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THE COMMUNES IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

Author(s): LUCY JEN HUANG
Source: International Review of Modern Sociology, Vol. 6, No. 1 (SPRING 1976), pp. 189-200
Published by: International Journals
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THE COMMUNES IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA: RETROSPECT AND
PROSPECT
LUCY JEN HUANG
International Review of Modern Sociology 1976, Vol. 6 (Spring): 189-200
The establishment of the commune system in the People's Republic

of China in 1958 has been considered one of the most ambitious
experiments in Chinese history . It has undergone various changes
in the seventeen years since its inception . The first period of
commune formation was marked with a high degree of enthusiasm
verging on fanaticism in the common effort to build up China as a
nation standing on two legs , agriculture and industry.
Since 1959 a reorganization pattern has been instituted.
There was a return to a relatively smaller unit of production control
and a decentralized administrative structure was advocated. A
commune consists of various production brigades , each of which
consists of various production teams. The production team , the
smallest unit of the commune , is made up of various households
whose members work in certain assigned fields.
Contrary to the apprehension of many China watchers , family
sentiment under the new regime has expanded from earlier familis -
tic individualism to extended kinship orientations toward non-
kin. Slogans such as " the commune is like home " and " the larger
family of revolution " represent efforts of the regime to encourage
the cooperation of the masses in the rebuilding of a new nation
under communism.
The Chinese commune system , with its trials and errors , has
been rather successful in raising the economic standards of the
country through large-scale participation of the masses. As long
as the family structure is intact and human values have not been
denied we may look forward to a tremendous advancement in the
social and economic levels of the whole nation .
One of the most outstanding charac-is that of political consciousness and

teristics in the life styles of citizenspatriotism. The public service ori-
in the People's Republic of Chinaented philosophy is a far cry from that
190 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY
of pre-Communist China inrative.

which The earlier cooperatives, con-
the old saying, "One sweeps snow
sisting of numerous mutual-aid teams,
called the
from his front door steps instead of"lower form" or "elemen-
worrying about the frost tary"on his agricultural producers' coope-
ratives,
neighbor's roof," was illustrative ofamounted to about 670,000
in 1954
the old philosophy of familistic indi-(Wang, 1955). By 1955 many
vidualism. of the smaller cooperatives were
combined into larger and more ad-
In a quarter of a century, mainland
China has been able to abolish vanced forms (reducing the number
to 650,000) consisting of 16,900,000
begging and prostitution, gambling
peasant households (embracing only
and drug addiction. Visiting American
15 per cent of China's 120,000,000
reporters and scholars have confirm-
ed the fact that it is impossible peasant
to tip households). By the fall of
anyone for service rendered. 1956 Couldan enthusiastic report of Chou
it be possible that mainlandEn-lai China to the Communist Party Con-
has also been able to abolish greed?gress showed a total of 992,000 agri-
As one of the most populous cultural producers' cooperatives em-
nations in the world, social change bracing 91.7 per cent of the country's
in the People's Republic of China peasant households, while Peking
has not been spontaneous or un- published the percentage as 96 per
planned. Since the advent of the new cent (Statistical Office, 1957). China
regime in 1949, leaders under Chair- experts agreed that initial collectivi-
man Mao have attempted to trans- zation in China in 1955-1956 was
form the economic institution from much smoother than it was in Russia,
private ownership to collective as the transformation from private
ownership. ownership was made far less abruptly
with increasing degrees of collecti-
The Origin of the Commune vity initiated at various stages.
System Hudson (1960) and Lin (1958), in
discussing the course of develop-
The transformation from privale ment for the countryside, referred to
ownership to collective ownership the following stages: cooperative,
began in the early 1950s when advanced cooperative, people's com-
peasants were organized into mutual- mune, and advanced people's com-
aid teams (Liao, 1952: 22-24). They mune. The people's commune, there-
pooled their labor, draught animals,fore, represents the last stage of the
and farm equipment in the hope of collectivistic movement of socia-
greater efficiency and higher produc- lism. This is a crucial stage from
tion in agriculture. From mutual-aid which the regime leaders hope to
teams the peasants were made to transform a socialist society into a
pool individual plots of land, animals,communist one.
and heavy farm equipment by means The first period of commune for-
of an agricultural producers' coope- mation was marked by a high degree
THE COMMUNES IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 191
period that the Weihsing Commune

of enthusiasm verging on fanaticism
in the common effort to build a
had wiped out certain last vestiges
utopia under communism. Gearçd
ofto
private ownership of the means of
the ultimate realization of the com- production. It became impossible
munist principles, "From each accor-and unnecessary for commune mem-
ding to his needs" and "Ownershipbers to keep small personal plots of
by the whole people," the Communist land and breed their own pigs due to
Party began to build up China as athe ever-growing need to work collec-
nation standing on two legs, agri-tively and the extension of public
culture and industry. mess hall service for all ( Red Flag ,
The emergence of the first com- 1958).
mune, Weihsing (i Sputnik ) People's Once the state takes over the eco-
Commune in Honan Province took nomic function, the whole nation
becomes employees. One works for
place in April 1958 (Red Flag , 1958).
There was not only the merging the of people, the common good, ins-
cooperatives into a commune but also tead of individual gain or family pros-
the integration and merging of indus-perity. In order to maximize human
labor, every able-bodied-citizen was
try, agriculture, exchange, culture and
put to work. In the Commune of
education, and military affairs. There-
fore, commune members were to Sixteen Guarantees, members were
assume flexible and interchangeable qualified to receive the following :
roles of farmer-worker-trader-stu-
dent-militiaman, depending on the 1. Food
needs of the country at the moment. 2. Clothing (18 Yuan per year in
Through the centralized control of money or clothing)
the commune system, Party leaders 3. Housing
sought to discover an effective device 4. Transportation
in mobilizing maximum human labor, 5. Maternity benefits with 45 days
be it constructing irrigation works, leave and a catty of red sugar
leveling and improving land, affores- 6. Sick leave and free medical aid
ting, struggling against natural cala-7. Free old age care
mities, mechanizing agriculture, buil- 8. Free funeral
ding hydroelectric power plants,9. Free burial
10. Free upbringing of children
or improving communications and
living conditions in the countryside.1 1 . Free recreation
Optimistically the timetable for the12. A small marriage grant on the
transition from collective ownership eve of one's wedding (5 Yuan
to ownership by the whole people each)
was set at "at most six years" and13. Twelve free haircuts per year
from socialism to communism as 14. Twenty free bath tickets per
"after a few years only" (Editorial, year (hot water).
15. Free tailoring
People's Daily , 3 September 1958).
It was also reported during this
16? Free lighting (electricity or oil)
(reported by emigres fromproduction

People's brigade level. All the bri-
Republic of China). gades in turn are under the super-
vision of the commune itself. In a
Benefits for members may vary of rural industry in China,
discussion
from commune to commune, though
Sigurdson presents the following table
basic necessities were well taken care ( The China Quarterly, April-June
of along with maximizing human re- 1972) to show the general area com-
sources in the reconstruction of a munes in Tsunhua County, T'ang-
nation. However, Bowie and Fair- shan Region:
bank (1962) have analyzed the period
of disillusionment and readjust- Total area: 1,640 square kilometers
ment. The Wuhan Resolution indi- (164,000 hectares)
cated that commune members should Cultivated area: 64,000 hectares
be able to retain some individual Grain production: 3.8 tons per hec-
means of livelihood such as farm tare (1971)
tools, animals, etc. The system of
Total industrial production value:
free supply did not seem to function 18,000,000 Yuan (1970)
well, for as long as the commune
Communes : 43
provided free food, members eitherBrigades: 691
overate or squandered public com- Production teams : 2,409
munal materials unnecessarily . Households
A : 1 16,000
meal ticket system was introduced in
Total population: 553,000
various communes and members
There are various subparts which
were not compelled to take meals in
the mess halls if they did not wish to.make up the commune organization.
Thus members began to show moreDue to the extreme policies of 1958
incentive to be frugal and thrifty many modifications of the radical
{China Youth , October 1958; People's
measures that were promoted when
Daily, March 1959). Each family
the communes were first introduced
was able to be rationed from 8 to have taken place (Barnett, 1962: 37).
1 5 per cent of one mou (one-sixth of
One of the changes consisted in reor-
an acre of land). An additional 10ganizing the commune structure into
per cent of one mou will be given various
to subunits for greater decentra-
lized management. Instead of the
a family which breeds one pig, but the
largest plot shall not exceed one mou.
centralized control of the commune
A reorganization pattern has been over various households, various
instituted since 1959. Instead of the
households belong to a production
highly centralized tendency of theteam. And in turn various produc-
early period, a more decentralized tion teams belong to a production
administrative structure was advo- brigade, and various brigades are
cated. There was a return to a rela-under the control of a commune.
tively smaller unit of production con-
trol, The ownership is vested in the In theory, the people's council
[roughly corresponding toend of 1959 in Harbin alone, eight

