SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 160257 January 31, 2006

ROBERT LASTRILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL A. GRANDA, Respondent.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Robert Lastrilla seeks the partial reversal of the July 18, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. No. 26273 which
modified the May 8, 2002 Resolution of the Department of Justice (DOJ), finding probable cause to file three (3) informations charging him with
the crime of Falsification of Public Document under Article 172 (1), in relation to Article 171 (1), (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code.

The facts are as follows:

Respondent Rafael Granda is a grandson and legal heir of the deceased spouses Rafael and Aurora Granda, who died in June 1989 and
September 16, 2000, respectively. The Granda spouses had ten children, namely: Blanquita Serafica, Jesse1 Granda, Aurora Sumcad, Violeta
Cuenca, Rafael R. Granda, Olivia Walker, Lourdes Manabat, Fernando Granda, Benjamin Granda and Silvina Granda. Respondent's father, Jesse
Granda, predeceased the spouses.

During Aurora's lifetime, she owned several parcels of land with some improvements thereon in Tacloban City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) Nos. T-249, T-1312, T-816 and T-9874, all registered in her name.2 Said parcels of land were allegedly sold by the Granda spouses, as
evidenced by the following deeds of absolute sale, all dated December 7, 1985, witnessed by petitioner and the deceased spouses' youngest
daughter Silvina and notarized by Atty. Camilo Camenforte, to wit:

(a) The first Deed of Absolute Sale involved two parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. T-249 and T-1312, which were sold by the Granda spouses,
as vendors, in favor of petitioner's siblings Necita Uy, Elsa Uy, Andres Uy, Tinong Uy and Rosa Uy, as vendees, for a consideration of
P3,800,000.00, receipt of which was acknowledged by the spouses;3

(b) The second Deed of Absolute Sale involved two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-816, which were likewise sold by the Granda
spouses, as vendors, in favor of petitioner's siblings Mary Uy Cua, Necita Uy, Elsa Uy, Andres Uy, Tinong Uy and Rosa Uy, as vendees, for a
consideration of P5,000,000.00, receipt of which was also acknowledged by the spouses;4 and

(c) The third Deed of Absolute Sale involved three (3) parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-6736, which were sold by the Granda spouses, as
vendors, in favor of petitioner and his spouse Norma Lastrilla, as vendees, for a consideration of P200,000.00, receipt of which was also
acknowledged by the deceased spouses.5

On February 28, 2000, the deeds of absolute sale involving the properties covered by TCT Nos. T-1312, T-816 and T-249 were annotated at the
back of their corresponding TCTs. Consequently, TCT Nos. T-1312, T-816, and T-249 were cancelled and TCT Nos. T-6696, T-54400, and T-54401,
respectively, were issued in the names of the respective vendees.6 The deed of absolute sale involving the properties covered by TCT No. 6736
was not annotated as said TCT was found to be non-existent.

On February 21, 2001 or more than five months after Aurora's death, respondent filed the instant complaint7 for Violation of Articles 171 and
172 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner, Silvina, Atty. Camenforte, Norma Lastrilla, Mary Uy Cua, Necita Uy, Elsa Uy, Andres Uy, Tinong
Uy and Rosa Uy, docketed as I.S. No. 2001-343. Respondent claimed that a month after his grandmother's death, he learned that all of the
latter's properties in Tacloban were sold to different persons sometime in 1999-2000. To verify such reports, he requested copies of the
purported deeds of absolute sale with the Register of Deeds and was able to obtain copies of the three (3) deeds of absolute sale in question.
Upon careful scrutiny of the subject deeds, he noticed that the signatures of his deceased grandparents were falsified. Upon verification, the
examining officers of the PNP Crime Laboratory confirmed that the signatures of respondent's deceased grandfather Rafael in the deeds and his
specimen signatures "were not written by one hand and the same person." They also found that the signatures of his deceased grandfather and
the signatures of the deceased spouses' youngest daughter Silvina "reveal some similarities in stroke structure, indicative of one writer."
Likewise, the examining officers found that the signatures of respondent's grandmother Aurora in the questioned deeds and her specimen
signatures "were not written by one and the same person."8 Respondent also claimed that the three deeds of absolute sale were antedated.
While the sales took place in 1999 or 2000, it was made to appear that the transactions took place on December 7, 1985, at a time when both of
the Granda spouses were still alive. Respondent alleged that: (a) Petitioner himself told respondent that it was in 1999 that he bought the lots
covered by TCT No. T-816; (b) Silvina could not have signed as a witness on December 7, 1985 as she was then cloistered in the Cariana
Movement Monastery under Fr. Odon Castro who certified that as a member of said religious community, she could "not go out of the
monastery unless there was a very valid reason" and "she was not sent out for any errant (sic) nor went to the province" for the whole year of
1985;9 (c) Aurora was still exercising rights of ownership over the properties subject of the assailed deeds after December 7, 1985, as evidenced
by the General Power of Attorney (GPOA),10 dated February 14, 1999, executed by Aurora in favor of her youngest daughter Silvina, to
administer her properties subject of the assailed deeds and to collect and receive all rentals from the occupants of the buildings therein; (d) As
attorney-in-fact, Silvina executed lease contracts dated February 4, 200011 with some of the lessees of the office spaces in the commercial
building located in the two lots covered by TCT Nos. T-1312 and T-249; (e) As per Certification from the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court
of the 8th Judicial Region, the three deeds of absolute sale were not among the available notarized documents submitted to said office for the
year 1985; and (f) the subject deeds were registered with the Register of Deeds only on February 28, 2000 or almost fifteen (15) years after the
alleged sales. Respondent claimed that petitioner conspired with Silvina and Atty. Camenforte in falsifying the three deeds by signing as an
instrumental witness therein. Also, petitioner and the other vendees allegedly conspired by benefiting from the use of said public documents in
transferring the titles of the properties from the name of Aurora to their names.

Petitioner's co-respondent sibling Elsa Uy submitted her counter-affidavit,12 averring that sometime in 1998, Aurora repeatedly offered the sale
of the subject properties to her. After conferring with her siblings, she agreed to buy Aurora's properties for a total consideration of P18,000,000
subject to the conditions: (1) That the preparation, documentation, notarization and registration of the document of sale, the cancellation of the
TCTs in Aurora's name and the issuance of the new TCTs in the names of the vendees would be Aurora's sole and exclusive responsibility; (2)
That all the expenses for documentation, registration of documents, capital gains tax, documentary stamps tax, transfer tax, sales tax, fees for
the cancellation and issuance of titles and expenses for similar purposes would be for the exclusive and sole account of Aurora; (3) That as soon
as the TCTs in the names of the vendees are issued, Aurora would turn over the new TCTs to them; (4) That all the necessary documents would
be executed by Aurora and/or by any and all persons who may have any interest, lien or claim over the properties at the instance of Aurora and
at her expense, in order that the said properties would be free from any lien or encumbrance; and (5) That the mode and manner of payment
for the consideration of the sale would be as directed by Aurora.

Aurora allegedly agreed to the said terms and conditions subject to an increase in the total consideration from P18,000,000 to P18,800,000. As
directed by Aurora, periodic payments were made to her totaling P8,800,000. Partial advance payments of P1,000,000 each were likewise made
to Aurora's children Silvina and Lourdes. Thereafter, Elsa and her siblings, Mary Uy Cua, Necita Uy, Rosa Uy, Tinong Uy and Andres Uy, gave
Aurora's children P1,000,000 each or a total of P8,000,000. The share of Aurora's deceased son Jesse Granda was divided equally among the
latter's seven (7) children, one of whom is respondent, who received his share of P142,857.14. Subsequently, all the heirs of Aurora executed
separate documents denominated as "Deed of Assignment."13 The Deed of Assignment dated April 20, 2000, signed by respondent under the
name "Rafaelito" on "2/16/2000," together with the latter's siblings, states that:

For and in consideration of the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, receipt of the amount from MARY UY CUA,
NECITA UY, ELSA UY, ANDRES UY, TINONG UY and ROSA UY, is hereby acknowledged and confessed by us to our entire and full satisfaction x x x
and

We do hereby confirm and acknowledge the fact that our grandmother, Aurora Ratcliffe de Granda, has the lawful right to dispose of the above
described parcels of land and such other real properties she has wherever located, as she is the absolute and exclusive owner being her
exclusive and paraphernal properties.14 (citation omitted)

Elsa contended that she and her siblings were innocent purchasers in good faith and for valuable consideration. It was sometime in September
2000 when TCT Nos. T-6696 and T-54401 were presented to them, together with the ten (10) separate Deeds of Assignment executed by
Aurora's heirs. Her siblings, namely Mary Uy Cua, Necita Uy, Andres Uy, Tinong Uy and Rosa Uy, never met or personally conferred with Aurora
or her heirs. Nor were they in possession or control of the three (3) subject deeds and the owner's duplicates of TCT Nos. T-1312, T-249, T-816
and T-9874 as said documents remained in the absolute control of Aurora. They were never involved in the preparation, execution, notarization
and registration of the three (3) deeds of absolute sale and the payment of the required fees, taxes, the cancellation of the certificates of title
and the issuance in their names of TCT Nos. T-6696, T-54400 and T-54401 as the same were all made and effected by Aurora. She denied having
taken advantage of or profited from the subject deeds and certificates of title. She contended that the filing of the instant complaint is "an act of
utter bad faith, done for some evil motives and with malicious criminal intent"15 as complainant was the very same person who gave his
conformity and consent to the questioned sales, confirmed the sales and acknowledged receipt of P1,000,000 by executing, together with his
siblings, the Deed of Assignment dated April 20, 2000. Allegedly, it was complainant who unjustly enriched himself at their expense when he
received from them his share of P142,857.14. That respondent filed the instant case only after his grandmother's death allegedly shows his
sinister scheme to preclude his grandmother from divulging the truth. She claimed that complainant was a party to the alleged falsification and
perpetrated an act of fraud to their damage and prejudice.

Alleging the same statement of facts and defenses, petitioner's other siblings, Necita Uy, Rosa Uy, Mary Uy Cua, Tinong Uy and Andres Uy, filed
their Joint Counter-Affidavit16 and petitioner's spouse, Norma Lastrilla, filed her own counter-affidavit.17 Atty. Camenforte also submitted his
counter-affidavit18 containing his personal defenses. In response, respondent filed his Reply Affidavit,19 contending that petitioner and Silvina
should be deemed to have admitted the allegations in the complaint for their failure to file their respective counter-affidavits despite due notice.
Petitioner eventually submitted his own counter-affidavit20 on the same day that his co-respondent siblings and spouse filed their Rebuttal-
Affidavits.21

In his defense, petitioner adopted the allegations of his co-respondents insofar as they were material to the charges against him. He contended
that the charge against him is "malicious and bereft of truth, designed mainly to cast a cloud of doubt on the title of the vendees."22 He claimed
that the filing of the complaint was merely aimed at making him and his siblings submit to additional monetary consideration being demanded
by respondent

who must have felt shortchanged because he had to share his deceased father's P1,000,000-share with his six (6) siblings. Respondent allegedly
threatened him with criminal prosecution after he and his siblings refused to heed his demands. Petitioner claimed that it was only Elsa and
Aurora who negotiated for the sale of the properties in question. His other siblings participated only with respect to their respective
contributions to the purchase price and he was the one tasked to ensure that the signatures on the subject deeds were all authentic and
genuine as they were parting with millions of hard earned money. Upon Aurora's request, he readily agreed to affix his signatures in the subject
deeds as a witness, thinking that such act would seal the validity of the sale. He contended that the fact that the sale was only registered on
February 28, 2000 is not evidence of falsification. In fact, he and his wife were the named vendees in one of the deeds and paid a total of
P200,000 for the properties therein described. However, they did not benefit from the said sale because contrary to what was stated in the deed
of sale, only Lot 4691 was covered by T-6736, Lot 2455 was an unregistered land and has an adverse claimant thereto while Lot 4693 was
covered by TCT No. T-9874. In view of the misrepresentation, they never acquired title to the properties they bought and in fact suffered
pecuniary loss in the amount of P200,000.

Further, petitioner claimed that "although the Application in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, denominated as Control No.
183, requesting registration of title to the properties" subject of the deeds of absolute sale bears his signature, the same "is not evidence that it
was not Aurora Granda who caused the registration of said Deeds of Sale... because the truth of the matter is that the same application was just
given to [him] by someone sent by Aurora Granda requesting that [he] affix [his] signature thereto." It is likewise "not evidence that [he] was the
one who personally submitted the same to the Office of the Register of Deeds."23 He did not deny that the corresponding real property tax and
special (SEF) tax for the parcels of land were in his name and that of Washington Trading but he contended that the same does not prove that
respondent vendees were the ones who paid said taxes, for the truth of the matter is that Aurora, in consonance with her agreement with Elsa
Uy, fulfilled her part of the conditions of the sale that she would cause the preparation, documentation and notarization of the deeds of
absolute sale and paid the taxes in his name and Washington Trading.

On May 5, 2001, the Office of the City Prosecution of Tacloban issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which states:

In view of the foregoing, it appearing that Camilo Camenforte and Silvina Granda conspired with each other to falsify the three Deeds of Sale,
the filing of three (3) informations, one for each Deed of Sale, charging the respondents with the crime of Falsification by Public Officers by
forging the signatures of Aurora and Rafael Granda to make it appear that the said persons have participated in an act or proceedings when they
did not in fact participated (sic) penalized and defined in Art. 171, sub-par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.24

In dismissing the complaint against petitioner, his wife and his siblings, the investigating prosecutor reasoned that:
The question to be resolved is, [w]ho falsified these documents? It can not be the respondents, Elsa Uy, Tinong Uy, Necita Uy, Andres Uy, Mary
Uy Cua, as alleged by the complainant since they have paid a total amount of P18,800,000.00 to Aurora Granda and her heirs for the purchase of
said properties.

It must be noted that the complainant himself never denied that they received the amount. In fact, in the Deed of Assignment that the
complainant and his co-heirs executed they admitted having received P1,000,000.00 as their share in the purchase of the said properties. It is
highly improbable for someone to part with such an amount as a consideration for the purchase of a property and at the same time conspire to
forge the very same documents that is the basis of the sale. Why pay P18.8M and risk losing the said amount on a forged document?

Nor can it be Robert and Normal (sic) Lastrilla for the same reason. In fact, these two respondents incurred losses since they have already paid
the consideration of P200,000.00 without having acquired the property since the description of the property in the Deed of Sale is erroneous.

The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Sandangdiego, 81 SCRA 120, cited by the complainant does not apply to the above-
named respondents because it cannot be said that they took advantage of it and profited thereby since the respondents acquired the said
properties for valuable consideration.25

Respondent filed a petition for partial review of the Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecution of Tacloban with the DOJ, questioning the
dismissal of the complaint against petitioner, his spouse and his siblings. The petition for partial review was dismissed by then Secretary
Hernando B. Perez, holding that:

Suffice it to state that apart from the bare allegations of complainant that respondents-appellees conspired with respondents Silvina Granda and
Camilo Camenforte in the falsification of the subject deeds, no evidence has been presented to substantiate the charge. From the record, it is
unclear how respondents-appellees participated in the falsification of the subject documents. x x x

While respondent-appellee Robert signed as a witness in all of the three (3) subject documents, the determination of probable cause against
him will not depend alone on a finding of forgery because a careful scrutiny of the evidence adduced reveals that there are valid and complete
defenses available in his (Robert) favor that would negate any criminal intent on his part to commit the offense of falsification.

Firstly. It is significant to note that the complainant did not question the effectiveness and consummation of the sale transactions in questions
(sic) much less did he assail the authority of Aurora to do so. In fact, complainant himself confirmed the validity of the sale made by Aurora of
her properties by executing the Deed of Assignment dated April 20, 2000 and which deed he signed on February 16, 2000, the day he received
his share from the proceeds thereof as one of the children of the late Jessie Granda.

Secondly. Neither did complainant allege that the sales transactions were without or for inadequate, fictitious or simulated consideration. It is
without dispute that respondent-appellee Robert Lastrilla, together with his brothers and sisters, paid the sum of P18.8 M. By paying such a
substantial sum of P18.8 M, it was unlikely for respondent-appellee Robert to have intentionally and maliciously participated in the falsification
of the subject documents because it would be adverse to his own interests and that of his siblings. It would be the height of absurdity that
respondent-appellee would have consented to having falsified documents evidencing the subject transactions considering that his primary and
paramount concern was to protect his own interests and that of his siblings.

Thirdly. It is worthy to note that complainant was not joined in his complaint by any of the surviving heirs of Aurora Granda. If, indeed,
complainant and the other heirs of the estate of Aurora were cheated by respondents-appellees of the properties in question because of the
execution of the subject documents, the least that the other heirs could have done was to join complainant in the instant complaint. Such failure
lends credence to the claim of respondents-appellees that the sale transactions in question were regular and that they bought the subject
properties from Aurora in good faith and for a valuable consideration.

