. DDB 570 SCRA 410 (mandatory drug testing)
SEC v. Interport 567 SCRA 354 (show cause order)
People v. Siton 600 SCRA 476 (vagrancy law)
CREBA v. Romulo 614 SCRA 605 (creditable withholding tax; MCIT)
Sto. Tomas v. Paneda 685 SCRA 245 (illegal recruitment)
De Lima v. Gatdula, GR 204528, Feb 19, 2013 (writ of amparo)
Ligot v. Republic, GR 176944, March 6, 2013
Republic v. Roque, GR 204603, Sep. 24, 2013 (void for vagueness)
Bankers Association of the PH v. COMELEC, GR 206794, November 26, 2013
Manila Memorial Park v. DSWD, GR 175356, December 3, 2013
Burgos v. Esperon – 715 SCRA 208 (writ of amparo)
Hermano Oil Manufacturing v. TRB – 742 SCRA 397
33
III. Equal Protection of Law (do matrix of all cases; asterisk for recit)
Rational Basis Scrutiny –requires that the classification must serve a rationally related and legitimately related to state interest – the
government must not impose difference in treatment except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation.
Intermediate Scrutiny – requires that the classification must serve an important state interest and is substantially related to the achievement
of such objective – gender, illegitimacy, or sex.
Strict Scrutiny – requires that the classification must serve a compelling state interest and is necessary to achieve such interest involving
fundamental rights – race, nationality, religion, alienage, voting, migration, access to courts.
Requisites for a valid classification:

(1) Must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) Must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) Must not be limited to existing conditions only (present and future)
(4) Must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Case: Facts Alleged Valid Classification Test Doctrine Notes

Discrimination
*Villegas v. City ordinance 6537 It is arbitrary, Substantial Distinction (NO) – P50 is Although the Philippines may The equal protection
Hiu Chiong which does not allow oppressive and unreasonable because it is (1) excessive regulate entry of aliens, when clause does not
Tsai Pao Ho - non-Filipinos to be unreasonable, and (2) it failed to consider substantial they are within the Philippines, only provide for a
86 SCRA 270 employed or engaged being applied differences in situation among aliens. – reasonable
(employment in any occupation only to aliens. some earns more than others They are also protected by the qualification, but
permit) within the City of Constitution and cannot be during instances
Manila without first The P50 fee is Germane to the purpose of the law (NO) deprived of their life without when classification
securing an unreasonable.. – there is no logic or justification in exacting due process of law. is need, the law
employment permit a fee from aliens who have been cleared for must classify such.
(with respective costs) employment DOCTRINE: Once an alien is
from the Mayor of the admitted within the PH territory,
city. Present and Future Conditions (YES) – he cannot be deprived of life
without due process of law and
Equal application to the members of the this guarantee includes the
same class (NO) – Once a person has means of livelihood. The
been admitted to the country, he cannot protection under the due process
deprived of life(livelihood included) without and equal protection clause is
due process of law. Protection of EPC is given to ALL persons, both
given to all persons, both alien and aliens and citizens.
citizens.
*Ormoc Ormoc City It is alleged that Substantial Distinction (N/A) – Laws should not target single Wilayco: “all sugar
Sugar Central Ordinance which ordinance and exclusive companies in a mills should pay 1%
v. Ormoc City provides that Ormoc violates EPC Germane to the purpose of the law (not way that subsequent companies municipal tax
- L-23794 Sugar Company shall for only discussed) – of the same nature shall not be exported.”
February 17, pay 1% municipal tax targeting them affected by the law.
1968 (law for everything and not others. Present and Future Conditions (NO) –
specific for exported to foreign taxing ordinances should not be singular DOCTRINE: An ordinance was
Ormoc Sugar countries and exclusive as to exclude any subsequent declared void because it taxes
Central) established sugar central only centrifugal sugar produced
and exported by the Ormoc
Equal application to the members of the Sugar Company and none other,
same class (NO) – “Ormoc Sugar Central such that if a new sugar central
shall 1% municipal tax for its every export.” is established in Ormoc, it would
not be subject to the ordinance.
There was an invalid
classification.
*Central Bank Last paragraph of It is being Substantial Distinction (NO) – there is no Concept of Relative Constitutionality:
Employees Section 15 (C) of Art II alleged that the substantial distinction so as to differentiate
Ass’n v. of R.A. 7653 (New aforesaid the BSP rank-and-file from other rank-and- The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every
Bangko Central Bank Act) paragraph file of the 7 government financial institution. instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its
Sentral ng states that violates the provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution,
Pilipinas, 446 compensation and equal Germane to the purpose of the law (NO) since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied
SCRA 299 wages structure of protection for – distinction is not germane to the purpose to one set of facts and invalid in its application to
(read with employees whose its only BSP of the law given that the purpose is (1) to another.
*British position fall under that maintains promote professionalism and excellence AT
American salary grade 19 and that all salary ALL LEVELS of the BSP, and (2) to hire A statute valid at one time may become void at another
Tobacco v. below shall be in grade 19 would and retain qualified and effective personnel time because of altered circumstances.
Sec of accordance with the be in accord
Finance, rates prescribed under with the SSL. Present and Future Conditions (Not Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes
2008) R.A. 6758 or the SSL Discussed) – arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though
(classification where other affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and
based on governmental financial Equal application to the members of the investigation in the light of changed conditions.
salary- institutions were same class (NO) – it creates a
relative exempted from the classification between who do not have
constitutionali Salary Standardization substantial distinction.
ty) and the Attrition Act by
Congress *the court ruled that there was no valid
classification, despite formerly stating it as
constitutional.
35
*Yrasuegi v. Art. 282 (e) of the Petitioner On Discrimination** There is substantial distinction between
PAL 569 Labor Code which alleges that his obese cabin attendants against other
SCRA 467 provides reasons that obesity, being Substantial Distinction (YES) – an obese cabin given that the former’s immobility can
(obese flight justify an employee’s not intended attendant, being rather immobile, may impede passengers impede passengers from evacuating the
attendant) dismissal from service willfully, does from evacuating the aircraft in cases of emergency. aircraft in cases of emergency.
by his employer. not fall under
the “analogous Germane to the purpose of the law (YES) – the purpose Doctrine: EPC cannot be invoked against
A PAL steward was cases” of PAL in promoting such law is to provide flight safety to a private party. EPC may only be invoked
overweight and was provided as passengers against the government.
terminated from work reasons for just
after several notices, dismissal as Present and Future Conditions (YES) –
chances and years to provided in the
get to the normal Labor Code. Equal application to the members of the same class
weight. (YES) – petitioners cannot establish discrimination by
simply naming supposed cabin attendants who are
allegedly similarly situated as him.
*League of Cityhood Law made The cityhood Substantial Distinction (YES) – the capability of other The cities *Those cities
Cities v. the net income laws granted municipalities and the exempted municipalities into enumerated in the enumerated were
COMELEC – requirement from 20M special becoming component cities of their respective provinces. cityhood laws also of the same
608 SCRA to 100M, but it treatment to have substantial class as those who
636 (pending provides municipalities municipalities Germane to the purpose of the law (YES) – the purpose difference against were already turned
bills for cities- that do not need these by way of is to create a more responsive and accountable local those not into a city
cityhood requirements because exemption from government structure instituted through a system of enumerated given
laws) they were already in the NEW decentralization whereby LGUs shall be given more their capability to *those of the same
Congress even before standard 100M powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. become class must enjoy the
the passage of the minimum component cities same privileges.
said law. income Present and Future Conditions (YES) – of their respective
requirement. provinces.
Equal application to the members of the same class
(YES) –
*People v. Siton was charged with vagrancy Substantial Distinction (YES) – ones punished are those endangering Penal statutes only punish
Siton – 600 pursuant to Art. 202 of the RPC which public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community, not those who satisfy the
SCRA 476 punishes any person found loitering for their status as for being poor or unemployed elements of a certain crime,
(vagrancy) about public or semi-public buildings or regardless of status.
places or tramping or wandering about Germane to the purpose of the law (YES) – to protect public peace
the country or streets without visible Penal statutes do NOT
means of support Present and Future Conditions (YES) – punish people, for who they
are, but what they DO or
Discriminatory against the poor and Equal application to the members of the same class (YES) – how they conduct
unemployed themselves.
36
*Quinto v. Omnibus Election Like in Farinas Substantial Distinction (YES) – there is substantial Appointive officials are classified
COMELEC – Code, COMELEC v. Executive difference as appointive officials hold their office by virtue differently from elective officials because
613 SCRA Resolution 8678, and Secretary of their designation thereto by appointing authority while they are prohibited from engaging in
385 RA 9369 provides that petitioners seek elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the partisan political activity.
(appointive any appointive public the same electorate
official) official shall be treatment as
considered ipso facto elective officials Germane to the purpose of the law (YES) – avoidance
resigned upon filing who are able to of danger of a powerful political machine and ensuring
his or her candidacy continue acting employees achieve advancement on their merits and be
for an elective position as elective free from coercion or favor from political activity
officials even
after filing Present and Future Conditions (YES) –
COCs for the
forthcoming Equal application to the members of the same class
elections. (YES) –
*People v. Accused Edgar Should there Substantial Distinction (No) – To uphold the argument DOCTRINE: The single definition for all
Jumanan - Jumawan was be a different of Jumawan would discriminate against married rape three forms of the crime shows that the
722 SCRA charged with the crime standard for victims over unmarried ones because it deprives them the law does not distinguish between rape
108 of rape by his wife, marital rape? – penal redress equally granted by law to ALL rape victims. committed in wedlock and those
KKK. The complaint NO committed without a marriage. Hence, the
alleged that he raped Germane to the purpose of the law (N/A) – law affords protection to women raped by
his wife on two their husband and those raped by any
occasions. Present and Future Conditions (N/A) – other man alike.
In his defense, Equal application to the members of the same class

Jumawan argues that (N/A) –
the two incidents were
consensual, obligatory
even, because he and
the victim were a
legally married and
cohabiting couple.
*Villanueva, After about a year Is the policy of Substantial Distinction (Yes) – Placing a premium on DOCTRINE: The foregoing shows that
v. JBC – 755 from being appointed JBC requiring many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely substantial distinctions do exist between
SCRA 182 as a MCTC judge, 5-year service applying one of the stringent constitutional standards lower court judges with five-year
Judge Villanueva is requiring that a member of the judiciary be of “proven experience and those with less than five
applied for the vacant constitutional? competence.” In determining competence, the JBC years of experience, like the petitioner,
position of presiding – Yes considers, among other qualifications, experience and and the classification enshrined in the
judge in performance. assailed policy is reasonable and relevant
some RTC branches. to its legitimate purpose.
37
Germane to the purpose of the law (Yes) –
The JBC however
informed him that he Present and Future Conditions (Yes) –
was not included in
the list of candidates Equal application to the members of the same class
for such position (Yes) –
because the JBC’s
long-standing policy
requires 5 years of
service as judge of
first-level courts before
one can apply as
judge for second-level
courts.
*Ferrer v. The Quezon City Substantial Distinction + Present and Future Conditions (Yes) – Doctrine: The disparities between a real
Bautista – Council enacted 2 property owner and an informal settler as
760 SCRA ordinances imposing: Germane to the purpose of the law (Yes) – SC held that while the law two distinct classes are too obvious and
652 1) Socialized Housing authorizes LGU’s to collect SHT on lands with an assessed value of more need not be discussed at length.
Tax (SHT) of Quezon than Php 50,0000, the questioned ordinance only covers lands with an
City, an imposition of a assessed value exceeding Php 100,000.
special assessment
that will collect 0.5% Equal application to the members of the same class (Yes) – For the
on the assessed purpose of undertaking a comprehensive and continuing urban development
value of land in excess and housing program, the disparities between a real property owner and an
of Php 100,000. informal settler as two distinct classes are too obvious and need not be
discussed at length.
2) Garbage Collection Substantial Distinction + Equal application to the members of the same For the purpose of garbage collection,
Fees imposing fees on class (No) – a resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized there is no substantial distinction between
residential properties housing project has to pay Php200.00; unlike unit occupants, all occupants an occupant of a lot, on one hand, FROM
based on the of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed rate of an occupant of a unit in a condominium,
land/floor area. Php100.00 socialized housing project or apartment,
on the other hand
Present and Future Conditions (Not Discussed) –
Most likely, garbage output produced by
Germane to the purpose of the law (No) – The classifications under the these types of occupants is uniform and
ordinance are NOT germane to its declared purpose of “promoting shared does not vary to a large degree; thus, a
responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in similar schedule of fee is both just and
over-consuming the present resources and in generating waste.” equitable.
38
*1-United v. COMELEC Resolution  “The EPC is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
COMELEC – was issued which departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
755 SCRA prohibit the posting of denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.”
441 any election campaign  A regulation of public transport terminals based on extraneous circumstances, such as prohibiting the posting of
or propaganda election campaign materials, amounts to regulating the ownership of transport terminal and not merely the permit to
material, inter alia, in operate
public  The Constitution does not require that things, which are different in fact, be treated in law as though they were the
utility vehicles (PUVs) same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different.
and public transport  In the case at bar, the classification is constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on substantial distinction
terminals. and is not germane to the purpose of the law.
 As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and
Does the prohibition owners of private vehicles and other properties.
on owners of PUVs o The ownership of PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains
and transport private.
terminals from posting  Any election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by many
election campaign people.
materials violate the o Campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other public places would also be seen by many
equal people.
protection clause? – o Thus, there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
YES  Classifying owners of PUVs and transport terminals apart from owners of private vehicles and other properties bears
no relation to the stated purpose of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615, i.e., to provide equal time,
space and opportunity to candidates in elections.
 The nexus between the restriction on the freedom of expression of owners of PUVs and transport terminals and the
government’s interest in ensuring equal time, space, and opportunity for candidates in elections was not established
by the COMELEC.
39
People v. Cayat - 68 PHIL. 12, 18 (indigenous people)
Ichong v. Hernandez - 101 PHIL. 1155 (retail trade)
Dumlao v. COMELEC - 96 SCRA 392 (young v retired elective official)
Goesart v. Cleary - 335 US 464 (female bartenders)
Basco v. PAGCOR - May 14, 1991 (gambling)
Republic v. Sandiganbayan – 230 SCRA 711 (deed of assignment by De’Venecia)
Binay v. Domingo - 201 SCRA 508 (poor burial assistance)
NPC v. De Guzman – 229 SCRA 801 (police retirement)
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance –249 SCRA 628 (E-VAT)
Himagan v. People - 237 SCRA 538 (PNP suspension)
Almonte v. Vasquez – 244 SCRA 286 (OMB complaint)
Lim v. Pacquing - 240 SCRA 649 (revoked jai-alai franchise)
Conference of Maritime Manning v. POEA - 243 SCRA 666 (land based v. sea-based OFW)
Regala v. Sandiganbayan – 262 SCRA 122 (attorney-client privilege)
Sison v. Ancheta – 130 SCRA 654 (tax on professionals)
Marcos v. CA – 278 SCRA 843 (pending criminal case)
Nolasco v. COMELEC – 275 SCRA 762 (COMELEC power)
Phil. Judges v. Prado – 227 SCRA 703 (franking privileges)
Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan – 248 SCRA 700 (business permits)
GMC v. Torres – 196 SCRA 216 (non-resident v resident alien employment permit)
Segovia v. Sandiganbayan - 288 SCRA 328 (OMB power to suspend)
Chavez v. PCGG – GR 130716 December 9, 1998 (witness in forfeiture cases)
Telebap v. COMELEC – 289 SCRA 337 (media in providing free airtime to COMELEC)
Tiu v. CA – GR 127410 January 20, 1999 (Subic Naval Base)
Lacson v. Executive Secretary – GR 128096 January 20, 1999 (SB jurisdiction)
Soriano v. CA – GR 123936 March 4, 1999 (financial capacity in probation cases)
Aguinaldo v. COMELEC – GR 132774 June 21, 1999 (incumbent officials)
Loong v. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832 (special election for governor)
International School v. Quisumbing – GR 128845 June 1, 2000 (salary for foreign hires)
De Guzman v. COMELEC, GR 129118, July 19, 2000 (election officers to other stations and fixed salary
for poll watchers)
Bayan v. Zamora, GR 138570, October 10, 2000 (Visiting Forces Agreement)
People v. Mercado, GR 116239, November 29, 2000 (death penalty)
People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689 (exemption of elective official)
Lopez v. CA, GR 144573, Sept. 24, 2002 (OMB Act)
Philreca v. Sec. of DILG, GR 140376, June 10, 2003 (withdrawal of tax exemption)
Farinas v. Executive Secretary, GR 147387, Dec. 10, 2003 (appointive officials)
Dimaporo v. HRET, GR 158359, Mar. 23, 2004 (congressional candidate)
GSIS v. Montescarlos, 434 SCRA 441 (married pensioners)
In re Request of Assistant Court Administrators, 440 SCRA 16 (compensation for judiciary)
Mirasol v. DPWH (supra. Substantive) (motorcycle v other vehicles)
In re Request of ACA 495 SCRA 432 (compensation for CTA and MTC judges)
Dimayuga v. OMB 495 SCRA 461 (OMB power to conduct preliminary investigation)
SJS v. Atienza 545 SCRA 92 (oil depot being dangerous)
Gobenciong v. CA 550 SCRA 302 (OMB power to suspend)
MIAA v. Olongapo 543 SCRA 269 (public bidding)
Nicolas v. Romulo – 578 SCRA 438 (VFA military member)
Serrano v. Gallant – 582 SCRA 254 (OFW v local worker)
CREBA v. Romulo – 614 SCRA 605 (supra.) (MCIT)
NPC v. Pinatubo – 616 SCRA 611 (manufacturers and processors of aluminum steel)
Biraogo v. PTC – 637 SCRA 78 (truth commission)
League v. COMELEC – 643 SCRA 149 (pending bills cityhood law)
PAGCOR v. BIR – 645 SCRA 338 (PAGCOR subject to tax)
Gancayco v. Quezon City – 658 SCRA 853 (demolition of building against Building Code)
Mendoza v. People, GR 183891, October 19, 2011
Bureau of Customs v. Teves, GR 181704, December 6, 2011 (IRR does not violate EPC)
Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary (supra.) (appointive officials)
Alvarez v. People 677 SCRA 673 (not all accused charged)
Garcia v. People 677 SCRA 750 (conviction under RPC and military court)
Arroyo v. DOJ (supra., Procedural Due Process)
Sto. Tomas v. Paneda 685 SCRA 245 (illegal recruitment)
In the matter of the brewing controversies in the elections of the IBP, AM 09-5-2-Sc, April 11, 2013 (supra
Art 3, Sec 1)
Aquino v. Philippine Ports Authority, GR 181973, April 17, 2013
Garcia v. Drilon, GR 179267, June 25, 2013
National Artist for literature Almario, GR 189028, July 16, 2013
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board v. Stronghold Insurance, Gr 200740, October 2,
2013
Imbong v. Ochoa, GR 204819, April 8, 2014 (RH Law) (supra Art III, Sec 1)
Spouses Dacudao v. DOJ, GR 188056, Jan 8, 2013
Goldenway v. Equitable – 693 SCRA 439
Remman v. PRBRES (supra.)
Espinas v. COA - 720 SCRA 302
Disini v. Secretary of Justice (supra.)
Bartolome v. SSS - 740 SCRA 78
41
Section 3.
Candelaria:
 Will the use of drones to view another’s property be a violation or privacy?
 Will the viewing of emails and iphones be considered a violation of communication and
correspondence under Section 3?
Privacy; Exclusionary Rule
*Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA – 235 SCRA 111 (wiretap)

 RA 4200 explicitly prohibits the admission of wire-tapped conversations as evidence in any
hearing, unless there was consent from all of the parties to the conversation. Absent a clear
showing THAT BOTH PARTIES TO THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS allowed the
recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No.
4200.
o *Note* It is still inadmissible if one of the parties to the conversation recorded it without the
consent of the other.
o It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or
however otherwise described.
*Zulueta v. CA - 253 SCRA 699 (husband and wife privacy)

 Right to privacy of communication found in the Constitution is only against the State. It is under
Art 26 of the New Civil Code which provides similar rights as provided in the Bill of Rights. There
must be unlawful acquisition of the documents to invoke this article.
 Privacy of Communication and Correspondence; Privacy of communication and correspondence
is inviolable. The only exception in the Constitution is if there is a “lawful order [from a] court or
when public safety or order requires, otherwise, as prescribed by law.”
 Doctrine: A person by contracting marriage does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy
as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
o The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the
drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or
his/her right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection.
*People v. Marti - 193 SCRA 57 (search by private person)

 The constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of
one’s person from interference by government; it cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
 The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against act of private
individuals, it is directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law.
 Doctrine: A search by a private person in his privacy capacity is not necessarily an unlawful
search and seizure because there was no warrant nor the exceptions. If it is against a private
person, one can’t invoke the exclusionary rule.
 The search is valid because it was conducted by a private individual, without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. Mere presence of NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected by proprietor Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure.
o Facts: Marti tried to send packages to a person in Switzerland through Manila Packing
and Export Forwarders. The proprietor, following its standard procedure of checking
42
packages, noticed a suspicious smell and found dried leaves. A portion was forwarded to
the NBI and was found to be Marijuana leaves
Sesbreño v. CA 720 SCRA 57(reiterates principle that guaranty against illegal searches and seizures does
not apply against private parties)
 Doctrine: If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally
be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. Even if the one that made the
search is a private individual.
 However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.
Ramirez v. CA – 248 SCRA 590

 In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a
private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone
extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated
therein, following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused.”
Waterous Drug Corp. v. NLRC – 280 SCRA 735

 There was no violation of the right of privacy of communication and Waterous was justified in
opening an envelope, even if addressed to one of its employees, from its regular suppliers as it
could assume that the letter was a business communication.
o The evidence was admissible because a company is justified to open the letter because it
can assume the letter was for the company just addressed to one of the employees.
People v. Bongcuaran, GR 143944, July 11, 2002

 Facts: Canoy reported to the security officer of M/V Super Ferry 5 that her jewelry is missing. She
suspected that her co-passenger as the culprit. The accused was bodily searched and no jewelry
was found. The security officer asked the accused to open her luggage which she did without
complaint where small plastics of shabu were found. The accused claims that it was an illegal
search and seizure.
 Ruling: The Court ruled that it was not an unlawful search and seizure because the party
conducting the search is not government employees. The unlawful search and seizure provision
only applies against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
o The security personnel are a private employee of the company; thus, the accused cannot
invoke the provision.
o It was only after the shabu was found before the Philippine Coast Guard was called; thus,
the search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was carried out without
government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable
search and seizure does not apply
Gutang v. People, GR 135406, July 11, 2000

 With a valid search warrant:
o 1) Receipt of Seized Property – should be with a counsel
o 2) laboratory exam of items – allowed
o 3) Urine Test– bodily exam is not prohibited
o 4) Validly seized – the physical and chemical examination is allowed even without a
counsel.
43
 The Receipt of Property Seized is inadmissible as evidence if it was obtained without the
assistance of a counsel because such receipt is a declaration against his interest and a tacit
admission of the crime charged.
 Doctrine: What is prohibited is the tacit confession with the signature of the accused. Thus, to
avoid such, the accused should not sign the bags containing the illegal drugs as it will be a tacit
confession on its part. To identify the drug seized, the accused is not required the bag of
illegal drugs, it can be any other person.
People v. Mendoza – GR 109279-80 January 18, 1999

Ople v. Torres - (supra, Substantive)
People v. Aruta – (supra, Warrantless Searches)
People v. Lim, GR 141699, Aug. 7, 2002
KMU v. Dir. - Gen. of NEDA 487 SCRA 623 (read with Ople)
Republic v. Roque, GR 204603, Sep. 24, 2013
Disini v. Secretary of Justice, GR 203335, Feb 18, 2014 (Cybercrime Law) (supra Art 3, Sec 1)
Waiver of Rights under Sec. 2 and Sec. 3
*People v. Damaso – 212 SCRA 547 (personal waiver)

 Doctrine: The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal
one, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one who is
expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
o In the case at bar, the records show that appellant was not in his house at that time Luz
Tanciangco and Luz Morados, his alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter it. We
find no evidence that would establish the fact that Luz Morados was indeed the appellant’s
helper or if it was true that she was his helper, that the appellant had given her authority to
open his house in his absence.
*Spouses Veroy v. Layague – 210 SCRA 97 (search of persons, not of materials)

 The personal waiver should be strictly construed. The waiver should state what is being
waived and only that is waived.
o The wife only waives the right to search for rebel soldiers and not a room to room search
and acquire unlicensed firearms. (It was not in plain view). The permission did not include
any authority to conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The items found
are not in the exceptions; thus, it was acquired illegally.
o In this case, the bpolice officers still employed a locksmith to open the padlock to open
the room of the children where they acquired the firearms. As there was no permission to
conduct a search of personal belongings. The search was illegal. They had acquired the
illegal items from inside the drawer, inside the handbags, etc.
People v. Evaristo - GR 93828 December 11, 1992

 The Court ruled that while in pursuit of a lawful arrest, the officers in plain view saw the
unlicensed firearms or illegal objects is admissible as evidence against the accused. Although they
were searching for a certain Rosillio, they had by accident and in plain view saw in the sala
unlicensed firearms.
Pastrano v. CA – (supra, Requisites of Warrant)

 The contention that Capt. Manoza did not have personal knowledge of the crime was cured by
the testimonies of the two witnesses which was trial court’s basis for the issuance of the warrant
of arrest.
44
Habeas Data
*Vivares v. St. Theresa’s College – 77 SCRA 92

 Doctrine Before one can have expectation of privacy in his/her online activity, it is first necessary
that said user manifest the intention to keep certain posts private through the employment of
measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.
 The writ of habeas data can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to
privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. Habeas data, to stress, was designed
“to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.” As such, it is erroneous to
limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only.
 Nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against
abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
As provided under Section 1 of the Rule: Section 1. Habeas Data.—The writ of habeas data is a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
 Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that
said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility. And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s
privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber
world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
o Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that
the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof
that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph.
o Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.
o It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to
“Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is
not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend
can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also,
when the ost is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of
the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting
of which was set at “Friends.”
 Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the
ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
o Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were limited to the
original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact
list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom"
setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to
limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at
large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
 It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and
activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. We cannot afford protection to
persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their private
zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they
desire to keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy
settings, such as those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing
these settings and the site’s layout often.
Lee v. Ilagan – 738 SCRA 59

Cam v. Almario, GR 212174, October 14, 2014
Zarate v. Aquino, III (supra.)
45
SECTION 4.
Prior Restraint
 Freedom of expression may not be limited upon a showing of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the State must prevent.
*Near v. Minnesota - 238 US 697 (malicious articles against officials)

 Enjoining the publication of an article, upon mere proof publication of “defamatory, scandalous
and malicious statements”, without looking into the falsity of the publication constitutes invalid
prior restraint. The proper remedy is a libel suit, where the facts are investigated.
*Freedman v. Maryland - 380 US 51 (judicial determination)

 DOCTRINE 1: Where motion pictures are concerned, a requirement of prior submission to a
censorship board is not necessarily unconstitutional. A noncriminal process requiring prior
submission of a film to a censor avoids constitutional invalidity only with procedural safeguards
designed to eliminate the dangers of censorship. Any restraint prior to judicial review must be
limited to preservation of the status quo and for the shortest period compatible with sound judicial
procedure. A prompt final judicial determination of obscenity must be assured
 Doctrine 2: It may avoid unconstitutionality only by compliance to the following procedural
requirements:
o Any prior restraint to judicial review can be imposed only briefly in order to preserve the
status quo;
o The censor must bear the burden of instituting judicial proceedings and proving that the
material is obscene; and,
o A prompt judicial determination of obscenity or non-obscenity by the court must be
assured.
*New York Times Co. v. US - 403 US 713 (top secret information)

 Doctrine: First Amendment guarantees the press must be left to publish news, whatever the
source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints, and the government has the heavy
burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint.
 Facts: The case occurred during the late 1960s-70s, at the time of the Vietnam War. US Sec of
Defense ordered the creation of a top-secret history of the American role in Indochina. History
article was entitled “History of US Decision-Making Process in Vietnam Policy” and was included in
the so-called “Pentagon Papers”.
o NY Times got hold of this article and began publishing news reports and articles about it.
The US government issued an injunction order against N YTimes in order to restrain them
from further publication of other articles purporting to be the Pentagon Papers.
o The Attorney General cited the Espionage Act to uphold such injunction. Such penalizes
“whoever has unauthorized possession of any document xxx relating to national defense,
which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the
US or to the advantage of any foreign nation.”
 Ruling: Is the publication of articles related to the Pentagon Papers allowed under the First
Amendment (right to free speech) – YES! Injunction was invalid for restricting the freedom of the
press. It is incumbent upon the government to show cause as to why such articles should not be
published.
Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance - GR 115444 October 30, 1995

 Doctrine 1: Press is not immune from paying taxes because it is still a legitimate business.
License tax is different from ordinary taxes because license tax to operate business is a prior
restraint based on US jurisprudence while ordinary taxes are placed upon every business.
License Tax = Illegal vs Regular Taxes = Legal
 Doctrine 2: Registration fees do not bar the freedom to expression, but only an administration
free.
46
 Doctrine 3: For tax are imposed on the sale of an object and NOT to burden the freedom of
expression. VAT is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege or a restraint to a right because every
object sold has VAT
INC v. CA - GR 119673 July 26, 1996

 Acts of prior restraint have a presumption of invalidity. It is only upon showing of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the State must prevent, that an infringement of religious
expression may be justified.
 **Congress can grant an administrative body quasi-judicial power to preview and classify TV
programs/films and enforce its decision subject to review by the Courts.
Newsounds v. Dy – 583 SCRA 333 (content-based restraint)

Alexander v. US - 113 S. Ct. 2766, 125 L. Ed. 2d. 441
David v. Arroyo – (supra)
Chavez v. Gonzales, GR No. 168338, Feb. 15, 2008
GMA v. COMELEC – 734 SCRA 88 (supra.)
Subsequent punishment
*People v. Perez - 45 PHIL. 599 (dangerous tendency rule)

 Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary is permitted
and would be within the range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious.
This must yield to punitive measures.
o Candelaria: Take note of the historical and political context of the case.
 This must yield to the dangerous tendency rule. Seditious statements must be punished to
maintain the integrity and the prestige of authority and the State.
 *G.R. Use Clear and Present Danger Rule unless it is an attack on the Judiciary (SC). The
standards are higher before one can get convicted. (Atty. Wilwayco)
o If lower courts – clear and present danger. Only if SC will be use the Dangerous
Tendency Rule.
o In gist, the clear and present danger rule is when the statement or act will create a
substantive evil that the government will want to prevent.
*Dennis v. US - 341 US 494 (overthrow of government)

 Facts: Petitioners were leaders of the Communist Party in the US. They were unwilling to work
under the framework of democracy, instead leading by violent revolution. They are charged with
violation of the Smith Act, which makes it a crime for a person to advocate, abet, advice, or teach
to overthrow or the destruction of the government by force or violence
 Ruling: The convictions are upheld and the law is constitutional. The Congress was concerned
with the very kind of activity the petitioners engaged in.
 The law does not punish speech, but the advocacy. Restraint on speech is merely incidental. A
conviction relying on speech as evidence of violation may only be sustained when the speech
creates a clear and present danger of attempting or accomplishing the prohibited crime.
 Freedom of speech is not an unlimited, unqualified right but the societal value of speech must, on
occasion, be subordinated to other values and considerations. Overthrowing the Government by
force and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government to limit
speech.
 *Note* For the clear and present danger rule, it does not mean that you have to wait for the
danger to actually happen because otherwise it would be too late.
*Gonzales v. COMELEC - 27 SCRA 835 (early nomination of candidates)

 From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the
press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom
of expression is not an absolute. It would be too much, to insist that at all times and under all
47
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other social values that
press for recognition.
 The Clear and Present Danger Rule means that the evil consequence of the comment or
utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the
utterance can be punished. There is a substantive evil ought to be prevented. The danger must
not only be probable but very likely inevitable.
 The Dangerous Tendency Rule -- “If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the
state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some
definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfullness be advocated. It is sufficient that
such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be
reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfullness. It is sufficient if
the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body seeks to prevent”.
 The "balancing" test requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the
interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation.
o A wide range of factors are necessarily relevant in ascertaining the point or line of
equilibrium. Among these are (a) the social values and importance of the specific aspect
of the particular freedom restricted by the legislation; (b) the specific thrust of the
restriction, i.e., whether the restriction is direct or indirect, whether or not the persons
affected are few; (c) the value and importance of the public interest sought to be secured
by the legislation — the reference here is to the nature and gravity of the evil which
Congress seeks to prevent;(d) whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress is
reasonably appropriate and necessary for the protection of such public interest; and (e)
whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved by
some other measure less restrictive of the protected freedom.
 Facts: Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 4880 which prohibits the too early
nomination of candidates (150 days/90 days) and limiting the period of election campaign or
partisan political activity (120days/90 days).
 Ruling: It lacked ONE vote to be declared as unconstitutional.
o It is known to all that the country has suffered direful consequences and harmful effects
with regard to purely partisan pursuits. (only political motives to maintain in power)–
Actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty,
corruption and violence if they are allowed to campaign all year long.
o No work would be done in the government. The law is a valid limitation on the preferred
rights of speech and press.
*Ayer Prod. PTY. LTD. v. Judge Capulong - 160 SCRA 861 (public figure)
 Doctrine: A limited intrusion into a person’s privacy has been long regarded as permissible
where: 1) the person is a public figure, and 2) the information sought to be elicited from him or
to be published about him constitute of a public character.
o Right of privacy; Right of privacy like right of free expression is not an absolute right; The
right cannot be invoked to resist publication and dissemination of matters of public
interest.
o The subject matter of “The Four Day Revolution” is one of public interest and concern
and does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the private life of private
respondent Ponce Enrile.
 A public figure has been defined as a person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of
living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in his
doings, his affairs, and his character, has become a ‘public personage.’
 Facts:
o McElroy, a Australian film maker, and his movie production company Ayer Productions,
envisioned sometime in 1987 the filming for commercial viewing the historic peaceful
struggle of the Filipinos at EDSA to be entitled “The Four Day Revolution.” Concerned
government agencies and public people were consulted and gave their approval, except
for Enrile who invokes his right to privacy.
48
o JPE sought an injunction because a portrayal of his life or that of his family is without his
consent violates his right to privacy.
 Ruling: Injunction was invalid.
o There was no finding of a clear and present danger of a violation of right to privacy in
making the film. The subject matter is one of public interest and concern. It is not
principally about JPE. The extent of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to keep that
film a truthful historical account.
Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans, Jr. - 137 SCRA 628 (courts and quasi-tribunals guidelines)
 All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on this freedom is the clear
and present danger rule.
o The clear and present danger test must take the particular circumstances of broadcast
media into account.
o The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners
to violently overthrow it.
o Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views
on public issues, they also deserve special protection.
 Before a broadcast station may be closed, Ang Tibay’s requirements in administrative
proceedings must be followed:
o right to a hearing (includes right to present evidence)
o tribunal must consider such evidence
o decision must have something to support itself
o evidence must be substantial
o decision must be based on the evidence presented
o the tribunal must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy.
o the body should render its decision in all controversial questions
Roxas v. De Zuzuarregui – 527 SCRA 446 (articles about acts of SC justices)

 Contemptuous remarks against the SC cannot be tolerated on the basis of free speech when they
tend to degrade the dignity of the SC and erode the public confidence accorded to it
o The fact that the decision was not in his favor does not mean that the same was contrary
to laws and was not rendered in a fair and impartial manner. After going over the MR, the
SC did not find any substantial argument that would merit the modification of the
decision.
o The attack on the person of Justice Nazario has caused her pain and embarrassment. He
cannot hide behind the rights to free speech and expression to prevent liability. It is an
abuse of such right.
o Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy one’s irrational obsession to
demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.
 Facts: This is a contempt proceeding concerning Atty. Roxas who, in a letter addressed to
Associate Justice Chico-Nazario with copies furnished to the CJ and all the other AJs, intimated
that Justice
o Nazario decided two cases on considerations other than pure merits of the case and
called the Supreme Court a “dispenser of injustice.” Roxas claims that he did not intend
to attack the person of Justice Nazario as he chose to ventilate his criticisms in a private
manner and in a personal letter instead of the media. He said he was merely exercising
his right to express a legitimate grievance and fair criticism of the Court’s ruling. It was
noted that before this letter, he sent a first one addressed to CJ Panganiban containing
similar sentiments on the same issue.
49
Fortun v. Quisayas – 690 SCRA 623
 The Court stated that Quisayas, being a lawyer and an officer of the court, he should have known
the confidential nature of a disbarment proceeding. The Court ruled that the premature disclosure
by publication of the filing and pendency of disbarment proceedings is a violation of the
confidentiality rule.
 Freedom of speech cannot be given weight because Atty. Quinsayas is liable for proper
conduct and etiquette of a lawyer and officer of the Court.
 The media and the broadcasters have the right to report the news and were free from liability
since Atty. Fortun became a public figure or has become a public figure, and because he is
representing a matter of public concern, and because the event itself that led to the filing of the
disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of public concern.
Speech and the Electoral Process
*Adiong v. COMELEC – 207 SCRA 712 March 31, 1992 (election propaganda)
 DOCTRINE: The COMELEC promulgated Res. No. 2347 w/c provides that decals and posters
may only be posted on authorized posting areas – such as campaign headquarters, candidates’
residences, common posted areas, etc. It also prohibits the exhibition of stickers and decals in
mobile places such as vehicles. The regulation unduly infringes upon a citizen’s right to free
speech. There is no adequate government interest endangered that would justify the
curtailment; there is no clear and present danger. It likewise strikes at the freedom of the
individual to express his preference and support and sweeps too broadly invading the area of
protected freedoms. It is also too loosely worded such that even posting in one’s residence (non-
candidate) or car is illegal. It infringes upon the lawful use of private property. That the law
intends to equalize the playing field in favor of the poorer candidates is immaterial – as it is merely
of a marginal significance.
o The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or
private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship
which cannot be justified by the Constitution.
o Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that
it encompasses even the citizen’s private property which in this case is a privately-owned
vehicle.
 The so-called balancing of interests — individual freedom on one hand and substantial
public interests on the other — is made even more difficult in election campaign cases
because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to
supervise and regulate the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.
*SWS v. COMELEC –GR 147571, May 5, 2001 (election surevey before election)
 Doctrine: Test for constitutionality on content-neutral regulations – O’Brien Test
1. It should be within the constitutional power of the Government,
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest
3. The governmental interest should be unrelated to the suppression of free expression
4. The restriction on the freedom of speech is no greater than what is essential for the
furtherance of that interest.
 Facts: Petitioners assail the COMELEC Resolution from enforcing RA 9006(Fair Election Act) in
prohibiting the publish of surveys affecting national candidates 15 days before an election and
those affecting local candidates 7 days before an election. This was in 2001. COMELEC failed to
show evidence that there is an immediate and inevitable danger to the voting process posed by
the election surveys.
 Ruling: The restriction on the publication of election surveys constitutes a prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint.
 It is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression even though such suppression is
only for a limited period. The curtailment of the right is still direct, absolute and substantial. The
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than the
suppression of freedom of expression.
50
 Test for constitutionality on content-neutral regulations – O’Brien Test
1. It should be within the constitutional power of the Government,
2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental interest
3. The governmental interest should be unrelated to the suppression of free expression
4. The restriction on the freedom of speech is no greater than what is essential for the
furtherance of that interest.
 Here, the 4th requisite is missing. There are other, less intrusive means of preventing bandwagon
effect and manipulation of surveys, such as punishing releasing of false information or survey
materials.
o By prohibiting the publication of election survey results because of the possibility that
such publication might undermine the integrity of the election, §5.4 actually suppresses a
whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion concerning the same
subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators, armchair theorists,
and other opinion makers. In effect, §5.4 shows a bias for a particular subject matter, if
not viewpoint, by preferring personal opinion to statistical results.
*Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, GR 205728, January 21, 2015

