In Re Cunanan

IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to
1953;

ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL., petitioners.

Resoluti, 1954on

March 18

Facts:

Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of
1953.” In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the
bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to
the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers
were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There
are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however,
invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed
the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act
No. 972.

Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Held:
 RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in
the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment
or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

Legal Profession – Admission to the Bar – Citizenship Requirement

In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He
eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino
citizen before he be allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen
but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963.
Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the
foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that he has always considered
himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos;
that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.

The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese
and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
that under prevailing jurisprudence, “upon reaching the age of majority” is construed as within
7 years after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old because he was born in 1964
while the 1935 Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998
or 14 years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General
recommended that the rule be relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot
agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had lapsed and it’s
way beyond the allowable 7 year period. The Supreme Court even noted that the period is
originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it can’t be extended any further).
Ching’s special circumstances can’t be considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life
that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The
rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he belatedly
chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never thought he’s Chinese
not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship
is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute
an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest
civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be
simply glossed over.

In Re: Petition of Ramon Quisimbing for Admission to the Bar, Bar Matter No. 419, the court
held that Filipino citizens who obtained their law degree abroad are required to take the bar
examinations for admission to the Philippine bar].

Non-graduates of Philippine law schools have also been allowed to take the Bar Examinations.
In a Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated July 27, 1993 (Re: Application of Adriano
M. Hernandez to take the 1993 Bar Examinations), the Court allowed the applicant, a Filipino
citizen who obtained a Juris Doctor from Columbia University, New York and who has taken
fourth year review courses and other bar subjects at the Ateneo Law School, to take the 1993
Bar Examinations, considering the fact that in the past, it had allowed Filipinos “who have
studied law in foreign law schools from the strict requirements of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138
and allowed them to take the bar examinations…”, but with the caveat that:
“beginning next year, the Court WILL NOT ALLOW GRADUATES OF FOREIGN LAW SCHOOLS TO
TAKE THE BAR EXAMINATIONS. An applicant who desires to take the bar examinations must not
only have studied law in a local law school but has to present the certifications required under
Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 in order to take the bar examination. Since graduates of foreign
law schools cannot submit said certifications, they shall henceforth not be allowed to take the
bar examinations” (emphasis supplied).

Was Adriano M. Hernandez the last Filipino to graduate from a foreign law school who was
allowed to take the Bar Examinations?

No.

In Re: Argosino, 270 SCRA 26

FACTS:

Al Caparros Argosino had passed the bar examinations but was denied of taking the Lawyer’s
Oath and to sign the Rolls of Attorneys due to his conviction of “reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide” from a hazing incident. Later in his sentence, he was granted probation by the
court. He filed a petition to the Supreme Court praying that he be allowed to take the Lawyer’s
Oath and sign the Rolls of Attorneys. As a proof of the required good moral character he now
possess, he presented no less than fifteen (15) certifications among others from: two (2)
senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious order. In addition, he,
together with the others who were convicted, organized a scholarship foundation in honor of
their hazing victim.
ISSUE:

Whether or not Mr. Argosino should be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath, sign the Rolls of
Attorneys, and practice law.

HELD:

YES. Petition granted.

RATIO:

Given the fact that Mr. Argosino had exhibited competent proof that he possessed the required
good moral character as required before taking the Lawyer’s Oath and to sign the Rolls of
Attorneys, the Supreme Court considered the premises that he is not inherently in bad moral
fiber. In giving the benefit of the doubt, Mr. Argosino was finally reminded that the Lawyer’s
Oath is not merely a ceremony or formality before the practice of law, and that the community
assistance he had started is expected to continue in serving the more unfortunate members of
the society.

Matter No. 2112 July 24, 2012In Re: Petition Re-Acquire the Privilege to Practice Law in the
Philippines, Epifanio B. Muneses,

REYES, J.:Facts of the Case

Petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP)in March 21, 1966. He lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the
UnitedStates on August 28, 1981. On September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship
pursuant to R.A. 9225 or the “Citizenship Retention and Re

-Acqu

isition Act of 2003”by taking his

oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in

WashingtonD.C., USA. On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Muneses with the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) praying the he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner should be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines

Ruling: Yes.