Fourth. No right of complainant was violated by the execution of the subject deeds. The deceased Aurora had the free disposition of the
properties such that whatever means and method adopted by Aurora in causing the transfer of her properties to the respondents-appellees is
beyond complainant's concern much less did he have any right whatsoever to question the said disposition. Obviously, complainant could not
allege that he had sustained damage as a result of the sale simply because no right of his could have been violated. On the contrary, complainant
admittedly benefited from the sale.

Fifth. We find it rather odd for complainant to have initiated the instant action only after the death of her (sic) grandmother Aurora. It is noted
that as early as October 1999 and February 2000, complainant admits having learned about the sale of Aurora's properties to other persons. In
fact, as earlier stated, on February 16, 2000 he signed a document denominated as Deed of Assignment wherein he not only recognized the
validity of the sale by Aurora in favor of the respondents-appellees of the properties described therein but he also acknowledged receipt of the
amount of P142,857.14 representing his share of the proceeds of the said sale as heir of the deceased Jesse Granda. These facts clearly create
doubt as to the real motive of the complainant in filing the instant complaint.

Indeed, the foregoing circumstances clearly establish respondent-appellee Robert Lastrilla's lack of criminal intent in the falsification of the
subject document. Par. no. 1 of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code in conjunction with Par. no. 1 of Article 171 of the same Code penalizes a
private individual who forges a signature of another in public document. However, in the absence of criminal intent, there is no falsification and
the absence of damage negates criminal intent. x x x26

Subsequently, respondent filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the CA. In its Decision dated July 18, 2003, the CA
modified the Resolution dated May 8, 2002 issued by the Secretary of Justice, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated May 8, 2002 issued by the Department of Justice is hereby MODIFIED. Finding probable cause against private
respondent Robert Lastrilla, we hereby direct the Office of the Prosecutor of Tacloban City to issue a recommendation for the filing of three (3)
informations charging Robert Lastrilla of the crime of Falsification of Public Document under Article 172 (1), in relation to Article 171 (1), (2) and
(5) of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.27 (emphases supplied)

The CA ratiocinated that:

In the case of Robert Lastrilla, there are allegations that: first, he knew that the three deeds of sale were falsified and, despite such knowledge,
he still signed them as an instrumental witness; second, he was personally and directly responsible for registering the falsified deeds with the
Register of Deeds of Tacloban City; third, he caused the cancellation of the Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of Aurora Granda; finally, he
effected the issuance of the new Transfer Certificates of Title.

The foregoing circumstances convinces us of the presence of probable cause against private respondent Robert Lastrilla, as the evidence will
show that there is a reasonable ground for presumption that a falsification exists as would lead the prosecutor to believe that he is probably
guilty of the offense charged and can be held for trial.28

Petitioner's partial motion for reconsideration proved futile.29 Hence, he filed the instant petition, assigning as lone error that:

[THE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST [PETITIONER] ROBERT A. LASTRILLA FOR FALSIFICATION OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENT UNDER ARTICLE 172 (1), IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 171 (1), (2), AND (5) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.30

Articles 172 (1) and 171 (1), (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code, state that:

Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents.-- The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine of not more than P5,000 shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any public or official document or
letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; x x x

Article 171. x x x

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate; x x x

5. Altering true dates; x x x

In the case at bar, there is no question that all the elements of falsification are present. The issue is whether there is probable cause to engender
the belief that petitioner is one of the authors of the falsification.

Petitioner questions the findings of the CA that: (a) he knew that the three deeds of absolute sale in question were falsified but still signed the
same as an instrumental witness; and (b) despite such knowledge, he personally and directly caused the registration of the same with the
Register of Deeds of Tacloban, the cancellation of the TCTs in the name of Aurora and the issuance of the new TCTs in the names of the
respective vendees. He contends that the decision of the CA finding probable cause to file three (3) informations for Falsification of Public
Document under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171(1), (2) and (5) of the Revised Penal Code against him is merely based on the allegations
of respondent, unsubstantiated by any evidence on record.31

We disagree.

In a preliminary investigation, probable cause for the filing of an information by the prosecutor has been defined as "the existence of such facts
and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."32 It is well-settled that "a finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based
on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt."33

From the records, there is no question that petitioner signed as an instrumental witness to the subject deeds of absolute sale. As such, he
attested that the Granda spouses, as vendors, signed the said deeds in his presence on December 7, 1985. By petitioner's own admission,
however, the negotiations for the sales only started in 1998, thus, the deeds were admittedly antedated. The investigating prosecutor, the DOJ
and the CA also unanimously found probable cause to believe that the signatures of the Granda spouses were falsified as evidenced by: (a) the
PNP Crime Laboratory report which concluded that the specimen signatures of the spouses did not match the signatures affixed in the subject
deeds; and (b) the undisputed fact that vendor-spouse Rafael died in June 1989. The disputable presumption is that a person intends the
ordinary consequences of his voluntary act and takes ordinary care of his concerns.34 This presumption assumes greater significance to the case
of petitioner who, as "the one tasked [by his siblings] to ensure that the signatures on the subject deeds were all authentic and genuine," is
naturally expected to not have voluntarily affixed his signature in the subject deeds unless he understood the clear significance of his act.

Moreover, there is sufficient evidence to prove that petitioner "was personally and directly responsible for registering the falsified deeds with
the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City" and that "he caused the cancellation of the Transfer Certificates of Title in the name of Aurora" and
"effected the issuance of the new Transfer Certificates of Title." The following pieces of evidence support such findings: (a) a copy of Control No.
183 dated February 28, 2000 and the certification of the Register of Deeds state that petitioner "presented for registration" the three deeds in
question to the Register of Deeds;35 and (b) a copy of the entries in the Receiving and Releasing Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Tacloban City and the Certification dated July 4, 2001 of the Register of Deeds show that the deeds in question were released to petitioner on
March 3, 2000.36 Petitioner's defense that it was actually Aurora who effected the transfer cannot overcome the presumption in favor of the
Register of Deeds that in issuing the certifications, official duty has been regularly performed.37 Notably, other than his bare assertion,
petitioner did not present any other evidence to corroborate his claim, i.e., the testimony of the alleged representative of Aurora who made him
sign the questioned application form. In the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is
the forger of said document.38 If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it, taking advantage of it and profiting
thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.39

The presumptions elicited by the evidence on record are not of little significance. The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to
create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case created, thereby which, if no contrary proof is offered, will prevail.40

Petitioner lays stress on the ruling of the DOJ that "in the absence of criminal intent, there is no falsification and the absence of damage negates
criminal intent." The following circumstances allegedly show lack of criminal intent on his part, viz: (a) Respondent did not question the
effectiveness and consummation of the sale transactions in question or assail the authority of Aurora to do so. In fact, complainant himself
confirmed the validity of the sale made by Aurora of her properties by executing the Deed of Assignment dated April 20, 2000; (b) Petitioner and
his siblings paid the sum of P18,800,000, hence, could not have intentionally and maliciously participated in the falsification of the subject
documents as it would be adverse to their interests; (c) The other heirs of Aurora did not join respondent in filing the instant complaint, thus,
giving credence to the claim of petitioner that the sale transactions were regular, done in good faith and for valuable consideration; (d)
Respondent had no right which was violated by the execution of the subject deeds as Aurora had the free disposition of her properties during
her lifetime; and (e) It is rather "odd" for complainant to have initiated the instant action only after the death of his grandmother Aurora. Finally,
petitioner also invokes the defense of good faith. He contends that assuming he knew or had a hand in the falsification of the three (3) deeds of
absolute sale and used the same to process the issuance of the new TCTs, said act is not a punishable act of falsification as the same was
authorized by the heirs of Aurora, including respondent.41

The arguments are unmeritorious.

The mentioned circumstances in the ruling of the DOJ which allegedly negate the existence of criminal intent on the part of petitioner are
unavailing. First, the contention that the validity of the sale transactions was not disputed is contrary to the allegations of respondent and the
evidence on record. In his complaint-affidavit, respondent alleged that "the purported sale of the subject properties on 07 December 1985 is
false and fraudulent."42 Moreover, the new TCTs issued in the names of the vendees through the deeds in question have an annotation of
respondent's adverse claim that "the deed[s] of sale are simulated."43 Second, petitioner's reliance on the deeds of assignment signed by
respondent and his co-heirs to prove the validity of the sale transactions is shaky. By said deeds, the heirs of Aurora merely acknowledged that
they received certain sums of money from the Uys and that they "assign[ed], transfer[red] and convey[ed] unto and in favor of" Aurora "all [the]
rights, interests, and participation that [they] have or may have in any and all parcels of land,44 wherever located, together with all the
improvements thereon, two parcels of land" of which were particularly described as the ones covered by TCT No. T-816. No reference was made
to the alleged contracts of sale between Aurora and the Uys. Likewise, said deeds contain a marked contradiction: if indeed, the properties were
the "exclusive and paraphernal properties" of Aurora, why was there a need for her heirs (which included respondent) to assign their rights to
her? Finally, the attribution of ill-motive to respondent by the fact that the complaint was only filed after Aurora died and that respondent was
not joined in by his co-heirs in filing the complaint are speculative and are not sufficient to overcome the legal presumptions establishing a prima
facie case for falsification against petitioner.

In any case, even assuming that the payment of the sum of P18,800,000 shows lack of damage on the part of respondent and his co-heirs,
petitioner's conclusion that there can be no criminal intent in the absence of damage is hasty, to say the least. Criminal intent is a mental state,
the existence of which is shown by the overt acts of a person.45 We have clarified that the absence of damage does not necessarily imply that
there can be no falsification as it is merely an element to be considered to determine whether or not there is criminal intent to commit
falsification.46 It is a settled rule that in the falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain
or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that in the falsification of a public document, the principal thing punished is the violation of
the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.47 In this case, petitioner's voluntary acts of: (a) signing as
witness to the three antedated notarized deeds of absolute sale, attesting that the Granda spouses, as vendors, signed the same in his presence,
when there is probable cause to believe that such signatures were falsified; and (b) knowingly causing the registration of the three falsified
deeds with the Register of Deeds to effect the cancellation of the old TCTs and the issuance of the new TCTs in his name and the names of his
siblings, evidence malice and willful transgression of the law.

We likewise reject petitioner's defense of good faith. As pointed out by respondent, the contention that even assuming petitioner had a hand in
the falsification and use of the falsified instruments, he is not liable because he was authorized by Aurora and her heirs, was belatedly raised on
appeal. Also, as logically pointed out by respondent, he is an heir of Aurora and definitely, he did not authorize petitioner to falsify the subject
deeds and use the same to effect the transfer of the TCTs from the name of Aurora to his name and that of his siblings. Furthermore, the finding
that there is probable cause to believe that the signatures of both Aurora and Rafael were falsified and the dates of the instruments were
antedated lay serious doubt on the claim that the conveyance was indeed authorized by Aurora herself. To further sow doubt on the claim of
authority, respondent's claim that in 1999, his grandmother Aurora was already "too sickly and frail to execute said documents," finds support in
the evidence on record. A certain Rebecca Araza, a househelp in the residence of Aurora, attested that in 1999, she was one of those who took
care of Aurora who was then "very sickly," "could hardly recognize faces,… remember names and events and very rarely talked" and whose
"condition worsened starting January 1999."48 Also bolstering respondent's claim is the noticeable fact that Aurora signed the GPOA dated
February 14, 1999 in favor of Silvina by affixing her thumbmark instead of her customary signature.49

While it is this Court’s general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving the investigating officers sufficient
discretion to determine probable cause,50 we have nonetheless made some exceptions to the general rule, such as when the acts of the officer
are without or in excess of authority.51 Although there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the
same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear
dictates of reason.52 From the records of the case at bar, it is clear that a prima facie case for falsification exists against petitioner.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The July 18, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26273 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-36345 November 25, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO MONTANO and WENCESLAO CABAGSANG, defendants-appellants.

BUTTE, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, convicting the defendants-appellants of the crime of falsification of
public documents. The defendant Wenceslao Cabagsang was the chief of police and the defendant Pedro Montano was the justice of the peace
of the municipality of Tanza in the Province of Cavite, in the month of September, 1930, when the crimes for which they were convicted
occurred. It appears from the evidence that on September 5, 1930, a criminal complaint against one Arturo A. Soriano for the crime of qualified
seduction was filed with the said justice of the peace. The justice, apparently to favor Soriano, delayed the preliminary investigation until the
offended woman on September 18, 1930, filed with him a motion demanding immediate action and calling his attention to the fact that his delay
was a violation of the circular of instructions of the judge of the Court of First Instance of said province. The case was then set for hearing on
September 22, 1930. Thereafter administrative charges against the justice of the peace were filed with the Court of First Instance of Cavite,
alleging that the delay in the preliminary investigation was a violation of the circular of the Court of First Instance, dated November 15, 1928,
requiring all justices of the peace to dispose of all preliminary investigations within ten days from the date on which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused.lawphil.net

The evidence shows beyond reasonable doubt that prior to the hearing of said administrative case, the defendants, in order to make it appear
that there had been no violation of the said instructions to the justices of the peace, falsified official records in their custody as follows:

The defendant chief of police fraudulently altered and falsified the municipal police blotter and the book of records of arrests and the return of
the warrant of arrest and Soriano's bail bond so as to make them show that the said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested and gave bond on the 13th
day of September, 1930, whereas, in truth and in fact, as said records showed before said falsification, the said Arturo A. Soriano was arrested
and released on bond on the 6th day of September, 1930; that the defendant Pedro Montano conspired and cooperated with his codefendant in
making said falsifications in order to meet the administrative charges then pending against him. The court below rejected the defense of the
accused that said alterations were made in good faith and corresponded to the true facts of the case. There is no issue of law raised in the
assignment of errors. We have made a careful review of the evidence and have come to the conclusion that the judgment of the court below
should be affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull and Vickers, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38948 November 18, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. TOMAS MANANSALA, ET AL., defendants.
GALICANO ALON and RICARDO CABRALES, appellants.

VICKERS, J.:

The appellants Galicano Alon ( alias Grego), and Ricardo Cabrales ( alias Maning), together with Tomas Manansala, Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro
Mendoza, were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the crime of estafa, committed as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of February, 1932, in the municipalities of Pasay and Caloocan, Province of Rizal, within two and a half miles from
the city limits and within the jurisdiction of this court, and in the City of Manila proper, Philippine Islands, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defraud one Perfecto Abordo in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false and fraudulent representations which may made to the said Perfecto Abordo to the
effect that they had for sale six hundred (600) tins of opium, a prohibited drug, and that they would deliver the same to him upon paying them
P600 in advance and by means of other similar deceit, induced the said Perfecto Abordo to give and deliver to them, as in fact he gave and
delivered to them, the said sum of P600, in consideration of which the accused gave him a gasoline can which they represented to contain the
600 tins of opium, when in truth and in fact, as the said accused well knew, the said can contained only six small tin cans containing a black
substance which was not opium, the accused thereby wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defrauding the said Perfecto Abordo in the sum of
P600 to his damage and prejudice in said amount.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

That the accused Tomas Manansala y Velasco and Galicano Alon y Ponce ( alias Grego) have each once been convicted of the crime of estafa;
and the accused Ricardo Cabrales y Pelorina ( alias Maning) and Isidro Mendoza y Santos Sollo are habitual delinquents, the first having been
convicted once for robbery, once for theft and three times for estafa, having served his last sentence on February 4, 1927, and the second having
been convicted one of estafa and once of robbery, having served his last sentenced on October 30, 1922, all of said convictions having been
rendered by virtue of final judgments of competent courts.

