G.R. No.
226679 authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987
SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y ASUELA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition1 is the constitutionality of
Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.)No. 9165, or the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which provides:
SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under any provision
of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of
the provision on plea-bargaining.3
The facts are not in dispute.
Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in Criminal Case
No. 13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of
Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any regulated drug
and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in his possession and under his control
and custody, one (1) piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as
VOP 03/21/16- l G containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance, which
when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine
Hydrocloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a
Plea Bargaining Agreement,5 praying to withdraw his not guilty plea and, instead,
to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his
being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized
in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 violates: (1) the
intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof; (2) the rule-making
Constitution; and (3) the principle of separation of powers among the three equal
branches of the government.
In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution moved for
the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which
is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to choose which offense it
would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment or Opposition7 dated June 29,
2016, it manifested that it "is open to the Motion of the accused to enter into plea
bargaining to give life to the intent of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section
2 of [R.A. No.] 9165, however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A.
No.] 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject
the proposal of the accused."
On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying Estipona's
motion. It was opined:
The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165, which prohibits
plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure because plea bargaining is a
"rule of procedure." Indeed, plea bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, particularly under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only
the Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its
constitutional rule-making power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot
be found in any statute.
Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is
unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the operation of Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-
trial conference in criminal cases.
The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also the intendment
of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a drug offense.
Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal drugs because plea
bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the Supreme Court allowed
rehabilitation for accused charged with possession of paraphernalia with traces
of dangerous drugs, as held in People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13
December 2010. The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case manifested the
relaxation of an otherwise stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order
to serve an intent for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.
Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there might be plausible
basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165, which bars plea bargaining
as unconstitutional because indeed the inclusion of the provision in the law
encroaches on the exclusive constitutional power of the Supreme Court.
While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from resolving,
whenever warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not unaware of the
admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts must observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions. Upon which admonition, it is thus
not for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given
the potential ramifications that such declaration might have on the prosecution
of illegal drug cases pending before this judicial station.8
Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an Order9 dated
July 26, 2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as follows:
I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH PROHIBITS
PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE SAID LAW, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER OF THE
SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF PROCEDURE.
III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY HON. FRANK
E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING
TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE
SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.10
We grant the petition.
PROCEDURAL MATTERS
The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), contends that the petition should be dismissed outright for being
procedurally defective on the grounds that: (1) the Congress should have been
impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of Section 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3) the proper recourse
should have been a petition for declaratory relief before this Court or a petition
for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues that the petition fails to
satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (1) Estipona lacks legal standing
to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2) there is no actual case or controversy;
and (3) the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is not the lis mota of
the case.
On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe
correct.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be underscored
that it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court. Under
proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation of the
parties' arguments and positions despite the supposed technical infirmities of a
petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its solemn duty as the final
arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not shirk from its obligation to
determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching
implications.11
Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a backseat when
issues of substantial and transcendental importance are present. 12 We have
acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on illegal drugs has reached
"epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions,13 and that its disastrously
harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have broken the lives, shattered
the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands especially our young
citizens.14 At the same time, We have equally noted that "as urgent as the
campaign against the drug problem must be, so must we as urgently, if not more
so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the accused as mandated by the
Constitution x x x who, because of excessive zeal on the part of the law
enforcers, may be unjustly accused and convicted." 15 Fully aware of the gravity
of the drug menace that has beset our country and its direct link to certain crimes,
the Court, within its sphere, must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen,
if not totally eradicate, the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and
users.16
Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this petition,
technical matters should not deter Us from having to make the final and definitive
pronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment and
guidance.17 When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside procedural
rules in order to resolve a constitutional issue.18
x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the application of the
rules of procedure as a necessary complement of its power to promulgate the
same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed the rationale for this tenet, viz. :
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect
this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive
and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared
to be final, x x x.
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from
the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held
that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice. 19
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Rule-making power of the Supreme
Court under the 1987 Constitution
Section 5(5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Our
exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative
departments.20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 21 then Associate Justice
(later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of the Court's rule-
making power and highlighted its evolution and development.
x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to
enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without
independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the
maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice." Hence, our Constitutions
continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be
co-existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to
repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to
the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws
on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and
modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on its
surface. In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to amend rules
of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the
Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing grade, the average of
70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71 % in
the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as
unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed
law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court
during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although
this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative nor
executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these
departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the
law in question." The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that
the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to
this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for
the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist tone of the power of
Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973
Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x
x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa x x x." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxxx
"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which,
however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade,
and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate
rules governing the integration of the Bar.
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its
Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxxx
"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.
Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. "
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first
time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the .first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power
of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive. x x x.22
Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)23 further
elucidated:
While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various
courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress, the power to
promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts belongs exclusively to this Court.Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads:
xxxx
In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution
of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, had
been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress. As it now
stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting
the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus solidifying in
one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of
institutionalizing a " [ s] tronger and more independent judiciary."
The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show
that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rulemaking powers
should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the
sentence "The National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules
with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court," right after the phrase
"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]"
in the enumeration of powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner
Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after
the word "[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with
the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise
formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to
Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National Assembly
may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence
of the Supreme Court" and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to
withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present
lack of textual reference to any form of Congressional participation in
Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. Theprevailing consideration was that "both
bodies, the Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent
powers."
Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.x x x.24
The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government
has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. 25 The
other branches trespass upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders
that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated
by the Court.26 Viewed from this perspective, We have rejected previous
attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to
amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:
1. Fabian v. Desierto27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the
Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court
of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rulesinstead of appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. 28 -
The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules on
summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of
Legal Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes;30 In Re: Exemption of the
National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of
the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 - Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS,
BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment of legal fees
imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division)33 - The first paragraph of
Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme Court
from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is unconstitutional as it
contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.
Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court
asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of
procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on pleading,
practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our
institutional independence.34
Plea bargaining in criminal cases
Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our jurisdiction
since July 1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4, Rule 114 (Pleas)
of which stated:
SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent of the
court and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than that charged
which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the complaint or
information.
When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same provision
was retained under Rule 118 (Pleas).1âwphi1 Subsequently, with the effectivity
of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of guilty to a lesser
offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent of the
offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to
a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the
crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial
court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (4a, R-118)
As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly required
during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall consider
the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2, Rule 118
was retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second paragraph
was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be equivalent to a
conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy."
When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted,35 Section 2, Rule
118 of the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the law required that
plea bargaining and other matters 36 that will promote a fair and expeditious trial
are to be considered during pre-trial conference in all criminal cases cognizable
by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Regional Trial Court, and the Sandiganbayan.
Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000 Rules37 are
quoted below:
RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial
court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be
allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir.
38-98)
RULE 118 (Pre-trial):
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan,Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the
court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is
provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial
conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but
interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and
civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3, Cir. 38-98)
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure
The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal procedural
rules is limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the former should
not diminish, increase or modify the latter.38 "Substantive law is that part of the
law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the right and
duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which
prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain redress for their
invasions."39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto40 laid down the test for determining
whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.
It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those rules or
statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this Court's rule-making
power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a particular rule may be
procedural in one context and substantive in another. It is admitted that what is
procedural and what is substantive is frequently a question of great difficulty. It
is not, however, an insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach
is taken within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice
and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is,
the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction
of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule
creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive
matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the
rule deals merely with procedure.41
In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates
substantive rights. For example, in People v. Lacson, 42 Section 8, Rule 117 of
the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special procedural limitation
qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of
the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so that its expiration operates to
extinguish the right of the State to prosecute the accused.43Speaking through
then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Court opined:
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-
bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to the
offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression, unreasonable
compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However,
in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the
accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum
prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into account the substantial rights
of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed that the
time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed
cases with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The
time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the period
is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of justice. The
petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules
and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the administration of
the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of the State and the
accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts of provisionally
dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution or the accused or
jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite
period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such
criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the control
of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical
attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State and the accused
despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal
proceedings.
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it usually
operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the consequences of his trial
and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which dominant
cases have been known to expire.
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair or
reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or
nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may have been lost.
Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of time
makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused may become a fugitive from
justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from the dismissal
of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal case
does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be revived
at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the accused for
employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy and create
anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life because of
community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties
and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also
lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the
long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the
fairness of the entire criminal justice system.
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the malaise
that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for the benefit of
the State and the accused; not for the accused only.44
Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6, Rule 120
of the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to appear at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies available
against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but merely provides
the manner through which an existing right may be implemented.
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right
of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure
of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of
promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail
themselves of the remedies against the judgment.
It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes
or modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the
power of the Supreme Court to "provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases." This provision protects the courts from delay
in the speedy disposition of criminal cases - delay arising from the simple
expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of
the judgment of conviction.46
By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts47 that the rules on plea
bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal charges by agreement
of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an "important," "essential,"
"highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of the administration of
justice.48 Some of its salutary effects include:
x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the advantages of
pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are obvious - his exposure is
reduced, the correctional processes can begin immediately, and the practical
burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the State there are also advantages - the
more promptly imposed punishment after an admission of guilt may more
effectively attain the objectives of punishment; and with the avoidance of trial,
scarce judicial and prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in
which there is a substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is
substantial doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof. (Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])
Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt and largely
final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the corrosive impact of
enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for those who are denied release
pending trial; it protects the public from those accused persons who are prone
to continue criminal conduct even while on pretrial release; and, by shortening
the time between charge and disposition, it enhances whatever may be the
rehabilitative prospects of the guilty when they are ultimately
imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and
uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to
acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there
may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce
resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with
criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal
proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 [1977])
In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the
case subject to court approval."49 There is give-and-take negotiation common in
plea bargaining.50 The essence of the agreement is that both the prosecution
and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. 51 Properly
administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged because the chief virtues of
the system - speed, economy, and finality - can benefit the accused, the offended
party, the prosecution, and the court.52
Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage,53 the rules on plea
bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it operates
as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.
The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's
appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by the apparent likelihood of
securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and accepted. 54 In any case,
whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser crime, a guilty plea is a
"serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it constitutes a waiver of the
fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, to be
heard by himself and counsel, to meet the witnesses face to face, to bail (except
those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong), to be convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself.55
Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are
infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need
not do so if he prefers to go to trial.56 Under the present Rules, the acceptance
of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but depends on the consent
of the offended party57and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a
valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is necessarily included in the offense
charged.58 The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the
prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper
offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can
sustain.59
[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute.
The reasons for judicial deference are well known. Prosecutorial charging
decisions are rarely simple. In addition to assessing the strength and importance
of a case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and intangible factors,
such as government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how
best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice system that simply
cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because
these decisions "are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are
competent to undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to examine the
decision whether to prosecute. "60
The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an exercise
of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make such
plea.61 Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter
offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of
bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.62
Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the
point when the prosecution already rested its case.63 As regards plea bargaining
during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of discretion should not
amount to a grave abuse thereof.64 "Grave abuse of discretion" is a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of
passion or hostility; it arises when a court or tribunal violates the Constitution,
the law or existing jurisprudence.65
If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail
hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only
when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of
the crime charged.66 The only basis on which the prosecutor and the court could
rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing
more and nothing less than the evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor
has submitted a comment whether for or against said motion, it behooves the
trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the
circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that
the interests of justice and of the public will be served.67 The ruling on the motion
must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence.68 Absent
any finding on the weight of the evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the
defendant's change of plea is improper and irregular. 69
On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 violates the equal protection
clause
At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order
not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations
behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to
adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it
proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases
until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. Section
23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared unconstitutional for being contrary to the
rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 119
G.R. No. 143093 May 21, 2007
RIMBERTO T. SALVANERA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LUCITA PARANE, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal are the Decision dated April 30, 1999 and the two Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals, dated September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 46945. The Court of Appeals discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and
Domingo Tampelix from the Information in Criminal Case No. TM-1730 for
Murder, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City, to
become state witnesses. The appellate court likewise cancelled the bail bond of
petitioner Rimberto Salvanera.
First, the facts:
In an Information1 dated November 30, 1996, petitioner Rimberto Salvanera,
together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is
charged with the murder of Ruben Parane, committed as follows:
That on or about October 23, 1995, in the Municipality of Gen. Trias, Province of
Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with
treachery and evident premeditation, then armed with a firearm, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one RUBEN
PARANE Y MAGSAMBOL, inflicting gunshot wound on his body, resulting to his
instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
As per theory of the prosecution, petitioner was the alleged mastermind;
Lungcay, the hired hitman; Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle which carried
Lungcay to the place of the commission of the crime; while Tampelix delivered
the blood money to the latter. All the accused have been arrested and detained,
except Edgardo Lungcay who remained at-large.
Respondent Lucita Parane is the spouse of victim Ruben Parane.
On January 22, 1997, petitioner applied for bail. The prosecution, on March 4,
1997, moved for the discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo
Tampelix, to serve as state witnesses.
In an Omnibus Order2 dated September 5, 1997, the trial court granted
petitioner’s application for bail and denied the prosecution’s motion for the
discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix. The prosecution moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied.
The prosecution then appealed to the Court of Appeals. It contended that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to
discharge accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state witnesses. It alleged that the
testimonies of the two accused are absolutely necessary to establish that
petitioner masterminded the murder of Ruben Parane. The prosecution likewise
claimed that it was premature and baseless for the trial court to grant petitioner’s
application for bail because the prosecution had not yet rested its case in the
hearing for the discharge of the two accused.
The Court of Appeals sustained the prosecution. It discharged accused Feliciano
Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the Information to become state witnesses,
and cancelled the bail bond of petitioner Salvanera. In its Resolution dated
September 22, 1999, it denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner
then filed his Motion for Clarification with Leave of Court. The same was also
denied in a Resolution dated May 11, 2000.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner enumerates the grounds for his appeal, as follows:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR IN RENDERING THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD
ASSAILED ORDERS DEFYING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
THEREON WHEN IT RULED THAT THE "SUBSTANTIAL
CORROBORATION" REQUIREMENT UNDER SECTION 9, RULE 119
OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT WAS SATISFIED BY THE
PROSECUTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT -
A. THE "SUBSTANTIAL CORROBORATION" REQUIREMENT
MUST BE SATISFIED THROUGH THE TESTIMONY OF THE
OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHO ARE NOT
AN (sic) ACCUSED SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED AS
STATE WITNESS, NOT BY ANOTHER ACCUSED LIKEWISE
SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED.
B. THE SWORN STATEMENT OF AN ACCUSED SOUGHT TO
BE DISCHARGED CANNOT BE USED AS EVIDENCE FOR
 PURPOSES OTHER THAN HIS OWN DISCHARGE PRIOR TO
THE ISSUANCE BY A COMPETENT COURT OF THE ORDER
OF HIS DISCHARGE.
C. THE TESTIMONIES OF ABUTIN AND TAMPELIX CANNOT
BE SUBSTANTIALLY CORROBORATED IN ITS MATERIAL
POINTS BY THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
D. THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY AN ACCUSED SOUGHT TO
BE DISCHARGED AS STATE WITNESS CANNOT BE USED
TO CORROBORATE THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY ANOTHER
ACCUSED LIKEWISE SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED AS
STATE WITNESS.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR IN RENDERING THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD
ASSAILED ORDERS, DEFYING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE ON
THE MATTER, WHEN IT CANCELLED PETITIONER'S BAIL BOND
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE ALREADY
RULED THAT THE EVIDENCE OF HIS GUILT IS NOT STRONG.3
We uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the
following conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an
offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its
case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of
said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.4
According to petitioner, the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged to
become a state witness must be substantially corroborated, not by a co-accused
likewise sought to be discharged, but by other prosecution witnesses who are
not the accused in the same criminal case. Petitioner justifies this theory on the
general principles of justice and sound logic. He contends that it is a notorious
fact in human nature that a culprit, confessing a crime, is likely to put the blame
on others, if by doing so, he will be freed from any criminal responsibility. Thus,
in the instant case, petitioner supposes that both Abutin and Tampelix will
naturally seize the opportunity to be absolved of any liability by putting the blame
on one of their co-accused. Petitioner argues that prosecution witnesses Parane
and Salazar, who are not accused, do not have personal knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the alleged conspiracy. Thus, they could not testify
to corroborate the statement of Abutin and Tampelix that petitioner is the
mastermind or the principal by induction.
We agree with the Court of Appeals in dismissing this reasoning as specious. To
require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of
Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same points is to render nugatory the other
requisite that "there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state
witness."5 The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to
consist of the very same evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state
witnesses. We have ruled that "a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts
of a fellow criminal than by any other method. If it is shown that the statements
of the conspirator are corroborated by other evidence, then we have convincing
proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony only applies to some
particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in other
respects."6 It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by
some other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a
reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are
corroborated on important points by each other’s testimonies and the
circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of the other prosecution
witnesses, and "to such extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest."7
As part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan
of the conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of
the conspirators is essential because only they have knowledge of the
crime.8 The other prosecution witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as,
in fact, there is none. No one except the conspirators knew and witnessed the
murder. The testimonies of the accused and proposed state witnesses Abutin
and Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the commission of the crime.
In Chua v. Court of Appeals,9 we ruled that the trial court has to rely on the
information offered by the public prosecutor as to who would best qualify as a
state witness. The prosecutor knows the evidence in his possession and the
witnesses he needs to establish his case. In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan,10 we
held:
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the
prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of
a person for government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate
renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of
having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State
to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably
elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be
exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are
questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power
to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the
corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.
We further ruled:
In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in these areas, the
jurisdiction of the respondent court is limited. For the business of a court of
justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or
failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution may
err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to
rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. For
fairness demands that courts keep the scales of justice at equipoise between
and among all litigants. Due process demands that courts should strive to
maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and perpetually level.
Lastly, we affirm the ruling of the appellate court in cancelling the bail bond of
petitioner. The grant of petitioner’s application for bail is premature. It has to
await the testimony of state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix. Their testimonies
must be given their proper weight in determining whether the petitioner is entitled
to bail.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945, dated April 30, 1999,
September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, respectively, are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152643 August 28, 2008
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C.
CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 19, petitioners,
vs.
RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL
D.B. BONJE, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1dated August 15, 2001 and its
Resolution2 dated March 12, 2002. The CA decision set aside the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Orders dated August 25, 20003 granting Concepcion Cuenco Vda.
de Manguerra’s (Concepcion’s) motion to take deposition, and dated November
3, 20004 denying the motion for reconsideration of respondents Raul G. Risos,
Susana Yongco, Leah Abarquez, and Atty. Gamaliel D.B. Bonje.
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow:
On November 4, 1999, respondents were charged with Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Document before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19,
through a criminal information dated October 27, 1999, which was subsequently
amended on November 18, 1999. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No.
CBU-52248,5 arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage
allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that
Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo
property, affixed her signature to the document. Hence, the criminal case.6
Earlier, on September 10, 1999, Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City,
while on vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical
Center due to upper gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila
for further treatment.7
On November 24, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the
Proceedings in Criminal Case No. CBU-52248 on the ground of prejudicial
question. They argued that Civil Case No. CEB-20359, which was an action for
declaration of nullity of the mortgage, should first be resolved.8 On May 11, 2000,
the RTC granted the aforesaid motion. Concepcion’s motion for reconsideration
was denied on June 5, 2000.9
This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action for certiorari before
the CA seeking the nullification of the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders. The case
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60266 and remains pending before the
appellate court to date.10
On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter’s
deposition.11 He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcion’s testimony due
to her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.
On August 25, 2000, the RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcion’s
deposition be taken before the Clerk of Court of Makati City.12 The respondents’
motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on November 3, 2000.
The court ratiocinated that procedural technicalities should be brushed aside
because of the urgency of the situation, since Concepcion was already of
advanced age.13 After several motions for change of venue of the deposition-
taking, Concepcion’s deposition was finally taken on March 9, 2001 at her
residence.14
Aggrieved, respondents assailed the August 25 and November 3 RTC orders in
a special civil action for certiorari before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 62551.15
On August 15, 2001, the CA rendered a Decision16 favorable to the respondents,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the August 25, 2000 and
November 3, 2000 orders of the court a quoare hereby SET ASIDE, and any
deposition that may have been taken on the authority of such void orders is
similarly declared void.
SO ORDERED.17
At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the respondents’
petition by not impleading the People of the Philippines, an indispensable party.
This notwithstanding, the appellate court resolved the matter on its merit,
declaring that the examination of prosecution witnesses, as in the present case,
is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter provision, said the appellate
court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific provision of Section 15,
Rule 119, Concepcion’s deposition should have been taken before the judge or
the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before
the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC
clearly committed grave abuse of discretion. 18
In its Resolution dated March 12, 2002 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, the CA added that the rationale of the Rules in requiring the
taking of deposition before the same court is the constitutional right of the
accused to meet the witnesses face to face. The appellate court likewise
concluded that Rule 23 could not be applied suppletorily because the situation
was adequately addressed by a specific provision of the rules of criminal
procedure.19
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
APPLIES TO THE DEPOSITION OF PETITIONER.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT FAILURE TO IMPLEAD THE "PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES" IN A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ARISING FROM A
CRIMINAL CASE A QUO CONSTITUTES A WAIVABLE DEFECT IN THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.20
It is undisputed that in their petition for certiorari before the CA, respondents
failed to implead the People of the Philippines as a party thereto. Because of
this, the petition was obviously defective. As provided in Section 5, Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all criminal actions are prosecuted
under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Therefore, it behooved
the petitioners (respondents herein) to implead the People of the Philippines as
respondent in the CA case to enable the Solicitor General to comment on the
petition.21
However, this Court has repeatedly declared that the failure to implead an
indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such a case,
the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may
be added by order of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at
any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff
refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter
may dismiss the complaint/petition for the petitioner’s/plaintiff’s failure to
comply.22
In this case, the CA disregarded the procedural flaw by allowing the petition to
proceed, in the interest of substantial justice. Also noteworthy is that,
notwithstanding the non-joinder of the People of the Philippines as party-
respondent, it managed, through the Office of the Solicitor General, to file its
Comment on the petition for certiorari. Thus, the People was given the
opportunity to refute the respondents’ arguments.
Instructive is the Court’s pronouncement in Commissioner Domingo v.
Scheer23 in this wise:
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents.
Their sole purpose is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties. They were created, not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate
and promote, the administration of justice. They do not constitute the thing itself,
which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. They are designed as the
means best adapted to obtain that thing. In other words, they are a means to an
end. When they lose the character of the one and become the other, the
administration of justice is at fault and courts are correspondingly remiss in the
performance of their obvious duty.24
Accordingly, the CA cannot be faulted for deciding the case on the merits despite
the procedural defect.
On the more important issue of whether Rule 23 of the Rules of Court applies to
the instant case, we rule in the negative.
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in
the presence of the judge.25 This is especially true in criminal cases in order that
the accused may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
pursuant to his constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face.26 It also
gives the parties and their counsel the chance to propound such questions as
they deem material and necessary to support their position or to test the
credibility of said witnesses.27 Lastly, this rule enables the judge to observe the
witnesses’ demeanor.28
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules
of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by
a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies
of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections
12,29 1330 and 15,31 Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of both the
defense and prosecution witnesses.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who,
according to the petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial
court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into play, and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily
appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the
trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date
of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where
the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his
absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on
him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial.
Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or
against the accused.
Petitioners contend that Concepcion’s advanced age and health condition
exempt her from the application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and thus, calls for the application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The contention does not persuade.
The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the
coverage of Rule 119 is at once the ground which places her squarely within the
coverage of the same provision. Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may
be conditionally examined: 1) if the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the
trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of
returning. Thus, when Concepcion moved that her deposition be taken, had she
not been too sick at that time, her motion would have been denied. Instead of
conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would have been
compelled to appear before the court for examination during the trial proper.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is
thus required that the conditional examination be made before the court where
the case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he
can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after
reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it
be conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through
question and answer.
At this point, a query may thus be posed: in granting Concepcion’s motion and
in actually taking her deposition, were the above rules complied with? The CA
answered in the negative. The appellate court considered the taking of
deposition before the Clerk of Court of Makati City erroneous and contrary to the
clear mandate of the Rules that the same be made before the court where the
case is pending. Accordingly, said the CA, the RTC order was issued with grave
abuse of discretion.
We agree with the CA and quote with approval its ratiocination in this wise:
Unlike an examination of a defense witness which, pursuant to Section 5, Rule
119 of the previous Rules, and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the present Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, may be taken before any "judge, or, if not
practicable, a member of the Bar in good standing so designated by the judge in
the order, or, if the order be made by a court of superior jurisdiction, before an
inferior court to be designated therein," the examination of a witness for the
prosecution under Section 15 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
(December 1, 2000) may be done only "before the court where the case is G.R. No. 209195 September 17, 2014
pending."32
MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR., Petitioner,
Rule 119 categorically states that the conditional examination of a prosecution vs.
witness shall be made before the court where the case is pending. Contrary to PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
petitioners’ contention, there is nothing in the rule which may remotely be
interpreted to mean that such requirement applies only to cases where the x-----------------------x
witness is within the jurisdiction of said court and not when he is kilometers away,
as in the present case. Therefore, the court may not introduce exceptions or G.R. No. 209215
conditions. Neither may it engraft into the law (or the Rules) qualifications not
contemplated.33 When the words are clear and categorical, there is no room for PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
interpretation. There is only room for application.34 vs.
MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR., Respondent.
Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies to the instant case, because the
rules on civil procedure apply suppletorily to criminal cases. DECISION

