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Socrates
classical Greek Athenian philosopher

The unexamined life is not worth living.

I set to do you—each one of you, individually and in
private—what I hold to be the greatest possible service.
I tried to persuade each one of you to concern himself
less with what he has than with what he is, so as to
render himself as excellent and rational as possible.

It would be better for me... that multitudes of men

should disagree with me rather than that I, being one,

should be out of harmony with myself.
If the entire soul, then, follows without rebellion the
part which loves wisdom, the result is that in general
each part can carry out its own function—can be just,
in other words—and in particular each is able to enjoy
pleasures which are its own, the best, and, as far as
possible, the truest.

Anyone who holds a true opinion without

understanding is like a blind man on the right road.
Each of these private teachers who work for pay ...
inculcates nothing else than these opinions of the
multitude which they opine when they are assembled
and calls this knowledge wisdom.

I only wish that wisdom were the kind of thing that

flowed … from the vessel that was full to the one that
was empty.

The inexperienced in wisdom and virtue, ever occupied

with feasting and such, are carried downward, and
there, as is fitting, they wander their whole life long,
neither ever looking upward to the truth above them

nor rising toward it, nor tasting pure and lasting

pleasures. Like cattle, always looking downward with
their heads bent toward the ground and the banquet
tables, they feed, fatten, and fornicate. In order to
increase their possessions they kick and butt with
horns and hoofs of steel and kill each other, insatiable
th
as they are.

Socrates (Σωκράτης; c. 470 BC – 399 BC)

was a classical Greek (Athenian)
philosopher credited as one of the
founders of Western philosophy. Through
his portrayal in Plato's dialogues, Socrates
has become renowned for his contribution
to the field of ethics, and it is this Platonic
Socrates who lends his name to the
concepts of Socratic irony and the
Socratic method, or elenchus. The latter
remains a commonly used tool in a wide
range of discussions, and is a type of
pedagogy in which a series of questions is
asked not only to draw individual answers,
but also to encourage fundamental insight
into the issue at hand.

Quotes

False words are not only evil in themselves, but they

infect the soul with evil.

Socrates left no writings of his own, thus

our awareness of his teachings comes
primarily from a few ancient authors who
referred to him in their own works (see
Socratic problem).

Plato

The words of Socrates, as quoted or

portrayed in Plato's works, which are the
most extensive source available for our
present knowledge about his ideas.
I only wish that wisdom were the kind of
thing that flowed … from the vessel that
was full to the one that was empty.
Plato, Symposium, 175d

Gorgias
 It would be better for me... that
multitudes of men should disagree with
me rather than that I, being one, should
be out of harmony with myself.
Gorgias, 482c

Phaedrus

In every one of us there are two ruling

and directing principles, whose
guidance we follow wherever they may
lead; the one being an innate desire of
pleasure; the other, an acquired
judgment which aspires after
excellence.
Phaedrus
 Oh dear Pan and all the other gods of
this place, grant that I may be beautiful
inside. Let all my external possessions
be in friendly harmony with what is
within. May I consider the wise man
rich. As for gold, let me have as much as
a moderate man could bear and carry
with him.
Socrates' prayer, Phaedrus, 279

Crito

Has a philosopher like you failed to

discover that our country is more to be
valued and higher and holier far than
mother or father or any ancestor, and
 more to be regarded in the eyes of the
gods and of men of understanding?
Crito

Theaetetus

Wonder is the feeling of a philosopher,

and philosophy begins in wonder.
Theaetetus, 155d
ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν
βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρ᾽ ἑτέρου
σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι
μετρίως.
I myself know nothing, except just a
little, enough to extract an argument
from another man who is wise and
to receive it fairly.
 Theaetetus, 161b

Republic

Each of these private teachers who work

for pay ... inculcates nothing else than
these opinions of the multitude which
they opine when they are assembled
and calls this knowledge wisdom.
Plato, Republic, 493a
Anyone who holds a true opinion
without understanding is like a blind
man on the right road.
Plato, Republic, 506c
The inexperienced in wisdom and virtue,
ever occupied with feasting and such,
are carried downward, and there, as is
fitting, they wander their whole life long,
neither ever looking upward to the truth
above them nor rising toward it, nor
tasting pure and lasting pleasures. Like
cattle, always looking downward with
their heads bent toward the ground and
the banquet tables, they feed, fatten, and
fornicate. In order to increase their
possessions they kick and butt with
horns and hoofs of steel and kill each
other, insatiable as they are.
Plato, Republic IX: 586a-b
If the entire soul, then, follows without
rebellion the part which loves wisdom,
the result is that in general each part
can carry out its own function—can be
 just, in other words—and in particular
each is able to enjoy pleasures which
are its own, the best, and, as far as
possible, the truest. ... When one of the
other parts takes control, there are two
results: it fails to discover its own proper
pleasure, and it compels the other parts
to pursue a pleasure which is not their
own, and not true.
Plato, Republic, T. Griffith, trans.
(2000), 587a

Apology

Plato's account of the trial of Socrates.