A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires hisPhilippine
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 remains to be a member of the Philippine bar.However, as
stated by the Court in a similar petition by Dacanay (Bar Matter No. 1678, datedDecember 17,
2007), the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No 9225provides the need
to apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in suchpractice. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with by Muneses, the OBCrecommended that the
petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.Thus, the petition of Atty. Epifanio B.
Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the conditionthat he shall re-

take the Lawyer’s Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the
payment of appropriate fees

327 scra 804

Article 19 of the Civil Code

Petitioner was enrolled in the defendant’s College of Law. He failed to take the regular
examination in Practice Court 1 for which he was given an incomplete grade. He enrolled for
the second semester as a fourth year student, and filed an application for the removal of the
incomplete grade which was approved by the Dean. In the meantime, the faculty members and
the Dean met to deliberate who among the fourth year students should be allowed to
graduate. The plaintiff’s name appeared on the tentative list, he also attended the investiture
ceremonies to which he tendered blowout afterwards. He thereafter prepared himself for the
bar examination and took review classes. However, he was not able to take the bar
examination because his academic requirements is not complete. Consequently, respondent
sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, sleepless nights, when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations
arising from the latter’s negligence. He prayed for an award of moral damages, unrealized
income, attorney’s fees and cost of suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a
student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when
such is not the case.

HELD: The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the contractual obligation of
the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every
student as to where he or she had already complied with the entire requirement for the
conferment of a degree or whether they should be included among those who will graduate.
The school cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be
sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of
right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.

Rule 138-A.
From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the
contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent
himself in any case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation
personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by
a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in
the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the litigation. [14]
Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of
evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law, [15] petitioner, not being a lawyer
himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore,
Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-
0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to
represent himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must,
therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying
Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner’s claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule
provides for conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows
the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No.
19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines
for limited law student practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when
a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule
138-A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard
by himself and counsel, [16] this Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot
be waived. [17] The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado, [18] where we
declared that “even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”
The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous
concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not
obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a
lawyer’s assistance, effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the
chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts
that he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils
incident to this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule
138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the
supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party
litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias
and partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her
alleged negative demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: “Hay naku, masama ‘yung
marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?” Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent judge
already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioner’s and
his co-plaintiff’s loss of faith and confidence in the respondent’s impartiality.

We do not agree.

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case [19]
against the respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for
lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Court’s findings of fact in the
administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge
Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear
and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, [20] as
voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion
of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational
and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her. [21] Absent clear
and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in
favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

In fine, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition, modified the assailed Resolution and Order
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, and directed it to ADMIT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant

IN RE TESTATE ESTATE OF DOÑA GABINA RAQUEL. VICENTE J. FRANCISCO

petitioner-appellee

vs

. AUREA MATIAS

oppositor-appellant

. On July 16, 1952, said Aurea Matias

—

named as executrix in the will

engaged the services of Atty. Vicente Francisco, who, with the assistance of Atty. Agbunag and
of Attorneys Alberto J. Francisco and J. Gonzales Orense, personally handled the case before
three different judges

successively.
After the decision of this Court had become final, said attorney filed on October 7, 1958, in the
Cavite court, in this testate proceeding, motion to fix his attorney's fees on the basis of

quantum meruit

. He alleged, among other things, that the Supreme Court had approved the probate of the will
of Gabina Raquel, that he had agreed to receive a contingent fee of P15,000.00 under his
erroneous belief, due to misrepresentations of Aurea Matias, that Gabina Raquel had left
properties worth only P167,000.00; that he learned, after the decision of the Supreme Court
that the said properties actually amounted to much more than that sum; and that,
consequently, he was not bound by his agreement to receive a contingent fee of P15,000.00
only. Atty. Francisco prayed that his compensation be fixed at 30% of the market value of the
estate. In deciding the main petition in view of the testimonial and documentary evidence, it
brushed aside, as immaterial, the alleged misrepresentation in the making of the written
contract,

since "reasonable amount" had become the real issue. It appears that the will of Gabina
Raquel, who died without forced heirs, bequeathed the greatest part of the estate to
appellant, and the rest to Santos Matias, Rafael Matias (her brothers) and to Victorina Salud,
Santiago Salud and Policarpio Salud. Atty. Francisco said he contracted with her as the
executrix. The will (shown to him) designated her as such;. She later asked to be noted in the
estate proceedings, the amount of P15,000.00 (Francisco's fees)

as a lien upon the estate

(p. 103, R.A.); 3. In her motion

ex-parte

of July 20, 1959, she petitioned for authority to pay

from the estate

, the sum of P2,000.00 as part of the retainer fees of Atty. Francisco; 4 She

included in her

statement of accounts as executrix, Francisco's attorney's fees in the amount of P11,000.00;