It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of
civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In
effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have suppletory application to
criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal proceedings are
primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that
Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we
find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose
of taking his deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the
judge, where the case is pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule
119 of the Rules. We find no necessity to depart from, or to relax, this rule. As
correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made elsewhere, the accused may
not be able to attend, as when he is under detention. More importantly, this
requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the witness’
deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is especially
true when the witness’ testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case.
BRION, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the amended decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 entitled Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. v. Hon.
Zaldy B. Docena et al.
The CA did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC Branch 170, Malabon) Judge Zaldy B. Docena (Judge
Docena)in issuing the order which granted the People of the Philippines’ motion
to discharge Manuel A. Montero (Montero)as a state witness in Criminal Case
No. 39225-MN.
The G.R. No. 209195petition was filed by Manuel J. Jimenez, Jr. (Jimenez). He
prays in this petition for the reversal of the CA’s amended decision insofar as it
ruled that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in issuing the
assailed order.

While we recognize the prosecution’s right to preserve its witness’ testimony to
prove its case, we cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for the
protection of the accused’s constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during
trial is the general rule. The conditional examination of a witness outside of the
trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.
The People likewise filed its petition, docketed as G.R. No. 209215. This petition
seeks to reverse the amended decision of the CA insofar as it ordered the re-
raffle of the criminal case to another RTC judge for trial on the merits.
The Factual Antecedents