After the prosecution had rested, the information was dismissed as to the defendants Tomas Manansala, Generoso Jacinto, and Isidro Mendoza
for lack of evidence to show that they had taken part in the commission of the crime. Upon the termination of the trial, Judge Pedro Concepcion
found the defendants Galicano Alon and Ricardo Cabrales guilty of estafa, in accordance with the provisions of article 354, No. 2, of the Penal
Code, as amended by Act No. 3244, and sentenced each of them to suffer four months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the offended party, Perfecto Abordo, in the sum of P600, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the proportionate part of the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The trial judge's findings as to the facts as follows:

With respect to the other accused, Galicano Alon and Ricardo Cabrales, the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently shows that about a week
prior to February 19, 1932, the former who gave his name as "Grego" and the latter known by the name of "Maning" in company with another
person whom they called "Pepe" offered to sell Attorney Perfecto Abordo 17,000 tins of opium at P1.50 each telling him that he could sell them
for P10 a tin. Tempted with the prospect of an enormous profit, Mr. Perfecto Abordo agreed to buy the merchandise, and the accused agreed to
sell it to him in lots of 1,000 tins at P600 lot. It was agreed that the delivery of P1,000 tins would take place at P5.30 p. m., at the corner of Taft
Avenue Extension and Vito Cruz within the jurisdiction of this city. Attorney Perfecto Abordo accordingly went to the place indicated with the
money, and there waited for them. The accused Galicano Alon arrived alone in an automobile and invited Abordo to go with him to the place
where the 1,00 tins of opium were kept. trusting Gallicano Alon, who always called Abordo "brother" because he claimed to be a Mason like Mr.
Abordo, the latter went with him in his automobile to the rotunda of Rizal Avenue Extension. Chauffeur Jose Jonsay was at the wheel. It was
already twilight when they arrived at the rotunda, and there they met Maning, or the accused Ricardo Cabrales, who, in company with others,
was waiting for Abordo in another automobile. The accused Cabrales alighted and shortly thereafter appeared Pepe who was ordered by
Cabrales to get the tins of opium. Pepe got from a lot nearby the can Exhibit A, the top of which was ordered by Cabrales in order to show
Abordo the six tins of opium contained in a wooden box, Exhibit B, which Abordo saw when the top of said Exhibit A was opened. Finding that
said tins really contained opium, Abordo believed that the rest of the contents of the can also consisted of tins of opium. He handed the six
hundred pesos to Maning, who, after receiving the money, immediately went to the automobile where his companions were waiting. At the
same time Abordo returned to his car with the accused Galicano Alon and the person named Pepe, carrying the can. While proceeding towards
Taft Avenue Extension Abordo noticed that the accused Cabrales was following in his automobile, and that when they were nearing the corner of
Taft Avenue Extension and Vito Cruz the car in which Cabrales was riding attempted to block Abordo's way, while Galicano Alon told Attorney
Abordo that those in the other automobile were constabulary men and it would be better to get rid of the can Exhibit A. The accused Cabrales,
whom Attorney Abordo was able to recognize very well, and the companions of the former whom Abordo was not able to identify because it
was already dark, approached his car saying that they were constabulary agents and told Abordo that he was under arrest. Knowing that they
were not constabulary agents and that their purpose was to get possession of the can Exhibit A, Abordo drew his revolver and ordered his
chauffeur to proceed. Cabrales and his companions again followed him in their car and for the second time tried to head off Abordo somewhere
before the intersection of F. B. Harrison and Vito Cruz streets, but Abordo proceeded until he arrived at his house. There he opened the can
Exhibit A and inside he found the wooden box Exhibit B, but the rest of the contents of the can was sand. He bore a hole in one of the tins and
found that it only contained molasses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The accused tried to give, by their testimony and that of Miguel Rosales, who had been convicted twelve times of estafa, a long story to the
effect that Abordo engaged the accused Cabrales, through the intervention of Miguel Rosales, to prepare 1,000 tins of molasses resembling tins
of opium, that on the afternoon agreed upon for the payment of the value of said tins, Abordo refused to deliver the money on the pretext that
the purchaser of said tins had not arrived, and invited the accused to his house in Pasay in order to make the payment inasmuch as they insisted
upon collecting from him; but before arriving in Pasay Cabrales stopped Abordo's automobile and required the latter to hand over the money, at
the same time placing at the side of Abordo's automobile a sack which he said contained the 1,000 tins of molasses asked for by
Abordo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is hardly necessary to state that this story is a sheer fabrication.

The attorney for the appellants makes the following assignments of error:
I. El Juzgado incurrio en error al declarar que las pruebas demuestran que Ricardo Cabrales y Galicano Alon, en compañia de otro individuo
llamado "Pepe", vendieron al abogado Perfecto Abordo mil latas de opio falsificado por el precio de P600.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

II. El Juzgado incurrio en eror al no declarar que el supuesto ofendido, Perfecto Abordo, por medio de Miguel Rosales, encomendo a Ricardo
Cabrales la confeccion de mil latas de opio al precio de P0.60 cada lata poniendo como contenido melaza, para venderlas como opio
legitimo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

III. El Juzgado incurrio en error al no declarar que aun en el supuesto de que realidad Ricardo Cabrales vendio a Perfecto Abordo dichas mil latas
de opio por el precio de P600, el acusado Galicano Alon nada tiene que ver con dicha venta.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

IV. El Juzgado incurrio en error al no absolver a los acusados apelantes, apreciando cuando menos en favor de los mismos y sobre todo en favor
del apelante Galicano Alon, el beneficio de la duda racional.

The assignments of error raise only questions of fact, depending on the credibility of the witnesses. No reason has been adduced that would
justify us in disturbing the findings of the trial judge. As to the contention of the appellants, the trial judge found it to be a mere fabrication and
worthy of no credit. The witnesses for the defense were Miguel Rosales and the appellants themselves. The evidence shows that Miguel Rosales
had been convicted of the falsification of commercial documents in twelve cases. The appellant Galicano Alon had been convicted of estafa, and
the other appellant, Ricardo Cabrales, had been convicted once of robbery, once of theft, and three times of estafa. The trial judge was fully
justified in disbelieving the improbable story of said witnesses.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The crime committed by the appellants is that of estafa as defined in article 315, paragraph 1 ( a) of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that
any person who shall defraud another through unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence by altering the substance, quantity, or quality of anything
of value which the offender shall deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be based on an immoral or illegal
consideration. The amount of the fraud being P600, the penalty applicable is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prison correccional in its
minimum period, and it appearing that the appellant Galicano Alon has already been convicted of estafa, he is therefore a recidivist, and the
penalty applicable to him should be imposed in the maximum degree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It was alleged in the information that Ricardo Cabrales was a habitual delinquent because he had been convicted once of robbery, once of theft,
and three times of estafa, and that the last penalty for estafa was extinguished by him on February 4, 1927. These prior convictions were
admitted by him in open court. He is therefore a habitual delinquent, but his prior convictions can not be taken into consideration also as an
aggravating circumstance for the purpose of increasing the principal penalty, which should therefore be imposed in the medium
degree.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As the additional penalty, the Solicitor-General recommends the medium degree of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, or from
six years and one day to seven years and four months. This is erroneous. It is apparently based upon the mistaken idea that only the prior
convictions of this appellant for estafa are to be taken into account. The correct interpretation of the law is that all prior convictions of any of the
crimes of theft, robbery, estafa, or falsification should be taken into account when a person is convicted of any one of these crimes and of being
habitual delinquent. To hold otherwise, a person might be twice convicted of each of these four crimes, and still not be a habitual
delinquent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

For the foregoing reasons, the appellant Galicano Alon is sentenced to suffer one year, eight months, and one day of prision correccional, and
the appellant Ricardo Cabrales is sentenced to suffer one year and one day of prision correccional, and said defendants are jointly and severally
sentenced to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P600, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The
appellant Ricardo Cabrales having been previously convicted five times of theft, robbery, or estafa, he is sentenced as a habitual delinquent to
suffer an additional penalty of eleven years, six months, and twenty-one days of prision mayor.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Hull, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-10286. May 23, 1958.]
LUIS E. ARRIOLA, Petitioner-Appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Oppositor-Appellant.

DECISION

FELIX, J.:

The petition alleges and the evidence shows that Luis F. Arriola was born in the City of Manila on August 19, 1926, of Chinese parents. Since then
he resided in this country and in the City of Manila for a period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of the petition,
interrupted only by 2 vacations in Amoy, China, first, when he was 2 years old and the second when he was 9 years of age. He is the manager of
his father’s Cafeteria from which he derives an average annual income of P1,800.00 with free board and lodging. He has a savings account with
the China Banking Corporation with a deposit of P4,029.07 as of August 12, 1955 (Exh. R.) . He is single and can speak, read and write English
and Tagalog, as shown by his testimony given in English and a sample of his handwriting in Tagalog which is marked as Exhibit X-court). He
finished his primary and intermediate courses in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, and the high school course in Cuyapó, Nueva Ecija. He is a holder of the
degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce (cum laude) from the Far Eastern University, which was awarded to him on April 12, 1953. While a
student in the Far Eastern University, he was a member of the Kappa Gamma Phi membership, which was based only on highly scholastic and
moral considerations. He believes in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution and has conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as the
community in which he is living. He is not opposed to organized government nor affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold
and teach doctrines opposing all forms of organized government. He does not defend nor teach the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault or assassination for the success and predominance of man’s ideas. Neither is he polygamist nor a believer in the practice of polygamy. He
has never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, nor is he suffering from mental alienation or any incurable contagious disease.
He has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has learned and embraced the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos. That part of China of
which he is a citizen is not at war with the Philippines, which part grants rights to Filipinos to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof. He
has paid all his obligations to the government, as shown by his income tax receipts, based on income tax returns filed by him.

Two Filipinos of good standing in the country are his witnesses, namely, Andres Palma, Professor in the Far Eastern University and Technical
Adviser on Economic matters at the National Development Company, and Angel Roman, Jr., also a Professor in the Far Eastern University, both of
whom speak very highly of the petitioner and warrant that he is a person of good moral character and a law-abiding citizen, and, therefore,
recommend the approval of the petition (Rec. on Appeal Petition — p. 1-6 and Decision — p. 7-9).

Having been born in this country Luis F. Arriola was dispensed with the notice of declaration of intention and his petition was published as
required.

The hearing of the case was going through nicely until petitioner took the witness stand, when in the course of his cross-examination the
representative of the Solicitor asked him as to whether he had paid his residence tax, and answering in the affirmative, he produced his
residence certificate No. A-0224451 for the year 1955, which the government requested to be marked as Exhibit 1 (p. 31 of the Record of
Exhibits). It was noticed then that despite of all other exhibits produced by petitioner wherein he appeared as "Chinese", in said residence
certificate he was stated to be a "Filipino citizen", which was not true, and asked to explain this discrepancy, he replied that he did not know it
because he acquired the same through an agent and that it was only at that time that he noticed that his said certificate mentioned him as
Filipino. Petitioner then asked for the continuation of the hearing, which was granted by the Court setting the continuation thereof for August
18, 1955. On that date petitioner, instead of presenting the persons who secured that certificate for him, who most likely had committed the
alleged mistake, produced the same residence certificate with the word "Filipino" instead of the word "Chinese" appearing before as the
citizenship of the petitioner. On the reverse side of that certificate, however, there was the following explanation: "Duplicate hereof changed as
to Chinese citizenship per ACR No. 22803, dtd. 7/17/50, Manila" followed by the initials "R.C. 8/17/55." The initials R.C. correspond to the name
Rufino Cervantes, Chief, Residence Certificate Section, City Treasurer’s Office, Manila, who, at the hearing, testified for the petitioner
acknowledging to have made that change.

The representative of the Solicitor General makes too much ado about this incident, and says that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

One of the cardinal qualifications for naturalization provided by law is that the applicant must be of good moral character and must have
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the period of his residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which he is living (Sec. 2, paragraph 3, Revised Naturalization Law). In general, what
constitutes "good moral character" is such character that measures to the standard of the average citizen where the applicant resides. The word
"character" though is not synonymous with "reputation." It simply means what a person really is, not what he is supposed to be. In other words,
the inquiry of proof in naturalization proceedings is not so much as to the good reputation of the applicant, but as to his good behavior as an
index of actual good moral character, so that specific acts of bad behavior are material and competent. Needless to state, this requirement of
good moral character applies to the period up to the date of the hearing (2 Am. Jur. 569; In re Boomer [D. C. Mont. 1922] 79 F. 789, cited in
USCA, Title 8, footnote No. 21, p. 436-37). The Court, therefore can and should consider any act of misconduct which militates against the
applicant in relation to his petition for naturalization."

just to come to the conclusion that applicant Luis F. Arriola has not proved to be a person of honesty, fairness and morality, indispensable
requisites for moral character to entitle him to a grant of Philippine citizenship. The lower Court, however, did not yield to consider the
petitioner as one not being of good moral character and of irreproachable behavior, and granted the petition. Hence, this appeal by the
Government wherein appellant contends that the lower Court erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. In finding that petitioner is of good moral character and that he has conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner with the
constituted Government; and

2. In granting the instant petition for naturalization.

After weighing carefully the arguments adduced by the Solicitor General, We cannot find anything wrong in the behavior of the petitioner or
that he is not of good moral character by reason of the alleged correction of his aforementioned certificate of residence. There is ample proof on
record that the petitioner presented himself as a Chinese national and when his attention was called to the fact that in his residence certificate
for 1955, which was procured through an agent, he appeared as a Filipino, which is a false statement of his nationality, he took the necessary
steps to rectify that mistake, and instead of doing it by himself he went to the person whom he believed to be vested with authority to
accomplish the proper change desired, namely, the Chief of the Residence Certificate Section, City Treasurer’s Office, Manila, Mr. Rufino
Cervantes. Perhaps, the Solicitor General is right in saying that there is no law expressly authorizing the petitioner or said Chief of Section to
make the correction aforementioned, although We are inclined to believe that the latter official could have done it after receiving evidence of
the mistake appearing in a record under his custody. In the case of U. S. v. Alejandro R. Mateo, 25 Phil., 324, this Court stated the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"M being required in October, 1911, for the purpose of an affidavit to present his cedula for the year 1911 to a Justice of the Peace, produced
also his cedula for 1910; on reading the cedula for the year 1910, something which he had not done before, M discovered that his age was
stated incorrectly therein and he, fearing the result of presenting to a public official a cedula which contains an incorrect statement regarding his
own age, changed the age, making it 25 instead of 23; the change having been discovered by the Justice of the Peace on the presentation of the
cedula, M, without hesitation, detailed the part he had taken in the change and the reasons therefore; it is admitted that the age in the cedula
was incorrect and that the change made the cedula give his true age; M was charged with falsification of a cedula and was convicted. Held: Error.

In order that the crime of falsification of a cedula be committed it is necessary that the cedula, after the alteration, be capable, of effecting a
fraud or deception against the Government, or of obtaining for the person who altered it some privilege or immunity which he would not have
been able to obtain if the alteration had not been made.

In order that the crime of falsification of a cedula be committed it is necessary that the alteration be a material one, that is, one capable of
injuring the Government or benefiting the accused. A change which cannot possibly produce any such result, either injurious or beneficial, is not
sufficient to constitute a violation of Act 1189.

x x x

"Any alteration which makes a cedula speak the truth cannot be made the foundation of a criminal action. It is a falsification, and not a
correction, which the law punishes." (See also the case of People v. Moreno, CA-38, Off. Gaz., 109).

We, therefore, conclude that the act of petitioner in causing the correction of an erroneous information appearing in his cedula which had
passed to him unnoticed, correction that he caused to be made by the authority or person having custody of the original of the same, cannot
reflect unfavorable on petitioner’s moral character and irreproachable conduct.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

 SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5952 October 24, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
RUFINO PONTE, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

CARSON, J.:

Rufino Ponte, Pedro Pedraza, Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban Verata, were charged with the
crime of malversation of public funds, as defined and penalized in Act No. 1740, in an information couched in the following terms:

That on or about the 6th day of September, 1909, the defendant Rufino Ponte was a bonded employee of the provincial and municipal
government of Calabanga, Ambos Camarines, and as municipal treasurer of said pueblo had in his possession and in his charge the sum of
P3,795.53 and safe valued at P50. The defendant Pedro Pedraza was the janitor or porter of the municipal treasury of Calabanga, and Juan
Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram and Esteban Verata were municipal policemen of said pueblo of Calabanga, Ambos
Camarines, and as such officers had committed to them the guardianship and custody of the municipal treasury of Calabanga, where the said
sum of P3,795.93 and the safe containing it were kept.

That the said defendant Rufino Ponte did maliciously, criminally and unlawfully misappropriate and make personal use of the said sum of
P3,795.93, and refused and failed to render account of the same, as well as of the safe containing it.

That the defendants Pedro Pedraza, Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban Verata, did, each and every
one of them, maliciously, criminally and unlawfully, directly aid said Rufino Ponte in this malversation by taking said safe with the said amount
from the municipal treasury and carrying it to the sitio of Inarian: in violation of law.

Counsel for the defendants Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban Verata, demurred to the information
on the ground that as to these defendants the facts set out in the information did not constitute the crime with which they were charged. The
grounds upon which they base this contention are stated by counsel as follows:

The crime with which the above-named defendants are charged is provided for and penalized by a special Act, No. 1740, which has repealed
such provisions of the Penal Code relating to malversation and misappropriation as conflict with the provisions of said Act.

According to the information cited, the above-named accused were municipal policemen of Calabanga, where the crime was committed, and
their sole participation therein was that they directly aided Rufino Ponte, the municipal treasurer, in said malversation by taking the safe with
the sum misappropriate and carrying it from the municipal treasury to the sitio of Inarian.