(Translated by Benjamin Jowett unless
otherwise specified.)
πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ᾽ οὖν ἀπιὼν ἐλογιζόμην
ὅτι τούτου μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ
σοφώτερός εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ
ἡμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κἀγαθὸν
εἰδέναι, ἀλλ᾽ οὗτος μὲν οἴεταί τι
εἰδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, ἐγὼ δέ, ὥσπερ οὖν
οὐκ οἶδα, οὐδὲ οἴομαι· ἔοικα γοῦν
τούτου γε σμικρῷ τινι αὐτῷ τούτῳ
σοφώτερος εἶναι, ὅτι ἃ μὴ οἶδα οὐδὲ
οἴομαι εἰδέναι.
When I left him, I reasoned thus
with myself: I am wiser than this
man, for neither of us appears to
know anything great and good; but
he fancies he knows something,
although he knows nothing;
 whereas I, as I do not know
anything, so I do not fancy I do. In
this trifling particular, then, I appear
to be wiser than he, because I do
not fancy I know what I do not
know.
21d
I realized that it was not by wisdom that
poets write their poetry, but by a kind of
nature or inspiration, such as you find in
seers and prophets; for these also say
many beautiful things, but do not know
anything of what they say.
22c
I went to the artisans, for I was
conscious that I knew nothing at all, as I
may say, and I was sure that they knew
many fine things of which I was
ignorant, and in this they certainly were
wiser than I was. But I observed that
even the good artisans fell into the
same error as the poets; because they
were good workmen they thought they
knew all sorts of high matters, and this
defect in them overshadowed their
wisdom — therefore I asked myself on
behalf of the oracle, whether I would like
to be as I was, neither having their
knowledge nor their ignorance, or like
them in both; and I made answer to
myself and the oracle that I was better
off as I was.
 22d–e
I am called wise, for my hearers always
imagine that I myself possess wisdom
which I find wanting in others: but the
truth is, O men of Athens, that God only
is wise; and in this oracle he means to
say that the wisdom of men is little or
nothing... as if he said, He, O men, is the
wisest, who like Socrates, knows that
his wisdom is in truth worth nothing.
And so I go on my way, obedient to the
god, and make inquisition into anyone,
whether citizen or stranger, who appears
to be wise; and if he is not wise, then in
vindication of the oracle I show him that
he is not wise; and this occupation quite
absorbs me, and I have no time to give
either to any public matter of interest or
to any concern of my own, but I am in
utter poverty by reason of my devotion
to the god.
23a-c
If somebody asks them, Why, what evil
does he practice or teach? they do not
know, and cannot tell; but in order that
they do not appear to be at a loss, they
repeat the ready-made charges which
are used against all philosophers about
teaching things up in the clouds and
under the earth, and having no gods, and
making the worse appear the better
cause; for they do not like to confess
that their pretense of knowledge has
been detected — which is the truth...
23d
Now answer me this. Do you think that
the same holds of horses? Do people in
general improve them, whereas one
particular person corrupts them or
makes them worse? Or is it wholly the
opposite: one particular person - or the
very few who are horse trainers - is able
to improve them, whereas the majority
of people, if they have to do with horses
and make use of them, make them
worse? Isn't that true, Meletus, both of
horses and of all other animals? Of
course it is, whether you and Anytus say
so or not. Indeed, our young people are
surely in a very happy situation if only
one person corrupts them, whereas all
the rest benefit them.
25b
Either I do not corrupt them, or I corrupt
them unintentionally, so that on either
view of the case you lie. If my offense is
unintentional, the law has no
cognizance of unintentional offenses;
you ought to have taken me privately,
and warned and admonished me; for if I
had been better advised, I should have
left off doing what I only did
unintentionally — no doubt I should;
whereas you hated to converse with me
or teach me, but you indicted me in this
court, which is the place not of
instruction, but of punishment.
26a
I have said enough in answer to the
charge of Meletus: any elaborate
defense is unnecessary; but as I was
saying before, I certainly have many
enemies, and this is what will be my
destruction if I am destroyed; of that I
am certain; not Meletus, nor yet Anytus,
but the envy and detraction of the world,
which has been the death of many a
good men, and will probably be the
death of many more; there is no danger
of my being the last of them.
 28a
Someone will say: And are you not
ashamed, Socrates, of a course of life
which is likely to bring you to an
untimely end? To him I may fairly
answer: There you are mistaken: a man
who is good for anything ought not to
calculate the chance of living or dying;
he ought only to consider whether in
doing anything he is doing right or
wrong — acting the part of a good man
or a bad. ...For wherever a man's place
is, whether the place he has chosen or
that where he has been placed by a
commander. there he ought to remain in
the hour of danger; he should not think
of death or of anything, but of disgrace.
28b–d
If, I say now, when, as I conceive and
imagine, God orders me to fulfill the
philosopher's mission of searching into
myself and other men, I were to desert
my post through fear of death, or any
other fear; that would indeed be strange,
and I might justly be arraigned in court
for denying the existence of the gods...
then I would be fancying that I was wise
when I was not wise. For this fear of
death is indeed the pretense of wisdom,
and not real wisdom, being the
appearance of knowing the unknown;
since no one knows whether death,
which they in their fear apprehend to be
the greatest evil, may not be the
greatest good. ...this is the point in
which, as I think, I am superior to men in
general, and in which I might perhaps
fancy myself wiser than other men —
that whereas I know but little of the
world below, I do not suppose that I
know: but I do know that injustice and
disobedience to a better, whether God or
man, is evil and dishonorable, and I will
never fear or avoid a possible good
rather than a certain evil.
29a–b
 Alternate translation: "To fear death,
is nothing else but to believe
ourselves to be wise, when we are
not; and to fancy that we know what
we do not know. In effect, no body
knows death; no body can tell, but it
may be the greatest benefit of
mankind; and yet men are afraid of
it, as if they knew certainly that it
were the greatest of evils."
And how is not this the most
reprehensible ignorance, to think that
one knows what one does not know?
But I, O Athenians! in this, perhaps, differ
from most men; and if I should say that I
am in any thing wiser than another, it
would be in this, that not having a
competent knowledge of the things in
Hades, I also think that I have not such
knowledge.
29b [alternate translation]
I shall never cease from the practice and
teaching of philosophy, exhorting
anyone whom I meet after my manner,
and convincing him, saying: O my friend,
why do you who are a citizen of the
great and mighty and wise city of
Athens, care so much about laying up
the greatest amount of money and
honor and reputation, and so little about
wisdom and truth and the greatest
improvement of the soul, which you
never regard or heed at all? Are you not
ashamed of this? And if the person with
whom I am arguing says: Yes, but I do
care: I do not depart or let him go at
once; I interrogate and examine and
cross-examine him, and if I think that he
has no virtue, but only says that he has, I
reproach him with overvaluing the
greater, and undervaluing the less. ...For
this is the command of God, as I would
have you know...
29d–30a
I do nothing but go about persuading
you all, old and young alike, not to take
thought for your persons or your
properties, but and chiefly to care about
the greatest improvement of the soul. I
tell you that virtue is not given by money,
but that from virtue comes money and
every other good of man, public as well
as private. This is my teaching, and if
this is the doctrine which corrupts the
youth, I am a mischievous person.
30a–b
If you kill such a one as I am, you will
injure yourselves more than you will
injure me. Meletus and Anytus will not
injure me: they cannot; for it is not in the
nature of things that a bad man should
injure one better than himself. I do not
deny that he may, perhaps, kill him, or
drive him into exile, or deprive him of
civil rights; and he may imagine, and
others may imagine, that he is doing him
a great injury: but in that I do not agree
with him; for the evil of doing what
Anytus is doing — of unjustly taking
away another man's life — is greater far.
30c–d
So now, Athenian men, more than on my
own behalf must I defend myself, as
some may think, but on your behalf, so
that you may not make a mistake
concerning the gift of god by
condemning me. For if you kill me, you
will not easily find another such person
at all, even if to say in a ludicrous way,
attached on the city by the god, like on a
large and well-bred horse, by its size and
laziness both needing arousing by some
gadfly; in this way the god seems to
have fastened me on the city, some
such one who arousing and persuading
and reproaching each one of you I do
not stop the whole day settling down all
over. Thus such another will not easily
come to you, men, but if you believe me,
you will spare me; but perhaps you
might possibly be offended, like the
sleeping who are awakened, striking me,
believing Anytus, you might easily kill,
then the rest of your lives you might
continue sleeping, unless the god caring
for you should send you another.
 30e
If I had engaged in politics, I should have
perished long ago and done no good to
either you or to myself. ...for the truth is
that no man who goes to war with you
or any other multitude, honestly
struggling against the commission of
unrighteouosness and wrong in the
State, will save his life; he who will really
fight for right, if he would live even for a
little while, must have a private station
and not a public one.
31e
I have had no regular disciples: but if
anyone likes to come and hear me while
I am pursuing my mission, whether he
be young or old, he may freely come.
Nor do I converse with those who pay
only, and not with those who do not pay;
but anyone, whether he be rich or poor,
may ask and answer me and listen to
my words; and whether he turns out to
be a bad man or a good one, that cannot
be justly laid to my charge, as I never
taught him anything. And if anyone says
that he has ever learned or heard
anything from me in private which all the
world has not heard, I should like you to
know that he is speaking an untruth.
33a–b
I did not go where I could do no good to
you or to myself; but where I could do
the greatest good privately to everyone
of you, thither I went, and sought to
persuade every man among you that he
must look to himself, and seek virtue
and wisdom before he looks to his
private interests, and look to the State
before he looks to the interests of the
State; and that this should be the order
which he observes in all his actions.
What shall be done to such a one?
Doubtless some good thing...
36c–d
I set to do you—each one of you,
individually and in private—what I hold to
be the greatest possible service. I tried
to persuade each one of you to concern
himself less with what he has than with
what he is, so as to render himself as
excellent and rational as possible.
36c6, as cited in Pierre Hadot,
Philosophy as a Way of Life (1995),
p. 90
Someone will say: Yes, Socrates, but
cannot you hold your tongue, and then
you may go into a foreign city, and no
one will interfere with you? Now I have
great difficulty in making you
understand my answer to this. For if I
tell you that this would be a
disobedience to a divine command, and
therefore that I cannot hold my tongue,
you will not believe that I am serious;
and if I say that the greatest good of a
man is daily to converse about virtue,
and all that concerning which you hear
me examining myself and others, and
that the life which is unexamined is not
worth living — that you are still less
likely to believe.
37e–38a
ὁ δὲ ἀνεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς
ἀνθρώπῳ (ho de anexetastos bios ou
biôtos anthrôpôi)
The unexamined life is not worth
living for a human being.
38a
 Variant translations:
(More closely) The unexamining life
is not worth living for a human
being
The life which is unexamined is not
worth living.
An unexamined life is not worth
living.
The unexamined life is not the life
for man.
Life without enquiry is not worth
living for a man.
I would rather die having spoken in my
manner, than speak in your manner and
live. For neither in war nor yet in law
ought any man use every way of
escaping death. For often in battle there
is no doubt that if a man will throw away
his arms, and fall on his knees before
his pursuers, he may escape death, if a
man is willing to say or do anything. The
difficulty, my friends, is not in avoiding
death, but in avoiding unrighteousness;
for that runs deeper than death.
38e–39a
And I prophesy to you who are my
murderers, that immediately after my
death punishment far heavier than you
have inflicted on me will surely await
you. Me you have killed because you
wanted to escape the accuser, and not
to give an account of your lives. But that
will not be as you suppose: far
otherwise. For I say that there will be
more accusers of you than there are
now; accusers whom hitherto I have
restrained: and as they are younger they
will be more severe with you, and you
will be more offended at them. For if you
think that by killing men you can avoid
the accuser censoring your lives, you are
mistaken; that is not a way of escape
which is either possible or honorable;
the easiest and the noblest way is not to
be crushing others, but to be improving
yourselves.
39c–d
We shall see that there is great reason
to hope that death is a good, for one of
two things: either death is a state of
nothingness and utter unconsciousness,
or, as men say, there is a change and a
migration of the soul from this world to
another. Now if you suppose there is no
consciousness, but a sleep like the
sleep of him who is undisturbed even by
the site of dreams, death will be an
unspeakable gain. For if a person were
to select the night in which his sleep
was undisturbed even by dreams, and
were to compare with this the other
days and nights of his life, and then
were to tell us how many days and
nights he had passed in the course of
his life better and more pleasantly than
this one, I think that any man, I will not
say a private man, but even the great
king, will not find many such days or
nights, when compared with the others.
Now, if death is like this, I say that to die
is gain; for eternity is then only a single
night. But if death is the journey to
another place, and there, as men say, all
the dead are, what good, O friends and
judges, can be greater than this?
...Above all, I shall be able to continue
my search into true and false
knowledge; as in this world, so also in
that; I shall find out who is wise, and
who pretends to be wise, and is not.
...What infinite delight would there be in
conversing with them and asking them
questions! For in that world they would
not put a man to death for this; certainly
not. For besides being happier in that
world than in this, they will be immortal,
if what is said is true.
40c–41c
Wherefore, O judges, be of good cheer
about death, and know that this is of a
truth — that no evil can happen to a
good man, either in life or after death.
...For which reason also, I am not angry
with my accusers, or my condemners;
they have done me no harm, although
neither of them meant to do me any
good; and for this I may gently blame
them.
41c–e
When my sons are grown up, I would ask
you, O my friends, to punish them; and I
would have you to trouble them, as I
have troubled you, if they seem to care
about riches, or anything, more than
about virtue; or if they pretend to be
something when they are really nothing
— then reprove them, as I have reproved
you, for not caring about that for which
they ought to care, and thinking that
they are something when they are really
nothing. And if you do this, I and my
 sons will have received justice at your
hands.
41e–42a

The hour of departure has arrived, and we go our ways

— I to die and you to live. Which is the better, only God
knows.

The hour of departure has arrived, and

we go our ways — I to die and you to
live. Which is the better, only God knows.
42a

Phaedo
 Plato's account of Socrates' death.

Note: Generally, the early works of Plato are

considered to be close to the spirit of
Socrates, whereas the later works, including
Phaedo, may possibly be products of Plato's
elaborations.