county
government] sets the goals for the
communes were in operation. He also
individual communes and decides stated that "statistics covering the
what they are to plant and which 22 large or medium-sized cities, in-
crops they are to give the state.cluding Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin,
The commune management team, Wuhan, Chungking, Sian, Shenyang,
in turn, assigns the tasks in theand Harbin listed over 20,000 of
these three factories and workshops
several production brigades on the
basis of the council's productionemploying over 750,000 people."
plan. The brigades parcel out theseThe role of the women in the
communes in the cities has been as
tasks among the various production
groups [Portisch, 1967: 65]. important as that of their rural sis-
ters, if not more. In fact, in an
The above Western visitor found attempt to extract maximum utiliza-
that, to his surprise, the fields did tion of human resources in the
not belong to the commune, nor cities, Communist leaders finally were
to the production brigades. Theyable to round up all the women who,
belong to the production teams, for one reason or another, had not
the smallest work units of the com-
been participating in full-time labor
mune. Each production team con- outside the home. Hughes (I960: 31)
sists of roughly fifty to one hundred refers to the report of the New China
field hands; it can take care of about News Agency in January of 1960 con-
ten small fields which originally might cerning the new commune industries
have belonged to members of the in Peking, i.e., the workshops and
production team before the collec- factories which are now operated by
tivistic movement (Portisch 1967: 69). the people, mostly housewives and
old persons, who were not previously
The Urban Commune gainfully employed. These units alone
added 10 million yuan (1,500,000)
In spite of the Party warning to in the industrial output of the city
con-
in 1959, equaling the total industrial
tinue making experiments in estab-
output value of Peking in 1949.
lishing new communes, various press
items in different cities showed that
beginning in August 1958, communes The Chinese Family under the
were set up in Shanghai, Kweiyang, Commune
Amoy, and Keifeng (Bowie and Fair-

bank, 1962: 26). It was announced Ever since 1958, China watchers and
that 173 urban communes had been experts have been relatively appre-
established in Honan alone at this hensive concerning the survival of the
time. Factories, enterprises, schools, family under the commune system.
government agencies, and streetsIn a monograph published in 1962,
were used as units (Lourd, 1960). we hypothesized that the key to the
Tang (1961: 27) reported that by the major çommunç failures would liç
family life of a Christian minister's

in the thoughtless mismanagement
of family life so deeply wife
rooted anda new atmosphere in
represents
inherent in the centuries-old Chinese the home:
culture (Huang, 1962:46). We fur-
ther projected that if the regime Our family life is now very interes-
leaders were able to provide ade- ting. I and my husband both have
quate personal security and family our work, and our two children are
love for commune members, they in junior and senior middle school.
(the commune members) would be We eat in the public mess hall,
able to contribute their best efforts getting breakfast at dawn, and then
to the support of the commune and we do not see each other again
the State. until the evening meal. At that time
At the beginning of the collectivi- we take turns in telling the rest of
zation of family life, even the citizens the family what we have been doing
in the People's Republic of China during the day. There is a lot to say,
showed doubts and worries. They and it is a lively meal. But sometimes
wrote to regime leaders via editors the evening meal is quiet. I remem-
of magazines inquiring whether col- ber one evening I came about seven
lective life would destroy the family o'clock, and there was nobody
system. The response from the edi- home. On the table was a note from
tors ( Women of China, December my daughter, saying that she had
1958, No. 19: 27-28, 31) assured the eaten supper and hurried back to
readers that the new family system the school for an evening meeting.
was healthy and strong, and that the Underneath were a few words ad-
establishment of the mass dining ded by my son, who said he had not
halls and nurseries would not des-
had supper, but seeing no one at
troy the family. Instead they would home had gone out to the barber's
help to bring sexual equality by hel- for a haircut. That evening I also
ping women to participate in gainful had a meeting to attend, so I
employment and serve the nation hastily ate my supper, and having
more wholeheartedly. The only type added another line to the note
of family they would like to destroy saying where I was, 1 left for my
would be the old, traditional, feuda-meeting. That day my husband was
lists family in which the women on late shift, and did not get home
and children were oppressed. until about twelve o'clock, so be-
In fact the participation of women fore we went to sleep we wrote
in the urban and rural communes him a note to tell him what we had
has indeed brought new sexual done. This has become the most
equality and freedom for women. convenient way of family commu-
Under the encouragement and pro- nication in the Great Leap Forward.
tection of regime leadership there is How delightful our family life is!
a refreshing change in family rela- [China Bulletin , 9 May 1960, No,
tionships. The description of the 10].
The regime leaders furthermore care that it shows us is more than

capitalize on the consanguineal that ofback-
parents for their children"
ground of the age-old Chinese (p. 24). Songs and poems often sing
family, encourage citizens to partici-praises for the Party like the follow-
pate in production outside the ing, "Father is dear, Mother is dear,
home, and to work for "the larger but they are not as dear as the Com-
family of revolution," meaning the munist Party" (p. 24). The main
State. In fact the term "the State" title for a collection of articles repor-
or "country" has always been "State
ting on the return of overseas students
family" in the Chinese language. to mainland China read, "Mother
There is a general theme that theCountry, We have Returned to
whole nation is like a family, and
Your Embrace." The song they sang
after 1949, the regime has been es-was entitled "Overseas Orphans Have
pecially encouraging in promoting Found a Mother." The welcome
committee was called "Welcome
the concept of the nation as a family
revolution. Relatives Representatives" {New
One of the traditional practices in
Inspection, No. 6, March 1960: 6-9).
smaller communities, villages, andAll over the mainland, people have
all the rural areas is to address one
been encouraged to address one
another in kinship terms among another in kinship terms. It is true
people who are not at all relatedthat among small rural commu-
by blood or marriage. The commu-nities and intimate neighborhood
nist regime in the People's Republicgroups in urban areas some kinship
of China has often proclaimed thatterms had been used among non-kin
"Commune is Like Home" or "Love before 1949. However, this practice
Commune Like Home" through dis-has been widely observed in almost
playing posters in various strategicall circles since the advent of the
locations since 1958 ( Women ofCommunist regime; it is especially
China , No. 10, October 1961:5).evident on the pages of press and
The government and Chairman Maomagazines. Nursery personnel are
are presented as the symbols of generally addressed as "Aunties."
paternal authority. Communist Hero- Nursery children are encouraged to
ines are often lauded for "living the sing songs like "Good Auntie, Good
life of the larger family of revolu- Auntie, Auntie is like Mama, and
tion" (Editorial, "The Party's Con- Bao-bao [the child's name] obeys
cern is Unlimited," Women of China ,you..." (Gia Gee, "Good Auntie,"
July 1961, No. 7: 24). The Party Women of China , No. 6, June 1961).
is often referred to as "parents of When one sees older people, he
my rebirth" (Suen Chih-ying, "The usually addresses them as "Grand-
Three Memorable Days," Women of father Lee," "Grandmother Chen,"
China , February 1961, No. 2: 8-9) "Father Wong" or "Mother Loo."
and it is stated that the "Party's When he meets someone of the
concern for the people, the loving same generation, he would call
was or
this person cousin, brother stunned by grief; his commune
sister,
or sister-in-law. When one stranger
"brothers" got together to take care
asks another on the street for the of their "sister-in-law's" funeral (Hai,
direction of a hospital or a factory,
1960). A helpful neighbor who took
he would address him as "older care of some thirty workers' fami-
brother." lies was lauded as a "Model Wife"
With the increasing impersonality and "Good Homemaker" (Wong,
of the commune structure, in plan- 1961:5). The "Happy Home" for
ning and establishing small factories, senior citizens has been well attended
medical clinics and hospitals, and by "good daughters" (employees)
irrigation, individuals seem to have and it was reported that little "grand-
been lost in the shuffle. However, sons" and "granddaughters" from
nurseries had made frequent visits
From the point of view of com- to sing and dance for "grandparents."
munist political methods, it sought China watchers and scholars have
to restore the face-to-face relation- in general been convinced that the
ship of groups, of neighbors, led by establishment of rural and urban
neighbors [often indeed relatives communes since 1958 does not
rather than neighbors] while at appear to threaten the sense of
the same time leaving the Party as belonging to the family even though
free as political conditions permitted the structure of the home has been
to renew the emphasis upon in- affected (Lazure, 1967: 429). The ra-
creased scale [Gray, 1966: 219]. dical changes in social life, with 80
per cent of women who are physi-
Indeed, after the initial euphoria cally fit working outside their homes,
and errors in 1958, there was increa- have brought greater sexual equality
sing sophistication and flexibility. in China than anytime in history.
The commune system's success has
been attributed to the active coope- Future Perspectives
ration of natural social groupings
with intensely personal and local It is apparent that there is greater
loyalties. The Communist regime progress in the economy of the
does not only encourage family sen- People's Republic of China than in
timent by emphasizing the impor- pre-Communist days. The achieve-
tance of kinship terminology, but ments of communes have been re-
also advocates that commune mem- ported via various means. According
bers show concern and affection for to Klatt (1970: 102):
one another in action and in deed.
When a mother died in childbirth,At Anhwei some 150,000 people,
the commune adopted the baby and working during the winter along
arranged for a wet nurse to takethe Yangtse river, apparently com-
care of her (Chang, 1957). On thepleted no more than a foot each of
death of his wife a commune member a new dike. In Honan a pumping
station driven by water wheels seemsrewards (Khan, 1972: 544).