It is evident from what has just stated that the question relates to the guilt of the accused Alamida, Narvasa, Cada, Metram and Verata as
accomplices in the crime of malversation. (3 Phil. Rep., 6; art. 14, Penal Code.)

As accomplices, said defendants are not liable under Act No. 1740, because this Act only punishes the principals, the officers, whether bonded
or not, who misapply or misappropriate the funds they may have in their possession by reason of their office.

The provisions of the Penal Code regarding the criminal responsibility of accomplices in crimes are applicable to this case, because the crime
under consideration is penalized by a special Act, which is the only law that should govern.

Therefore, in view of the arguments adduced, the court is requested to sustain this demurrer and order the dismissal of this cause with
reference to the accused municipal policemen of Calabanga.

The court below sustained the demurrer in the following order:

Careful perusal of section 1 of Act No. 1740 shows that it refers to bonded officers or employees and any other persons who, having charge, by
reason of their office or employment or by operation of law, of funds or property of the Government, who misappropriate, fail to render
account, etc.

Two requisites are therefore necessary for the existence of the crime of malversation, according to Act No. 1740, to wit: (1) That a bonded
officer or employee or any other person by reason of his office or employment or by operation of law have charged of funds or property of the
Government; and (2) that said officer or person refuse or fail to render account, or make personal use of the same or misappropriate them, etc.

Are these requisites applicable to the accused policemen?

No: for the office of the municipal policemen does not carry with it any duty of guardianship or custody of Government funds, nor is there any
law which prescribes that by reason of being policemen they must take charge of and guard Government funds, nor is it alleged in the complaint
that the funds in question were turned over to them; it merely appears that it was their duty as policemen to guard the safe, or municipal
treasury. The information itself avers that "as such officials they had committed to them the guardianship and custody of the municipal treasury
of Calabanga, where the said sum of P3,795.93 and safe containing it were kept." More clearly: the law does not refer to those who guard or
care for the municipal building or treasury, but to those who are intrusted with or have in their charge funds or property of the
Government.1awphil.net

Accordingly, if the policemen abstracted the money and the safe containing it, and carried it to another place, as is alleged in the complaint, they
committed the crime of robbery, or some other crime against property, but not the crime of malversation as defined in Act No. 1740.

Therefore the court sustains the demurrer, declaring this cause dismissed with reference to the policemen Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades,
Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban Verata, with five-sixths of the costs de oficio, and orders the provincial fiscal again to investigate
the facts and then present an information against said policemen for robbery or some other crime against property.
We are agreed with the trial judge in so far as he refused to give any weight to contention of counsel for the defense that the information merely
charges these defendants as accomplices in the commission of the crime defined and penalized in Act No. 1740, and that there is nothing in the
Act which penalizes the assistance rendered by accomplices in the commission of this crime; it will be seen that the information expressly
alleges that "the defendants did, each and every one of them, maliciously, criminally and unlawfully, directly aid said Rufino Ponte in this
malversation by taking said safe with the said amount from the municipal treasury and carrying it to the sitio of Inarian," thus charging them
with having taken a direct part in the commission of the crime, which could not have been successfully carried out had it not been for their
direct participation and cooperation. Clearly these defendants are charged in the information as coprincipals and not as accomplices.

But we can not agree with the trial court in sustaining the demurrer on the ground that the accused, not having had the money in question in
their charge by reason of a public office held by them, could not commit the crime of malversation of public funds as defined in Act No. 1740,
the true nature of the crime committed by them being, in the opinion of the trial judge, "robbery" or some other of the offenses against
property defined and penalized in the code. It may be that the acts committed by these defendants constituted the crime of robbery, but under
all the circumstances, we have no doubt that these acts also constituted the crime of malversation of public funds as defined in Act No. 1740.

Groizard, in his Commentaries on article 405 of the Spanish Penal Code, which is substantially identical with article 390 of the Philippine Code,
says that:

Doubt, weighty doubt may arise, nevertheless, regarding the definition of the crime and of the penalty to be imposed upon the private party
who abstracts funds with the consent of the officer charged with their custody. Shall the person so doing be guilty of the crime of malversation
here provided for, and shall he suffer the same penalty as the unfaithful officer, or shall he be guilty only to the crime of theft and undergo the
punishment he deserves therefor?

xxx xxx x x x1awphil.net

Without overlooking the force of the arguments we have just cited, we are inclined to take the first point of view. We are led thereto by the
consideration that in contending for the imposition of the same penalty upon the private party who abstracts public funds as upon the employee
who gives his consent thereto we recognize the differentiation with which crimes are always described and penalized in the code. In the action
which the text describes as a crime there is perfect unity: the private party does not act independently from the public officer: rather, he knows
that the funds of which he wishes to get possession are in the latter's charge, and instead of trying to abstracts them by circumventing the
other's vigilance he resorts to corruption, and in the officer's unfaithfulness seeks and finds the most reprehensible means for accomplishing a
deed which by having a public officer as its moral instrument assumes the character of a social crime. If the article were not so interpreted, it
would be necessary to agree that the act, in spite of its evident unity, would constitute not one but two distinct crimes, and the persons
participating therein, although they acted together throughout, would be guilty of two different kinds of wrongdoing. Moreover, the rule of
article 80, which prevents extension from some culprits to others of the responsibility that arises from their personal qualities, is restricted by
fundamental principles and by the article itself, wherein it is applied to the consideration of the extenuating and aggravating circumstances
which may affect the persons respectively responsible for the crime, and it neither can nor must influence in any way the characterization of the
facts. One who helps a son kill his father is an accomplice of parricide: one who plans with a servant to commit a theft (hurto), and does commit
it, is guilty of hurto domestic. When the law clearly defines a crime, as it has here defined the crime of malversation, those who in any way
participate therein must be principals, accomplices or abettors thereof. (Vol. 4, p. 275.)

Viada, in his Commentaries upon the same article, says:

Shall the person who participates or intervenes as co-perpetrator, accomplice or abettor in the crime of malversation of public funds, committed
by a public officer, have the penalties of this article also imposed upon him? In opposition to the opinion maintained by some jurists and
commentators (among others the learned Pacheco) we can only answer the question affirmatively, for the same reasons (mutatis mutandis) we
have already advanced in Question I of the commentary on article 314. French jurisprudence has also settled the question in the same way on
the ground that the person guilty of the crime necessarily aids the other culprit in the acts which constitute the crime. (Vol. 2, 4th edition, p.
652.)

The reasoning by which Groizard and Viada support their views as to the correct interpretation of the provisions of the Penal Code touching
malversation of public funds by a public official, is equally applicable in our opinion, to the provisions of Act No. 1740 defining and penalizing
that crime, and we have heretofore, in the case of the United States vs. Dowdell (11 Phil. Rep., 4), imposed the penalty prescribed by this section
of the code upon a public official who took part with another in the malversation of public funds, although it was not alleged, and in fact clearly
appeared, that those funds were not in his handy by virtue of his office, though it did appear that they were in the hands of his coprincipal by
virtue of the public office held by him.

The order of the lower court sustaining the demurrer should be and is hereby overruled.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 5072. October 27, 1909. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SANTIAGO AUSTERO, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

ARELLANO, C.J. :

Santiago Austero, a police sergeant at Tiwi, a town in the Province of Albay, proposed to Barbara Cirio, a young woman 16 years of age, who was
married to Gregorio Colada, that he pay the land tax for her on certain land inherited from her father, in exchange for a hog that belonged to her.
The offer was accepted and Santiago Austero handed to Barbara Cirio two receipts for payment of the land tax made out in favor of Angel Cirio,
Barbara’s father, and thereupon obtained delivery of the hog which was valued at P45. Barbara Cirio, however, was subsequently notified by the
municipal treasurer that she was delinquent in the payment of said tax, in view of which her husband, Gregorio Colada, went to the municipality
with the two receipts showing the payment of the tax as delivered by Austero; but Santiago Austero, who was there, snatched them from his
hand and tore them up; the pieces were, however, recovered later on and the receipts thus pieced together and offered in evidence as corpus
delicti, being Exhibit A and B, demonstrated the fraud which had been perpetrated on the young woman Cirio by giving her receipts with which
she could prove no payment whatever.

All of the foregoing facts have been fully proven; the silence of the defense has contributed to such proof; it has offered no evidence at all,
resting its case solely on the point of law as to whether, by such acts, the crime of falsifications was committed or merely that of estafa.

The falsification charged in the complaint consists, according to the same, in that "the accused did falsity official public documents, to wit, two
land tax receipts, Provincial Form 25, numbered . . . whereon the name of Dionisio Austero originally appeared, making on said document, which
was a lawful and real one, an alteration which changed its sense, that is to say, erasing the name written thereon and substituting for it that of
Angelo Cirio, the father of the injured woman."cralaw virtua1aw library

"Counsel for the accused has admitted — it so appears apud acta — that the receipts A and B were originally made out to Dionisio
Austero . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Dionisio Austero was the father of Santiago Austero and held the receipts in question showing the payment made by him for the land tax in
1902. Santiago Austero erased the name of his father, Dionisio Austero, and wrote over the erasure the name of Angelo Cirio, the father of
Barbara Cirio, so as to show that the latter had paid the same tax for the year 1904; he thus managed to deceive her and profit thereby to the
extent of a hog, valued, as already stated, at P45.

The defense endeavored to show that the above facts constitute the crime of estafa only, not that of falsification, and in support thereof cited
the decisions of this Supreme Court in the cases of United States v. Paraiso (1 Phil. Rep., 66), United States v. Roque (1 Phil. Rep., 372), United
States v. Buenaventura (1 Phil. Rep., 428), United States v. Leyson (5 Phil. Rep., 447), United States v. Sayson (6 Phil. Rep., 382), and United States
v. Angeles (6 Phil. Rep., 435).

In this instance the Attorney-General very rightly observes that none of the above-cited decisions apply in the present case.

In the cause against Paraiso the doctrine is established that "the agent of a mercantile concern who signs false receipts with the name of a third
person is not guilty of falsification under articles 300 and 304 of the Penal Code if he does not attempt to imitate the signature or mark of that
person." In that against Roque: "The signing of another’s name to a receipt with design to deceive does not constitute falsification unless there is
an attempt to imitate the genuine signature." In that against Buenaventura: "When no attempt has been made to imitate the signature or
writing of another, there can be no conviction for falsification . . ." And in that against Leyson: "Leyson did then and there counterfeit and feign
the signature of J.Y. McCartey . . ." In all of the foregoing decisions the matter at issue has been the falsification of signatures.

The case at bar has not to do with the falsification of a signature, nor is it necessary to inquire whether or not an attempt was made to imitate
the signature or writing which constitutes the sign of authenticity, or reason for according credit to the document. The falsified documents in
question are printed ones. The blanks that are filled out in this class of documents with the name of the taxpayer, the location of the property
and certain figures, need not, nor can they be imitated, inasmuch as their authenticity lies in the issue thereof by an officer authorized by law so
to do, and in the stub from which the same detached when lawfully issued. As the complain states, the documents exhibited in the case are
genuine ones, the falsification consists in that the truth therein contained has been altered.

In the cases against Sayson and Angeles, this Supreme Court has established the doctrine that the falsification of seals, or of certificates of
ownership of cattle, is not punished under article 301 in connection with article 300 of the Penal Code, but by article 311, as in the case of
Sayson, and 312 as in that of Angeles.

The above cases refer to special kinds of falsification, different from the eight general forms specified in article 300. In none of them has
reference been made to any acts that might be qualified as estafa but to acts that purely and simply constitute the crime of falsification.

The established rule has been constantly maintained, both in Spain and in its colonial possessions, as well as by the Supreme Court in these
Islands in punishing, under paragraph 1 of article 300, the counterfeiting or feigning of a signature, writing, or rubric, only when an attempt is
made to imitate the signature, writing , or rubric of a person in order to induce another to accept the document as written, signed, or rubricated
by the former. Counterfeiting consists in making one thing so similar to another that they can only be distinguished with difficulty. To feign a
signature, writing, or rubric is to imitate the same. Where the imitation is such that anyone would mistake it for the signature, writing, or rubric
that was imitated, the crime of falsification is committed as defined by paragraph 1 of article 300 of the Penal Code. Where said imitation is not
complete, or, when there is no imitation, and the signature, writing, or rubric does not appear counterfeited, but the issuance or execution of a
document is merely supposed to have been done by a certain person, then the case defined by article 300 does not apply.

All the foregoing and elemental doctrine does not apply in the present case; the question is not whether the accused counterfeited or feigned
the signature, writing, or rubric of some person, nor had he any necessity to imitate another’s writing. By substituting the name of Angelo Cirio
for that of Dionisio Austero he did not counterfeit or feign any signature, writing, or rubric whatever. What he did do was to foist a printed
document as a receipt to Angelo Cirio for the payment of the land tax for 1903; it was not a false one by reason of the fiction of the signature,
writing, or rubric appearing thereon, but a real and authentic one issued in favor of Dionisio Austero as a voucher of a payment made by him in
1902 for his land tax. He who shall feign the handwriting of a document, thereby attempting to cause others to believe that it was written by a
given person, or imitates the signature or rubric of said person in order to induce the belief that it was drawn by him, utters a false document.
But a document genuine in every respect, made out in favor of Dionisio Austero, but which subsequently turns out to be false because in lieu of
said name, that of Angelo Cirio has been inserted, is not a false document by reason of the counterfeiting or feigning of the signature, writing, or
rubric of any person, but by reason of the alteration made thereon and which is punished under paragraph 6 of article 300 above cited.

The Attorney-General has therefore in this instance very properly applied the doctrine set up by two decisions of this court, and by another of
the supreme court of Spain which, and especially the latter, are conclusive in defining the responsibility of the culprit, the extent and the manner
of applying the penalty.

In the case of the United States v. Victoria (9 Phil. Rep., 81) although it deals with the crime of falsification of a private document, while in the
present case the falsification of a public one is involved, the fundamental doctrine is the same. Victoria had altered an account which called for
the sum of P10 by substituting a "3" for the "1" so as to make it appear "P30" instead of "P10," and had collected P30 from the payor of the
account; he was a clerk in a commercial firm to which he, however, only handed P10, profiting thereby to the extent of P20. "The fact," as this
court said, "involves the characteristics of the crime of estafa, besides that of falsification, which served as the means for its commission,
because by adopting deceitful means he obtained a price which he would not otherwise have secured by telling the truth."cralaw virtua1aw
library

The above decision has nothing to do with the previous ones even as paragraph 6 of article 300 of the Penal Code has nothing to do with
paragraph 1 thereof. A document is not falsified in one manner only; according to the said article there are eight; each paragraph indicates a
different species, and clearly the various species within the class must necessarily differ from each other, as each is a specific variation in the
class, or type of crime.

In the decision rendered in the case of the United States v. Llames (1 Phil. Rep., 130), the court held: "The writing of a false receipt by an
employee of the revenue department for the purpose of embezzling the amount is a necessary means for the commission of the latter offense
and the penalty is that of the higher offense, to wit, that of falsification."cralaw virtua1aw library

The decision rendered by the supreme court of Spain on the 14th of December, 1888, reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"An employee of a city government (Ayuntamiento) who alters the figures in a warrant officially issued for the payment of municipal obligations,
and by said means unlawfully appropriates a certain sum of money, commits the crime of estafa defined by paragraph 1 of article 547 of the
Penal Code of Spain (art. 534 of that of the Philippines) through the falsification of an official document as included in article 315 (301 of that of
the Philippines). Since the falsification was a necessary means to commit the estafa article 90 of the code (89 of that of the Philippines) must of
necessity be applied to the case in order to impose, in strict compliance therewith, the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum
degree."cralaw virtua1aw library

The estafa committed by this accused consisted of the gain which, by deceitful means, he obtained from a hog valued at P45, a sum less than
250 pesetas. This is punished by the code with the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium degrees.

The deceit consisted in the delivery of a true printed official document, which was a land-tax receipt issued to Dionisio Austero for the year
1902; the accused changed the name written thereon to that of Angelo Cirio so as to make it appear as a receipt for the land tax due by the
latter, as if he had paid it for the year 1903 or 1904; he thus committed the falsification defined in paragraph 6 of article 300, which consists of
making any alteration or interlineation in a genuine document which alters its meaning, and "which is punished with presidio mayor and a fine
of from 1,250 to 12,500 pesetas."cralaw virtua1aw library

But inasmuch as under article 89 where one of the crimes is the necessary means for committing the other, only the penalty corresponding to
the more serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum degree, and as the maximum degree of presidio mayor is from ten years and one day to
twelve years, the penalty of eleven years and one day of presidio mayor should be imposed on the accused herein.