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
and Resolution dated August 25, 2000 and March 12, 2002, respectively, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 62551, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
On May 18, 2009 and June 11, 2009, Montero (a former employee of the BSJ
Company owned by the Jimenezes) executed sworn statements confessing his
participation in the killing ofRuby Rose Barrameda (Ruby Rose),and naming
petitioner Jimenez, Lope Jimenez (Lope, the petitioner Jimenez’s younger
brother),Lennard A. Descalso (Lennard) alias "Spyke," Robert Ponce (Robert)
alias "Obet," and Eric Fernandez (Eric), as his coconspirators. 2
The statements of Montero which provided the details on where the alleged steel
casing containing the body of Ruby Rose was dumped, led to the recovery of a
cadaver, encased ina drum and steel casing, near or practically at the place that
Montero pointed to.3
On August 20, 2009, the People, through the state prosecutors, filed an
Information before the RTC, charging Jimenez, Lope, Lennard, Robert, Eric and
Montero of murder for the killing of Ruby Rose.4
Montero thereafter filed a motion for his discharge entitled "Motion for the
Discharge of the Witness as Accused Pursuant to the Witness Protection
Program" pursuant to Republic Act No. 6981. The People also filed a motion to
discharge Montero as a state witness for the prosecution. Jimenez opposed both
motions.5
The RTC’s ruling
On March 19, 2010, the RTC’s Acting Presiding Judge Hector B. Almeyda
(Judge Almeyda)denied the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness.6
Judge Almeyda ruled that the prosecution failed to comply with the requirements
of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for the
discharge of an accused as a state witness; it failed to clearly show that Montero
was not the most guilty or, at best, the least guilty among the accused. The judge
further ruled that Montero’s statements were not corroborated by the other
evidence on record. The prosecution, too, failed to present evidence to sustain
the possibility of conviction against Jimenez. 7
Montero and the People filed separate motions for reconsideration.
The July 30, 2010 order
On July 30, 2010, Judge Docena, the newly-appointed regular judge,
reconsidered and reversed Judge Almeyda’s order and ruled that the
prosecution had presented clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence showing
compliance with the requisites of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
According to Judge Docena, the crime would have remained undiscovered and
unsolved had it not been for Montero’s extrajudicial confession that narrated in
detail the manner of the abductionand subsequent murderof Ruby Rose. As the
crime was committed in secret, only one of the co-conspirators, such asMontero,
could give direct evidence identifying the other coconspirators.
Judge Docena further ruled that Montero is qualified tobe discharged as a state
witness as he does not appear to be the most guilty although he is a principal by
direct participation. The principals by inducement are more guilty because,
without their orders, the crime would not have been committed. Finally, Montero
has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. Jimenez moved
for the reconsideration of Judge Docena’s ruling.8
The December 29, 2010 order
During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration, Jimenez filed a motion
for inhibition, praying that Judge Docena inhibit himself from hearing the case on
the ground of bias and prejudice. Judge Docena denied the motion in his order
of December 29, 2010.9
The June 29, 2011 order
On June 29, 2011, Judge Docena issued an omnibus order: 1) denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the July 30, 2010 order; 2) denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the December 29, 2010 order; and 3)
granting Manuel Jimenez III’s alternative motion to suspend the proceedings, as
his inclusion in the Information was still pending final determination by the Office
of the President.
Jimenez responded to these adverse rulings by filing with the CA a petition for
certiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petition sought the annulment
of Judge Docena’s orders dated July 30, 2010, December 29, 2010, and June
29, 2011. The petition also prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and a writ of preliminary injunction that the CA both granted in its
resolutions of December 8, 2011 and February 6, 2012, respectively. 10
The CA’s Decision
On May 22, 2012, the CA’s then Tenth Division, through the ponencia of
Associate Justice Agnes Reyes-Carpio (concurred in by Associate Justice Jose
C. Reyes, Jr. and Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla) rendered a
decision granting Jimenez’ petition.11
However, on motion for reconsideration filed by the People, the CA reversedits
earlier ruling and issued anAmended Decision penned by Associate Justice Jose
Reyes.
The CA’s Amended Decision
The CA held that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering
Montero’s discharge to become a state witness because the prosecution had
complied with the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.12
First, Judge Docena acted in accordance with settled jurisprudence when he
ruled that there was absolute necessity for the testimony of Montero as no other
direct evidence other than his testimony was available. Additionally, since the
determination of the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure is highly factual in nature, Judge Docena did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in largely relying on the recommendation of
the prosecution to discharge Montero as a state witness.13
Furthermore, the CA agreed with Judge Docena that Montero is not the most
guilty among the accused because the principals by inducement are more guilty
than the principals by direct participation. To the CA, this finding is highly factual
in nature and it would not interfere with the trial court’s exercise of discretion on
factual issues in the absence of showing that the court had acted with grave
abuse of discretion.14
On Judge Docena’s ‘no inhibition’ order, the CA held that while the case does
not call for mandatory inhibition, it should still be raffled to another sala for trial
on the meritsto avoid any claim of bias and prejudice.15
The CA likewise dismissed the motion for the issuance of a show cause order
which Jimenez filed against Judge Docena.16
Both Jimenez and the People moved for partial reconsideration of the CA’s order
but these motions were all denied.17 The denials prompted both parties to file
with this Court the present consolidated petitions for review on certiorari.
The Present Petitions
I. G.R. No. 209195 (The Jimenez Petition)
Jimenez raises the following errors:
First, there is no necessity to discharge Montero as a state witness because: 1)
the voluntary sworn extrajudicial confessions of Montero are all in the possession
of the prosecution which they could readily present in court without discharging
Montero; and 2) there was unjust favoritism in the discharge of Montero because
all the other conspirators are equally knowledgeable of the crime.18
Second, contrary to the CA’s ruling, the judge, and not the prosecution, has the
ultimate discretion in ensuring that the requirements under Section 17, Rule 119
are complied with.19 Third, the cases the CA cited are factually different from the
present case. Chua v. CA20 should not apply as it deals with two accused, one
of whom was ordered discharged.21 Fourth, Montero’s testimony cannot be
substantially corroborated in its material points as the prosecution’s own
evidence contradicts his declarations.
These inconsistencies include: Montero’s statement that a "busal" was placed
inside the mouth of Ruby Rose; this statement is belied by the other prosecution
witness; Montero also never mentioned the presence of a packaging tape
wrapped around the head and neck of the recovered cadaver; in Montero’s
sinumpaang salaysay, he stated that Ruby Rose was killed by strangulation
using a "lubid" but the death certificate stated asphyxia by suffocation and not
by strangulation; the identification of the cadaver as Ruby Rose is likewise
questionable as there are differences in the height, and the dental and
odontological reports of Ruby Rose and the recovered cadaver.
Jimenez argued that these inconsistencies would require a thorough scrutiny;
hence, the immediate discharge of Montero as a state witness is suspicious. 22
Fifth, Montero appears to be the mostguilty. He was the architect who designed
and actively participated in all phases of the alleged crime.23
Jimenez further argued that there is no authority supporting the ruling that the
principals by inducement are more guilty than the principal by direct participation.
On the contrary, the Revised Penal Code imputes on the principal by direct
participation the heavier guilt; without the latter’s execution of the crime, the
principal byinducement cannot be made liable. Even if the principal by
inducement is acquitted, the principal by direct participation can still be held
liable and not vice-versa.24
Sixth, the discharge of Montero was irregular because Judge Docena failed to
conduct a prior hearing.25
Finally, Montero already executed a notice of withdrawal of consent and
testimony which was submitted to the CA.26
Comment of the People
The People argued that Jimenez is now estopped from raising the lack of hearing
as an issue since he raised this issue only after Judge Docena granted the
motion to discharge and not after Judge Almeyda denied the motion – an action
that was favorable to him.27
It also argued that Jimenez actively participated in the proceedings for Montero’s
discharge as the trial court received evidence for and against the discharge. In
this light, Judge Docena’s order granting or denying the motion for discharge is
in order, notwithstanding the lack of actual hearing.28
The People also agreed with the CA’s amended ruling that the requirements for
the discharge of anaccused as a state witness were complied with. 29 It added
that the availability of the extrajudicial statements in the prosecution’s
possession is not a ground to disqualify an accused from being a state witness. 30
It further maintained that the alleged contradictions between Montero’s
statements and other prosecution’s evidence are better resolved during trial and
are irrelevant tothe issues in the present case.31
For purposes of the present case, the material allegations of Montero on the
identity of the victim and the manner of her killing were substantially corroborated
by the presence of the recovered original steel casing, the drum containing a
cadaver, the place where it was found, and the cadaver’s apparel.32
The People observed that Montero had already testified on direct examination
on June 28, 2011 and October 25, 2011. He attested and affirmed his statements
in his affidavits dated May 18 and June 11, 2009; he narrated in his statements
the murder of Ruby Rose and Jimenez’ participation. 33
Reply of Jimenez
Jimenez reiterated his allegations in the comment. He added that Montero did
not identify or authenticate his sworn statements in support of the motion for his
discharge.34
According to Jimenez, the notice of withdrawal of consent and testimony of
Montero rendered his discharge as a state witness moot and academic. 35
II. G.R. No. 209215(The People’s Petition)
The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that the CA’s order
to re-raffle the case to another sala is not supported by Section 1, Rule 137 of
the Rules of Court, either under mandatory or voluntary inhibition.36
To disqualify a judge from hearing a case, bias and prejudice must be proven, in
the manner being done in cases of voluntary inhibition.37
Jurisprudence establishes, too, that affiliation does not necessarily translate to
bias.38 A judge’s non-favorable action against the defense is not also necessarily
indicative of bias and prejudice.39
Finally, the administrative case filed against Judge Docena is not a ground to
disqualify him from hearing the case.40
Comment of Jimenez
The option for voluntary inhibition does not give judges unlimited discretion to
decide whether or not they will desist from hearing a case. Jimenez enumerated
Judge Docena’s acts that allegedly constituted bias and prejudice:
First, Judge Docena granted the motion to discharge even though the legal
requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure were not factually and legally proven. He also relied on the
suggestions and information of the prosecutors thereby surrendering his duty to
ensure that the requirements for a discharge are duly complied with.
Second, in a previous case where his fraternity brother appeared as counsel,
Judge Docena inhibited himself from hearing the case. Thus, no reason exists
for him not to similarly act in the present case where Jimenez is his fraternity
brother and State Prosecutor Villanueva was his classmate.
Third, Judge Docena granted the prosecution’s motion for cancellation of the
September 29, 2011 hearing because the state prosecutor would be attending a
legal forum. This was improper since other prosecutors were available and other
prosecution witnesses could be presented. Fourth, Judge Docena has an
uncontrolled temper and unexplainable attitude. In Jimenez’ bail hearing, Judge
Docena immediately shouted at Jimenez’ counsel whenhe made a
mistake.41 The Issues
1) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Judge Docena did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to discharge
Montero as a state witness; and
2) Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the re-raffle of Criminal Case
No. 39225-MN toanother RTC branch for trial on the merits.
THE COURT’S RULING:
G.R. No. 209195
We agree with the CA’s ruling that Judge Docena did not gravely abuse his
discretion when he granted the motion to discharge Montero as a state witness.
The well-settled rule is that a petition for certiorariagainst a court which has
jurisdiction over a case will prosper only ifgrave abuse of discretion is clear and
patent. The burden is on the part of the petitioner to prove not merely reversible
error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the public respondent issuing the impugned order. Notably, mere
abuse of discretion is not enough; the abuse must be grave. Jurisprudence has
defined "grave abuse of discretion" as the capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.42
We agree with the CA that the prosecution has complied with the requisites
under Section 17,Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides that:
In the discharge of an accused inorder that he may be a state witness, the
following conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an
offense;
(2) The motion for discharge isfiled by the prosecution before it rests its
case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn
statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the
discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested; b) There is no other
directevidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially
corroborated in its material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not atany time been convicted of any
offense involving moral turpitude.
No issues have been raised with respect to conditions (1), (2), (4), and 5(e). The
parties dispute the compliance with conditions (3) and 5(a) to (d) as the issues
before us. We shall discuss these issues separately below.
Absolute necessity of the testimony of Montero
We see no merit in Jimenez’s allegation that no absolute necessity exists for
Montero’s testimony.
Absolute necessity exists for the testimony of an accused sought to be
discharged when he or she alone has knowledge of the crime. In more concrete
terms, necessity is not there when the testimony would simply corroborate or
otherwise strengthen the prosecution’s evidence.43 We do not agree with
Jimenez that the Court’s pronouncement in Chua v. CA et al.is inapplicable in
the present case simply because more than two accused are involved in the
present case. The requirement of absolute necessity for the testimony of a state
witness depends on the circumstances of each case regardless of the number
of the participating conspirators.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Perez et al.,44 the Court ordered the discharge
of the accused Roncesvalles, ruling that his testimony is absolutely necessary
to prove conspiracy with his other co-accused. The Court agreed with the
Solicitor General that considering the circumstances of the case and that the
other accused could not be compelled to testify, certain facts necessary for the
conviction of the accused would not come to light unless the accused
Roncesvalles was allowed to testify for the State. Specifically, unless accused
Roncesvalles was allowed to testify for the government, there would be no other
direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense charged,
particularly on the role of his co-accused in the preparation and completion of
the falsified loan application and its supporting papers.
Similarly in People v. Court of Appeals and Tan,45 the Court reinstated the ruling
of the trial court which ordered the discharge of accused Ngo Sin from among
the five accused. The record justified his discharge as a state witness
considering the absolutenecessity of his testimony to prove that the accused
Luciano Tan had planned and financed the theft.
In the present case, not one ofthe accused-conspirators, except Montero, was
willing to testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose and their participation in her
killing. Hence, the CA was correct in ruling that Judge Docena acted properly
and in accordance with jurisprudence in ruling that there was absolute necessity
for the testimony of Montero. He alone is available to provide directevidence of
the crime.
That the prosecution could use the voluntary statements of Montero without his
discharge as a state witness is not an important and relevant consideration. To
the prosecution belongs the control of its case and this Court cannot dictate on
its choice in the discharge of a state witness, save only when the legal
requirements have not been complied with.
The prosecution’s right to prosecute gives it "a wide range of discretion — the