Content-neutral regulation Content-based restraint /
censorship
Definition Concerned with incidents of the speech; Restriction is based on the
or merely controls time, place or manner subject matter of the utterance
of speaking or speech
How is it approached Intermediate approach (validity of a law Strictest scrutiny
will not be squashed easily, restrictions
will be narrowly-tailored to promote an
important government interest)
Subject to Intermediate Review [O’Brien Test] Clear and present danger rule
 Content-based regulation
o Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions “based on the subject matter
of the utterance or speech.” In contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls
merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.
o The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content
is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
o Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has
used the clear and present danger rule as measure.
o Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive,
‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the
challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional
muster, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality.”
o Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation.
There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the
tarpaulin as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason
for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their
private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional
rights.
 Content-Neutral Regulation
o Intermediate Approach test: A content-neutral government regulation is sufficiently
justified:
 1. If it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
 2. If it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
 3. If the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and
 4.If the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
51
 Deprivation of property
o The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise
protected by the Constitution.
o Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property
or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.
 Facts:
o Petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6') by ten
feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.
The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law." The second tarpaulin is
the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote"
and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH)
Team Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their
vote on the adoption of the RH Law.
o COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the immediate removal of the
tarpaulin. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet
(2’) by three feet (3’).
 Ruling:
o COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expression made by private citizens. The
tarpaulins were not campaign materials belonging to candidates. Existing election law
provisions on the subject refer to matters done by or on behalf of and in consideration
with candidates and political parties.
o Section 79 of B.P. 881 defines an election campaign as an “act designed to promote the
election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office.” It also
provides that “Public expressions or opinions or discussions of probable issues… shall
not be construed as part of any election campaign, or partisan political activity…”
o The tarpaulin in question contains speech as a matter of public concern within the realm
of petitioners’ right to freedom of expression. Every citizen’s expression with political
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
o COMELEC contends that removal of the tarpaulin is a content-neutral regulation. But
petitioners found it as content-based as it applies to political speech. Assuming arguendo
that the size restriction is a mere time, size and manner regulation, it is still
unconstitutional for lack of a clear and reasonable nexus with constitutionally sanctioned
objective. There is no compelling state interest endangered by the posting of the
tarpaulin.
o Finally, the tarpaulin remained the private property of petitioners even if readily seen by
the public. Their right to property is likewise protected by the Constitution.
o The tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech. It did not convey any religious
doctrines of the Catholic church.
*1-United v. COMELEC (supra; read with Adiong)

 Does Resolution 9615 violate the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals? – YES
 The concerned provisions of Resolution 9615 are prior restraints on speech.
 Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign material
during an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation
of the public utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election offense.
o Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and
private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting of election
campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with them.
 The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of
PUVs and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport
52
terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain
of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.
(Court cites ratio in Adiong)
 Even assuming prohibition on posting election campaign materials is not a content-based
regulation, it is also an invalid content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free-speech clause.
 Content-neutral regulation is one which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or
one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards. It is
constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following
requisites concur:
o First(x), the government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government;
o Second(✓), it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
o Third(✓), the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and
o Fourth(x), the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
 On the First Requisite: The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to operate and
not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals.
o Note that franchise/permit to operate transportation utilities is a privilege to engage in the
business of transporting people/goods, limited by law only on certain aspects of
ownership (not on the totality of rights of the owner).
o A franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities pertains to considerations affecting
the operation of the PUV as such, e.g., safety of the passengers, routes or zones of
operation, maintenance of the vehicle, of reasonable fares, rates, and other charges, or, in
certain cases, nationality.25 Thus, a government issuance, which purports to regulate a
franchise or permit to operate PUVs, must pertain to the considerations affecting its
operation as such. Otherwise, it becomes a regulation or supervision not on the
franchise or permit to operate, but on the very ownership of the vehicle used for
public transport.
o The expression of ideas or opinion of an owner of a PUV, through the posting of election
campaign materials on the vehicle, does not affect considerations pertinent to the
operation of the PUV. Surely, posting a decal expressing support for a certain candidate in
an election will not in any manner affect the operation of the PUV as such.
o Regulating the expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the posting of an election
campaign material thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit to operate, but a
regulation on the very ownership of the vehicle.
 On the Fourth requisite: The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and transport
terminals is not necessary to further the stated governmental interest. While ensuring equality of
time, space, and opportunity to candidates is an important and substantial governmental interest
and is essential to the conduct of an orderly election, this lofty aim may be achieved sans any
intrusion on the fundamental right of expression. There are more than sufficient provisions in our
present election laws that would ensure equal time, space, and opportunity to candidates in
elections.
o Prohibition on posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals
was not provided under the law (and the COMELEC resolution provided for it anyway)
o There are more than sufficient provisions in election laws ensuring equal time, space and
opportunity.
 Captive Audience Doctrine not applicable.
o The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical matter,
escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted. The "captive-audience"
doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message
in circumstances in which the communication cannot be avoided.
o Ruling: SC stated that he commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election
campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of
declining to receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials
since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive.
53
*SWS v. COMELEC – 755 SCRA 124
 Petitioners’ free speech rights must be weighed in relation to the Fair Elections Act’s purpose of
ensuring political equality and, therefore, the speech of others who want to participate
unencumbered in our political spaces.
 While election surveys are not per se election propaganda, when published, however, the
tendency to shape voter preference comes into play. In this respect, these surveys partake of
the nature of election propaganda, hence, subject to regulation under Section 5.2 of the Fair
Elections Act.
 The resolution does not suppress expression but merely regulates the manner of publication by
disclosing those who commissioned and/or paid for, including those subscribed to, published
election surveys.
 Existing contracts of petitioners with third parties must be understood to have been made in
reference to possible exercise of the COMELEC’s regulatory powers.
o Contention by SWS: They claim that it “unduly interferes with [their] existing contracts . . .
by forcing [them] to disclose information that, under the contracts, is confidential or
privileged.
o It is settled that “the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment . . . is limited by the
exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals
and general welfare.”
*Davao City v. Aranjuez – 758 SCRA 235

 Doctrine 1: The time and place of the activity are not determinative of the prohibition. Whether
done within government hours, a concerted activity is allowed if it is without any intent at work
stoppage.
 The prohibition on concerted mass action done within the regular government office hours
pursuant to Sections 5 and 6 of CSC Resolution No. 021316 is anchored on two operative phases,
namely: (a) “any collective activity”; and, (b) “work stoppage or service disruption.” Without intent
at work stoppage or service disruption, the concerted activity is not prohibited, even if done
within government hours.
o The wearing of t-shirts with inscriptions of “CNA Incentive Ihatag Na, Dir. Braganza
Pahawa Na!” during the fun run fall within the description of “any sports attire” that the
office memo allowed to be worn.
o It is clear that the collective activity of joining the fun run in t-shirts with inscriptions on
Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA) incentives was not to effect work stoppage or
disrupt the service.
 Doctrine 2: It is correct to conclude that those who enter government service are subjected to a
different degree of limitation on their freedom to speak their mind; however, it is not tantamount to
the relinquishment of their constitutional right of expression otherwise enjoyed by citizens just by
reason of their employment.
Sanidad v. COMELEC - 181 SCRA 529

National Press Club v. COMELEC – 207 SCRA 1
Osmeña v. COMELEC – 288 SCRA 447
ABS CBN v. COMELEC – 323 SCRA 811
Ejercito v. COMELEC – 742 SCRA 210
54
Commercial Speech
*Rubin v. Coors Brewing - 131 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1995) (liquor labels)

 Central Hudson Test for determining whether or not the suppression of commercial speech
passes scrutiny: (LSAN)
o 1. Commercial speech must concern lawful activity and is not misleading
o 2. There is substantial government interest
o 3. The regulation directly advances asserted government interest
o 4. Whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest
 Facts:
o Sec. 5(e) (2) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act prohibited beer labels from
displaying alcohol content. The federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
rejected Coors Brewing Co.’s application for approval of the proposed labels that
disclosed such content. Coors Brewing contended that the provision violates the First
Amendment’s protection of commercial speech. The Government argued that the labeling
ban was necessary to suppress the threat of “strength wars” among the brewers.
 Ruling:
o The Government has a significant interest in protecting the health, safety and welfare of
its citizens by preventing brewers from competing on the basis of alcohol strength.
o While there was a substantial government interest, the means did not further this interest
in a direct and material way. There are available alternatives to the labeling ban which
would prove to be less intrusive to the protection for commercial speech. Prohibition of
displaying alcohol content to liquor labels, but not other advertisements does not make
sense.
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network - 123 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1993) (news racks; aesthetics)

City of Ladue v. Gilleo - 129 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1994) (sinage in house)
Disini v. Secretary of Justice, GR 203335, Feb. 18, 2014 (supra Art. 3, Sec. 1)
Unprotected Speech
Libel
*Policarpio v. Manila Times - 5 SCRA 148 (protected if true, and done in good faith)
 Doctrine: To enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be not
only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any comments or
remarks.
o Newspapers may publish news items relative to judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings, which are not of confidential nature, because the public is entitled to know
the truth with respect to such proceedings, which, being official and non-confidential, are
open to public consumption, for them to enjoy immunity, a publication containing
derogatory information must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made
in good faith and without any comments or remarks.
 Facts:
o Policarpio is a member of the PH bar, and for a time, was the executive secretary of the
local UNESCO commission. During this time, she charged Reyes, one of her
subordinates and caused her to be removed from office. Reyes, in turn, filed counter
charges against Policarpio for alleged (1) malversation of public funds, and (2) estafa
o After a few days, an article, with a picture of Policarip was in the front page of the
Saturday Mirror. The article was entitled “Woman official sued PCAC raps L.
Policarpio on Frauds.”
 It talked about the charge against Policarpio and detailed the testimony of Reyes
that Policarpio had used. UNESCO stencils for personal purposes not at all
connected with UNESCO work.
55
 Ruling:
o The GR is that newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion in determining the
manner in which a given event should be presented to the public, and the importance to
be attached thereto, as a news item. A newspaper may publish news items relative to
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings, which are not of confidential nature,
because the public is entitled to know the truth with respect to such proceedings, which,
being official and non-confidential, are open to public consumption.
o HOWEVER, to enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information must be
not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and without any comments
or remarks.
o In this case, aside from containing derogatory information, the article also presented
Policarpio in a worse predicament than that in which she, in fact, was. It was not a fair and
true report of the proceedings before the court.
*Lopez v. CA - 34 SCRA 116 (wrong picture of person)

 Doctrine 1: While a newspaper should not be held to account for honest mistakes owing to
pressure of a daily deadline, there is no such pressure to meet, and no occasion to act with haste
in a weekly magazine.
o In the Quisumbing v. Lopez, a newspaper made this honest mistake with its choice of
words. The SC held that it was liable as a newspaper company is under a daily deadline.
However, a magazine company is not. Thus, the magazine company is liable.
 Doctrine 2: A retraction published to correct the mistake does not wipe out the responsibility
arising from the publication of the libelous photograph or article, although it may and should
mitigate it.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan - 376 US 254 (public official – actual malice)
 As a general rule, a public official (in relation to public functions) is prohibited from recovering
damages for defamatory statements attacking his governance UNLESS he proves that the
statement was made with actual malice—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether or not it was true or false.
Hustler v. Magazine - 485 US 46

 Public figures and officials MAY NOT recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress by
reasons of publication without showing in addition that the publication contains a false statement
of fact which was made with actual malice i.e. with knowledge that the statement was false or
with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.
 *Note* Current Rule: Actual Malice must be shown in both public officials in performance of their
actual malice and public figures (despite being a private individual) on matters of public concern.
Borjal v. CA – GR 126466 January 14, 1999

 Fair Commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged.
 In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although it is no
necessary that he be named.
o This standard was not met as it was the respondent himself who revealed that he was the
organizer. The public would not have known that fact it were not for his act.
 Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense for libel or slander (privileged communication on matters of public concern).
Baguio Midland Courier v. CA, 444 SCRA 28

 While the law itself creates the presumption that every defamatory imputation is malicious,
nevertheless, the privileged character of a communication destroys said presumption. The burden
of proving actual malice shall then rest on the plaintiff, private respondent herein [1 st paragraph of
Art. 354 of RPC]
56
o The rule only applies to fair comment on matters of public interest, fair comment being
that which is true, or which if false, expresses the real opinion of the author based upon
reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds.
o The principle, therefore, does not grant an absolute license to authors or writers to
destroy the persons of candidates for public office by exposing the latter to public
contempt or ridicule by providing the general public with publications tainted with
express or actual malice.
 In the latter case, the remedy of the person allegedly libeled is to show
proof that an article was written with the author’s knowledge that it was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Fermin v. People, 550 SCRA 132 (2008). [Important Summary of Rules on Malice]
 DOCTRINE: Although a wide latitude is given to critical utterances made against 1) public
officials in the performance of their official duties, or 2) against public figures on matters
of public interest, such criticism does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally
protected speech—if the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officer’s
performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the
same may give rise to criminal and civil liability.
 Note: Pursuant to Art. 354 of the RPC, the general rule is that every imputation is presumed to be
malicious except on the above two grounds where one must prove there is actual malice.
o Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except in the following cases:
 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of
any legal, moral or social duty; and
 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks,
of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. - 403 US 29 (nudist magazines)

Gertz v. Robert Welch - 418 US 323 (private person)
In Re Jurado AM No. 90-5-2373, 4 LR 19 Aug’90
In Re Jurado - 243 SCRA 299 (articles about corruption in judiciary)
Vasquez v. CA – GR 118971 September 15, 1999
Vicario v. CA – GR 124491 June 1, 1999
Jalandoni v. Drilon, 327 SCRA 107(reiterates Borjal)
Arafiles v. Philippine Journalists, Inc., 426 SCRA 336
Obscenity
*Miller v. California - 37 L. Ed. 2d 419 (mailing of adult materials)

 Obscenity is to be determined by applying contemporary community standards and not
national standards. Basic guidelines:
o 1) Whether an average person applying contemporary community standards would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest (having or encouraging
an excessive interest in sexual matters).
o 2) Whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by applicable state law.
o 3) Whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.
57
*Gonzales v. Kalaw-Katigbak - 137 SCRA 717 (Obscene movie)
 The power of the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television (BRMPT) is limited to the
classification of films. The test to determine whether a motion pictures exceeds the bounds of
permissible exercise of free speech and, therefore, should be censored, is the clear and danger
test.
 Censorship or prior restraint is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate
public interest.
 Test to determine Obscenity: whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest.
o Obscene material is material dealing with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.
The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself
sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of
speech and press.
 *Note* The rule is different/ stricter for television because the television can affect the youth
unlike motion pictures where patrons have to pay their way. See also Soriano v. Laguardia
(G.R. No. 164785, March 15, 2010).
 *Note 2* No one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials
unless these materials depict or describe patently offensive "hard core" sexual conduct.
Examples included (a) patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts,
normal or perverted, actual or simulated; and (b) patently offensive representations or
descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals. What
remains clear is that obscenity is an issue proper for judicial determination and should be
treated on a case to case basis and on the judge’s sound discretion. See Fernando v.
Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 159751, December 6, 2006).
*Pita v. CA - 178 SCRA 362

 Doctrine 1: There has been no uniformity even with American jurisprudence regarding the issue
of whether obscenity is included in the guaranty of free speech or not, but if such pictures are
shown in art exhibits for the sake of art to be viewed by art enthusiasts, there would be no
offense, but if it is for commercial purposes then it may be viewed by people whose aim is
to satisfy their lust and desires – materials which are not entitled to constitutional
protection.
 Doctrine 2: Searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant otherwise they
become unreasonable. It is essential for validity of previous restraint or censorship that the
authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may
require. Requisites are (1) Apply for warrant from a judge, if they believe publications are
obscene, (2) convince the court that publications pose a clear and present danger of an evil
substantive enough to warrant State interference, (3) Judge determines w/n it is obscene upon
his own discretion, (4) if probable cause exist, warrant may be issued.
o The fact that the former respondent Mayor’s act was sanctioned by police power is no
license to seize property in disregard of due process.
 Facts: Pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign, Mayor Bagatsing, ordered the seizure and confiscation
from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along sidewalks, magazines and other
reading materials believed to be obscene and pornographic, and subsequently burning the
materials in public. Among those seized were the Pinoy Playboy magazines. Pita, the publisher of
Playboy Magazine, filed a case claiming that the magazine is decent, artistic and an educational
magazine which is not per se obscene, and protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom
of speech and of the press. Thus, it should not be confiscated and its sale should be allowed.
 Ruling: The state in the exercise of police power to suppress obscene materials, provided that
they are proven to be obscene but these materials cannot just be deemed obscene because of
one’s opinion Freedom of expression may only be restrained when a clear and present danger
that would make state interference justifiable.
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o There is no sufficient proof to justify the seizure. Invoking police power cannot disregard
the right to due process, for it does not exempt law enforcers from observing the right to
due process and the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
o Mayor Bagatsing cannot have validly ordered the raid without a warrant just because of
his opinion that a violation was committed for it would make him play the roles of a judge,
a jury and an executioner.
Barnes v. Glen Theater - 498 US 439

F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation - 438 US 726
Renton v. Playtime Theater - 475 US 41
Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser - 478 US 675
Hazelwood School Dist. v. KUHLMEIER - 484 US 260
Fernando v. CA 510 SCRA 351
Assembly and petition
*Bayan v. Ermita, GR 169838, April 29, 2006 (no permit no rally and CPR)
 Doctrine: BP 880 is a valid exercise of police power. It does not restrain the exercise of the right
to peaceful assembly. It merely regulates where, when and manner the peaceful assembly
would be conducted. Moreover, the permits to rally CANNOT be DENIED unless there is
clear and present danger to public safety, morals or health. Thus the method employed was
also reasonable.
o B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that
simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies, which refer to the
content-neutral regulation of the manner of holding public assemblies.
o A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of
public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does not
make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise
they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the words "opinion,"
"protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly content based, since
they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the government for redress of
grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided.
Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is
independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
o Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.
Navarro v. Villegas - 31 SCRA 73

PBM Employees v. PBM - 51 SCRA 189
JBL Reyes v. Mayor Bagatsing - 125 SCRA 553
Malabanan v. Ramento - 129 SCRA 359
Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance – (supra, Equal Protection) Acosta v. CA – 334 SCRA 486
Pader v. People, GR 139157, February 8, 2000
Candelaria Question:
 Is online newspaper media covered and protected or liable for libel?
o Is there no chance to verify the information so that it will fall under the fair comment rule?
o Remember it has to be believe to be a fair comment. Can we not use the internet easily to
verify such information; thus, resulting to libel if we do not verify?
 Attacking court decisions is prohibited. However, stating that the court “erred” is permissible as its
plainly argumentative.
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SECTION 5.
Non-establishment of region
*Aglipay v. Ruiz - 64 PHIL. 201 (postage stamps incidental benefit to religion)

 Doctrine: Acts of government which do not have any religious purpose are valid even if they
cause an incidental benefit to a religious sect. Thus, selling stamps which highlight a specific
event in the Philippines is permissible even if there is incidental benefit to the Catholic Church.
 Facts: Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church. Aglipay opposed.
 Ruling: The only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was “to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourists to this country.” The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event
considered of international importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its people. What is
emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, as the seat of that congress.
o While the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably
linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by
the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. The
Government should not be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental
results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could
legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be
frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated
*Garces v. Estenzo - 104 SCRA 510

 Doctrine 1: Not violate non-establishment clause since the funds to acquire the image were
taken from private donations and even if it becomes public funds the purpose is to show the
image during the city festival a socio-religious affair that is part of Philippine culture even if
the image was of Catholic descent.
o A resolution of the Barangay Council for soliciting contributions to buy a statue of the
barangay’s patron saint and the use of such fund for said purpose does not violate the
Constitution’s provision prohibiting use of public funds for religious purposes.
 If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron
saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron
saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as
illegal. As noted in the first resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its
celebration is an ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the
monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.
 Doctrine 2: Not every governmental activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and
which has some religious tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of
church and state, freedom of worship and banning the use of public money or property [citing the
case of Aglipay] as long as it is merely incidental to the religious stint.
 Doctrine 3: If it chooses to change its mind and decides to give the image to the Catholic church,
that action would not violate the Constitution because the image was acquired with private funds
and is its private property.
*Board of Education v. Allen - 392 US 236 (providing textbooks to schools)

 Facts: PET questions the validity of Education Law of State of NY requiring local school boards
to lend students from grades 7-12 books free of charge, alleging that the same constitutes as an
infringement to the establishment and free exercise clause.
 Doctrine: The test may be stated as follows: there must be a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
o The express purpose of the statute was the furtherance of educational opportunities
for the young, and the law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a
general program to lend school books free of charge. Books are furnished at the
request of the pupil and ownership remains, at least technically, in the State. Thus, no
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funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to parents
and children, not to schools.
o As with public provision of police and fire protection, sewage facilities, and streets and
sidewalks, payment of bus fares was of some value to the religious school, but was
nevertheless not such support of a religious institution as to be a prohibited establishment
of religion within the meaning of the First Amendment.
 Candelaria: There is no transfer of funds to religious organizations as the books were only merely
lend to the parochial schools. Moreover, the lending of books is not only granted to
religious/parochial schools but to all schools. Thus, there is a valid secular purpose even if there is
incidental benefit to parochial schools.
*Lemon v. Kurtzman - 403 US 602 (salary subsidy to teachers)

 Doctrine: Salary subsidy of the government to teachers constitutes excessive entanglement as
the teachers may include religious objectives in the secular subjects being taught.
 Thus, US jurisprudence has developed 3 requisites for statutes to be consistent with the non-
establishment clause:
1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose
a. In this case, there is compliance as the statutes intended to enhance the quality
of the secular education in all schools covered by it
2. The principal effect of the statute must neither advance nor inhibit religion
3. The statute must not foster excessive entanglement of the government with religion
 Facts:
o The Rhode Island Salary Act allowed state officials to supplement the salaries of
teachers of secular subjects in non-public schools.
o The Pennsylvania non-public elementary and secondary education act allowed
government support in terms of reimbursement for those purely secular in purpose in
non-public schools.
 Ruling: Both Statues are unconstitutional.
o In Rhode Island, 95% of the schools affected were parochial schools. In Pennsylvania,
96% of students in non-public schools attend parochial schools.
o Although the objective is secular in nature, there will be excessive entanglement as this
parochial schools are still affiliated with the Catholic Church. They have religious
objectives which may permeate even in secular subjects.
*Tilton v. Richardson - 403 US 672 (construction grants to schools)

 Doctrine 1: Financial aid to religious institutions are not invalid per se. They can be provided for a
purely secular purpose such as construction grants to schools – libraries and language
laboratories -- which may not be used for religious purposes.
 Doctrine 2: There are generally significant differences between institutions of higher
learning and parochial elementary and secondary schools. College students are less
susceptible to religious indoctrination unlike elementary students whose faith are shaped at an
early age. Many church-related colleges and universities are also characterized by a high degree
of academic freedom.
o In Lemon, however, the state programs subsidized teachers, either directly or indirectly.
Since teachers are not necessarily religiously neutral, greater governmental surveillance
would be required to guarantee that state salary aid would not, in fact, subsidize religious
instruction. Remember that the teachers are under the control and supervised by the
school which is founded by the Church. There, we found the resulting entanglement
excessive.
o Here, on the other hand, the Government provides facilities that are themselves
religiously neutral. The risks of Government aid to religion, and the corresponding need
for surveillance, are therefore reduced. There is academic freedom on what to teach.
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 Ruling:
o The Act authorizes grants and loans only for academic facilities that will be used
for defined secular purposes, and expressly prohibits their use for religious
instruction, training, or worship. Record shows that some church-related institutions
have been required to disgorge benefits for failure to obey them.
 More importantly, none of the four church-related institutions in this case has
violated the statutory restrictions. The institutions presented evidence that there
had been no religious services or worship in the federally financed
facilities, that there are no religious symbols or plaques in or on them, and
that they had been used solely for nonreligious purposes. On this record,
therefore, these buildings are indistinguishable from a typical state university
facility.
 Not every form of financial aid to church-sponsored activity violates the Religion
Clauses. The crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a religious
institution as a consequence of the legislative program, but whether its principal
or primary effect advances religion.
o There are generally significant differences between institutions of higher learning
and parochial elementary and secondary schools. College students are less
susceptible to religious indoctrination unlike elementary students whose faith are shaped
at an early age. Many church-related colleges and universities are also characterized by
a high degree of academic freedom.
 Evidence shows that non-Catholics were admitted as students and given faculty
appointments. Not one of these four institutions requires its students to attend
religious services. Also, courses are not limited to courses about the Roman
Catholic religion. The schools introduced evidence that they made no attempt to
indoctrinate students. Their mission is to provide their students with a secular
education.
Candalaria: Excessive entanglement is based on the long-term effect on whether or not it promotes,
advances or inhibits a religion?
 If primary effect – unconstitutional
 IF there is excessive entanglement – unconstitutional.
Taruc v. de la Cruz – 453 SCRA 123

 The Court does not have any jurisdiction on this case. Excommunication is purely religious matter
which the Courts cannot decide on. The only reason for courts to intervene would be when there
is a substantive right which is violated in the process. As it is a religious matter, it is best left to
the discretion of the officials and laws and cannons, of said institution/organization.
UCCP v. Bradford UCC – 674 SCRA 92 (SEC’s authority)

 The separation of BUCCI from UCCP is valid, and the validity of said separation is not purely an
ecclesiastical affair.
 Even with their religious nature, SEC may exercise jurisdiction over them in matters that are legal
and corporate. UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and grantees of primary franchise, are
subject to the jurisdiction of SEC which shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control
over all corporations. BUCCI, as a juridical entity separate and distinct from UCCP, possesses
the freedom to determine its steps.
 The disaffiliation of BUCCI from UCCP is a legal matter under the jurisdiction of SEC. Such
separation does not involve an ecclesiastical affair. Therefore, it is within the purview of civil
courts. Regardless, the UCCP’s by-laws uphold local church autonomy.
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Austria v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, August 16, 1999.
 Doctrine: Termination of the employment of a minister does not involve ecclesiastical affairs; it
involves the employee-employer relationship. However, if the minister was excommunicated due
to misappropriation of funds, then it is an ecclesiastical affair.
 Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and
its members and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of
the congregation.
o An ecclesiastical affair is "one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form of worship of the
church, or the adoption and enforcement within a religious association of needful laws
and regulations for the government of the membership, and the power of excluding from
such associations those deemed unworthy of membership.
o To be concrete, examples of this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot
meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers,
administration of sacraments and other activities with attached religious
significance.
 The case at bar does not even remotely concern any of the above cited examples. While the
matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case
a religious significance. Simply stated, what is involved here is the relationship of the church as
an employer and the minister as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever
with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of the church.
o In this case, petitioner was not ex-communicated or expelled from the membership of
the SDA but was terminated from employment.
o Indeed, the matter of terminating an employee, which is purely secular in nature, is
different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious
congregation.
School District v. Schempp – 10 L 2d 844 (reading of bible)

Country of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union - 57 LW 504 (government endorsement to crèche
and menorah)
Zobrest v. Catalina - No. 92-94 June 18, 1993 (aid to deaf student in religious school)
Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette & Ku Klux Klan – U.S. No. 94-780 June 29, 1995 (cross in public
forum)
Manosca v. CA - 252 SCRA 412
Islamic Da’wah v. Executive Secretary – GR 153888, July 9, 2003 (halal certification)
Free Exercise of Religion
*Victoriano v. Elizalde, 59 SCRA 54 (closed shop agreements)

 Doctrine: The right to religion prevails over contractual or legal rights.
o As such, an INC member may refuse to join a labor union and despite the fact that there
is a close shop agreement in the factory where he was employed, his employment could
not be validly terminated for his non-membership in the majority therein.
o Further, the court reiterated that the right to join a union also comes with it the right not to
join a union.
 The Court uphold R.A. No. 3350 as it does not favor those any religious sector. The law was
intended so that certain people may not be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be
dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood,
by reason of union security agreements. The law acted merely to relieve the exercise of religion,
by certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by union security agreements.
63
*Cantwell v. Connecticut - 310 US 296 (prior restraint)
 Facts: Jesse Cantwell and his sons were Jehovah's Witnesses; they were trying to convert
predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut to their religion. They went from house to
house to ask each person to listen to a record and buy the book it describes. If the person wasn’t
interested, they would asked for solicitation in exchange for pamphlets. The Cantwells were then
arrested for a violation of Sec. 294 of General Statutes of Connecticut, which disallows soliciting
“money, services, subscription or any valuable thing for any alleged religious, charitable or
philanthropic cause…unless such cause shall have been approved…[u]pon application…for
permit.”
 Ruling:
o The Freedom to Believe is an absolute freedom that cannot be regulated. People
are free to believe whatever they want, even if they cannot prove it. The Freedom to Act
is when belief is translated into external acts; they can be subjects of regulation
and police power.
o The Court states that the State may, by general and nondiscriminatory legislation,
regulate the time, the place, and the manner of solicitation, in the interest of public safety,
peace, comfort or convenience.
o The Court, however, ruled that the statue was not a regulation because the grant solely
rests upon the exercise of a determination by state authority to what is a religious cause.
Requiring a license before one can solicit aid for the perpetuation of religious views or
system is forbidden in the exercise of liberty protected by the Constitution.
o The licensing officer could also act arbitrarily, capriciously, corruptly against a religion the
officer is not part of and not issue the permit even if the group may satisfy the
requirement in being a religious group
*US. v. Ballard - 322 US 78 (good faith in believing)

 Doctrine: The Court cannot look into the truthfulness or falsity of a religious belief. Otherwise
stated on whether there is such a god or religion. The Court can only look into on whether or not
the individual believes in such religious belief in good faith. If he believes in such act. In the case
at bar, on whether the respondents truly believe that their messenger can heal is what the Court
can look into and not on whether their god can truly heal. 
 Facts: The respondents were alleged to have designed corporations, distributed literature and
solicited funds and memberships in their “I Am movement,” by means of false representations.
These were covered by their religious doctrines and beliefs, believing that Guy W. Ballard (now
deceased), Jesus, George Washington and Godfre Ray King had been selected by “ascertained
masters,” and that Ballard is a divine messenger of the divine entity, along with his relatives
Edna and Donald Ballard. They believe to have the power to heal persons of diseases,
presenting hundreds of people who were in fact cured by them. The respondents were
convicted for using and conspiring to use the mails to defraud in the District Court.
 Ruling: The US SC does not agree with the CA that the issue on the truthfulness of their beliefs
should have been submitted to the jury for questioning as men believe what they cannot prove
and what some believe may be incomprehensible to others. If one could be sent to jail because a
jury found their beliefs and teachings false, little would be left of religious freedom. The Court
can only take a look at the good faith belief on whether the respondents truly believe in
such god.
*Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent - 219 SCRA 256 and (MR) December 29, 1995 (flag ceremony)
 Doctrine: Jehovah’s Witnesses may be excluded from not participating in the mandatory flag
ceremony (they were present but did not just participate) in public schools as mandated by R.A.
1265 as it was against their religion to worship other idols. While maintaining that the Philippine
flag and the flag ceremony are not religious idols and rituals, the SC upheld the right to not
participate. However, they may not disrupt it either.
o Candelaria: The students must still need to be present; however, they do not need to
follow the protocol. At the end of the day, they mus still respect the national anthem.
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 Facts: Petitioners are 68 expelled students from the Jehovah’s Witnesses Sect, represented by
their parents, coming from both private and public schools in Cebu who refused to salute the flag,
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge. They refuse to do so because they
believe that those acts are “acts of worship” or a form of religious devotion which they feel is a
form of idolatry. The respondents expelled the children pursuant to the implementing regulations
of DECS which was pursuant to R.A. No. 1265 requiring educational institutions to observe daily
flag ceremony.
 Ruling:
o The expulsion orders are annulled.
o Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to
religious worship is: 1) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of
thought, and 2) Freedom to act on one‘s belief which is regulated when translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare. It is clear that their refusal to perform such
acts do not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant for their expulsion.
o The sole justification for a prior restraint is the existence of a clear and present danger.
Absent such threat to public welfare, expulsion of the petitioners is not justified.
o If the children quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates
and their teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the pledge, the
court does not see how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose ―a grave
and present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any
other legitimate public interest that the State has a right to prevent.
*Estrada v. Escritor, AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003 and 429 SCRA 1 (court official with live-in
partner; benevolent neutrality)
 Doctrine: The Benevolent Neutrality Doctrine gives room for accommodation of religious
exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause, provided that it does not offend compelling
state interest.
 The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government’s favored form of
religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance; What is
sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially
neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its “burdensome effect,” whether by the
legislature or the courts.
o Benevolent neutrality recognizes the religious nature of the Filipino people and the
elevating influence of religion in society; at the same time, it acknowledges that
government must pursue its secular goals. Benevolent neutrality does not mean that the
Court ought to grant exemptions every time a free exercise claim comes before it. But it
does mean that the Court will not look with hostility or act indifferently towards religious
beliefs and practices and that it will strive to accommodate them when it can within
flexible constitutional limits.
 Compelling state interest — If the plaintiff can show that a law or government practice inhibits
the free exercise of his religious beliefs, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that
the law or practice is necessary to the accomplishment of some important (or compelling) secular
objective and that is the least restrictive means of achieving that objective.
o 1. Has the statute or government action created a burden on the free exercise of religion?
o 2. Is there a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify this infringement of religious
liberty
o 3. Has the state in achieving its legitimate purpose used the least intrusive means
possible so that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state?
65
 Facts: This case involved a court interpreter, who while still married to another, cohabited with a
man who was himself married to another. In her defense, Escritor contended that under the rules
of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, a religious sect of which she is a member, the act of signing a
Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, is sufficient to legitimize a union which would otherwise be
classified as adulterous and bigamous. Escritor alleged that in compliance with the foregoing rules,
she and her partner signed the Declaration Pledging Faithfulness, and by virtue of such act, they
are for all purposes, regarded as husband and wife by the religious denomination of which they
are devout adherents.
 Issue: Whether or not the respondent’s right to religious freedom should be carved out as an
exception from the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are
held administratively liable.
 Ruling: The good faith belief of Escritor in signing the pledge was sufficient to constitute them as
husband and wife. Here, the State was not able to show that there was a compelling state interest
to sanction the acts or the religious beliefs of Escritor. Her job as a court interpreter has nothing to
do with the job she is working at.
*Perfecto v. Esidra – 763 SCRA 323

 Test of Benevolent Neutrality: Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue
its secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
 Facts:
o Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera married Richard Tang Tepace on May 7, 1989 in a
civil ceremony. There was no valid license to marry.
o On March 18, 1990, Judge Desales-Esidera married Renato Esidera under a Catholic
wedding rite (Matrimonio de Conciencia) but the priest had no authority under civil law.
o On October 3, 1990, Judge Desales-Esidera gave birth to a daughter with Renato.
o On January 27, 1992, Judge Desales-Esidera’s marriage to Tepace was declared void.
o On June 3, 1992, Judge Desales-Esidera entered into a second marriage with Renato but
this with all the formalities required by law.
o On July 15, 2010, Eladio Perfecto filed an administrative complaint against Judge
Desales-Esidera for falsification of a public document and dishonesty because she
falsified her daughter’s birth certificate to make it appear that she and Renato were
married on March 18, 1990 and that their daughter was a legitimate child.
o Judge Desales argued that everything she did was legal and in accordance with her
religious beliefs. The office of Court Administrator found her guilty of disgraceful, immoral
and dishonest conduct.
 Issue:
o 1) whether her act of entering into a second marriage constitute as immoral in accordance
with the Code of Professional Responsibility – No.
o 2) whether she should be administrative liable for entering into a marriage in violation of
Article 350 Revised Penal Code (contracting marriage against provisions of laws; here is
contracting marriage where the solemnizing officer does not have authority to marry) – No.
o 3) whether she can be held liable for the sexual relations with Renato despite the
existence of the first marriage (no judicial declaration yet) – Yes.
 Ruling:
o Morality may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the moral prescriptions
of a high moral authority or the beliefs of a particular religion. HOWEVER, the non-
establishment clause bars the State from establishing, through laws and rules,
moral standards according to a specific religion. To be guilty of “immorality” under
the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), a lawyer’s conduct must be so
depraved as to reduce the public’s confidence in the Rule of Law.
 Religious marriages are recognized in and may be governed by our laws only if
they conform to legal requirements. Religious marriages that lack some or all the
66
requirements under the law are invalid. Thus, the respondent judge’s marriage in
1990 was invalid because of the solemnizing officer’s lack of authority. They are
not considered to have been entered into. They do not enjoy the benefits,
consequences, and incidents of marriage provided under the law.
 Therefore, we cannot properly conclude that respondent judge’s acts of
contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of her alleged first marriage
and having an alleged “illicit” affair are “immoral” based on her Catholic faith. This
court is not a judge of religious morality.
 Summary: In short, there is nothing immoral with the action as the there was no
first marriage pursuant to law. Although her actions of entering into a second
marriage while the first marriage is immoral in accordance with the catholic
religion. However, as there is really no marriage, it does not constitute as immoral
pursuant to the CPR.
 Note: even if her actions do not constitute as immoral she is liable for
misconduct.
o The judge, knowingly entering into the marriage where the solemnizing officer does not
have authority to do so, should not be administratively punished as her religious beliefs
allow her to enter into such marriage which is effective pursuant to her religious beliefs
despite the lack of the authority of the solemnizing officer. Article 350 of the Revised Penal
Code should give way pursuant to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. The exception of
benevolent neutrality is when such kin of marriage ceremony violates other people’s rights
or pose a grave and imminent danger, the Supreme Court (SC) cannot rule that
respondent judge is administratively liable for her participation in her religious marriage
ceremony as it was pursuant to her religious beliefs. The test of benevolent neutrality must
be applied.
o Benevolent neutrality and claims of religious freedom cannot shield respondent judge from
liability for misconduct under our laws; Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in
sexual relations with another person during the subsistence of a marriage is an exercise of
her religious expression.
 However, Judge Desales-Esidera knowingly entered into a civil marriage with her
first husband knowing the effects under existing laws. She had sexual relations
with her second husband while her first marriage was subsisting. This act is
obviously not in the exercise of her religious expression. Her conduct affects the
credibility of the courts in dispensing justice.
o It is only in the third ground where the Court found liability.
 Guilty for violation of Canon 1 CPR: A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (suspended for 1 month and sternly
warned)
American Bible Society v. City of Manila - 104 PHIL. 386 (selling bibles)
 With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the contention the Mayor's
permit before any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupations
enumerated therein, it does not that it impose any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted
by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. Thus, Ordinance 3000 is valid. It
valid as it merely requires procurement of a permit.
 Ordinance 2529 is valid but is not applicable to petitioners because in doing so it would impair
free exercise of religion. In the case at bar, the license fee is imposed for THE DISTRIBUTION
AND SALE of bibles and other religious literature: It is a license tax — a flat tax imposed on the
exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights. In the case, the prices of the religious
pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this
cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
"merchandise" for profit.
o NIRC indicates that corporations organized and operated exclusively for religious
purposes are exempted from taxes with respect to income. Such, exemption clearly
67
indicates that the act of distributing and selling bibles, etc. is purely religious and does not
fall under the legal provisions concerning taxes.
Wisconsin v. Yoder - 406 US 205 (Amish students not required to go to school upon reaching 15)
 The State's claim that it is empowered, as parens patriae, to extend the benefit of secondary
education to children regardless of the wishes of their parents cannot be sustained against a free
exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, for the Amish have introduced convincing
evidence that accommodating their religious objections by forgoing one or two additional years of
compulsory education will not impair the physical or mental health of the child, or result in an
inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in
any other way materially detract from the welfare of society.
 The law violated respondent’s under the Free Exercise Clause.
o 1. Compulsory HS attendance can lead to their psychological harm and destruction of the
Amish community.
2. Amish succeeded in preparing their HS-aged children to be productive members of
their community.
3. A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be imposed as a barrier to
reasonable state regulation of education unless claims must be rooted in religious belief.
Such was satisfied.
McDaniel v. Paty - 435 US 618 (Current Rule regarding religious persons such as ministers to run for
public office.)
 Doctrine: a person despite being part of a religious sector such as a minister can now run for
office.
o The challenged provision violates McDaniel’s right to the free exercise of his religion
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, because it conditions his
right to the free exercise of his religion on the surrender of his right to seek office. The
challenged provision conditions the right to free exercise of religion on the surrender of
the right to seek office. It thus establishes a religious classification which inhibits religion
in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
o The Tennessee disqualification also violates the Establishment Clause. Government
generally may not use religion as a basis of classification for the imposition of duties,
penalties, privileges, or benefits. Specifically, government may not fence out from political
participation, people such as ministers whom it regards as overinvolved in religion. The
disqualification provision employed by Tennessee here establishes a religious
classification that has the primary effect of inhibiting religion.
Pamil v. Teleron - 86 SCRA 413