and 5. The statement of assets and liabilities of the estate filed by her with the lower court on
January 10, 1959, listed appellee's fees in the amount of P15,000.00 as an item of estate
liability. Generally speaking, where the employment of an attorney is under an express valid
contract

fixing the compensation for the attorney, such contract is conclusive as to the amount of
compensation. At any rate, we may take judicial notice of the general information that the
market value of real property in the provinces is usually three or more times the assessed
valuation thereof. Citing Section 22, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court which says that "an attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation
for his services". This Supreme Court has held the following as the guidelines to be observed in
determining the compensation of an attorney: (a) the amount and character of the services
rendered; (b) the labor, time and trouble involved; (c) the nature and importance of the
litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (d) the responsibility imposed; (e)
the amount of money or the value of the property affected by the controversy, or involved in
the employment; (f) the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services; (g)
the professional character and standing of the attorney; (h) the results secured; (i) and whether
or not the fee is absolute or contingent, it being a recognized rule that an attorney may
properly charge a much larger fee

when it is to be contingent than when it is not." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
III [1957 Ed.] pp. 644, 645, citing Haussermann vs. Rahmeyer. The whole estate would have
passed to the oppositor Basilia Salud, who is the first cousin of the deceased Gabina Raquel

—
 to the exclusion of appellant and the other legatees named in the will. Aurea Matias, whose
father is a first cousin of the deceased, stands five degrees removed from Gabina Raquel,
whereas Basilia Salud is only four degrees removed from her; and under our rules on succession

13

in case of intestate or legal succession, the relative nearer in degree excludes the more remote
ones and considering also, that in the collateral line, the right of representation holds only
where nephews and nieces survive with brothers and sisters of the deceased.

14

Note incidentally, that the will favored Aurea because the latter lived with, and rendered
services to, her aunt Gabina for more than 32 years. Indeed, the legal services rendered in the
lower court were expectably quite exacting. The trial alone covered almost a period of four
years. The preparation and presentation of evidence called for strenuous work. Thirty-one
documents were presented as evidence for the proponent of the will. The transcript of the
stenographic notes consisted of more than a thousand pages. Numberless motions were filed.
After the closing of the evidence, a memorandum had to be filed to answer the oppositor's
motion to reject the will. And then, despite the extensive study, research, and preparation of
the evidence, and notwithstanding the skill and experience of Atty. Francisco, the Cavite court
denied the probate of the will. Taking into account all the variables of the process, in the light
of our several pronouncements on the matter of contingent lawyer's fees, we feel that
modifying the appealed resolution and awarding 12.5% of the market value to the herein
appellee would accomplish substantial justice. This figure represents a compromise, some
members having voted for a bigger amount, while others voted for less. The Suntay and the
Harden cases were specially mentioned, since they belonged to the million-peso class. This
award sets a higher ratio than the first, because the latter involved over three million pesos and
because Atty. Francisco rendered much greater services to this estate. For one thing, he
handled tedious trial work which lasted for about four years

—
and for another, the fee was contingent. The Harden ratio (20%) was not applied, because
attorney and client had entered therein into a valid written contract.

Several circumstances account for this drastic reduction, among them: (a) 25% of P1,236,993.46
equals P309,248.36; but Atty. Francisco expressed willingness to receive P100,000.00

only

, in his letter of September 15, 1958 (Record on Appeal, p. 132); (b) although admittedly the
leading legal counsel, he got the assistance of three other attorneys; (c) believing the estate
amounted to P167,000.00, he agreed to receive P15,000.00 as contingent fee, i.e. 9% only; and
(d) he has already received a total of P11,000.00.

Nasser vs. Cuevas

Facts: In the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the late Amadeo Matute, a
document with a compromise agreement for partition was executed among the heirs and other
parties. It was approved by the court but later rendered moot. Anyway, the agreement
provided for the payment of attorney's fees of Atty. Paterno Canlas of P600,000, in property
and in cash (P412,000, the rest in property). The agreement contained the following clause:
...a charging lien for attornye's fees to secure the payment of said fees by signatories to this
agreement expressly agree to the establishment and creation of the aforesaid charging lien,
provided that upon full payment of the corresponding liability of a party, the lien on his/her
share is extinguished.

Shortly after the approval of the agreement, Atty Canlas moved for the execution, and it was
granted.

The order, issued by Judge Cuevas, was assailed in certiorari and prohibition, on the ground
that the execution was improper in the absence of a written agreement on the precise terms of
payment of Canlas' attorney's fees. Petitioners claim that they are entitled to pay Atty. Canlas
at installment.