to provide irrigation for 30 hectares As the result of the commune
movement in China, rural unemploy-
per wheel; against this, in Hopei,
400 wells equipped with power- ment has virtually been solved. With
operated pumps irrigate 5 hectares the establishment of village indus-
each. In Hunan a commune applies tries and workshops, there is now
200 tons of compost per hectare no shortage of work; however, the
of farm land - an enormous under- seasonal agricultural demands may
taking; another commune claims fluctuate. The peasants of China who
a yield of 10 tons of paddy per hec- were on the average working produc-
tare - approximately four times the tively for only 161 days in 1957, were
national average. working as many as 300 days a year
in the 1960s (Greene, 1964: 150).
In the process of reorganizing the Barnett (1960: 24-25) discussed
commune system, an increasing trend with much caution concerning the
of decentralization of leadership has Chinese commune system:
been observed. There is a general
push toward an incentive system. The communes have portentous
Instead of using the quota system and implications for China's future.
the daily assessment of the labor eff- Economically, they represent an au-
orts of a worker, in some communes dacious attempt to organize and
a standard or model is fixed by the mobilize the entire rural popula-
masses. In a monthly meeting the tion behind a regimented, intensive
members of the squads and the campaign to develop both agricul-
team select a model worker, keeping ture and rural industry. They have
in view the following criteria: (1) greatly expanded the labor force
ideological consciousness, (2) atti- that the regime can control
tude to labor and to the collective,
and (3) quantity of work and quality The author continued to refle
of work. The individual worker pessimism concerning such
innovations as communal mes
assesses his work against the model
worker and reports what he or communal
she nurseries, and hom
the aged which might beco
should get in terms of work points
which are finalized after mass dis- almost Orwellian political c
cussion of the group. For as long as over China's population. His
have not been warranted based
one works to the best of his ability
conscientiously, there is no discri-on recent reports from mainland
mination between light or heavyChina. "In the three years 1970 to
work. The most important point 1972, the average increase in the
here is the attitude, working for the country's total grain output was 40
revolution and for the reconstruction per cent every year, And total grain
of the communist nation instead of output in 1973 was over 10 per cent
working for work points and material more than the previous year" (Lu
and Chou, 1974: 15). It was in

further
the rural areas. By the end of 1972
reported that members of themore than 50 per cent of China's
Tashan
professional medical workers and
People's Commune had transformed
medical
their hills year by year. Poor, appropriations were serving
deso-
late mountainous villages the
had been
countryside at the county level
turned into a flourishing,and
newbelow
so-(Hsin, 1973: 2). Since
1966 grain
cialist countryside. Average commune-level staff have raised
output of the commune in their
1972skill
rosethrough training courses,
to 6.48 tons per hectare as againstlearning from experienced
on-the-spot
doctors, and further study in the
2.93 tons in 1957. From 1958 to
county hospital. They can now do
1974 total grain and oil-bearing
crops, peanuts and soya beans,abdominal
deli- operations for such con-
vered by the commune to theditions
state as appendicitis, intestinal obs-
truction, and gastric ulcers. Almost
amounted to over 16,000 and 14,000
all emergency
tons respectively. In their effort to cases can be handled.
establish a relatively completeThe commune hospitals also train
net-
barefoot doctors; both Chinese and
work of water conservation projects,
Western
Yutai County now can irrigate all medicine are combined and
its 30,000 hectares of paddy each school attempts to learn from
fields
once within sixteen hours. If a storm the other in the cooperative effort
comes up, all surplus water can basi- to study cases (Hsin, 1973:2-4).
cally be drained out within 24 The Chinese commune system with
hours. The state contributed onlythree levels of production control is
30 per cent of the fund while various primarily the social innovation of
communes provided 70 per cent of the the communist regime of the People's
money needed to build the projectRepublic of China. Its major function
(Lu and Chou, 1974: 13-15). It iscenters around the economic develop-
indeed difficult to assess the accu- ment of the nation. Based on reports
racy of these reports ; however,from mainland China as well as from
one may surmise that things havevisiting Western reporters and re-
improved a great deal since the for- searchers, the commune system seems
mation of the commune system. to enjoy relative success, after almost
The contribution of the commune seventeen years of experimentation.
system is not confined only to the The unique nature of the Chinese
production of grain or the manufac-commune, in contrast to the Ameri-
ture of rural industries; it also pro- can version, is in its origin. Instead
vides medical and educational ser- of the spontaneous inception of the
vices for the welfare of commune many varieties of the American
communes by members themselves,
members. Nearly every one of China's
50,000 communes has a hospital.the Chinese communes were orga-
Since the cultural revolution in 1966,
nized and planned by political leaders
health departments have made great with the masses participating on
strides in medical and health work different levels of production.
It has been reported (Starr, Chang,

1972:Liang-ming
1957 "Commune sister." People's
106-125) that the Paris Commune
Daily, Jen Min Jih-Pao (June
which existed for seventy-two days 1).
from 18 March to 29 May 1871,
Chinahad
Bulletin
been reconsidered as a model for the 1960 No. 10 (May 9).
Gia Gee
commune operations during the early
months of the Cultural Revolution. 1961 "Good auntie." Women of
China 6 (June).
The Commune model was actually Gray, Jack
implemented briefly in February of 1966 "Some aspects of the deve-
1967 in China's two largest cities. lopment of Chinese agrarian
The model proved to be desirable policies, contemporary China"
but unattainable within the limits In Ruth Adams (ed.), Vintage
Books, pp. 119-219.
of the political conditions of the Greene, Felix
Cultural Revolution. The establish- 1964 A Curtain of Ignorance.
ment of the communes was seen by Garden City, New York:
the Chinese much more in terms of its Doubleday and Company,
Inc.
social and economic significance than
Hai Po
it was in terms of its political signi- 1960 "Commune report." New
ficance. Inspection 24 (December).
It is our contention that the Hsin Hua-wen
Chinese commune system, with 1973 its "Commune hospitals grow."