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends
on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors." Under
Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court is
given the power to discharge a state witness only after it has already acquired
jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.46
Montero’s testimony can be substantially corroborated
We also do not find merit in Jimenez’ argument that Montero’s testimony cannot
be substantially corroborated in its material points and is even contradicted by
the physical evidence of the crime. As the trial court properly found, the evidence
consisting of the steel casing where the cadaver was found; the drum containing
the cadaver which the prosecution successfully identified (and which even the
acting Judge Almeyda believed) to be Ruby Rose; the spot in the sea that
Montero pointed to (where the cadaver was retrieved); the apparel worn by the
victim when she was killed as well as her burned personal effects, all partly
corroborate some of the material points in the sworn statements of Montero.47
With these as bases, Judge Docena’s ruling that Montero’s testimony found
substantial corroboration cannot becharacterized as grave abuse of discretion.
Jimenez points to the discrepancies in Montero’s statements and the physical
evidence, such as the absence of "busal"in the mouth of the retrieved cadaver;
his failure to mention that they used packaging tape wrapped around the head
down to the neck of the victim; and his declaration that the victim was killed
through strangulation using a rope (lubid).
However, the corroborated statements of Montero discussed above are far more
material than the inconsistencies pointed outby Jimenez, at least for purposes
of the motion to discharge.
The alleged discrepancies in the physical evidence, particularly on the height
and dental records of Ruby Rose, are matters that should properly be dealt with
during the trial proper.
We emphasize at this point that to resolve a motion to discharge under Section
17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules only require
that that the testimony ofthe accused sought to be discharged be substantially
corroborated in its material points, not on all points.
This rule is based on jurisprudential line that in resolving a motion to discharge
under Section 17, Rule 119, a trial judge cannot be expected or required, at the
start of the trial, to inform himself with absolute certainty of everything that may
develop in the course of the trial with respect to the guilty participation of the
accused. If that were practicable or possible, there would be little need for the
formality of a trial.48
Montero is not the most guilty
We also do not agree with Jimenez that the CA erred in finding that Montero is
not the most guilty.
By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms
of participation in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean
the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the
same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have lesser
orthe least guilt taking into account his degree of participation in the commission
of the offense.49
What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would be set free while
his co-accused who are less guilty in terms of participation would be penalized. 50
Before dwelling on the parties’ substantive arguments, we find it necessary to
first correct the rulings of the CA that are not exactly correct.
Contrary to the CA’s findings, a principal by inducement is not automatically the
most guilty in a conspiracy. The decision of the Court in People v. Baharan51 did
not involve the resolution of a motion to discharge an accused to become a state
witness. Instead, the pronouncement of the Court related to the culpability of a
principal by inducement whose coinducement act was the determining cause for
the commission of the crime.
Thus viewed, Baharan cannot be the basis of a peremptory pronouncement that
a principal by inducement is more guilty than the principal by direct participation.
In Chua v. People,52 which involved a motion to discharge an accused, the Court
declared that if one induces another to commit a crime, the influence is the
determining cause of the crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not
have been committed; it is the inducer who sets into motion the execution of the
criminal act.
To place the Chua ruling in proper perspective, the Court considered the
principal by inducement as the most guilty based on the specific acts done by
the two accused and bearing in mind the elements constitutive of the crime of
falsification of private documents where the element of "damage" arose through
the principal by inducement’s encashment of the falsified check. This led the
Court to declare that the principal by inducement is the "most guilty" (or properly,
the more guilty) between the two accused.
Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to discharge an accused as
a state witness,what are controlling are the specific acts of the accused in
relation to the crime committed.
We cannot also agree with Jimenez’ argument that a principal by direct
participation is more guilty than the principal by inducement as the Revised
Penal Code penalizes the principal by inducement only when the principal by
direct participation has executed the crime.
We note that the severity of the penalty imposed is part of the substantive
criminal law which should not be equated with the procedural rule on the
discharge of the particeps criminis. The procedural remedy of the discharge of
an accused is based on other considerations, such as the need for giving
immunity to one of several accused in order that not all shall escape, and the
judicial experience that the candid admission of an accused regarding his
participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully.53
On the substantive issues of the present case, we affirm the CA ruling that no
grave abuse of discretion transpired when Judge Docena ruled that Montero is
not the most guilty.
We draw attention to the requirement that a state witness does not need to be
found to be the least guilty; he or she should not only "appear to be the most
guilty."54
From the evidence submitted by the prosecution in support of its motion to
discharge Montero, it appears that while Montero was part of the planning,
preparation, and execution stage as most of his co-accused had been, he had
no direct participation inthe actual killing of Ruby Rose. While Lope allegedly
assigned to him the execution of the killing, the records do not indicate that he
had active participation in hatching the plan to kill Ruby Rose, which allegedly
came from accused Lope and Jimenez, and in the actual killing of Ruby Rose
which was executed by accused Lennard.55 Montero’s participation was limited
to providing the steel box where the drum containing the victim’s body was
placed, welding the steel box to seal the cadaver inside, operating the skip or
tug boat, and, together with his co-accused, dropping the steelbox containing the
cadaver into the sea.
At any rate, the discharge of anaccused to be utilized as a state witness because
he does not appear to bethe most guilty is highly factual in nature as it largely
depends on the appreciation of who had the most participation in the commission
of the crime. The appellate courts do not interfere in the discretionary judgment
ofthe trial court on this factual issue except when grave abuse ofdiscretion
intervenes.56
In light of these considerations, we affirm the ruling of the CA that Judge Docena
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that Montero is not the most
guilty.
The discharge of Montero as a state witness was procedurally sound
We agree with the People that Jimenez is estopped from raising the issue of lack
of hearing prior to the discharge of Montero asa state witness. Jimenez did not
raise this issue when Acting Judge Almeyda denied the motion to discharge.
This denial, of course, was favorable toJimenez. If he found no reason to
complain then, why should we entertain his hearingrelated complaint now?
The People even supported its argument that Jimenez actively participated in
the proceedings of the motion to discharge such as his filing of a 20-page
opposition to the motion; filing a reply to the People’s comment; submitting his
memorandum of authorities on the qualification of Montero as state witness; and
filing a consolidated opposition on the People’s and Montero’s motion for
reconsideration of Judge Almeyda’s order.57
In these lights, Jimenez cannot impute grave abuse of discretion on Judge
Docena for not conducting a hearing prior to his grant of the motion to discharge.
In People v. CA and Pring,58 the Court ruled that with both litigants able to
present their sides,the lack of actual hearing is not sufficiently fatal to undermine
the court's ability to determine whether the conditions prescribed for the
discharge ofan accused as a state witness have been satisfied. Contrary to
Jimenez’ argument, the Pringruling is applicable in the present case. In Pring,
the sworn statements of the accused sought to be discharged (Nonilo Arile),
together with the prosecution’s other evidence, were already in the possession
of the court and had been challenged by the respondent in his Opposition to
Discharge Nonilo Arile and in his Petition for Bail. The issue in that case was the
propriety of the trial court’s resolution of the motion to discharge Nonilo Arile
without conducting a hearing pursuant Section 9, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure (now Section 17, Rule 119 ofthe Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure).
With Jimenez’ active participation in the proceeding for the motion to discharge
as outlined above, the ruling of the Court in Pringshould squarely apply.
Montero’s Notice of Withdrawal of Consent is not material in the resolution of the
present case
We find no merit in Jimenez’ argument that Montero’s submission of his notice
of withdrawal of consent and testimony of Manuel dated February 26, 2013
rendered the present case moot, since the Court cannot consider this document
in this petition.
It must be recalled that the present case involves an appellate review of the CA’s
decision which found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Docena
in granting the motion to discharge.
Under the present recourse now before this Court, we cannot rule on the notice
of withdrawal and consider it in ruling on the absence or presence of grave abuse
of discretion in the issuance of the assailed orders. The present case is not the
proper venue for the determination of the value of the notice.
This conclusion is all the more strengthened by the fact that Montero already
testified on direct examination on June 28, 2011 and October 25, 2011. He
attested and affirmed his statements in his affidavits dated May 18 and June 11,
2009; he not only narrated the grisly murder of Ruby Rose, but also revealed
Jimenez’ participation in the murder.
With this development, the notice may partake of the nature of a recantation,
which is usually taken ex parte and is considered inferior to the testimony given
in open court. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before
a court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later changed his/her
mind.59
In sum on this point, the appreciation of the notice of withdrawal properly belongs
to the trial court.
Interplay between the judge and prosecutor in the motion to discharge an
accused to become a state witness
As a last point, we find it necessary to clarify the roles of the prosecution and the
trial court judge in the resolution of a motion to discharge an accused as a state
witness.This need arises from what appears to us to be a haphazard use of the
statement that the trial court judge must rely in large part on the prosecution’s
suggestion in the resolution of a motion to discharge.
In the present case, the CA cited Quarto v. Marcelo60 in ruling that the trial court
must rely in large part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the
prosecuting officer, thus:
A trial judge cannot be expected orrequired to inform himself with absolute
certainty at the very outset of the trial as to everything which may be developed
in the course of the trial in regard to the guilty participation of the accused in the
commission of the crime charged in the complaint. If that were practicable or
possible there would be little need for the formality of a trial. He must rely inlarge
part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the prosecuting
officer in coming to his conclusions as to the "necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested"; asto the availability or non-availability
of other direct or corroborative evidence; as to which of the accused is "most
guilty," and the like.
We deem it important to place this ruling in its proper context lest we create the
wrong impression that the trial court is a mere "rubber stamp" of the prosecution,
in the manner that Jimenez now argues.
In Quarto, we emphasized that it is still the trial court that determines whether
the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-witness’ qualifications
to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality
a symbiotic one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the
administration of justice, largely exercises its prerogative based on the
prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.61
Thus, we ruled in People v. Pring62 that in requiring a hearing in support of the
discharge, the essential objective of the law is for the court to receive evidence
for or against the discharge, which evidence shall serve as the court’s tangible
and concrete basis – independently of the fiscal's or prosecution's persuasions
– in granting or denying the motion for discharge. We emphasize, in saying this,
that actual hearing is not required provided that the parties have both presented
their sides on the merits of the motion.1âwphi1
We likewise do not agree with Jimenez that Quartoshould not apply to the
present case, since the principles laid down in that case similarly operate in the
present case, specifically, on issue of the procedural processes required in the
discharge of the accused as a state witness.
G.R. No. 209215
We find the People’s petition meritorious.
We note at the outset that the CA did not provide factual or legal support when
it ordered the inhibition ofJudge Docena. Additionally, we do not find Jimenez’
arguments sufficiently persuasive.
The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 137 does not give judges the
unlimited discretion to decide whether or not to desist from hearing a case. The
inhibition must be for just and valid causes. The mere imputation of bias or
partiality is likewise not enough ground for their inhibition, especially when the
charge is without basis.63
It is well-established that inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a
schoolmate or classmate appears before the judge as counsel for one of the
parties. A judge, too, is not expected to automatically inhibit himself from acting
in a case involving a member of his fraternity, such as Jimenez in the present
case.64
In the absence of clear and convincing evidenceto prove the charge of bias and
prejudice, a judge’s ruling not to inhibit oneself should be allowed to stand. 65
In attributing bias and prejudice to Judge Docena, Jimenez must prove that the
judge acted or conducted himself in a manner clearly indicative of arbitrariness
or prejudice soas to defeat the attributes of the cold neutrality that an impartial
judge must possess.Unjustified assumptions and mere misgivings that the judge
acted with prejudice, passion, pride and pettiness in the performance of his
functions cannot overcome the presumption that a judge shall decide on the
merits of a case with an unclouded vision of its facts.66
In the present case, Jimenez’ allegation of bias and prejudice is negated by the
CA finding in its amended decision, as affirmed by this Court, that Judge Docena
did not gravely abuse his discretion in granting the motion to discharge. We G.R. No. 167710 June 5, 2009
support this conclusion as the cancellation of the September 29, 2011 hearing
is not clearly indicative of bias and prejudice. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
On the allegation that Judge Docena's uncontrollable temper and unexplainable JOVEN DE GRANO, ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO and
attitude should be considered as a factor, we note that the allegations and ESTANISLAO LACABA,Respondents.
perceptions of bias from the mere tenor and language of a judge is insufficient
to show prejudgment. Allowing inhibition for these reasons would open the DECISION
floodgates to abuse. Unless there is concrete proof that a judge has a personal
interest in the proceedings, and that his bias stems from an extra-judicial source, PERALTA, J.:
the Court would uphold the presumption that a magistrate shall impartially decide
the merits of a case.67 This is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions 1 dated January 25, 2005 and
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition in G.R. No. 209195 and affirm the CA's April 5, 2005, issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160.
amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 insofar as it found no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of Judge Docena in granting the People's motion to The antecedents are as follows:
discharge Montero as a state witness.
On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder committed against Emmanuel
We GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 209215 and modify the CA's amended Mendoza was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan,
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 121167 in accordance with our ruling that Judge Batangas, against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando), and
Docena's denial of the motion for inhibition was proper. Estanislao Lacaba (Estanislao), together with their co-accused Leonides
Landicho (Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil
SO ORDERED. (Leonardo), who were at-large.2 It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2730, the
pertinent portion of which reads:

That on April 21, 1991, between 9:00 o’clock and 10:00 o’clock in the evening,
in Barangay Balakilong, [M]unicipality of Laurel, [P]rovince of Batangas, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, all the above named accused,
conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, motivated by common
design and intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
and by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, shoot EMMANUEL
MENDOZA with firearms, inflicting upon him eight gunshot wounds and causing
his death thereby, thus committing the crime of MURDER to the damage and
prejudice of his heirs in the amount as the Honorable Court shall determine. 3

Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty" to the crime
as charged; while their co-accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained
at-large. Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the
prosecution’s evidence was not strong.4

Meanwhile, considering that one of the accused was the incumbent Mayor of
Laurel, Batangas at the time when the crime was committed, Senior State
Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios moved that the venue be transferred from the
RTC, Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas to any RTC in Manila. Consequently, the
case was transferred to the RTC Manila for re-raffling amongst its Branches. The
case was re-docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-129988 and was initially re-
raffled to Branches 6, 9, and 11 before being finally raffled to Branch 27, RTC,
Manila.5
Before transferring the case to the RTC, Branch 27, Manila, the trial court
deferred the resolution of respondents’ motion for bail and allowed the
prosecution to present evidence. Thereafter, the hearing of the application for
bail ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Teresita and Dr. Leonardo
Salvador. After finding that the prosecution’s evidence to prove treachery and
evident premeditation was not strong, the RTC, Branch 11, Manila, granted
respondents’ motion for bail. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was
denied.6
The prosecution then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 41110, which was denied. Aggrieved, they sought recourse before
this Court in G.R. No. 129604. In a Resolution dated July 12, 1999, this Court
granted the petition and set aside the decision of the CA together with the Order
of the RTC granting bail to the respondents. The RTC was also ordered to
immediately issue a warrant of arrest against the accused. The resolution was
also qualified to be immediately executory. 7 As a result, Estanislao was re-
arrested, but Joven and Armando were not.8
However, upon respondents’ motion for reconsideration, this Court, in a
Resolution dated September 4, 2001, resolved to remand the case to the RTC.
We noted that, in view of the transmittal of the records of the case to this Court
in connection with the petition, the trial court deferred the rendition of its decision.
Consequently, the case was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings,
including the rendition of its decision on the merits.
After the presentation of the parties’ respective sets of evidence, the RTC
rendered a Decision9 dated April 25, 2002, finding several accused guilty of the
offense as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, CONSIDERING ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the
accused JOVEN DE GRANO, ARMANDO DE GRANO, DOMINGO LANDICHO
and ESTANISLAO LACABA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER, qualified by treachery, and there being no modifying circumstance
attendant, hereby sentences them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua,
and to indemnify the heirs of Emmanuel Mendoza the sum of P50,000.00 and to
pay the costs.
The case as against accused Leonides Landicho and Leonardo Genil is hereby
sent to the files or archived cases to be revived as soon as said accused are
apprehended.
Let alias warrants of arrest be issued against accused Leonardo Genil and
Leonides Landicho.
Only Estanislao was present at the promulgation despite due notice to the other
respondents.
Respondents, thru counsel, then filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated
May 8, 2002, praying that the Decision dated April 25, 2002 be reconsidered and
set aside and a new one be entered acquitting them based on the following
grounds, to wit:
1. The Honorable Court erred in basing the decision of conviction of all
accused solely on the biased, uncorroborated and baseless testimony
of Teresita Duran, the common-law wife of the victim;
2. The Honorable Court erred in not giving exculpatory weight to the
evidence adduced by the defense, which was amply corroborated on
material points;
3. The Honorable Court erred in not finding that the failure of the
prosecution to present rebuttal evidence renders the position of the
defense unrebutted;
4. The Honorable Court erred in adopting conditional or preliminary
finding of treachery of the Supreme Court in its Resolution dated July
12, 1999; and
5. The Honorable Court erred in rendering a verdict [sic] of conviction
despite the fact that the guilt of all the accused were not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.10
In its Opposition, the prosecution pointed out that while the accused jointly
moved for the reconsideration of the decision, all of them, except Estanislao,
were at-large. Having opted to become fugitives and be beyond the judicial
ambit, they lost their right to file such motion for reconsideration and to ask for
whatever relief from the court.11
Acting on respondents’ motion for reconsideration, the RTC issued an
Order12 dated April 15, 2004 modifying its earlier decision by acquitting Joven
and Armando, and downgrading the conviction of Domingo and Estanislao from
murder to homicide. The decretal portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court modifies its
decision and finds accused DOMINGO LANDICHO and ESTANISLAO LACABA,
"GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the crime of Homicide, and
in default of any modifying circumstance, sentences them to an indeterminate
prison term of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as minimum,
to TWELVE YEARS [and] ONE DAY of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. Said
accused shall be credited with the full period of their preventive imprisonment
pursuant to B.P. Blg. 85.1avvphi1
Accused ARMANDO DE GRANO and JOVEN DE GRANO are hereby
ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable doubt. They are likewise declared free
of any civil liability.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the Decision dated April 25, 2002
stands.
SO ORDERED.13
Estanislao filed a Notice of Appeal, while the prosecution sought reconsideration
of the Order arguing that:
1. There was absolutely no basis for this Court to have taken cognizance
of the "Joint Motion for Reconsideration" dated May 8, 2002, citing Sec.
6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
2. The testimony of Teresita Duran deserves credence. The delay in the
taking of Ms. Duran’s written statement of the events she witnessed is
understandable considering that Joven de Grano was the mayor of the
municipality where the crime was committed and that another accused,
Estanislao Lacaba, was a policeman in the same municipality.
3. The crime committed is murder.
4. Accused Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano participated in the
conspiracy.
On September 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order 14 denying the motion and
giving due course to Estanislao’s notice of appeal.
Petitioner, thru Assistant City Prosecutor Cesar Glorioso of the Office of the
Manila City Prosecutor, with the assistance of private prosecutor Atty. Michael
E. David, filed a Petition15 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
before the CA arguing that:
(a) the private respondents, having deliberately evaded arrest after
being denied bail and deliberately failing to attend the promulgation of
the Decision despite due notice, lost the right to move for
reconsideration of their conviction; and
(b) the grounds relied upon by respondent RTC in modifying its Decision
are utterly erroneous.16
Petitioner alleged that it had no other plain, adequate, and speedy remedy,
considering that the State could not appeal a judgment of acquittal. However, by
way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a showing by
the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not only
reversible errors of judgment, but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thus rendering the
assailed judgment void. Consequently, the accused cannot be considered at risk
of double jeopardy.17
Respondent De Grano filed a Motion to Dismiss,18 arguing that the verification
and certification portion of the petition was flawed, since it was signed only by
counsel and not by the aggrieved party. Also, the petition did not contain the
conformity of the Solicitor General.19
On January 31, 2005, petitioner, through the private prosecutor, filed an
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.20Petitioner explained that, for lack of material
time, it failed to secure the conformity of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
when it filed the petition, but it would nevertheless obtain it. A day after filing the
petition, the private prosecutor sought the OSG’s conformity in a letter 21 dated
January 12, 2005. The OSG, in turn, informed the private prosecutor that rather
than affixing its belated conformity, it would rather await the initial resolution of
the CA.22 Also, so as not to preempt the action of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) on the case, the OSG instructed the private prosecutor to secure the
necessary endorsement from the DOJ for it to pursue the case. Anent the
verification and certification of the petition having been signed by the private
prosecutor, petitioner explained that private complainant Teresita was in fear for
her life as a result of the acquittal of former Mayor Joven de Grano, but she was
willing to certify the petition should she be given ample time to travel to Manila.23
However, in a Resolution24 dated January 25, 2005, which was received by the
petitioner on the same day it filed its Opposition or on January 31, 2005, the
petition was dismissed outright by the CA on the grounds that it was not filed by
the OSG and that the assailed Orders were only photocopies and not certified
true copies. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is hereby OUTRIGHTLY
DISMISSED.
Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 25 In addition to the
justifications it raised in its earlier Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner
argued that the petition was not only signed by the private prosecutor, it was also
signed by the prosecutor who represented the petitioner in the criminal
proceedings before the trial court. Petitioner also maintains that the certified true
copies of the assailed Orders were accidentally attached to its file copy instead
of the one it submitted. To rectify the mistake, it attached the certified true copies
of the assailed Orders.26 This was opposed by the respondents in their
Comment/Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.27lawphi1
Meanwhile, in its 1st Indorsement28 dated March 15, 2005, DOJ Secretary Raul
M. Gonzalez, endorsed the petition filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor, with
the assistance of the private prosecutor, to the Solicitor General for his
conformity.
On April 5, 2005, the CA issued a Resolution29 denying the motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.
In denying the motion, the CA opined that the rule on double jeopardy prohibits
the state from appealing or filing a petition for review of a judgment of acquittal
that was based on the merits of the case. If there is an acquittal, an appeal
therefrom, if it will not put the accused in double jeopardy, on the criminal aspect,
may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. It added that
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court may be
filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State
and the private offended party or complainant. Moreover, the records reveal that
the petition was not filed in the name of the offended party; and worse, the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition was
signed not by the private offended party, but by her counsel. Notwithstanding the
efforts exerted by the petitioner to secure the confirmation of the OSG and the
endorsement of the DOJ, there is no showing of any subsequent participation of
the OSG in the case.
Hence, the petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
FOR NOT HAVING BEEN FILED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL NOR IN THE NAME OF THE OFFENDED PARTY.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THE VERIFICATION AND
CERTIFICATION ATTACHED TO THE PETITION WAS SIGNED BY THE
PRIVATE COUNSEL AND NOT BY THE OFFENDED PARTY.30
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, argues that, except for Estanislao, none
of the respondents appeared at the promulgation of the Decision. Neither did
they surrender after promulgation of the judgment of conviction, nor filed a
motion for leave to avail themselves of the judicial remedies against the decision,
stating the reasons for their absence. The trial court thus had no authority to take
cognizance of the joint motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents as
stated in Section 6, Rule 120 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
As such, the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Having been issued without jurisdiction, the Order dated
April 15, 2004 is void. Consequently, no double jeopardy attached to such void
Order. The CA, therefore, committed reversible error when it dismissed the
petition for certiorari on the ground of double jeopardy.31
Petitioner also contends that, with the endorsement of the DOJ and the letter of
the OSG manifesting its intention to pursue the petition, the OSG had in fact
conformed to the filing of the petition and agreed to pursue the same. Had the
CA given the OSG ample time to file the necessary pleading, the petition would
not have been dismissed for the reason that it was filed by the said office.32
With respect to the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, petitioner
invokes a liberal application of the Rules for private complainant’s failure to
personally sign it. Petitioner maintains that out of extreme fear arising from the
unexpected acquittal of Joven, private complainant was reluctant to travel to
Manila. After she was taken out of the witness protection program, she took
refuge in the Visayas and she was there at the time her signature was required.
Since the period for filing the petition for certiorari was about to lapse, and it
could not be filed without the verification and certification of non-forum shopping,
the private prosecutor was left with no option but so sign it, instead of allowing
the deadline to pass without filing the petition.33
Moreover, petitioner maintains that the OSG has the authority to sign the
verification and certification of the present petition, because the real party-in-
interest is the OSG itself as the representative of the State.34
On their part, respondents contend that the petition for certiorari questioning the
order of acquittal is not allowed and is contrary to the principle of double
jeopardy. Respondents argue that, contrary to the OSG’s contention,
respondents Joven and Domingo’s absence during the promulgation of the
Decision dated April 25, 2002 did not deprive the trial court of its authority to
resolve their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, considering that one of the
accused, Estanislao, was present during the promulgation.35
Joven, Armando, and Domingo maintain that while they were not present during
the promulgation of the RTC Decision, Estanislao, who was under police
custody, attended the promulgation of the said Decision. Thus, when they filed
their Joint Motion for Reconsideration, which included that of Estanislao, the
RTC was not deprived of its authority to resolve the joint motion.36
Respondents insist that the CA properly dismissed the petition for certiorari, as
it was not instituted by the OSG on behalf of the People of the Philippines, and
that the verification and certification portion thereof was not signed by private
complainant Teresita.37
Respondents also argue that the petition for certiorari before this Court should
be dismissed, since the verification and certification thereof were signed by a
solicitor of the OSG, not private complainant.
The petition is meritorious.
Before considering the merits of the petition, we will first address the technical
objections raised by respondents.
As regards the issue of the signatory of the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping, a liberal application of the Rules should be applied to the
present case.
The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the
allegations in the petition have been made in good faith; or are true and correct,
not merely speculative. This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form
of pleadings, and noncompliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally
defective.38 Truly, verification is only a formal, not a jurisdictional, requirement.
Hence, it was sufficient that the private prosecutor signed the verification.
With respect to the certification of non-forum shopping, it has been held that the
certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant shall not be
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practice is
detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.39 However, this Court has relaxed,
under justifiable circumstances, the rule requiring the submission of such
certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. 40 Not
being jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance.
In Donato v. Court of Appeals41 and Wee v. Galvez,42 the Court noted that the
petitioners were already in the United States; thus, the signing of the certification
by their authorized representatives was deemed sufficient compliance with the
Rules. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals,43 the Court upheld substantial justice and
ruled that the failure of the parties to sign the certification may be overlooked, as
the parties’ case was meritorious. In Torres v. Specialized Packaging and
Development Corporation,44 the Court also found, among other reasons, that the
extreme difficulty to secure all the required signatures and the apparent merits
of the substantive aspects of the case constitute compelling reasons for allowing
the petition.
In Ortiz v. Court of Appeals45 and similar rulings, the following has always been
pointed out:
The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires
personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the Court’s
consideration, petitioners here must show reasonable cause for failure to
personally sign the certification. The petitioners must convince the court that the
outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.
Thus, petitioners need only show that there was reasonable cause for the failure
to sign the certification against forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal
of the petition would defeat the administration of justice.46
We find that the particular circumstances of this case advance valid reasons for
private complainant’s failure to sign the certification. As pointed out in the
petition, it was out of extreme fear that private complainant failed to personally
sign the certification. It is to be noted that when Armando and Joven were
acquitted, Teresita was already out of the witness protection program and was
in hiding in the Visayas. As such, she could not travel to Manila to personally
sign the petition. Moreover, as maintained by the petitioner, since the period for
filing the petition for certiorari was about to lapse, the private prosecutor was left
with no option but to sign the verification and certification, instead of allowing the
period to file the petition to pass without it being filed. A relaxation of the
procedural rules, considering the particular circumstances, is justified. The
requirement was thus substantially complied with.
As summarized in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals,47 when a
strict and literal application of the rules on non-forum shopping and verification
would result in a patent denial of substantial justice, they may be liberally
construed. An unforgiving application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules will
not be given premium if it would impede rather than serve the best interests of
justice in the light of the prevailing circumstances in the case under
consideration.
We reiterate our holding in City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella,48 that
the signature of the Solicitor General on the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping in a petition before the CA or with this Court is substantial
compliance with the requirement under the Rules, considering that the OSG is
the legal representative of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
its agencies and instrumentalities; more so, in a criminal case where the People
or the State is the real party-in-interest and is the aggrieved party.49
Also, respondents’ contention that there is no showing of any subsequent
participation of the OSG in the petition before the CA does not hold water. In the
letter dated January 18, 2004, the OSG instructed the private prosecutor to
secure the necessary endorsement from the DOJ for it to pursue the case. In its
1st Indorsement dated March 15, 2005, DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez,
endorsed the petition to the Solicitor General for his conformity. When the CA
denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for its outright dismissal of the
petition, the OSG filed motions50for extension of time to file the present petition.
Moreover, the OSG filed a Comment51 on respondents’ Motion for
Reconsideration.52 Thus, any doubt regarding the endorsement, conformity, and
participation of the OSG in the petitions is dispelled.
Now on the substantive aspect.
A peculiar situation exists in the instant case. Petitioner has sought recourse
before the CA, via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, from an Order of the
trial court drastically modifying its earlier findings convicting the respondents of
the crime of murder, by acquitting Joven and Armando, and downgrading the
convictions of their co-accused from murder to homicide; this, notwithstanding
that all the accused, except Estanislao Lacaba, failed to personally appear at the
promulgation of the Decision despite due notice thereof.
Petitioner contends that its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with the CA was the proper remedy, since the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it entertained the
Joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Armando and Joven despite the
fact that they had not regained their standing in court.
Petitioner’s recourse to the CA was correct.
A writ of certiorari is warranted when (1) any tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (2) there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 53 An act of a
court or tribunal may be considered as grave abuse of discretion when the same
was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner because of passion or hostility.54
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed
in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but only upon a
clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused,
committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or to a denial of due
process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.55 In which event, the
accused cannot be considered at risk of double jeopardy — the revered
constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of answering
twice for the same offense.
Double jeopardy has the following essential elements: (1) the accused is
charged under a complaint or an information sufficient in form and substance to
sustain a conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been
arraigned and he has pleaded; and (4) he is convicted or acquitted, or the case
is dismissed without his express consent.56
Although this Court does not absolutely preclude the availment of the remedy
of certiorari to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner must clearly and
convincingly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave and so severe as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice.57
Under English common law, exceptions to the pleas of prior conviction or
acquittal existed where the trial court lacked jurisdiction, the theory being that a
defendant before such a court was not actually placed in jeopardy.58Hence, any
acquittal or conviction before a court having no jurisdiction would not violate the
principle of double jeopardy since it failed to attach in the first place.
Section 14(2),59 Article III of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia,
allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not at certain stages of the
proceedings, to wit: (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt;
(b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the
promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case, the
accused may appear by counsel or representative. At such stages of the
proceedings, his presence is required and cannot be waived. 60
Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Rules
applicable at the time the Decision was promulgated, provides:
Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. –The judgment is promulgated by reading
it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was
rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge
is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by
the clerk of court.
If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment
may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having
jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court
which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have
authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending
appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application
for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court.
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused, personally or through
his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the
promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he
jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last
known address.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the
judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known
address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was
without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules
against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15)days
from promulgation of judgment however, the accused may surrender and file a
motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons
for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence
was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within
fifteen (15) days from notice.61
Thus, the accused who failed to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the
remedies available in the Rules against the judgment. However, within 15 days
from promulgation of judgment, the accused may surrender and file a motion for
leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state in his motion the reasons
for his absence at the scheduled promulgation, and if he proves that his absence
was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within
15 days from notice.62
When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao
Lacaba was present. Subsequently thereafter, without surrendering and
explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined
Estanislao in their Joint Motion for Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the
Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were
at large, it also took cognizance of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for
Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who were at large. It should
have considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely
filed by Estanislao. Being at large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their
standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or
escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless
he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have
waived any right to seek relief from the court.63
Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy
because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without
jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal
contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it
cannot be the source of an acquittal.64
However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no reversible error
when it entertained the Motion for Reconsideration. He was in custody and was
present at the promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost
jurisdiction over his person. Consequently, the RTC’s ruling downgrading his
conviction from murder to homicide stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone,
the proscription against double jeopardy applies.
Factual matters cannot be inquired into by this Court in a certiorari proceeding.
We can no longer be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and
analyze, assess and weigh them again to ascertain if the trial court was correct
in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the
other.65 The sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of
jurisdiction, including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, and does not include a review of the RTC’s evaluation of the
evidence and the factual findings based thereon.66
True, were it not for the procedural lapses of the RTC and its blatant disregard
of the Rules, the finality of respondents’ acquittal and their co-accused’s
conviction of homicide instead of murder would have been barred by the rule on
double jeopardy.
We may tolerate an erroneous acquittal borne from an attempt to protect the
innocent or from an attempt to uphold the accused’s treasured right to a fair trial,
but when these concerns are not evident, an erroneous acquittal is a source of
substantial dismay and warrants this Court’s corrective action via a special writ
of error.
Moreover, although the CA dismissed the appeal filed before it, the RTC Judge
cannot hide behind such fact considering that the dismissal of the appeal was
not based on the validity of the assailed Order of the RTC, but was based on
technical rules and the rule against double jeopardy.
It is to be stressed that judges are dutybound to have more than a cursory
acquaintance with laws and jurisprudence. Failure to follow basic legal
commands constitutes gross ignorance of the law from which no one may be
excused, not even a judge.67 The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that "a
judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence."68 It
bears stressing that competence is one of the marks of a good judge. When a
judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the Rules, he erodes the public’s
confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law.
Having accepted the exalted position of a judge, he/she owes the public and the
court the duty to be proficient in the law.69
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 25,
2005 and April 5, 2005, issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88160,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The pertinent portions of the Order dated April
15, 2004 issued by the Regional Trial Court, convicting Domingo Landicho of the
crime of Homicide and acquitting Armando de Grano and Joven de Grano, are
ANNULLED and DELETED. In all other aspects, the Order stands.
To the extent herein altered or modified, the pertinent portions of the Decision
dated April 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court are REINSTATED.
The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to INVESTIGATE Judge
Teresa P. Soriaso for possible violation/s of the law and/or the Code of Judicial
Conduct in issuing the Order dated April 15, 2004 in Criminal Case No. 93-
129988.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015
JOCELYN ASISTIO Y CONSINO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND MONICA NEALIGA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated August 31, 2011 and its Resolution2 dated
January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads: chan roble svirtual lawlib rary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Orders dated 14 October 2008
and 12 February 2009 of Branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila, in Criminal
Case No. 01-197750, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let
the records of this case be REMANDED to Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, for further appropriate proceedings.
SO ORDERED.3 cralawlawlibra ry
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section 46 of
the Cooperative Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938).4 The
accusatory portion of the Information filed against her reads: chanrob lesvi rtua llawli bra ry
That on or about July 27, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, being then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, and as such, have a
complete control and exclusively manage the entire business of A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously acquires, in violation of her duty as such and
the confidence reposed on her, personal interest or equity adverse to A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative by then and there
entering into a contract with Coca Cola Products at A. Mabini Elementary School
Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative in her own personal capacity when in truth
and in fact as the said accused fully well knew, the sale of Coca-Cola products at
A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative should have
accrued to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative to
the damage and prejudice of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-
Purpose Cooperative.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5 cralawlawlib rary
Upon her arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty." Trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution sought to prove that petitioner, then Chairperson of the A.
Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, had entered into
an exclusive dealership agreement with Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.,
(Coca Cola) for the sale of softdrink products at the same school. By virtue of a
Memorandum of Agreement between the school and the Cooperative, Dr. Nora T.
Salamanca, the school principal, directed petitioner to submit her financial
reports during her tenure as Chairperson. Instead, petitioner claimed that the
principal had no business and authority to require her to produce financial
statements, and that the said reports had been posted on the school bulletin
board.
The school principal then created an audit committee to look into the financial
reports of the Cooperative. The committee was composed of Aurora Catabona
(Chairperson), Monica Nealiga (member), with Noemi Olazo (Chairperson-
auditor) and Sylvia Apostol (auditor), who later executed their respective
affidavits in support of the charge against petitioner. Based on the documents
obtained from Coca-Cola, including the records of actual deliveries and sales, and
the financial statements prepared by petitioner, the audit committee found that
petitioner defrauded the Cooperative and its members for three (3) years in the
following amounts: School Year (S.Y.) 1998-1999 - P54,008.00; S.Y. 1999-2000
- P40,503.00; and S.Y. 2000-2001 - P8,945.00. Despite requests for her to
return to the Cooperative the amounts she had allegedly misappropriated,
petitioner failed and refused to do so. Thus, the Cooperative issued a Board
Resolution authorizing the filing of criminal charges against petitioner.
After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner moved
to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She
argued, among other matters, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime charged
(Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which
she can be held criminally liable.
On October 14, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction,
thus:chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
Considering that the MeTCs, MTC, MCTCs have exclusive original jurisdiction over
all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years
irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory
or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offense or
predicated thereon, and considering that violation of [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 would
be punishable by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than
one (1) year and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both
at the discretion of the Court, this Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction to hear and
determine the instant case which properly pertains to the first level courts.
c ralawre d
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds and holds that it has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged. Accordingly, the instant case is
hereby DISMISSED. This Court having no jurisdiction, further discussions over
the defense' allegation that there was a violation of the principle of primary
jurisdiction and that the private complainants used a falsified resolution to
purposely empower them to file the instant case become moot and academic.
IT IS SO ORDERED.6 cralawlawlib ra ry
On February 12, 2009, the RTC denied for lack of merit the private prosecutor's
motion for a reconsideration of the order of dismissal.7 The RTC held: chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
Nowhere in said [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 does it provide for penal sanctions/liability
for violation of acts or omission prescribed therein. If ever, the liability is only for
damages and for double the profits which otherwise would have accrued to the
cooperative. It is a fundamental rule in law that an act or omission is not a crime
unless there is a law making it so and providing a penalty therefor. Otherwise
put, the facts charged in the information do not charge an offense. And even
assuming arguendo that they do constitute an offense, the penalty therefor is
that provided under paragraph 4 of [Section] 124 of R.A. [6938] which is
"imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a
fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of
the court," which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the first, not the second
level court.
Another factor which strongly militates against the cause of the prosecution is
the undisputed fact that before this case was filed in Court,
conciliation/mediation process for the amicable settlement of the dispute was not
availed of by the private complainants who are all members (directors) of the A.
Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative in accordance with
the by-laws of the Cooperative and the Cooperative Code itself and the
Guidelines for the Implementation of Conciliation/Mediation of Cooperative
dispute (Memo Circular No. 2007-05, Series of 2007). The dispute involving the
parties is certainly a dispute and issue between and among directors, officers or
members of the A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative
which is governed by the Guidelines.
Prior availment and exhaustion of administrative remedies until the Office of the
President as outlined in the Cooperative Code and in its implementing rules not
having been resorted to by the complainants, the rule on primary jurisdiction was
violated and this Court acquired no jurisdiction to hear and determine the
present case.8 cralawlawli bra ry
Dissatisfied, the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the order of dismissal to the CA.
On August 31, 2011, the CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the
RTC Orders dated October 14, 2008 and February 12, 2009 and remanded the
case records to the RTC for further proceedings. On January 31, 2012, the CA
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its decision.9
Aggrieved, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, raising the following issues: chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
1. WHETHER IN REVERSING THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT'S DECISION OF
DISMISSAL, HAS THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DISREGARDING THE CLEAN, UNAMBIGUOUS AND CATEGORICAL PROVISION OF
PARAGRAPH 4 OF [SECTION] 124 OF RA-6938 IN REFERENCE TO THE PENAL
SANCTION FOR VIOLATION OF [SEC] 46 OF THE COOPERATIVE [CODE], RA-
6938 AND ADOPTING FOR ITS DECISION ONE DERIVED FROM ITS
INTERPRETATION OF A SUPPOSED STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION WHICH
INTERPRETATION, EVEN SUBJECT PETITIONER TO A HIGHER PENALTY OF 5
YEARS TO 10 YRS. WHICH WAS TO JUSTIFY THAT TFIE RTC SHOULD NOT HAVE
DISMISSED THE CASE AND USED IT AS A GROUND TO REVERSE THE DECISION
OF THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.
2. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE OTHER GROUNDS
ASSIGNED FOR THE DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGE OTHER THAN THE
VIOLATION OF [SECTION] 46 OF RA-6938, (COOPERATIVE CODE). THAT THERE
WAS A VIOLATION OF THE RULE ON PRIMARY JURISDICTION - EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IN THE COOPERATIVE LEVEL BEFORE GOING TO
COURT.
3. WHETHER THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS' ORDER REMANDING THE CASE
BACK TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IGNORED
THE RULE THAT DISMISSAL OF THE CHARGE ON DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL, AND THE DISMISSAL IS NOT APPEALABLE.
4. WHETHER REMANDING THE CASE BACK TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS SUBJECT THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED TO DOUBLE
JEOPARDY AND TO HIGHER PENALTY HAS NOT BEEN CONSIDERED.
5. [WHETHER THE RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT A NEW AND AMENDED
COOPERATIVE CODE RA-9520 COULD POSSIBLE APPLY TO THIS CASE AGAINST
THE PETITIONER, VIOLATIVE OF EXPOSE (SIC) FACTO LAW.]10
The petition has no merit.
Prefatorily, the Court notes that petitioner filed a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, instead of an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, which the OSG points out as the proper
remedy to assail the CA decision.
Petitioner asserts that she filed the petition pursuant to Rule 65, because the
assailed CA decision is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. She posits that the
Court ordered the exclusion of the CA as one of the party respondents, and
considered the petition as one filed under Rule 45, since the focal issue raised in
the petition is a question of law calling for an interpretation of Sections 46 and
124 of RA 6938, in relation to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by RA 7691. She adds that had she
chosen to file an appeal by certiorari, the Court would be faced with the same
question of law.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
As a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final order of the CA is appeal via
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.11 In Mercado v. Court of
Appeals,12 the Court had again stressed the distinction between the remedies
provided for under Rule 45 and Rule 65, to wit: chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
xxx [T]he proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of
Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45, which is not identical to a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or resolutions
of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the action or
proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which
would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. On
the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an independent action
based on the specific ground therein provided and, as a general rule, cannot be
availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including
that to be taken under Rule 45. xxx.13 cralawlawlib ra ry
In Artistica Ceramica, Inc., v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner's Association,
Inc.,14 the Court explained that one of the requisites of certiorari is that there be
no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal
is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse
of discretion. It is also well settled that a party cannot file a petition both under
Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court because said procedural rules pertain to
different remedies and have distinct applications. The remedy of appeal under
Rule 45 and the original action for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive
and not alternative or cumulative. Thus, when petitioner adopts an improper
remedy, petition may be dismissed outright.
However, the Court may set aside technicality for justifiable reasons as when the
petition before it is clearly meritorious and filed on time both under Rules 45 and
cralawlawli bra ry
65.15 In accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and
in the interest of justice, the Court may treat the petition as having been filed
under Rule 45. Here, no justifiable reasons were proffered by petitioner for a
more liberal interpretation of procedural rules. Although it was filed on time both
under Rules 45 and 65, the petition at bench lacks substantive merit and raises
only questions of law which should have been duly made in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.16
On the substantive issue of which court has jurisdiction over petitioner's criminal
case for violation of Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee
Members) of RA 6938, the Court affirms the CA ruling that it is the RTC, not the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), which has jurisdiction over her case.
In criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of
the complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the
filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for the
crime charged at the time of its commission.17 Section 32 of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, provides that the MeTC has exclusive jurisdiction over offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six years, irrespective of the
amount of fine: chanroble svirtuallaw lib rary
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. - Except in cases falling within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the
Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: c han roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
xxxx more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion; (Emphasis
supplied)