Goldman v. Weinberger - 54 LW 4298 (yarmulke in military)
German v. Baranganan - 135 SCRA 514 (rally in St. Jude Chapel)
Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance – (supra, Equal Protection)
Centeno v. Villaon-Pornillos – 236 SCRA 197 (fraudulent solicitations)
Lee v. Weisman – U.S. No. 90-1014 June 24, 1992 (rabbi in graduation)
Church of the Lukumi v. City of Hialeach - No. 91-948 June 11, 1993 (animal sacrifice)
Lamb’s Chapel v. School District - No. 91-2024 June 7, 1993 (film series regarding values played in school
by religious institution)
Long v. Basa, G.R. No. 134963-64, September 27, 2001 (basis of religious organization is the belief)
INC v. CA, 259 SCRA 529 (remarks about the bible in a TV show)
In re Request Muslim Employees – 477 SCRA 648
Iglesia Filipino Independiente v. heirs of Taezo, G.R 179592, February 3, 2014
Romulo v. People – 728 SCRA 675
Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, GR 205728, January 21, 2015
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SECTION 6.
Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel
*Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 PHIL 778 (deported prostitutes)

 Doctrine: A public officer, without authority of law, cannot be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen
of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile Thus, a mayor cannot remove a person from
domicile or compulsion to change domicile.
 Ruling: Lukban committed GAD by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will.
There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public
officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his
residence.
o The prostitutes are still entitled to the rights as stipulated in the Bill of Rights. Their choice
of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. They have been deprived of their
liberty by being exiled to Davao.
*Marcos v. Manglapus - 177 SCRA 668 (right to return in the country not included)
 Doctrine 1: The right to return to one’s country is not among the rights speciﬁcally guaranteed
under the Bill of Rights, though it may well be considered as a generally accepted principle of
international law which is part of the law of the land.
o The constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners are not absolute and inﬂexible, they
admit of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public
interests.
 Doctrine 2: However, the President has the power under the Constitution to bar Marcos from
returning pursuant to her residual powers in protecting the general welfare of the people based on
the surrounding circumstances of Martial Law.
o The President, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual
powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are
necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution.
o The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against
external and internal threats to its existence.
o Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace
is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the
commander-in-chief provision.
o For in making the President Commander-in-Chief, the enumeration of powers that follow
cannot be said to exclude the President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers
short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and
security.
o This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses
under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the
President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a
diminution of the general grant of executive power.
*Yap v. C.A., G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001 (not disallowed, merely requiring certification from
Mayor prior to change of residence)
 Doctrine: The accused, pursuant to conditions in the bail bond, cannot be prevented from
changing abode; however, he may be validly required to inform the court in case he does so. This
conditions of the bond do not violate his liberty of abode and travel.
 Facts: Condition imposed by CA in a bail bond: He (accused-appellant) secures a
certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of his residence that he is a resident of the area
and that he will remain to be a resident therein until final judgment is rendered or in case he
transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court.
69
 Ruling: The order of the Court of Appeals releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order
as contemplated by the Constitutional provision. The condition imposed by the Court of Appeals is
simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond, which is to ensure that petitioner will
make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence. The first condition
set by the Court is regarding the certification is that 1) Yap needs to secure from the Mayor
stating that he is a resident of that place and 2) mandates him to give prior notice when he
decides to change his residence. It does not prohibit him from actually transferring residence.
These do not impair petitioner’s right to change abode as long as the court is apprised of his
change of residence.
SPARK v. Quezon City, G. R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017

 Doctrine: A local government unit may enact curfew ordinances. However, it should be narrowly
tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their
other constitutional rights.
o Public safety may be basis to restrict the minors’ right to travel. Under the strict scrutiny
test government must prove that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest; and, (2) is the least restrictive means. The local government units showed
compelling state interest, but as regards the restrictions it appears that the Manila and
Navotas ordinances are not narrowly drawn and run the risk of overly restricting the
minors’ fundamental freedoms. The list of exceptions in the Quezon City ordinance is
more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors’ right to association, free exercise of
religion, travel, to peaceably assemble and of free expression.
 Other doctrine: On the penal sanctions, in relation to R.A. 9344, Sections 57 and 57-A of this law
prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations. What
the law prohibits is the imposition of penalties on minors. Community service is a valid form of
intervention program. Admonition is a mere warning. These are not penalties. On the other hand,
reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment are penalties prohibited by R.A. 9344.
Santiago v. Vasquez - 217 SCRA 633

 A hold departure order is allowed to validly restrict a person’s right to travel. The hold departure
order is but an exercise of respondent court’s inherent power to preserve and to maintain the
effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
o Article III Section should not be interpreted to mean that the right to travel may only be
impaired on the following grounds: national security, public safety, or public health. The
Court ruled that such rights must NOT construed to delimit the inherent powers of the
Court to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in a criminal
cases pending before such.
 Since Santiago posted a bail bond she hold herself amenable to the orders and processes of the
court. She may legally be prohibited from leaving the country during the pendency of the case.
Parties with pending cases should apply for permission to the country from the very same courts
which are in the best position to pass upon applications and to impose appropriate conditions
since they are conversant with the facts of the cases.
Silverio v. CA - 195 SCRA 760

Marcos v. Sandiganbayan - 247 SCRA 127
Mirasol v. DPWH (supra)
OAS v. Macarine – 677 SCRA 1
Republic v. Roque, GR 204603, Sep. 24, 2013 (right to travel and bail) (supra Art III, Sec. 1)
70
SECTION 7.
Information and Access to Official Records
*Legaspi v. CSC - 150 SCRA 530 (eligibility of sanitarians)

 The fundamental right to information on matters of public concern recognized in the Bill of Rights,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution and amplified in Article III, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution
can be invoked in a Mandamus proceeding.
o When a Mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of
personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen.
 Government agencies in custody of public records may regulate the manner of examination but
the disclosure of information of public concern and the access to public records cannot be
discretionary on the part of said agencies.
 Constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute but subject to
limitations as may be provided by law.
o The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as
those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to
a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought,
i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being
exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold
question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public
concern.
 Facts: The CSC earlier denied Valentin Legaspi’s request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City.
These government employees had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligible who
passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.
o HERE: CSC has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit
Legaspi’s right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligible. The Court takes
judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations,
as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released
to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one’s civil service eligibility, if actually
possessed. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim
to be civil service eligible, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their
professed eligibilities from the CSC.
*Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr. - 170 SCRA 256

 The right to information is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental
decision-making as well as in checking abuses in the government. The constitutional right to
information is not an absolute right, hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the
information sought is of “public interest” or “public concern” and that the same is not exempted by
law from the operation of such constitutional right.
o The information sought by herein petitioners as to the truth of reports that some
opposition members were granted “clean loans” by the GSIS is a matter of public interest
and concern.
71
*Sereno v. Committee, GR 175210, February 2, 2016 (minutes of EO486)
 G.R.: The constitutional guarantee of the right to information on matters of public concern
enunciated in Section 7 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution complements the State’s policy of full
public disclosure in all transactions involving public interest expressed in Section 28 of Article II of
the 1987 Constitution.
 Doctrine 1: Two requisites must concur before the right to information may be compelled by writ
of mandamus.
o Firstly, the information sought must be in relation to matters of public concern or public
interest.
o And secondly, it must not be exempt by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee.
 Doctrine 2: The Supreme Court (SC) has already declared that the constitutional guarantee of the
people’s right to information does not cover national security matters and intelligence information,
trade secrets and banking transactions and criminal matters.
o Equally excluded from coverage of the constitutional guarantee are diplomatic
correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meeting and executive sessions of either house of
Congress, as well as the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
 Doctrine 3: Even assuming that some members of the committee were not part of the
President’s Cabinet was of no moment. What should determine whether or not information was
within the ambit of the exception from the people’s right to access to information was not the
composition of the body, but the nature of the information sought to be accessed.
 Doctrine 4: Every claim of exemption, being a limitation on a right constitutionally granted to the
people, is liberally construed in favor of disclosure and strictly against the claim of confidentiality.
 Facts:
o Sereno, as executive director of the Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the
Philippines (APMP) filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Committee on Tariff and
Related Matters (CTRM)-NEDA to provide him a copy of the minutes of its May 23, 2005
meeting as well as all official records, documents, papers and government research data
as basis for the issuance of E.O. 486 which lifted the suspension of tariff reduction on
petrochemical resins and other plastic products under the ASEAN Free Trade Area –
Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme (AFTA-CEPT). The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the petition.
 Ruling: The CTRM-NEDA is an advisory body composed of various department heads or
secretaries and is classified as cabinet meetings which may fall under the category of privileged
information.
o The May 23, 2005 meeting was classified as a closed-door Cabinet meeting by virtue of
the committee’s composition and the nature of its mandate dealing with matters of
foreign affairs, trade and policy-making. They assert that the information withheld was
within the scope of the exemption from disclosure because the CTRM meetings were
directly related to the exercise of the sovereign prerogative of the President as the
Head of State in the conduct of foreign affairs and the regulation of trade, as
provided in Section 3(a) of Rule IV of the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 6713.
o Even assuming that some members of the committee were not part of the President’s
Cabinet was of no moment. What should determine whether or not information was within
the ambit of the exception from the people’s right to access to information was not the
composition of the body, but the nature of the information sought to be accessed. A
different holding would only result to the unwanted situation wherein any concerned
citizen, like the petitioner, invoking the right to information on a matter of public concern
and the State’s policy of full public disclosure, could demand information from any
government agency under all conditions whenever he felt aggrieved by the decision or
recommendation of the latter.
72
Hilado v. Reyes 496 - SCRA 282
 Article III, Section 7 guarantees a general right - the right to information on matters of “public
concern” and, as an accessory thereto, the right of access to “official records.” The right to
information on “matters of public concern or of public interest” is both the purpose and the limit of
the constitutional right of access to public document.
 Access to court records may be permitted at the discretion and subject to the supervisory and
protective powers of the court, after considering the actual use or purpose for which the request
for access is based. In this case, the petitioners’ stated main purpose for accessing the records is
to monitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of
the assets of the estate, hence they are “interested persons” in the case. If any party, counsel
or person has a legitimate reason to have a copy of court records and pays court fees,
court may not deny access to such records.
 The term “judicial record” or “court record” does not only refer to the orders, judgment or verdict of
the courts. It includes the official collection of all papers, exhibits and pleadings filed by the
parties, all processes issued and returns made thereon, appearances, and word-for-word
testimony which took place during the trial and which are in the possession, custody, or control of
the judiciary or of the courts for purposes of rendering court decisions.
Chang v. NHA – 530 SCRA 335

 These Section 7 of the Bill of Rights seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise
effectively other constitutional rights. In defining the limits of these freedoms, the Court noted that
such information requests must pertain to definite propositions of the government and that
information might be shielded by applicable privileges (e.g. military secrets and information
relating to national security.
 Take note on those matter which are under executive privilege.
Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato - 203 SCRA 515

Osmeña v. COMELEC – (supra, Speech and Electoral Process)
Echegaray v. Sec. of Justice – GR 132601 October 12, 1988
Chavez v. PCGG – GR 130716 December 9, 1988
Gonzales v. Narvasa, GR 140835, August 14, 2000
Chavez v. PEA, GR 133250, July, 9, 2002
Sabio v. Gordon 504 - SCRA 704
Bantay v. COMELEC – 523 SCRA 1
Berdin v. Mascarinas – 526 SCRA 592
Neri v. Senate, GR 180643, March 25, 2008-09-23 and MR (executive privilege)
Suplico v. NEDA, GR 178830, July 14, 2008
Akbayan v. Aquino, GR 170516, July 16, 2008 (JEPEPA diplomatic negotiations)
Province of North Cotabato v. GRP Panel, GR 183591, October 14, 2008 (MOA- AD peace negotiations
not exempted)
Guingona v. COMELEC – 620 SCRA 448
Antolin v. Domondon – 623 SCRA 163
Center for People v. COMELEC – 631 SCRA 41
Francisco v. TRB – 633 SCRA 470
Initiatives v. PSALM – 682 SCRA 602
Privatization and Management Office v. Strategic Alliance, GR 200402, June 13, 2013 (right and duty in
relation to Article 2, Sec 28)
Cocofed v. COMELEC, GR 207026, August 6, 2013
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SECTION 8.
Right to Form Association
Candelaria:
 The right to associate is an aspect of democratic principles.
 A person cannot be barred to form lawful associations and organizations. However, there are
limitations in the public sector.
*Manila Public School Teachers v. Laguio, Jr. – 200 SCRA 323

 Doctrine 1: Employees in the public (civil) service, unlike those in the private sector, do not have
the right to strike. Thus, public school teachers cannot strike. HOWEVER, they have: (1) The right
to self-organization; (2) The right to petition Congress for betterment of employment conditions as
they are not fixed by law; and (3) The right to negotiate with government agencies their
grievances.
 Doctrine 2: Despite not having the right to strike, public school teachers have the right to
peaceably assemble for redress of grievances but NOT during class hours. If the public school
teachers will “peaceably assemble” during class hours. This act is considered to be a strike which
is illegal for them.
o Peaceably assembling, outside class hours, is not considered as a strike as there is no
work stoppage nor service disruption [See Davao case].
*Padcom v. Ortigas Center, GR 146807, May, 9, 2002 (automatic membership of buyer)

 Facts: Bought condo from TDC. TDC originally bought it from Ortigas Center under Deed of Sale
with provision on automatic membership of buyer and transferee to the association.
 Ruling: The automatic membership clause of the contract does not violate the freedom of
association because Padcom had the choice of not buying the property if it does not want
to become a member of the association then it has all the right to not buy a condo.
 Other relevant doctrine:
o Any lien annotated on previous certificates of title should be incorporated in or carried
over to the new transfer certificates of title; Such lien is inseparable from the property as
it is a right in rem, a burden on the property whoever its owner may be.
 Thus, the second buyer/ transferee of a condominium unit is bound by the liens
in the TCT.
 Thus, in this case, the buyers are bound by the lien in the TCT which is to the
automatic membership of the buyer in the condominium’s association.
TUCP v. NBC - 173 SCRA 33

SSS Employees v. CA – 175 SCRA 686
UPCSU v. Laguesma – 288 SCRA 15
Sta. Clara Homeowners v. Gaston, 374 SCRA 396
SECTION 9.
Expropriation in General; Reversion
Vda. De Ouna v. Republic – 642 SCRA 384 (reversion)

 The notion that the government via expropriation proceedings acquires unrestricted ownership
over or a fee simple title to the covered land is no longer tenable; The taking of a private land in
expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued devotion to its public purpose;
Once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the former owner, if he so
desires, may seek its reversion subject of course to the return at the very least of the just
compensation received.
Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, GR 135087, March 14, 2000
74
NHA v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, GR 15441, June 19, 2003
Mactan v. Lozada – 613 SCRA 618 (reversion)
Power to Undertake Expropriation Case.
Iron and Steel Authority v. CA – 249 SCRA 538 (substitution of the Republic)
Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC - 244 SCRA 272
Telebap v. COMELEC – (supra, Equal Protection)
Estate of Heirs of the Late Ex-Justice JBL v. City of Manila, 422 SCRA 551
Lagcao v. Labra, GR 155746, Oct 13, 2004
Rights of Owner Before Expropriation
Greater Balanga v. Mun. of Balanga – 239 SCRA 436 (rights prior to expropriation)
Velarma v. CA – 252 SCRA 406
Solanda v. CA – 305 SCRA 645 (ejectment before actual expropriation)
Republic v. Salem - 334 SCRA 320 (title not cancelled until paid)
Elements of "Taking"
 Taking” of property; Elements of.—A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” of
property for purposes of eminent domain:
o (1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
o (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period;
o (3) the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
o (4) the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and
o (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
 As a general rule, just compensation is counted from the date the complaint is filed; however, if
taking occurs prior to such complaint, it shall be from the date the owner is deprive of all beneficial
enjoyment of property.
o Rule 67, Section 4. Order of expropriation. — If the objections to and the defenses against
the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears
to defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of expropriation declaring
that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the
public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation
to be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first.
*Republic v. Vda. de Castelvi - 58 SCRA 336 (rent by military; elements of taking)

 DOCTRINE: Mere notice of intention to expropriate cannot bind landowner; Expropriate must be
commenced in court.
 Facts: Republic filed a complaint for eminent domain against de Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun over
a parcel of land in Pampanga. They were disputing over the land’s market price and whether
Castellvi is still the owner, or the land underwent “taking” as Republic claims. This is based on the
lease of land to AFP.
 Rulings: Only requisites 1, 3 and 4 are present. It is clear, therefore, that the “taking” of Castellvi’s
property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken place in 1947 when
the republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.
o Requisite number 2 is not present according to the Supreme Court, “momentary” when
applied to possession or occupancy of real property should be construed to mean “a
limited period” -- not indefinite or permanent. The aforecited lease contract was for a
period of one year, renewable from year to year. The entry on the property, under the
lease, is temporary, and considered transitory. The fact that the Republic, through AFP,
constructed some installations of a permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry
75
into the lant was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to
year by consent of the owner of the land. By express provision of the lease agreement the
republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in substantially the same condition
as at the time the property was first occupied by the AFP. It is claimed that the intention of
the lessee was to occupy the land permanently, as may be inferred from the construction
of permanent improvements. But this “intention” cannot prevail over the clear and
express terms of the lease contract.
o The 5th requirement is also lacking. In the instant case the entry of the Republic into the
property and its utilization of the same for public use did not oust Castellvi and deprive her
of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained as owner, and was
continuously recognized as owner by the Republic, as shown by the renewal of the lease
contract from year to year, and by the provision in the lease contract whereby the Republic
undertook to return the property to Castellvi when the lease was terminated. Neither was
Castellvi deprived of all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, because the Republic
was bound to pay, and had been paing, Castellvi the agreed monthly rentals.
*US v. Causby - 328 US 256 (navigable airspace)

 Facts: Private respondents owned a parcel of land which was adjacent to a military airport. On the
land were a dwelling house and a barn for the respondents’ chicken business. The path of glide to
the runway passed directly overt the property. The noise it made startled the chicken that around
6-10 chickens would die in a day due to fright. As a result, they stopped their chicken business.
They claimed that there was a taking of their property.
 Ruling:
o There was a taking. While it is a general rule that the air is a public highway, it should be
noted that a landowner has exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping
atmosphere. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless they are so low and so
frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
land.
o When a plane passes over a property, it would normally be an easement. But if that
easement, is permanent and not merely temporary, it would be the equivalent of a
fee interest. It would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over
the surface of the land. The fact that the planes never touched the surface would be as
irrelevant as the absence in this day of the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of real
estate. The owner's right to possess and exploit the land -- that is to say, his beneficial
ownership of it -- would be destroyed.
*Penn Central Transportation v. NY City - 438 US 104 (not taking, there is still control of the owner)
 Facts: Grand Central Terminal, owned by by Penn Central, was designated by NY as a landmark
site. Under their Landmarks Law, the Commission may designate an area to be a historic district,
and owner of that landmark must keep the exterior in good repair and must secure Commission’s
approval before any exterior changes may be made. Penn entered into a 50-year lease with UGP
Properties for an agreement to construct a 55-story office building on top of the terminal. The
application for this was denied by the Commission.
 Ruling: The government may execute laws that adversely affect recognized economic values
without its action constituting a taking if the prohibition is for safety, health, morals or
general welfare. In deciding whether there was taking, character of the nation, nature and extent
of the interference with property rights are focused upon.
o Landmarks Law simply prohibits appellants or others from occupying certain features of
the space while allowing appellants gainfully to use remainder of property. Interference
was not “taking” if impact of the regulation was insufficient to require government to
institute eminent domain proceeding. There is no showing that smaller, harmonizing
structure would not be authorized.
o The US SC held that compensation is not necessary as the prohibition was based on a
substantial government interest (to protect Landmark sites) and that the primary
purpose of the property, as a terminal, was not disrupted. The only prohibition was the
construction of the building on top of the terminal.
76
*OSG v. Ayala – 600 SCRA 617 (free parking spaces in malls)
 The Court finds the argument of the OSG controlling the imposition of such fees untenable as
there is nothing in the National Building Code which supports the idea that the mall owners must
provide parking spaces for free, for it only talks about the minimum standards and requirements
to regulate the location or the site, including the construction and maintenance of the building.
The Code actually limits the regulatory power of officials, not granting them an all-encompassing
power to regulate.
 If police power is invoked, the Court stated that totally prohibiting the mall owners from imposing
parking fees would be acting beyond the bounds of police power. Police power is the power to
regulate, but the latter does not include the power to prohibit nor the power to confiscate unless
there is a necessity for peace and order or for the general welfare.
 Eminent domain is exercised when there is taking or confiscation of private property for public
use, but of course upon payment of just compensation. A regulation that deprives any person of
the profitable use of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him to compensation, unless the
invasion of rights is so slight as to permit the regulation under the police power.
 In the case at bar, the prohibition against the collection of parking fees already amounts to a
confiscation of the respondents’ properties, which is already an excessive intrusion into their
property rights. Not only are they being deprived of the right to use a portion of their properties as
they wish, they are further prohibited from profiting from its use or even just recovering therefrom
the expenses incurred in the maintenance and operation of the facilities.
NPC v. Ibrahim – 526 SCRA 149

 The sub-terrain portion of the property belongs to the surface owner of the land. The landowners’
right extends to such height or depth where it is possible for them to obtain some benefit or
enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more interest protected
by law.
 The landowners’ right extends to such height or depth where it is possible for them to obtain some
benefit or enjoyment, and it is extinguished beyond such limit as there would be no more interest
protected by law.
 As the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of the property’s normal beneficial
use, notwithstanding the fact that the expropriator only occupies the sub-terrain portion, it is liable
to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land.
NPC v. Tuazon – 653 SCRA 84 (right of way for transmission lines)

 Just compensation should be equivalent to the full value of the land traversed by the transmission
lines.
 The right-of-way easement in the case similarly involved transmission lines traversing privately
owned land. It likewise held that the transmission lines not only endangered life and limb, but
restricted as well the owner’s use of the land traversed. Our pronouncement in Gutierrez—that the
exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily includes the imposition of right-of-way
easements upon condemned property without loss of title or possession—therefore remains
doctrinal and should be applied.
Cabahug v. NPC – 689 SCRA 666 (right of way for transmission lines)
 The owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land if the easement is
intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the
imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property
or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of
ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects which, by their nature, create or
increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land
is necessary.
 The determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is a judicial function and
no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over
the court’s findings.
77
 Lastly, it should be borne in mind that just compensation should be computed based on the fair
value of the subject property at the time of its taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever came
first.34 Since in this case the filing of the eminent domain case came ahead of the taking, just
compensation should be based on the fair market value of spouses Zabala’s property at the time
of the filing of Napocor’s Complaint on October 27, 1994 or thereabouts.
Garcia v. CA - 102 SCRA 597

City Government v. Judge Ericta – 122 SCRA 759
People v. Fajardo - 104 PHIL. 443
Republic v. PLDT - 26 SCRA 620 (capacity of govt to require PLDT to contract with them)
NPC v. Jocson – 206 SCRA 520
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto - 467 US 986
NPC v. Manubay – 437 SCRA 60
NPC v. San Pedro - 503 SCRA 333
NPC v. Tiangco – 514 SCRA 674
LBP v. Imperial – 515 SCRA 449
NPC v. Bongbong – 520 SCRA 290
Tan v. Republic – 523 SCRA 203
NPC v. Purefoods – 565 SCRA 17 (right of way for transmission lines)
NPC v. Capin – 569 SCRA 648 (right of way for transmission lines)
PNOC v. Maglasang – 570 SCRA 560 (lease not basis for taking)
NPC v. Co – 578 SCRA 243 (right of way for transmission lines)
NPC v. Villamor – 590 SCRA 11 (right of way for transmission lines)
NPC v. Maruhom – 609 SCRA 198 (right of way for transmission lines)
"Public Use"
*Sumulong v. Guerrero - 154 SCRA 461 (housing is for public use)

 Doctrine: Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The "public use" requirement is an
evolving concept influences by changing conditions. Urban renewal or redevelopment and the
construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the
expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution
 Facts: On December 5, 1977, the National Housing Authority filed a complaint for the
expropriation of 25 hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal pursuant to PD 1224 authorizing the
expropriation of private lands for socialized housing. Among those lands sought to be expropriated
are the petitioners' lands. They brought this suit in the SC challenging the constitutionality of PD
1224.
 HELD: Petitioners contend that socialized housing for the purpose of condemnation proceedings
is not public use since it will benefit only a handful of people. The "public use" requirement is an
evolving concept influences by changing conditions. Urban renewal or redevelopment and the
construction of low-cost housing is recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the
expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the Constitution.
Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and significantly affects public
health, safety, the environment and, in sum, the general welfare. Petitioners claim that there are
vast areas of lands in Rizal hundreds of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only.
Why should the NHA pick their small lots? Expropriation is not confined to landed estates. The test
to be applied for a valid expropriation of private lands was the area of the land and not the number
of people who stood to be benefitted. The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad
discretion to designate the property. The property owner may not interpose objections merely
because in their judgment some other property would have been more suitable.
78
*Phil. Columbian Assn. v. Hon. Panis – 228 SCRA 668 (housing project)
 Doctrine 1: Expropriation is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates. public
use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular,
urban land reform and housing.
 Doctrine 2: Moreover, that only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property
does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and
shelter for all who need them.
o Thus, the City of Manila has the express power to acquire private lands in the city and
subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona-fide tenants or occupants thereof
and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city.
 Facts:
o PCA is a non-profit domestic corporation and is engaged in the business for providing
sports and recreational facilities for its members. Its office and facilities are located in
Paco, Manila, and adjacent thereto, is a parcel of land also owned by petitioner. This land
is occupied by private respondent. Petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against
private respondents. Subsequently, City of Manila filed a complaint against petitioner for
the expropriation of said land. Petitioner rejects this expropriation.
o The City of Manila filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of the writ of possession of the
land and mentioned the 2 Million PHP pending in PNB. This was granted by the court and
denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
 Ruling:
o The Revised Charter of Manila provides authority to “condemn private property for public
use” and “to acquire private land and subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy
terms to city residents.” The public use requirement is not violated. That only a few could
actually benefit from the expropriation does not diminish its public use character. It is
simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them. Public
use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit, particularly urban land
reform and housing.
o Due process had been complied with as they were offered such and was heard regarding
the matter. The court had fixed just compensation to P 2M which both parties agreed to.
Manosca v. CA – 252 SCRA 412

Province of Camarines Sur v. CA – 222 SCRA 173
Reyes v. NHA, GR 147511, Jan. 20, 2003
Masikip v. Pasig 479 SCRA 391
Didipio v. Earth Savers v. Gozun 485 SCRA 586
Barangay v. CA – 518 SCRA 649
Manapat v. CA – 536 SCRA 32
Mactan v. Tudtud – GR 174012, November 14, 2008
City of Manila v. Tan Te – 658 SCRA 88 (socialized housing)
Just Compensation
*City of Manila v. Estrada - 25 PHIL. 208 (judicial review of just compensation)

 Doctrine 1: Just compensation = Fair market value (+) consequential benefits (-) consequential
damages.
o Doctrine 1.1: The value of the properties sold within the vicinity are not admissible as
evidence for eminent domain proceedings as they do not represent fair market value.
o For comparison with other property, factors to be considered are: substantially similar in
characteristics, time (proximity of condemnation proceedings to the date of sale), and
distance (property must be within the immediate neighborhood).
 Evidence of sales of other land is competent if the character of such parcels as
sites for business purposes, dwellings, or for whatever use which enhances the
pecuniary value of the condemned land is sufficiently similar to the latter that it
may be reasonably assumed that the price of the condemned land would be
approximately near the price paid for the parcels sold. But to be admissible, the
79
property thus sold must be in the immediate neighborhood, that is, in the zone of
commercial activity with which the condemned property is identified. The sales
must also be sufficiently coeval with the date of the condemnation proceedings
as to exclude general increases or decreases in property values due to changed
commercial conditions in the vicinity, and must be made by one who is desirous
but not obliged to sell and to one who is desirous but not obliged to buy.
 Doctrine 2: There can be judicial review of just compensation assessed by the commissioners.
The report of the commissioners is not final. The court may, 1) upon hearing, accept the report; 2)
set the report aside and appoint new commissioners; or 3) accept the report in part and reject it in
part.
*San Roque v. Republic – 532 SCRA 493

 Doctrine 1: The payment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is an
indispensable requisite for the exercise of the State’s sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure
to observe this requirement renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public
purpose.
o If the Republic had actually made full payment of just compensation, in the ordinary
course of things, it would have led to the cancellation of title, or at least, the annotation of
the lien in favor of the government on the certificate of title covering the lot.
 Doctrine 2: An innocent purchaser for value is one who, relying on the certificate of title, bought
the property from the registered owner, without notice that some other person has a right to, or
interest in, such property, and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase,
or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property.
 Facts: In 1938, there were parcels of land in Cebu City owned by 3 people. These parcels of land
became subject to expropriation proceedings initiated by the then Commonwealth of the
Philippines. Judge Martinez ordered the initial deposit of P9,500 as pre-condition for the entry on
the lands. In 1940, a decision was rendered condemning the parcels of land. However, the title
was not transferred to the government. Eventually, the land was subdivided. In 1995, San
Roque bought the land and begun construction of townhouses on the land. Republic alleges that it
is the owner of the land as part of the Camp Lapu-Lapu Military Reservation, by virtue of the 1938
Decision.
 Ruling: The Republic cannot claim ownership over the subject lands.San Roque has better title to
the land as it was an innocent purchaser for value.
o The Republic’s bare contention and assumption cannot defeat San Roque’s apparent
ownership over the subject properties. There was no record of payment of compensation
to the land owners. Without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of
title from the landowner to the expropriator.
o The initial deposit, if it was indeed disbursed, would still not adequately recompense all the
owners of the 18 expropriated lots. More importantly, if the Republic had actually made full
payment of just compensation, in the ordinary course of things, it would have led to the
cancellation of title, or at least, the annotation of the lien in favor of the government on the
certificate of title covering the lot.
o Eminent domain cases are to be strictly construed against the expropriator. The payment
of just compensation for private property taken for public use is an indispensable requisite
for the exercise of the State’s sovereign power of eminent domain. Failure to observe this
requirement renders the taking ineffectual, notwithstanding the avowed public purpose.
80
*Republic v. BPI – 705 SCRA 650 (consequential damages proper if other property impaired)
 Doctrine: BPI is entitled to an additional compensation for consequential damages. No actual
taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages. Consequential damages are
awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from an
impairment or decrease in value. The rules on expropriation clearly provide a legal basis for the
award of consequential damages.
o The BPI building was forced to move back when it was constructed to conform with the
requirement of the Building Code. There is a minimum standard for sidewalks.
 Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. The
general rule is that the just compensation to which the owner of the condemned property is entitled
to is the market value. Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not
compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be
paid by the buyer and received by the seller.
o The general rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is
expropriated. In such a case, the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion
actually taken, he is also entitled to recover the consequential damage, if any, to the
remaining part of the property.
 No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential damages.
Consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of
the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in value. The rules on expropriation clearly
provide a legal basis for the award of consequential damages.
 *NOTE* Section 6 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides: x x x The commissioners shall
assess the consequential damages to the property not taken and deduct from such
consequential damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public
use or public purpose of the property taken, the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the
carrying on of the business of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall
the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages assessed, or the
owner be deprived of the actual value of his property so taken.
*NPC v. Manalastas, GR 196140, January 27, 2016

 Doctrine: Inflation rate in just compensation is accounted through payment of interest; valuation of
land should not include inflation rate for purposes of just compensation.
o Valuation of the land for purposes of determining just compensation should not include the
inflation rate of the Philippine Peso because the delay in payment of the price of
expropriated land is sufficiently recompensed through payment of interest on the market
value of the land as of the time of taking from the landowner.
Manila Railroad v. Paredes - 31 PHIL. 118

Municipality of Daet v. CA - 129 SCRA 665
NPC v. CA - 129 SCRA 665
EPZA v. Dulay - 149 SCRA 305
Maddumba v. GSIS - 182 SCRA 281
Berkenkotter v. CA – 216 SCRA 584
Meralco v. Pineda – 206 SCRA 196
NPC v. CA – 254 SCRA 577
Land Bank v. CA – 249 SCRA 149 and (MR) 258 SCRA 404
Panes v. VISCA – 264 SCRA 708
Republic v. CA – 263 SCRA 758
NPC v. Henson – GR 129998 December 29, 1998
Santos v. Landbank, GR 137431, Sept. 7, 2000 (CARL, payment not in cash)
Sigre v. CA, GR 109568, Aug. 8, 2002 (CARL, just compensation)
NHA v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo, GR 154411, June 19, 2003
CIR v. Central Luzon 492 SCRA 575
CIR v. Bicolandia 496 SCRA 176
Mactan v. Urgello – 520 SCRA 515
Sy v. Local Govt of Quezon City, GR 202690, June 5, 2013
81
Cortes v. Ombudsman, GR 187896-97, June 10, 2013
Heirs of Spouses Tria v. Land Bank, GR 170245, July 1, 2013
DPWH v. Spouses Tecson, GR 179334, July 1, 2013 (FMV at taking) (supra Art II, Sec 1)
NPC v. YCLA, GR 193936, December 11, 2013 (FMV at taking)
NPC v. Zabala – 689 SCRA 554 (Judicial function) LBP v. Gallego – 702 SCRA 377 (prompt payment)
Judicial Review
*De Knecht v. Bautista - 100 SCRA 660 (EDSA extension; social impact)
 Facts: The plan to extend EDSA to Roxas Boulevard to be ultimately linked to the Cavite Coastal
Road Project, originally called for the expropriation of properties along Cuneta Avenue in Pasay
City. Later on, however, the Ministry of Public Highways decided to make the proposed extension
pass through Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets. Because of the protests of residents of the
latter, the Commission on Human Settlements recommended the reversion to the original plan,
but the Ministry argued the new route withh save the government P2 million. The government
filed expropriation proceedings against the owners of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, among
whom was petitioner.
 HELD: The choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets is arbitrary and should not receive
judicial approval. The Human Settlements Commission concluded that the cost factor is so
minimal that it can be disregarded in making a choice between the two lines. The factor of
functionality strongly militates against the choice of Fernando Rein and Del Pan streets, while the
factor of social and economic impact bears grievously on the residents of Cuneta Avenue. While
the issue would seem to boil down to a choice between people, on one hand, and progress and
development, on the other, it is to be remembered that progress and development are carried out
for the benefit of the people.
*Republic v. De Knecht - 182 SCRA 142 (EDSA extension)

 Doctrine 1: While it is true that said final judgment of this Court [De Knecht v. Bautista] on the
subject becomes the law of the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of the
petitioner to take private properties for public use upon the payment of the just compensation is
so provided in the Constitution and our laws.
 Doctrine 2: Expropriation proceedings may be undertaken by the Republic by:
o Voluntary negotiation with the land owner;
o Taking appropriate court action; or
o Legislation
 Facts:
o De Knecht was one of the owners of several properties along the Fernando Rein-Del Pan
streets which the Government sought to expropriate to give way to the extension of EDSA
and the construction of drainage facilities. De Knecht filed a case to restrain the
Government from proceeding with the expropriation. Her prayer was denied by the lower
court but upon certiorari, the SC reversed the lower court decision and granted the relief
asked for by De Knecht ruling that the expropriation was arbitrary. The case was
remanded to the lower court.
o No further action was taken despite the SC decision until two years later, in 1983, when
the Government moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the Legislature
has since enacted BP 340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose.
 RULING: While it is true that said final judgment of this Curt on the subject becomes the law of
the case between the parties, it is equally true that the right of petitioner to take private properties
for public use upon payment of just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and the laws.
Such expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary
negotiation with the land owners but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.
o When BP 340 was passed, it appears that it was based on supervening events that
occured after the 1980 decision of the SC on the De Knecht case was rendered. The
social impact factor which persuaded the Court to consider this extension to be arbitrary
had disappeared.
82
 Social impact factor cited by the Human settlement commission has
disappeared already as 1) all residents in the area have been relocated and
duly compensated and 2) only private respondent remains as the solitary
obstacle to the project that will solve not only the drainage and flood control
problem but also minimize the traffic bottleneck in the area.
o Moreover, the said decision is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in
thereafter making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing
as to the propriety of undertaking the expropriation of properties in question and thereafter
by enacting the corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the
wisdom and necessity of enacting BP 340. Thus the anterior decision of the Court must
yield to the subsequent legislative fiat.
*Manotoc v. NHA - 150 SCRA 89