Issue: Whether or not the agreement pertained to installment.

Held: No. It evidently contemplates the probability that the heirs obliged to pay Canles would
pay at different times and denotes nothing more than that if one of the obligors separately pays
his share in Canlas's fees, the lien on his share of the estate is thereby extinguish, a quite
obvious proposition to be sure. the clause cannot be construed as tgranting to any of them the
option of pay in installments. Also, the payment had been delayed for 14 years already, so
magbayad ka na!

G.R. No. L-43155 August 14, 1987

LUISA Y. ORTEGA, NIEVES Y. ORTEGA, MARIA MARIZAL POLANCOS, represented by her father
and natural guardian MAMERTO POLANCOS, JOAQUIN ORTEGA, JR., represented by his cousin,
MARIA LUISA O. SEVILLE, as guardian ad litem, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE NUMERIANO ESTENZO CALIXTA YAP,
ADELAIDA ORTEGA, CONCHITA ORTEGA, MAXIMO JOSE ORTEGA, JESUS ORTEGA, CARMEN
ORTEGA LIM, AMPARO ORTEGA LONGALONG, and MERCEDES ORTEGA BACALSO, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

The sole issue in this petition for certiorari is whether the respondent Judge Numeriano Estenzo
of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch V, acted in excess of jurisdiction when he
converted Civil Case No. 1184-0, an action for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of sale, and
annulment of tax declaration of a parcel of land, into an action for the declaration of who is the
legal wife, who are the legitimate children, if any, and who are the compulsory heirs of the
deceased Joaquin Ortega. The Court of Appeals * dismissed the petition assailing the decision
of the trial court.

As factual background, it should be stated that on May 22, 1948, Joaquin Ortega died intestate.
On January 3, 1949, Emilia Ybañez, the surviving spouse of Joaquin Ortega, initiated intestate
proceedings (Docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 441-R) in the then Court of First Instance of Cebu City,
Branch II, for the settlement of the estate of her deceased husband. In that proceedings, Emilia
Ybañez was appointed administratrix of the estate, with letters of administration issued to her
on February 22, 1949. Joaquin Ortega was also survived by his daughters by Emilia Ybañez,
namely, Luisa Y. Ortega de Sevilla, Elena Y. Ortega, Nieves Y. Ortega, Eufemia Y. Ortega and
Agueda Y. Ortega, all petitioners in this case.

On March 17, 1949, Calixta Yap, who claimed to be the common-law wife of Joaquin Ortega,
filed a motion for reconsideration of the order appointing Emilia Ybañez as administratrix of
Joaquin Ortega's estate on the ground that her own acknowledged natural children by Joaquin
Ortega were the only surviving forced heirs of the decedent. She also claimed that Emilia
Ybañez and Joaquin Ortega were never married; hence, their children (petitioners herein) could
not be considered legitimate, the motion was denied.
On May 19,1949, Emilia Ybañez presented a verified inventory and appraisal of the estate of
the deceased. It was approved by the probate court. On June 30, 1954, Aqueda Concordia Y.
Ortega, a daughter of Joaquin Ortega, by then the duly appointed administratrix of the estate,
filed another inventory which the court also approved.

On April 17, 1959, the children of Calixta Yap, herein private respondents, filed in the probate
court a motion for intervention in the intestate proceedings, alleging that they were the
acknowledged natural children. They prayed to be declared the heirs of Joaquin Ortega.

On June 25, 1959, another inventory was filed in court by Eufemia Y. Ortega, another daughter
of Emilia Ybañez by Joaquin Ortega, at that time the appointed administratrix of the estate. The
inventory was approved by the probate court.

On November 14, 1962, the children of Calixta Yap filed a motion for the dismissal of their
motion for declaration of heirs, which the court granted in an order dated November 16, 1962.

On November 24, 1962, Judge Amador E. Gomez, Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu, Branch
11, issued an order in Sp. Proc. No. 441-R declaring Emilia Ybañez and her daughters by Joaquin
Ortega the legal heirs of the said Joaquin Ortega, to whom all the assets of the estate were
adjudicated in undivided equal shares, and, there having been no money claims filed against
the estate, the court, in the same order, declared the proceedings closed and terminated.