How singular is the thing called

pleasure, and how curiously related to
pain, which might be thought to be the
opposite of it; for they never come to a
man together, and yet he who pursues
either of them is generally compelled to
take the other. They are two, and yet
they grow together out of one head or
stem.
In the course of my life I have often had
intimations in dreams "that I should
make music." The same dream came to
me sometimes in one form, and
sometimes in another, but always saying
the same or nearly the same words:
Make and cultivate music, said the
dream. And hitherto I imagined that this
was only intended to exhort and
encourage me in the study of
philosophy, which has always been the
pursuit of my life, and is the noblest and
best of music.
[Why is suicide held not to be right?]
There is a doctrine uttered in secret that
a man is a prisoner who has no right to
open the door to his prison and run
away; this is a great mystery which I do
not understand. Yet I too, believe that
the gods are our guardians, and that we
are a possession of theirs. ...And if one
of your possessions, an ox or an ass, for
example took the liberty of putting
himself out of the way when you had
given no intimation of your wish that he
should die, would you not be angry with
him, and would you not punish him if
you could? ...Then there may be reason
in saying that a man should wait, and
not take his own life until God summons
him, as he is now summoning me.
I am quite ready, Simmias and Cebes,
that I ought to be grieved at death, if I
were not persuaded that I am going to
other gods who are wise and good and
to men departed who are better than
those whom I leave behind; and
therefore I do not grieve as I might have
done, for I have good hope that there is
yet something remaining for the dead,
and, as has been said of old, some far
better thing for the good than for the
evil.
The true disciple of philosophy is likely
to be misunderstood by other men; they
do not perceive that he is ever pursuing
death and dying; and if this is true, why,
having had the desire of death all his life
long, should he repine at that which he
has always been pursuing and desiring?
When does the soul obtain truth?—for in
attempting to consider anything in
company with the body she is obviously
deceived. ...Then must not existence be
revealed to her in thought, if at all? ...And
thought is best when the mind is
gathered into herself and none of these
things trouble her—neither sounds nor
sights nor pain nor any pleasure—when
she has as little as possible to do with
the body, and has no bodily sense or
feeling, but is aspiring after being? ...And
in this the philosopher dishonors the
body; his soul runs away from the body
and desires to be alone and by herself?
The body is a source of endless trouble
to us by reason of the mere requirement
of food; and is also liable to diseases
which overtake and impede us in the
search after truth: and by filling us so
full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and
fancies, and idols, and every sort of folly,
prevents our ever having, as people say,
so much as a thought.
Whence come wars, and fighting, and
factions? whence but from the body and
the lusts of the body? For wars are
occasioned by the love of money, and
money has to be acquired for the sake
and in service of the body; and in
consequence of all these things, the
time which ought to be given to
philosophy is lost.
Either knowledge is not to be attained at
all, or if at all, after death. For then, and
not til then, the soul will be in herself
alone and without the body.
In this present life, I reckon that we
make the nearest approach to
knowledge when we have the least
possible concern or interest in the body,
and are not saturated with the bodily
nature, but remain pure until the hour
when God himself is pleased to release
us. And then the foolishness of the body
will be cleared away and we shall be
pure and hold converse with othe pure
souls, and know of ourselves the clear
light everywhere; and this is surely the
light of truth. For no impure thing is
allowed to approach the pure. These are
the sort of words, Simmias, which the
true lovers of wisdom cannot help
saying to one another, and thinking.
And now that the hour of departure is
appointed to me, this is the hope with
which I depart, and not I only, but every
man that believes that he has his mind
purified.
And will he who is a true lover of
wisdom, and is persuaded in like
manner that only in the world below can
he worthily enjoy her, still repine at
death? Will he not depart with joy?
Surely he will, my friend, if he be a true
philosopher. ...And if this be true, he
would be very absurd, ...if he were to
fear death.
And when you see a man who is
repining at the approach of death, is not
his reluctance a sufficient proof that he
is not a lover of wisdom, but a lover of
the body, and probably at the same time
a lover of either money or power, or
both?
There is a virtue, Simmias, which is
named courage. Is not that a special
attribute of the philosopher? ...Again,
there is temperance. Is not the calm,
and control, and disdain of the passions
which even the many call temperance, a
quality belonging only to those who
despise the body and live in philosophy?
...do not courageous men endure death
because they are afraid of yet greater
evils? ...Then all but philosophers are
courageous only from fear, and because
they are afraid; and yet that a man
should be courageous from fear, and
because he is a coward, is surely a
strange thing.
And are not the temperate exactly in the
same case? They are temperate
because they are intemperate—which
may seem to be a contradiction, but is
nevertheless the sort of thing which
happens with this foolish temperance.
For there are pleasures which they must
have, and are afraid of losing; and
therefore they abstain from one class of
pleasures because they are overcome
by another: and whereas intemperance
is defined as "being under the
domination of pleasure," they overcome
only because they are overcome by
pleasure.
The exchange of one fear or pleasure or
pain for another fear or pleasure or pain,
which are measured like coins, the
greater with the less, is not the
exchange of virtue. O, my dear Simmias,
is there not one true coin, for which all
things ought to exchange?—and that is
wisdom; and only in exchange for this,
and in company with this, is anything
truly bought or sold, whether courage or
temperance or justice. ...in the true
exchange, there is a purging away of all
these things, and temperance, and
justice, and courage, and wisdom
herself are a purgation of them.
I conceive that the founders of the
mysteries had a real meaning and were
not mere triflers when they intimated in
a figure long ago that he who passes
unsanctified and uninitiated into the
world below will live in a slough, but that
he who arrives there after initiation and
purification will dwell with the gods. For
"many," as they say in the mysteries, "are
the thyrsus bearers, but few are the
mystics,"—meaning, as I interpret the
words, the true philosophers.
If generation were in a straight line only,
and there were no compensation or
circle in nature, no turn or return into one
another, then you know that all things
would at last have the same form and
pass into the same state, and there
would be no more generation of them.
I am confident in the belief that there
truly is such a thing as living again, and
that the living spring from the dead, and
that the souls of the dead are in
existence, and that the good souls have
a better portion than the evil.
If the knowledge which we acquired
before birth was lost to us at birth, and
afterwords by the use of the senses we
recovered that which we previously
knew, will not that which we call learning
be a process of recovering our
knowledge, and may not this be rightly
termed recollection by us? ...Then,
Simmias, our souls must have existed
before they were in the form of man—
without bodies, and must have had
intelligence.
We admitted that everything living is
born of the dead. For if the soul existed
before birth, and in coming to life and
being born can be born only from death
and dying, must she not after death
continue to exist, since she has to be
born again?
Now the compound or composite may
be supposed to be naturally capable of
being dissolved in like manner as being
compounded; but that which is
uncompounded, and that only, must be,
if anything is, indissoluble. ...And the
uncompounded may be assumed to be
the same and unchanging, where the
compound is always changing and
never the same? ...Is that idea or
essence, which in the dialectical
process we define as essence of true
existence—whether essence of equality,
beauty, or anything else: are these
essences, I say, liable at times to some
degree of change? or are they each of
them always what they are, having the
same simple, self-existent and
unchanging forms, and not admitting of
variation at all, or in any way, or at any
time?
Suppose that there are two sorts of
existences, one seen, and the other
unseen. ...The seen is the changing, and
the unseen is the unchanging. ...And
further, is not one part of us body, and
the rest of us soul? ...Then the soul is
more like to the unseen, and the body to
the seen? ...the soul is then dragged by
the body into the region of the
changeable, and wanders and is
confused; the world spins round her, and
she is like a drunkard when under their
influence?
But when returning into herself she [the
soul] reflects; then she passes into the
realm of purity, and eternity, and
immortality, and unchangeableness,
which are her kindred, and with them
she ever lives, when she is by herself
and is not let or hindered; then she
ceases from her erring ways, and being
in communion with the unchanging is
unchanging. And this state of the soul is
called wisdom.
The soul is in the very likeness of the
divine, and immortal, and intelligible, and
uniform, and indissoluble, and
unchangeable; and the body is in the
very likeness of the human, and mortal,
and unintelligible, and multiform, and
dissoluble, and changeable.
But the soul which has been polluted,
and is impure at the time of her
departure, and is the companion and
servant of the body always, and is in
love with and fascinated by the body
and by the desires and pleasures of the
body, until she is led to believe that the
truth exists only in bodily form, which a
man may touch and see and taste and
use for the purposes of his lusts—the
soul, I mean, accustomed to hate and
fear and avoid the intellectual principle,
which to the bodily eye is dark and
invisible, and can be attained only by
philosophy—do you suppose that such a
soul as this will depart pure and
unalloyed?
He who is a philosopher or lover of
learning, and is entirely pure at
departing, is alone permitted to reach
the gods. And this is the reason,
Simmias and Cebes, why the true
votaries of philosophy abstain from all
fleshly lusts, and endure and refuse to
give themselves up to them—not
because they fear poverty or ruin of their
families, like the lovers of money, and
the world in general; nor like the lovers
of power and honor, because they dread
the dishonor or disgrace of evil deeds.
They who have a care of their souls, and
do not merely live in the fashions of the
body, say farewell to all this; they will not
walk in the ways of the blind: and when
philosophy offers them purification and
release from evil, they feel that they
ought not resist her influence, and to her
they incline, and whither she leads they
follow her.
When the feeling of pleasure or pain in
the soul is most intense, all of us
naturally suppose that the object of this
intense feeling is then plainest and