The Court of First Instance of Albay which tried the case sentenced the accused to eight years and one day of presidio mayor, to the accessory
penalties, to pay a fine of 1,250 pesetas, to make restitution of the hog to Barbara Cirio or otherwise pay P45, the value of the same, and to pay
the costs.

From the said judgment the accused has appealed.

It being understood that the main penalty shall be eleven years and one day of presidio mayor the judgment appealed from is otherwise
affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the Appellant.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19603 December 29, 1922
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CATALINO TEVES, Defendant-Appellant.

OSTRAND, J.:

The defendant is accused of the crime of falsification of public documents, the information alleging:

That on or about the period between January 1st and April 30th, 1921, in the municipality of Dumaguete, Province of Oriental Negros, P. I., and
within the jurisdiction of this court the said accused being the warden of the provincial prison of this province did at that time and place wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit the crime of falsification of public documents by making an untruthful statement of facts and by simulating
the intervention of persons who had not intervened in various public documents, to wit: In the provincial voucher No. 350 of February, 1921; in
the provincial voucher No. 724 of March, 1921; and in the provincial voucher No. 1075 of April, 1921; stating therein facts which were not true,
by means of which falsification the accused made it appear and simulated that he had purchased from a Chinese person, Tan Juanco, of
Dumaguete on the aforesaid dates and place and under the provincial voucher No. 350, 1,1750 liters of rice-corn at P0.13 per liter and 122
gantas of beans at P0.75 a ganta, for the amount of P236.10; under provincial voucher No. 724, 150 liters of rice-corn at P0.13 a liter, 75 gantas
of beans at P0.75 a ganta, 65 kilos of dry fish at P0.73 a kilo, and two sacks of sugar at P6.90 a sack, for the sum of P254.12; and under the
provincial voucher No. 1075, 138 gantas of beans at P0.70 a ganta, 85 kilos of dry fish at P0.66 a kilo and a sack of salt at P4 a sack, for the sum
of P155.85; when as a matter of fact the aforesaid accused had bought from said Tan Juanco only 114 gantas of rice-corn on January 8, 1921, for
the sum of P80; that by means of said falsification the accused succeeded in collecting from the Government P566.07 more than he was entitled
to, manifestly contrary to law.

As will be seen, the information charges three separate offenses but the defendant did not demur to it, or object, and under the doctrine
established in the case of United States vs. Balaba (37 Phil., 260), he must be considered to have waived the right secured to him under section
21 of General Order No. 58. The trial court found him guilty on all three counts and, taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance of
having taken advantage of his position as a public functionary, sentenced him to suffer ten years and one day of prision mayor and to pay a fine
of 250 pesetas for each offense; to indemnify the provincial treasury of Oriental Negros in the sum of P566.07, to be perpetually disqualified for
public office and to pay the costs. From this judgment he appeals and presents six assignments of error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

The first assignment is to the effect that the trial court erred in taking into consideration the aggravating circumstance that advantage was taken
by the defendant of his public position. This point is well taken; the defendant was convicted under article 300 of the Penal Code which
prescribes the penalty of prision mayor and a fine for "any public officer, employee or notary who, by taking advantage of his official position,
shall be guilty of falsification of a document." The taking advantage of official position being a necessary element of the crime, it cannot, of
course, also be taken into consideration as an aggravating circumstance. The penalty imposed by the court below must, accordingly, be reduced
to that of the medium of prision mayor, there being no aggravating or extenuating circumstance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

The second error assigned is that the court erred in convicting the accused of three separate offenses in the same judgment, the penalty
imposed thus resulting disproportionate to the crime. This assignment is without merit; in the case of United States vs. Balaba, supra, this court
held (quoting syllabus): "The accused having made no objection to the information on the ground that it charged more than one offense, the
prosecution properly submitted evidence as to the commission of each and all of the offenses charged; and the court properly entered judgment
of conviction of each and all of these offenses which were established by the introduction of competent evidence at the trial, and should,
thereupon, have imposed the prescribed penalties for each and all of the offenses of which the accused was convicted in accord with the
provisions of article 87 of the Penal Code." chanrobles virtual law library

The penalty which we must impose upon the defendant may seem severe, but it is that prescribed by law and its measure does not lie within the
discretion of the court; for his relief by way of a reduction of the penalty, recourse must be had to a petition for executive
clemency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The remaining assignments of error relate to the admissibility of certain documents offered by the prosecution and objected to by the defense
principally on the ground that they were not properly certified or authenticated. Standing alone, the documents might be of doubtful
admissibility but taken in connection with the oral evidence they were, in our opinion, properly admitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

With the sole modification that the term of imprisonment imposed by the lower court be reduced from ten years and one day to eight years and
one day of prision mayor for each of the three offenses charged in the information, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs
against the appellant. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Araullo, C. J., Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19676 February 7, 1923
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. GERARDO AGNIS, Defendant-Appellant.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

While the accused was on May 9, 1921, discharging the function of his office as postmaster of the town of Dipolog, Zamboanga, a C.O.D.
package arrived at the post-office from the "Little Leather Library" of New York, addressed to R. Vic. Oliva. The accused notified the sendee
several times, but the latter could not make the required payment in accordance with the nature of the correspondence, and asked him to
advance the amount and to retain it until he could reimburse him. The accused retained the package without paying for it, and about July 28th
of that year, he opened the package which proved to contain printed pamphlets which he carried to his house to show them to his
sister.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

At the inspection of that office on the 30th day of that month of July, the officer who made the inspection, Eugenio de Mesa, learned that there
was such correspondence in that post-office, but that the package was not in the safe where it should have been kept. Asked as to the
whereabouts of the package, the defendant brought it to the office by order of the inspector, saying that he had carried it to his house to show
to his sister the pamphlets contained therein. The rules of the post-office as to correspondence of such a nature are to the effect that if a C.O.D.
matter is not claimed and paid for by the sendee within sixty days from receipt, it must be returned to the sender.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

If the pamphlets in question can be considered as the documents or papers contemplated in article 360 of the Penal Code, the application to the
case now before us of this legal provision would be obvious. This court in the case of United States vs. Orera (11 Phil., 596), defined the terms
"documents" or "papers" employed in said article 360 of the Penal Code, as: "A deed, instrument or other duly authorized paper by which
something is proved, evidenced or set forth," ... "every deed or instrument executed by a private person, without the intervention of a public
notary or of other person legally authorized, by which document some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced or set
forth," ... ."chanrobles virtual law library

The pamphlets in question cannot be said to evidence a fact, agreement or disposition. They are rather merchandise as any other article usually
sent by C.O.D. mail. For this reason we think that the act complained of does not come within the sanction of said article 360 of the Penal
Code.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Neither is section 1952 of the Administrative Code, in connection with 2757, subsection ( e), of said Code applicable to it, nor is article 362 of the
Penal Code, because it does not appear from the evidence that the package in question was closed; on the contrary it appears that it could be
opened on one end.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Nor can the act complained of be held to constitutes theft, since it is not alleged in the information, nor was it proven, that the accused took the
package with intent of gain.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

These are in substance the remarks of the Attorney-General, which we find correct, wherefore said officer recommends the dismissal of the case
and the acquittal of the defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We find this petition to be well grounded, and that judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the appellant acquitted with the costs de
oficio. So ordered.

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and Johns, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1650. April 28, 1905. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. LINO LITONJUA ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

ARELLANO, C.J. :

The cause of the complaint in this suit was the forgery of the signature of "Jean M. Poizat" on a check which was a part of a genuine check book
kept by a person so called. This signature was so perfectly imitated that on its presentation in the offices of the Guaranty Trust Company of New
York in the city of Manila it "might have passed in the rush of business," as stated by the assistant cashier of said office, Mr. John Martin, who
also affirms that "it is a good imitation of the signature of Mr. Poizat, although the handwriting is a little bit different, for which reason the check
was suspected.

Accompanying the check was found a note subscribed, it seems, by the same maker of the check, in which note was requested sixty bank notes
of fifteen dollars each, there being no issue of bank notes of that denomination. The one who presented the check for collection and the note
regarding the bank notes was the defendant Lino Litonjua, an employee of the house of Mr. Poizat. The latter, having been notified by the bank,
did not acknowledge the signature on the check or that of the note. When Litonjua was placed in the hands of the police there was found on
him a paper with the signature of Mr. Poizat traced on same, inverted, and a certificate of good conduct, apparently, issued and signed by Mr.
Poizat in favor of the defendant, and in the desk of Litonjua, in Mr. Poizat’s office, several documents were found, among them the stub of the
check presented for payment and another note similar to that which was presented, together with the clerk to obtain the bank notes of the
denomination of fifteen dollars.

The charges are fully proven against Lino Litonjua. Against Cirilo Santiago the evidence which has been taken into consideration is the imputation
of his codefendant, Litonjua, when he tried to excuse himself, saying that the former had given him the check; and "the style of the handwriting
and shape of the figures on the falsified check are similar to the handwriting and shape of the figures on the stubs of the check, written
previously by Santiago." The statement of the codefendant, which is not only incriminating but also exculpatory of the very fact, does not
deserve any credit in itself. It could have been taken into consideration if it had been really corroborated by the other data taken into
consideration in the judgment, but, even though there is resemblance in the character and form of the authentic handwriting of Cirilo Santiago
with the handwriting and figures in the falsified check, this does not permit of the affirmation that the figures and the handwriting in the check
are the work of the same person who wrote the authentic notes in the stubs which served as a means of comparison.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from as regards Lino Litonjua, sentencing him to ten years de presidio and a fine of 2,000 pesetas,
with one-half of the costs in both instances, and we reverse the sentence as regards Cirilo Santiago, whom we acquit with the other half of the
costs de oficio. So ordered.

Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1368. February 12, 1904. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. FRED FREIMUTH, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

The defendant is charged with having falsified a public document by counterfeiting and feigning the signatures of Charles Brugget, W. F. Farrow,
and other persons to a pay roll. At the time in question the defendant was a clerk in the office of one Behan, the disbursing officer of the Board
of Health of the city of Manila. The evidence shows that he did not sign the names of any of the persons mentioned in the complaint to the pay
roll, but it does not show that the witness Kennedy signed the name of Charles Bruggert at the request of the defendant and that the witness
Davis signed the name of W. F. Farrow. There was no attempt whatever by either Kennedy or Davis to imitate the signatures of Bruggert and
Farrow. The signatures made by the witnesses are entirely unlike the genuine signatures of these persons. The case is fully, covered by former
decisions of this court. (United States v. Buenaventura, Off. Gaz., 446; 1 United States v. Balmori, Off. Gaz., 182; 2 United States v. Paraiso, Nov.
13, 1901, 3 United States v. Roque, 1 Off. Gaz., 350. 4)

The judgment is reversed and the defendant acquitted with the costs of both instances de oficio.

Arellano, C.J. and Mapa, J., concur.

Torres, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions

COOPER, J., dissenting, with whom concurs McDonough, J. :

The decision in this case has been made to turn upon the question whether there was an imitation of the signature of the parties whose names
were placed on the pay roll, and former decisions of this court have been cited.

We do not think that the question of imitation of signatures is involved in the case. While it is alleged in the complaint that there was a
counterfeiting and feigning of the signatures of certain-named persons to the pay roll, and perhaps the complaint in this respect would have
been sufficient to have sustained the conviction, still, under the complaint, the offense charged was not only the counterfeiting and feigning of
the signatures, but it was for falsifying an official document "by including in the act of making said pay roll the participation of the said last-
named persons had no participation in the act of making said pay roll." The indictment perhaps was demurrable as comprising two distinct
offenses, but was clearly sufficient to sustain a conviction for the falsification of a public document under clause 2 of article 300 of the Penal
Code, which makes a public official guilty who, taking advantage of his official authority, shall commit a falsification:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"2. By excluding in any act the participation of persons who had no such participation."cralaw virtua1aw library

The testimony shows that the defendant, Freimuth, was employed as clerk and chief timekeeper for the Board of Health of the Philippine
Islands; that on the 25th day of June, 1902, in the city of Manila, he took advantage of his authority and position as such official, his duty being
to see the pay rolls of the department were properly signed and certified, and made out a second pay roll several weeks subsequent to the
making of the original pay roll, was attempted to be used by one James Behan, disbursing officer of the sanitary department, to defraud the
Government by using it as a voucher and obtaining credit a second time for the amount for which he had received credit on the original pay roll.

We think the proof fully sustains the charge and that the defendant is guilty of the falsification of a public document under clause 2 of article 300
of the Penal Code.

Johnson, J., did not sit in this case.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 12127. October 13, 1917. ]
UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELADIO CINCO and EUSEBIO REDOÑA, Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

STREET, J. :

This appeal is brought by the defendants Eladio Cinco and Eusebio Redoña to reverse a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Samar, finding them guilty of the falsification of a private document.

It appears that Eusebio Redoña had been deputized to conduct a sale under an execution issuing from the Court of First Instance of said
province, which sale was advertised to take place at the municipal building in Borongan, Samar, on the 10th day of October, 1914. On that day
the property was properly put up at auction, but according to the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution, no bid or offer for the same, or
any part thereof, was made by any person during the lawful hours of sale, and as a result the property remained unsold. On the other hand the
witnesses for the defense testify that the defendant Eladio Cinco made a bid and became the purchaser of the property as sole bidder.

The theory of the prosecution is that no such sale took place and that by collusion between the defendants a false return was made showing
that Eladio Cinco had become the purchaser of the property. The trial court so found, and we see no reason for disturbing this finding. At any
rate the defendant Redoña, as deputy sheriff, prepared a return of the execution showing that Cinco had become purchaser at the execution
sale, and that the purchase price (P160) had been paid by him to Redoña.

It further appears that prior to the day of sale the execution creditors had prepaid the estimated costs incident to the sale, and as a consequence
they were entitled to be reimbursed for such costs from the proceeds of the sale, as well as to receive the principal amount to be made by
execution, any surplus being payable of course to the debtors in the execution. As the principal debt to be made by the execution amounted to
P156.24, it is obvious that the judgment creditors were entitled, by way of the principal debt and cost, to the entire proceeds of the sale.

In order to avoid the necessity of paying cash for the entire property, Eladio Cinco approached the judgment creditors, and made an
arrangement whereby they delivered to him their joint receipt, acknowledging the payment of P160, the proceeds of the sale. This receipt was
obtained by Cinco for the purpose of showing that the purchase price had been satisfied, but as a matter of fact he paid them only P50, it being
agreed between him and them that he could pay the balance at his convenience.

When the deputy sheriff Redoña came to make up his return it seemed to him that what was needed was not a receipt from the judgment
creditors to Eladio Cinco but a receipt from them to himself, showing that the money had been paid by him as deputy sheriff to the proper
parties. Accordingly another and different receipt was prepared by Eladio Cinco under the direction of Redoña. If these proceedings had been
regular the - proper course would have been to surrender the first receipt and procure the judgment creditors to sign the new one in its place.
In- stead of this, the defendant Eladio Cinco wrote the names of said creditors, without their knowledge or consent, at the foot of the receipt
and placed cross marks between the Christian name and surname in each instance, the fact being that these people were illiterate and in any
event would necessarily have signed by making their marks. The present prosecution is based upon the falsification of said receipt. The original
receipt has not appeared in evidence and was doubtless destroyed or suppressed; but the false receipt was attached by Redoña to his return of
the execution.

The principal victim of the scheme revealed in the record were the debtors in the execution, for as a result of the supposed sale they were
dispossessed of their land and as the proof shows suffered considerable damage thereby. But as the official return to the execution is a public
document, no serious effort has been made to secure a conviction of the defendant Redoña upon the charge of falsifying the return, owing to
the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Weems v. United States (217 U. S 349); and the judgment of conviction in the lower
court is exclusively based on the charge of the falsification of the private document, the receipt to Redoña, in violation of article 304 of the Penal
Code.

In order to sustain a conviction for the falsification of a private document it is necessary to prove that the falsification was committed to the
damage of another, or with the intent to cause such damage. That this condition is fulfilled in the present case appears obvious for two reasons
In the first place the falsification was effected for the purpose of giving the appearance of legal validity to the sale, whereby the debtors in the
execution, being the owners of the land, were wrongfully dispossessed; and in the second place the receipt itself purported to extinguish an
obligation which had not been in fact satisfied. It will be noted that the receipt to Redoña was not a counterfeit of the receipt originally given to
Cinco but was a new receipt to Redoña. Besides as we have already seen, Eladio Cinco had paid only P50 to the judgment creditors when the
first receipt was taken by himself; and consequently the debt in any event had been only in part extinguished.

Furthermore the case for the prosecution is evidently not affected by the fact that the whole transaction was probably fraudulent and that the
sale could have been avoided in a proper proceeding. The falsification of a receipt may clearly sustain a conviction notwithstanding the fact that
the principal debt may be voidable; for the receipt shows the absolute extinguishment of the liability to the extent of the amount stated therein.