On December 6, 1972, Calixta Yap and her children herein private respondents, filed against
petitioners a complaint for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of sale, annulment of tax
declaration, damages and other reliefs, in the CFI of Leyte, Branch V, presided over by Judge
Numeriano Estenzo. The complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 1184-0, made the following
substantial allegations: that Calixta Yap was the absolute owner of a parcel of land situated in
Sta. Cruz, Isabel, Leyte, with an area of 174,496 square meters, more or less, and covered by
Tax Declaration No. 4251; that on October 20, 1927, while Calixta Yap was living together with
her common-law husband, Joaquin Ortega, she and her grandfather, Froilan Maurillo, executed
a simulated deed of sale transferring and conveying the land mentioned above to Joaquin
Ortega; that Calixta Yap had always been in possession of said land until the death of Joaquin
Ortega in 1948; that Calixta Yap and Joaquin Ortega had eight children, her co-plaintiffs.

On February 12, 1973, the complaint in Civil Case No. 1184-0 was amended, showing these
changes: that Calixta Yap was married to Joaquin Ortega in 1927 before Justice of the Peace
Silverio Zamora of Merida, Leyte, which marriage was kept a secret to avoid a
misunderstanding with the family of Emilia Ybañez; that Calixta Yap's children by Joaquin
Ortega were legitimate or were legitimated; that Emilia Ybañez's children by Joaquin Ortega
were illegitimate; that the approval by the probate court of the inventories submitted in the
intestate proceedings had no basis in law and in fact; and that the declaration by the probate
court in Sp. Proc. No. 441-R of Emilia Ybanez and her children as heirs of Joaquin Ortega was an
error.

On February 19,1973, the complaint in Civil Case No. 1184-0 was amended a second time, with
the following additions to the subject matter of the action: a) the four other lots adjacent to the
one covered by Tax Declaration No. 4251; and b) the six other lots in Cangag, Isabel, Leyte. The
original subject matter of the complaint (the 174,496 square meters of land in Sta. Cruz, Isabel,
Leyte) plus the aforementioned additions comprise the entire estate of Joaquin Ortega, which
were already adjudicated in Sp. Proc. No. 441-R to Emilia Ybañez and her children on November
24, 1962.

Despite the vehement objections of the petitioners (then the defendants below) that the
amendment had altered the nature of the case, respondent Judge Numeriano Estenzo
nevertheless allowed the amendments.

The amended complaint in essence prayed-

1) That Calixta Yap be declared the absolute owner of the parcel of land at Bo. Sta. Cruz, Isabel,
Leyte in her own right;
2) That her children by Joaquin Ortega be declared the only legitimate children, or in the
alternative, the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Joaquin Ortega, and, as heirs,
entitled to the residuary estate of the decedent;

3) That the deed of sale earlier executed by her in favor of Joaquin Ortega be declared
inexistent and void.

Petitioners filed their answer to the amended complaint, raising the following allegations: that
Joaquin Ortega, then Justice of the Peace of Hilongos, Leyte, was legally married to Emilia
Ybañez, that their children and heirs are Luisa Elena Ortega, Eufemia Ortega, Nieves Ortega,
Agueda Ortega, and Maria Elena Ortega; that, on the other hand, Calixta Yap was only a
concubine of Joaquin Ortega, and that her children were spurious children, begotten during the
existence of the marriage of Emilia Ybañez and Joaquin Ortega; that s since 1927, Joaquin
Ortega and Emilia Ybañez, their children and grandchildren, have been continuously, openly,
peacefully and adversely in possession and occupation of the land in litigation, and that
plaintiffs' cause of action, if any, had already prescribed; that the estate of Joaquin Ortega (a
part of which is in litigation) was the subject of the intestate proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 441-R
in the CFI of Cebu, and that in said proceedings, the plaintiffs were not among those declared
the heirs of Joaquin Ortega.

On February 24, 1975, respondent Judge Numeriano Estenzo rendered a decision which reads
in part —

This is a case of first impression where the issue to be resolved by this Court has been to
determine who is the legitimate wife of the deceased Joaquin Ortega, as between plaintiff
Calixta Yap Ortega who claims she was married to Joquin Ortega on May 2, 1927 before the
Justice of the Peace Silverio Zamora of Merida Leyte, on one hand, and Emilia Ybanez or Emilia
Abundo, mother of the alternative defendants who claim their aforesaid mother married
Joaquin Ortega sometime in May 1915, which marriage claims have no entries in the respective
Local Civil Registrar Considering the loss of the records, as well as the corresponding marriage
contracts due to the last war.
xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the alternative
defendants, declaring Calixta Yap Ortega as the surviving spouse of Joaquin Ortega, of Isabel
Leyte as described in the deed of sale in favor of Joaquin Ortega dated October 21, 1927, with
right to the 1/2 share of all other parcels of land which are found by this Court as above
indicated to be the conjugal partnership properties of Calixta Yap and Joaquin Ortega, hereby
adjudicating the other half to all other plaintiffs in equal proportion.