 Doctrine: the law cannot provide for the amount of just compensation; just compensation is
determined by the court through an analysis of factors such as valuation by local assessors,
statements made in tax declarations, determination made by expert commissioners after having
examined the property and all other pertinent documents.
 Facts: The Manotocs are the owners of 2 large estates known as the Tambunting Estate and
Sunog Apog in Tondo. Both of which were declared expropriated in 2 decrees issued by Pres
Marcos, PD 1669 and PD 1670. Both P.D.s also provided the price of the property evaluated on
1978; however, the expropriation law was only issued in 1980.
o The Manotocs contend that the decrees violate their constitutional right to due process
and equal protection since by their mere passage of the PDs, their properties were
automatically expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the ownership and
possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation.
o The government on the other hand contends that the power of eminent domain is
inherent in the State and when the legislature or the Pres through his law making powers
exercises this power, the public use and public necessity of the expropriation and the
fixing of the just compensation become political in nature and the courts must respect the
decision.
 Issue: Whether the expropriation through the 2 PDs is beyond the ambit of the courts—NO
 Ruling: The due process clause cannot be rendered nugatory every time a specific decree
or law orders the exprop of somebody’s property and provides its own peculiar manner of
taking the same. Neither should the courts adopt a hands-off policy just because the
public use has been ordained by as existing by the decree or the just compensation has
been fixed and determined beforehand by a statute.
o Although due process does not always necessarily demand that a proceeding be had
before a court of law, it still mandates some form of proceeding where in notice and
reasonable opportunity to be heard are give to the owner to protect his property rights.
o Where it is alleged that in the taking of a person’s property, his right to due
process of law has been violated, the courts will have to step in and probe into
such alleged violation.
o The determination of just compensation and the rationale behind it either:
 At the time of the actual taking of the government; or
 At the time of the judgment by the court, WHICHEVER CAME FIRST.
 Here, the expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the
signing of the decree.
o Not only are the owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the
expropriation, plead their side, or question the amount of payments fixed by
decree, but the decisions, rulings, orders, or resolutions of the NHA are expressly
declared as beyond the reach of judicial review. An appeal may be made to the OP
but the courts are completely enjoined from any inquiry or participation whatsoever in the
expropriation of the subdivision or its incidents.
Militante v. CA, GR 107040, Apr. 12, 2000
83
SECTION 10.
*Home Building and Loan Assn. v. Blaisell - 290 US 398 (extended mortgage redemption)
 Facts: In the midst of the Great Depression, Minnesota passed a law declaring an emergency and
saying courts could extend the time periods in which mortgagees could pay back their debts to
their lenders. Pursuant to the statute, Blaisdell’s period of redemption was extended. Home
Building asserts that the statute is repugnant to the Contract Clause of the Constitution
 Ruling: The law was a legitimate use of its police powers since Minnesota faced massive
economic difficulties. The question is not whether legislative action affects contracts, but instead
whether legislative action is reasonably appropriate to the achievement of a legitimate end. In this
case, the legislation was addressed to a legitimate end – an emergency existed in Minnesota.
Plus, the conditions upon which the period of redemption under the contract was extended do not
appear unreasonable.
o Note: It will be against the general welfare of the people by allowing the contract of
mortgages’ redemption period to elapsed. Most, if not all people during the Great
Depression will forfeit their mortgaged property. Being a time of emergency, there was a
valid exercise of police power to extend the redemption period.
*Rutter v. Esteban - 93 PHIL. 68 (unreasonable delay of 8 years)

 Doctrine: Although as a general rule, government can invoke police power to impair a contract;
however, when it becomes unreasonable and oppressive, it is not a valid exercise of police power.
 Ruling:
o The SC declared the continued operation and effect of RA 342 null and void. It explained
that the continued operation of the law at the present time is unreasonable and
oppressive as the reason for its enactment has been accomplished. That at the present
time, the economy already recovered and there’s no reason for the defendant not to pay
his remaining obligation.
*Abella v. NLRC - 152 SCRA 140

 Doctrine 1: Non-impairment of obligations and contracts; To come under the constitutional
prohibition the law must effect a change in the rights of the parties with reference to each other
and NOT with reference to non-parties. In the case at bar, the contract, which does not have
anything to do with employment benefits, cannot have the effect of annulling subsequent
legislation for the protection of the workers.
 In this case, the contract entered into was a lease contract and has nothing to do with the
employment of farm workers. Thus, it does not fall under the prohibition of non-impairment of
contracts.
o Facts: Abella leased a farmland from Ramona for a period of 10 years. Abella also hired
the private respondents. At the expiration of the lease, she dismissed the private
respondents and turned over the hacienda to the owners. Private respondents filed a
complaint against petitioner for overtime pay, reinstatement, and illegal dismissal.
 Petitioner then contends that the Art. 284, as amended (granting separation pay)
violates the constitutional guarantee against impairment of obligations and
contracts, because when she leased Hacienda Danao-Ramona on June 27, 1960,
neither she nor the lessor contemplated the creation of the obligation to pay
separation pay to workers at the end of the lease.
o Ruling: As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, Article 284 as amended refers to
employment benefits to farm hands who were not parties to petitioner's lease contract with
the owner of Hacienda Danao-Ramona. Thus, the contract in case at bar cannot have the
effect of annulling subsequent legislation for the protection of the workers.
 Doctrine 2: In any event, doubts in implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the
Labor Code and their implementing regulations resolved in favor of labor
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*Presley v. Bel-Air Village Asso. - 201 SCRA 13 (commercial zone)
 Doctrine: Contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if said conditions are annotated on
the torrens title can be impaired if necessary to reconcile with the legitimate exercise of police
power.
o Like all contracts, restrictive easements are subject to the overriding demands, needs and
interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of
police power.
 Facts: Bel-Air Village (BAVA) is seeking damages against Presley for operating a Hot Pandesal
store over a piece of land situated along Jupiter St. which was supposedly only to be used for
residential purposes. Such restriction was contained in the Deed of Restrictions which was
annotated with the title of the land when it was purchased from BAVA. Pending the said case, the
Sangalang case was decided which upheld the classification of Jupiter St. into a ‘high density
commercial zone’ by virtue of Ordinance No. 81-01. Petitioner’s are invoking the said ruling to
absolve them from paying damages to BAVA.
 Ruling:
o The provisions of the Deed of Restrictions are in the nature of contractual obligations
freely entered into by the parties. However , these contractual stipulations on the use of
the land even if said conditions are annotated on the torrens title can be impaired if
necessary to reconcile with the legitimate exercise of police power. (Ortigas & Co.
Limited Partnership v. Feati Bank and Trust Co., 94 SCRA 533 [1979]).
o The court ruled in the Sangalang case that the National Government itself, through the
Metro Manila Commission (MMC), had reclassified Jupiter Street from a “residential (R-1)
zone” into a “high density commercial (C-3) zone”, pursuant to its Ordinance No. 81-01.
Hence, the petitioners have no cause of action on the strength alone of the said deed
restrictions.
o Jupiter Street has been highly commercialized since the passage of Ordinance No. 81-
01. The records indicate that commercial buildings, offices, restaurants, and stores have
already sprouted in this area. There no reason why the petitioner should be singled out
and prohibited from putting up her hot pandesal store.
*Miners Association v. Factoran - 240 SCRA 100

● Doctrine: The strictures of the non-impairment contract clause do not apply in a Timber License
Agreement. A person who has a timber license do not possess any vested rights as these licenses
are not property nor property rights.
 Ruling:
o The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-
impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property nor property rights.
 Doctrine 2: Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is
limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of
the State.
*Ortigas v. Feati Bank – 94 SCRA 533

 Municipalities are empowered by law to adopt zoning ordinances and regulations.—Section 3 of
R.A. No. 2264 otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, empowers a Municipal Council” to
adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations” for the municipality.
o The only exceptions under Section 12 are existing vested rights arising out of a contract
o between a “a province, City or municipality on one hand and a third party on the
other,” in which case the original terms and provisions of the contract should govern. The
exceptions, clearly, do no apply in the case at bar.
 For the exception to apply, the contract must be between the government and
third party.
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 Doctrine: Thus, the police power is superior to contractual stipulations between parties on the use
of lands sold by subdivisions even if said conditions are annotated on the Torrens Title.
o Thus, Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part EDSA as industrial and
commercial zone is a valid exercise of police power. EDSA, a main traffic artery which
runs through several cities and municipalities in the Metro Manila area, supports an
endless stream of traffic and the resulting activity, noise and pollution are hardly
conducive to the health, safety or welfare of the residents in its route.
*SWS v. COMELEC (supra.)

 Existing contracts of petitioners with third parties must be understood to have been made in
reference to possible exercise of the COMELEC’s regulatory powers.
o Contention by SWS: They claim that it “unduly interferes with [their] existing contracts . . .
by forcing [them] to disclose information that, under the contracts, is confidential or
privileged.
o It is settled that “the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment . . . is limited by the
exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals
and general welfare.”
Goldenway Merchandising Corp v. Equitable PCI, GR 195540, March 13, 2013

 Facts:
o Goldenway executed a Real Estate mortgage in 1985 in favor of Equitable Bank to secure
a loan. Goldenway failed to settle the loan obligation and the properties mortgaged were
sold.
o Goldenway’s counsel offered to redeem the properties but was informed that it is no
longer possible because R.A. 8791 applied and, therefore, barred the redemption.
o Goldenway argued that Act No. 3135 should instead apply which allowed a one-year
period of redemption and not the shorter term under R.A. 8791, otherwise it would impair
its obligation of contract.
 Issue: Was the right of Goldenway violated when the amendatory law, R.A. 8791, was in effect
when the mortgage was foreclosed?
 Ruling: There is no impairment of the obligation of contract.
 Reasoning:
o Section 47 of R.A. 8791 did not divert juridical persons of the right to redeem foreclosed
properties but only modified the time for the exercise of such right by reducing the one-
year period originally provided in Act No. 3135.
o There is, likewise, no retroactive application of the new redemption period because
Section 47 exempts from its operation those properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity
and whose owners retain redemption rights under Act No. 3135.
Del Rosario v. Delos Santos - L-20589-90

Phil. Vet. Bank Employees v. Phil Vet. Bank - 189 SCRA 14
Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance - 235 SCRA 630 (supra, Equal Protection)
Siska Development v. Office of the President - 231 SCRA 674
Philconsa v. Enriquez - 235 SCRA 506
Lim v. Pacquing - 240 SCRA 649
Juarez v. CA – 214 SCRA 475
FPIB v. CA - 252 SCRA 259
CMMA v. POEA - 243 SCRA 666
PNB v. O.P. - 252 SCRA 5
Eugenio v. Drilon - 252 SCRA 106
JMM v. CA – (supra, Substantive)
C & M Timber v. Alcala – 273 SCRA 402
Republic v. Agana – 269 SCRA 1
Producers v. NLRC – GR 118069 November 16, 1998
Blaquera v. Alcala – GR 109406 September 11, 1998
Meralco v. Province of Laguna, 306 SCRA 750
86
City Government v. Reyes – GR 127708 March 25, 1999
Harrison Motors Corp v. Navarro, GR 132269, April 27, 2000
Bardillon v. Brgy. Masili, GR 146886, Apr. 30, 2003
Philreca v. Sec. of DILG, GR 143076, June 10, 2003
Republic v. Rosemoor Mining and Development Corp, 426 SCRA 517
Chavez v. COMELEC, 437 SCRA 415
Alvarez v. PICOP 508 SCRA 498
Lepanto v. WMC 507 SCRA 315
Republic v. Caguioa – 536 SCRA 193
Land Bank v. Republic – 543 SCRA 453
Serrano v. Gallant – 582 SCRA 254
Alvarez v. PICOP – 606 SCRA 444
Surigao v. ERC – 632 SCRA 96
Hacienda Luisita v. PARC – 653 SCRA 154
Pryce Corp v. China Banking Corp, GR 172302, Feb 18, 2014
Victorio v. Pacific Plans, GR 193108, December 10, 2014 (reiterates Pryce)
87
Section 2.
When is a search a “search”?
Valmonte v. General de Villa - 178 SCRA 211, (MAIN) and 185 SCRA 665 (MR)
Guazon v. De Villa - 181 SCRA 623
*SJS v. DDB 570 SCRA 410 (mandatory drug testing, requirement of a valid search)
 As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,
reasonableness is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. And
whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of
the government-mandated intrusion on the individuals privacy interest against the
promotion of some compelling state interest.
o In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be
personally determined by a judge.
o Given that the drug-testing policy for employees and students for that matter under RA
9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia
as swift and informal disciplinary procedures, the probable-cause standard is not
required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the
reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.
1. On Elective Candidates: INVALID.
 Congress cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g) validy impose qualifications
on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitutional prescribes.
2. Secondary and Tertiary Students: VALID
 Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a
random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable
but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless
a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected.
 Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be
sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
requirements.
3. Employees—VALID
 In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy
expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the
company’s work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by
management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain
discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has
been upheld.
 Reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state
concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to
properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable
and, ergo, constitutional.
4. Persons Charged—INVALID
 The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint.
 They are singled out and are impleaded against their will.
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Requisites of a valid warrant
*People v. Veloso - 48 PHIL. 169 (John Doe warrant, description personae)

 The Bill of Rights provide “that no [search] warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized.”
 It is invariably recognized that the warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void,
“EXCEPT in those cases where it contains a description personae such as will enable the officer
to identify the accused.” Thus, a John Doe Warrant is valid.
 John Doe warrants must contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the
person or persons to be apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the
proper person or persons upon whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal
appearanee and peculiarities, give his occupation and place of residence, and any other
circumstances by means of which he can be identified.
o As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in
the building occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John
Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe as
Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.
*Stonehill v. Diokno – 20 SCRA 383 (general warrants, rule on exclusion)

 The Constitution provides that no [search] warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge, and that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
 General search warrants are outlawed because they place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of
peace officers
o Search warrants, issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons
therein named had committed a violation of Central Bank laws, tariff and customs laws,
Tax Code and Revised Penal Code do not satisfy the constitutional requirements because
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications.
 Search warrants authorizing the seizure of books of accounts and records "showing all the
business transactions" of certain persons, regardless of whether the transactions were legal
or illegal, contravene the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized
should be particularly described and defeat its major objective of eliminating general warrants.
 To prevent the issuance of general warrants, the Supreme Court amended the Old Rules of Court
by providing in the Revised Rules of Court that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one
specific offense".
 Exclusionary Rule  all evidence obtained from illegal searches and seizures are inadmissible.
*Central Bank v. Morfe – 20 SCRA 507 (general pattern of business)

 The failure of the deponent to mention particular individuals does not necessarily prove that he
had no personal knowledge of specific illegal transactions of the savings and loans association, for
the witness might be cquainted with specific transactions even if the names of the individuals
concerned are unknown to him.
 The banking laws seek to protect the public against actual, as well as potential injury. Transactions
objected to by the bank involves general pattern of the business of the organization and not
isolated transactions. It is not necessary to specify or identify the parties involved in said isolated
transactions, so that the search and seizure be limited to the records pertinent thereto.
o The line of reasoning of respondent Judge might, perhaps, be justified if the acts imputed
to the Organization consisted of isolated transactions, distinct and different from the type
of business in which it is generally engaged. In such case, it may be necessary to specify
or identify the parties involved in said isolated transactions, so that the search and seizure
be limited to the records pertinent thereto.
o Such, however, is not the situation confronting us. The records suggest clearly that the
transactions objected to by the Bank constitute the general pattern of the business of the
89
Organization. Indeed, the main purpose thereof, according to its By-laws, is "to extend
financial assistance, in the form of loans, to its members," with funds deposited by them.
*Bache & Co. v. Ruiz - 37 SCRA 823 (depositions made by clerk)

 The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. 3, Sec. 1,
par. 3, of the Constitution, and Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, should be
conducted by the judge himself and not by others.
o Thus, the deposition taken by Deputy Clerk of Court does not comply with constitutional
mandate.
o The reading of the stenographic notes to respondent judge did not constitute sufficient
compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner respondent
judge did not have opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and his
witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on
account of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important in
arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was
probable cause.
 The amended Revised Rules of Court provide that “no search warrant shall issue for more than
one specific offense.”
o You should issue one search warrant per offense. The judge is allowed to issue more than
one search warrant.
 Under Art. 111, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.
o Seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions not a particular description.
o The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant—to leave the officers of
the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that
“unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made,—that abuses may not be
committed.
o A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized:
 when the description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily
allow; or
 when the description expresses a conclusion of fact—not of law—by which the
warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; or
 when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued.
 If the articles desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other
than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject
of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen
such evidence.
*Soliven v. Makasiar - 167 SCRA 393 (judge not required to personally examine)
 What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge
to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses.
o Wilwayco: There is a current complaint/case; therefore an examination by the fiscal is
allowed. As opposed to search warrant, there is no pending case yet. As such, it must be
the judge who should examine the witnesses and the complainant before he issues the
search warrant.
 Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
o (1) personally evaluate the report and THE SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS submitted by
the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or
90
o (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report
and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
*Lim, Sr. v. Judge Felix – 194 SCRA 292 (certification used by judge)
 Doctrine 1: The Constitution prohibits the issuance of search warrants or warrants of arrest where
the judge hasnot personally determined the existence of probable cause. In satisfying the
existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and witness.
 Doctrine 2: The contents of the prosecutor’s report will support his own conclusion that there is
reason to charge the accused of an offense and hold him for trial. However, the judge must decide
independently. Hence, he must have supporting evidence, other than the prosecutor’s bare report,
upon which to legally sustain his own findings on the existence (or nonexistence) of probable
cause to issue an arrest order.
o A judge may rely upon the fiscal’s certification of the existence of a probable cause and,
on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. The certification however, does not bind the
judge to come out with the warrant of arrest.
o By itself the Prosecutor’s certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the
affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting
documents behind the Prosecutor’s certification which are material in assisting the Judge
to make his determination.
o The warrant issues not on the strength of the certification standing alone but because of
the records which sustain it.
o In this case, probable cause was not determined personally by the judge because the
records were still in Masbate when he issued the warrant so he had no basis to make his
own personal determination. He also did not examine under oath the complainant and
witness he may produce. He just used the certification.
 Doctrine 3: There are two types of Preliminary Investigation.
o Preliminary Investigation Proper – made by Fiscal; Executive in nature; to determine
probable cause whether or not to file a case.
o Preliminary Investigation to issue warrant – made by Judge; Judiciary in nature; to
determine probable cause whether or not to issue warrant.
 Doctrine 4: Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
o Moreover, as held in a long line of decisions, the probable cause must refer to onl y
one specific offense.
*People v. Francisco, GR 129035, Apr. 22, 2002 (different address of house)

 Doctrine 2: Absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the search
warrant. Presumption of regularity cannot invoked by the officer.
 The requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant are:
o (1) probable cause is present;
o (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge;
o (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by
the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation;
o (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and
o (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
 Even a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended.
 Doctrine 1: The controlling subject of search warrants is the place indicated in the warrant itself
and not the place identified by the police.
o Police who conducted the surveillance gave a description matching the house at 122
Hizon so the warrant was issued for the search of that house.
91
o However, from the application for a search warrant as well as the search warrant itself, the
police officer serving the warrant cannot, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended precisely because it was wrongly described as No. 122, although it may
have been located on the same street as No. 120.
o Even the description of the house by police asset Baradilla referred to that house located
at No. 122 M. Hizon St., not at No. 120 M. Hizon St.
Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP - 133 SCRA 800 (general warrant)
 The fact that some of the properties seized do not belong to the person against whom a search
warrant was directed, not a sufficient ground to annul the same
o Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to
be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles and
property seized under the warrants.
Salazar v. Achacoso - 183 SCRA 145

 G.R. Only judges can issue warrants of search and arrest. Thus, the Article 38 (c) of the Labor
was declared unconstitutional as it allowed the DOLE Secretary to cause the arrest and detention
of non-licensee and non-holder of authority of illegal recruitment agencies.
 Exception: The President has the power to order the arrest (of illegal or undesirable aliens) for the
purpose of deportation.
Silva v. Pres. Judge of RTC of Negros Or. 203 SCRA 140 (searching questions, not suggestive)
 Before issuing a search warrant, the judge must determine whether there is probable cause by
examining the complainant and witnesses through searching question and answers.
o Search Warrant No.1 is unconstitutional. Judge Ontal failed to comply with the
requirement that he must examine the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions to determine probable cause.
o It can be found in the case that the deposition contained yes or no questions only and
were even suggestive. It was also only 4 questions.
Ortiz v. Palaypayon - 234 SCRA 391 (no personal examination of witnesses and complainants)
 A police officer was, and is not authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, hence, a judge
cannot and must not rely on an inquiry made by a police investigator as the law mandates him to
conduct his own preliminary examination.
o A police officer was, and is not authorized to conduct preliminary investigation, hence, a
judge cannot and must not rely on an inquiry made by a police investigator as the law
mandates him to conduct his own preliminary examination.
Webb v. De Leon - 247 SCRA 652 (supra, Procedural Due Process) (evidence need not be conclusive)
 Before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability of a crime,
not the certainty/conclusiveness of the guilt of accused based on the testimony of the complainant
or his witnesses or from the affidavits, records, stenographic notes submitted by the prosecutor.
th
20 Century Fox Film v. CA – 164 SCRA 655 (no mastertape)
 The presentation of master tapes at the time of application for search warrant is necessary for the
validity of the search warrant.
 A search warrant issued for alleged violation of the Anti-Film Piracy law which did not describe
with particularity the articles to be seized but instead listed articles and appliances generally
connected with the legitimate business of renting out betamax tapes, is in the nature of a general
warrant.
92
Yousef Al-Ghoul v. CA, G.R. No. 126859, September 4, 2001 (place searched not in the warrant)
 As held in PICOP v. Asuncion, the place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor
amplified by the police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in
doing so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded.
 Thus, the placed searched which is not included in the warrant is inadmissible as evidence.
However, the items acquired in the apartment included in the warrant is admissible.
Uy v. BIR, GR 129651, October 20, 2000 (superseding warrant)

 The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other
places in the community.
o In this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found
in Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating
the premises of petitioner-corporation. That Search Warrant A-1 therefore, inconsistently
identified the city where the premises to be searched is, is not a defect that would spell the
warrant’s invalidation in this case.
 Doctrine: Where the apparent intent in issuing another warrant was to supersede an earlier
warrant, the earlier warrant is deemed revoked by the latter warrant.
Vallejo v. CA - 427 SCRA 658 (more than one offense)

 A warrant must be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.
o The questioned warrant in this case is a scatter-shot warrant for having been issued for
more than one offense—Falsification of Land Titles under Article 171 and Article 213
of the Revised Penal Code, and violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. A warrant must be issued upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense. In fact, a careful perusal of the application
for the warrant shows that the applicant perusal of the application for the warrant
shows that the applicant did not allege any specific act performed by the petitioner
constituting a violation of any of the aforementioned offenses.
Del Castillo v. People – 664 SCRA 430 (test-buy operation)

 If the search was conducted by private persons, it will be admissible. The barangay tanods who
got the shabu are still persons of authority.
HPS Software v. PLDT – 687 SCRA 426

 What is involved here is a search warrant proceeding which is not a criminal action, much
less a civil action, but a special criminal process. Since a search warrant proceeding is not a
criminal action, it necessarily follows that the requirement set forth in Section 5, Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that “all criminal actions either commenced by complaint
or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor” does
not apply.
Unilever v. Tan, GR. 179367, January 29, 2014

 The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing of information in court is essentially an
executive function that is lodged, at the first instance, with the public prosecutor and, ultimately, to
the Secretary of Justice. Their findings with respect to the existence or non-existence of probable
cause are generally not subject to review by the Court.
o Courts can neither override their determination nor substitute their own judgment for that
of the latter. They cannot likewise order the prosecution of the accused when the
prosecutor has not found a prima facie case.
 Nevertheless, this policy of non-interference is not without exception. The Constitution itself allows
the court may intervene in the executive determination of probable cause, review the findings and
conclusions, and ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause by
examining the records of the preliminary investigation when the executive’s discretion has been
gravely abused.
93
Alvarez v. CFI - 64 PHIL. 33 (search at night)
Placer v. Villanueva - 126 SCRA 463
Corro v. Lising - 137 SCRA 541
Board of Co (CID) v. Dela Rosa - 197 SCRA 853
Allado v. Diokno - 232 SCRA 192 (not proven crimes)
People v. Martinez - 235 SCRA 171 (warrantless search)
Munez v. Arino - 241 SCRA 478
Cabilao v. Sardido - 246 SCRA 94
De los Santos-Reyes v. Montesa - 247 SCRA 85
Agcaoili v. Molina - A.M. No. MTJ - 94-979, 249 SCRA 482
People v. Woolcock - 244 SCRA 235
Tambasen v. People - 246 SCRA 184
Manlavi v. Gacott - 244 SCRA 50
Columbia Pictures v. CA – 237 SCRA 367
Columbia Pictures v. CA – 262 SCRA 219
Roberts v. CA – 254 SCRA 307 (Pepsi number case)
Republic v. Sandiganbayan - 255 SCRA 438
Ho v. People – 280 SCRA 365 (personal determination of probable cause)
People v. CA – 291 SCRA 400
Pastrano v. CA – 281 SCRA 287
People v. Lagao – 271 SCRA 51
Gozos v. Tac-an – GR 123191 December 17, 1998
Flores v. Sumalig – 290 SCRA 568
Kho v. Makalintal – GR 94902-06 April 21, 1999
Paper Industries v. Asuncion – GR 122092 May 19, 1999
Gov’t of USA v. Purganan, GR 148571, Sept. 21, 2002 (probable cause)
Cupcupin v. people, GR 132389, Nov. 19, 2002
People v. Gonzales, GR 121877, Sept. 12, 2001
People v. Molina - 352 SCRA 179
People v. Salunguit, GR 133254, Apr. 19, 2001
Del Rosario v. People, GR 142295, May 31, 2001
People v. Mamaril - 420 SCRA 662
People v. de los Reyes - 441 SCRA 305 (leading questions not searching)
Okabe v. Gutierrez - 429 SCRA 685 (reiterates Lim v. Felix)
Sony v. Espanol – 453 SCRA 360
Betoy v. Coliflores 483 SCRA 435
Dizon v. Veneracion, AM RTJ-97-1376, July 20, 2000
Abdula v. Guiani, 326 SCRA 1
Raro v. Sandiganbayan, GR 108431, July 14, 2000
Tolentino v. Malanyaon, AM RTJ-99-1444, August 3, 2000
Savage v. Taypin, 331 SCRA 697
People v. Baula, GR 132671, November 15, 2000
Nala v. Barroso, Jr. GR 153087, Aug. 7, 2003
People v. Venecario, 420 SCRA 280
Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp., Inc, 438 CSRA 224
Miranda v. Tuliao 486 SCRA 377
Kho v. Lanzanas 489 SCRA 444
People v. Choi 497 SCRA 547
David v. Arroyo 489 SCRA 160
People v. Del Norte - 426 SCRA 383
Mayo v. Penalosa – Fermo – 582 SCRA 1
People v. Nunez – 591 SCRA 394
Borlongan v. Pena – 626 SCRA 633
Sy Tan v. Sy Tiong – 613 SCRA 98
People v. Tuan – 628 SCRA 226
94
WWW Corp v. People, GR 161106, Jan 13, 2014
Ocampo v. Abando, Gr 176830, Feb 11, 2014
Century v. People 709 SCRA 177
Microsoft v. Farajallah 735 SCRA 34
PLDT v. Alvarez, 718 SCRA 94
Dela Cruz v. People, 730 SCRA 655
Laud v. People, 741 SCRA 239
Petron v. Ong, GR 199371, February 3, 2016
Ogayon v. People – 768 SCRA 670
Warrantless searches and seizures.
Five exceptions to the search warrant requirement: IMP-C-CES

1. Incidental to Valid Arrest [arrest first before search]
 Objects used in the crime;
 Fruits;
 Anything that might harm the arresting officer;
 Any evidence that may be used for trial (Dean Candelaria)
2. Moving Vehicle
3. Plain View Doctrine
4. Customs Search
5. Consented to the warrantless search
6. Emergency and Exigent Circumstances
7. Stop and Frisk (Terry Search)
*MHP v. CA - 236 SCRA 227 (boy scout; enough time to apply for the warrant)
 Where a warrantless search and seizure is conducted despite the fact that there is sufficient
time to apply for a judicial warrant, the persons who participate therein take the risk of a suit for
damages in event that the seizure is proven to violate the right against unreasonable search
and seizure.
o Private persons who instigate an illegal warrantless search and seizure may be held liable
for damages. Private persons who initiate an illegal warrantless search and seizure,
accompany the raiding team and stand by during the operation, apparently assenting
thereto, are liable for damages to the same extent as the public officers themselves.
 Ruling: Petitioner received information that private respondents were illegally selling Boy Scouts
items in October 1983. A surveillance of the stores was made and reported to the Philippine
Constabulary. On October 25, 1983, a raid was conducted and the supposed illicit goods were
seized.
o The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the
stores of private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and
the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial warrant.
o Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of
private respondents. In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the
seizure would be proved to violate the right of private respondents against unreasonable
search and seizure. In the case at bench, the search and seizure were clearly illegal.
*People v. CFI - 101 SCRA 86 (moving vehicle)

 Doctrine: Persons exercising authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant, except a search inside a dwelling house.
o In Papa v. Mago, the Court in that case expressed the considered view that “except in
the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under
the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the
enforcement of customs laws.”
 Even assuming that customs officers do not have such authority, the agents could not have
secured a valid warrant even if they had the information several days before the encounter
95
because they lacked the relevant details needed for a valid warrant. All they knew is the general
knowledge that some highly dutiable goods would be transported in a blue Dodge automobile.
*Roan v. Gonzales - 145 SCRA 687 (custodia legis)

 The search and seizure of items was illegal. Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as
the search is valid. It was also because the military authorities who entered petitioner’s home had
no right to be there. In addition, the circumstances which would render a search without a valid
warrant valid is not attendant in this case, thus confiscation is illegal.
 However, the seized pistol under a void warrant shall remain in custodia legis pendente lite
although it cannot be used in evidence against the accused.
o The revolver and the live bullets cannot be used as evidence against the petitioner in a
criminal action against him for illegal possession of firearms but such will still be in
custodia legis pending the resolution of the case of illegal possession.
o Prohibited items (i.e. guns, drugs, etc), though seized in an illegal search, can be validly
confiscated by the government and put in custodia legis.
o Question do you have to return it after?
*People v. Malmstedt – 198 SCRA 401 (bus to Sagada) [incidental to lawful arrest]
 Doctrine 1: Warrantless search based on the information received during checkpoint did not give
enough time to obtain warrant.
o When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein
accused, that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him
prohibited drugs, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.
 Doctrine 2: Where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a
search warrant; Circumstances where a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace
officer or a private person.
o SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.––A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person: a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
 When his bags were searched, he was actually committing a crime already
[caught inflagrante delicto], which is possession of illegal drugs.
 Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by
this Court as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the smell of
marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the
accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
 Candelaria: There was also probable cause on his warrantless search on
Malmstead since they already received reports of illegal drugs being brought
down from Sagada, and that he was also acting suspiciously—which taken
together as a whole, lead the officers to believe he was hiding something illegal
[or committing a crime].
 The offense was recognized with the warrantless search conducted by NARCOM
prompted by probable cause: (1) the receipt of information by NARCOM
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession and (2) failure of the accused to immediately present his passport.
Taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe
that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities.
From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless
search that was made on the personal effects of the accused.
*Posadas v. CA - 188 SCRA 288 [not incidental to lawful arrest; but valid “stop and search” or
“stop and frisk”]
 From the foregoing provision of law it is clear that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by
a peace officer or private person, among others, when in his presence the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; of when an offense
has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person arrested has committed it.
96
o However, at the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and
apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had
committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did
now know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without
a warrant.
 The "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints is constitutional.
o Thus, as between a warrantless search and seizure conducted at military or police
checkpoints and the search thereat in the case at bar, there is no question that, indeed,
the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the former, it was effected on the
basis of a probable cause.
o Facts: INP members were conducting surveillance in Magallanes St. Petitioner was
spotted in the premises of Rizal Memorial College, carrying a buri bag and acting
suspiciously. They approached him but he attempted to flee so the patrols prevented him
from doing so. His buri bag was inspected and was found to contain rounds of live
ammunition and a tear gas grenade.
o Ruling: The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was a probable cause that he was
concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the right and duty of the police
officers to inspect the same.
 It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the
possession of the petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant
for the purpose.
* Aniag v. COMELEC - 237 SCRA 424 (gun ban; checkpoint)

 Doctrine 1: A warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is
neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
merely limited to a visual search.
o A warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of
evidence in plain view, as well as the search conducted at police or military
checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless
search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is merely limited to a visual search
o Search in a checkpoint is limited to viewing what can be seen from the outside.
 Doctrine 2: An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers
conducting the search had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that
either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched.
o The action of policemen who conducted a warrantless search in spite of the absence of
any circumstances justifying the same intruded into the petitioner’s privacy and the
security of his property, and the firearms obtained thereby cannot be admitted for any
purpose in any proceeding.
 Doctrine 3: “Consent” given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the
purview of the constitutional guaranty. [Consented Search]
*Malacat v. CA – 283 SCRA 159 (fast moving eyes)

 For Stop and Frisk mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
o There is nothing in Malacat’s behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited
even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were “moving very fast” – an observation
which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat
and it was already 6:30 pm, thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were
merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble.
97
o Moreover, there is no ground to believe that the petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu. According to Yu, the alleged grenade was discovered in
the front waistline of the petitioner. However, also according to Yu’s testimony that they
did not see or notice any bulging object in the person of the petitioner. As such, there was
no reason to stop and frisk him.
 Terry Case, where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons
with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for
his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment.
o Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2)
the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer
to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
 Other notes:
o A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one “in flagrante delicto,” while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a “hot pursuit” arrest.
*People v. Aruta – 288 SCRA 626

 Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
o Warrantless Arrest Incidental to Valid Arrest [arrest first before search]
o Search of a Moving Vehicle
 Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
o Plain View Doctrine
o Customs Search
o Consented to the warrantless search
o Emergency and Exigent Circumstances
o Stop and Frisk (Terry Search)
 In the recognized exceptions of the search warrant requirement [IMP-C-CES], it must be noted,
however, that in all of these recognized exceptions, the requirement of probable cause
must still be present.
o In instances where a search will be conducted as an incident to a lawful arrest, the
arrest must come first before a search may be conducted, not the other way
around.
o If a person will be arrested by virtue of an invalid search, the arrest will be invalid.
o There is no valid warrantless arrest where the accused was apprehended while merely
crossing the street and was not acting in any manner that would engender a
reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was
committing a crime and it was only when the informant pointed to the accused and
identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out
as the suspect.
98
 Notes – Distinguishing this from other cases.
o Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case,
the police officers had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant.
Second, Aruta’s identity was priorly ascertained. Third, Aruta, was not acting
suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was search aboard a moving vehicle, a legally
accepted exception to the warrant requirement. Aruta, on the other hand, was searched
while about to cross a street.
o In People v. Bagista, the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all
vehicles coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential
information they received from their regular informant that a woman having the same
appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north.
They likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellant’s belongings since she
fitted the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid
warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained in the course of said
search is admissible against accused-appellant.
 Again, this case differs from Aruta as this involves a search of a moving vehicle
plus the fact that the police officers erected a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to
the requirements of a search warrant.
*Asuncion v. CA – GR 125959 February 1, 1999 (shabu in vehicle)

 The search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the Constitutional
mandate that no search or seizure shall be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge
after personally determining the existence of probable cause.
 A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.
 Aminudin is not applicable because:  
o Even though the POs already identified the petitioner as an alleged shabu dealer and
confirmed the area where he allegedly was plying his illegal trade, they were uncertain as
to the time he would show up in the vicinity.
o they were uncertain as to the type of vehicle petitioner would be in, taking into account
reports that petitioner used different cars in going to and from the area. 
o there was probable cause as the same POs had a previous encounter with the petitioner,
who was then able to evade arrest.
 Ruling: Accused was arrested while in a moving vehicle. Probable cause was present since the
arresting officers had their informant point the vehicle that was personally known to him to be the
car of the accused. In this case, the arresting officers did not have the time to obtain a warrant
since the informant divulged the information only hours before the arrest and the latter did not
know what car the accused will be using on that day nor did he know where exactly the accused
will be. In addition to the fact that the accused was arrested while in a moving vehicle, which is a
recognized exception.
*People v. Canton, GR 148825, Dec. 27, 2002 (airport search)

 Doctrine: Warrantless search by the airport security is stop-and-frisk, pursuant to the airport
procedure allowed by R.A. No. 6235. Her subsequent arrest without warrant is justified because
she was caught in flagrante delicto.
 In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a
search can be made; the process cannot be reversed. As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the
strip search in the ladies’ room, the airport security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were
hidden on SUSAN’s body; hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being committed.
Thus, the search cannot, therefore, be said to have been done incidental to a lawful arrest.
 Search is pursuant to airport security procedure [custom’s search], which constitutes another
exception to proscription against warrantless arrest and seizures unlike the “Terry Search”, an
airport search is NOT limited to weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited
materials or substances.
99
o In airport security procedures, Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure
clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack
of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.
*Disini v. Sec. of Justice, GR 203335, February 18, 2014 [DOJ cannot issue warrant]
 Codal [Unconstitutional Section 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. — When
a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall
issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.
 Based on the foregoing, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data
under its control and disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot
substitute for judicial search warrant.
o Computer data may refer to entire programs or lines of code, including malware, as well
as files that contain texts, images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to go into a
lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital space, it is indisputable that computer
data, produced or created by their writers or authors may constitute personal property.
Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable searches and seizures, whether
while stored in their personal computers or in the service provider’s systems.
o Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in one’s
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge.
o Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control
and disposition without a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for
judicial search warrant.
Nolasco v. Pano - 147 SCRA 509 (person of accused)

 Initial decision: Although the search warrant is invalid for being general, because Roque was
arrested near her residence, no valid search warrant was needed to search the place, pursuant to
Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
 Reconsidered decision: Search cannot be conducted without warrant in this case. To rule
otherwise would mean one can simply wait for him to get home to arrest him. The arrest was at
11.30am, and the search was at 12nn, so this is not incidental.
 Doctrine: Search of a person arrested without warrant should be limited to a search of his person.
The search incidental to arrest should be made only on the place of arrest.
People v. Lo Ho Wing – 193 SCRA 122 (drug case – Hong Kong)