trials and errors, has been rather China Reconstructs (November).
Huang, Lucy Jen
successful in raising the economic 1962 The Impact of the Commune
standards of the country through on the Chinese Family. Santa
large-scale participation of the mas- Barbara, California: General
ses. As long as the family structure Electric Company.
is intact and human values have not Hudson, Geoffrey (ed.)
1960 The Chinese Communes, Insti-
been denied we may look forward tute of Pacific Relations. New
to a tremendous advancement in the York.
social and economic levels of the Hughes, Richard
whole nation. 1960 The Chinese Communes.
London: The Rodley Head.
Hung-ch'i
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York: John Wiley and Son, 1972 "Revolution in retrospect: the
Inc.
Paris Commune through
Liao, Lu- Yuen Chinese eyes." The China
1952 "The great victory of three Quarterly 49 (January-March).
years of land reform move- Statistical Office
ment." Hua Ch'iao Jih-Pao,
New York (October): 22-23. 1957 Report on the Fulfillment of
the Economic Plan for 1956.
Lin
1958 Red Flag. October 1. Peking.
Lourd, D. E. E. Suen Chih-ying
1960 "The urban communes." The 1961 "The three memorable days."
China Quarterly (July-Septem- Women of China 2 (February).
ber). Tang, Peter S. H.
Lu Hsuan, and Chou Chin
1961 The Commune System in
1974 "Tremendous force in trans-
Mainland China. Washington,
forming nature." Peking re-
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returned to your embrace." 1955 "The great accomplishments of
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1958 "Hold high the red flag of Women of China 10 (October).
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on." Editorial (September 3).
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1959 Editorial (March 7).
limited." Editorial (July).
Portisch, Hugo
1958 No. 19 (December).
1967 Red China Today. New York:
1961 No. 10 (October).
Fawcett Crest Books.
Red Flag Wong, Pao-shin
1958 "Greet the upsurge in forming 1961 "Liu Siu-san: model wife of a
people's communes" (Septem- mine worker." Women of
ber). China.
The Role of the People's Commune in Rural Development in China
Author(s): Greg O'Leary and Andrew Watson
Source: Pacific Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 4 (Winter, 1982-1983), pp. 593-612
Published by: Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2756843
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The Role of the People's
Commune in Rural
Development in China*
Greg O'Leary
Andrew Watson
DURING THE TWENTY YEARS from 1958 to 1978, the framework for
rural development throughout China was provided by the peo-
ple's commune, a structure with a "three-level system of ownership with
the production team as its basis." In the vast majority of communes, the
ownership of land, labour, basic farming-implements, and animals was
vested in the team level, a unit with an average population of fewer than
170 people.' The team managed the farming tasks and formed the unit
of account for calculating and dividing income. At successively higher
levels of organization, the brigade and the commune provided inputs of
larger machinery and water resources, general management, and overall
planning. Depending on the quality of leadership and available re-
sources, the latter two levels also accumulated the funds to invest in
infrastructure, subsidiary undertakings, and small industries. In addi-
tion, the commune formed the basis for governmental administration in
the countryside. It absorbed the functions of the old xiang (township)
and took most of the responsibility for the provision of welfare services,
education, public security, and so forth.2
At different times during those twenty years, there were variations in
the emphasis placed on different aspects of this structure and on the
extent of peasant activity outside it. There was never, however, any
* This paper, which was presented in draft form at the Asian Studies Association of
Australia Conference in Melbourne, May 1982, grows out of work on Chinese agriculture
currently being undertaken with support by grants from the Australian Research Grants
Scheme.
1 Zhongguo Nongye Nianjian, 1980 (China Agriculture Yearbook for 1980) (hereafter
Yearbook) (Nongye Chubanshe, 1981), p. 5, reports 4,816,000 teams with 803,200,000
members in 1978.
2 See Xu Dixin, ed., Zhengzhi Jingjixue Cidian (Dictionary of Political Economy), vol. 3
(Beijing, 1981), pp. 87-9, for a definition of the commune structure before the reforms
mooted in the draft constitution of April 1982 (Renmin Ribao [People's Daily], 28 April
1982).
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Pacific Affairs
suggestion that alternative structures for the development of China's

countryside were under consideration. Future development of rural
society, in both economic and political terms, was conceived in terms of a
transition over a long period from team, through brigade, to commune-
level ownership, management, and accounting.
As a model of development, the commune embodied two main
characteristics: it was based on a belief in the necessity of collective
organization economically, politically, and socially; and it operated
according to the principle of self-reliance. Apart from being seen as the
necessary form for socialist agriculture, collective organization was
regarded as providing the means to mobilize the peasants and to
accumulate the resources necessary for development. Self-reliance in
part reflected the situation of scarcity where the peasants could rely on
little but their own efforts, and in part it reflected the belief that
development must be created from within a community with the full
participation of all its members.
Both inside and outside China, many political, social, and economic
advantages were attributed to this model. In political terms, the com-
mune was believed to advance socialism by eradicating private owner-
ship of the means of production and by enabling a greater degree of
state-planning and control. Although not fully socialist in the sense of
achieving complete public ownership, the commune was nevertheless
seen to embody ideals of political and economic equality that would form
part of the growth of socialism. It was also believed to be both
democratic and participatory since, in theory at least, the peasants were
entitled to take part in decisions about their collective. The model was
therefore "educative," in that participation by the peasants was expected
to improve their understanding and control of economic development.
New technology, for example, could be adapted to conform to commu-
nity requirements rather than dictating them.
In social terms, the commune structure was seen as a form of
community development in which all, rather than a minority, of the
peasants in a collective could share in the benefits of economic develop-
ment. Public accumulation could eventually provide social services and
medical and welfare care for everyone. The absence of private owner-
ship and hired labour ensured that social polarization could not take
place. As the operation of the collective moved progressively up the
three-level structure, successively larger numbers of people would unite
with a greater pooling of resources and benefits. Furthermore, as this
happened, the peasants would be educated away from the customs and
594
The Role of the People's Commune in China
habits of the traditional small-peasant economy and would learn both

socialist values and modern science and technology.
In economic terms, the commune was thought to embody many
important advantages, including economies of scale, greater accumula-
tion and better distribution. First, it enabled concentration and rational-
ization in the use of labour. Since labour formed the major input in
agricultural production, improved use of this resource would help both
to increase production and to accumulate funds for modernization. The
development of collective activities would also ensure full employment
for the rural labour force and prevent the drift to urban areas that has
taken place in other developing countries. Second, the commune
enabled concentration of land. This not only reduced the waste inherent
in the farming of small plots, but also made it possible to improve soil
management and irrigation and to undertake large projects to level and
reclaim land. Third, the commune enabled the concentration of capital.
This could be used to purchase and maintain inputs which individual
families could not afford-such as large machinery, deep wells, large
irrigation works, transport equipment, and other infrastructural re-
quirements. It could also develop subsidiaries and help diversify produc-
tion, as well as improving scientific and technical levels. Finally, the
commune would redistribute wealth and income within the collective
community and thereby ensure a more equal standard of living for all
peasants.
Clearly it would have been idealistic for the Chinese to claim that all
of these hoped-for advantages were realised in all communes over the
past twenty years. Discussion in the Chinese media has, therefore,
consistently relied on publicizing model-units for other communes to
emulate, each model illustrating one or several aspects. The most well-
known of these, of course, was Dazhai Brigade which through self-
reliance and collectivization overcame its poor mountain environment to
achieve high grain-yields and a relatively good standard of living. In
general, such models tended to stress that collective mobilization and
changes in the relations of production could form the basis for develop-
ment. It was never conceded that poor natural endowment or lack of
resources could make development impossible. Rather, it was claimed
that, in the spirit of the foolish old man who moved the mountain,
collective effort and hard work could defy seemingly insuperable odds.
In practice, one factor common to all of these models was the
presence of high-quality inspirational leadership. This was true of
Dazhai Brigade and of most other models open to foreigners, such as
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Wugong Brigade in Hubei, Xiadingjia Brigade in Shandong, and

Fenghuo and Yuanjia Brigades in Shaanxi.3 In most cases, the leader-
ship groups in these units have been working as effective teams at least
since the 1950s, and in some cases since the 1940s. Whatever locational
and environmental advantages and disadvantages these collectives may
have, their presentation as models tended to reflect the importance of
leadership as a crucial factor in development.
In sum, therefore, for most of the period between 1958 and 1978,
the people's commune was presented as a form of rural community
development where the advantages of collectivization and self-reliance
could be realised through proper leadership. There was never any
indication, except during the few years after the Great Leap Forward
when the operation of the commune system was heavily revised, that
there were any weaknesses in the model, and evaluation of its perform-
ance has generally been positive and optimistic. In material terms,
during that period, total grain production grew by some 50 per cent
(from 195.05 million tonnes in 1957 to 304.8 million tonnes in 1978),4
the agricultural sector produced enough to feed and clothe an addition-
al 300 million people (from 646.53 million in 1957 to 958.09 million in
1978),5 and a considerable amount of capital was accumulated to invest in
agricultural modernization and in industry.6
THE COMMUNE MODEL UNDER ATTACK
Since 1978, the above optimistic view of the commune as a model for
development has come under increasing scrutiny within China. This
reassessment, which has grown steadily more critical, has been accompa-
nied by policy changes which have had increasingly deeper impact on
commune structure. By early 1981, this had reached the stage where
some economists in China were already calling for thorough reforms of
the commune system and the abandonment of many of its established
features.7 One year later, many of those reforms were in operation, and
others were foreshadowed in the draft state constitution.
Criticisms of the commune system, which have appeared in the
3 We visited Wugong and Xiadingjia in 1979, and Fenghuo and Yuanjia in 1981. Th
are all units which have been regularly publicized both nationally and locally.
4 Yearbook, p. 34.
S Liu Zheng, et al., China's Population: Problems and Prospects (Beijing: New World Pres
1981), pp. 59, 68.
6 On the accumulation of industrial investment funds from agriculture, see Su Xing
"On the Question of Agricultural Prices," Shehui Kexue Zhanxian (Social Sciences Front),
(1979), pp. 101-8.
' See, for example, remarks by Yu Zuyao inJingJixue Dongtai (Economic Trends) 1 (19
pp. 25-9.
596
Chinese press and various journals cited in this article, have addressed a
wide range of issues. The commune has been blamed for failing to raise
peasant income and provide incentives for peasants to work harder. As a
result, improvements in the productivity of land have been uneven and
the productivity of labour has hardly improved at all. The combination
of economic and governmental functions in the same structure is
criticised for making economic policy subordinate to governmental or
political priorities. As a consequence, decisions have tended to be taken
without consideration of their economic efficiency-for example, the
generalized pursuit of higher grain-yields has in many cases been
achieved only at the cost of reduced profitability and income. This in
turn has made it difficult for many communes to accumulate funds to
invest in diversification and sideline activities to further modernization,
or to provide welfare services. Such problems, the critics say, have been
compounded by poor or corrupt leadership. Many low-level rural cadres
are said to have preferred to implement directives blindly. Others are
criticised for "feudal" or corrupt leadership and are said to have used
their position to avoid doing any work themselves and to usurp collective
labour or collective funds for their own benefit. The list of such
criticisms is long and includes both technical issues-such as the difficul-
ties involved in setting labour norms correctly to ensure collective
profitability and reduce costs, while at the same time providing full
incentives to the peasants-and issues of general policy, such as the
extent of autonomy of the production team.
Party journals now argue that around one-third of collectives in
China have avoided these shortcomings and have been relatively success-
ful; another third are in an intermediate position with some failings, but
with the potential to succeed; and the remainder are poor and backward.8
In practice, however, the policy changes that are taking place have had a
significant impact on all communes, regardless of their past successes or
failures. In the following sections, we shall examine more closely some of
the criticisms now being levelled at the communes and some of the
organizational reforms being carried out in response to these criticisms.
We shall conclude by looking at the implications for the future of the
commune model.
Low Levels of Productivity
Despite current criticisms of low productivity-increases, the output of