The case against Eusebio Redoña, as co-author in this crime, is not quite so well made out as that against Eladio Cinco. We have it on Redofia’s
own testimony that the receipt in question was written by Eladio Cinco under Redoña’s directions and in his presence. He also testified that the
names of the three purported subscribers were also written by Cinco upon the same occasion and likewise in Redoña’s presence. But Redoña
says that the marks of the three subscribers (who were illiterate) were really and truly made by themselves respectively at the same time, they
being then and there present. This testimony if true would show that no falsification was committed and that the marks accompanying the
signatures were genuine. Other proof, however, which is conclusive, shows that the marks were made in the absence of the parties whose
names were signed to the receipt; and the following peculiarity of the signatures was proved by a competent expert, namely, that in each case
the defendant Cinco first wrote the Christian name, then the mark, and finally the surname, instead of making the mark after the full name was
written. If the marks had been made by the purported subscribers they would naturally have been written after the full names had been written
by Cinco. This peculiarity of the signatures, namely, that the marks were written immediately after the Christian names were written and before
the surnames were written was fairly apparent to the eye of any person reasonably familiar with the art of writing. Now if we accept as proved
the fact that the marks were thus written, it necessarily follows that upon his own testimony Redoña was present at the act and was guilty as
one of its authors. Redoña says that he immediately carried the receipt away, and it was used by him for the purpose for which it was intended.
There is also ample proof that the whole fraudulent transaction regarding the sale, of which the fabrication of this receipt was a feature, was the
result of collusion and conspiracy between the two defendants.
With reference to the legal aspects of the offense, it is clear that there can be no conviction under article 304 of the Penal Code in relation with
subsection 1 of article 300, since it is not shown that the marks which were intended to impart the appearance of authenticity to the false
signatures were made in imitation of the genuine marks of the parties whose names were signed. It has been the uniform ruling of this court
that where a person signs the name of another to a document without attempting to imitate his signature, he cannot be convicted under
paragraph 1 of article 300. (U. S. v. Paraiso, 1 Phil., 66; U. S. v. Roque, 1 Phil., 372; U. S. v. Buenaventura 1 Phil., 428; U. S. v. Balmori, 1 Phil., 661;
U. S. v. Castro, 6 Phil., 10.)

It is, however, the opinion of the court that the offense in this case is punishable under article 304 of the Penal Code, in relation with subsection
2 of article 300, notwithstanding statements to be found in some of the cases tending to a different conclusion. (U. S. v. Buenaventura, 1 Phil.,
428.) In United States v. Braga (12 Phil., 202), the accused had used a rubber stamp bearing the name of the company by which he was
employed, signing his own name in connection therewith. He had authority so to use the stamp for the purpose of buying goods for the
company, but not for the purpose of obtaining money. It was held that in so signing an order by which he obtained money he was guilty of
falsification under article 304 of the Penal Code, in connection with subsection 2 of article 300, for the reason that in effecting the transaction in
question he made it appear that the company was a party thereto when, as a matter of fact, it did not participate therein.

In the court below, the defendant Cinco was sentenced to two years, eleven months and ten days, presidio correccional in its minimum and
medium degree, while the defendant Redoña was sentenced to one year, eight months and twenty-one days, presidio correccional in its
minimum and medium degree. We believe that the discretion of the judge in imposing a more severe penalty upon Eladio Cinco was properly
used. Each defendant was also sentenced to pay a fine of P125 and to undergo the accessory penalties and subsidiary personal liability in case of
insolvency as provided by law., and to pay one-half of the costs.

As we find no error prejudicial to the defendants in the action of the court below the judgment of said court should be affirmed with costs. So
ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-12089. April 29, 1960.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PATRIA E. YANZA, Defendant-Appellee.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.:

In the general elections held November 8, 1955, Patria E. Yanza, was elected municipal councilor of the municipality of Tayabas, Quezon
Province. She was duly proclaimed and took her oath of office on March 31, 1956. A quo warranto proceeding was filed afterwards against her
on the ground that in November 1955, she had not completed her 23 years, inasmuch as she was born in March 1933. However, the proceeding
was dismissed because it was not filed within a week after the proclamation of her candidacy, as required by Section 173 of the Election Law.

On August 4, 1956, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information charging her with falsification because in her certificate of candidacy, she had
"willfully and unlawfully" made the false statement that she was "eligible" to the said office although "in fact and in truth, she knew fully well
that she was under 23 years old, thereby making in this manner, (an) untruthful statement in the narration of facts." Upon a motion of the
defendant, the Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint upon the ground that the dismissal of the quo warranto proceeding which is the
remedy afforded under Section 173 of the Election Law, precluded the institution afterwards, of the criminal action based on the same facts."
Citing the decision of the Court of Appeals in Peñaflorida v. Jarencio 1 , His Honor, added in justification that to permit the criminal prosecution
of the successful candidate (after the dismissal of the quo warranto proceeding for ineligibility), would amount to authorizing the Provincial
Fiscal to question the eligibility of Patria E. Yanza, anytime within the prescriptive period fixed by the Penal Code; and that would defeat the
underlying object of the law in prescribing a one-week period in Sec. 173 within which to challenge the right of any successful candidate to hold
office.

The provincial Fiscal appealed in due time.

There is no question that the defendant stated under oath in her certificate of candidacy filed on September 6, 1955, that she was "eligible" for
the office of the municipal councilor. There is also no question that she was born in March 29, 1933.

Section 2174 provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 2174. Qualification of Elective Municipal Officer. — An elective municipal officer must, at the time of the election, be a qualified voter in
his municipality and must have been resident therein for at least one year; he must be loyal to the United States (now the Republic of the
Philippines) and not less than twenty-three- years of age. He must also be able to read and write intelligently either Spanish, English or the local
dialect."cralaw virtua1aw library

None denies that, except as to age, Yanza had all the qualifications above enumerated.

The prosecution contends that the certificate filed by her "was tantamount to stating that as of November 8, 1955, she was 23 years of age, to
comply with the age requirement as provided for in Sec. 2174." The contention that a candidate for municipal office must, on the day of
election, be not less that 23 years of age, accords with the opinion of the majority of this Court as expressed in Feliciano v. Aquino, L-10201,
September 23, 1957. However, five members contended that under the above section, the candidate need not be 23 years of age on election
day, it being sufficient that he was 23 years old on the day he should take, or actually takes the oath. Evidently, this defendant in stating she was
"eligible" thought along the same lines expressed in such minority opinion.

Now then, considering that when defendant certified she was eligible for the position, she practically wrote a conclusion of law 2 which turned
out to be inexact 3 or erroneous 4 — not entirely groundless —- we are all of the opinion that she may not be declared guilty of falsification,
specially because the law which she has allegedly violated (Art. 171, Revised Penal Code, in connection with other provisions), punishes the
making of untruthful statements in narration of facts — emphasis on "facts." Had she stated that she was born on March 29, 1931, she would
undoubtedly have been guilty of falsification, because the date of her birth was a matter of fact. But when she declared that she was "eligible",
she merely expressed her belied that the 23-year requirement could be adequately met if she reached 23 years upon assuming the
councilorship. Unfortunately, she made a mistake of judgment 5; but she could not be held thereby to have intentionally made a false statement
of fact in violation of Article 171 above-mentioned. 6

Wherefore, the dismissal of the charges must be, and is hereby affirmed. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción, Endencia, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1375. April 1, 1905. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. PACIFICO GONZAGA, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

The defendant in this case and the defendant in the case of the United States v. Pacifico Gonzaga 1 (2 Off. Gaz., 383) is the same person, and this
proceeding grows out of an interlocutory order made by the defendant in the case there under the discussion. The defendant, acting as
municipal president, had taken jurisdiction of a criminal proceeding against Ruperto Gimarino, a justice of the peace, for prevaricacion, and had
issued an order of arrest on the 7th day of July, 1903, fixing the bail of the justice of the peace in the sum of 2,000 pesos. Afterwards, and on the
25th of July, 1903, the defendant made an order increasing the amount of the bail from 2,000 pesos to 32,000 pesos, and directed two
policemen to arrest Gimarino. The latter was brought to the municipal building, and the order increasing the amount of the bail was read to him.
He stated that he could not furnish it, and he was not allowed by the defendant to depart from the municipal building until about 5 o’clock in the
afternoon, when the defendant made another order, vacating his former order increasing the amount of bail, and verbally told the justice of the
peace that he might go. He was detained for about nine hours. The court below convicted the defendant in this case of a violation of article 200
of the Penal Code.

In view of the fact that in the other case against this defendant we held that he could not be convicted for usurping judicial functions in taking
and in for a time retaining jurisdiction of this case, we do not see how he could be convicted for making interlocutory orders in the same
proceeding. Moreover, in no event can he be convicted of a violation of said article 200, for that article is limited to the case of a public officer
who makes an arrest not on account of the commission of some crime but for other reasons. In the case before us it appears that the justice of
the peace had been charged with a criminal offense; that he had been arrested by reason of that charge, and that he subsequent detention on
the 25th of July was on account of the same offense charged against him. The case therefore does not fall between article 200.

We held in the former case that the defendant apparently acted in good faith. In this case it was proved that in making the order increasing the
amount of the bond he acted in bad faith. We can not see how this fact can change the result.

The judgment of the court below is reversed and the defendant acquitted, with the costs of both instances de oficio.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7236 April 30, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. PO GIOK TO, Defendant-Appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

In the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the defendant appellee Po Giok To was charged with the crime of falsification under the following
information:

That on or about the 7th day of January, 1952, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with intent to falsify or forge a public document, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify, or forge a public
document consisting of residence certificate No. A-1618529 issued to him in the City of Cebu, on January 7, 1952, by e representative of the City
Treasurer of Cebu, to wit: by misrepresenting to the said representative of the City Treasurer of Cebu that his name is Antonio Perez, that his
place of birth is Jaro, Leyte and that his citizenship is Filipino, and by means of such misrepresentation, said representative of the City Treasurer
of Cebu was made to issue and write, and in fact did issue and write, on the corresponding lines on said residence certificate No. A-1618529 the
name of Antonio Perez, as the name of the taxpayer, Jaro, Leyte as his place of birth, and Filipino as his citizenship, thus causing it to appear that
the said residence certificate No. A-1618529 dated January 7, 1952, was issued to one Antonio Perez with his place of birth as Jaro, Leyte, and
with his citizenship as Filipino, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, his true name is Po Giok To, his place of birth is Amoy, China,
and his citizenship is Chinese.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Contrary to law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

(Appellants Brief, pp. 2-3).

The accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that the information does not allege (1) that the accused had the obligation to disclose the
truth in the document allegedly falsified, nor (2) that the accused had the wrongful intent to injure a third person. The City Fiscal opposed the
motion to quash claiming that the information alleges all the integral elements of the offense charged as defined by the statute. The lower
Court, however, found the motion to quash meritorious and ordered the amendment of the information. Upon insistence of the City Fiscal that
the information was sufficient and that he was not in possession of any evidence that the accused made use of the residence certificate
containing the alleged false entries, the Court a quo dismissed the case without prejudice. Hence, this appeal by the
Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The sole issue is whether or not the information in question alleges sufficient facts to constitute the crime of falsification of public document.
The defense contends that the information is insufficient for failure to recite two alleged essential elements of the crime charged; namely, the
obligation on the part of the accused to disclose the truth, and wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure third
persons.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We agree with the Solicitor-General that the first element allegedly lacking in the information, viz., the obligation on the part of the accused to
disclose the truth as to the facts that should appear in a residence certificate, is inherent in the very nature and purpose of said document.
Section 3 Commonwealth Act 465 (otherwise known as the Residence Tax Act) provides "that the residence certificate for persons shall contain
the full name, place and date of birth, citizenship, civil status, length of residence in the city or municipality where the certificate is issued,
occupation or calling", all of which facts are required to appear therein for the purpose of establishing the true and correct identity of the person
to whom the certificate is issued. Needless to say, this provision implies that the person to whom the certificate is issued must state to the
officer who issues the same, the true facts, required to appear therein, the latter having merely the ministerial function of recording thereon the
facts as supplied by this person. And to guarantee that the facts given correctly and truly identify the holder of the certificate, he is also required
by Sec. 3, supra, to sign the document and affix his right hand thumb mark thereon. There is, therefore, no question that the accused had the
duty to disclose the true facts about his name, place of birth, and citizenship to the officer or employee who issued his residence certificate No.
A-1618529; and such duty being inherent in the transaction, there was no need for the criminal charge to allege that the accused had such
duty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Anent the second element allegedly lacking in the information in question, the law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to
injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

Article 172, par. 1, in connection with Art. 171, par. 4, of the Revised Penal Code, under which provision the accused is charged, provides as
follows:

ART. 171. Falsification by the public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. - The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position shall falsify a document
by committing any of the following acts:

xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

ART. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. - The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

xxx xxx x x xchanrobles virtual law library

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in any other kind of commercial
document.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On the other hand, Art. 172, par 2, defining the crime falsification of private document, provides:chanrobles virtual law library

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in the next preceeding article.
The distinction made by the law between falsification by private persons, first, of public documents, and secondly of private documents, is clear;
the first is committed by the mere performance of any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171; while the second is committed not only
by the performance of any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171; but it must likewise be shown that such act of falsification was
committed to the damage of a third party or with intent to cause such damage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The reason for the distinction is given in a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated December 23, 1885, cited by this Court in the case of
People vs. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48; i.e., that in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is
unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradiction to private
documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Our own commentators on the Revised Penal Code are also agreed on this distinction. (Francisco, Revised Penal Code.) Sec. ed., Vol. II, Part 1, p.
301; Guevara, Comm. on the Revised Penal Code, IV Ed., P. 172; Albert, Revised Penal Code, 1948 Ed., p. 398).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

Moreover, the acts charged, if true, would result in confusion in the government records, since the fingerprint of the accused would not
correspond to that of the person whose personal circumstances are recited in the certificate. Such confusion in its records evidently operates to
the Government's prejudice. Being the natural and direct result of the criminal act charged, the accused must be presumed to have intended
it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Defendant-appellee also advances the theory that a private person can not commit the crime of falsification charged, i. e., by making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts, referring to the opinion of the late Justice Albert that "only of the eight ways of committing falsifications
enumerated in Article 171, to wit, the first, the fifth, and the sixth, are open to a private individual" (Albert, supra, p. 405); and stresses that if
there had been any falsification at all in this case, it was committed by the employee who, though innocently, wrote the allegedly untrue facts on
defendant's residence certificate. The opinion quoted plainly refers to direct falsification by a private person, and does not contemplate
situations where the accused, though a private person, becomes a principal to the act of falsification committed by a public official or employee,
by induction, cooperation, or planned conspiracy (cf. Sent. of Tribunal Supremo of Spain of 23 Mar. 1885; 28 Apr. 1905; 28 Mar. 1893). In the
present case, although it is true that it was the employee of the Office of the City Treasurer of Cebu who performed the overt act of writing the
allegedly false facts on the defendant's residence certificate, it was however, the defendants who induced him to do so by supplying him with
those facts. Consequently, the employee was defendant's mere innocent agent in the performance of the crime charged, while defendant was a
principal by inducement.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Finally, it is argued for the defendant-appellee that there being a special law with respect to residence certificates expressly punishing their
falsification (Commonwealth Act No. 465), this special law, and not the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, should apply in this case; and since
Commonwealth Act No. 465, sec. 11 punishes the falsification of a residence certificate only when it is done "for the purpose of using the same
in the payment of revenue or in securing any exemption or privilege conferred by law", which element is not alleged in the information, the
same was properly dismissed by the lower Court. Again this contention is without merit. The fact that Commonwealth Act No. 465 punishes the
falsification of residence certificates in the cases mentioned therein does not prevent the application of the general provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on other acts of falsification not covered by the special law, since under Art. 10 of the Rev. Penal Code, it has supplementary
application to all special laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary, and Commonwealth Act No. 465 makes no provision that it
exclusively applies to all falsifications of residence certificates. Then, again, section 12 of Commonwealth Act. No. 465 penalize all other
violations of the residence certificate law not covered by the preceeding sections thereof. Which law is applicable should be determined when
the case is decided on its merits. At the present stage of the proceedings, however, it can be stated that whether the crime charged be
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, or sec. 12 Comm. Act No. 465, the information was sufficient, and its dismissal for insufficiency by the
Court below was improper and erroneous.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The order of the trial court dismissing the information filed in this case is, therefore, reversed, and the case is remanded to the Court below for
further proceedings, with costs against the defendant-appellee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Pablo, Acting C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1537. April 8, 1905. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. GERONIMO MILLA, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.