 Facts: Oplan Sharon 887 was conducted after receiving a tip about an organized group importing
illegal drugs and smuggling. Tia was recruited to infiltrate the crime syndicate; he submits regular
undercover activities to Capt. Palmera. He was eventually hired as the traveling companion of Lo.
Tia and Lo left for HK and purchased six tin cans of tea with drugs. They went back to the
Philippines. Lo Ho Wing, Lim and Tia rode a cab. Upon seeing appellant and Tia leave the airport,
the operatives who first spotted them followed them. Along Imelda Avenue, the car of the
operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by appellant and Tia and cut into its path forcing the taxi
driver to stop his vehicle.
 Ruling: As the case involves a moving vehicle, the search was valid. It is not practicable to
secure a warrant if the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction of the
warrant. They have probable cause due to the information given by operative Tia.
Mustang Lumber v. CA – 257 SCRA 430 (trucks with lumber)

 A search warrant has a lifetime of ten days and it could be served at any time within the said
period, and if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in one day, the same may be
continued the following day or days until completed.
o Thus, when the search under a warrant on one day was interrupted, it may be continued
under the same warrant the following day, provided it is still within the ten-day period.
100
Eugenio v. People 549 SCRA 433 (entry of plea)
 Any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over her
person, should be raised in a motion to quash at any time before entering her plea, and failure to
timely raise this objection amounts to a waiver of such irregularity, resulting in concomitant
submission to the trial court’s jurisdiction over her person
Fajardo v. People – 639 SCRA 194

 Plain View Doctrine
o (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area;
o (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
o (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of
a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure
o “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search
People v. Rodriguez - 232 SCRA 227

People v. Saycon - 236 SCRA 329
Papa v. Mago – 22 SCRA 857 (Bureau of Customs)
Bagalihog v. Fernandez - 198 SCRA 614
People v. Sibug - 229 SCRA 489
People v. Garcia - 235 SCRA 371
People v. Cuachon – 238 SCRA 540
People v. Merabueno – 239 SCRA 197
People v. Pablo - 239 SCRA 500
People v. De Gracia - 233 SCRA 716
People v. Santos - 236 SCRA 686
People v. Acol - 232 SCRA 406
People v. De Lara - 236 SCRA 291
People v. Fernandez – 239 SCRA 174
People v. Barros - 231 SCRA 557
People v. Figueroa - 248 SCRA 679
People v. Balingan - 241 SCRA 277
People v. Tabar – 222 SCRA 144
Veronia School District. 47 J v. ACTON - June 26, 1995
Manlavi v. Gacott - 244 SCRA 50
People v. Velasco - 252 SCRA 135
People v. Lua - 256 SCRA 539
People v. Juatan – 260 SCRA 532
People v. Leangsiri - 252 SCRA 213
Hizon v. CA – 265 SCRA 517
People v. Que – 265 SCRA 721
People v. Cuizon - 256 SCRA 329
People v. Bagista – 214 SCRA 63
People v. Salazar – 266 SCRA 607
People v. Encinada - 280 SCRA 72
Padilla v. CA – 269 SCRA 402
People v. Gatward – 267 SCRA 785
People v. Sotto – 275 SCRA 191
People v. Lising – 275 SCRA 804
People v. Lacerna – 278 SCRA 561
People v. Montilla – 285 SCRA 703
People v. Cuenco – GR 128277 November 16, 1998
Españo v. CA – 288 SCRA 558
People v. Correa – 285 SCRA 679
People v. Mendoza – GR 109279-80 January 18, 1999
People v. Doria – GR 125299 January 22, 1999
101
People v. Valdez – GR 127801 March 3, 1999
Austria v. NLRC, GR 124382, August 16, 1999 (?)
Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan, 302 SCRA 102
People v. Mendoza, 301 SCRA 66
People v. Sevilla, GR 124077, September 5, 2000
People v. Figueroa, GR 134056, July 6, 2000
People v. Che Chun Ting, GR 130568-69, March 21, 2000
People v. Escano, 323 SCRA 754
People v. Hindoy, G.R. No. 132662, May 10, 2001
People v. Deang, GR 128045, August 24, 2000
People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 121877, September 12, 2001
People v. Valdez, GR 129296, September 25, 2000 (plain view)
People v. Lacap, G.R. No. 139114, October 23, 2001
People v. Johnson, GR 138881, December 18, 2000
People v. Uy, 380 SCRA 100 (in flagrante)
People v. Que- Ming Kha, GR 133265, May 29, 2002 (plain view)
People v. Salanguit, 356 SCRA 683
People v. Aspiras, 376 SCRA 596
Caballes v. CA, 373 SCRA 221
People v. Asis, GR 142531, Oct. 15, 2002 (waiver)
People v. Libnao, GR 136860, Jan. 20, 2003
People v. Macalaba, GR 146284, Jan. 20, 2003
People v. Sarap, GR 132165, Mar. 26, 2003
People v. Tudtud, GR 144037, Sept. 26, 2003
People v. Suzuki, GR 120670, Oct.23, 2003
People v. Ayangao - 427 SCRA 428
People v. Pendatun, 434 SCRA 198
People v. Peralta - 426 SCRA 472
Rieta v. People, 426 SCRA 273
People v. Huang – 439 SCRA 350 (plain view)
Unilab v. Isip – 461 SCRA 574 (plain view)
Salvador v. People – 463 SCRA 574 (moving vehicle and customs search)
Amante v. Serwelas – 471 SCRA 348 (moving vehicle)
People v. Penaflorida 551 SCRA 111
People v. Cabacoba 557 SCRA 475
People v. Bohol 560 SCRA 232
People v. Dumangay 566 SCRA 290
People v. Aguitay 566 SCRA 572
Ching v. People 569 SCRA 711
People v. Lopez GR No. 181441, Nov. 14, 2008
Ambant v. CA 553 SCRA 295 (plain view)
People v. de la Cruz 555 SCRA 329 (entry of plea)
People v. Concepcion 556 SCRA 421 (entry of plea)
People v. Alunday 564 SCRA 135 (entry of plea)
Revaldo v. People – 585 SCRA 341
Abelita v. Doria – 596 SCRA 220
Valeroso v. CA – 598 SCRA 41
People v. Rivera – 597 SCRA 299
Dolera v. People – 598 SCRA 484
Esquillo v. People – 629 SCRA 370
Rebellion v. People – 623 SCRA 343 (drugs)
People v. Araneta – 634 SCRA 475 (drugs)
People v. Tan – 634 SCRA 773 (drugs)
People v. Sembrano – 628 SCRA 328 (drugs)
People v. Mariacos – 621 SCRA 327
People v. Racho – 626 SCRA 633 (entry of plea)
102
People v. Aminola – 630 SCRA 384
People v. de los Reyes – 656 SCRA 417
Luz v. People – 667 SCRA 421
Martinez v. People – 693 SCRA 549
People v. Villaroel – 693 SCRA 549
Antiquera v. People – 712 SCRA 339
Sales v. People – 690 SCRA 141
People v. de Jesus - 690 SCRA 180
People v. Candidia – 707 SCRA 494
People v. Colantiao – 727 SCRA 20
People v. Edaño – 729 SCRA 255
Cresencio v. People – 741 SCRA 319
Castro v. People, GR 212260, November 26, 2014
Sanchez v. People – 741 SCRA 294
Dela Cruz v. People, GR 209387, January 11, 2016
Searches and seizures “of whatever nature and for whatever purpose.”
*Material Distributors v. Natividad - 84 PHIL. 127 (Rules of Court – production of documents)

 Doctrine: The orders in question [subpoena duces tecum], issued in virtue of the provisions of
Rule 21, pertain to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with the unreasonable
searches prohibited by the Constitution.  
o The constitutional guarantee of privacy of communication and correspondence will not be
violated, because the trial court has power and jurisdiction to issue the order for the
production and inspection of the books and documents in question in virtue of the
constitutional guarantee making an express exception in favor of the disclosure of
communication and correspondence upon lawful order of a court of justice.
 Facts: Lope Sarreal filed a complaint seeking a money judgment against Material Distributors
and Harry Lyons totaling Php1.2M. Sarreal filed a motion for the production and inspection of
documents including Books and Papers of Material Distributors (Cash Receipts Journal, Cash
Payments Journal, Individual Ledgers of specific persons) and Letters exchanged between
Material Distributors and Lyons. CFI Judge Natividad granted both motions and required Material
Distributors and Lyons to produce the documents. Petitioner avers that this violates the
constitutional guarantee to privacy of communications and is tantamount to a search warrant.
 Ruling: It is not a search warrant and the order is reasonable. The books and papers requested
constitute evidence material to the matters of the case.
*Camara v. Municipal Court - 387 US 523 (housing inspector)

 THE COURT IN THIS CASE OVER TURNED THE DOCTRINE OF Frank v. Maryland. The Frank
Doctrine was convicted for refusal to let in his private premises inspectors of Municipal fire and
health to conduct warrantless search. In this case they upheld the warrantless search since it
complies with the standards set by the municipal ordinance and that the search is not to get
evidence of criminal action.
 THIS CASE OVERTURNED THE FRANK DOCTRINE ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS:
o Fire, housing and sanitation inspections may still be made even with a warrant.
What we are disallowing is making them without warrant. The Court said that there
is no evidence that these types of inspection programs cannot achieve their goals
within the standards of the warrant process.
o Under this system, the occupant has no way of knowing what the search is about, what
the limits are, and WON the agent is acting upon proper authorization. He must first
question the search and risk a criminal conviction for not allowing it. The practical effect is
to give the official wide discretion in the field.
103
 Thus, warrantless searches of these kinds, like the case at bar, are violative of the 4th
amendment.
o THE QUESTION FOR NEED OF PROBABLE CAUSE:
o Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are to be issued for area code
enforcement inspections is not dependent on the inspector's belief that a particular
dwelling violates the code, but on the reasonableness of the enforcement agency's
appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole. The standards to guide the magistrate
in the issuance of such search warrants will necessarily vary with the municipal program
being enforced.
Oklahoma Press v. Walling - 327 US 186 (limited rights of corporation)
Warrantless arrests
*Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago - 162 SCRA 840 (pedophilia)

 Right against unreasonable searches and seizure guaranteed by the Constitution is
available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of a crime or not.
 One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search/arrest warrant is that it must be based
upon probable cause – “Such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the
warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act
in pursuance thereof.”
 Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace
officer or even a private person, when...
o A person has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in
his presence; or  
o When an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
o When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
 But even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the
records show that formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable
aliens.
o Thus, the fundamental rule is that a Writ of Habeas Corpus will not be granted
when the confinement is or has become legal although such confinement was
illegal at the beginning.
*People v. Aminnudin - 163 SCRA 402 (disembarking from ship)

 NOT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO 
o Aminnudin was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that
he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier
of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension.
 HAD ENOUGH TIME TO OBTAIN A WARRANT 
o The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC
witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
104
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."
*People v. Burgos - 144 SCRA 1 (seditious materials; arrested while plowing)

 Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The
offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view.
o Provision in question: “(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;”
 Note: the word in his presence was defined by the court as personal knowledge
or within his view.
o The statute or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is
strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a
warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot
liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the
cases specifically provided by law.
 In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime.
o Provision in Question“ [1)] When an offense has just been committed, and [2)] he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and”:
 A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has
actually been committed is an essential precondition. IT IS NOT ENOUGH
TO SUSPECT THAT A CRIME MAY HAVE BEEN COMMITTED.
o The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable
ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
 Presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.
o Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the
accused to be searched simply because he failed to object.
o To constitute a waiver,
 it must appear first that the right exists;
 secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such a right; and
 lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
 The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not
amount to a permission to make a search therein.
*Umil v. Ramos - 187 SCRA 311 (Main) and October 3, 1991 (MR) (continuing offense)
 An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when
o the person arrested is caught in flagranti delicto, viz.,
 in the act of committing an offense; or
 when an offense has just been committed and
o the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the
person arrested has committed it.
 The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute
direct assaults against the State are in the nature of continuing crimes.
*Go v. CA – 206 SCRA 138 (arrested without warrant six days after commission)
 Parties’ reliance on Umil v. Ramos is misplaced as the warrantless arrests were made 1-14 days
after the actual commission of offense. It cannot be so because murder is not a continuing
offense, which was the reason for a valid warrantless arrest in the aforementioned case.
o Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan.
o The “arresting” officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a),
at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan.
105
o Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded
as effected “when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed” within the meaning of
Section 5(b).
o Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal knowledge” of facts indicating
that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan.
o The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by
alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting—one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another
was able to take down the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number which turned out to be
registered in petitioner’s wife’s name.
o That information did not, however, constitute “personal knowledge.”
*People v. Mengote - 210 SCRA 174 (looking side to side)

 Warrantless search in broad daylight of a person merely looking from side to side and holding his
stomach is illegal.
o These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest
in question, the accused-appellant was merely “looking from side to side” and “holding his
abdomen,” according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no
offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being
attempted by Mengote in their presence.
o The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary
as long as Mengote’s acts “created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting
officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the
accused-appellant had committed it.” The question is, What offense? What offense could
possibly have been suggested by a person “looking from side to side” and “holding his
abdomen” and in a place not exactly forsaken?
 A person may not be stopped and frisked in broad daylight on a busy street on mere unexplained
suspicion.
o On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why
his eyes were darting from side to side and he was holding his abdomen. If they excited
suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has
nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about.
o In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only
because of the telephone call from the informer that there were “suspicious-looking”
persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The
caller did not explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on
the impending crime.
*Manalili v. CA – 280 SCRA 400 (drug user with red eyes and swaying side to side)
 SC said that “stop and frisk” is another exception to the warrant rule (art 3 sec 2). What is only
required is that the police, based on his experience, must have probable cause to “stop and
frisk” a person, in this case petitioner had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner –
characteristics of a high drug addict; reason – practicality, for safety purposes.
 Court concurs with the Solicitor General’s contention that petitioner effectively waived the
inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object
thereto during the trial.
o Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal.
People v. dela Cruz - 184 SCRA 416

People v. Sucro - 195 SCRA 388
People v. Kalubiran – 196 SCRA 644
People v. Alvarez – 201 SCRA 365
People v. Briones - 202 SCRA 708
People v. Simon - 234 SCRA 555
People v. Manlulu - 231 SCRA 701
People v. Yap - 229 SCRA 787
People v. De Guzman - 231 SCRA 737
106
People v. Rabang - 187 SCRA 682
People v. Agustin - 240 SCRA 541
People v. Lopez - 246 SCRA 95
People v. Rayray - 241 SCRA 1
People v. Flores - 243 SCRA 374
People v. Manzano - 248 SCRA 239
Velasco v. CA - 245 SCRA 677
People v. Nitcha - 240 SCRA 283
People v. Rivera - 245 SCRA 421
People v. Samson - 244 SCRA 146
People v. Rodrigueza – 205 SCRA 791
People v. Sequino – 264 SCRA 79
People v. Solayao – 262 SCRA 255
People v. Lapura - 255 SCRA 85
People v. Nazareno – 260 SCRA 256
People v. Silan - 254 SCRA 491
People v. Alolod – 266 SCRA 154
People v. Mahusay – 282 SCRA 80
People v. Alvario – 275 SCRA 529
Larranaga v. CA – 281 SCRA 254
Bernarte v. CA – 263 SCRA 323
Filoteo v. Sandiganbayan – 263 SCRA 222
People v. Herbias – 265 SCRA 571
People v. Salvatierra – 276 SCRA 55
People v. Hernandez – 282 SCRA 387
People v. Jayson – 282 SCRA 166
OCA v. Barron – A.M. RTJ 98-1420 October 8, 1998
People v. Aruta – (supra, Warrantless Searches) 288 SCRA 626
Larranaga v. CA – 287 SCRA 521
People v. Olivarez – GR 77865 December 4, 1998
People v. Cabilles – 284 SCRA 199
People v. Pacistol – 284 SCRA 520
People v. Barrientos – 285 SCRA 221
People v. Galleno – 291 SCRA 761
People v. Tidula – 292 SCRA 596
Boneng v. People, 304 SCRA 252
People v. Navarro – GR 129566 October 7, 1998
Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan – GR 134307*
Bagawali v. People – GR 133563 March 4, 1999
People v. Bensil – GR 120163 March 10, 1999
People v. Nullan – GR 126303 April 14, 1999
People v. Silvano – GR 127356 June 29, 1999
Cadua v. CA, GR 123123, August 19, 1999
People v. Garcia, GR 126252, August 30, 1999
People v. Balluda, GR 114198, November 19, 1999
People v. Elamparo, GR 121572, March 31, 2000
People v. Chua Uy, 327 SCRA 335
People v. Cubcubin, GR 136267, July 10, 2001
People v. Compacion, G. R. No. 124442, July 20, 2001
People v. Montano, GR 130836, August 11, 2000
People v. Zheng Bai Hui, GR 127580, August 22, 2000
People v. Beriarmente, G.R. No. 137612, September 25, 2001
Posadas v. Ombudsman, GR 131492, September 29, 2000
People v. dela Cruz, GR 138516-17, October 17, 2000
People v. Bongalon, 374 SCRA 289 (consent, in flagrante, waiver)
People v. Vinalon, GR 135542, July 28, 2002 (recent commission of crime)
107
People v. Recepcion, GR 141923, Nov. 13, 2002 (hot pursuit, waiver of illegality)
People v. Sanus, GR 135057, Sept. 17, 2002
People v. Mendez, GR 147671, Nov. 21, 2002 (arrest 4 days late)
People v. Avendano, GR 137407, Jan. 28, 2003
People v. Libnao, GR 136860, Jan. 20, 2003
People v. Eugenio, GR 146805, Jan. 16, 2003
David v. Arroyo, GR 171390, May 3, 2006
Dizon v. Lambino 498 SCRA 233
People v. Escordial, 373 SCRA 585
People v. Butulfo, GR 143790, May 7, 2002
People v. Baccoy, GR 134002, Sept. 12, 2002
People v. Billaber, 421 SCRA 27
People v. Yang, 423 SCRA 82
People v. Cadley, 425 SCRA 495
People v. Peralta, 426 SCRA 472
People v. Ejandra, 439 SCRA 364
People v. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740
People v. Bolasa, GR 125754, December 22, 1999
People v. Gomez, 325 SCRA 61
People v. Buluran, 325 SCRA 476
People v. Gallarde, 325 SCRA 38
People v. Ereno, 326 SCRA 157
People v. Gamer, 326 SCRA 664
People v. Logarto, 326 SCRA 693
People v. Legaspi, GR 117802, April 27, 2000
People v. Baniguid, GR 137714, September 8, 2000
People v. Zaspo, GR 136396, September 21, 2000
People v. Emoy, GR 109760, September 27, 2000
People v. Baylon, GR ____________, October 18, 2000
People v. Madraga, GR 129294, November 15, 2000
People v. Gopio, GR 133925, November 29, 2000
People v. Pasudag, G.R. No. 128822, May 4, 2001
People v. Liwanag, G.R. No. 120468, August 15, 2001 (waiver)
People v. Pralta, 426 SCRA 472
People v. Kimura, 428 SCRA 51
San Agustin v. People, 432 SCRA 392
People v. Mantung, GR 130372, July 20, 1999
People v. Rondero, GR 125687, December 9, 1999
Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 142295, May 31, 2001
People v. Estrada, GR 124461, June 26, 2000
People v. Abrenica. G.R. No. 136267, July 10, 2001.
People v. Huang Zhen Hua, 439 SCRA 350
People v. Torres 501 SCRA 591
Cruz v. People – 578 SCRA 447
Revaldo v. People – 585 SCRA 341
People v. Agojo – 585 SCRA 652
Abelita v. Doria – 596 SCRA 220
Zalameda v. People – 598 SCRA 537
People v. Quebral – 606 SCRA 247
People v. Ara – 609 SCRA 304
People v. Santos - 564 SCRA 135
People v. Ng – 639 SCRA 88
People v. Manlangit – 639 SCRA 455
People v. Uyboco – 640 SCRA 146
People v. Dequena – 640 SCRA 111
People v. Cruz – 652 SCRA 286
108
Miclat v. People – 656 SCRA 539
People v. Buenaventura – GR 184807, November 13, 2011
Ambre v. People – 678 SCRA 552
Goco v. People, GR 198694, Feb 13, 2013 (without probable cause)
People v. Alejandria, GR 192913, June 13, 2013
People v. Cogaed – 731 SCRA 427
Sydeco v. People 740 SCRA 288
Pestillos v. Generoso – 739 SCRA 337
Commendiante v. People – 763 SCRA 587
Ongcoma Hadji v. People – 768 SCRA 584
SECTION 11. FREE ACCESS TO COURT
Re: Letter Dated April 18, 2011 of Chief Public Atty Acosta requesting exemption from payment of sheriff’s
expenses, AM 11-10-03-O, July 30, 2013, (sheriff’s expenses as hindrance to access to court)
SECTION 12.
I. Custodial Investigation, In General
A. Definition
*People v. Camat- 256 SCRA 52

 Doctrine 1: Absent any showing that the accused were duly advised of the mandatory
guarantees under the Bill of Rights, their extrajudicial confessions are inadmissible against
them and cannot be used in support of their conviction.
o The lower court cannot admit the extra-judicial confession, absent any showing that
appellants were duly advised of the mandatory guarantees under the Bill of Rights. Thus,
their confessions made before Patrolman Cariño are inadmissible against them and
cannot be used in support of their conviction.
o However, the accused may still be convicted provided there was still another witness who
saw the accused committing the crime.
 Doctrine 2: The presumption of regularity of official acts does not apply during in-custody
investigation. Thus, it is now incumbent upon the prosecution to prove during the trial that, prior
to questioning, the confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected rights.
 Doctrine 3: An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible
against his co-accused. As against the latter, the confession is hearsay. Doctrine of Res Inter
Alios Acta.
 Doctrine 4: An accused’s constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face is limited to
proceedings before the trial court, at the trial and not during custodial investigation.
 PROCEDURE DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
o When a person is arrested, the arresting officer must inform him of the reason of his
arrest and must show the warrant of arrest, if any.
o The person arrested must be informed of his RIGHT TO COUNSEL and RIGHT TO
REMAIN SILENT, & any statement he would make would be taken against him.
o The person arrested must have the RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE with his counsel or
relatives.
o Custodial investigation must be conducted in the PRESENCE OF COUNSEL.
o Right to counsel may be WAIVED but the waiver must have the ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL and in WRITING.
People Pavillare, GR 129970, April 5, 2000

People v. Bandula - 232 SCRA 566
Navallo v. Sandiganbayan - 234 SCRA 175
Sebastian v. Garchitorena, GR 114028, October 18, 2000
OCA v. Sumulong, 271 SCRA 316
109
People v. Almanzor, GR 124918, July 11, 2002 (no need for counsel)
People v. Valdez, GR 129296, September 25, 2000
People v. Marra - 236 SCRA 565
People v. Labtan, G.R. No. 127493, December 8, 1999
Manuel v. NC Construction – 282 SCRA 326
People v. de la Cruz, GR 137405, Sept. 27, 2002
People v. Evangelista - 256 SCRA 611
People v. Andan – 269 SCRA 95
People v. Artellero, GR 129211, October 2, 2000
People v. De Jesus – 213 SCRA 345
People v. Legaspi, GR 117802, April 27, 2000
B. Rationale
*Miranda v. Arizona 384 US 436 (Miranda Rights)

 Rules to be observed during custodial investigation:  
o must be warned that he has a right to remain silent
o warned that statements he make may be used as evidence against him 
o warned that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed
o may waiver effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly, willingly, and intelligently 
o no questioning, if he indicates, in any manner and at any stage of the process, that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking 
o The police may not question him, if the individual is alone and indicates, in any manner,
that he does not wish to be interrogated 
o The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some
statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any
further inquiries, until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned
 Ratio for the Miranda Rights is because compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings.
 Doctrine: Accused has the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to consult with a
lawyer. If he cannot afford one, one will be provided one for him.
People v. Canton, GR 148825, Dec. 27, 2002
II. Instances of Custodial Investigations
People v. Lim - 196 SCRA 809

People v. Bolanos – 211 SCRA 262
People v. Salazar – 266 SCRA 607
People v. Castro – 274 SCRA 115
People v. Isla- 278 SCRA 47
People v. Casimiro, GR 146277, June 20, 2002
III. Miranda Rights Safeguarded by the Bill of Rights in Relation to Custodial Investigations
A. Procedural Requirements
Miranda v. Arizona- 384 US 436 (supra.)

People v. Mahinay – GR 122485 February 1, 1999
People v. Camat - 256 SCRA 52
110
B. Duty of an Officer During Custodial Investigation

People v. Salcedo – 273 SCRA 473
C. When the Rights of Custodial Investigation May Be Invoked
People v. Loveria - 187 SCRA 47

People v. Tan – 286 SCRA 207
D. The Right to Remain Silent
People v. Bandin – 226 SCRA 299

People v. Lacbanes – 270 SCRA 193
People v. Morico – 246 SCRA 214
People v. Ang Chun Kit – 251 SCRA 660
People v. De Las Marinas – 196 SCRA 504
People v. Castro – 274 SCRA 115
People v. Enriquez – 204 SCRA 674
E. The Right to Counsel
a. When to Invoke
People v. Sunga, GR 126029, Mar. 29, 2003 (city legal officer)

People v. Labtan, G.R. No. 127493, December 8, 1999
People v. Sapal, GR 124526, March 17, 2000
People v. Lamsing - 248 SCRA 471
People v. Maqueda - 242 SCRA 565
People v. Macam – 238 SCRA 306
People v. De Jesus – 213 SCRA 345
People v. Dimaano – 209 SCRA 819
People v. Compil - 244 SCRA 135
b. When Presence of Counsel is Required
*Tanenggee v. People – 699 SCRA 639

 Doctrines: The right to counsel “applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation
but not to those made in an administrative investigation.”
o It must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is
meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule
under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a
criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
People v. Rodriguez - 232 SCRA 227

Estacio v. Sandiganbayan – 183 SCRA 12
People v. Bandula - 232 SCRA 566
People v. Isla- 278 SCRA 47
People v. Jimenez - 204 SCRA 719
People v. Cortes, 323 SCRA 131
People v. Rous - 242 SCRA 732
People v. Espanola – 271 SCRA 689
People v.Zuela - 325 SCRA 589
111
People v. Macabalang - 508 SCRA 282
c. Effective and Vigilant Counsel Defined
*People v. Sunga, GR 126029, Mar. 29, 2003 (city legal officer)

 Doctrine: Right to independent counsel requires that there be no conflict of interest between the
accused and counsel.
o A suspect was denied his right to counsel where the lawyer who assisted him in the
execution of extrajudicial admission before the police was the City Legal Officer.
o A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is guaranteed the following
rights by the Constitution: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) the right to have competent
and independent counsel of his own choice, and to be provided with one if he cannot
afford the services of counsel; and (3) the right to be informed of these rights.
o Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear
harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an independent
counsel must be struck down as inadmissible.
 Custodial investigation is the stage “where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the
police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.
 The right to counsel applies in certain pre-trial proceedings that can be deemed “critical stages” in
the criminal process—the preliminary investigation can be no different from the in-custody
interrogations by the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be
subjected to no less than the State’s processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of pursuing
those who might be liable for criminal prosecution.
*People v. Ibañez – 698 SCRA 161 (duty of counsel to explain)

 An extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following requirements: (1) the
confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of a competent and
independent counsel[,] preferably of the confessant’s choice; (3) it must be express; and (4) it
must be in writing.
 Doctrine: An ‘effective and vigilant counsel’ necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be
present and [be] able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first
question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.
o Ruling: SC stated that Nabilgas’ confession was not made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel.
 The services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas’ behalf, were
provided by the very same agency investigating Nabilgas – the NBI itself; she was
assigned the task despite Nabilgas’ open declaration to the agency’s investigators
that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan.
 Atty. Paglinawan confirmed this fact when he stated that he was already
representing Nabilgas at the time his client made the alleged confession.
 Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when
she was called to assist him; she merely represented herself to be a mere witness
to the confession.
 There was also nothing in the records to show that Atty. Go ascertained whether
Nabilgas’ confession was made voluntarily, and whether he fully understood the
nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession and its impact on his
constitutional rights.
People v. Velarde, GR 139333, July 18, 2002

People v. Culala, GR 83466, October 13, 1999
People v. Gerolago – 263 SCRA 143
People v. Paule – 261 SCRA 649
People v. Delmo, GR 130078, Oct. 4, 2002
People v. Lucero - 249 SCRA 425
112
People v. Bacor – GR 122895 April 30, 1999
People v. Sahagun – 274 SCRA 208
People v. Taliman, GR 109143, October 11, 2000
People v. Espiritu – GR 128287 February 2, 1999
People v. Barasina - 229 SCRA 450
People v. Alegria - 190 SCRA 122
People v. Suarez – 267 SCRA 119
People v. Parojinog - 203 SCRA 673
People v. Baello – 224 SCRA 218
Galman v. Pamaran – 138 SCRA 295
People v. Jerez – 285 SCRA 393
People v. Ranis, GR 129113, Sept. 17, 2002
People v. Dumalahay, 380 SCRA 37
People v. Pamon – 217 SCRA 501
People v. Cabiles – 284 SCRA 199
People v. Gallardo, 323 SCRA 318
People v. Base, GR 109773, March 30, 2000
People v. Obrero, GR 122142, May 17, 2000
Cariaga v. People – 626 SCRA 231
d. Independence
People v. Porio, 376 SCRA 596
e. Competence
People v. Suela, supra, 373 SCRA 163
f. Assistance After Start of Custodial Investigation
People v. Matigunas, 379 SCRA 56

People v. Suela, supra.
g. Valid Confession with Counsel
People v. Tablon, 379 SCRA 280

People v. Principe, GR 135862, May 2, 2002
People v. Oranza, GR 127748, July 25, 2002
People v. Canicula, GR 131802, Aug. 6, 2002
Tangengge v. People, GR 179448, June 26, 2013 (proscription applicable only in custodial investigation)
Manila Water Compant v. Rosario, GR 188747, January 29, 2014 (administrative investigation)
h. Confession Without Counsel
People v. Casimiro, GR 146277, June 20, 2002

People v. Ochate, GR 127154, July 30, 2002
People v. Mendez, GR 147671, Nov. 21, 2002 (reiterates P. v. Morada)
People v. Lauga – 615 SCRA 548
Lumanog v. People – 630 SCRA 42
People v. Tumaco – 610 SCRA 350l
People v. Bokingo – 655 SCRA 313
People v. Uy – 649 SCRA 236
People v. Bokingo – 655 SCRA 313
People v. Uy – 649 SCRA 236
People v. Soriano – 693 SCRA 404
113
i. Failure to Object to Confession Made Without Counsel
People v. Gonzales, GR 142932, May 29, 2002

 Failure of the defense to raise its objections to the admissibility of statements given without
compliance with the Miranda Warnings constitutes waiver of the right to object to the admissibility
of such statements.
People v. Tamayo, GR 137856, July, 30, 2002

People v. Samus, GR 135957, Sept. 17, 2002
People v. Mole, GR 137366, Nov. 27, 2003
j. Right to Be Informed
People v. Manriquez, GR 122510-11, March 17, 2000

Magtoto v. Manguera - 63 SCRA 4
People v. Camat- 256 SCRA 52
People v. Sabban – 260 SCRA 630
People v. Barlis - 231 SCRA 426
People v. Samolde, GR 128551, July 31, 2000
People v. Sevilla, GR 124077, September 5, 2000
People v. Muleta – GR 130189 June 25, 1999
People v. Tizon, GR 133228, July 30, 2002
People v. Llenaresas - 248 SCRA 629
People v. Cajara, GR 122498, September 27, 2000
People v. Manriquez, GR 122510-11, March 17, 2000
People v. Samolde, GR 128551, July 31, 2000
IV. Waiver of Rights
A. Requisites of a Valid Waiver
a. Must Be in Writing and in the Presence of Counsel
People v. Taliman, GR 109143, October 11, 2000

People v. Gomez – 270 SCRA 432
People v. Cabintoy – 247 SCRA 442
People v. Corullo – 289 SCRA 481
People v. Olivarez – GR 77865 December 4, 1998
People v. Ruelan - 231 SCRA 650
Malacat v. CA – (supra, Warrantless Arrests)
People v. Bacor, 306 SCRA 522
People v. Quidato – GR 117160 or 6 October 1, 1998
b. Must Be Voluntary, Knowing and Intelligent
People v. Nicolas - 204 SCRA 191

114
V. Extrajudicial Confessions
A. Difference Between Admission and Confession
Ladiana v. People, GR 144293, Dec. 4, 2002
People v. Maqueda - 242 SCRA 565

 In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in
criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
charged.
B. Requisites for Valid Extrajudicial Confession
People v. Dano, GR 117690, September 1, 2000

People v. Pagaura – 267 SCRA 17
People v. Calvo – 269 SCRA 676
People v. Tan – 286 SCRA 207
People v. Olivarez – GR 77865 December 4
People v. Base, GR 109773, March 30, 2000
People v. Continente, GR 100801-02, August 25, 2000
People v. Naag, 322 SCRA 710
People v. Fabro – 277 SCRA 19
People v. Sinoc – 275 SCRA 357
People v. Alicando - 251 SCRA 293
People v. Maneng, GR 123147, October 13, 2000
People v. Llanes, GR 140268, September 18, 2000
People v. Deang, GR 128045, August 24, 2000
People v. Nicolas, GR 135877, Aug. 22, 2002
People v. Sabalones – 294 SCRA 751
People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455
People v. Obrero, GR 122142, May 17, 2000
People v. Capitle – 639 SCRA 373
Jesalva v. People – 640 SCRA 253
People v. Capitle – 639 SCRA 373
C. Voluntariness
People v. Santos – 283 SCRA 443

People v. Alvarez, GR 140388-91, Nov. 11, 2003
Astudillo v. People - 509 SCRA 302
Jesalva v. People – 640 SCRA 253
D. Presumptions

People v. Maneng, GR 123147, October 13, 2000
People v. Vallejo, GR 144656, May 9, 2002
People v. Sahagun – 274 SCRA 208
People v. Sabban – 260 SCRA 630
115
People v. Ranis, GR 129113, Sept. 17, 2002
People v. Rous - 242 SCRA 732
People v. Parojinog - 203 SCRA 673
People v. Montiero – 246 SCRA 786
People v. Ruelan - 231 SCRA 650
People v. Aquino – GR 123550-51 July 19, 1999
People v. Tolentino, 423 SCRA 448
People v. De Vera, G.R. No. 128966, August 18, 1999
People v. Santos – 283 SCRA 443
Santos v. Sandiganbayan, GR 71523-25, December 8, 2000
People v. Magdamit – 279 SCRA 423
People v. Aquino, GR 130742, July 18, 2000
People v. Hernandez – (supra, Warrantless Arrests)
People v. Sabalones – 294 SCRA 751
People v. Calvo – 269 SCRA 676
People v. del Rosario, G.R. No. 131036, June 20, 2001
E. To Whom Such Confession Can Be Used Against

Santos v. Sandiganbayan, GR 71523-25, December 8, 2000
Tan v. People, G.R. No. 134298, August 26, 1999
F. Lawyer Given by Police Investigator; Valid Confession
Aquino v. Paiste, 555 SCRA 255
G. Exceptions
VI. When Custodial Investigations May Not Apply
A. Preliminary Investigation
People v. Judge Ayson - 175 SCRA 216
B. Voluntary Surrender
*People v. Chavez – 735 SCRA 728

 Doctrine: Even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their
Miranda rights.
o It may appear that the Miranda rights only apply when one is “taken into custody by the
police,” such as during an arrest.
o However, Republic Act No. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial investigation
to “include the practice of issuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to
the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for any violation of law.”
o This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer
must be apprised of their Miranda rights.
 For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez
is also being questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an
additional pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother
who accompanied him to the police station.
People v. Taylaran – 108 SCRA 373
116
C. Audit Examination

Kimpo v. Sandiganbayan - 232 SCRA 53
D. Administrative Investigation
Manuel v. NC Construction – 282 SCRA 326

Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.13747, August 2, 2001
Escleo v. Durado, AM no. P-99-1312, July 31, 2002
Anonymous Complaint against Lyn Maceda – 720 SCRA 27
Luspo v. People - 739 SCRA 133
De Castro v. People - GR 171672, February 2, 2015
E. Not in Police Custody
People v. Tobias – 266 SCRA 229

OCA v. Sumulong, 271 SCRA 316
F. Police Line-up
General Rule
People v. Piedad, GR 131923, Dec. 5, 2002 (no need for counsel)

People v. Lamsing – 248 SCRA 471
People v. Frago - 232 SCRA 653
*Gamboa v. Judge Cruz - 162 SCRA 642

 There was no violation of his right to counsel. The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an
investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused.
 Doctrine 1: The right to counsel guaranteed in Art. III, Section 12(l) of the Constitution does not
extend to police lineups because they are not part of custodial investigations. Hence, he was not
yet entitled at such stage to counsel.
 Doctrine 2: However, in a police lineup, the moment there is a move or even an urge of said
investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear
innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by
counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
o When petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been
held yet to answer for a criminal offense. In fact, when he was identified in the police line-
up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. He was, therefore, not
interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far from what he professes, the
police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used against him. For it was not he
but the complainant who was being investigated at that time. He "was ordered to sit down
in front of the complainant while the latter was being investigated"
People v. Escordial, 373 SCRA 585 (police line- up after custodial investigation starts, requires counsel)
 Doctrine: When the accused was already under custodial investigation prior to the police line-up
for identification, he has the right to counsel.
o Any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a
show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible
as evidence against him.
117
People v. Salvatierra – 276 SCRA 55 (supra, Warrantless Arrests)
Dela Torre v. CA – 294 SCRA 196
People Pavillare, GR 129970, April 5, 2000
People v. Timple - 237 SCRA 52
People v. Dimaano – 209 SCRA 819
People v. Tolentino, 423 SCRA 448
People v. Martinez, 425 SCRA 525
People v. Sultan, GR 130594, July 5, 2000
Exceptions
People v. Teehankee, Jr. – 249 SCRA 54 (supra, Procedural)

 Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups
where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru
mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done
thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court
identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and
its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process.
 In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have
adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors:
o 1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
o 2) witness' degree of attention at that time;
o 3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
o 4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
o 5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and
o 6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure
 There is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are identified by witnesses.
Identification may be done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the crime and the
criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim.
o There is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are identified by witnesses.
Identification may be done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the crime and
the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim.
People v. Hatton – 210 SCRA 1

People v. Gamer, 326 SCRA 660
People v. Meneses – 288 SCRA 95
G. Spontaneous Statements

 The constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement,
not elicited through questioning by the authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the
suspect orally admits having committed the crime.
People v. Morada – GR 129723 May 19, 1999

 Accused’s alleged confession made to a barangay captain not admissible where the same was
part of an ongoing police investigation.
 In People v. Andan, this Court held that the constitutional guarantees during custodial investigation
do not apply to spontaneous statements not elicited through questioning by the authorities and
given during an ordinary conversation or during media interviews, whereby the suspect orally
admits the commission of the crime. Our ruling in that case does not, however, authorize the
police to obtain confessions they cannot otherwise obtain through media reporters who are
actually acting for the police.
118
 An admission by the accused before the barangay captain, who is neither a police officer nor
a law enforcement agent, even if done without the assistance of a lawyer, is not in violation
of the accused’s constitutional rights—the constitutional requirements on custodial
investigation do not apply to spontaneous statements made in a voluntary manner.