truest; but this is not the case.
...because each pleasure and pain is a
sort of nail which nails and rivets the
soul to the body, and engrosses her and
makes her believe that to be true which
the body affirms to be true; and from
agreeing with the body and having the
same delights she is obliged to have the
same habits and ways, and is not likely
ever to be pure at her departure to the
world below, but is always saturated
with the body; so that she soon [after
death] sinks into another body and there
germinates and grows, and has
therefore no part in the communion of
the divine and pure and simple.
And this, Cebes, is the reason why the
true lovers of knowledge are temperate
and brave; and not for the reason that
the world gives. For not in that way does
the soul of a philosopher reason.
...Never fear, Simmias and Cebes, that a
soul which has been thus nurtured and
has had these pursuits, will at her
departure from the body be scattered
and blown away by the winds and be
nowhere and nothing.
Will you not allow that I have as much of
the spirit of prophecy in me as the
swans? For they, when they perceive
that they must die, having sung all their
life long, do then sing more than ever,
rejoicing in the thought that they are
about to go away to the god whose
ministers they are.
As there are misanthropists, or haters of
men, there are also misologists or
haters of ideas, and both spring from
the same cause, which is ignorance of
the world. Misanthropy arises from too
great confidence of inexperience; you
trust a man and think him altogether
true and good and faithful, and then in a
little while he turns out to be false and
knavish; and then another and another,
and when this has happened several
times to a man, especially within the
circle of his most trusted friends, as he
deems them, and he has often quarreled
with them, he at last hates all men, and
believes that no one has any good in
him at all. ...The reason is that a man,
having to deal with other men, has no
knowledge of them; for if he had
knowledge he would have known the
true state of the case, that few are the
good and few the evil, and that the great
majority are in the interval between
them.
Nothing is more uncommon than a very
large or a very small man; and this
applies generally to all extremes,
whether of great and small, or swift and
slow, or fair and foul, or black and white;
and whether the instances you select be
man or dogs or anything else, few are
the extremes,but many are in the mean
between them.
When a simple man who has no skill in
dialectics believes an argument to be
true which he afterwards imagines to be
false, whether really false or not, and
then another and another, he no longer
has any faith left, and great disputers, as
you know, come to think, at last that they
have grown to be the wisest of mankind;
for they alone perceive the utter
unsoundness and instability of all
arguments, or, indeed, of all things,
which like the currents in the Euripus,
are going up and down in never-ceasing
ebb and flow.
Let us... be careful of admitting into our
souls the notion that there is no truth or
health or soundness in any arguments
at all; but let us rather say that there is
as yet no health in us, and that we must
quit ourselves like men and do our best
to gain health—you and all other men
with a view to the whole of your future
life, and I myself with a view to death.
The soul, being a harmony, can never
utter a note at variance with the
tensions and relaxations and vibrations
and other affections of the strings out of
which she is composed; she can only
follow, she cannot lead them? ...And yet
do we not now discover the soul to be
doing the exact opposite—leading the
elements of which she is believed to be
composed; almost always opposing and
coercing them in all sorts of ways
throughout life... threatening and
reprimanding the desires, passions,
fears, as if talking to a thing which is not
herself...
You want to have proven to you that the
soul is imperishable and immortal, and
you think that the philosopher who is
confident in death has but a vain and
foolish confidence, if he thinks that he
will fare better than one who has led
another sort of life, in the world below,
unless he can prove this; and you say
that the strength and divinity of the soul,
and of her existence prior to our
becoming men, does not necessarily
imply her immortality. ...For any man,
who is not devoid of natural feeling, has
reason to fear, if he has no knowledge or
proof of the soul's immortality. That is
what I suppose you to say, Cebes, which
I designedly repeat, in order that nothing
may escape us...
When I was young, Cebes, I had a
prodigious desire to know the
department of philosophy which is
called Natural Science; this appeared to
me to have lofty aims, as being the
science which has to do with the causes
of things, and which teaches why a thing
is, and is created and destroyed; and I
always agitated myself with the
consideration of such questions as
these... I went on to examine the decay
of them, and then to the study of the
heaven and earth, and at last I
concluded that I was wholly incapable of
these inquiries... There was a time when
I thought that I understood the meaning
of greater and less pretty well... that ten
is more than eight, and that two cubits
are more than one, because two is twice
one. I should be far from imagining...
that I knew the cause of any of them,
indeed I should, for I cannot satisfy
myself that when one is added to one,
the one to which the addition is made
becomes two... nor can I understand
how the division of one is the way to
make two; for then a different cause
would produce the same effect.
Then I heard someone who had a book
of Anaxagoras, as he said, out of which
he read that the mind was the disposer
and cause of all... and I said to myself: If
mind is the disposer, mind will dispose
all for the best, and put each particular
in the best place; and I argued that if
anyone desired to find out the cause of
the generation or destruction of
anything, he must find out what state of
being or suffering or doing was best for
that thing, and therefore a man had only
consider the best for himself and others,
and then he would also know the worse,
for that the same science comprised
both.
And I rejoiced to think that I has found in
Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of
existence such as I desired, and I
imagined that he would tell me first
whether the earth is flat or round; and
then he would further explain that this
position was the best, and I should be
satisfied... and not want any other sort
of cause. And I thought that I would then
go and ask him about the sun and moon
and stars, and he would explain to me
their comparative swiftness, and their
returnings and various states, and how
their several affections, active and
passive, were all for the best. For I could
not imagine that when he spoke of mind
as the disposer of them, he would give
any other account of their being as they
are, except that this was best; and I
thought when he had explained to me in
detail the cause of each and the cause
of all, he would go on to explain to me
what was best for me and what was
best for all. ...I seized the books and
read them as fast as I could in my
eagerness to know the better and the
worse.
How grievously I was disappointed! ...I
found my philosopher altogether
forsaking mind and any other principle
of order, but having recourse to air, and
ether, and water, and other
eccentricities. I might compare him to a
person that began by maintaining
generally that mind is the cause of the
actions of Socrates, but who, when
endeavored to explain the causes of my
several actions in detail, went on to
show that I sit here because my body is
made up of bones and muscles; and the
bones he would say, are hard and have
ligaments which divide them, and the
muscles are elastic, and they cover the
bones, which also have a covering or
environment of flesh and skin which
contains them; and as the bones are
lifted at their joints by the contraction or
relaxation of the muscles, I am able to
bend my limbs, and this is why I an
sitting here in a curved posture... and he
would have a similar explanation of my
talking to you, which he would attribute
to sound, and air, and hearing, and he
would assign ten thousand other causes
of the same sort, forgetting to mention
the true cause, which is that Athenians
have thought fit to condemn me, and
accordingly I have thought it better and
more right to remain here and undergo
my sentence; for I am inclined to think
that these muscles and bones of mine
would have gone off to Megara or
Boeotia... if they had been guided only
by their idea of what was best, and if I
had not chosen as the better and nobler
part... to undergo any punishment that
the State inflicts.
It may be said, indeed, that without
bones and muscles and the other parts
of the body I cannot execute my
purposes. But to say that I do as I do
because of them, and that this is the
way in which the mind acts, and not
from the choice of the best, is a very
careless and idle mode of speaking. I
wonder that they cannot distinguish the
cause from the condition, which the
many, feeling about in the dark, are
always mistaking and misnaming.
And thus one man makes a vortex all
round and steadies the earth by the
heaven; another gives the air as support
for the earth, which is sort of a broad
trough. Any power which in disposing
them as they are disposes them for the
best never enters into their minds, not
do they imagine that there is any
superhuman strength in that; they rather
expect to find another Atlas of the world
who is stronger and more everlasting
and more containing than the good is,
and are clearly of the opinion that the
obligatory and containing power of the
good is as nothing; and yet this is the
principle which I would fain learn if
anyone would teach me. But as I have
failed either to discover myself or to
learn of anyone else, the nature of the
best, I will exhibit to you, if you like, what
I have found to be the second best
mode of inquiring into the cause.
I thought that as I had failed in the
contemplation of true existence, I ought
to be careful that I did not lose the eye
of my soul; as people may injure their
bodily eye by observing and gazing on
the sun during an eclipse, unless they
take the precaution of looking at the
image reflected in the water, or in some
similar medium. ...I was afraid that my
soul might be blinded altogether if I
looked at things with my eyes or tried by
the help of my senses to apprehend
them. And I thought that I had better had
recourse to ideas, and seek in them
truth in existence. I dare to say that the
simile is not perfect—for I am far from
admitting that he who contemplates
existence through the medium of ideas,
sees them only "through a glass darkly,"
any more than he who sees them in their
working and effects.
This was the method which I adopted: I
first assumed some principle which I
judged to be the strongest, and then I
affirmed as true whatever seemed to
agree with this, whether relating to the
cause or to anything else; and that
which disagreed I regarded as untrue. ...I
want to show you the nature of that
cause which has occupied my thoughts,
and I shall have to go back to those
familiar words which are in the mouth of
everyone, and first of all assume that
there is an absolute beauty and
goodness and greatness, and the like;
grant me this, and I hope to be able to
show you the nature of the cause, and to
prove the immortality of the soul.
If there is anything beautiful other than
absolute beauty, that can only be
beautiful as far as it partakes of
absolute beauty—and this I should say
of everything. ...by beauty all things