grain over the period between 1957 and 1978 grew at a rate of around
8 See article by Du Runsheng in Hongqi (Red Flag), 19 (1981), pp. 17-25.
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Pacific Affairs
2.7 per cent per annum.9 Furthermore, the extension of irrigation and
double-cropping, the introduction of improved seeds, and the develop-
ment of mechanization have all been widely-reported features of agri-
cultural development over the past twenty years. The issue, therefore, is
what enabled some collectives to succeed in raising productivity and
what hindered others.
To some extent, of course, the improvement of productivity depends
on factors outside the control of communes. The availability and cost of
new inputs-such as machinery to raise labour productivity and fertiliser
to raise land productivity--is largely determined within the state-
planning and industrial system. Although over the past twenty years
considerable investments have been made in agriculture-related indus-
tries, and the prices of agricultural means of production have deliberate-
ly been kept low, recent analysis in China of the proportion of planned
investment (i.e., excluding local and commune investment) devoted to
projects supporting agriculture has argued that it has been insufficient
for agricultural needs. It is also claimed that the diversion of labour and
resources to heavy industrial projects during the Great Leap Forward
and the 1970s worked to the detriment of the agricultural sector.10
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the overall terms of trade
between agriculture and industry have also worked to accumulate funds
from agriculture for investment in industry at an excessive rate."
A related issue is the extent to which increases in total output have
been achieved not through improvements in productivity but through
increases in total cultivated area or in the total amount of labour power.
The extension of double-cropping both raises land productivity and
extends the sown acreage. The addition of new land, however, may
increase total output while reducing average productivity. Increasing
the amount of labour used without improving its quality may raise total
output, but ipsofacto does not improve productivity. Depending on local
land, water, and labour resources, communes have been relatively free
to expand their production using the combination of these strategies
that they have felt to be most appropriate. Judging the results, however,
9 Yearbook, p. 34.
10 Yang Jianbai and Li Xueceng, "Lun Wo Guo Nong-Qing-Zhong Guanxi de Lishi
Jingyan" ("The Historical Experience of the Relation between Agriculture, Light Industry,
and Heavy Industry in China"), Jingji Yanjiu Cankao Ziliao (Economic Research Reference
Materials), no. 70 (May 1980), pp. 1-52. See, also, Liang Wensen, "Balanced Development
of Industry and Agriculture," in Xu Dixin, et al., China's Search for Economic Growth
(Beijing: New World Press, 1982), pp. 52-78.
11 Su Xing, "On the Question of Agricultural Prices."
598
has been difficult, given the uneven quality of the upward reported
figures.
According to the 1981 China Economic Yearbook, cultivated acreage
declined between 1957 and 1979, from 111.83 million hectares to 99.5
million hectares, while over the same years the irrigated area doubled
from 10.68 million hectares to 22.3 million.'2 This suggests that,
although some land was lost to the construction of buildings, roads, and
so forth, the potential for double-cropping on other land increased.
Nevertheless, the same source also states that the reported figure for
cultivated area is too low. Most commune cadres, for example, will
acknowledge that the "planned acreage" on which they have to pay tax
and make compulsory sales is less than the actual cultivated acreage. The
Chinese press has also criticised the existence of "bang mang tian" (help-
me-out fields)-that is, unreported acreage, the output of which is used
to boost the figures for yields on reported acreages. An aerial survey of a
county near Beijing and one in Jilin in 1980 showed that the actual
cultivated areas were respectively 7.8 per cent and 25.8 per cent higher
than the reported figures.'3 In addition, there were reports in Beijing
during 1981 that a Landsat survey had shown that cultivated acreage
was some 50 per cent greater than the official figures.'4 The issue is thus
a confused one and is probably compounded by local variations in the
size of the mu.15
The 1980 China Agricultural Yearbook, published some six months
after the 1981 Economic Yearbook, also notes that the figure for cultivated
acreage is under-reported. It estimates an error in the region of 20 per
cent and a probable total of over 120 million hectares, or an 11 per cent
increase over the 1957 figure. 16 The 1980 Yearbook, however, also
reports substantial increases in the per unit area yield of grain over the
period, rising from 195 jin per mu in 1957 (1.463 tonnes per hectare) to
337 jin per mu in 1978 (2.367 tonnes per hectare), while the grain-sown
acreage dropped from 133.6 million hectares to 120.6 million.'7 Even
given the substantial errors and distortions in these upward-reported
figures, the evidence does suggest a considerable improvement in land
productivity. It seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that most com-
12 1981 Zhongguo Jingii Nianjian (Chinese Economic Yearbook for 1981) (Beijing: Jingj
Guanli Zazhi She, 1981) p. VI-9.
13 Renmin Ribao, 19 January 1981.
14 Personal communication from Su Xing.
15Jingji Guanli (Economic Management), 5 (1979), p. 29.
16 Yearbook, p. 2.
17 Ibid., pp. 35-5. The sown-acreage total allows for double-cropping.
599
Pacific Affairs
munes have been able to raise yields through such means as improve-
ments in irrigation, seeds, and fertiliser application. While some land
may have been lost to other uses, this loss has been more than
compensated by increases in yields and by other additions to the
cultivated acreage. It is likely, however, that the latter additions have
been achieved by extending farming into more marginal areas at some
cost to average productivity. In practice, the process has probably been
one where communes in the better-endowed regions have been able to
raise yields significantly, while those in less favourable situations have
been raising total output by extending farming into more marginal land.
Given this probability of regional variations in the rate of improve-
ment of the productivity of land, there is some evidence to suggest that
in poorer areas and in collectives where there has been little accumula-
tion to invest in water resources and modern inputs, yields on private
plots are much higher than on collective lands. In Dongxigou and
Wangjia Brigades of Fenghuo Commune, for example, grain yields on
private plots were reported to be respectively five times and three times
that on the collectively farmed fields.18 Peasants and commune official
both in Fenghuo and other communes we visited in 1981 -as well as
economists in Beijing, Xi'an and elsewhere-considered this difference
in yields at Fenghuo reflected a fairly general situation. Although the
high yields achieved on private plots could not be generalized to all land,
given the greater intensity in use of traditional inputs on them, the
implication is that in some communes the collective organization has
failed to mobilize peasant initiative. Clearly, however, this does not
permit the conclusion that the commune structure per se has generally
hindered increases in the productivity of land. There can be no doubt
that such developments as the introduction of improved seeds and the
extension of irrigated area have taken place within the collective
framework.
In terms of the growth of labour productivity, however, less has been
achieved. Su Xing, for example, has pointed out that between 1957 and
1978 total grain output grew by about 50 per cent, while the total
agricultural labour force also grew by about 50 per cent. 19 While acc
must be taken of changes in the structure of agricultural output and
increases in the output of other crops, the simple conclusion is that most
of the growth in the output of grain can be attributed to increases in the
18 Interview at Fenghuo, October 1981.