DECISION

WILLARD, J. :

In the principal document, with the falsification of which the defendants were charged, it was recited that the defendants Geronimo Milla stated
that he was owner of the lands therein described and it was further recited that the complaining witness, Victoriano Barcena, and the four other
complaining witnesses, ceded to the defendant Geronimo Milla an undivided half of the said lands. That these Complaining witnesses actually
signed this document is undisputed. They so testified themselves. By such signatures they gave their consent to the contract and to the terms
thereof, as stated in the said instrument.

It is claimed by them, however, that their consent to the contract was obtained by intimidation on the part of the defendant Juan Cordona, in
which the other defendant Geronimo Milla participated, and of which the other defendants Agustin Ramos and Manuel Navarro the Municipal
secretary of the pueblo of Gerona, in the Province of Tarlac, and they signed the contract in their official capacity, the said Ramos claiming to
exercise the functions of a notary public. The complaint charges all the defendants with the falsification of a public document, in the particular
that they made in the contracting question a false statement of the facts (Art. 300, par 4, Penal Code). But in view of the facts that the parties to
the contract gave their consent to the document, we do not see how there could have been any false statement of the facts contained therein,
at least such false statement as would subject the parties to the contract to the penalties contained in article 300 of the Penal Code. It is claimed
by the Government that, because their consent to this contract was obtained by intimidation, the effect is the same as if no consent had ever
been given and the entire document been simulated. We can not agree with this contention. The document was not simulated or a false
document, but was a genuine one, bearing the genuine signatures of the parties to it. The fact that one’s consent to a contract may be obtained
by mistake, violence, intimidation, or fraud does not make the contract a false contract. The rights of a party whose consent has thus been
obtained are defined in articles 1265, 1300 et seq. of the Civil Code. Whatever other crime these defendants, and especially Cardona, may have
been guilty of, they were not, we think, guilty of the crime of falsification, either of a public or private document. The other documents with the
falsification of which the defendants are charged but state the result of the principal document, and if the latter is not falsified the former can
not be. The defendant Cardona having died pending the appeal, the cause is dismissed as to him. As to the other defendants, the judgment of
the court below is reversed and they are acquitted, with the costs of this instance de oficio.

Arellano, C.J., Mapa and Johnson, JJ., concur.

Carson, J., reserves his opinion.

[ G.R. No. 8025, September 17, 1913 ]
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ALEJANDRO R. MATEO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
MORELAND, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, convicting the accused of a violation of section 55 of Act No.
1189, and sentencing him to one year in prison and to pay a fine of P2,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs of the trial.

The defendant, Alejandro R. Mateo, is a priest of the Roman Catholic Church and was stationed in the town of Aliaga in the Province of Nueva
Ecija during the month of November, 1911, and had been for some months prior thereto. On the 27th day of October, 1911, he was called on in
the performance of his duties to execute an affidavit. Being asked to produce his personal cedula for the current year, a necessary prerequisite
under the law for a legal and valid affidavit, he, in ignorance, presented one not only for 1911, but also for 1910. Upon examination of the
cedula for the latter year it was observed by the justice that the age therein had been changed, the figures "23" having been changed to "25." A
complaint was filed charging the accused with falsification of the cedula for 1910, in violation of section 55 of Act No. 1189.

The testimony of the prosecution tends to show that the accused went to the office of the municipal treasurer to cash a check. The check not
having been indorsed by a person known to the municipal treasurer, the latter refused to cash it until the accused made an affidavit that the
check belonged to him and that he was entitled to the sum named therein. Thereupon the accused went to the justice of the peace of the
village to execute the affidavit thus required. The justice, as a prerequisite to administering the oath, asked the affiant to exhibit his cedula for
the current year. The accused, being ignorant of what the law required, produced two cedulas, one for 1910 and one for 1911. On examination
of the cedula for the year 1910 the change in the age of the accused was, as we have said, observed by the justice, who thereupon went to the
office of the municipal treasurer to examine the stubs from which cedulas had been torn. A comparison of the cedulas with the stubs confirmed
his observation that the age in said cedulas had been changed as already detailed.

The defense asserts, and the defendant testified, that, prior to going to the justice of the peace to make the affidavit referred to, he had never
examined or even read the cedulas, or any other cedulas for that matter, and was, for that reason, ignorant of their contents; that he had never
had occasion to use a cedula before, and, deeming that his duty was fully performed when he purchased those mentioned, he had laid them
away without examination and without thought. Being asked to produce the cedula for 1911, he went home and got not only the cedula for
1911 but also that for 1910. The fact that he had been called upon to present a cedula aroused his curiosity as to the contents of those in his
possession and he read them. To his surprise he found that the ages stated therein were incorrect. Being young he having been out of college
little more than a year and ignorant of the law relating to documents of that kind, he was seized with fear as to the consequences which might
follow if he exhibited to a public officer cedulas in which his age was stated incorrectly. He, therefore, went to the municipal treasurer, from
whom he had obtained them, for the purpose of having them corrected before presenting them to the justice. He asserts that, on showing
them to the municipal treasurer, he frankly stated to him that he himself had changed them in order to make them correspond with his actual
age, and asked him for his aid in correcting them, and that that official then and there consented to and confirmed the change. He declares,
further, that he had no intention of committing any wrong; that he in no sense intended to defraud or prejudice the municipality or the
Government by his act; that he obtained no profit or benefit therefrom of any kind, and that he did not know that what he had done was illegal
or unlawful.

It appears from the evidence of the defense, which seems to be uncontradicted, that there was a good deal of friction between the accused and
the municipal officers who presented the complaint against him and upon whose testimony he was convicted. Several suits of one kind or
another had been instituted against him by these officials or through their efforts or influence. In fact, the complaint against the accused seems
to have been the immediate result of an angry reply made by him to a question put by the municipal treasurer. The latter in his testimony says:
"I asked him who had changed the number in the cedula and he answered me in a threatening voice that I had nothing whatever to do with that
because he said that he had purchased the cedula and could do what he liked with it. Upon seeing this, I went at once to the court for the
purpose of denouncing him for the falsification of a document.
It is the claim put forward by the prosecution that a loss to the Government is not necessary to maintain the action; that no criminal intent is
required; that gain or purpose of gain on the part of the accused is not necessary to violate the Act. It is maintained further that the Act is
violated whenever a person makes any change whatever in a cedula, utterly regardless of whether the Government loses or the accused gains,
or whether the intent or purpose is innocent or otherwise; that the object of the law is to preserve intact the certificates which the Government
issues and to prevent them from being changed by any person for any purpose, whether the change be material or immaterial, whether it
corrects the document or falsifies it, whether the document, after change, is capable of effecting a fraud or deception or not.

The information in this case reads as follows:

"The undersigned, amending the information, accuses Alejandro R. Mateo of a violation of section 55 of the Internal Revenue Law, committed as
follows:

"On or about the month of October of the year 1911, said accused maliciously and criminally altered the age appearing in his personal cedula for
the year 1910, putting the age of 25 years in place of 23, and retained in his possession such altered cedula for the purpose of using the same,
thereby defrauding the internal revenues."
Giving the information the broadest interpretation possible, it charges, first, that the accused altered the age in the 1910 cedula, and second,
that he kept it in his possession with intent to use it, the phrase "thereby defrauding the internal revenues" being permitted to modify both
clauses, namely, that which alleges the alteration of the cedula and that which alleges his retaining it in his possession with intent of future use.

While, under certain circumstances, it may not be necessary, in order to establish the charge of falsifying a cedula, to show a pecuniary loss to
the Government, nevertheless, under the facts and circumstances of this case, we think we might fairly hold that the fraud charged, being one
which relates to the revenues of the Government, and therefore to a pecuniary or financial matter, such loss must be shown. But, not to restrict
too narrowly the consideration of this case, we will assume that the prosecution can be maintained without showing a financial loss to the
Government.

In the discussion of this case we take it that it is undisputed that the accused stated his correct age in his testimony on the trial, and, accordingly,
that the age in the altered cedula was his correct age; that, therefore, all that he did was to make the cedula speak the truth. It is also
uncontradicted that he voluntarily stated to the officials to whom he presented the cedula that he had changed it and that he did so for the
purpose of making it state his correct age; that he made no effort to conceal what he had done; that he maintained at the time that he had no
intention to injure or defraud, and that he made the change in the interest of truth; that he set forth fully the reasons which moved him to make
the change, all of which were, upon their face, innocent.
The foundation of judgment of conviction, given by the court, is as follows:
"From the evidence presented the court finds that on the 11th of January, 1910, the municipal treasurer of the municipality of Baliuag, Province
of Bulacan, issued in favor of the defendant, Alejandro R. Mateo, personal cedula No. F-1208348 upon receiving the sum of P2; that in order to
obtain said personal cedula the accused presented to the municipal treasurer his personal cedula for the year 1909 in which cedula the age
appeared to be 22, and for which reason said municipal treasurer put in the said cedula the age of 23 years; that in the month of October, 1911,
in the municipality of Aliaga the accused changed the age in said cedula, scratching out the figure 3 in the age 23 and putting in the place thereof
the figure 5, making his age appear 25 instead of 23; that after having altered the cedula in the manner stated the accused presented said cedula
to the justice of the peace of Aliaga and to the municipal treasurer of said municipality for the purpose of swearing to an affidavit relating to the
cashing of a check; that by reason of said change the accused defrauded the internal revenues of the sum of P4, or more, in the sense that,
according to the law, he should have begun payment of his personal cedula tax in the eighteenth year of his age, and, if it is true that he was 25
years of age in the year 1910 as he declared in this case, he ought to have paid the cedula tax for eight years, when, in reality, he had paid it for
only six; that if the father of the accused had made a mistake as to the time when he ought to have begun to purchase the personal cedula for
the accused, as the accused himself declares, this mistake ought to have been corrected and he should have settled the matter with the
municipal treasurer by the payment to him of the tax corresponding to the two years, together with the corresponding fine; that having altered
the cedula in the month of October, 1911, the accused presented said cedula to the justice of the peace of Aliaga and to the municipal treasurer
of said municipality."
From this quotation it is clear that the court inferred that the Government had been defrauded of F4. The basis of that inference is that,
according to the admitted age of the defendant at the time the cedula was changed, he should have paid the tax for eight years, whereas he had
actually paid it for only six. It seems to us that there is substantially no evidence in the case from which the inference can properly be drawn
that the accused had paid the tax for only six years. There is no direct proof to that effect. He himself declared positively, more than once, that
he, or his father, began paying the cedula tax when he was 18 years of age and that it had been paid every year from that time forward. The
Government seeks to overcome that evidence by inferences from the fact that the cedula was changed and that the age stated therein before
the change was incorrect in other words, that there had been, somewhere and sometime, a misrepresentation by the accused as to his age.
There was no reason why the Government should have left that fact to inference, if it was a material fact. If the defendant had not paid his tax
consistently from the time he was 18 years of age, it could easily have been proved by the production of the cedula stubs showing when the
defendant began to pay, the age that appeared in the first cedula, and all the cedulas for that matter, and the number of years that he had
actually paid. With evidence, clear and indisputable, easily at hand and capable of being presented, the Government, in a criminal case, ought
not to leave to inference a fact which it seems to regard as so material. Under all the facts and circumstances of this case, and particularly in
view of the failure of the Government to present the evidence in its possession upon that subject, we would, if we regarded it material, accept
as true, according to the weight of the evidence, the declaration of the defendant that he had paid all of the cedula taxes to which the
Government was entitled.

We do not, however, in this case, give much importance to this contention, even if true. We must observe that the information charges that the
defendant, by the act of changing the cedula, defrauded the Government; and that he retained said altered cedula in his possession with intent
to use it for the perpetration of other frauds. The issue in the case, then, is, did the act of altering the cedula and retaining it in his possesion
after the alteration actually defraud the Government, or could it, in any possible way, defraud the Government? The question is not, did the
defendant misrepresent his age at some time prior to the alteration of the cedula and thereby, at that time, defraud the Government, but is,
rather, did this particular act of alteration deprive the Government, at that time, of any part of its revenues, or could it do so in future? Or did
that act prejudice the Government in any possible way or benefit the accused in any possible way? In considering this question we must note:

In the first place, the cedula, with the alteration of which the defendant stands charged, was the cedula for 1910, and said cedula was altered, in
the month of October, 1911. According to the evidence, this cedula was issued to the defendant on the 11th day of January, 1910. It therefore
expired on the 31st day of December of the same year. That being so, the only cedula that had any force or effect in October, 1911, when this
1910 cedula was altered, was the cedula for the year 1911. The 1910 cedula was, therefore, without force or effect on the date on which this
crime is alleged to have been committed. The cedula being thus dead in law for all effects and purposes, was it possible to defraud the revenue
by any alteration as to age made in October, 1911? Or was it possible for the accused, by such alteration, to obtain any of the privileges or
immunities defined in section 125 of the law which he could not have obtained if there had been no alteration? While it is clear that it might
have been altered as to the year, for example, thereby defrauding the Government of the tax for one year, still it seems to us impossible to have
defrauded the revenues by merely altering the age. The tax had already been paid for the year to which that cedula referred. That cedula,
altered or unaltered as to age, could not have been used for any other year. Would that cedula, altered or unaltered as to age, have served the
accused if he had presented it to the justice of the peace in October, 1911? Clearly, no. Only a 1911 cedula would have availed him. Could he
have used the 1910 cedula, altered or unaltered as to age, for any purpose after the expiration of 1910? Clearly, no. No official would have
accepted it for a moment for any purpose whatever, altered or unaltered. How, then, did the act of the defendant defraud the revenues? Did
the Government have less money in its coffers after the act was performed than it did before? Would it have had more money in its Treasury if
the act had not been performed? Did the act prevent it from receiving a single centavo which it would have received otherwise? Would the act
diminish its revenues the day or the month or the year after? Would not the Government have been in exactly the same position if the act had
never been performed? The fundamental fact is that the cedula, after it was changed, was incapable of being used to commit a fraud. It is true
that, if he had placed a false age in the cedula, he might thereby, by using that as the basis for the issuance of succeeding cedulas, as a matter of
record, reach the age of exemption (60 years) quicker than he really ought. But it is undisputed that he did not put a false age in the cedula,
and, even if he did, the assumption that he did so to save P4 thirty-five years later is so remote that we think it negligible in this case. Precisely
these same reasons show that the Government was not injured or the accused benefited in any other way by the act complained of.

The only possible theory upon which it could be urged that the defendant committed any crime at all, and that is neither charged nor proved,
would be that, at the outset, he or his father had misrepresented his age and, instead of beginning to pay the tax when he was eighteen, he had,
by misrepresentation, deferred payment until he had reached the age of twenty; that, having misrepresented his age at the outset, it was
necessary to continue the misrepresentation because any change in the age would be immediately discovered by the official who issued the
cedula, who is required to refer to the cedula, or the record, of the previous year in issuing one for the current year; that, after the lapse of six
or eight years, when the defendant was called upon for the first time to produce his cedula for the inspection of a public official, fearing that his
former misrepresentation would be discovered, he thereupon, in order to cover up his fraud, changed the cedula to make it correspond to his
real age. But even if this theory be held to be tenable, would the act of altering the cedula be more than an attempt to hide the evidence of a
crime committed long since?

In the second place, we do not think that the defendant committed any crime on changing his age. He simply made the cedula speak the truth.
What harm could ensue to the Government by making the data in the cedula conform to the facts? It is the undisputed evidence in the case
that the cedula, before it was changed, did not contain the correct age of the accused, and that the age, as changed, was the correct age. How
can the Government be injured by changing a cedula so that the correct age may appear therein? When done honestly and with no evil intent
and when no gain or advantage results or could possibly result therefrom, it is not forgery (and falsification is but an extension of the crime of
forgery as known in America) under Spanish or American authority to make a document of this kind speak the truth. While such a change by
one party without the consent of the other is always something to be strongly discouraged, nevertheless, it is not criminal and cannot,
therefore, be made the basis of a criminal prosecution.

The crime with which the defendant in this case stands charged is generally spoken of as the falsification of a cedula. The very word,
falsification, gives a clear insight into the nature of the crime and the act which constitutes it. The change made by the accused in this case was
not a falsification; it was a correction. It did not make the document speak a lie; it made it speak the truth. It did not deceive; it prevented
deception. Nor was it an alteration of the document in the sense in which the word is ordinarily used. Generally, the word alteration has
inherent in it the idea of deception-of making the instrument speak something which the parties did not intend it to speak. To be an alteration
in violation of law it must be one "which causes it (the instrument) to speak a language different in legal effect from that which it originally
spake."