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with The OSG points out that Section "47" in the above-quoted provision is a clerical
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of error because the "liability of directors, officers and committee members" is
fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including undisputedly governed by Section 46 of RA 6938, while Section 47 thereof deals
the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of with the compensation of directors, officers and employees, to wit: chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses

involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis added)
Offenses punishable with imprisonment exceeding six years, irrespective of the
amount of fine, fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, in
accordance with Section 20 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended: chan roble svirtual lawlib rary
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter
be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter.
Petitioner insists that Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee
Members) of RA 6938 provides only for a civil liability but not a criminal sanction,
hence, the MeTC has jurisdiction over her criminal case which is punishable
under paragraph 4 of Section 124:
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Section 46. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. -
Directors, officers and committee members, who willfully and knowingly vote for
or assent to patently unlawful acts or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad
faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative or acquire any personal or
pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or
committee member shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages or profits
resulting therefrom to the cooperative, members and other persons.
When a director, officer or committee member attempts to acquire or acquires, in
violation of his duty, any interest or equity adverse to the cooperative in respect
to any matter which has been reposed in him in confidence, he shall, as a trustee
for the cooperative, be liable for damages and for double the profits which
otherwise would have accrued to the cooperative.
Section 47. Compensation. - (1) In the absence of any provision in the by-
laws fixing their compensation, the directors shall not receive any compensation
except for reasonable per diem: Provided, That any compensation other than per
diems may be granted to directors by a majority vote of the members with

voting rights at a regular or special general assembly meeting specifically called