become beautiful. ...by greatness only
great things become great and greater
and greater, and by smallness the less
becomes less.
You would say... inexperienced as I am,
and ready to start, as the proverb says,
at my own shadow, I cannot afford to
give up the sure ground of principle.
...and when you are further required to
give an explanation of this principle, you
would go on to assume a higher
principle, and the best of the higher
ones, until you found a resting place; but
you would not refuse the principle and
consequences in your reasoning like the
Eristics—at least if you wanted to
discover real existence.
Not that this confusion signifies to them
who never care to think about the matter
at all, for they have the wit to be well
pleased with themselves, however great
the turmoil of their ideas. But you, if you
are a philosopher, will, I believe, do as I
say.
Absolute greatness will never be great
and also small, but that greatness in us
or in the concrete will never admit the
small or admit of even being exceeded;
instead of this, one of two things will
happen—either the greater will fly and
retire before the opposite, which is the
less, or the advance of the less will
cease to exist; but will not, if allowing or
admitting smallness, be changed by
that...nor can any other opposite which
remains the same ever be or become its
own opposite, but either passes away or
perishes in the change.
[One of the company... said: ...is not this
the direct contrary of what we admitted
before—that out of the greater came the
less and out of the less the greater, and
that opposites are simply generated from
opposites; whereas now this seems to be
utterly denied.] ...then we were speaking
of opposites in the concrete, and now of
the essential opposite which, as is
affirmed, neither in us nor in nature can
ever be at variance with itself... these
essetial opposites will never, as we
maintain, admit of generation into or out
of one another.
What is that the inherence of which, will
render the body alive? [The soul.] ...Then
whatever the soul possesses, to that
she comes bearing life? ...And is there
an opposite to life? [Death.] Then the
soul, as she has been acknowledged,
will never receive the opposite of what
she brings. ...And what do we call the
principle which does not admit of death?
[The immortal.] And does the soul admit
of death? [No.] Then the soul is
immortal? [Yes.]
If the immortal is also imperishable, the
soul when attacked by death cannot
perish; for the preceding argument
shows that the soul will not admit of
death, or even be dead, any more than
three or the odd number will admit of
the even...
If death had only been the end of all, the
wicked would have had a good bargain
in dying, for they would have been
happily quit not only of their body, but of
their own evil together with their souls.
But now, as the soul plainly appears to
be immortal, there is no release or
salvation from evil except the
attainment of the highest virtue and
wisdom. For the soul when on her
progress to the world below takes
nothing with her but nurture and
education...
For after death, as they say, the genius
of each individual, to whom he belonged
in life, leads him to a certain place in
which the dead are gathered together
for judgment, whence they go into the
world below, following the guide who is
appointed to conduct them from this
world to the other; and when they have
there received their due and remained
their time, another guide brings them
back again after many revolutions of
ages.
[In the world below...] The wise and
orderly soul is conscious of her
situation, and follows in the path; but the
soul which desires the body, and which...
has long been fluttering about the
lifeless frame and the world of sight, is
after many struggles and many
sufferings hardly and with violence
carried away by her attendant genius,
and when she arrives at the place where
the other souls are gathered, if she be
impure and have done impure deeds or
have been concerned in foul murders or
other crimes... from that soul everyone
flees and turns away; no one will be her
companion, no one her guide, but alone
she wanders in extremity of evil until
certain times are fulfilled...
If any man could arrive at the exterior
limit, or take the wings of a bird and fly
upward, like a fish who puts his head out
and sees the world, he would see a
world beyond; and, if the nature of man
could sustain this sight, he would
acknowledge that this was the place of
the true heaven and the true light and
the true stars. For this earth, and the
stones, and the entire region which
surrounds us, are spoilt and corroded...
Upon the earth are animals and men,
some in a middle region, others dwelling
about the air as we dwell about the sea;
others in islands which the air flows
round, near the continent; and in a word,
the air is used by them as the water and
the sea are by us, and the ether is to
them as the air is to us. Moreover, the
temperament of their seasons is such
that they have no disease, and live much
longer than we do, and have sight and
hearing and smell, and all the other
senses, in far greater perfection, in the
same degree that air is purer than water
or the ether than air. Also they have
temples and sacred places in which the
gods really dwell, and they hear their
voices and receive their answers and are
conscious of them and hold converse
with them, and they see the sun, moon,
and stars as they really are, and their
other blessedness is of a piece with
this.
[In the world below...] those who appear
to have lived neither well not ill, go to the
river Acheron, and mount such
conveyances as they can get, and are
carried in them to the lake, and there
they dwell and are purified of their evil
deeds, and suffer the penalty of the
wrongs which they have done to others,
and are absolved, and receive the
rewards of their good deeds according
to their deserts. But those who appear
to be incurable by reason of the
greatness of their crimes—who have
committed many and terrible deeds of
sacrilege, murders foul and violent, or
the like—such are hurled into Tartarus,
which is their suitable destiny, and they
never come out. Those again who have
committed crimes, which, although
great, are not unpardonable—who in
moment of anger, for example, have
done violence to a father or a mother,
and have repented for the remainder of
their lives, or who have taken the life of
another under like extenuating
circumstances—these are plunged into
Tartarus, the pains of which they are
compelled to undergo for a year, but at
the end of the year the wave casts them
forth—mere homicides by way of
Cocytus, patricides and matricides by
Pyriphlegethon—and they are borne to
the Acherusian Lake, and here they lift
up their voices and call upon the victims
whom they have slain or wronged, to
have pity on them, and to receive them,
and to let them come out of the river
into the lake. And if they prevail, then
they come forth and cease from their
troubles; but if not, they are carried back
again into Tartarus and from thence into
the rivers unceasingly, until they obtain
mercy from those whom they have
wronged: for this is the sentence
inflicted upon them by their judges.
Those also who are remarkable for
having led holy lives are released from
this earthly prison, and go to their pure
home which is above, and dwell in the
purer earth; and those who have duly
purified themselves with philosophy live
henceforth altogether without the body,
in mansions fairer far than these...
I do not mean to affirm that the
description which I have given of the
soul and her missions is exactly true—a
man of sense ought hardly say that. But
I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is
shown to be immortal, he may venture
to think, not improperly or unworthily,
that something of this kind is true.
Let a man be of good cheer about his
soul, who has cast away the pleasures
and ornaments of the body as alien to
him, and rather hurtful in their effects,
and has followed after the pleasures of
knowledge in this life; who has adorned
the soul in her own proper jewels, which
are temperance, and justice, and
courage, and nobility, and truth—in these
arrayed she is ready to go on her journey
to the world below, when her time
comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all
other men, will depart at some time or
other. Me already, as the tragic poet
would say, the voice of fate calls.
[In what way would you have us bury
you?] In any way that you like; only you
must get hold of me, and take care that I
do not walk away from you. ...I cannot
make Crito believe that I am the same
Socrates who have been talking and
conducting the argument; he fancies
that I am the other Socrates whom he
will soon see, a dead body... And though
I have spoken many words in the
endeavor to show that when I have
drunk the poison I shall leave you and go
to the joys of the blessed—these words
of mine, with which I comforted you and
myself, have had, I perceive, no effect
upon Crito. ...you should be my surety to
him that I shall not remain, but go away
and depart; and then he will suffer less
at my death, and not be grieved when he
sees my body being burned or buried.
I would not have him sorrow at my hard
lot, or say at the burial, Thus we lay out
Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to the
grave or bury him; for false words are
not only evil in themselves, but they
infect the soul with evil. Be of good
cheer then, my good Crito, and say that
you are burying my body only, and do
with that as is usual, and as you think
best.
What do you say about making a libation
out of this cup to any god? ...I may and I
must pray to the gods to prosper my
journey from this to that other world—
may this, then, which is my prayer, be
granted to me. [Then holding the cup to
his lips, quite readily and cheerfully he
drank off the poison. And hitherto most
of us had been able to control their
sorrow; but now, when we saw him
drinking, and saw too, that he had
finished the draft, we could no longer
forbear, and in spite of myself my own
tears were flowing fast; so that I covered
my face and wept over myself, for
certainly I was not weeping over him, but
at my own calamity at having lost such a
companion. Nor was I the first, for Crito,
when he found himself unable to restrain
his tears, had got up, and moved away,
and I followed; and at that moment,
Apollodorus, who had been weeping all
the time, broke out in a loud cry which
made cowards of us all. Socrates alone
retained his calmness:] What is this
strange outcry? ...I sent away the
women mainly in order that they might
not offend in this way, for I have heard
that a man should die in peace. Be quiet
then, and have patience.
There is no greater evil one can suffer
than to hate reasonable discourse.
By means of beauty all beautiful things
become beautiful. For this appears to
me the safest answer to give both to
myself and others; and adhering to this, I
think that I shall never fall, but that it is a
safe answer both for me and any one
else to give — that by means of beauty
beautiful things become beautiful.
Phaedo
He who has lived as a true philosopher
has reason to be of good cheer when he
is about to die, and that after death he
may hope to receive the greatest good
in the other world.
 Phaedo
False words are not only evil in
themselves, but they infect the soul with
evil.
Phaedo 115e
literally: 'For know well', he said,
'o dearest Kriton, that to not
speak well is not only sinful by
itself, but lets evil intrude into
the soul.'(εὖ γὰρ ἴσθι, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, ὦ
ἄριστε Κρίτων, τὸ μὴ καλῶς
λέγειν οὐ μόνον εἰς αὐτὸ
τοῦτο πλημμελές, ἀλλὰ καὶ
κακόν τι ἐμποιεῖ ταῖς ψυχαῖς.)