'9Jingji Yanjiu (Economic Research), 2 (1979), p. 37.
600
input of labour. A similar conclusion can be drawn from the figures

cited by Yang Jianbai and Li Xueceng:
Total Agricultural Total Grain Grain Output

Social Labour Force Output per Labourer
(millions) (million tonnes) (kg. per person)
1957 193.1 195.5 1,010.1

1978 294.26 304.3 1,035.6
(Source: Jingji Yanjzu Cankao Ziliao, no. 70 [May 1980])
If these figures are reliable, one possible interpretation is that,

although communes have managed successfully to organize labour, to
extend irrigation, and to farm intensively, using both modern and
traditional inputs, they have only been able to do this by adding to the
labour force and not by improving labour productivity. They have
simply used more of the same input. Assuming the potential for
improving labour productivity exists, the implication is that there has
been considerable underemployment of the rural labour force. Recent
examples of improvements in productivity as a result of the introduction
of the production responsibility systems seek to prove that this was
indeed the case. A report from one commune in Anhui in 1981, for
example, claimed that before household contracting was introduced the
labour force engaged in farming made up 81.3 per cent of the total
commune labour force. After the change, this declined to 45.1 per cent
and in 1981 further decreased to 37 per cent. There was a surplus of
some 16,000 labourers.20 Similarly, a report from Henan claimed that in
three communes in Kaifeng Prefecture, the introduction of the produc-
tion responsibility system meant that there was now a labour surplus of
around 42.3 per cent of the original labour force. If generalized to the
prefecture as a whole, this would give a surplus of 860,000 labourers out
of a total of 2.03 million.21 While these examples are obviously intende
to justify the new system and should not be taken at their face value to
represent the national situation as a whole, they may well reflect an
underlying structural problem, one that the commune system has not
been able to overcome and may even have exacerbated. With a large
growth in population and a minimum growth in productivity, it is not
surprising to find claims that until recently as much as one-eighth of the
20 Renmin Ribao, 26 November 1981.

21Jingji Guanli, 8 (1981), p. 3.
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Pacific Affairs
rural population did not have sufficient grain to eat and, for most
people, grain rations in 1978 were little different from 1957.22
Egalitarian Income Distribution and Low Incentives
This aspect of commune operation has been one of the most widely
criticised. The work-point system frequently did not reflect differences
in the quality and amount of work each peasant performed. Peasants
who turned up for work were awarded points regardless of the efficien-
cy of their effort and, for the sake of simplicity, in many cases all
peasants were given similar points regardless of their strength or level of
skill. As a result, there were no incentives for peasants to work harder.
Moreover, restrictions on the size of private plots and on rural markets
meant there was little incentive for peasants to exert themselves even
outside the collective economy. At present, such problems are catego-
rized as excessive egalitarianism and a failure to implement the principle
of "payment according to work done."
In reality, of course, there has always been considerable variation in
the way each collective has organized its labour force and established its
labour norms and work-point quotas. Furthermore, in some cases
commune cadres report that they resisted the introduction of egalitarian
systems of income distribution and continued to make payments accord-
ing to work done while changing the name used for their system to suit
the political demands of the times.23 It is thus risky to generalize for all
communes. It may well have been the case that the major problem with
the work-point system was not the way the work points themselves were
distributed, but the fact that extra efforts by individual peasants did not
lead to an increase in their own income but to an increase in total team or
brigade income, which was then divided equally among everyone. In
communes where improved farming and diversified production meant
that the value of the work-point distribution from the collective was
higher than the income that could be obtained from family farming, this
is unlikely to have been a disincentive. In the less successful communes,
however, where the situation was closer to subsistence crop-farming, the
issue may well have been important. In addition, the efforts during the
Cultural Revolution to introduce the Dazhai work-point system, while
22 "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Som

Questions Concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Development (Draft)," December
1978, in Issues and Studies (July 1979), pp. 105-6.
23 Interviews at Dayudao Brigade and Shijiazhuang Brigade, Shandong, December
1979.
602
probably not widely successful, were symptomatic of a preference for a

method of income distribution which took into account considerations
other than simply the amount and quality of work done.
It is now widely believed in China that the only way to provide
incentives for increasing production and raising peasant incomes is to
introduce new systems of labour organization which directly relate
income to production. Work points should be awarded according to the
fulfillment of production targets, and surpluses should be rewarded by
bonuses. The way to ensure that this has the desired incentive effect is to
contract directly with individual peasants or households. In addition, it is
accepted that controls over rural labour should be loosened so that it is
freer to engage in activities outside the collective and further increase
production and income.
Ultimately, this approach means accepting inequalities of income
between peasant families. While under the old system it was always true
that differences in the ratio between labourers and dependents in each
family led to differences in total family incomes and standards of living,
it is now argued that those families able to make the most of their
resources to increase their wealth should not be restrained, and that
"some may grow rich before others." An increase in income differentials
is thus now explicitly encouraged.
Rigidity of Operation
The criticism that commune control over constituent teams is too

rigid relates not only to the internal structure of the commune but also
to its external obligations. Commune and brigade leaders, for example,
are criticised for requisitioning team labour without consideration of the
needs of the teams, and for taking other resources from teams without
proper compensation. Such actions are now forbidden.24 On the other
hand, such restrictions on team activity as the setting of sown-acreage
quotas for different crops, limitations on per capita distribution, and
restrictions on marketing, were the result of the overall structure of
agricultural administration. In these cases, the commune cadres were
simply passing on or implementing directives from above.
Similarly, criticisms of commune cadres for having a "one crop"
mentality reflect the fact that commune leaders were under pressure
from outside to plant grain crops and to meet compulsory sales quotas.
It is now commonly argued by Chinese commentators that, as a result,
24 "Decision of the Central Committee," pp. 1 10-1 1.
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Pacific Affairs
TABLE 1. GROSS VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT BY SECTOR (PER CENT)
Animal
Year Crop Farming Forestry Husbandry Subsidiaries Fisheries
1957 80.6 1.7 12.9 4.3 0.5

1965 75.8 2.0 14.0 6.5 1.7
1970 74.7 2.2 12.9 8.7 1.5
1976 69.3 3.3 13.9 12.0 1.5
1977 67.5 3.2 13.1 14.1 1.5
1978 67.8 3.0 13.2 14.6 1.4
Source: Jingjz Yanjzu Zzhao,
grain production was extended into unsuitable areas at a cost to the

environment and at the cost of foregoing other more profitable produc-
tion such as fruit, timber, and animal husbandry. This was accompanied
by a failure to consider the economic costs of such efforts. In many cases,
it is claimed, increases in grain output resulted in a drop in collective
income because of large rises in production costs. While some aspects of
this problem can be attributed to the planned-price structure or to the
general difficulty experienced in Chinese agriculture of calculating
production costs25 -and the situation in many communes may be more
complex than this simple argument suggests-the costs of increasing
grain production in marginal areas may well have exceeded the returns.
Alongside this attack on a "one crop" mentality is the widely reported
view that the communes have failed to develop diversified farming and
subsidiary undertakings. At first sight, such criticism would seem
undeserved. The development of small-scale rural enterprises has
always been seen as part of the commune model.26 By 1976 there were
over 1.1 million commune and brigade enterprises employing 17.9
million peasants, or 6.1 per cent of the total labour force.27 Further-
more, according to Yang Jianbai and Li Xueceng, the internal structure
of the gross value of agricultural output changed between 1957 and
1976 as illustrated in Table 1. The role of subsidiary production has thus
begun to take on growing importance in the countryside. Certainly
many successful communes report that from 30 to 50 per cent and more
25 "Nongye bu zhaokai nongchanpzn chengben hesuan zuotanhui" ("Forum on Cost Accoun

ing for Farm Products Conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture"), Jingjixue Dongtai, 11
(1979), pp. 9-1 1.
26 Curtis Ullerich, Rural Employment and Manpower Problems in China (White Plains
York: M.E. Sharpe, 1979), pp. 64-74.
27 Zeng Qixian, "Employment Creation and Economic Development," in Xu Di
al., Chzna's Search for Economic Development, p. 163.
604
of their total income derives from their subsidiaries. The evidence

therefore suggests that some of this criticism of communes may be
unjustified.
Nevertheless, the figures in Table 1 show that, apart from subsidiary
output, production in other alternative sectors to crop-farming has
remained proportionately static. Furthermore, the growth of subsidiar-
ies may have been narrowly concentrated in a limited number of
communes. Much of the output of small-scale rural industries has
consisted of inputs for agricultural production (the "five small indus-
tries": fertiliser, machinery, iron, cement, and coal), contracted process-
ing for urban industries, and processing of agricultural products. While
all of these have undoubtedly contributed to commune development, it
is now claimed that there has been a failure to introduce more commer-
cially-oriented profit-making subsidiaries, because commune cadres
have been afraid of being criticised for "putting profits first" and
"following the capitalist road." Given the previous absence of rural fairs
and markets and the often cumbersome nature of administratively
determined channels for marketing rural products, there may still be
considerable potential for increasing income in these areas.
Such criticism does not overlook the considerable regional variation
in the rigidity of the agricultural economy. Nevertheless, to the extent
that political or administrative considerations contradicted collective
economic profitability, and restrictions were placed on local initiative to
exploit resources, the potential for communes to raise peasant income
and increase accumulation has also been limited.
The Quality of Commune Leadership
As noted above, the quality of commune leadership has always been a