Alternative defendants are ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the sum at the
rate of P2,400.00 a year from 1949 until April 7, 1973, plus another amount of P10,000.00 for
and as litigation expenses, plus another sum of P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fee plus
P10,000.00 for and as moral damages all of which amounts shall bear legal rate of interest,
from the filing of this case until paid, with no costs against the said alternative defendants.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II in
connection with Sp. Proc. No. 441-R entitled Estate of Joaquin Ortega for its ready reference.

The defendant administrator Jesus Laurente of the Estate of Joaquin Ortega is ordered to
deliver the land as above indicated to the plaintiffs, upon termination of the aforesaid special
proceedings now pending in Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Cebu after the
submission and approval of the project of partition and the payment of the estate and
inheritance taxes. (pp. 182-183, rollo)

On August 11, 1975, after several motions for execution of judgment had been filed by the
private respondents, petitioners filed their petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-04494-R assailing the proceedings and the judgment in Civil Case
No. 1184-0 on the ground that respondent Judge Estenzo converted private respondents'
action for quieting of title, declaration of nullity of sale, and annulment of tax declaration of a
parcel of land into an action for declaration of the legal wife, legitimate children, and legal heirs
of the deceased Joaquin Ortega. It is likewise the contention of petitioners that the assailed
decision nullified, modified, and revoked the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch I I, dated November 24, 1962, in Sp. Proc. No. 441-R which declared Emilia Ybanez and
her children by Joaquin Ortega the heirs of the said Joaquin Ortega.

In a decision promulgated on February 14, 1976, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
Hence, this present recourse.

The declaration of heirs made by Judge Estenzo is void, said matter having been already
resolved with finality by the probate court, whose order of November 24, 1962 has not been
appealed and is therefore final insofar as said declaration is concerned. But of course the
ownership of the disputed parcel cannot be said to be res judicata, for a probate court has no
right to determine with finality the ownership thereof.

Civil Case No. 1184-0 was instituted for the purpose of having Calixta Yap declared owner of a
parcel of land in Barrio Sta. Cruz, Isabel, Leyte, asserting her title as against the decedent
Joaquin Ortega himself. The subject matter being beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, sitting as a probate court, it was proper that the issue of ownership of a
specific property was raised in a separate ordinary action.

This Court has ruled:

It is well-settled that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or

intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties all that the said court could do as
regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute,
well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have
to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because
the probate court cannot do so. (Mallari vs. Mallari, 92 Phil. 694; Baquial vs. Amihan, 92 Phil.
501; vda. de Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 540)
Thus, it is fitting and proper that the issue of ownership of the parcel of land be resolved in the
already instituted Civil Case No. 1184-0, in the then Court of First Instance of Leyte, Branch V.

This is as far as We can go. For now, the issue of ownership cannot be determined by Us with
finality. The resolution of the issue is better left to the trial court where Civil Case No. 1184-0 is
now instituted. The resolution of this issue will need a full-dress hearing where the parties will
exchange various pleadings between themselves. This Court not being a trier of facts, it is clear
that We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property
involved from the estate of Joaquin Ortega.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED. This case is REMANDED to the trial court
for a full hearing only on the question of ownership of the 174,496 square meters of land in Sta.
Cruz, Leyte as covered by the original complaint.

SO ORDERED

Guevarra vs. Eala, A.C. No. 7136 , August 1, 2007

Facts: Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a.
Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's
oath."

The complainant first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee
Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent Atty. Eala, a lawyer and a sportscaster, to him as her
friend who was married to Mary Ann Tantoco with whom he had three children.
 After his marriage to Irene, complainant noticed that Irene had been receiving from
respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you,"
or "Meet you at Megamall." He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night
or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When
he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. More so, complainant has seen Irene and
respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following
which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

Moreover, Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the
words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated
October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene. Also, it was revealed that Irene gave birth to a
girl in 2002 and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father.

In his answer, Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship
with Irene, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only
to the immediate members of their respective families. He also said that his special relationship
with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral
conduct as would be a ground for disbarment.

Issue: Whether the respondent be disbarred from the practice of Law.

Held: YES. The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married
woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly.
 While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two
unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it
is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-
marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is
considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law.
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."

As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent
himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.