People v. Ulit, 423 SCRA 374
 The barangay chairman is not deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section
12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution–a suspect’s uncounselled statement before the
barangay chairman is admissible.
People v. Barrientos – 285 SCRA 221

Arroyo v, CA - 203 SCRA 750
People v. Dumantay, 307 SCRA 1
H. Marked Money
*People v. Linsangan – 195 SCRA 784

 Doctrine: Although accused was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills, his right
against self-incrimination was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute
a crime; the subject of prosecution was his act of selling marijuana.
I. Booking Sheets
*People v. Ang Chun Kit – 251 SCRA 660

 Doctrine: When an arrested person signs a booking sheet and arrest report at a police station he
does not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any incriminating circumstance.
o With regard to the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, we already said in People v. Morico
that “when an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a police
station he does not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any
incriminating circumstance. The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the accused’s
being booked and of the date which accompanies the fact of an arrest. It is a police report
and may be useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the police themselves. It is
not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a judgment of conviction.”
 Other Relevant Point: Court agrees with the accused that his signature on the receipt or lists of
items confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence as there is no showing that he was then
assisted by counsel.
J. Paraffin Test
People v. Gamboa – 194 SCRA 372

 Paraffin test conducted without the presence of the accused’s lawyer does not violate the right
against self-incrimination.
K. When Body of the Accused is Examined
People v. Piedad, GR 131923, Dec. 5, 2002 (no need for counsel)

 The presence of counsel during such investigation is intended to prevent the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false.
 The rights accorded an accused under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution applies only
against testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined,
as was done in this case—presented to the witnesses to be identified.
People v. Sinoc – 275 SCRA 357

Gutang v. People, GR 135406, July 11, 2000
119
People v. Paynor – 256 SCRA 611
L. Taking of Pictures

 The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely
mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
M. Incident to a Lawful Arrest
People v. Enriquez – 204 SCRA 674

Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan – GR 109242 January 26, 1999
VII. The Exclusionary Rule
A. Violation of Rights

People v. Hermoso, GR 130590, October 18, 2000
People v. Pinlac - 165 SCRA 675
People v. Bacamante - 248 SCRA 47
People v. Montes – GR 117166 December 13, 1998
People v. Salcedo – 273 SCRA 473
People v. Macoy – 275 SCRA 1
People v. Arceo - 202 SCRA 170
People v. Atrejenio – GR 120160 July 13, 1999
Tan v. People, G.R. No. 134298, August 26, 1999
People v. Binamira – 277 SCRA 232
People v. Turingan – 282 SCRA 424
People v. Pagaura – 267 SCRA 17
People v. Quidato – GR 117401 October 1, 1998
People v. Sequino – 264 SCRA 79
People v. Paglinawan, 324 SCRA 97
People v. Bravo, GR 13562
People v. Bariquit, GR 122733, October 2, 2000
People v. Malimit – 264 SCRA 167
People v. Rivera – 245 SCRA 421
People v. Meneses – 288 SCRA 95
People v. Paburada, GR 137118, December 5, 2000
People v. Lapitaje, GR 132042, Feb. 19, 2003
B. Immunity against Self-Incrimination
Galman v. Pamaran – (supra, Custodial Investigation)

 Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants “use immunity”; and the
other, which grants what is known as “transactional immunity.” The distinction between the two is
as follows:
o “Use immunity” prohibits use of witness’ compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner
in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness.
o On the other hand, “transactional immunity” grants immunity to the witness from
prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates.
120
C. Re-enactments
People v. Suarez – 267 SCRA 119
D. Applicability to Aliens
People v. Wong Chuen Ming - 256 SCRA 182
E. Verbal Confessions
People v. Deniego – 251 SCRA 626

People v. Bonola – 274 SCRA 238
People v. Suela, 373 SCRA 163 (confession to private party)
People v. Taboga, 376 SCRA 500 (confession to private party)
People v. Baloloy, GE 140740, Apr. 12, 2002 (res gestae) People v. Guillermo, 420 S 326
Guting v. People – 770 SCRA 334
F. Co-Accused not Bound
G. Who May Raise the Question
People v. Balisteros - 237 SCRA 499

 Under the modified formulation in the 1987 Constitution, a confession taken in violation of
Sections 12 and 17 of Article III “shall be inadmissible in evidence against him,” meaning the
confessant, and the objection can be raised only by the confessant whose rights have been
violated since such right is personal in nature.
H. When Must the Objection Be Raised
*Macasiray v. People – 291 SCRA 154

 A party is not deemed to have waived objection to admissibility of documents by his failure to
object to the same when they were marked, identified, and then introduced during the trial—
objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier.
 Where the trial court had earlier sustained the defense’s objection to the admission of the
extrajudicial confession and statements given by the accused, the defense, in subsequently asking
the accused questions regarding his confession for the purpose of denying their contents, could
not be considered as having introduced the confession—the defense should not be penalized for
exercising an abundance of caution.
People v. Samus, GR 135957, Sept. 17, 2002

 While uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible, under the present circumstances, the
Court cannot rule it out because of the accused’s failure to make timely objections.
o Where the accused did not question or object to the admissibility of a prosecution witness’
testimony on what would otherwise be the fruit of the poisonous tree, and worse, his
counsel even freely cross-examined the witness without any reservation, the accused
cannot raise this question for the first time on appeal—to disregard unceremoniously a
major portion of the prosecution’s case at this late stage when it can no longer present
additional evidence as substitute for that which is now claimed to be inadmissible goes
against fundamental fairness.
People v. Montilla – 285 SCRA 703

 A plea is tantamount to foregoing an objection to the irregularity of one’s arrest.
121
People v. Salvatierra – 276 SCRA 55
 Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition of jurisdiction over
the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived.
Gamboa v. Judge Cruz - 162 SCRA 675

 If a defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads, he shall be
taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash, except where the
complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the
same.
I. Admissible Evidence
People v. Espiritu, 302 SCRA 533

People v. Lumandong, 327 SCRA 650
VIII. Rights After Custodial Investigation

People v. De Guzman - 194 SCRA 191
SECTION 13.
Right to Bail
*Yap v. CA, GR 141529, June 6, 2001 (excessive if equal to civil liability)

 Doctrine: Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail.
o The amount should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when required
but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. To fix bail at an amount
equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged (in this case, P5,500,000.00) is
to permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that
accused is charged of; this we cannot allow because bail is not intended as a punishment,
nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which should necessarily await the judgment of the
appellate court. Court finds that the setting of the amount at P5,500,000.00 is
unreasonable, excessive, and constitutes an effective denial of petitioner’s right to bail.
 The courts are advised that they must not only be aware but should also consider the Bail Bond
Guide due to its significance in the administration of criminal justice. This notwithstanding, the
Court is not precluded from imposing in petitioner’s case an amount higher than P40,000.00
(based on the Bail Bond Guide) where it perceives that an appropriate increase is dictated by the
circumstances.
*Enrile v. Sandiganbayan – GR 213847, August 18, 2015

 Bail, a matter of right; exception.
o All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties,
or released on recognize as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
 Bail, when discretionary.
o Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application
for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of
appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However,
if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by
the appellate court.
122
 The general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
o For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial cour
 Doctrine: Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should
be allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
o The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail. This is borne out by the findings of Dr. Jose C. Gonzales, the Director of
Philippine General Hospital.
o Moreover, Enrile’s social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to
the authorities indicate that the risk of flight or escape is highly unlikely.
*Gov’t of Hongkong v. Hon. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470, April 19, 2007 (right to bail in extradition cases)
 Doctrine 1: An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting
or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases—the potential extradite must prove
by “clear and convincing proof” that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and
processes of the extradition court.
 Doctrine 2: An extradite should not be deprived of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain
standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
 Doctrine 3: Bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and convincing
showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community, and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
 If bail can be granted in deportation cases, the Court sees no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases—clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be
viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights.
 While extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain
the purpose of extradition is also “the machinery of criminal law”—obviously, an extradition
proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process.
*Gov’t of Hongkong v. Munoz, 800 SCRA 467, August 16, 2016. [Double Criminality Rule]
 The right of a state to successfully request the extradition of a criminal offender arises from a
treaty with the requesting state.
o Candelaria: There is no international law which mandates extradition to be made, other
than treaty obligations.
 For purposes of the extradition of Muñoz, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR)
as the requesting state must establish the following six elements, namely:
o (1) there must be an extradition treaty in force between the HKSAR and the Philippines;
o (2) the criminal charges that are pending in the HKSAR against the person to be
extradited;
o (3) the crimes for which the person to be extradited is charged are extraditable within the
terms of the treaty;
o (4) the individual before the court is the same person charged in the HKSAR;
o (5) the evidence submitted establishes probable cause to believe that the person to be
extradited committed the offenses charged; and
o (6) the offenses are criminal in both the HKSAR and the Philippines (double
criminality rule).
123
 Doctrine: Under the double criminality rule, the extraditable offense must be criminal under the
laws of both the requesting and the requested states. This simply means that the requested state
comes under no obligation to surrender the person if its laws do not regard the conduct covered by
the request for extradition as criminal
o Candelaria: It does not need to be exactly the same offense but an analogous ones will
suffice.
 Although the crime of conspiracy to defraud was included among the offenses
covered by the RP-Hong Kong Agreement, and the RTC and the CA have agreed
that the crime was analogous to the felony of estafa through false pretense as
defined and penalized under Article 315(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
 Yet, because the offense of accepting an advantage as an agent charged against
him in the HKSAR is one that deals with private sector bribery, the conditions for
the application of the double criminality rule are obviously not met. Accordingly,
the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent must be dropped from the
request for extradition.
 The Philippines does not have an analogous private sector bribery.
Lavides v. CA, 324 SCRA 321

People v. Gako, GR 135045, December 15, 2000
Fortuna v. Sitaca, AM No. RTJ-01-1633, June 19, 2001
Jinggoy Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002
Gov’t of USA v. Hon Purganan, GR 148571, Sept. 24, 2002
Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148468, Jan. 28, 2003
People v. Sandiganbayan – 529 SCRA 764
Waiver of the Right
People v. Judge Donato & Rodolfo Salas – 198 SCRA 130

People v. Mapalao - 197 SCRA 79
Excessive Bail
*De La Camara v. Enage - 41 SCRA 1 (10 guidelines)

 Factors to consider when imposing bail.
1. Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
2. Nature and circumstances of the offense;
3. Penalty for the offense charged;
4. Character and reputation of the accused;
5. Age and health of the accused;
6. Weight of the evidence against the accused;
7. Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
8. Forfeiture of other bail;
9. The fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
10. Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
 Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the
evidence of guilt is strong. Denial of right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of
guilt is strong.
 Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that
is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no such
prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no
mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law.
 Ruling: Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970
fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by petitioner, the sum of
P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder, there being fourteen victims, and the
sum of P355,200.00 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder, there being twelve victims,
is clearly violative of this constitutional provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two
124
offenses charged, the amount required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the
information for murder and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it
be ignored in this case that the Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,-000.00
for the two offenses.
Chu v. Dolalos – 260 SCRA 309

Magsucang v. Judge Balgos, AM no. MTJ- 02- 142, Feb. 27, 2003
Right to Bail of Military Personnel
Commendador v. Gen. de Villa - 200 SCRA 80

 Constitution grants the right to bail to all persons is applicable and covers all military men facing
court-martial proceedings.
Aspects of the Right to Bail
Sule v. Biteng - AM MTJ-95-1018, 243 SCRA 524

Paderanga v. CA – 247 SCRA 741
Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Chin v. Judge Gustilo, et al. AM No- RTJ-94-1243, 247 SCRA 175
People v. Nitcha – 240 SCRA 283
Padilla v. CA – 260 SCRA 155
Parada v. Veneracion – 269 SCRA 371
Obosa v. CA – 266 SCRA 281
Moslares v. CA – 291 SCRA 440
Catiis v. CA 482 SCRA 71
SECTION 14.
Rights under Section 14: (DIHI-SWC)

1. Right to Due Process of Law;
2. Right to be presumed Innocent;
3. Right to be Heard by himself and counsel;
4. Right to be Informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;
5. Right to have a Speedy, impartial and public trial; [sip]
6. Right to meet the Witness face-to-face; and
7. Right to have Compulsory process to secure:
a. Attendance of witness; and
b. Production of evidence in his behalf.
Due Process
People v. Boras, GR 127495, December 22, 2000

People v. Horio, GR 137842, August 23, 2001
Military Tribunal
Olaguer v. Military - 150 SCRA 144

 Military courts cannot try civilian cases even during martial law if and when civil courts are open.
Tan v. Barrios - 190 SCRA 685
125
Presumption of innocence
*United States v. Luling - 34 PHIL. 725

 Doctrine: Congress has the power to define what shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt
for a crime and such power is not violative of the right against presumption of innocence.
 G.R. Presumption of Innocence
 Exception: Congress may provide for some material fact or facts which shall constitute as prima
facie evidence of guilt. The accused has the burden of disproving the same.
o No constitutional provision is violated by a statute providing that proof by the state of
some material fact or facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that
then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of showing that such act or
acts are innocent and are committed without unlawful intention.
o The state having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well defined
limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what
proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then to put upon the defendant
the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are not committed with any
criminal intent or intention.
*Dumlao v. COMELEC - 95 SCRA 392

 The provision of the Election Code that the filing of charges for the commission of crimes before a
civil or military court shall be prima facie evidence of the commission of an act of disloyalty to the
State is void as it condemns a person before he is finally heard.
o The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges
have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is
fully heard.
o In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a
person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for
such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.
o A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed
against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a
crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence.
 Although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be
rebutted, yet, there is “clear and present danger” that because of the proximity of the elections,
time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary to
overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
People v. Mingoa - 92 PHIL. 856

Pamintuan v. People - 234 SCRA 63
Marquez v. COMELEC – 243 SCRA 538
Hizon v. CA – 265 SCRA 517
People v. Caranguian, GR 124514, July 6, 2000
People v. Aquino, GR 130742, July 18, 2000
People v. Guillermo, GR 111292, July 20, 2000
People v. Balacano, GR 127156, July 31, 2000
People v. Mansueto, GR 135196, July 31, 2000
Soriano v. Angeles, GR 109920, August 31, 2000
People v. Fajardo, GR 128583, November 22, 2000
Rueda v. Sandiganbayan, GR 129064, November 29, 2000
People v. Baulite, G.R. No. 137599, October 8, 2001
Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, GR 186739-960, April 17, 2013
Aguilar v. DOJ, GR 197522, Sept. 11, 2013
People v. Cadidi, GR 191263, October 16, 2013 (supra Art III, Sec 2)
People v. Atienza, GR 191756, November 25, 2013
126
Right to Be Heard and to Production of Evidence
Maliwat v. CA - 256 SCRA 718

People v. Buemio – 265 SCRA 582
People v. Ramilla – GR 127485 July 19, 1999
Marquez v. Sandiganbayan – 641 SCRA 175
Right to Counsel
*People v. Holgado - 85 PHIL. 752

 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “if the defendant appears without attorney, he must be
INFORMED by the court that it is his RIGHT TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY being arraigned and must
be asked if he desires such aid. If so, the Court must assign an attorney to defend him.”
 The Constitution provides that “No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.” The accused “shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.”
 In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be
heard by counsel.
o Further, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel
especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense
found to be capital by the court.
o It is NOT enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is
essential that the court should assign one de oficio, if he so desires and he is
poor, and grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.
 Right to Counsel is necessary & indispensable:
o During custodial investigation to prevent the use of duress and other undue influence in
extracting confessions
o Even after conviction of the accused; even when the case is on appeal.
o When the accused gives a qualified plea.
o When the sworn statement was extracted from the accused.
Salaw v. NLRC - 202 SCRA 7

 The right to counsel, a very basic requirement of substantive due process, has to be observed.
o It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by the
technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. However, the right to
counsel, a very basic requirement of substantive due process, has to be observed.
Indeed, the rights to counsel and to due process of law are two of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution to any person under investigation, be the
proceeding administrative, civil, or criminal.
United v. Ash - 413 U. S. 300

People v. Rio – 201 SCRA 702
Carillo v. People - 229 SCRA 386
People v. Macagaling - 237 SCRA 299
De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan - 256 SCRA 171
People v. Cuizon - 256 SCRA 329
People v. Cabodoc – 263 SCRA 187
People v. Echegaray – 267 SCRA 682
Reyes v. CA – 267 SCRA 543
People v. Serzo – 274 SCRA 553
Dans v. People – 285 SCRA 504
Amion v. Chiongson – AM No. RTJ-97-1371 January 22, 1999
People v. Ambray – GR 127177 February 25, 1999
People v. Bolatete – GR 127570 February 25, 1999
People v. dela Cuesta – GR 126134 March 2, 1999
People v. Lakindanum – GR 127123 March 10, 1999
127
People v. Cantos – GR 129298 April 14, 1999
People v. Alba – GR 131858-59 April 14, 1999
People v. Onabia – GR 128288 April 20, 1999
People v. Bermas – GR 120420 April 21, 1999
People v. Pedres – GR 129533 April 30, 1999
People v. Acala – GR 127023-25 May 19, 1999
People v. Puertollano – GR 122423 June 17, 1999
People v. Bonghanoy – GR 124097 June 17, 1999
People v. Larena – GR 121205-09 June 29, 1999
People v. Nuñez – GR 128875 July 8, 1999
People v. Ramilla – GR 127485 July 19, 1999
People v. Sesbreno, G.R. No. 121764, September 8, 1999
People v. Santoclides, G.R. No. 109149, December 21, 1999
People v. Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001
People v. Bagas, G.R. No. 104383, July 12, 2001
People v. Liwanag, G.R. No. 120468, August 15, 2001
People v. Bernas, 377 SCRA 391
People v. Caralipio, GR 137766, Nov. 27, 2002
Sia v. People 504 SCRA 507
Briones v. People – 588 SCRA 362
Villanueva v. People – 644 SCRA 356
Absence of Violation
People v. Aquino, GR 129288, March 30, 2000

Villanueva v. People, GR 135098, April 12, 2000
Presence of Violation
People v. Nadera, 324 SCRA 490

Callangan v. People 493 SCRA 269
Right to Be Informed
*People v. Regala – 113 SCRA 613

 Doctrine: Any qualifying aggravating circumstance [note, however, that TODAY, any
aggravating circumstance, whether they be generic, special or qualifying] must be stated
in the Information to be appreciated otherwise, it will be a violation of the right to be
informed of the accused.
 An accused cannot be convicted of a crime not properly alleged in the body of the information
because it will be a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against him. The fact that the crime [not alleged in the information] was established by
the evidence of the prosecution, without any objection from the accused, cannot likewise cure the
defect as to validly convict the accused thereof.
Senador v. People, GR 201620, March 6, 2013

 In offenses against property, if the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable,
such as the money unlawfully taken, an error in the designation of the offended party is fatal
and would result in the acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of the offense
is specific and identifiable, such as a warrant or a check, an error in the designation of the
offended party is immaterial.
o Rule 112, Section 10 of the Rules of Court provide “In offenses against property, if the
name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.”
 However, as presented above, it applies to specific and identifiable property and
not generic and not identifiable such as money.
128
o Lahoylahoy ruled that if the subject matter of the case is generic, like for example, money
(Php 100), the accused should be acquitted. On the contrary, Kepner (warrant), Sayson,
and Ricarze (both checks) support the doctrine that if the subject matter is specific, such
error would not result in the acquittal of the accused.
o The trust receipt agreement specified the various kinds of jewelry. Therefore, the error in
designation of the offended party in the Information is immaterial.
Jaca v. People – 689 SCRA 276

 Pursuant to the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, the Revised Rules of Court require that the information state the
designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which
constitute the offense charged.
 Additionally, it requires that these acts or omissions and their attendant circumstances “be stated
in ordinary and concise language” and “in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment.”
 As long as the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such particularity and reasonable
certainty that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged, then the information is
considered sufficient.
Pielago v. People 0 693 SCRA 476

 As correctly explained by the CA, the factual allegations contained in the Information determine
the crime charged against the accused and not the designation of the offense as given by the
prosecutor which is merely an opinion not binding to the courts.
Enrile v. Salazar - 186 SCRA 217

People v. Taguba - 229 SCRA 188
People v. Barte - 230 SCRA 401
People v. Vitor - 245 SCRA 392
Sabiniano v. CA – 249 SCRA 24
People v. Reyes - 242 SCRA 264
People v. Legaspi - 246 SCRA 206
People v. Ramos - 245 SCM 405
People v. Namayan - 246 SCRA 646
Pecho v. People – 262 SCRA 518
People v. Laurente - 255 SCRA 543
People v. Rosare – 264 SCRA 398
People v. Evangelista - 256 SCRA 611
People v. Cruz – 259 SCRA 109
People v. De Guzman – 265 SCRA 228
Salud Imson-Souweha v. Rondez – 279 SCRA 258
People v. Manansala – 273 SCRA 502
People v. Palomar – 278 SCRA 114
People v. Ortega – 276 SCRA 166
People v. Antido – 278 SCRA 425
People v. Sadiosa – 290 SCRA 92
People v. Villamor – GR 12444 October 7, 1998
People v. Rosare – 264 SCRA 398
People v. Llaguno – 285 SCRA 124
People v. Bugayong – GR 126518 December 2, 1998
People v. Manalili – 294 SCRA 220
People v. Dimapilis – GR 128619 December 17, 1998
People v. de Guzman – 289 SCRA 470
People v. Quitlong – 292 SCRA 360
People v. Perez – GR 122764 September 24, 1998
People v. Renido – 288 SCRA 369
129
People v. Venerable – 290 SCRA 15
People v. Lozano – GR 125080 September 25, 1998
People v. Padilla – GR 126124 January 20, 1999
People v. Acosta, G.R. No. 142726, October 17, 2001
People v. de la Pena G.R. No. 138358-59 Nov. 19, 2001
People v. Abino, G.R. No. 137288, December 11, 2001
People v. Tan, GR 116200-02, June 21, 2001
People v. Tagana, GR 137608-09, July 6, 2001
People v. Alcalde, GR 139225, May 29, 2002
People v. Mejeca, GR 146425, Nov. 21, 2002
People v. Esurina, 374, SCRA 429
People v. Togud, 375 SCRA 291
People v. Espejon, 377 SCRA 412
People v. Lavador, 377 SCRA 424
People v. Hermanes, 379 SCRA 190
People v. Portugal, 379 SCRA 212
People v. Baluya, 380 SCRA 533
People v. Arofo, 380 SCRA 663
People v. Cana, GR 139229, June 6, 2002
People v. Soriano, GR 135027, July 3, 2002
People v. Radam, GR 138395, July 18, 2002
People v. Abala, GR 135858, July, 23, 2002
People v. Romero, GR 137037, Aug. 5, 2002
People v. Magtibay, GR 142985, Aug. 6, 2002
People v. Miclat, GR 137024, Aug. 7, 2002
People v. Guardian, GR 142900, Aug. 7, 2002
People v. Ocampo, GR 145303, Aug. 7, 2002
People v. del Ayre, GR 139788, Oct. 3, 2002
People v. Caliso, GR 131475, Oct. 14, 2002
People v. Buado, GR 137341, Oct. 28, 2002
People v. Alemania, GR 146221, Nov. 13, 2002
People v. Terible, GR 140635, Nov. 18, 2002
People v. Victor, GR 127904, Dec. 5, 2002
People v. Velasquez, 377 SCRA 219
People v. Lachica, GR 143677, May 9, 2002
People v. Sajolga, GR 146684, Aug. 21, 2002
People v. Ramos, GR 142577, Dec. 27, 2002
People v. Mascarinas, GR 144034, May 28, 2002
People v. Sanchez, 375 SCRA 355
People v. Abayon, GR 142874, July, 31, 2002
People v. Gavina, GR 143237, Oct. 28, 2002
People v. Orbita, GR GR 136591, July 11, 2002
Dado v. People, GR 131421, Nov. 18, 2002
Santos v. People, GR 14761, Jan. 20, 2002
People v. Bon, GR 149199, Jan. 28, 2003
People v. Llanto, GR 146458, Jan. 20, 2003
People v. Migrante, GR 147606, Jan. 14, 2003
People v. Dy, GR 115326-37, Jan. 16, 2003
People v. Lapitaje, GR 132042, Feb. 19, 2003
People v. Ostia, GR 131804, Feb. 26, 2003
People v. Ganete, GR 142930, Mar. 28, 2003
Garcia v. People, GR 144785, Sept. 11, 2003
People v. Villanueva, GR 138364, Oct. 15, 2003
Burgos v. Sandiganbayan, GR 123144, Oct. 15, 2003
People v. Rote, GR 146188, Dec. 11, 2003
People v. Rata, GR 145523-24, Dec. 11, 2003
130
Andaya v. People 493 SCRA 539
People v. Estrada – 583 SCRA 302
People v. Abella – 610 SCRA 19
People v. Pangilinan – GR 183090, November 14, 2011
Senador v. People, GR 201620, March 6, 2013
Neri v. Sandiganbayan, GR 202243, August 7, 2013
Disini v. Sandiganbayan, GR 169823-24, September 11, 2013
People v. Manansala – 695 SCRA 70
Espino v. People – 700 SCRA 570
Sevilla v. People – 732 SCRA 687
People v. Chi Chan Liu, GR 189272, January 21, 2015
Relationship
*People v. Begino – 582 SCRA 189 (2009)

 Revised Penal Code – Art. 266-B -- The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape
is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
o 1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
 Ruling: the Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the RTC that, as the evidence
undoubtedly proved, rape was committed by Begino against AAA. However, we hold that Begino
could not be indicted for qualified rape and penalized under paragraph 1 of Article 266-B.
o The age of the victim was sufficiently proved. However, the Information stated that
Begino is the “stepfather” of AAA. It presupposes a legitimate relationship between
Begino and BBB. The evidence adduced by the prosecution showed that Begino is not
the stepfather of AAA but the common law spouse of BBB. Since Begino is not the
stepfather of AAA, the prosecution’s failure to prove the qualifying circumstance bars
conviction for rape in its qualified form.
o Consequently, since the qualifying circumstance of “common law spouse” was not
alleged in the Information for rape against Begino, he could not be convicted of rape
in the qualified form as he was not properly informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him.
 Doctrine: In a criminal prosecution, it is a fundamental rule that every element of the crime
charged must be alleged in the complaint or information including the proper relationship of the
parties .
People v. Cepedon, 542 S 550

People v. Talan, GR 177354, November 14, 2009
People v. Estrada – 610 SCRA 222
People v. Corpuz – 577 SCRA 465
Nature of Offense: Different Offense; Same Offense;
People v. Paglinawan, 324 SCRA 97

People v. Paramil, GR 128056-57, March 31, 2000
Evangelista v. People, GR 108135-36, August 14, 2000
People v. Puzon, GR 123156-59, August 29, 2000
People v. Valdesancho, G.R. NO. 137051-52, May 30, 2001
People v. Dawisan, G.R. No. 122095, September 13, 2001
Mapas v. People, 544 SCRA 85
Pactolin v. Sandiganbayan, 554 SCRA 136
People v. Hu, 567 SCRA 697
Sevilla v. People – 732 SCRA 687
People v. Chi Chan Liu – 745 SCRA 476
131
Absence of Qualifying Circumstance
People v. Ronato, G.R. No. 124298, October 11, 1999

People v. Bayron, G.R. No. 122732, September 7, 1999
People v. Abella, G.R. No. 131847, September 22, 1999
People v. Gallo, G.R. No. 124736, September 29, 1999
People v. Panique, G.R. No. 125763, October 13, 1999
People v. Aguinaldo, G.R. No. 130784, October 3, 1999
People v. Tabion, G.R. No. 132715, October 20, 1999
People v. Torio, G.R. No. 132216, November 7, 1999
People v. Alfanta, G.R. No. 125633, December 9, 1999
People v. Flores, G.R. No. 123599, December 13, 1999
People v. Ramon, G.R. No. 130407, December 15, 1999
People v. Villar., 322 SCRA 390
People v. Bernaldez, 322 SCRA 762
People v. Flores, 322 SCRA 779
People v. Palanco, 322 SCRA 790
People v. Bacule, 323 SCRA 734
People v. Bartolome, 323 SCRA 836
People v. Bayona, 327 SCRA 190
People v. Siao, 327 SCRA 231
People v. Bayzo, 327 SCRA 771
People v. De los Santos, GR 121906, August 5, 2000
People v. Fraga, GR 134130-33, April 12, 2000
People v. Licanda, GR 134084, May 4, 2000
People v. Sabredo, GR 126114, May 11, 2000
People v. Alicante, GR 127026-27, May 31, 2000
People v. Traya, GR 129052, May 31, 2000
People v. Mamac, GR 130332, May 31, 2000
People v. Decena, GR 131843, May 31, 2000
People v. Lomibao, GR 135855, August 3, 2000
People v. Canonigo, GR 133649, August 4, 2000
People v. Cruz, GR 128346-48, August 14, 2000
People v. Watimar, GR 121651-52, August 16, 2000
People v. Gabiana, GR 123543, August 23, 2000
People v. Banihit GR 132045, August 25, 2000
People v. Gutierrez, GR 132772, August 31, 2000
People v. Villanueva, GR 135330, August 31, 2000
People v. Melendres, GR 133999-4001, August 31, 2000
People v. Mendez, GR 132546, July 5, 2000
People v. Alarcon, GR 133191-93, July 11, 2000
People v. Baybado, GR 132136, July 14, 2000
People v. Surilla, GR 129164, July 24, 2000
People v. Campaner, GR 130500, July 26, 2000
People v. Balacano, GR 127156, July 31, 2000
People v. Villaraza, GR 131848-50, September 5, 2000
People v. Baniguid, GR 137714, September 8, 2000
People v. Bali-Balita, GR 134266, September 15, 2000
People v. Cajara, GR 122498, Sepember 27, 2000
People v. Nogar, GR 133946, September 27, 2000
People v. Magtrayo, GR 133480-82, October 4, 2000
People v. Taguba, GR 112792-93, October 6, 2000
People v. De la Cuesta, GR133904, October 5, 2000
People v. Arves, GR 134628, October 13, 2000
People v. Baldino, GR 137269, October 13, 2000
People v. Baltazar, GR 130610, October 16, 2000
132
People v. Francisco, GR 136252, October 20, 2000
People v. Sarmiento, GR 134768, October 25, 2000
People v. Crispin, 327 SCRA 167
People v. Paramil, GR 128056-57, March 31, 2000
People v. Gallego, GR 130603, August 15, 2000
People v. Tejada. G.R. No. 126166, July 10, 2001
People v. Lalingjaman, G.R. No. 132714, September 6, 2001
People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 139904, October 12, 2001
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 19, 2001
People v. Marahay, GR 120625-29, Jan. 28, 2003
People v. Montemayor, GR 124474, Jan. 28, 2003
People v. Delim, GR 142773, Jan. 28, 2003
People v. Acosta, GR 140402, Jan. 28, 2003
People v. Caloza, GR 138404-06, Jan. 28, 2003
People v. Layoso, GR 14773-76, Jan. 22, 2003
People v. Baldogo, GR 128106-07, Jan. 24, 2003
People v. De la Cruz, GR 175954, December 16, 2008
People v. De la Cruz, GR 174371, December 11, 2008
Andres v. People – 588 SCRA 830
Sambilon v. People – 591 SCRA 405
Valenzuela v. People – 596 SCRA 1
Number of Offenses
People v. Tresballes, G.R. No. 126118, September 21, 1999

People v. Gerona, G.R. No. 126169, December 21, 1999
People v. Pambid, GR 124453, March 15, 2000
People v. Alvero, GR 134536, April 5, 2000
People v. Guiwan GR 117324-8, April 27, 2000
People v. Surilla, GR 129164, July 24, 2000
People v. Rama, 379 SCRA 477
People v. Cuyugan, GR 146641, Nov. 18, 2002
People v. Montinola, 543 SCRA 412
Date of Commission of Crime
*People v. Ching – 538 SCRA 117

 To be considered as valid and sufficient, an information must state
 the name of the accused;
 the designation of the offense given by the statute;
 the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
 the name of the offended party;
 the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and
 the place where the offense was committed.
o The purpose of the requirement for the information’s validity and sufficiency is to enable
the accused to suitably prepare for his defense since he is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
 With respect to the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically provides that it is not necessary to state in the
information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the offense, and that the offense may be alleged to have been committed on a
date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
 In rape cases, failure to specify the exact dates or times when the rapes occurred does not ipso
facto make the information defective on its face. The date or time of the commission of rape is not
133
a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a
woman through force and intimidation.
o The precise time when the rape took place has no substantial bearing on its commission.
As such, the date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that
the complaint or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as
near as possible to the date of its actual commission
 The allegations in the informations which stated that the three incidents of rape
were committed in the year 1996 and in May 1998 are sufficient to affirm the
conviction of the accused in the instant case.
 The allegations therein that the acts were committed “on (sic) the year 1991 and
the days thereafter” substantially apprised appellant of the crime he was charged
with since all the essential elements of the crime of rape were stated in the
information. [People v. Magbanua].
People v. Ladrillo, G.R. No. 124342, December 8, 1999

 Certainly, time is not an essential ingredient or element of the crime of rape. However, the phrase
“on or about the year 1992” encompasses not only the 12 months of 1992 but includes the years
prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for which Edwin has to virtually account for
his whereabouts.
o Thus, it violates the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
People v. Narito, G.R. No. 132058, October 1, 1999

People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 12888, December 3, 1999
People v. Ferolino, GR 131730-31, April 5, 2000
People v. Gianan, GR 135288-93, September 15, 2000
People v. Trelles, GR 137659, September 19, 2000
Sumbang v. General Court Martial PRO- Region 6, GR 140188, August 3, 2000
Arambulo v. Laqui, GR 138596, October 12, 2000
People v. Capinpin, GR 118608, October 30, 2000
People v. Capinpin, GR 118608, October 30, 2000
People v. Tagana, G.R. Nos. 137608-09, July 6, 2001
People v. Bidoc 506 SCRA 481
People v. Ibañez – 523 SCRA 136
People v. Rafon – 532 SCRA 370
People v. Domingo – 538 SCRA 733
People v. Ceredon, 542 SCRA 550
People v. Pascual, 569 SCRA 534
People v. Aure, 569 SCRA 836
People v. Diocado, GR 170567, November 14, 2008
People v. Canares – 579 SCRA 582
People v. Aboganda – 585 SCRA 1
People v. Jimenez – 586 SCRA 580
People v. Lazaro – 596 SCRA 587
No violation
People v. Escoro, 376 SCRA 670

 The precise time of the crime of rape has no substantial bearing on its commission—it is sufficient
to state that it was committed “in the month of March 1997.”
People v. Pascual, 379 SCRA 235

 The date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. Indeed, we have held that the
allegations that rapes were committed ‘before or until October 15, 1994,’ ‘sometime in the year
1991 and the days thereafter,’ and ‘on or about and sometime in the year 1988.
134
People v. Conde, 380 SCRA 159
People v. Miranda, GR 142566, Aug. 8, 2002
People v. Roque, GR 130569, Aug. 14, 2002
People v. Segovia, GR 138974, Sept. 29, 2002
People v. Caralipio, GR 137766, Nov. 27, 2002
People v. Cantomayor, GR 145522, Dec. 5, 2002
People v. sarazan, GR 123269-72, Jan. 22, 2003
People v. Taperla, GR 142860, Jan. 16, 2003
People v. Lizada, GR 143468-71, Jan. 24, 2003
People v. Dy, GR 115326-37, Jan.16, 2003
Batulanan v. People 502 SCRA 35
People v. Corpuz 482 SCRA 435
Soledad v. People – 644 SCRA 258
Torres v. People – 655 SCRA 720
Right to Speedy Trial
*Conde v. Rivera - 45 PHIL. 650

 Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial.
o Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if
innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law.
 The Court lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause,
secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable
period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a
proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his
liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
People v. Gines - 197 SCRA 481

 When the delay was in good faith and reasonable, it does not constitute a denial of the right to a
speedy trial.
o The non-appearance of the complainant for 8 months due to medical reason was in good
faith and the delay of 8 months was not long enough to constitute capricious and
vexatious delay.

Tai Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131483, October 26, 1999
Nepomuceno v. Sec. of National Defense - 108 SCRA 658
Abadia v. CA - 236 SCRA 676
Gonzales v. CA - 232 SCRA 667
Cadalin v. POEA – 238 SCRA 721
People v. Tampal – 244 SCRA 202
Dacanay v. People - 240 SCRA 490
Guerrero v. CA - 257 SCRA 703
Dizon v. Lopez – 278 SCRA 483
Luzarraga v. Meteoro, AM 00-1572, August 3, 2000
Solar Entertainment and People v. Hon. How, GR 140863, August 22, 2000
De Zuzurregui v. Rosete, GR AM no. MTJ-02-1426
People v. Dy, GR 115326-37, Jan. 16, 2003
Lumanlaw v. Peralta 482 SCRA 396
Padilla v. Apas 487 SCRA 29
People v. Hernandez 499 SCRA 688
Uy v. Adriano 505 SCRA 625
Benares v. Lim 511 SCRA 100
Gaas v. Mitmug, 553 SCRA 535
Albert v. Sandiganbayan – 580 SCRA 279
135
Tan v. People – 586 SCRA 139
Tallo v. People – 588 SCRA 520
Olbes v. Buemio – 607 SCRA 336
Jacob v. Sandiganbayan – 635 SCRA 94
Braza v. SAndiganbayan, GR 195032, Feb 20, 2013
People v. Castaneda, GR 208290, December 11, 2013
Roallos v. Epople – 712 SCRA 593
Co v. New Prosperity Plastic – 727 SCRA 503
Bonsubra v. Xerro, GR 205952, February 11, 2015
Right to Impartial Trial
*Mateo. Jr, v. Villaluz - 50 SCRA 18

 Doctrine: Judges should observe cold neutrality at all times. When a suspect has executed an
extra-judicial statement sworn before a judge who is also the same judge who handles the criminal
case in which the victim is involved, neutrality of the judge is impaired.
o The specific issue then that must be resolved is whether the circumstance of a party
having subscribed before respondent Judge an extra-judicial statement purporting to
describe the manner in which an offense was committed, later on repudiated by him as the
product of intimidation in the course of his having been asked to testify against petitioners,
would suffice to negate that degree of objectivity the Constitution requires?
o The answer must be in the affirmative. Petitioners are thus entitled to the relief sought.
Respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was asserted before
him in such extrajudicial statement.
 Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not in the slightest bit offended by the affiant's
turnabout with his later declaration that there was intimidation by a government
agent exerted on him. That was hardly flattering to respondent Judge. It is not
only that. His sense of fairness under the circumstances could easily be blunted.
The absence of the requisite due process element is thus noticeable.

