LAMB VS PHIPPS

Facts:
• Lamb was the superintendent of the Iwahig Penal Colony until he resigned on Dec. 31,
1911 due to ill health. Before that he was assigned as provincial treasurer for
Marinduque, Mindoro and Laguna. He requested the Auditor General, Phipps, for his
clearance certificate (showing that Lamb has accounted for all property and funds under
his custody) in order that Lamb may be allowed to leave the Philippines without
incurring criminal liability.
• Phipps, although the records of the Auditor General show that Lamb indeed has settled
his accounts, refuses to issue the certificate because a certain Fernandez may bring a
civil suit against the government. However the records also show that Fernandez signed
the receipt acknowledging payment from the government.
• The petition for mandamus, asking the SC to compel Phipps to issue the certificate was
demmurred to by the auditor because it is a suit against the government and the
petition states no cause of action.
• The SC initially asked Lamb to amend his petition but the latter did not do so hence the
SC decided the case upon the facts Lamb intended to make.

Issue+ RULING
W/N Mandamus may issue to compel the auditor general to issue the certificate of clearance of
LambàNO
• The certificate of clearance is needed only for bonded government employees and there
is no averment that Lamb is a bonded employee other than having custody of
government property and funds, however, the SC assumed that Lamb was a bonded
officer.
• It is confidently contended that the Auditor is not obliged under the law to accept a
mere paper accounting as final and conclusive as to the real responsibility of
Government employees and to issue a clearance upon that alone. He may, it is true, if
he is satisfied; but certainly, he may, if he so desires and if he has any doubt about the
correctness of such accounts, make an actual examination of the funds and property
represented by such paper accounts or balances.
• Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and
unreasonable delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is clear duty imposed by law,
the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of mandamus to compel
action. If the duty is ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is
purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. In the present
case, however, the mandamus is not for the purpose of the compelling action only. It is
presented for the purpose of requiring particular action on the part of the Auditor.
There is a very wide distinction between the use of the writ of mandamus to compel
action and its use to compel particular action on the part of a public official, board, or
officer upon whom particular duties are imposed by law.
• The following are the powers and duties of the Auditor General:
o First, that the Auditor for the Philippine Islands has exclusive jurisdiction in the
first instance to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenues and receipts from whatever source of every governmental entity
within the Philippine Islands.
o Second, that his decision or the result of his accounting upon such revenues and
receipts and accounts is final and conclusive upon all parties unless an appeal is
taken within a period of one year.
o Third, that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands is not possessed with
power to revoke or alter or modify the results of accountings made by the
Auditor without reference to the Secretary of War.
o Fourth, that when an appeal is taken to the Governor-General and the latter
disapproves of the accounting made by the auditor, he must at once forward to
the Secretary of War for final action the matter in controversy.
• The SC held that since the nature of the Auditor’s job requires him to exercise
discretion, he may not compelled by mandamus to issue the certificate to Lamb. Also,
 there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy afforded to Lamb in that the Auditor’s
decision may be appealed to the Governor-General. The SC relied on the case of Decatur
vs. Paulding where it was held the the US courts that an Auditor may not be compelled
by mandamus. Also, the SC held that the decision of the executive branch is not
reviewable by the courts.

Dissent of Justice Trent:

• Justice Trent makes issue about the supposition of the majority in the allegations Lamb
intended to make saying that the Court cannot do so without substantiating that inference
which in his mind the majority did not discharge this burden.
• In the final analysis, the whole case, up to this point, is narrowed down to one question
only; that is, Can the courts control by mandamus the judgment and the discretion which were
exercised by the respondent when he denied the relator's request for a certificate of clearance
upon the grounds (1) that a probable suit might be brought by one Fernandez against the
Government, and (2) that the Government, in all probability, would have to pay the claims of
the relator for leave, salary, and transportation? I shall now attempt to demonstrate that this
question is, upon sound legal principles, to be answered in the affirmative, and in so doing, I
shall disregard as inapplicable all the authorities cited in the majority opinion which tend to
support the general proposition that the decision of the Auditor upon matters pertaining to the
settlement of bonded officers' accounts is final and conclusive, because the accounts of the
relator as superintendent of the Iwahig Penal colony have been, according to the pleadings,
balanced, leaving the relator owing the Government nothing.

• That one Fernandez cannot sue the Government in a civil action without its consent is
well known by everyone. Then, why should the respondent be allowed to hold up the claims of
the relator for accrued leave, salary, and transportation on this ground? In deciding to do so,
what kind of judgment and discretion did he use?

• The point of Justice Trent is that in order to determine whether mandamus should issue
the court must be governed by the nature of the duty sought to be enforced and not by the
nature of the office held by the respondent( Marbury v Madison)

• The courts will not interfere where it is necessary to weigh the evidence and decide on
which side a nice preponderance lies. A strict adherence to such a rule would, however, require
the courts in every case to go into the merits and decide on which side the preponderance lies,
exactly the same as in any ordinary case. But discretion is no concrete thing to be conferred or
transferred as a piece of land or a commission to office. It is a trait of character bestowed by
nature upon all men in a greater or less degree. If the law permits an officer to act with
discretion, he must necessarily use that discretion. He can, in the nature of things, use no other.
Legal discretion is, after all, nothing but a man-made standard for measuring and keeping
within bounds the personal discretion of such public officers. If they fail to make their official
acts conform to this standard, they will be called to account. For political of legislative acts, they
are responsible directly to the people. But if it be administrative and properly within the
jurisdiction of the courts, the courts will provide the remedy.