Last words
 Ὦ Κρίτων […] τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ ὀφείλομεν
ἀλεκτρυόνα. ἀλλὰ ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ
ἀμελήσητε.
Crito, Crito, we owe a cock to
Aesculapius. Pay it and do not
neglect it.
Phaedo 118a

Xenophon

Words of Socrates as quoted by

Xenophon
You will know that the divine is so great
and of such a nature that it sees and
hears everything at once, is present
everywhere, and is concerned with
everything.
 Memorabilia I.4.18
Order and discipline are the most
important things in an army, and without
them it is impossible to have any other
service of the troops than of a confused
heap of stones, bricks, timber, and tiles;
but when everything is in its due place,
as in a building, when the foundations
and the covering are made of materials
that will not grow rotten, and which no
wet can damage, such as are stones
and tiles, and when the bricks and
timber are employed in their due places
in the body of the edifice, they altogether
make a house, which we value among
our most considerable enjoyments.
 Memorabilia III.1
It is a disgrace to grow old through
sheer carelessness before seeing what
manner of man you may become by
developing your bodily strength and
beauty to their highest limit. But you
cannot see that, if you are careless; for it
will not come of its own accord.
Memorabilia III.7.8
If I am to live longer, perhaps I must live
out my old age, seeing and hearing less,
understanding worse, coming to learn
with more difficulty and to be more
forgetful, and growing worse than those
to whom I was once superior. Indeed,
life would be unliveable, even if I did not
notice the change. And if I see the
change, how could life not be even more
wretched and unpleasant?
Memorabilia IV.8.8
ἆρα, ἔφην, ὦ Ἰσχόμαχε, ἡ ἐρώτησις
διδασκαλία ἐστίν; ἄρτι γὰρ δή, ἔφην
ἐγώ, καταμανθάνω ᾗ με ἐπηρώτησας
ἕκαστα: ἄγων γάρ με δι᾽ ὧν ἐγὼ
ἐπίσταμαι, ὅμοια τούτοις ἐπιδεικνὺς ἃ
οὐκ ἐνόμιζον ἐπίστασθαι ἀναπείθεις,
οἶμαι, ὡς καὶ ταῦτα ἐπίσταμαι.
Really, Ischomachus, I am disposed
to ask: "Does teaching consist in
putting questions?" Indeed, the
secret of your system has just this
instant dawned upon me. I seem to
 see the principle in which you put
your questions. You lead me
through the field of my own
knowledge, and then by pointing out
analogies to what I know, persuade
me that I really know some things
which hitherto, as I believed, I had
no knowledge of.
Oeconomicus (The Economist)
XIX.15 (as translated by H. G.
Dakyns)
It is the example of the rider who wishes
to become an expert horseman: "None
of your soft-mouthed, docile animals for
me," he says; "the horse for me to own
must show some spirit" in the belief, no
 doubt, if he can manage such an animal,
it will be easy enough to deal with every
other horse besides. And that is just my
case. I wish to deal with human beings,
to associate with man in general; hence
my choice of wife. I know full well, if I
can tolerate her spirit, I can with ease
attach myself to every human being
else.
Symposium 17–19 [= 2.10]

Plutarch

Socrates as quoted by Plutarch

I am not an Athenian or a Greek, but a
citizen of the world.
 Note: Compare doctrine of fidelity
to Athenian law in Plato's Crito.
Bad men live that they may eat and
drink, whereas good men eat and drink
that they may live.
Plutarch Moralia, How the Young
Man Should Study Poetry
Variant translation: Base men live to
eat and drink, and good men eat
and drink to live.

Diogenes Laertius

Socrates as quoted in Diogenes

Laertius' Lives of Eminent Philosophers
Ηe knew nothing except just the fact of
his ignorance.
 Alternate translation: I know
nothing except the fact of my
ignorance.
II.32. Original Greek: εἰδέναι μὲν
μηδὲν πλὴν αὐτὸ τοῦτο [εἰδέναι].
Often when looking at a mass of things
for sale, he would say to himself, "How
many things I have no need of!"
Variant: How many things I can do
without!
[H]e was nearest to the gods in that he
had the fewest wants.
There is only one good, knowledge, and
one evil, ignorance.
Variant: The only good is knowledge
and the only evil is ignorance.
 Socrates II: xxxi . Original Greek: ἓν
μόνον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὴν ἐπιστήμην,
καὶ ἓν μόνον κακόν, τὴν ἀμαθίαν
Socrates having heard Plato read the
Lysis, said, "O Hercules! what a number
of lies the young man has told about
me." For he had set down a great many
things as sayings of Socrates which he
never said.
He [Socrates] would say that the rest of
the world lived to eat, while he himself
ate to live.
Socrates II: xxiv . Original Greek:
ἔλεγέ τε τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους
ἀνθρώπους ζῆν ἵν᾽ ἐσθίοιεν: αὐτὸς
δὲ ἐσθίειν ἵνα ζῴη.
Attributed
Contentment is natural wealth; luxury,
artificial poverty.
As reported by Charles Simmons
in A Laconic Manual and Brief
Remarker, containing over a
thousand subjects alphabetically
and systematically arranged
(North Wrentham, Mass. 1852),
p. 103 . However, the original
source of this statement is
unknown.
 Cf. Joseph Addison in The
Spectator No. 574 Friday, July 30,
1714, p. 655 : In short, content is
equivalent to wealth, and luxury
to poverty; or, to give the thought
a more agreeable turn, "content is
natural wealth," says Socrates: to
which I shall add, "luxury is
artificial poverty.".
If we are to use women for the same
things as the men, we must also
teach them the same things.
Socrates, as quoted by Bettany
Hughes: "Feminism started with
the Buddha and Confucius 25
centuries ago" .
The state will only ever be a half of
itself.
Socrates in Plato's Republic
talking about women lacking
rights. As quoted by Bettany
Hughes: "Feminism started with
the Buddha and Confucius 25
centuries ago" .
Socrates: Shall we set down
astronomy among the objects of
study? Glaucon: I think so, to know
something about the seasons, the
months and the years is of use for
military purposes, as well as for
agriculture and for navigation.
Socrates: It amuses me to see how
 afraid you are, lest the common herd
of people should accuse you of
recommending useless studies.
Socrates as quoted by Plato. In
Richard Garnett, Léon Vallée,
Alois Brandl (eds.), The Universal
Anthology: A Collection of the
Best Literature (1899), Vol. 4, 111.

Misattributed
 

As for me, all I know is that I know nothing.

Know thyself.
This statement actually predates
Socrates, and was used as an
Inscription at the Oracle of
Delphi. It is a saying traditionally
ascribed to one of the "Seven
Sages of Greece", notably Solon,
but accounts vary as to whom.
Socrates himself is reported to
 have quoted it although it is very
likely that Thales was in fact the
one who first stated it.
The children now love luxury; they
have bad manners, contempt for
authority; they show disrespect for
elders and love chatter in place of
exercise. Children are now tyrants, not
the servants of their households. They
no longer rise when elders enter the
room. They contradict their parents,
chatter before company, gobble up
dainties at the table, cross their legs,
and tyrannize their teachers.
Adapted from a passage in
Schools of Hellas , the
posthumously published
dissertation of Kenneth John
Freeman (1907). The original
passage was a paraphrase of the
complaints directed against
young people in ancient times.
See the Quote Investigator
article .
see Respectfully Quoted: A
Dictionary of Quotations
Requested from the Congressional
Research Service, Edited by Suzy
Platt, 1989, number 195 .
See also this discussion about
the topic.
 Actually a paraphrase of a quote
(lines 961–985 ) from
Aristophanes' The Clouds, a
comedic play known for its
caricature of Socrates.
Education is the kindling of a flame,
not the filling of a vessel.
No findable citation to Socrates.
First appears in this form in the
1990s, such as in the Douglas
Bradley article "Lighting a Flame
in the Kickapoo Valley",
Wisconsin Ideas, UW System,
1994. It appears to be a variant
on a statement from Plutarch in
On Listening to Lectures: "The
correct analogy for the mind is
not a vessel that needs filling, but
wood that needs igniting — no
more — and then it motivates one
towards originality and instills the
desire for truth." Alternate
translation, from the Loeb
Classical Library edition, 1927 :
"For the mind does not require
filling like a bottle, but rather, like
wood, it only requires kindling to
create in it an impulse to think
independently and an ardent
desire for the truth." Often quoted
as, "The mind is not a vessel to
be filled but a fire to be kindled."
Variants of the quote that are
correctly attributed to Plutarch
but which substitute "education"
for "the mind" date back at least
as far as the 1960s, as seen in
the 1968 book Vision and Image
by James Johnson Sweeney, p.
119 .
Variants with "education" are also
sometimes misattributed to
William Butler Yeats, as in the
1993 book The Harper Book of
Quotations (third edition), p. 138 .
In the previously-mentioned
Vision and Image, the misquote of
Plutarch involving "education"
(which has exactly the same
wording as the quote attributed
to Yeats in The Harper Book of
Quotations) is immediately
preceded by a different quote
from Yeats ("Culture does not
consist in acquiring opinions but
in getting rid of them"), so it's
possible this is the source of the
confusion—see the snippets
here and here .
The misattribution may also be
related to a statement about
Plato's views made by Benjamin
Jowett in the introduction to his
translation of Plato's Republic (in
which all the main ideas were
attributed to Socrates, as in all of
Plato's works), on p. cci of the
third edition (1888): "Education is
represented by him, not as the
filling of a vessel, but as the
turning the eye of the soul
towards the light." Jowett seems
to be loosely paraphrasing a
statement Plato attributes to
Socrates in a dialogue with
Glaucon, in sections 518b –
518c of book 7 of The Republic,
where Socrates says: "education
is not in reality what some people
proclaim it to be in their
professions. What they aver is
that they can put true knowledge
into a soul that does not possess
it, as if they were inserting vision
into blind eyes … But our present
argument indicates that the true
analogy for this indwelling power
in the soul and the instrument
whereby each of us apprehends
is that of an eye that could not be
converted to the light from the
darkness except by turning the
whole body."
Further discussion of the history
of this quote can be found in this
 entry from the "Quote
Investigator" website.
The secret of change is to focus all of
your energy, not on fighting the old,
but on building the new.
This is actually a quotation from
a character named Socrates in
Way of the Peaceful Warrior: A
Book that Changes Lives , by Dan
Millman.
The greatest way to live with honor in
this world is to be what we pretend to
be.
No findable citation to Socrates.
Found ascribed to Socrates in
Stephen Covey (1992), Principle
 Centered Leadership (1990) p.
51 .
When the debate is lost, slander
becomes the tool of the loser.
Does not appear in any works
with direct sources to Socrates.
Origin and earliest use unknown.
By all means, marry. If you get a good
wife, you'll become happy; if you get a
bad one, you'll become a philosopher.
Origin unknown. Attributed to
Sydney Smith in Speaker's
Handbook of Epigrams and
Witticisms (1955) by Herbert
Prochnow, p. 190. Variant
reported in Why Are You Single?
 (1949) by Hilda Holland, p. 49:
«When asked by a young man
whether to marry, Socrates is
said to have replied: "By all
means, marry. If you will get for
yourself a good wife, you will be
happy forever after; and if by
chance you will get a common
scold like my Xanthippe—why
then you will become a
philosopher."»
As for me, all I know is that I know
nothing.
See All I know is that I know
nothing on Wikipedia for a
detailed account of the origins of
this attribution.
μοι νυνὶ γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ
διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναι· ὁπότε
γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἶδα ὅ ἐστιν,
σχολῇ εἴσομαι εἴτε ἀρετή τις
οὖσα τυγχάνει εἴτε καὶ οὔ, καὶ
πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ
εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν ἢ εὐδαίμων.
Hence the result of the
discussion, as far as I'm
concerned, is that I know
nothing, for when I don't
know what justice is, I'll
hardly know whether it is a
kind of virtue or not, or
 whether a person who has it
is happy or unhappy.
Republic, 354b-c (conclusion
of book I), as translated by
M.A. Grube in Republic
(Grube Edition) (1992)
revised by C.D.C. Reeve, p.
31
Confer Apology 21d (see above),
Theaetetus 161b (see above) and
Meno 80d1-3: "So now I do not
know what virtue is; perhaps you
knew before you contacted me,
but now you are certainly like one
who does not know."
Confer Cicero, Academica, Book I,
section 1 : "ipse se nihil scire id
unum sciat ("He himself thinks he
knows one thing, that he knows
nothing"). Often quoted as "scio
me nihil scire" or "scio me
nescire." A variant is found in von
Kues, De visione Dei, XIII, 146
(Werke, Walter de Gruyter, 1967,
p. 312): "...et hoc scio solum, quia
scio me nescire... [I know alone,
that (or because) I know, that I do
not know]." In the modern era, the
Latin quote was back-translated
to Greek as "ἓν οἶδα ὅτι οὐδὲν
οἶδα", hèn oîda hóti oudèn oîda).
 Confer Diogenes Laertius, II.32
(see above)