In the third place, and this is but an addition to the observations just made, the instrument was not changed in any material sense. Before the
crime of falsification of a cedula is complete, it is necessary that the instrument be altered in some material respect. If the cedula could produce
no other or different effect after the change than before, no crime has been committed. It is the capacity which the instrument has for mischief
after the change which is the essence of the crime. In a decision of the supreme court of Spain of the 23d of December, 1885, published in the
Gazette on the 21st of June, 1886, it appeared that one of the clerks in the office of the district court, in spreading upon the record the
proceedings taken for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for certain minor children and the declaration of heirship in their favor, entered
such proceedings as of a date anterior to the date on which they were actually entered. The clerk, for this act, was charged with the falsification
of a public document, was convicted of imprudencia temeraria in the Court of First Instance, and appealed to the supreme court of Spain, which
tribunal in reversing the judgment said in part:
"Considering that even though in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is
unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private
documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, it
must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that the change in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or to change
the effects which it would otherwise produce; for, unless that happens, there could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit
the crime which is required by article 1 of the Penal Code; considering that the fact that Don Augustin Montes Moreno set out the proceedings
as of a date prior to that on which they actually occurred, and therefore incorrectly, the remaining part of the document being true, * * *
neither affected the integrity or truth of said proceedings nor affected in any essential way their results or effects, it is necessary to conclude
that the criminal intent mentioned in the previous observation was absent; considering that, even though the accused consciously attached
incorrect dates to the proceedings, nevertheless that act does not take on the character of a crime, and for that reason the Audiencia de Huelva
erred in convicting the accused * * *."
Viada (vol. 2, p. 435) says in reply to the question, what is to be understood by the words "essential element" of a cedula as used in article 321:
"We are of the opinion that, there existing no other purpose in this class of documents than that of assuring the identity of the individual and
the surveillance of the administrative authorities, only those elements should be considered essential in a cedula the alteration of which has for
its object the prevention of identification of the citizen or the escape of that surveillance which the administrative authorities are to exercise in
the interest of the public security. Moreover, it was very proper that the authors of the Code should have limited the falsification of this class of
documents to the alteration of the essential elements of the document. Thanks to this prudent and well understood limitation, which is not
found in the Penal Code of our neighboring republic, there could not arise in this country the situation recorded in French jurisprudence,
wherein it appears that a cura economo, who was journeying in company with a woman with whom he was living in concubinage, sought to hide
his identity as a cleric and falsified the passport or cedula he was carrying, by substituting the word habitant for the word desservant. The trial
court acquitted him of the charge of having falsified a cedula, basing its decision upon the ground that, in altering the passport or cedula, he did
nothing more than yield to a legitimate sense of shame without injuring either public or private interest. The supreme court, however, set aside
the judgment of acquittal, in spite of the reasonableness and justice of the grounds upon which it was based, holding that he was guilty of the
falsification charged because article 153 of the French Code punishes every alteration of a passport without distinction as to circumstances or
motives. Under the better wording of our article 321, our supreme court would undoubtedly have affirmed the judgment of acquittal on the
ground that the alteration in question could not be regarded as essential, either for what it represented in itself or for the very evident motive
that prompted it, which was to avoid a public scandal."
We do not hold that the age contained in a cedula issued to a particular person is not an essential element of the cedula. If the alteration in the
age is of such a character as to hide the identity of the person, or to assist in doing so, such alteration would be essential and the crime of
falsification would be complete. In the case before us, Jiowever, the alteration in the age was not sufficient to warrant us in holding that such an
alteration was material with respect to the identity of the person to whom it was issued or with regard to his ability thereby to obtain a privilege
or immunity which he could not have obtained if the change had not been made. (Sec. 125, Act No. 1189.)

The age would also be essential, and its alteration would be an essential alteration, if the change were of such character and extent as to enable
the one altering it to secure a privilege or an immunity which he would hot have enjoyed if the change had not been made. Such, for example,
would be a change in the age so as to make one a voter when he in fact was not. In the case in hand, however, the alteration was not of that
character. The change did not affect in the remotest degree the privileges or immunities which the accused could enjoy under the cedula. (Sec.
125.)

The judgment is reversed and the accused acquitted. Costs de oficio. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
 Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-22642 December 19, 1924

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE P. CASTRO and PEDRO A. PACANA, defendants-appellants.

---------------------------
G.R. No. L-22645 December 19, 1924
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISIDRO ADORABLE and PEDRO A. PACANA, defendants-appellants.

---------------------------
G.R. No. L-22646 December 19, 1924
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE P. CASTRO and PEDRO A. PACANA, defendants-appellants.

MALCOLM, J.:

These are five related criminal cases for the crimes of falsification of public documents and estafa committed by means of falsification of public
documents, in which the accused are Pedro A. Pacana, secretary of the provincial board of Misamis, Isidro Adorable, member of the provincial
board of Misamis, and Vicente P. Castro, member of the provincial board of Misamis. Should convictions be sustained, Pacana will receive
sentences totalling forty-four years and five days imprisonment, and Adorable and Castro for the alleged unlawful taking of P25 each will receive
sentences of ten years and one day imprisonment.

The charge in the first numbered case against Pedro A. Pacana relates to the falsification by the accused of minutes of the meeting of the
provincial board on June 9, 1923, for the alleged purpose of permitting the district engineer to incur illegal expenses in the reconstruction of a
provincial road. The charge in the second case against the same accused relates to the falsification of minutes of the provincial board on June 16,
1923. The charge in the third case against the same accused relates to the falsification of an excerpt from the minutes of the provincial board of
June 9, 1923. And the last two cases, one against provincial board member Isidro Adorable and Pedro A. Pacana, and the other against provincial
board member Vicente P. Castro and Pedro A. Pacana, relate to the crimes of estafa committed by means of falsification of public documents,
whereby it is alleged Adorable and Castro were each able to collect the sum of P25 as per diems for two fictitious meetings of the provincial
board. Since the first three cases were tried together and the last two together, and since the facts of all of them are closely interwoven, for
convenience sake a general statement will first be made, leaving for special mention certain circumstances affecting particular cases.

The provincial board of Misamis is made up of Segundo Gaston, governor, and Isidro Adorable and Vicente P. Castro, members, with Pedro A.
Pacana as secretary. The board as thus composed left on an inspection trip of the province on May 23, 1923. A session of the board was held in
the municipality of Tulisan, Misamis, on June 4, 1923. It returned to Cagayan, Misamis, the provincial capital, on the morning of June 18, 1923.
Following the arrival of the board at the provincial capital, it was kept busy during the succeeding days because on June 19, 1923, the Governor-
General landed at the port of Cagayan, because on that day was the Rizal birthday celebration, because on June 20, 1923, the Governor-General
departed, and because on the same day there arrived the Quezon-Roxas-Osmeña-Gabaldon-Guevara party which left on June 21, 1923. These
facts are not disputed.lawphil.net

It is likewise admitted that the documents on which the prosecutions are based, Exhibits C, D, Q-3, Y, and X, are actually in existence. It is the
theory of the prosecution that said documents were prepared by the provincial secretary with the connivance of the members of the provincial
board for illegal purposes. To substantiate this theory, attention is concentrated on the following prominent facts:

Exhibits C and D were seen by the chief clerk of the district auditor, Juan Callante, in the office of Pacana on the afternoon of June 18, 1923.
Copies of Exhibits C and D were made by a clerk in the office of the district auditor, Juan Borja, on the morning of June 19, 1923. An excerpt from
Exhibit C containing resolution No. 224 was received in the office of the provincial treasurer of Misamis before 5:50 o'clock on the afternoon of
June 19, 1923. Another excerpt from Exhibit C containing resolution No. 225, Exhibit Q-3, the basis of the third prosecution, was received in the
office of the district engineer on June 27, 1923, and when the chief clerk of this office noted the date June 9, 1923, on the minutes and brought
it to the attention of the provincial secretary, the date was changed to June 16, 1923. The mistake of the secretary was attempted to be rectified
by the provincial board on September 20, 1923, by changing the dates of the excerpts to June 16, 1923, and thus another error was perpetrated.
(Exhibit B-2.) The originals of Exhibits C and D have disappeared, possibly through the machinations of the provincial secretary. The provincial
board of Misamis could not have celebrated a session at Cagayan before June 18, 1923, because of its absence on an inspection trip, and could
not have celebrated a session on the afternoon of June 19, 1923, as claimed by the defense, because of a velada held on the same afternoon in
the intermediate school of Cagayan at which the provincial governor and member Castro were present. And finally, before the district auditor,
the three accused re-affirmed the fact that sessions of the provincial board were held on June 9 and 16, 1923. (Exhibits J, K, L.)

The theory of the defense is diametrically opposed to that of the prosecution. Defendants thesis is simple and is to the effect that on account of
the carelessness of the provincial secretary and the amount of work thrown on his inexperienced shoulders, error was committed, and that,
instead of meetings of the provincial board being held on June 9 and 16, 1923, meetings were in reality held on June 19 and June 21, 1923. The
bulwark this stand, the defense relies on the following facts:

Meetings of the provincial board were actually had on the afternoons of June 19 and June 21, and to this effect is the testimony of the members
present, the secretary, and a clerk. Subjects were treated in these two sessions which could not possibly have come to the attention of the
provincial board prior to the sessions. The preoccupations of the provincial secretary due to the inspection trip of the provincial board and the
arrival and departure of the parties of the Governor-General and of the Legislature, were the cause of the mistakes. Errors of a similar character
appear in other meetings of the provincial board. The excerpts of the meetings transmitted to the offices of the district engineer and district
auditor, respectively, were prepared by a clerk in the office of the provincial governor and were merely signed as a matter of form by the
provincial secretary. The book in which the minutes were kept was obtained by the district auditor so that the original minutes could have
disappeared while in his possession. The accused all signed the statements before the district auditor not understanding what the investigation
was about. As soon as the mistakes in dates were discovered and before the criminal prosecution was begun, the provincial board corrected its
minutes. (Exhibits 8, 10.)
Certain other points in relation with the questioned documents are helpful in resolving these cases. Turning first to Exhibit C, on which the first
case is exclusively founded, and related to three of the other cases, it is interesting to take note of its contents. It is headed "Regular Meeting of
the Provincial Board of Misamis Held at Cagayan on Thursday June 9, 1923." As a matter of fact, June 9 fell on a Saturday. Then after showing
who were present and who were absent and the authority for the meeting, under the general heading "Resolutions" comes a resolution
concerning the payment of the real property tax. Further on, the letter of His Excellency (Exhibit 4) informing the board of his disapproval of
resolution No. 207 of the board, current series, is again mentioned. As a matter of fact, this letter was dated at Manila, on June 11, 1923, and
probably was not received at Cagayan until June 19, 1923. Next following in the minutes mention is made of a "letter dated June 14, 1923, of the
district engineer." Obviously, a "letter dated June 14, 1923," could not have been acted upon at a meeting held on June 9, 1923. Next following
in the minutes, comes a resolution having to do with a communication of the district engineer "dated June 16, 1923." Obviously, again, a
communication of the district engineer "dated June 16, 1923," could not have been approved at a meeting of the provincial board held on June
9, 1923. Also in the same minutes are found data as to letters of the district engineer of June 8, 1923, of the Chief of the Executive Bureau, and
of the Public Utility Commissioner. So much for Exhibit C.

As for Exhibit D, on which the second case is founded and having connection with two other prosecutions, it shows on its face a regular meeting
of the provincial board of Misamis held at Cagayan on Saturday, June 16, 1923. It discloses action taken on about fifty resolutions of municipal
councils. Included therein is approval of a resolution of the municipal council of salary of June 15, 1923. According to the witness Sabas Abao,
municipal secretary of Salay, this resolution was not placed in the mails until June 16, 1923, and according to the postmaster of Balingasay, could
not have left for the provincial capital until June 20, 1923.

As to Exhibit Q-3, the basis of the third prosecution, it purports to be an "excerpt from the minutes of the regular meeting of the provincial
board of Misamis held at Cagayan on Thursday, June 9, 1923." The provincial secretary then certifies to the correctness of a resolution
concerning a "letter dated June 14, 1923, of the district engineer." The utter impossibility of such approval needs no discussion.

Exhibits Y and X, approved by the provincial governor and certified to as correct and just by the two members of the provincial board,
respectively, are provincial vouchers in the usual form calling for services rendered as members of the provincial board during the period June 9,
16, 23 and 26, inclusive, at P12.50 a meeting.

According to the prosecution, the motive for the criminal acts was, first, the desire on the part of the provincial secretary to fabricate resolutions
probably with the connivance of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board, which would placate the American engineer,
Mr. Allen. The motive in the second place, according to the prosecution, was to permit the members of the provincial board to collect a total of
P50 not legally due them. On the other hand, according to the defense, the cause of the prosecution is the enmity existing between the district
engineer and the district auditor, and has been brought about as an act of vengeance by the district auditor. Political intrigue is also
insinuated.lawphi1.net

Up to this point, we have endeavored to state briefly and fairly the salient facts of order as they are pressed upon us by the opposing sides. No
comment of any importance has been proffered. Having progressed thus far, the case comes down to a determination of whether there was an
international and deliberate falsification of public documents on the part of the accused, or whether there was merely a human error
committed, in which criminal intent was wholly lacking.

It must be admitted that the physical facts are mostly in favor of the accused. The documents, Exhibits C and D, could not have been fabricated
on June 9 and June 16, if the matters to which they relate were not then before the provincial board for action. Unless by supernatural means,
that would be an utter impossibility. Just how we can reconcile these circumstances with the strong oral testimony, mostly circumstantial in
nature, presented by the prosecution, is hard to say, unless there was exaggeration on the part of some of the witnesses.

Now as to the motive, recognizing that a quarrel was on between two provincial officers, and that possibly the provincial board was siding with
the district engineer and against the district auditor, just why was it necessary to make meetings out of the air to serve this purpose when actual
meetings would have served the same purpose just as effectively? The resolution approving of the acts of the district engineer had to be made
public and copies of it had to be sent to the proper authorities. Just why two members of the provincial board would care to certify to the
correctness of meetings which were never held, in order to benefit themselves in the paltry amount of P25 each, when they could have
recovered the same amount for actual meetings, is also difficult to understand.

The whole case impresses us as a job bunglingly performed by the provincial secretary. He is a man who should not be entrusted with official
responsibility. He has none of the qualifications which fit one of public office. But it is a far cry from hopeless ineptitude and hopeless stupidity
to criminal intent and criminal responsibility. Still, even under the most favorable aspect, the facts skirt perilously near to the Penal Code crime
of reckless imprudence.

Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be crime. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when
the criminal mind is wanting. Ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and real, will as a general rule, exempt the doer from criminal
responsibility. The exception, of course, is neglect in the discharge of a duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to a criminal
intent. The element of malicious intent is supplied by the element of negligence and imprudence.

A decision of the supreme court of Spain of December 23, 1885, is in point. It appeared that one of the clerks in the office of the district court, in
spreading upon the record the proceedings taken for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for certain minor children and the declaration of
heirship in their favor entered such proceedings as of a date anterior to the date on which they were actually entered. The clerk, for this act, was
charged with the falsification of a public document, was convicted of imprudencia temeraria in the court of first instance, and appealed to the
supreme court of Spain, which tribunal in reversing the judgment said in part:

Considering that even though in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is
unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private
documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, it
must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that the change in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or to change
the effects which it would otherwise produce; for, unless that happens, there could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit
the crime which is required by article 1 of the Penal Code; considering that the fact that Don Augustin Montes Moreno set out the proceedings
as of a date prior to that on which they actually occurred, and therefore incorrectly, the remaining part of the document being true, ... neither
affected the integrity or truth of said proceedings not affected in any essential way their results or effects, it is necessary to conclude that the
criminal intent mentioned in the previous observation was absent; considering that, even though the accused consciously attached incorrect
dates to the proceedings, nevertheless that act does not take on the character of a crime, and for that reason the Audiencia de Huelva erred in
convicting the accused .. . (See further decision of supreme court of Spain of February 25, 1885; U.S. vs. Mateo [1913], 25 Phil., 324, 334; U.S. vs.
Reyes [1902], 1 Phil., 341; U.S. vs. Ah Chong [1910], 15 Phil., 488; U.S. vs. Catolico [1911], 18 Phil., 504; and Guevara's Penal Code, 2nd edition,
pp. 1-3, 401-406.)

It is a serious matter to be responsible for sending the accused to prison for long terms. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate error and
not crime should be indulged in to the benefit of the prisoners at bar. The Government has suffered no loss. If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused of the crime charged and
the other consistent with their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
(U.S. vs. Maaño [1903], 2 Phil., 718.) We cannot bring ourselves to find these accused guilty on the facts of record.

It results, therefore, that we must, as we hereby do, reverse the judgments appealed from and acquit the accused of the charges laid against
them, with costs de oficio. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.