Maliwat v. CA – 256 SCRA 718
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan – 268 SCRA 332
People v. Adora – 275 SCRA 441
Cosep v. People – 290 SCRA 378
People v. Castillo – 289 SCRA 213
People v. Vaynaco – GR 126286 March 22, 1999
People v. Estrada, GR 130487, June 19, 2000
Impartiality of a Judge
Soriano v. Angeles, GR 109920, August 31, 2000

Almendra v. Asis, AM RTJ-1550, April 6, 2000
People v. Zheng Bai Hui, GR 127580, August 22, 2000
People v. Genosa, GR 135981, September 29, 2000
Right to a Public Trial
*In Re Oliver -333 U.S. 237

 Summary trials for alleged misconduct called contempt of court have not been regarded as an
exception to this universal rule against secret trials.
 The accused is granted the right to a public trial. This guarantee has always been recognized as
a safeguard against any attempt to employ our courts as instruments of persecution.
Garcia v. Domingo - L-30104, July 25, 1973, 52 SCRA 143
136
Compulsory Process
Fajardo v. Garcia - 98 SCRA 514

People v. Yambot, GR 120350, October 13, 2000
Right to Confrontation, to Cross-Examine, or to Meet Witness Face to Face
*Tampar v. Usman - 200 SCRA 652

 Doctrine: An oath cannot be used as evidence unless it is subject to a cross-examination made by
the opposing party [constitutionally granted right of an accused].
o Section 7 of the Special Rules of Procedure prescribed for Shari’a courts aforecited
provides that if the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his claim, the defendant shall take an
oath and judgment shall be rendered in his favor by the Court.
o On the other hand, should defendant refuse to take an oath, plaintiff may affirm his claim
under oath, in which case judgment shall be rendered in his favor.
 Said provision effectively deprives a litigant of his constitutional right to due process. It denies a
party his right to confront the witnesses against him and to cross-examine them. It should
have no place even in the Special Rules of Procedure of the Shari’a courts of the country.
People v. Digno - 250 SCRA 237

People v. Miyake – 279 SCRA 180
People v. Narca – 275 SCRA 696
People v. Quidato – GR 117401 October 1, 1998
People v. Crispin, 327 SCRA 167
People v. Libo-on, G.R. NO. 136737, May 23, 2001
Carriaga v. C.A., G.R. No. 143561, June 6, 2001
People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 139180, July 31, 2001
People v. Monje, GR 146689, Sept. 27, 2002
Victorino v. People 509 SCRA 483
Herrera v. Sandiganbayan – 579 SCRA 32
Ho Wai Pang v. People – GR 1716229, October 19, 2011
Trial in Absentia; Right to Be Present
*Carredo v. People - 183 SCRA 273

 It is important to state that the provision of the Constitution authorizing the trial in absentia of the
accused in case of his non-appearance after arraignment despite due notice simply means that he
thereby waives his right to meet the witnesses face to face among others. An express waiver of
appearance after arraignment, as in this case, is of the same effect.
 Doctrines: However, such waiver of appearance and trial in absentia does not mean that the
prosecution is thereby deprived of its right to require the presence of the accused for purposes of
identification by its witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the accused. Such waiver of a
right of the accused does not mean a release of the accused from his obligation under the
bond to appear in court whenever so required. The accused may waive his right but not his
duty or obligation to the court.
o Exception to Requirement of Appearance: Accused may be compelled to be present
at the trial for purposes of identification unless he unqualifiedly admits in open court
after his arraignment that he is the person named as defendant in the case on trial.
 G.R. Right to be Present
o Exception: Trial in Absentia!
o Exception to Exception: There is a statutory rule which requires the presence of the
accused at the promulgation of judgment.
 Requisites for Trial in Absentia: [ANU]
o Accused has been ARRAIGNED
o NOTICE OF TRIAL was duly served to the accused and properly returned; and
o Failure of accused to appear is UNJUSTIFIED.
137
People v. Ravelo - 202 SCRA 655
People v. Rivera - 242 SCRA 26
People v. Tabag – 268 SCRA 115
Parada v. Veneracion – (supra, Right to Bail)
Admissibility of Evidence
People v. Morial, G.R. No. 129295, August 15, 2001

People v. Tulin, G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001
SECTION 15. (HABEAS CORPUS)
SECTION 16.
Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
*Binay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 120681, October 1, 1999 (reasonable delay)

 Doctrine 1: The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only
o when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
o when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or
o when without justifiable cause a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried.
 Doctrine 2: A mathematical computation of the time involved would therefore be an insufficient
basis. Particular regard of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case must be taken.
o The balancing test is used to weigh the violation of the right against the length of the
delay, the reasons thereof, the assertion or failure to assert such right, and the prejudice
caused by delay.
o Violations of this section
 Doctrine 3: The constitutional right to “a speedy disposition of cases” is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and
administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.
o Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all
officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
o Here, the Court found that there was no undue delay in the disposition of the subject
cases. Judging from the findings, the court found that the cases were sufficiently
complex, thus justifying the length of time for their resolution.

Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan - 199 SCRA 299 (no violation)
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan - 253 SCRA 773 (no violation)
Bolalin v. Occiano – 266 SCRA 203 (violation)
Angchangco v. Ombudsman – 268 SCRA 301 (violation)
Lambino v. De Vera – 275 SCRA 60
Duterte v. Sandiganbayan – 289 SCRA 721(preliminary investigation, violation)
Marcos v. Sandiganbayan – GR 126995 October 6, 1998 (violation)
Roque v. Ombudsman – GR 129978 May 12, 1999 (violation)
Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan – GR 108595 May 18, 1999 (violation)
Dansal v. Fernandez, 327 SCRA 145 ( no violation )
Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, 322 SCRA 655 (no violation)
Castillo v. Sandiganbayan, GR 109271, March 14, 2000 (no violation)
Raro v. Sandiganbayan, GR 108431, July 14, 2000
Dela Pena v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 144542, June 29, 2001
Lopez v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 140529, September 6, 2001
Lee v. People, Gr137914, Dec. 4, 2002
People v. Monje, GR 146689, Sept. 27, 2002
138
Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan, 374 SCRA 200
Guiani v. Sandiganbayan, GR 146897, Aug. 6, 2002 (delay in preliminary investigation)
Avilla v. Reyes 479 SCRA 334
Enriquez v. Office of OMB, 545 SCRA 618
OMB v. Jurado, 561 SCRA 135
Perea v. People, 544 SCRA 532
Gaas v. Mitmug, 553 SCRA 335
Roquera v. Chancellor – 614 SCRA 723
Lumanog v. People – 630 SCRA 42
Conscolluela v. Sandiganbayan, GR 191411, July 15, 2013
People v. Sandiganbayan. GR 188165, December 11, 2013 (pending cases)
Borja v. Sandiganbayan – 691 SCRA 421
SECTION 17.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
*United States v. Navarro - 3 PHIL. 143 (rationale)

 It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce evidence showing
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused can not be called upon either by express words
or acts to assist in the production of such evidence; nor should his silence be taken as proof
against him. He has a right to rely on the presumption of innocence until the prosecution proves
him guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged.
 The right of the accused to be exempt from testifying applies equally to any compulsory disclosure
of the guilt of the offender himself, whether sought directly as the object of the inquiry or indirectly
and incidentally for the purpose of establishing facts involving an issue between other parties.
*United States v. Tan Teng - 23 PHIL.145 (substances emitted to prove STD infection)
 Doctrine: The prohibition against compelling a man in a criminal cause to be a witness against
himself is a prohibition against physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from
him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material.
o The prohibition contained in the Philippine Bill (sec. 5) that a person shall not be
compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
 Facts: Accused Tan Teng claims that the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he
was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was suffering from
gonorrhea. That to admit such evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself.
o The gonorrhea found in his body is admissible as evidence to prove that he raped the girl
as the girl was found to have gonorrhea.
*United States v. Ong Siu Hong - 36 PHIL. 735 (discharge)

 Forcing an accused to discharge morphine from his mouth is not compelling him to be a
witness against himself.
o There is no self-incrimination from forcing the accused to discharge the morphine from his
mouth. Such doctrine would be a forced construction of the provision that any article,
substance or thing taken from a person accused of a crime could not be given in evidence.
Main purpose is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination.
139
*Villaflor v. Summers - 41 PHIL. 62 (pregnancy test)
 Such submission to medical examination is not self-incrimination.
o 1. Self-incrimination is only testimonial compulsion.
o 2. To compel one to lay bare her body without lawful authority is a trespass but between a
sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, law and justice cannot
hesitate.
o 3. Ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible, as long as there is
no torture or force. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by respectable
and disinterested physicians, due care will be taken not to use violence and not to
embarrass the patient.
o This is to balance the interests of State and justice.
*Beltran v. Samson - 53 PHIL. 570 (writing)

 Doctrine: Furnishing one’s handwriting is not a purely mechanical act as it involves the
application of intelligence and attention. If done, it would produce evidence against the accused.
o Here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing,
evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier.
o Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be
a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting.
o But even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or specimens without resorting
to the means complained, that is not reason for trampling upon a personal right
guaranteed by the constitution.
 Ratio: As compared to the Villaflor case, this case involves a compulsion to execute a positive
testimonial act. It deals with something not yet in existence.
Bermudez v. Castillo - 64 PHIL. 483

 Facts: Accused denied that the evidence presented in court was written by her. Thus, she was
asked to write so that her handwriting may be compared to the one in the letters. She refused to
do so. Is the refusal proper?
 Ruling: Yes, if she writes and it is found out to be the same as the handwriting in the letter, she
would have been found guilty of the crime of perjury. Thus, she cannot be compelled to write.
o A constitutional right should be liberally construed in favor of the one asserting it.
*Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr. - L-19052, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 1059 (forfeiture proceedings)
 Doctrine: Even if the case of an administrative charge of unexplained wealth, whenever a
penalty is present, the proceedings partake of a criminal nature. Given this, the accused may not
be compelled to take the witness stand. AS forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty, one
that is deemed criminal, so the invocation of the right is applicable.
 Distinguish from Almeda v. Perez
o In Almeda vs. Perez, the theory that, after the filing of respondents’ answer to a petition for
forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, said petition may not be amended as to substance
pursuant to our rules of criminal procedure, was rejected by this Court upon the ground
that said forfeiture proceeding is civil in nature.
 This doctrine refers, however, to the purely procedural aspect of said proceeding,
and has no bearing on the substantial rights of the respondents therein
particularly their constitutional right against self-incrimination.
140
*Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners - L-25018, May 26, 1969, 28 SCRA 344 (revocation of
license)
 Doctrine 1: In an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, the
Board of Medical Examiners CANNOT, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel
the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.
o A proceeding for malpractice possesses a criminal or penal aspect in the sense that the
respondent would suffer the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner, for some
an even greater deprivation than forfeiture of property.
 Doctrine 2: The right against self-incrimination extends not only to the right to refuse to answer
questions put to the accused while on the witness stand, but also to forego testimony, to remain
silent and refuse to take the witness stand when called as a witness by the prosecution.
Standard Chartered v. Senate – 541 SCRA 546 (legislative inquiry is not self- incriminating)
 Accused in a pending criminal case may still be compelled to answer senate’s queries in aid of
legislation even if the questions are related to the pending case. However, it does not preclude the
right to object if an incriminating question is asked.
o They were summoned merely as resource persons, or as witnesses in a legislative inquiry.
Petitioners neither stand as accused in a criminal case nor will they be subjected to any
penalty by reason of their testimonies.
o Court said the intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination.
Respondent cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming evidence of criminal
culpability.
Chavez v. CA – L- 29169, Aug.19, 1968

 In a criminal case, the accused cannot be compelled to take the witness stand to testify against his
own will even by the judge.
People v. Gamboa - 194 SCRA 372 (paraffin test)

People v. Canceran - 229 SCRA 581 (paraffin test)
People v. Tranca - 235 SCRA 455 (x-ray, not a violation)
Almonte v. Vasquez – 244 SCRA 286
People v. Go – 237 SCRA 73
Regala v. Sandiganbayan – 262 SCRA 122
People v. Malimit – 264 SCRA 167
Galman v. Pamaran – (supra, Custodial Investigation)
People v. Banihit, GR 132045, August 25, 2000 (relate to Tan Teng)
People v. Besonia, 422 SCRA 210
Sabio v. Gordon 504 SCRA 704
Benares v. Lim 511 SCRA 100
People v. Fielded – 737 SCRA 455
SECTION 18. (POLITICAL BELIEFS; INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDES)
141
SECTION 19.
Cruel, Degrading or Inhuman Punishment; Excessive Fines
*People v. Estoista - 93 PHIL. 647 (recommended executive clemency)

 Doctrine: The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of
exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are like small
fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are advised
to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty.
o Facts: Estoista convicted of illegal possession of firearms. Says na penalty of 5-10 years
is cruel and unusual.
o Without deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution against infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment applies both to the form of the penalty and the duration of
imprisonment, it is our opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years for possessing of
carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to the prevalent conditions
which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The rampant lawlessness against property,
person, and even the very security of the Government, directly traceable in large measure
to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in
normal circumstances might appear excessive.
*People v. Echegaray – 267 SCRA 682 (death penalty)

 Doctrine: Sec. 19 provides that for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress may
re-impose death penalty.
o R.A. No. 7659 (Death Penalty Law) is constitutional. Death penalty is imposed in heinous
crimes because the perpetrators have so deeply dehumanized a person or criminal acts
with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from abject
poverty through organized governmental strategies, and because they have so caused
irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society, and a repetition of
their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of
government. They must be prevented from doing so.
*Corpuz v. People – 724 SCRA 1

 While submitting that the penalties for crimes of property, as they stand today, are excessive, the
SC cannot impose a different penalty than that stated in the RPC. However, this Court cannot
modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation.
o The primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not
usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of
interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a
construction which is repugnant to its terms.
 The fact that the punishment is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. To come under the
ban, the punishment must be “flagrantly and plainly oppressive”, “wholly disproportionate to the
nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community”. Cruel as it may be, it is for
Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our modern time.
o Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in
respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has
regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the
pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and
imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.
 Moreover, one must attack the penalty as cruel and unusual in the constitutionality question and
not collaterally.
People v. Dapitan - 197 SCRA 378

Baylosis v. Chavez - 202 SCRA 405 (modified by Robin Padilla)
People v. Munoz - 170 SCRA 107
142
People v. Amigo - 252 SCRA 43
People v. Tongko – 290 SCRA 595
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice – 12 LR 32 N’98
Padilla v. CA – (supra, Right to Bail)
People v. Alicante, GR 127026-27, May 31, 2000
Lim v. People, GR 149276, Sept. 27, 2002
People v. Gabiana, GR 123543, August 23, 2000
People v. Horio, GR 137842, August 23, 2001
Pagdayawon v. Sec. of Justice, GR154569, Sept. 23, 2002
Perez v. People, 544 SCRA 532
Disini v. Secretary of Justice, GR 203335, Feb. 18, 2014 (supra.)
SECTION 20.
Imprisonment for Debt
*Lozano v. Martinez - 146 SCRA 323 (check)

 The Constitution provides that a person may not be imprisoned for non-payment of a
contractual debt. Here what is being punished is “[a]ny practice tending to destroy confidence in
checks as currency substitutes can be deterred to prevent havoc in trade and banking
community.”
o It is certainly, it is within the authority of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts
deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts
that the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong,
hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can
be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The State can do this in the
exercise of its police power. In fine, PD 115 is a valid exercise of police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional provision of non-imprisonment for non-payment of debt.”
o B.P. 22 was designed to prevent the deleterious effect on the public interest through the
making worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act as
an offense against public interest and not an offense against property. Or non-
payment of debt.
Tiomico v. CA – GR 122539 March 4, 1999 (trust receipt)

 Court upheld the validity of the Trust Receipts Law and consistently declared that it does not
violate the constitutional proscription against imprisonment for non-payment of debts.
o PD 115 is a declaration by the legislative authority that, as a matter of public policy, the
failure of a person to turn over the proceeds of the sale of goods covered by a trust receipt
or to return said goods if not sold is a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of
penal sanctions.
Caram Resources v. Contreras - 237 SCRA 724 (check).

Recuerdo v. People, GR 133036, Jan. 22, 2003 (check)
143
SECTION 21.
Dismissal at Preliminary Investigation; No Jeopardy
Attachment of jeopardy
*People v. Ylagan - 58 PHIL. 851

 Requisites for the attachment of legal Jeopardy.
o (1) In a court of competent jurisdiction;
o (2) upon a valid complaint or information;
o (3) after he has been arraigned; and
o (4) after he has pleaded to the information.
 Requisites for double Jeopardy to Attach.
o 1. A first jeopardy must have validly attached prior to the second
o 2. The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated
o 3. The second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information or is an attempt to
commit the offense or a frustration thereof [Identity of Offense]
 The phrase "without the consent of the accused" used in the Code of Criminal Procedure does not
mean "over the objection of the accused" or "against the will of the accused". The sound rule is,
that the mere silence of the defendant or his failure to object to the dismissal of the case
does not constitute a consent within the meaning of said section.
o The right not to be put in jeopardy a second time for the same offense is as important as
the other constitutional rights of the accused in a criminal case. Its waiver cannot, and
should not, be predicated on mere silence.
 Facts: A complaint for physical injuries was filed against Ylagan. This however was dismissed
upon plea of “not guilty” and she and his attorney said nothing about the dismissal. 11 days later,
the fiscal filed another information charging Ylagan with the same offense.
o Ruling: The Court held that Ylagan has already been once in legal jeopardy for the
offense for which she is now being prosecuted. Silence does not constitute consent.
People v. Balisacan - L-26376

Cinco v. Sandiganbayan - 202 SCRA 726
People v, Vergara - 221 SCRA 560
Galvez v. CA - 237 SCRA 685
Cunanan v. Arceo - 242 SCRA 88
People v. Tampal - 244 SCRA 202
People v. Montesa - 248 SCRA 641
De La Rosa v. CA – 253 SCRA 499
People v. Leviste - 255 SCRA 238
People v. Cawaling – 293 SCRA 267
Cudia v. CA – 284 SCRA 173
Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 123045, November 16, 1999
Dimatulac v. Villon – GR 127107 October 12, 1999
People v. Maquiling – GR 128986 June 21, 1999
People v. Nitafan – GR 707964-66 February 1, 1999
Binay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 120681, October 1, 1999
Limpangog v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134229, November 26, 1999
Flores v. Joven, GR 129874, Dec. 27, 2002
Miranda v. Tuliao 486 SCRA 377
Cabo v. Sandiganbayan 491 SCRA 264
Romualdez v. Marcelo 497 SCRA 89
People v. Terrado, 558 SCRA 84 (acquittal not reviewable)
144
Braza v. SAndiganbayan, GR 195032, Feb 20, 2013 (valid plea and objected to any further conduct of
reinvestigation) (supra Art III, Sec 14)
Digital v. Cantos – 710 SCRA 514
Quiambao v. People – 735 SCRA 345
People v. De Leon – 754 SCRA 147
Saldarriaga v. Panganiban – 755 SCRA 627
Asistio v. People – 756 SCRA 256
Termination of Jeopardy; Existence; Non-Termination
*Bulaong v. People - 17 SCRA 746

 Doctrines: Under Section 9, Rule 113 (now Section 9, Rule 117) of the Rules of Court, the
defense of double jeopardy is available to the accused only where he was either convicted or
acquitted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent.
o It is the conviction, acquittal of the accused or dismissal or termination of the case that
bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. In the case at bar
the accused has not been convicted or acquitted in another case filed against him.
 Here, neither has that case been dismissed or terminated without his consent for it is still
pending. Hence, the defense of double jeopardy is not available to him.
o Facts: Petitioner was charged of subversion and rebellion in two different courts. While
the subversion case is pending, petitioner was found guilty of rebellion in the RTC and
the CA and it is now being brought in the SC. The petitioner alleges that he cannot be
convicted of rebellion since he is being charged of subversion in the RTC and that
rebellion is a lesser form of subversion thus jeopardy has attached.
o Ruling: Jeopardy has not yet attached. For the accused has not been convicted or
acquitted in the case filed in the Court of First Instance against him for subversion.
Bustamante v. Maceren - 48 SCRA 155

People v. Obsania - L-24447
Rivera, Jr. v, People - 189 SCRA 331
Dizon-Pamintuan v. People - 234 SCRA 63
COMELEC v. CA - 229 SCRA 501
People v. Bans - 239 SCRA 48
State Prosecutors v. Muro - 236 SCRA 505
People v. Bellaflor - 233 SCRA 196
Guerrero v. CA - 257 SCRA 703
Teodoro v. CA - 258 SCRA 603
Cuidia v. CA – 284 SCRA 173
People v. Araneta, GR 125894 December 11, 1998, 95 OG 4556
Cuison v. CA – 289 SCRA 159
People v. CA, GR 128986 June 21, 1999
People v. Serrano, G.R. No. 135451, September 30, 1999
Barangan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123307, November 29, 1999
People v. Velasco, GR 127444, September 13, 2000
Tupaz v. ULEP, G.R. No. 127777, October 1, 1999
People v. Verra, GR 134732
Merciales v. CA, 379 SCRA 345
Poso v. Mijares, AM No. RTJ-02-1693, Aug. 21, 2002
People v. Alberto, GR 132374, Aug. 22, 2002
Condrada v. People, GR 141646, Feb. 28, 2003
People v. Romero, GR144156, March 20, 2003
People v. Espinosa, GR 153714, Aug. 15, 2003
Oriente v. People – 513 SCRA 348
145
Pacoy v. Cajigal – 534 SCRA 338
Summerville v. Eugenio – 529 SCRA 274
Herrera v. Sandiganbayan – 579 SCRA 32
Javier v. Sandiganbayan – 599 SCRA 324
Co v. Lim – 604 SCRA 702
Lejano v. People – 639 SCRA 760
Bangayon v. Bangayon, GR 172777, October 19, 2011
Goodland v. Co, GR 196685, December 18, 2011
Rule on “Supervening Facts”
*Melo v. People - 85 PHIL. 766

 Doctrine 1: Rule of Identity of Offense -- One who has been charged with an offense cannot be
again charged with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the
former.
o Ratio: "As the Government cannot begin with the highest, and then go down step by step,
bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein, neither can it begin
with the lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the same result."
 Doctrine 2: Rule on Supervening Event -- The rule of identity does not apply, however, when
the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason
that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.
o Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the
injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him
twice in jeopardy [Diaz v. U.S.]
 A charge of homicide made after death of the person assaulted is not the same as
a charge of the assault before the death of that person. One cannot be put in
jeopardy for the offense of homicide prior to the death of the person upon whom
the crime is committed.
 Here, a charge of frustrated homicide was amended to consummated homicide since the victim
died after arraignment. The petitioner allege that jeopardy has attached. Jeopardy did not attach
as evidence of death was only available after arraignment. The accused cannot be prosecuted for
consummated homicide if the victim is still alive.
*People v. Buling - 107 PHIL. 712

 Doctrine: Supervening fact deals with the non-existence of facts during the filing of the first
information. Otherwise stated, it deals with facts not present during the filing of the first
information such as a case of homicide cannot be filed where the victim is not yet dead.
However, when facts can be ascertained prior to the filing of the first complaint, the
doctrine of supervening facts do not apply.
o Facts: Respondent was charged and convicted of less serious physical injuries, however
the offended party’s wounds did not heal in 15-20 days. When the doctor examined the
hand again this time with an x-ray it was found he will be incapacitated for 1 ½ months to
2 ½ months. Respondent is not charged again with Serious Physical Injuries.
o Ruling: Here, the injury of the victim was already present during the first examination.
Failure to find out about it can be attributed to the incompetence of the physician (did not
use an X-ray in the first exam). Thus, the wound causing the delay in healing was
already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was caused by the
very superficial examination then made. Therefore, the general of double jeopardy
applies.
146
Same Offenses
*People v. Tiozon - 198 SCRA 368

 It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same
offense or identical offenses
o A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of
law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other
does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not
bar prosecution under the other.
o Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two
crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the
other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the other.”
 Thus, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate
prosecution for violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 (illegal possession of firearms) and violation
of either Article 248 (murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code; Rule against
double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
o The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against
double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law
while the second, homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code.
o In addition, the first offense is a violation of public peace and order while the other a
violation against a person.
Lamera v. CA - 198 SCRA 186

Gonzales v. CA - 232 SCRA 667
People v. Turda - 233 SCRA 702
People v. Manungas - 231 SCRA 1
People v. Deunida - 231 SCRA 520
People v. Fernandez - 239 SCRA 174
People v. Quijada – 259 SCRA 191
People v. Ballabare – 264 SCRA 350
People v. Calonzo – 262 SCRA 534
People v. Benemerito – 264 SCRA 677
People v. Tobias – 266 SCRA 229
People v. Manoyco – 269 SCRA 513
People v. Tan Tiong Meng – 271 SCRA 125
People v. Sadiosa – 290 SCRA 92
People v. Sanchez – 291 SCRA 333
People v. Saley – 291 SCRA 715
People v. Juego – GR 123162 October 13, 1998
People v. Ganadin – GR 129441 November 27, 1998
People v. Balasa – GR 106357 September 3, 1998
Paluay v. CA – 293 SCRA 358
People v. Mercado 304 SCRA 504
People v. Yabut, G.R. No. 115719, October 5, 1999
People v. Ong, 322 SCRA 38
People v. Meris, GR 117145-50, March 28, 2000
People v. Logan, G.R. No. 135030-33, July 20, 2001.
Potot v. People, GR 143547, June 26, 2002
People v. CA, 423 SCRA 605
Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan 499 SCRA 375
People v. Comila – 517 SCRA 153
Diaz v. Davao – 520 SCRA 481
Merencillo v. People – 521 SCRA 31
Lapasaran v. People – 578 SCRA 658
Ivler v. Modesto – 635 SCRA 191
147
People v. Ocden – 650 SCRA 124
People v. Lalli, GR 195419, October 12, 2011 (trafficking in person)
Alberto v. CA – 699 SCRA 104
Disini v. Secretary of Justice, GR 203335, Feb 18, 2014 (supra)
No Appeal from Acquittal; Instances of Void Acquittal; Review by Petition for Certiorari
Almuete v. People – 693 SCRA 167

 There was grave abuse of discretion when the CA acquitted Almuete. Acquittal through petition
for Certiorari is not allowed because the authority to review perceived error of the trial court in the
exercise of its judgment and discretion is correctible only by appeal by writ of error. The petition
for Certiorari was the wrong remedy availed of. It should have been an appeal.
 As the respondents have claimed, the petitioner’s right to appeal has already prescribed because
it should have been filed within 15 days from the time they received the copy of the Decision.
People v. Dumlao – 580 SCRA 409 (void acquittal)

 A purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives the State of a fair opportunity to
prosecute and convict since it denies the prosecution a day in court—it is void and cannot be the
basis of double jeopardy.
o The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence, while the ground
invoked by the respondent was that the facts charged did not constitute an offense. The
dismissal was clearly premature, because any dismissal based on insufficiency of
evidence may only be made after the prosecution rests its case and not at any time
before then.
 The exception to the double jeopardy rule attaches only when the trial court commits grave abuse
of discretion due to a violation of due process, i.e., that the prosecution was denied the
opportunity to present its case or that the trial court was a sham—if there is no denial of due
process, there can be no grave abuse of discretion that would merit the application of the
exception to the double jeopardy rule.
Mupas v. People, GR 189365, October 12, 2011 (void order on demurrer)

 As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal.
There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant thereof would not violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.
o It is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts granting an
accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does
not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by
an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the
accused against double jeopardy is not violated.
Villareal v. Aliga, GR 166995, January 13, 2014

 In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be
appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State to the Court of Appeals or before
the Supreme Court.
People v. Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 74

Yuchengco v. CA, 376 SCRA 531
San Vicente v. People, GR132081, Nov. 26, 2002
People v. CA, GR 132396, Sept. 23, 2002
People v. Sandiganbayan 491 SCRA 185
People v. Laguio – 518 SCRA 393
Tiu v. CA – 586 SCRA 118
People v. De Grano – 588 SCRA 550
148
People v. Nazareno – 595 SCRA 438
People v. Duca – 603 SCRA 159 (void acquittal)
People v. Go - &32 SCRA 216
People v. CA – GR 183652
Parties
Metrobank v. Meridiano, G.R. No. 118251, June 29, 2001
Ordinance and Statute
*People v. Relova - 148 SCRA 292

 Doctrine: Double Jeopardy Rule does not apply when it deals with different offenses (under
different laws [RPC and Special Penal Laws] or provisions under the RPC [crime against person
vs crime against chastity]) even if based on the same act or set of acts. However, double
jeopardy exists when there is an offense under a national statute and an ordinance, provided that
both offenses spring form the same act or set of acts.
 Where an offense is punished by different sections of a statute or different statutes, the inquiry,
for purposes of double jeopardy, is on identity of offenses charged. In contrast, where an offense
is penalized by an ordinance and a statute, the inquiry is on the identity of acts.
o The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second
prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior
prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same
act or set of acts.
o The second sentence of Article III Section 21 embodies an exception to the general
proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although
the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged
subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that
both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts.
Applied to Impeachment
Estrada v. Desierto, GR 146710-15 and GR 146738, March 2, 2001and MR-GR 146710-15 and 146738,
April 3, 2001
People v. Logan, G.R. No. 135030-33, July 20, 2001.
SECTION 22.
Ex Post Facto Laws and Bills of Attainder
*People v. Ferrer - 48 SCRA 382 (subversion act)

 Doctrine: a bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial.
o First, the bill of attainder MUST NOT apply to either named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them
without a judicial trial.
 A bill of attainder applies when it focuses on individuals or groups (CPPs) rather
than certain acts such as entities overthrowing the government. To not be
covered by the bill of attainder, it must focus on a specific act rather than a
specific set of individuals.
o Second, it is also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This
requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of
guilt.
 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial. Its essence is
the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against
bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining
legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.
149
o Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without
a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder.
o But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be
certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial
hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination.
 A statute prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from
serving as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative
finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit
acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill
of attainder.
 Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a
membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who
becomes a member of such society which fails to register or remains a member
thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to
the members of the Ku Klux Klan.
o Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within
the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply
retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of
attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt.
*Virata v. Sandiganbayan - 202 SCRA 680 (PCGG charter)

 It is not a bill of attainder because such is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
without judicial trial. The PCGG charter makes it clear that any judgment of guilt in the
amassing of ill-gotten wealth is to be handed by a judicial tribunal which is Sandiganbayan,
upon complaint filed and prosecuted by the PCGG.. At the same time, the Court ruled that “no
punishment inflicted by the executive orders, as the merest glance at their provisions will
immediately make apparent.” The E.O. providing for the creation of the PCGG provides for no
infliction of punishment.
o The PCGG merely investigates and files a complaint with the Sandiganbayan. The PCGG
is not allowed to adjudicate but merely fact find for acts and evidence which may be used
to convict one under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act [August 17, 1960]. It will still
be submitted to the Sandiganbayan for adjudication.
 It is not an ex post facto law as nothing in the charter would suggest that PCGG could alter legal
rules of evidence or quantum of proof required for any judgment. It is still preponderance of
evidence in civil cases, and guilt beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases.
*Lacson v. Executive Secretary, GR 128096 January 20, 1999 (jurisdiction of SB)

 Facts: Petitioner Lacson is implicated in the murder of 11 members of the Kuratong Baleleng
Gang. Based on the charges against Lacson, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
However, while the case in ongoing, Congress enacted RA 8249 which expanded the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, in pursuant to this, SB took jurisdiction again of Lacson’s case. Lacson
claims that it is ex post facto law as the crime when it was committed is with the RTC and not the
Sandiganbayan. Now it is being brought back to the SB.
 Ruling: The creation and implementation of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is not a ex post
facto law.
 Since An ex post facto law is one —
o (a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or
o (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or
o (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed.
o (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony that
the law required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to convict the
defendant.
o (e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation
150
of a person to his disadvantage.
o (f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
o (g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.
 Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is
a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or those that
define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A 7975, as regards the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared
by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute. Not being a penal law, the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Trinidad v. CA - 202 SCRA 106

People v. Taguba - 229 SCRA 188
People v. Sandiganbayan – 211 SCRA 241
Co v. CA – 227 SCRA 444
Rosales v. CA - 255 SCRA 123
Subido v. Sandiganbayan – 266 SCRA 379
Sesbreno v. CBAA – 270 SCRA 360
People v. Burton – 268 SCRA 531
People v. Nitafan, GR 107964-66 February 1, 1999
Fajardo v. CA, GR 128508 February 1, 1999
People v. Valdez, GR 127663 March 11, 1999
People v. Ringor, G.R. No. 123918, December 9, 1999
People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 128888, December 3, 1999
Republic v. Desierto, GR 136506, Aug. 23, 2001
People v. Torres - 501 SCRA 591
Salvador v. Mapa - 539 SCRA 34 [2008]
Republic v. Eugenio - 545 SCRA 384
Valeroso v. People - 546 SCRA 450
Presidential v. Desierto - 548 SCRA 295
Senior Citizen Party- List v. COMELEC, GR 206844-45, July 23, 2013 (resolution v. penal laws) (supra Art
3, Sec 1)
Disini v. Secretary of Justice, GR 203335, Feb. 18, 2014 (supra)
151
ARTICLE IV - CITIZENSHIP
SECTION 1.
Valles v. COMELEC, GR 137000, August 9, 2000

 As a general rule, res judicata does not apply. However, one must provide for facts which will
warrant the reversal of a ruling. Here, it was not proven.
Ong Chia v. Republic, GR 127240, March 27, 2000

 For naturalization to work, the applicant must abide by the necessary requirements provided by
C.A. 473 or the Revised Naturalization Law.
Children of Filipino fathers or mothers
Gatchalian v. Board of Commissioners – 197 SCRA 853 (no proof to invalidate filiation to Filipino father)
*Tecson v. Comelec, 424 SCRA 277 (FPJ case, illegitimate son of a Filipino father; recognized
paternity)
 Doctrine 1: Rule for an illegitimate child of a foreign mother
o If the father is unknown, follow the mother's citizenship.
o If the father is known and is Filipino, the illegitimate child is considered Filipino after
proving the paternity.
 Doctrine 2: MODES OF ACQUIRING CITIZENSHIP
o Jus Soli - Acquisition of citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
o Jus Sanguinis - Acquisition of citizenship on the basis of blood relationship.
o Naturalization - the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the privilege of a
native-born citizen.
 Doctrine 3: The Constitution provides that only natural-born citizens can run for president. The
term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
 Others: Paternity was successfully proven by FPJ.
o 1. Natural born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire Philippine citizenship.
 Lorenzo Pou (FPJ’s grandfather) is identified as a Filipino as his death certificate
proves
 FPJ’s birth certificate, as public documents thus prima facie proof of their
contents, show that Allan Poe is a Filipino while Bessie Kelly is an American
citizen.
o 2. Proof of filiation or paternity of FPJ was established.
 Sec. 39, Rule 130, Rules of Court: The act or declaration of a person deceased or
unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by
birth or marriage may be received in evidence where it recurred before the
controversy…
 Duly notarized declaration by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, Bessie Kelley’s sister,
before the COMELEC is acceptable to prove the acts of Allan Poe recognizing his
own paternal relationship with FPJ.
o 3. Any conclusion on the citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could be drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, he would have been born in 1870, meaning he
benefitted from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill effected in 1902.
o 4. 1935 Constitution: The following are citizens of the Philippines: xx (3) those whose
father are citizens
Go v. Ramos – 598 SCRA 266

Gonzales v. Rennisi – 614 SCRA 292
Cabiling v. Fernandez – 625 SCRA 566
152
Paragraph (3)
*Co. v. Electoral Tribunal - 199 SCRA 692 (election of citizenship – positive acts)
 Doctrine: How to Elect Philippine Citizenship.
o The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still
have to elect citizenship.
o For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate
choice (positive acts) which cannot be less binding (e.g., exercise of the right of suffrage
and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship)
 The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship.
o In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the
exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court,
we held: Esteban’s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.” The private respondent did more than
merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have
elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
 Any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of private respondent Jose Ong, Jr. would not
only have been superfluous but would also have resulted in absurdity considering that it was the
law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for him.
o An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or
his status is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this
case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21). Not only was his
mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was
only nine (9) years old. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected
citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary.
 We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.
*Republic v. Sagun – 666 SCRA 321 (2012 – respondent was before January 17, 1973)
 The Supreme Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the
Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual.
o One born before January 17, 1973, cannot go to court and have his citizenship declared
to be Filipino.
o There is no specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a
petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts.
 Under the 1973 Constitution, it is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship
of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow
her nationality.
o Being a legitimate child, respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is
Chinese, unless upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship.
However,an illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform any act to confer upon him all
the rights and privileges attached to citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes
a citizen.
 The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other
similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of
Philippine citizenship.
 Based on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1)
a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the
oath with the nearest civil registry.
153
o The records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal
requirements for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn
statement of her election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence
submitted by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of
allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was
unregistered. (Facts: In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun,
she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines).
o Even assuming arguendo that respondents oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was
not within a reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not
registered with the nearest civil registry.
o The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election should
be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by respondent for the delay
and the failure to register with the nearest local civil registry.
Paragraph (4)
*So v. Republic – 513 SCRA 267

 Under current and existing laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a citizen by
naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization pursuant to R.A. No. 9139; (b) judicial
naturalization pursuant to C.A. No. 473, as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization in the form
of a law enacted by Congress bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.
 Currently, there are two modes for an alien to acquire Philippine citizenship. The Court stated that
the legislature merely prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which may
be availed of by native born aliens. It cannot be inferred that C.A. No. 473 was intended to be
amended or repealed by R.A. No. 9139.
 C.A. No. 473, which is a judicial proceeding, covers all aliens regardless of class; while
R.A. 9139, which is an administrative proceeding, covers ONLY a native born alien.
Theoretically, R.A. No. 9139 implies that a native born alien has the choice to apply for judicial
(C.A. No. 473) or administrative (R.A No. 9139) naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications under both laws.
o If the qualifications prescribed in R.A. No. 9139 would be made applicable even to judicial
naturalization, the coverage of the law would be broadened since it would then apply
even to aliens who are not native born. It must be stressed that R.A. No. 9139 applies
only to aliens who were born in the Philippines and have been residing here.
o One of the qualifications set forth in R.A. No. 9139 is that the applicant was born in the
Philippines and should have been residing herein since birth. Thus, one who was born
here but left the country, though resided for more than ten (10) years from the filing of the
application is also disqualified. On the other hand, if we maintain the distinct qualifications
under each of the two laws, an alien who is not qualified under R.A. No. 9139 may still be
naturalized under C.A. No. 473.
 Character witnesses in naturalization proceedings stand as insurers of the applicant’s conduct
and character—they ought to testify on specific facts and events JUSTIFYING the inference
that the applicant possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by
law. The character witness must enumerate the specific facts and not merely state that the
applicant is of good moral character.
o SC: The witnesses’ testimonies consisted mainly of general statements in answer to the
leading questions propounded by his counsel. The Court finds that the witnesses only
conveniently enumerated the qualifications as set forth in the law without giving specific
details. The Court stated that it was not convinced that they personally know petitioner
well and are therefore in a position to vouch for his qualifications.
 In naturalization proceedings, it is the burden of the applicant to prove not only his own good
moral character but also the good moral character of his or her witnesses, who must be credible
persons.
o Within the purview of the naturalization law, a “credible person” is not only an individual
who has not been previously convicted of a crime; who is not a police character and has
154
no police record; who has not perjured in the past; or whose affidavit or testimony is not
incredible—what must be credible is not the declaration made but the person making it.
o This implies that such person 1) must have a good standing in the community; 2) known
to be honest and upright; 3) reputed to be trustworthy and reliable; and 4) his word may
be taken on its face value, as a good warranty of the applicant’s worthiness. The Court
stated that the records do not show that the character witnesses of petitioner met the
requisites as stated.
 A naturalization proceeding is not a judicial adversary proceeding, and the decision
rendered therein does not constitute res judicata—a certificate of naturalization may be
cancelled if it is subsequently discovered that the applicant obtained it by misleading the court
upon any material fact.
Loss of citizenship
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago - 169 SCRA 364 (expressed renunciation from external acts)