Quotes about Socrates

Socrates makes me admit to myself that, even though I

myself am deficient in so many regards, I continue to
take no care of myself, but occupy myself with the
business of the Athenians. ~ Alcibiades
 

Socrates was the chief saint of the Stoics throughout

their history… ~ Bertrand Russell

Alphabetized by author
Socrates makes me admit to myself
that, even though I myself am deficient
in so many regards, I continue to take no
care of myself, but occupy myself with
the business of the Athenians.
 Alcibiades in Plato, Symposium,
216a
This man here is so bizarre, his ways so
unusual, that, search as you might, you'll
never find anyone else, alive or dead,
who's even remotely like him. The best
you do is not to compare him to
anything human, but liken him, as I do, to
Silenus and the satyrs, and the same
goes for his ideas and arguments.
Alcibiades, as quoted in Symposium
by Plato
And so, from this day forth, we want all
the more to let our thoughts revolve
around and hover over Socrates and
Christ at all times, openly taking pride
that they are more alive for us than all
those living today and that we listen to
and love them as we do none of the
living.
Constantin Brunner, in Our Christ :
The Revolt of the Mystical Genius
(1921), as translated by Graham
Harrison and Michael Wex, edited
by A. M. Rappaport, p. 188
Socrates and Christ speak to us
everlastingly of mankind. … It belongs to
the great, to the greatest men to say
how things are with mankind, how they
stand in its innerness and which way it
is going; it belongs to Socrates and
Christ. These absolutely extraordinary,
eternally alive people penetrate to the
groundless depth of human nature and
understand the speech of ordinary
people, of those who are scarcely alive
from one day to the next.
Constantin Brunner, in Our Christ :
The Revolt of the Mystical Genius
(1921), as translated by Graham
Harrison and Michael Wex, edited
by A. M. Rappaport, p. 189
Socrates autem primus philosophiam
devocavit e caelo et in urbibus conlocavit
et in domus etiam introduxit et coegit de
vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis
quaerere.
 Socrates was the first to call
philosophy down from the sky, to
place it in cities, to introduce it even
into homes, to force it to consider
life and customs, good and evil.
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.10
(tr. Thomas Habinek)
Socrates was a totally new kind of Greek
philosopher. He denied that he had
discovered some new wisdom, indeed
that he possessed any wisdom at all,
and he refused to hand anything down
to anyone as his personal ‘truth’, his
claim to fame. All that he knew, humbly,
was how to reason and reflect, how to
improve himself and (if they would
follow him in behaving the same way)
help others to improve themselves, by
doing his best to make his own moral,
practical opinions, and his life itself, rest
on appropriately tested and examined
reasons—not on social authority or the
say-so of esteemed poets (or
philosophers) or custom or any other
kind of intellectual laziness. At the same
time, he made this self-improvement
and the search for truth in which it
consisted a common, joint effort,
undertaken in discussion together with
similarly committed other persons—
even if it sometimes took on a rather
combative aspect. The truth, if achieved,
would be a truth attained by and for all
who would take the trouble to think
through on their own the steps leading
to it: it could never be a
personal‘revelation’ for which any
individual could claim special credit.
John M. Cooper, Introduction to
Plato's Complete Works (1996)
What then is the chastisement of those
who accept it not? To be as they are. Is
any discontented with being alone? let
him be in solitude. Is any discontented
with his parents? let him be a bad son,
and lament. Is any discontented with his
children? let him be a bad father.
—"Throw him into prison!"—What prison?
—Where he is already: for he is there
against his will; and wherever a man is
against his will, that to him is a prison.
Thus Socrates was not in prison since
he was there with his own consent.
Epictetus, Golden Sayings of
Epictetus #32
It was the first and most striking
characteristic of Socrates never to
become heated in discourse, never to
utter an injurious or insulting word—on
the contrary, he persistently bore insult
from others and thus put an end to the
fray.
Epictetus, Golden Sayings of
Epictetus #64
Triginta tyranni Socratem circumsteterunt
nec potuerunt animum eius infringere.
There were thirty tyrants
surrounding Socrates, and yet they
could not break his spirit.
Seneca, Epistulae morales ad
Lucilium, letter 28
Seemeth it nothing to you, never to
accuse, never to blame either God or
Man? to wear ever the same
countenance in going forth as in coming
in? This was the secret of Socrates: yet
he never said that he knew or taught
anything... Who amongst you makes this
his aim? Were it indeed so, you would
gladly endure sickness, hunger, aye,
death itself.
Epictetus, Golden Sayings of
Epictetus #85
Neither one nor the other doth follow, for
that both the assertions may be true.
The Oracle adjudged Socrates the wi‐
sest of all men, whose knowledg is
limited; Socrates acknowledgeth that he
knew nothing in relation to absolute
wisdome, which is infinite; and because
of infinite, much is the same part as is
little, and as is nothing (for to arrive... to
the infinite number, it is all one to
accumulate thousands, tens, or ciphers,)
therefore Socrates well perceived his
wisdom to be nothing, in comparison of
the infinite knowledg which he wanted.
But yet, because there is some
knowledg found amongst men, and this
not equally shared to all, Socrates might
have a greater share thereof than others,
and therefore verified the answer of the
Oracle.
Galileo Galilei, Dialogue Concerning
the Two Chief World Systems (1632)
as quoted in the Salusbury
translation, The Systeme of the
World: in Four Dialogues (1661) p.
85
Agnosticism, in fact, is not a creed, but a
method, the essence of which lies in the
rigorous application of a single principle.
That principle is of great antiquity; it is
as old as Socrates; as old as the writer
who said, 'Try all things, hold fast by that
which is good'; it is the foundation of the
Reformation, which simply illustrated
the axiom that every man should be able
to give a reason for the faith that is in
him, it is the great principle of
Descartes; it is the fundamental axiom
of modern science.
Thomas Henry Huxley,
"Agnosticism"
I would trade all of my technology for an
afternoon with Socrates.
 Steve Jobs in Newsweek (29
October 2001)
Socrates gave a lot of advice, and he
was given Hemlock to drink.
Rose Kennedy, in an interview with
Barbara Walters (November 1968)
People think the world needs a republic,
and they think it needs a new social
order, and a new religion, but it never
occurs to anyone that what the world
really needs, confused as it is by much
learning, is a new Socrates.
Søren Kierkegaard, in The Sickness
unto Death (1849), as translated by
Alastair Hannay (1989), p. 124
It is exactly as it was in the time of
Socrates, according to the accusation
brought against him: “Everyone
understood how to instruct the young
men; there was but one single
individual who did not understand it –
that was Socrates.” So in our time, “all”
are the wise, there is only one single
individual here and there who is a fool.
So near is the world to having achieved
perfection that now “all” are wise; if it
were not for the individual cranks and
fools the world would be absolutely
perfect. Through all this God sits in
heaven. No one longs to be away from
the noise and clamor of the moment in
order to find the stillness in which God
dwells. While man admires man, and
admires him – because he is just like
everyone else, no one longs for the
solitude wherein one worships God. No
one disdains this cheap intermission
from aiming at the highest, by longing
for the standard of the eternal! So
important has the immediate itself
become. It is for this reason that
superficial disinterestedness is needed.
Oh, that I might in truth present such a
disinterested figure!
Soren Kierkegaard, Works of Love,
Swenson translation 1946 P. 297
Princeton University Press
For they say that the Athenians were
short of men and, wishing to increase
the population, passed a decree
permitting a citizen to marry one
Athenian woman and have children by
another; and that Socrates accordingly
did so.
Diogenes Laërtius, ii. 26
It is better to be a human being
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to
be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool
satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are
of a different opinion, it is because they
only know their own side of the
question. The other party to the
comparison knows both sides.
 John Stuart Mill in Utilitarianism, Ch.
2
Political leaders are never leaders. For
leaders we have to look to the
Awakeners! Lao Tse, Buddha, Socrates,
Jesus, Milarepa, Gurdjiev, Krishnamurti.
Henry Miller, in My Bike & Other
Friends (1977), p. 12
There is nothing more remarkable in the