crucial feature of the commune model. If the leadership in a village is
poor or ineffective, the chances of success are slim. When asked to
explain why their unit has been successful where others have failed,
commune, brigade, and team leaders in model units invariably under-
line that good leadership is fundamental above all other factors. Poorer
collectives are also quick to acknowledge their own deficiencies in
leadership.28 While the advantages of location or resource endowm
cannot be ignored, a model of development dependent on the mobiliza-
tion of peasant initiative clearly requires inspirational leadership. Such
leadership, however, is not easily provided. The average team consists of
28 From interviews with leaders of poor collectives in 1979 and 1981.
605
Pacific Affairs
around 170 people of whom, given the continued lack of opportunities

for women, only half are males eligible for leadership; of those males,
the largest proportion are young and lack education and experience. It
is easy to imagine the problems involved in finding the right leaders. In
1979, for example, Xiyulin Brigade of Linghe Commune, Shandong
Province, reported that its leadership had changed three times in the
previous ten years. Nevertheless, the brigade still lagged far behind its
neighbour, Shijiazhuang Brigade, having a 1978 per capita distribution
of only 70.6 yuan, compared with 200 yuan. Cadres from provincial and
prefectural levels stated that they felt the brigade's problem was the poor
quality of the leadership: "It has been changed three times with no
success. "29
Basic-level cadres are now being criticised for their inefficiency, their
lack of skills, and their corruption. It is argued that many of them have
just followed general orders from above with no attempt to tailor those
directives to the local situation. They have preferred "single-cut,"
generalized methods of administration to working out particular meth-
ods for particular situations. They lack skills in technical farming and
accounting. Many have avoided taking part in production, while appro-
priating more than their fair share of collective income.30 Privately,
many economists state that there has also been considerable corruption.31
These problems are said to have existed even in relatively well-run
communes; and one economist referred to a rice-planting song in which
the peasants complained that, of the seedlings they were planting, only a
few were for themselves, the rest going to support the cadres and the
hierarchy above them. Some of this criticism of basic-level cadres may
well be politically inspired, since the basic levels have in the past often
been blamed for the failure of central policies. Nevertheless, it seems
reasonable to assume that there is a shortage of good cadres.
In this situation, it is not surprising to find evidence of an underlying
animosity between ordinary peasants and the rural cadres. One of the
strong motives behind the peasant demand for the introduction of
household contracting is that it means all the cadres have to work in the
fields to produce their own income.32 While arguments of this kind are
29 Notes from a visit on 22 December 1979.

30 See, for example, Su Xing, "The Production Responsibility System in the Chin
Countryside," paper given at the Asian Studies Association of Australia Conference,
Monash University, May 10-14, 1982, p. 11.
31 Interviews conducted by the authors in 1981 with Chinese economists in var
tertiary institutions in Beijing, Xi'an, Wuhan, and the Northwest Agricultural College
(Shaanxi Province).
32 Zhan Wu, et al., in Hongqi, 17 (1981), p. 15.
606
an inevitable aspect of current efforts to show that policy changes are

necessary, it is also true that if good leadership is rare it makes sense to
reduce the extent of dependency on poor leaders and to strengthen
more indirect economic levers to achieve one's goals.
REFORMS OF THE COMMUNE SYSTEM
As may be expected, criticisms of the kind outlined above have

severely tarnished the commune image over recent years. They have
also led to changes in the operation of the agricultural economy and of
communes. Indeed, many of the criticisms have surfaced as justifications
for the changes that are being introduced. There are also experiments
taking place in some counties to replace the commune-level leadership
with a xiang government, and to reorganize the brigades and teams into
new cooperatives supported by specialized industrial, commercial and
service companies.33 Some economists have argued that reforms of this
kind should be generalized.34 Others have suggested that, after twenty
years of existence, the communes have a certain stability, and it would be
best not to disrupt rural organization too much at the moment.35 While
it therefore seems probable that communes will be retained in some
areas, they may well be replaced in others; and it is acknowledged that
the commune system need not be the only model for rural development
in the future.36 Certainly while the new draft constitution talks of
communes, it also refers to other forms of collectives and, compared
with its predecessor, is much less specific on the nature and structure of
the commune. It also confirms that the xiang-level government will be
restored and that the commune will cease to perform governmental
functions.
A number of the reforms that have taken place are external to the
commune, but affect the way they operate. The extension of rural
markets and the growth in their size has meant not only that individual
peasants are able to buy and sell their products but also that communes,
brigades, and teams are able to participate as collective traders. In the
free markets in Xi'an in 1981, we observed teams selling vegetables
produced on collective land alongside peasants selling the produce from
their private plots. In many cases, trade of this kind is conducted over
33 Interview with Su Xing, June 1981.

34 Yu Zuyao in Jingfixue Dongtai.
35 See, for example, Su Xing, "The Production Responsibility System," p. 12.
36 Du Runsheng in Hongqi, 19 (1981), p. 24.
607
Pacfic Affairs
long distances, and during 1981 it was commonplace to see trucks from
communes in southern Hebei selling farm products in the streets of
Beijing, or tractors from communes in Suide or Mizhi Counties in
northern Shaanxi selling potatoes in the central market in Xi'an. In
addition, teams and brigades also sell bulk quantities of fruit and
vegetables to urban units for internal distribution. The staff trade-union
of Xi'an Foreign Languages Institute, for example, was regularly
purchasing loads of apples, potatoes, and other products, which it then
sold cheaply to its membership. At another level, commune supply-and-
marketing cooperatives are also able to establish stalls in county-town
fairs to trade in clothing and other non-agricultural goods. Travelling to
the Qing Eastern Tombs from Beijing in the spring of 1981, we were
able to observe an almost Skinnerian pattern of markets. The county
town of Jixian was the site of large stalls run by supply-and-marketing
cooperatives selling a variety of industrial products, including such items
as clothing, clocks, shoes, and other consumer and durable goods. The
stalls were constructed of wood covered with matting, and were clearly
built to last a number of days. Less than twenty kilometers away, in the
village of Mashenqiao, a large cyclical rural fair was in progress,
thronged with peasants and collectives buying and selling rural prod-
ucts, pigs, timber, hoes, ropes, and a variety of goods and services.37
The opening up of rural markets has thus provided collectives with
an alternative source of income outside the state purchasing system.
Once they have fulfilled their tax, compulsory sales, and other commit-
ments, they are to some extent free to produce according to market
demand. One brigade cadre near Beijing told us that he was able to meet
state requirements farming a smaller area of land than before because of
the relaxation of sown-acreage quotas and the incentives to increase
productivity; moreover, he was now able to devote some land to growing
water melons for the Beijing free market. Rural collectives are thus now
in a position to operate as individual traders in the free markets.
Another external reform with a similar effect on commune operation
is the tendency in many areas for sown-acreage quotas and input-supply
quotas to be eliminated and replaced by simple commitments to supply
the state with its tax and sales requirements and by the supply of inputs
according to demand. While these quotas have not been relaxed in all
areas, many communes, brigades, and teams are now free to plan their
own crop patterns within the constraints of their commitment to sell to
the state, and are also able to buy the required inputs of fertiliser and
37 Observations by the authors in 1981.
608
machinery as they wish.38 Changes of this kind give collectives greater

power to structure output and costs in such a way as to maximize
income.
Within communes, the most fundamental reform has been the
introduction of the production responsibility systems.39 These are
basically intended to provide incentives for peasants to increase produc-
tion by directly relating income to production and by providing bonuses
for output above set quotas. They also have the effect in many instances
of decentralizing much of farm management to the household level.
Their introduction has led to changes in a large number of important
areas-including the setting of labour norms; the operation of the work-
point system; the extent of collective control over labourers; the use of
collective assets, animals, and machinery; the provision of collective
services; and the methods of collective accumulation. In practice, three
main forms have become dominant; specialist contracting (zhuanye
chengbao), contracting to labourers (lian chan dao lao), and contracting
output or land to households (bao chan dao hu, or bao gan dao hu).
Specialist contracting is mainly used in rich collectives where the
commune structure has operated successfully. It reflects a situation
where the division of labour and diversified production maintain a
relatively high standard of living and the collective is still the main unit
of accounting and distribution. Groups of peasants contract with the
collective for special types of work or particular tasks, and on completion
of their task receive a work-point income plus any bonus that might be
deserved. This system is used in less than 6 per cent of communes.40
Contracting output to labourers involves each peasant labourer being
assigned a land area, cost target, output target and work-point quota. If
the peasant meets the quotas, he or she receives the income; if the quotas
are surpassed, all or part of the surplus may be kept by the peasant.
Usually the collective maintains some assets and some control over
accounting and distribution, but the extent may vary from teams where
much of the planning and organization is managed by the collective to
teams where most of the actual management of the land is left to the
individual. This form of the production responsibility system is current-
ly used in about 16 per cent of collectives.i' In at least 50 per cent of the
38 Interviews with commune members in 1981.