 All his acts, if taken together, constitute an express renunciation of his Filipino citizenship. The
Court found that such acts are grossly inconsistent with the maintenance of petitioner’s Philippine
citizenship. Express renunciation means renunciation made known distinctly and explicitly, and not
that which is implied.
 He reacquired his Portuguese citizenship by performing all acts he did after naturalization which
effectively renounced his Filipino citizenship. It is because after his naturalization on 1978, he
reapplied for a Portuguese passport and declared in many business documents that he is
Portuguese.
Frivaldo v. COMELEC - 174 SCRA 245
Frivaldo v. COMELEC – 257 SCRA 727 (application for repatriation retroacts to the day of application)
Labo, Jr, v. COMELEC - 176 SCRA 1

Labo, Jr, v. COMELEC – 211 SCRA 297 (three modes of acquiring citizenship)
Aznar v. Osmena - 185 SCRA 703
Tabaso v. CA 500 SCRA 9
Mercado v. Manzano – GR 135083 May 26, 1999 (dual-citizenship)

 Facts: Edu acquired US citizenship by operation of US Constitution as he was born there (jus
soli). He is a natural born citizen by operation of the 1935 Constitution as his parents were
Filipinos at the time of his birth. He did not renounce his Philippine citizenship and did not take an
oath of allegiance to the US.
 Ruling: He is qualified to be the Vice Mayor based on citizenship.
o Dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification but it is different from dual allegiance. By
filing for a COC, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect,
renounced his American citizenship. For candidates with dual citizenship, it would
suffice if they elect Phil. citizenship upon filing their COC to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship.
 NOTE: Distinguish this case from the application of R.A. 9225. Retain Filipino citizenship upon
taking of oath. Here, Edu Manzano was already both without doing anything.
*Maquiling v. COMELEC, GR 195649, April 16, 2013 (renouncing citizenship)

 Facts: Respondent Rommel Arando is a natural born Filipino citizen but was naturalized as a
citizen of the Unites States. Respondent then applied for repatriation under R.A. 9225 before
the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco, USA at July 10, 2008.
 Ruling:
o It is of no question that Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to run for a public
office. He took the (1) Oath of allegiance and (2) Renounced his foreign citizenship and
that by doing these acts respondent performed the requirement needed for his to become
155
eligible to run under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 of the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003; His renunciation made him solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country.
o However, the respondent performs positive acts showing continued possession of
a foreign citizenship. Between April 3, 2009 (date of renunciation) and November 3,
2009 (date he filed his CoC), he used his foreign passport four times that run
counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier executed. His using of his foreign
passport positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American to the immigration
authorities.
o The COMELEC en banc is correct in ruling that such act of using a foreign
passport does not divest Arando of his Filipino citizenship but reverted him back
to his dual citizenship status.
 By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, Arnado was a dual citizen and
was qualified to vote but not qualified to run under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code.
 Ratio: A dual citizen can vote during the election (Art. V of
Constitution), but cannot be voted for (Section 40 (d) of LGC).
 Being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This leaves the
qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession
under the Local Government Code will not apply.
o Rules on succession states if there is permanent vacancy in the position of governor or
mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor succeeds. However, in this case, Maquiling is
deemed to not been a candidate. Thus, the second place is the real winner.
No collateral attack
Vilando v. HRET – 656 SCRA 17
SECTION 2
Cordero v. COMELEC – 580 SCRA 12
*Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001 (natural-born citizenship reacquired after
repatriation if natural-born from the beginning)
 DOCTRINE: Cruz was reverted to his “natural-born citizen status” upon repatriation. Repatriation
results in the recovery of the original nationality.  
o Repatriation caused Cruz to reacquire his natural-born citizenship. Repatriation may be
had when a person rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any
other time. It may consist by taking an oath of allegiance to the RP and registering said
oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last
resided. The court held that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his
original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
o NOTE: Repatriation and naturalization has different effect under C.A. 63. If one is
repatriation one “reverts” to his original status. However, naturalization, one becomes a
natural-born citizen.
o NOTE 2: Naturalization as a mode of re-acquisition of citizenship is no longer applicable
with the advent of R.A. 9225 as current rule is that the Filipino retains natural born status.
He or she will not need to go through naturalization. If prior to R.A. 9225, then effect is
naturalization.
 There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth and (2) by naturalization; A person who
at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
o A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born
citizen thereof.
o On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as
156
the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No.
2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.
 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a
Filipino citizen.
 Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner
provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
o Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural born Filipino.
 Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
o A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of
naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino; As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in
order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.
 Notes (not in the case):
o As what the Supreme Court held in the case of Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC: “Philippine
citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It
may be restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to
the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive
loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.”
o Moreover, RA 9225 provides that natural born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country, are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
o Also, natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become
citizens of a foreign country, shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking of the
aforesaid oath.
*David v. Agbay, GR 199113, March 18, 2015

 Doctrine 1: The rule that a favorable interpretation in favor of petitioner applies to a penal statute
and not to R.A. 9225 which is not a criminal statute.
 Doctrine 2: When petitioner re-acquired Filipino citizenship under R.A. 9225, the falsification was
already a consummated act and the law did not have a retroactive effect insofar as his dual
citizenship status is concerned.
 Doctrine 3: Basically, the distinction is to the effect that re-acquisition under C.A. 63 is to
the effect of naturalization and is not a natural born Filipino. However, this is different from
those who lose Filipino Citizenship after R.A. 9225 came into force. The effect is that one retains
his natural-born status. No need to apply for naturalization to “re-acquire” Filipino citizenship. Ipso
facto a nature born Filipino.
 In the case of those who became foreign citizens after Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 took effect
[August 29, 2003], they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign
citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.
o Section 3 of R.A. 9225 makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who
became foreign citizens before and after the effectivity of R.A. 9225. The first paragraph
of Section 3 refers to re-acquisition while the second paragraph covers retention of
citizenship.
o In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have
reacquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63 (before the
effectivity of RA 9225), under which naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways
by which Philippine citizenship may be lost.
157
 Note: Under C.A. 63, the three ways to re-acquire citizenship are (1) By
naturalization; (2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp:
Provided, That a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an
alien may be repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the
termination of the marital status; and (3) By direct act of the National Assembly.
 Basically, the distinction is to the effect that re-acquisition under C.A. 63 is
to the effect of naturalization and is not a natural born Filipino. However,
this is different from those who lose Filipino Citizenship after R.A. 9225 came into
force.
o As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the old
law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become
naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship, and also provides for
the procedure for re-acquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case of those
who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine
citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of
allegiance under the new law.
 Petitioner belongs to the first category wherein retroactivity of natural-born Filipino citizenship
cannot be applied. Besides, even assuming that the principle applies, it will not work for
petitioner’s cause because he had not alleged that he applied for reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship before he made the declaration in the public land application that he
is a Filipino.
*Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, GR 221697, March 8, 2016

1. STATISTICAL PROBABILITY - 99.83% statistical probability that a child born in PH is natural
born Filipino during the year that Grace Poe was born (citing Herrera vs. COMELEC and
Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC).
 As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would
exclude foundlings either. The Rafols amendment intended to include “children of unknown
parentage” in the 1935 Constitution as natural-born citizens was not carried simply because their
number was not significant enough to merit specific mention.
 Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. An
adoptee must be a Filipino.
 The process of acquiring a foundling certificate is done by the State and is not analogous to
naturalization or the election of citizenship.
o Poe did no act to acquire Filipino citizenship as opposed to naturalization where one must
perform certain acts to acquire Filipino citizenship.
 Foundlings are citizens under international law. Under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), “everyone has a right to nationality” (Article 15). Similarly, the UN Convention on
the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), a child has “a right to acquire a nationality” (Article 7, par.1). In
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) “every child has the right to
acquire a nationality” (Article 24, par. 3). Two other international law instruments, while yet
unratified by the
o Philippines, form part of the generally accepted principles of international law, namely: (a)
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of
Nationality laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the “nationality of birth;”
and, (b) Article 2 of the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness which
states that “ a foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents
possessing the nationality of that State. Supported by 99% statistics that Poe-
Llamanzares’ parents are probably Filipino nationals, she should be considered a natural-
born Filipino citizen.
 Bengson III v. HRET explained that repatriation results in the recovery of one’s original nationality.
Thus, the repatriation of Poe-Llamanzares in July 2006 restored her to her natural-born
citizenship.
158
 Poe-Llamanzares’ domicile had been timely changed as of 24 May 2005. She permanently settled
back with her family on this date.
o In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no
other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the
house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company,
notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating
excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S. employment right
after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually
reestablished her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N., enrolling her children in
Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the
Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned
on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
*David v. SET, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016

 The burden of evidence does not shift to Poe-Llamanzares by the mere showing that she is a
foundling. The assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born citizens unless there is
substantial evidence to the contrary.
o David’s reliance on Article 4, Section 1(2) and the need to establish bloodline is
misplaced. Between Article 4, Section 1(2) and Section 2, it is Section 2 that is on point.
o To determine whether Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born citizen, one must look into
whether she had to do anything to perfect her citizenship. In view of Bengson III
ruling, she did not have to go through the naturalization process to become a Filipino.
o The investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefit children, individuals whose
capacity to act is restricted.
 Important NOTE: R.A. 9225 is premised an immutability of natural-born status and proceeds from
an entirely different premise from the restrictive process of naturalization.
 In Tecson, the issue on FPJ’s citizenship was resolved on the basis of presumptions. It is true that
in Paa v. Chan (128 Phil. 815) it was ruled that presumptions cannot be entertained in citizenship
cases. This is no longer true in light of Tecson.
o Besides, the factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different. In Paa, evidence showed that
respondent Quintin Chan was registered as an alien. His father was likewise registered
as an alien. Go v. Ramos (614 Phil 451) cited Paa but revising it to make it appear that
the same pronouncement was generally applicable. Go was decided by a Division unlike
Tecson, which was decided by the court sitting En Banc. Go involved deportation not an
election controversy. In Go, copies of birth certificates unequivocally showed
Chinese citizenship of Go. Article 4, Section 1(2) must be read with Article 2, Sections
11 and 13; Article 15, Section 3; Article 3, Section 1; and, Article 13, Section 1.
 The equal protection clause prohibits differentiation of foundlings from children with known Filipino
parents.
 Interpreting Article IV, Section 2 in relation to Section 1 (2).
o Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2) stipulates that to be a citizen, either
one's father or one's mother must be a Filipino citizen.
o That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features, genetics, pedigree, and ethnicity
are not determinative of citizenship.
o Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens. It does not
even require them to conform to traditional conceptions of what is indigenously or
ethnically Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be ethnically foreign.
o Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree: parentage. The
citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as
petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline.
o Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of Filipino citizenship may be
sustained by evidence adduced in a proper proceeding, which substantially proves that
either or both of one's parents is a Filipino citizen.
159
160
SECTION 4
*Reyes v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013 (admission) (supra Art III, Sec 1)
[Distinguish from Poe-Llamanares]
 Facts: A petition to deny due course or to cancel the COC was filed against Regina Reyes as
Congressman of Marinduque. One of the grounds is that she is an American citizen. COMELEC
granted the petition. On MR, petitioner admitted that she is a holder of an American passport, but
she is only a dual citizen. Petitioner also attached an Affidavit of Renunciation.
 Ruling: When petitioner attached the Affidavit of Renunciation, it is considered as an admission
that RA 9225 applies to her. Twin requirements should have been complied with: 1. OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE AND 2. AFFIDAVIT OF RENUNCIATION. In this case, no oath of allegiance and
hence, Reyes did not validly reacquire Philippine citizenship.
 Other issue: Residency – Even if you stay here in the Philippines for more than 10 years, as long
as one is still an American citizen, did not take both the requirements. One will not in effect regain
his or her domicile. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that she has
not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
SECTION 5
*AASJS-Calilung v. Datumanong, G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007 (dual citizenship v dual allegiance)
 Doctrine: SC also said that it cannot tackle the issue of dual allegiance since Section 5, Article IV
of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not self-executing by express
provision of the Constitution.
o The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. Congress was given a
mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual
allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including
this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
 Doctrine 2: Republic Act No. 9225 just aims to facilitate the reacquisition of Phil. citizenship
by speedy means. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly
renounces his foreign citizenship. However, it does not recognize dual allegiance as it is inimical
to national interest. The deliberations reveal that in enacting the law, Congress has shifted the
burden of the problem of dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country.
o Note: What happens is the Naturalized Filipino renounces his foreign citizenship in favor
of Filipino. The effect, at least with regard to the Philippines, is that the naturalized person
has gotten his Filipino citizenship back by swearing the oath. Under R.A. 9225, he does
not need to renounce his foreign citizenship. As we are concerned, he/she is
Filipino again by taking the oath.
161
ARTICLE V - “SUFFRAGE”
SECTION 1
SECTION 2
Labo, Jr, v. COMELEC – (supra, Citizenship)

Romualdez v. RTC – 226 SCRA 408
*Macalintal v. COMELEC, GR 157013, July 10, 2003 (absentee voting)

 Issue: Does the provision of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act allowing registration of voters who
are immigrants or permanent residents abroad by their mere act of executing an affidavit
expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement (at least 1
year in the Ph and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months).
 Ruling: Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress
enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the
constitutional mandate to provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that
the “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country. The
qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the
Philippines. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not
necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the
Philippines.
 ConCom intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin.
o Pursuant thereto, they provided for Sec. 2 immediately after the residency requirement of
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution. By the doctrine of necessary implication in
statutory construction, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the ConCom
provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to
qualified Filipinos abroad. The ConCom has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who
are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy the
residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
*Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC 497 SCRA 649 (absentee voters/dual citizens need not comply with
residency)
 Doctrine: An overseas absentee voted should not be denied the right of suffrage provided
they meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A.
9189.
o This is the reason Section 2 of Article V was placed immediately after the clause
“who shal have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote, for atleast six months immediately preceding the
election.”
 It is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes absentee
voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency requirement.
o Moreover, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can
exercise their right to vote.
*Kabataan Party-List v. COMELEC, GR 221318, December 15, 2015

 Doctrine: The concept of “qualification” should be distinguished from the concept of
“registration,” insofar as suffrage is concerned. The act of registering is only one step towards
voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter. Registration is a
form of regulation not a qualification. Thus, biometric validation does not constitute as an
additional substantial qualification. It is merely procedural.
 Issue: Whether or not the No-Bio No Boto is unconstitutional for adding another substantive
qualification which is not allowed under the Constitution
162
 Ruling: The State may impose statutory disqualifications, with the restriction that the same do not
amount to a “literacy, property or other substantive requirement.”
o The concept of “qualification” should be distinguished from the concept of
“registration,” insofar as suffrage is concerned. The act of registering is only one
step towards voting, and it is not one of the elements that makes the citizen a
qualified voter. Registration is a form of regulation not a qualification. Registration
is a mere procedural requirement.
o R.A. 8189 governs the registration process. R.A. 10367 built on the policy considerations
behind R.A. 8189 to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a
clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters.
o Biometrics is a quantitative analysis that provides a positive identification of an individual.
Validation is the process of taking the biometrics of registered voters whose biometrics
have not yet been captured.
o The regulation passes the strict scrutiny test. There is a compelling state interest
involved, i.e., to cleanse the national voter registry so as to eliminate electoral fraud. The
regulation is the least restrictive means to achieve this end. There was sufficient
information and time afforded the public to abide by the law.
Special Registration Before General Elections
Akbayan v. COMELEC, GR 147066, March 26, 2001
163
ARTICLE XIII - SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
SECTION 1
Policy to Remove Inequities
*International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, GR 128845, June 1, 2000 (salary

difference between foreign and local hires)
 Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code, for example,
o It prohibits and penalizes the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as
against a male employee for work of equal value.
o Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to
wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
 If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these
employees perform equal work.
o The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform
work equal to that of foreign-hires. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest,
it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more.
The SC ruled that it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
 The State has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.—The
Constitution enjoins the State to “protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,” “to
afford labor full protection.” The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations
between labor and capital.
o These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that
labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common
good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts
will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
o Thus, the wages for foreign employees was strike down by the Court.
o Wages as the term implies is the remuneration for work done. If they are doing the same
work, they should be paid the same amount.
 For the same reason, the “dislocation factor” and the foreign-hires’ limited tenure also cannot
serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure
affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are
not enjoyed by local hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave
travel allowances.
SECTION 3.
Labor
*Eagle Security v. NLRC - 173 SCRA 479 (protection of workers – solidary liability of employers)
 Joint and general liability of the contractor and the principal mandated by the Labor Code.
o This joint and several liability of the contractor and the principal is mandated by the Labor
Code to assure compliance of the provisions therein including the statutory minimum wage
[Article 99, Labor Code].
o The contractor (the security agency) is made liable by virtue of his status as direct
employer. The principal, on the other hand, is made the indirect employer of the
contractor’s employees for purposes of paying the employees their wages should the
contractor be unable to pay them. This joint and several liability facilitates, if not
guarantees, payment of the workers’ performance of any work, task, job or project, thus
giving the workers ample protection as mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
 Application of the provisions of the Labor Code on joint and several liability of the principal and
contractor appropriate.
o In the case at bar, it is beyond dispute that the security guards are the employees of
EAGLE. That they were assigned to guard the premises of PTSI pursuant to the latter’s
164
contract with EAGLE and that neither of these two entities paid their wage and allowance
increases under the subject wage orders are also admitted. Thus, the application of the
aforecited provisions of the Labor Code on joint and several liability of the principal and
contractor is appropriate.
 Solidary liability does not preclude the right of reimbursement from the co-debtor by the one who
paid.
o The solidary liability of PTSI and EAGLE, however, does not preclude the right of
reimbursement from his co-debtor by the one who paid [See Article 1217, Civil Code]. It is
with respect to this right of reimbursement that petitioners can find support in the
aforecited contractual stipulation and Wage Order provision.
Jaguar Security vs Sales 552 SCRA 295 (2008) [from labor notes]
 Under Articles 106, 107 and 109 of the Labor Code, the joint and several liability of the contractor
and the principal is mandated to assure compliance of the provisions therein including the
statutory minimum wage.
o The contractor, petitioner in this case, is made liable by virtue of his status as direct
employer.
o On the other hand, Delta Milling, as principal, is made the indirect employer of the
contractor’s employees for purposes of paying the employees their wages should the
contractor be unable to pay them.
o This joint and several liability facilitates, if not guarantees, payment of the workers’
performance of any work, task, job or project, thus giving the workers ample protection as
mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
 The contractor cannot claim reimbursement from the principal through a cross-claim filed with the
labor court.
o The action is within the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs to the
regular courts.
o While the resolution of the issue involves the application of labor laws, reference to the
labor code was only for the determination of the solidary liability of the petitioner to the
respondent where no employer-employee relation exists.
 The contractor can claim payment of monetary obligations such as payment of
the increase in wages by virtue of a wage order from the principal.
 Payment, which means not only the delivery of money but also the performance,
in any other manner, of the obligation, is the operative fact which will entitle either
of the solidary debtors to seek reimbursement for the share which corresponds to
each of the debtors.
SSS Employees v. CA – (supra, Right to Form Association)

De Vera v. NLRC – 200 SCRA 439
Republic v. CA - 180 SCRA 428
MPSTA v. Laguio (supra, Right to Form Association)
Union v. Nestle – 192 SCRA 396
Jacinto v. CA – 281 SCRA 657
Telefunken Employees Union v. CA, GR 143013-14, December 18, 2000
Lanzaderas v. Amethyst Security, GR 143604, June 20, 2003
Standard Chartered Bank Employees v Confesor, GR 114974, June 16, 2004
Agabon v. NLRC, GR 158693, Nov. 17, 2004
The Province of Camarines Norte v. Gonzales, GR 185740, July 23, 2013(security of tenure)
Abbott Laboratories v. Alcaraz, GR 192571, July 23, 2013(security of tenure)
SME Bank v. De Guzman, GR 184517, October 8, 2013(security of tenure)
GMA v. Pabriga, GR 176419, November 27, 2013 (security of tenure)
Diamond Taxi v. Llamas, Gr 190724, March 12, 2014 (security of tenure)
165
SECTION 4.
Agrarian Reform
Assn. of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform - 175 SCRA 343 (retention limits, judicial review of
just compensation; revolutionary expropriation)
Tanaka v. Japan - 7 Minshui 1523
Luz Farms v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform – 192 SCRA 5 (agriculture does not include poultry and livestock)
Natalia v. DAR – 225 SCRA 278
Phil. Veterans Bank v. CA, GR 132767, January 18, 2000
Daez v. CA, GR 133507, February 17, 2000
Bautista v. Araneta, GR 135829, February 22, 2000
Corpus v. Grospe, GR 135297, June 8, 2000
Heirs of Santos v. CA, GR 109992, March 7, 2000
Padunan v. DARAB, GR 132163, Jan. 28, 2003
Heirs of Sandueta v. Robles, GR 203204, November 20, 2013 (Congress limitations)
*Hacienda Luisita v. PARC – GR No. 171101, July 5, 2011; November 22, 2011; April 24, 2012.
 (1) Does the PARC possess jurisdiction to recall or revoke HLI’s SDP?
o (1) YES, the PARC has jurisdiction to revoke HLI’s SDP under the doctrine of necessary
implication. Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that the
conferment of express power to approve a plan for stock distribution of the agricultural
land of corporate owners necessarily includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of
the plan.
o To deny PARC such revocatory power would reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP,
because the very same agency tasked to ensure compliance by the corporate landowner
with the approved SDP would be without authority to impose sanctions for non-compliance
with it.
 (2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock transfer in lieu of outright land transfer,
unconstitutional?
o (2) NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is not unconstitutional. [The Court actually refused to
pass upon the constitutional question because it was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and because the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case.
Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one
of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700.]
 It took FARM some eighteen (18) years from November 21, 1989 before it
challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late in the
day.
 The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally taken by
AMBALA (to which the FARM members previously belonged) and the Supervisory
Group, is the alleged non-compliance by HLI with the conditions of the SDP to
support a plea for its revocation. And before the Court, the lis mota is whether or
not PARC acted in grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP
for such non-compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented,
offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any of these
key issues may be resolved without plunging into the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of
RA 6657. Moreover, looking deeply into the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et
al., it is not the said section per se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged
application of the said provision in the SDP that is flawed.
o R.A. No. 6657, Section 31 is constitutional and does not violate Article 13, Section 4.
Besides, R.A. No. 6657, Section 31 vis-a-vis stock distribution has now been amended by
R.A. No. 9700, Section 5 which provides: “That after June 30, 2009, the modes of
acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and compulsory acquisition.”
 With the view We take of this case, the stock distribution option devised under
Sec. 31 of RA 6657 hews with the agrarian reform policy, as instrument of social
justice under Sec. 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution. Albeit land ownership for the
166
landless appears to be the dominant theme of that policy, We emphasize that
Sec. 4, Article XIII of the Constitution, as couched, does not constrict
Congress to passing an agrarian reform law planted on direct land transfer
to and ownership by farmers and no other, or else the enactment suffers
from the vice of unconstitutionality. If the intention were otherwise, the
framers of the Constitution would have worded said section in a manner
mandatory in character.
 (3) There is no impingement of the impairment clause. A law authorizing interference in
contractual relations is deemed read into the contract. The SDOA is a special contract imbued with
public interest. The rights, obligations and remedies of the parties to the SDOA are governed by
R.A. No. 6657, a special law. The present impasse between HLIand private respondents is not an
intra-corporate dispute.
 (4) Should those portions of the converted land within Hacienda Luisita that RCBC and LIPCO
acquired by purchase be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution?
o [T]here are two (2) requirements before one may be considered a purchaser in good faith,
namely: (1) that the purchaser buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in such property; and (2) that the purchaser pays a full and
fair price for the property at the time of such purchase or before he or she has notice of
the claim of another.
o In this factual setting, RCBC and LIPCO purchased the lots in question on their honest
and well-founded belief that the previous registered owners could legally sell and convey
the lots though these were previously subject of CARP coverage.
 (5) other notes
o Article 13, Section 4 has not been violated insofar as it provides farmers who are landless
to own directly or collectively the lands they till.
o 6,296 qualified farmer-beneficiaries have the right to choose whether to remain as HLI
stockholders or not, pursuant to the 2010 Compromise Agreement. The reckoning date for
“taking” is November 21, 1989 when PARC app
SECTION 9
Urban land Reform
Dee v. CA, GR 108205, February 15, 2000

Reyes v. NHA, GR 147511, Jan. 20, 2003
SECTION 10.
Urban Land Reform and Housing
*Macasiano v. NHA – 224 SCRA 236

 Questions on Constitutionality of a law cannot be addressed unless they are properly raised and
presented in appropriate cases. The issue of Constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.
The essential requisites are:
o Actual case or controversy involving conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination
o Locus standi or a proper party
o Must be raised at the earliest opportunity
o Resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the resolution of the case
 A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a
result of the acts or measures complained of. The first two requisites are absent. There is no
actual case or controversy. Even if the petition in reality is a petition for declaratory relief, it would
not prosper because actual case or controversy is an essential element for declaratory relief.
 The petitioner is not a proper party because as a consultant of DPWH, he is not vested with any
authority to demolish obstructions and encroachments on properties. He can only organize and
train personnel of DPWH and can only provide advice to the Secretary and other officials
167
regarding where to conduct demolitions and how to develop techniques. Being a taxpayer is not
always accepted since far as a taxpayer's suit is concerned, the Court is not devoid of the
discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained.
Jumawan v. Eviota – 234 SCRA 524

Filstream v. CA – 284 SCRA 716
*People v. Leachon – GR 108725 September 25, 1998 (just and humane manner)
 Presidential Decree No. 772, otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting Law, enjoys the presumption
of constitutionality.
 Under the Constitution, what makes the eviction and demolition of urban or rural poor
dwellers illegal or unlawful is when the same are not done in accordance with law and in a
just and humane manner.
o Respondent Judge erred in predicating the validity or legality of eviction on the existence
of a resettlement plan and area.
o What is meant by “in accordance with law” and “just and humane manner” is that the
person to be evicted be accorded due process or an opportunity to controvert the
allegation that his or her occupation or possession of the property involved is unlawful or
against the will of the landowner; that should the illegal or unlawful occupation be proven,
the occupant be sufficiently notified before actual eviction or demolition is done; and that
there be no loss of lives, physical injuries or unnecessary loss of or damage to properties.
Section 17 (4)
Budget
*CHR Employees v. CHR 496 SCRA 226 (fiscal autonomy)

 The creation of the Commission on Human Rights may be constitutionally mandated, but it is not,
in the strict sense, a constitutional commission.
o Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, plainly entitled “Constitutional Commissions,” identifies
only the Civil Service Commission; The Commission on Elections and the Commission
on Audit;
 The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants fiscal autonomy only to the
Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman.
 Article XIII, Section 17(4) on the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) evidently does not contain
the first sentence on the express grant of fiscal autonomy.
 Fiscal Autonomy shall mean independence or freedom regarding financial matters from outside
control and is characterized by self direction or self determination. It does not mean mere
automatic and regular release of approved appropriations to agencies vested with such
power in a very real sense, the fiscal autonomy contemplated in the constitution is enjoyed even
before and, with more reasons, after the release of the appropriations. Fiscal autonomy
encompasses, among others, budget preparation and implementation, flexibility in fund utilization
of approved appropriations, use of savings and disposition of receipts.
o THE CHR is only guaranteed an aspect of fiscal autonomy which is the automatic and
regular release of funds.
 Facts: The GAA of 1998 provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these provisions, the CHR promulgated a
Resolution adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among certain positions in the
Commission. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) rejected the Resolution.
168
SECTION 18.
Powers of the Commission on Human Rights
*Carino v. CHR - 204 SCRA 483 (no adjudicatory power, no contempt)

 Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no jurisdiction on adjudicatory powers
over certain specific type of cases like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political
rights.
o The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
 The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all
forms of human rights violations invoking civil and political rights.
o Based on the foregoing mandate, It cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine
causes) as courts of justice or even quasi-judicial bodies do.
EPZA V. CHR, et. al. – 208 SCRA 125 (no injunctive power)
*Simon v. CHR – 229 SCRA 117 (no injunctive power)

 Doctrine 1: The CHR is constitutionally authorized to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt.
o To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who
refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or
who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work.
 Doctrine 2: The “order to desist” (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance
before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power
that it does not possess.
 Doctrine 3: The constitutional provision directing the CHR to ‘provide for preventive measures
and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection’ may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining
order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said
so.
 The term “civil rights,” has been defined as referring—“(to) those (rights) that belong to every
citizen of the state or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected
with the organization or administration of government. They include the rights of property,
marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil
rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community.
 Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly,
in the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public
office, the right of petition and, in general, the right appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the
management of government.
 The Constitutional Commission delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would
focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations.
o Such areas as the “(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners
and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)
salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious.”
o Thus, demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia does not fall within the
compartment of “human rights violations involving civil and political rights” intended by
the Constitution.
169
ARTICLE XIV - EDUCATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS CULTURE AND SPORTS+
SECTION 1
Natural and Primary Right of Parents
Meyer v. Nebraska - 262 US 390

Pierce v. Society of Sisters - 262 US 510
Wisconsin v. Yoder - 406 US 205
Ginsberg v. New York - 390 US 629
Quality and accessibility of educational system
*DECS v. San Diego - 180 SCRA 533 (failed NMAT thrice, power to regulate admission)
 Issue: The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again?
 Ruling: The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The
Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of
study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.
o It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the
Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and
promise.
o The private respondent has failed the NMAT five times. While his persistence is
noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly misplaced, like a hopeless love. Thus, the
private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better
prepared.
 SC applied same rationale in the Tablarin Case. The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its
branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of
the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to
regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized.
o Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the
State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the
object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
 [On EPC] A substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who are
not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the
very lives of the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant
regulation. The accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession,
does not hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and to be similarly treated.
Non v. Judge Dames - 185 SCRA 523
SECTION 3
Duty of Institutions
*Miriam College v. CA, GR 127930, December 15, 2000 (obscene school paper)
 Doctrine: The right of the students to free speech in school premises, however, is not absolute.
The right to free speech must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment. Thus, while we upheld the right of the students to free expression in these
cases, we did not rule out disciplinary action by the school for “conduct by the student, in
class or out of it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or type of
behavior—which materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others.”
o In the landmark case of Malabanan vs. Ramento, students of the Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation held a demonstration to protest the proposed merger as it will
170
cause the increase of their tuition.. The rally however was held at a place other than that
specified in the school permit and continued longer than the time allowed. The protest,
moreover, disturbed the classes and caused the stoppage of the work of non-academic
personnel. For the illegal assembly, the university suspended the students for one year.
 Facts: Miriam College’s school paper and magazine published material that can be described as
obscene and sexually explicit. Following the publication, the members of the editorial board
received a letter from the Chair of Discipline Committee notifying of letters of complaint against
them. The school’s discipline committee proceeded with the investigation and imposed
disciplinary sanctions upon them.
 Ruling: Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. This freedom allows the school to set its own objectives, aims, and how best
to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint.
 The court upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression, HOWEVER, it does
not rule out disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students.
o The right to discipline is also evident in the academic freedom, "who may be admitted to
study."
o If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, it is logical to conclude that it
also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to
impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.
 In addition, Sec. 7 of the of the Campus Journalism Act provides that the school cannot
suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles they write EXCEPT when
such article materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of
the rights of others.
SECTION 5.
Academic freedom of “institutions of higher learning".
*Garcia v. Faculty Admission, 68 SCRA 277 (denied admission to theology)

 Four Essential Freedoms [Academic Freedom]:
o Who may teach;
o What may be taught;
o How it shall be taught; and
o Who may be admitted to study.
 Garcia cannot compel by mandamus, the respondent to admit her into further studies in the Loyola
School of Theology. For respondent has no clear duty to so admit the petitioner. The Loyola
School of Theology is a seminary for priesthood. Petitioner is admittedly and obviously not
studying for the priesthood, she being a lay person and a woman.
o And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that she is qualified to study for the priesthood,
there is still no duty on the part of respondent to admit her to said studies, since the school
has clearly the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of
space, facilities, professors and optimum classroom size and component considerations.
 Discretion appears to be of the essence. What a student in the position of petitioner possesses is
a privilege rather than a right. She cannot therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite
of a mandamus proceeding. Such being the case, there is no duty imposed on the Loyola School
of Theology.
 There is no duty on the part of respondent to admit her to said studies, since the school has clearly
the discretion to turn down even qualified applicants due to limitations of space, facilities,
professors and optimum classroom size and component considerations. In terms of Hohfeld's
terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather
than a right.
BME v. Judge Alfonso - 176 SCRA 304

Lupangco v. CA - 160 SCRA 848
171
*University of San Carlos v. CA - 166 SCRA 570 (freedom to give honors)
 It is an accepted principle that schools of learning are given ample discretion to formulate
rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of
academic freedom.
o Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of universities and
colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating
students. Its discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less
controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise.
o Lee not having demonstrated that she has a clear legal right to the honors sought.
Mandamus cannot lie. Moreover, USC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in
denying the honors sought by Lee.
 USC’s bulletin of information provides all students and all other interested parties
advise on the University policies and rules on enrollment and academic
achievements. Lee should know and is presumed to know those University
policies and is bound to comply therewith.
 USC cannot be faulted for refusing to vest the honors demanded of them by the
private respondent. One failure would have been sufficient to disqualify her but
she had one incomplete and two failures. Her only chance was to reverse her
failing grades. This she accomplished thru the back door.
 Nevertheless, even if Lee succeeded in removing her failing grades, it was still
within the sound discretion of the petitioners to determine whether private
respondent was entitled to graduate with honors.
Capitol Medical Center v CA - 178 SCRA 493 [Provisional Remedy case]

 The contract between the college and a student who is enrolled and pays the fees for a semester,
is for the entire semester only, not for the entire course. The law does not require a school to see a
student through to the completion of his course. If the school closes or is closed by proper
authority at the end of a semester, the student has no cause of action for breach of contract
against the school.
Reyes v. CA – 194 SCRA 402

Tan v. CA – 199 SCRA 212
Camacho v. Coresis, GR 134372, Aug. 22, 2002
Civil Service Commission v. Sojor – 554 SCRA 160
Regino v. Pangasinan Colleges of S&T, GR 156109, Nov 18, 2004
International School of Manila v. ISAE, GR 167286, Feb. 5, 2014 (standard of efficiency for teachers)
Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), 751 SCRA 469
 Facts: First Class Cadet Cudia was penalized by the PMA for having lied about the cause of his
tardiness during a lesson examination. He was dismissed after having been found guilty by the
PMA, pursuant to the Honor Code. Issue: Was there a valid dismissal? -- Yes
 The schools’ power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom
and that “the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those
pertaining to student discipline ....” Thus, schools have the right to impose disciplinary
sanctions which includes the power to dismiss or expel, on students who violate
disciplinary rules.
 As the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor
Code and the Honor System in particular.
 Due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The PMA Honor Code
explicitly recognizes that an administrative proceeding conducted to investigate a cadet’s honor
violation need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. There is aversion to
undue judicialization of an administrative hearing in the military academy.
172

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ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF LAW CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - LIST OF CASES (AS OF 04 APRIL 2017)

ARTICLE III - BILL OF RIGHTS

Primacy of Human Rights and Enforcement

Mijares v. Ranada, GR 139325, April 12, 2005 (Alien Tort Act)

Due Process: In General

*Tupas v. CA - 193 SCRA 597, February 6, 1991 (late petition)

Mortel v. Kerr, 685 SCRA 1

I. Procedural Due Process

*Banco Espanol v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 (jurisdiction over person)

2. Aspects of the Proceedings

State Prosecutors v. Muros 236 SCRA 505

Moldex v. Villabona - 675 SCRA 615 (chance to respond)

Galvez v. CA 237 SCRA 685

3. Publicity and T.V. Coverage

Webb v. de Leon 247 SCRA 652 (rape case, media)

B. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration

1. In General; administrative due process

*Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 Phil. 635 (due process in administrative proceedings)

Dazon v. Yap – 610 SCRA 19

2. Judges and Disciplinary Process

OCA v. Pascual 259 SCRA 604

*GMA v. COMELEC 734 SCRA 88

Lumiqued v. Exevea 282 SCRA 125

*Gov’t. of Hongkong v. Olalia, GR 153675 April 19, 2007

*Gov’t of Hongkong v. Munoz, G.R. No. 207342, August 16, 2016.

Sec. of Justice v. Lantion 343 SCRA 377

*RCBC v. Banco de Oro 687 SCRA 583

*ADMU v. Capulong 222 SCRA 644 (fraternity)

*Go v. Colegio de San Juan de Letran 683 SCRA 358

Angeles v. Sison 112 SCRA 26

*Lao Gi v. CA 180 SCRA 756

Domingo v. Scheer, 421 SCRA 468

E. Regulations: Fixing of Rates and Regulation of Profession

Standards for regulation of rates:

Government bodies have 2 powers:

*Maceda v. ERB 199 SCRA 454 (fixing rates)

Radiocom v. NTC 184 SCRA 517

Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218

*Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31 (pilot)

F. Dismissals, Suspensions, Reinstatements, etc. …

1. Dismissal in Government Boards and Commissions

Abalos v. CSC -196 SCRA 81

*Salaw v. NLRC - 202 SCRA 7

Hellenic v. Siete - 195 SCRA 179

Alonzo v. Capulong - 244 SCRA 80

*People v. Nazario 165 SCRA 186 (“manager”, void for vagueness)

Francisco v. CA - 199 SCRA 595

H. Motion for Reconsideration

Ylaya v. Gacott - 689 SCRA 452

Medenilla v. CSC - 194 SCRA 278

Stronghold Insurance v. CA - 205 SCRA 605

J. Tariff and Customs Code

*Feeder v. CA - 197 SCRA 842

Diona v. Balergue - 688 SCRA 22

Alba v. Deputy Ombudsman - 254 SCRA 753

*CB v. CA 220 SCRA 536 (relative constitutionality)

Rural Bank v. CA 162 SCRA 288

Concerned Officials v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502

N. UDHA – R.A. 7279; Squatting; Procedure for relocation; summary abatement

*Perez v. v. Madrona 668 SCRA 696 (not nuisance per se)

O. Cancellation of Property Rights/Privileges

*American Inter-Fashion v. OP 197 SCRA 409

ABAKADA v. Ermita 469 SCRA 1 (E-VAT Law)