life of Socrates than that he found time
in his old age to learn to dance and play
on instruments, and thought it was time
well spent.
Michel de Montaigne, The Essays of
Montaigne, Vol. 2, p. 593
Socrates … has nothing on his lips but
draymen, joiners, cobblers and masons.
His inductions and comparisons are
drawn from the most ordinary and best-
known of men’s activities; anyone can
understand him. Under so common a
form we today would never have
discerned the nobility and splendour of
his astonishing concepts; we who judge
any which are not swollen up by
erudition to be base and commonplace
and who are never aware of riches
except when pompously paraded. Our
society has been prepared to appreciate
nothing but ostentation: nowadays you
can fill men up with nothing but wind
and then bounce them about like
balloons. But this man, Socrates, did not
deal with vain notions: his aim was to
provide us with matter and precepts
which genuinely and intimately serve our
lives.
Michel de Montaigne, Essays, M.
Screech, trans. (1991), Book III,
Chapter 12, “Of Physiognomy,” p.
1173
Socrates … is the first philosopher of life
[Lebensphilosoph], … Thinking serves
life, while among all previous
philosophers life had served thought
and knowledge. … Thus Socratic
philosophy is absolutely practical: it is
hostile to all knowledge unconnected to
ethical implications.
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Pre-
Platonic Philosophers, G. Whitlock
trans., p. 145
We cannot help but see Socrates as the
turning-point, the vortex of world history.
Friedrich Nietzsche, in The Birth of
Tragedy (1872), p. 73
The more I read about him, the less I
wonder that they poisoned him. If he
had treated me as he is said to have
treated Protagoras, Hippias, and
Gorgias, I could never have forgiven him.
Thomas Babington Macaulay, Letter
to Thomas Ellis, 29 May 1835, in
 George Otto Trevelyan, The Life and
Letters of Lord Macaulay (1876)
The wisest of you men is he who has
realized, like Socrates, that in respect of
wisdom he is really worthless.
Plato, in Apology, 23b, as quoted in
The last days of Socrates: Euthyphro,
The apology: Crito [and] Phaedo
(1967), p. 52
Every one is agreed that Socrates was
very ugly; he had a snub nose and a
considerable paunch; he was "uglier
than all the Silenuses in the Satyric
drama" ( Xenophon, Symposium). He
was always dressed in shabby old
clothes, and went barefoot everywhere.
His indifference to heat and cold, hunger
and thirst, amazed every one. Alcibiades
in the Symposium, describing Socrates
on military service, says:
"His endurance was simply marvellous
when, being cut off from our supplies,
we were compelled to go without food —
on such occasions, which often happen
in time of war, he was superior not only
to me but to everybody: there was no
one to be compared to him. ...His
fortitude in enduring cold was also
surprising. There was a severe frost, for
the winter in that region is really
tremendous, and everybody else either
remained indoors, or if they went out
had on an amazing quantity of clothes,
and were well shod, and had their feet
swathed in felt and fleeces: in the midst
of this, Socrates with his bare feet on
the ice and in his ordinary dress
marched better than the other soldiers
who had shoes, and they looked
daggers at him because he seemed to
despise them."
His mastery over all bodily passions is
constantly stressed. He seldom drank
wine, but when he did, he could out-drink
anybody; no one had ever seen him
drunk. In love, even under the strongest
temptations, he remained "Platonic," if
Plato is speaking the truth. He was the
perfect Orphic saint: in the dualism of
heavenly soul and earthly body, he had
achieved the complete mastery of the
soul over the body. His indifference to
death at the last is the final proof of this
mastery.
Bertrand Russell, A History of
Western Philosophy (1945), Book
One, Part II, Chapter XI: Socrates, p.
90-91
We are told that Socrates, though
indifferent to wine, could, on occasion,
drink more than anybody else, without
ever becoming intoxicated. It was not
drinking that he condemned, but
pleasure in drinking. In like manner, the
philosopher must not care for the
pleasures of love, or for costly raiment,
or sandals, or other adornments of the
person. He must be entirely concerned
with the soul, and not with the body: "He
would like, as far as he can, to get away
from the body and to turn to the soul."
Bertrand Russell, A History of
Western Philosophy (1945), Book
One, Part II, Chapter XVI: Plato's
Theory of Immortality, p. 135
The Platonic Socrates was a pattern to
subsequent philosophers for many
ages... His merits are obvious. He is
indifferent to worldly success, so devoid
of fear that he remains calm and urbane
and humorous to the last moment,
caring more for what he believes to be
the truth than for anything else
whatever. He has, however, some very
grave defects. He is dishonest and
sophistical in argument, and in his
private thinking he uses intellect to
prove conclusions that are to him
agreeable, rather than in a disinterested
search for knowledge. There is
something smug and unctuous about
him, which reminds one of a bad type of
cleric. His courage in the face of death
would have been more remarkable if he
had not believed that he was going to
enjoy eternal bliss in the company of the
gods. Unlike some of his predecessors,
he was not scientific in his thinking, but
was determined to prove the universe
agreeable to his ethical standards. This
is treachery to truth, and the worst of
philosophic sins. As a man, we may
believe him admitted to the communion
of saints; but as a philosopher he needs
a long residence in a scientific
purgatory.
Bertrand Russell, A History of
Western Philosophy (1945), Book
One, Part II, Chapter XVI: Plato's
Theory of Immortality, p. 142-43
Socrates was the chief saint of the
Stoics throughout their history; his
attitude at the time of his trial, his
refusal to escape, his calmness in the
face of death, and his contention that
the perpetrator of injustice injures
himself more than his victim, all fitted in
perfectly with Stoic teaching. So did his
indifference to heat and cold, his
plainness in matters of food and dress,
and his complete independence of all
bodily comforts.
Bertrand Russell, A History of
Western Philosophy (1945), Book
One, Part III, Chapter XXVIII:
Stoicism, p. 253
With the trial of Socrates, the history of
Western political thinking begins.
Socrates’s death sparked off Plato’s
astonishing philosophical career. Only
five of Plato’s dialogues are centrally
concerned with politics, though many
bear on the practice of Athenian
democracy.
Alan Ryan, On Politics: A History of
Political Thought: From Herodotus to
the Present (2012), Ch. 1 : Why
Herodotus?
Politics may also have lain behind the
trial. Socrates’s friendship with the
opponents of the democracy, both in the
recent past and earlier in the case of
Alcibiades, had alienated his fellow
citizens. They did not mean him to die.
At his trial, he was offered the chance to
stop teaching, but would not take it.
Alan Ryan, On Politics: A History of
Political Thought: From Herodotus to
the Present (2012), Ch. 1 : Why
Herodotus?
It's important to remember that Thomas
Huxley recognized Socrates as the first
agnostic. Socrates very much believed
in a God, although his deity was
somewhat vague and outside of his
people's polytheistic religion.
Philosophically Socrates was the very
essence of agnosticism.
James Kirk Wall, in Agnosticism :
The Battle Against Shameless
 Ignorance (2011), p. 10
If anyone thinks that Socrates is proven
to have lied about his daimon because
the jury condemned him to death when
he stated that a divinity revealed to him
what he should and should not do, then
let him take note of two things: first, that
Socrates was so far advanced in age
that he would have died soon, if not
then; and second, that he escaped the
most bitter part of life, when all men's
mental powers diminish.
Xenophon in Memorabilia, IV. 8.1

See also
 A History of Western
Philosophy#Chapter XI. Socrates
Plato
Xenophon

External links
Socrates at Washington State
University
Project Gutenberg – e-texts on Socrates:
The Dialogues of Plato (see also
Wikipedia articles on Dialogues by
Plato)
The writings of Xenophon , such as
the Memorablia and Hellenica.
The satirical plays by Aristophanes
 Aristotle's writings
Voltaire's Socrates
The Second Story of Meno; a
continuation of Socrates' dialogue
with Meno in which the boy proves
root 2 is irrational (by an
anonymous author)
Ancient Greek schools of philosophy

Anaxagoras • Anaximander • Anaximenes • Democritus • Empedocles • Heraclitus •

Pre-
Leucippus • Melissus • Parmenides • Protagoras • Pythagoras • Thales • Zeno of
Socratic
Elea

Antisthenes • Aristippus • Aristotle • Diogenes of Sinope • Euclid of Megara •

Socratic
Phaedo of Elis • Plato • Socrates

Apollonius of Tyana • Augustine • Epictetus • Epicurus • John Philoponus • Lucretius

Hellenistic
• Plotinus • Proclus • Pyrrho • Sextus Empiricus • Zeno of Citium

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