39 Greg O'Leary and Andrew Watson, "The Production Responsibility System and the
Future of Collective Farming," Australlan Journal of Chinese Affairs, no. 8 (July 1982), pp. 1-
34.
40 This percentage comes from Jzngjixue Zhoubao (Economics Review), 11 January 1982,
and refers to October 1981.
41 Ibid.
609
Pacfic Affairs
remaining units, one of the two forms of household contracting is

used.42 When output is contracted, the collective still retains some
collective organization and accounting. When land is contracted, al-
though the team still owns the land, almost all farming functions are
decentralized to the family unit; the team merely ensures that families
meet their tax, sales, and collective levy quotas. All other production is
retained by the household, and there is no collective accounting or work
points.43
The overall effect of the introduction of these systems has been to
decentralize control over labour and to transfer control over farm
management, the provision of inputs, and accumulation to lower levels
of organization, including the family unit. Symptomatic of this change
has been the growth in the total number of accounting units in the
countryside. At the end of 1979, there were 5,154,000 production
teams.'" By the end of 1980, this figure had grown to 5,611,000;
the spring of 1981, to 5,870,000.45 Currently, the total is around
6,0,oo000.46 Clearly, changes of this kind are having a big impact on the
ability of many collectives to organize and control all economic activity
and to provide welfare, educational, and medical services.
Ultimately, therefore, the changes in marketing, labour organization,
and administrative procedures are having a cumulative effect which will
enhance the reintroduction of xiang governments and further reduce
the size and function of collectives. The idea that communes were
introduced too early, before the level of development of the forces of
production was high enough to support them, has already gained much
support. Consequently, there is a growing demand for a return to the
smaller and less ambitious types of collectives of the early 1950s.
Furthermore, there are already many reports of new types of small
peasant-cooperatives or mutual-aid teams growing up in the areas where
household contracting has been widely introduced.
At the same time, however, there is an increasing awareness among
Chinese commentators, as well as economists we interviewed, that the
reforms which have been introduced have also created a number of new
problems. Peasants have responded to the increased importance given to
42 This figure is given in NongyeJingji Wenti (Agricultural Economics Issues), no. 2 (1982),
p. 3.
43 See O'Leary and Watson, "The Production Responsibility System," for a fuller
discussion of these systems.
44 1981 China Economic Yearbook (Chinese edition), p. VI-9.
45 Quan Guo Jing/ixue Tuanti Tongxin (Nationwide Economic Organzzational Unity), 10
August 1981.
46 SU Xing, "The Production Responsibility System."
610
the family unit by having more children, and efforts are being made to
curb this tendency.47 There are worries that, with the relaxation of
controls over sown acreages and marketing, the state may not be able to
guarantee supplies of the basic commodities. There is the knowledge
that, while the production responsibility system and the growth of
markets may stimulate peasant initiative and lead to increases in produc-
tion in the short term, the longer-term problems of accumulation and
modernization remain unresolved. In addition, the growing inequalities
of income and a possible return to private ownership of land could
create serious problems. As one cadre at Fenghuo Brigade stated, if the
production responsibility system is not controlled there could be a
retreat to the situation of "landlords, rich peasants, and poor peasants."
Indeed, there are already reports of the hiring of labour.
CONCLUSION
As much of the above discussion has underlined, the criticisms of the

commune model that have been made and the reforms that have been
undertaken have not applied to all communes and to all regions. In
many ways, the situation is still one of experimentation and change.
There are clearly districts where the commune has been successful and
where the peasants will tend to oppose major changes. At the same time,
there are also areas where a full-scale return to family farming has taken
place in almost every way except in terms of the actual ownership of
land. In areas combining good leadership and a reasonable endowment,
therefore, the commune model has been successful. In areas lacking one
or both of these factors, the commune structure has not achieved much
and may have inhibited local initiative. In the future, therefore, there is
likely to be a much greater variety in the structure of rural organization
and in the operation of collectives. Although the goal of collective
farming may be retained, forms of rural organization are likely to range
from virtually independent household farming with a minimum of
collective organization, through a combination of small collectives sup-
ported by specialized extension services run by local government or
groups of peasants, up to large, rich communes and brigades which are
well-placed to use the new freedom for economic activity to maintain
high levels of income for their members. Thus, as the 1981 National
Conference on Rural Work recognised, the standardized commune
4 See the Anhui family-planning guidelines, NCNA News Bulletin, 12 February 1982.
611
Pacific Affairs
model will be replaced by a much greater diversity of structures, less

subject to government control and much more complex in their opera-
tion and interaction.48
South Australian College of Advanced Education, Australia

University of Adelaide, Australia
September 1982
48 Reported by NCNA, 5 April 1982 (in British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of

World Broadcasts, Far East/6999/B1 1/1- 12).
612

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International Journals

THE COMMUNES IN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

LUCY JEN HUANG

International Review of Modern Sociology 1976, Vol. 6 (Spring): 189-200

The establishment of the commune system in the People's Republic

One of the most outstanding charac-is that of political consciousness and

of pre-Communist China inrative.

period that the Weihsing Commune

(reported by emigres fromproduction

[roughly corresponding toend of 1959 in Harbin alone, eight

Amoy, and Keifeng (Bowie and Fair-

family life of a Christian minister's

The regime leaders furthermore care that it shows us is more than

station driven by water wheels seemsrewards (Khan, 1972: 544).

and Chou, 1974: 15). It was in

It has been reported (Starr, Chang,

Chinese commune system, with 1973 its "Commune hospitals grow."

under Communism. New Starr, John Bryan

Pacific Affairs, University of British Columbia is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,

suggestion that alternative structures for the development of China's

habits of the traditional small-peasant economy and would learn both

Wugong Brigade in Hubei, Xiadingjia Brigade in Shandong, and

THE COMMUNE MODEL UNDER ATTACK

Low Levels of Productivity

Despite current criticisms of low productivity-increases, the output of

8 See article by Du Runsheng in Hongqi (Red Flag), 19 (1981), pp. 17-25.

18 Interview at Fenghuo, October 1981.

input of labour. A similar conclusion can be drawn from the figures

Total Agricultural Total Grain Grain Output

1957 193.1 195.5 1,010.1

(Source: Jingji Yanjzu Cankao Ziliao, no. 70 [May 1980])

If these figures are reliable, one possible interpretation is that,

20 Renmin Ribao, 26 November 1981.

Egalitarian Income Distribution and Low Incentives

22 "Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Som

probably not widely successful, were symptomatic of a preference for a

The criticism that commune control over constituent teams is too

24 "Decision of the Central Committee," pp. 1 10-1 1.

TABLE 1. GROSS VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT BY SECTOR (PER CENT)

1957 80.6 1.7 12.9 4.3 0.5

Source: Jingjz Yanjzu Zzhao,

grain production was extended into unsuitable areas at a cost to the

25 "Nongye bu zhaokai nongchanpzn chengben hesuan zuotanhui" ("Forum on Cost Accoun

of their total income derives from their subsidiaries. The evidence

The Quality of Commune Leadership

As noted above, the quality of commune leadership has always been a

28 From interviews with leaders of poor collectives in 1979 and 1981.

around 170 people of whom, given the continued lack of opportunities

29 Notes from a visit on 22 December 1979.

an inevitable aspect of current efforts to show that policy changes are

REFORMS OF THE COMMUNE SYSTEM

As may be expected, criticisms of the kind outlined above have

33 Interview with Su Xing, June 1981.

37 Observations by the authors in 1981.

machinery as they wish.38 Changes of this kind give collectives greater

38 Interviews with commune members in 1981.

remaining units, one of the two forms of household contracting is

As much of the above discussion has underlined, the criticisms of the

model will be replaced by a much greater diversity of structures, less

South Australian College of Advanced Education, Australia

48 Reported by NCNA, 5 April 1982 (in British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of

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