Section 124. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions affecting
for the purpose: Provided further, that no additional compensation other than per
cooperatives are hereby prohibited:
diems shall be paid during the first year of existence of any cooperative.
chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

(4) Any violation of any provision of this Code for which no penalty is
The Court sustains the OSG's contention. Petitioner failed to present any
imposed shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than six (6)
compelling reason to warrant a departure from the exhaustive CA ruling on why
months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than One thousand
the RTC, not the MeTC, has jurisdiction over her criminal case for violation of
pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the court. (Emphasis added)
Section 46 of RA 6938, thus: chan roblesv irtuallawl ib rary

Petitioner argues that the provisions of Section 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers

The Court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature, may correct
and Committee Members), Section 47 (Compensation) and Section 124 (Penal
clerical errors, mistakes or misprints which, if uncorrected, would render the
Provisions) of RA 6938, are plain, unambiguous, and categorical. She submits
statute meaningless, empty or nonsensical or would defeat or impair its intended
that statutory construction of such clear provisions, especially if prejudicial to her
operation, so long as the meaning intended is apparent on the face of the whole
rights as an accused and would subject her to higher penalty, should not be
enactment and no specific provision is abrogated. To correct the error or mistake
allowed.
is to prevent the nullification of the statute and give it a meaning and purpose.
For it is the duty of the court to give a statute a sensible construction, one that
On the other hand, the OSG maintains that the RTC has jurisdiction over
will effectuate legislative intent and avoid injustice or absurdity. It is its duty to
petitioner's case pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 124 of RA 6938:
arrive at the legislative intent and in doing so, it should not adopt an arbitrary
chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry

rule under which it must be held without variance or shadow of turning the
(3) A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions legislature intended to make a typographical error, the result of which would be
of Section 47 (liability of directors, officers and committee members), to make nonsense of the act, and not to carry out the legislative scheme, but to
Section 50 (disloyalty of a director) and Section 51 (illegal use of confidential destroy it.
information) shall upon conviction suffer a fine of not less than Five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not
xxxx

Clearly, the accused-appellee cannot insist that reference to [Sec] 124,
paragraph 4, as the trial court did, is necessary and therefore, warranted the
dismissal of the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction. To reiterate, [Sec] 46 of the
Code, entitled "Liability of Directors, Officers, and Committee Members," provides
for violations under which the said officers could be held liable for, and the
corresponding liability for damages and profits from the said violations. Since the
said [section] does not provide for penal sanction, an application of [Sec] 124,
paragraph 3 should follow as the said provision evidently refers to the penal
sanction on erring directors, officers and committee members. It would
make no sense if we were to follow what clearly appears to be a clerical error,
that is, applying [Sec] 124, paragraph 4 instead, just because paragraph 3 of the
same [section] refers to [Sec] 47, which upon examination of the Code provides
for the "Compensation" of the directors, officers and other employees of the
cooperative.
We, thus, agree with the contention of the People that [Section] 124 (3) should
refer to "[Section] 46 (Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members,
[Section] 49 (Disloyalty of a Director) and [Section] 51 (Illegal use of confidential
information)." Following this interpretation, violation of [Sec] 46, therefore, is
punishable by a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or
imprisonment of not less than five (5) years but not more than ten (10) years or
both at the court's discretion, which under B.P. Blg. 129, shall be within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.18
cralawlawlib rary
It may not be amiss to point out that the clerical error noted by the OSG in
Section 124 (3) of RA 6938 on the liability of directors, officers and committee
members, has been recognized and duly corrected when the legislature enacted
RA 9520, entitled "An Act Amending the Cooperative Code of the Philippines to
be known as the Philippine Cooperative Code of 2008." Pertinent portions of the
corrected provision read: cha nrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
ART. 45. Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee Members. - Directors,
officers and committee members, who are willfully and knowingly vote for or
assent to patently unlawful acts or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith
in directing the affairs of the cooperative or acquire any personal or pecuniary
interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or committee
members shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages or profits resulting
therefrom to the cooperative, members, and other persons.
xxxx
ART. 140. Penal Provisions. - The following acts or omissions affecting
cooperatives are hereby prohibited: chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary
xxxx
(5) A director, officer or committee member who violated the provisions
of Article 45 on the Liability of Directors, Officers and Committee
Members, Article 48 on the Disloyalty of a Director, and Article 49 on the Illegal
Use of Confidential Information shall upon conviction suffer a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than five (5) years
but not more than ten (10) years or both at the court's discretion; [Emphasis
added]
On whether the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies was violated when
the Cooperative filed a criminal case against petitioner without undergoing
conciliation/mediation proceedings pursuant to the Cooperative Code and the By-
laws of the Cooperative, the Court rules in the negative. Conciliation or mediation
is not a pre-requisite to the filing of a criminal case for violation of RA 6938
against petitioner, because such case is not an intra-cooperative dispute. As
aptly pointed out by the CA: chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
Neither can the accused-appellee insist that this is an intra-cooperative dispute
and should have been resolved at the cooperative level. As aptly argued by the
People, this is not an intra-cooperative dispute. Intra-cooperative dispute is a
dispute arising between or among members of the same cooperative. The instant
case is a dispute between the Cooperative and its former chairperson, the
accused-appellee. The Board Resolution authorizing the filing of the criminal
complaint by the Board of Directors, for and in behalf of the Cooperative, is proof
that this is not an intra-cooperative dispute, and within the jurisdiction of the
regular court.19
cra lawlawlib rary
Moreover, it is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the
State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is
limited to the civil liability, and her role in the prosecution of the offense is
limited to that of a witness for the prosecution.20 In petitioner's criminal case for
violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, the State is the real offended party, while the
Cooperative and its members are mere private complainants and witnesses
whose interests are limited to the civil aspect thereof. Clearly, such criminal case
can hardly be considered an intra-cooperative dispute, as it is not one arising
between or among members of the same cooperative.
On whether the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to
evidence amounts to an acquittal, hence, final and unappealable, the Court rules
in the negative.
In Gutib v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court stressed that demurrer to the evidence
is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence
which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not,
to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the
sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The Court, in passing upon
the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.
In People v. Sandiganbayan,22 the Court explained the general rule that the grant
of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and
unappealable, to wit:
chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after
the prosecution had rested its case" and when the same is granted, it calls "for
an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to
warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case
on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a
criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to
do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of
acquittal, the case ends there.23 cralaw lawlib rary
In this case, however, the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed
the case not for insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged. Notably, the RTC did not decide the case on the merits, let
alone resolve the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence based on the evidence
proffered by the prosecution. This being the case, the October 14, 2008 RTC
Order of dismissal does not operate as an acquittal, hence, may still be subject to
ordinary appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.24 As aptly noted by the
CA:chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
The accused-appellee is also of a mistaken view that the dismissal of the case
against her is an acquittal. It should be emphasized' that "acquittal is always
based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence
does not show that the defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but
dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not
guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a
court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that the offense
was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient in form and substance, etc."25
cralawlawlib rary
On whether the remand of the criminal case to the RTC violated her right against
double jeopardy due to its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
the Court rules in the negative and upholds the CA in ruling that the dismissal
having been granted upon petitioner's instance, double jeopardy did not attach,
thus:
chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in double
jeopardy upon this appeal. It must be stressed that the dismissal of the case
against her was premised upon her filing of a demurrer to evidence, and the
finding, albeit erroneous, of the trial court that it is bereft of jurisdiction.
The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused
has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted
or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Definitely, there is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with the
accused-appellee's consent, that is, by moving for the dismissal of the case
through a demurrer to evidence. As correctly argued by the People, where the
dismissal was ordered upon or with express assent of the accused, he is deemed
to have waived his protection against doubly jeopardy. In this case at bar, the
dismissal was granted upon motion of petitioners. Double jeopardy, thus, did not
attach.26 cralawlawli bra ry
The Court also finds no merit in petitioner's new argument that the prosecution
of her case before the RTC for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 in Criminal Case
No. 07-197750 is barred by res judicatabecause the MeTC of Manila, Branch 22,
in a Resolution27 dated August 13, 2012, granted her demurrer to evidence and
acquitted her in a criminal case for falsification of private document in Criminal
Case No. 370119-20-CR.28 In support of her flawed argument, petitioner points
out that the private complainants [officers and directors of the Cooperative] and
the subject matter [unreported sales profits of Coca-Cola products] of both cases
are the same, and that the case for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 is actually
and necessarily included in the case for falsification of private documents.
At the outset, res judicata is a doctrine of civil law and thus has no bearing on
criminal proceedings.29 At any rate, petitioner's argument is incidentally related
to double jeopardy which embrace's a prohibition against being tried for any
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the former complaint or information.
Section 730 of Rule 117 lays down the requisites in order that the defense of
double jeopardy may prosper. There is double jeopardy when the following
requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the
same offense as in the first.31 As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches
only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused
was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.32
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites of double
jeopardy are present in view of the MeTC Resolution33 dated August 13, 2012
which granted petitioner's demurrer to evidence and acquitted her in a criminal
case for falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR.
Petitioner's argument dwells on whether the third requisite of double jeopardy —
a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first — is present. Such
question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is addressed by examining the
essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set
out in the respective legislative definitions of the offense involved.34
Thus, the remaining question to be resolved is whether the offense charged in
the information for Section 46 of RA 6938 necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in a crime for falsification of private document under Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC). The test to determine whether an
offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other is provided
under Section 5, Rule .120 of the Rules of Court:
chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib rary
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included
in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form part of those constituting the latter.
After a careful examination of the Informations filed against petitioner for from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR and for essential element of the other.38
cra lawlawlib rary

violation of Section 46, RA 6938 in Criminal Case No. 01-197750, the Court holds
that the first offense for which petitioner was acquitted does not necessarily
include and is not necessarily included in the second offense.
The Information for falsification of private document, on the one hand, alleged
that petitioner, being then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, as part of her duty to
prepare financial reports, falsified such report for the School Year 1999-2000, in
relation to the sales profits of Coca-Cola products in violation of Article 172
(2)35 of the RPC. The elements of falsification of private document under Article
172, paragraph 2 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts
of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171;36(2) that the falsification
was committed in any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused
damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to
cause such damage.
Since the Informations filed against petitioner were for separate, and distinct
offenses as discussed above—the first against' Article 172 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code and the second against Section 46 of the Cooperative Code (RA
6938)—one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double
jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be
charged with as many crimes as defined in our penal laws even if these arose
from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed against one person but
said act constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, or by a special law and the Revised Penal Code, as in this case,
the prosecution against one is not an obstacle to the prosecution of the other.39
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED, and the Court of
Appeals Decision dated August 31, 2011 and its Resolution dated Jan. 31, 2012
in CA-G.R. CR No. 32363, are AFFIRMED.

The Information for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 alleged, on the other SO ORDERED.
hand, that being then such officer and director of the Cooperative, petitioner
willfully acquired personal interest or equity adverse to it, in violation of her duty
and of the confidence reposed upon her, by entering into a contract with Coca-
Cola in her own personal capacity, knowing fully well that the sales profits of
such products should have accrued to the Cooperative. The essential elements of
violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 are (1) that the offender is a director, officer
or committee member; and (2) that the offender willfully and lcnowingly (a)
votes for or assents to patently unlawful acts; (b) is guilty of gross negligence or
bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative; or (c) acquires any personal
or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or
committee member.

Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of the
crimes of falsification of private document under Article 172 (2) of the RPC and
that of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, as alleged in the Informations filed
against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes can be said to necessarily include
or is necessarily included in the other, the third requisite for double jeopardy to
attach—a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first—is, therefore,
absent. Not only are their elements different, they also have a distinct
nature, i.e., the former is malum in se, as what makes it a felony is criminal
intent on the part of the offender, while the latter is malum prohibitum, as what
makes it a crime is the special, law enacting it.

Moreover, in People v. Doriguez,37 the Court held: chan roblesv irtuallawl ib rary

It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked
only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against
two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one
provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does
not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does
not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws
(or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of
them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise
G.R. No. 186001 October 2, 2009
ANTONIO CABADOR, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Court of
Appeals’ (CA) Decision of August 4, 20081 and Resolution of October 28,
20082 in CA-G.R. SP 100431 that affirmed the August 31, 2006 Order3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City.
The facts are not disputed.
On June 23, 2000 the public prosecutor accused petitioner Antonio Cabador
before the RTC of Quezon City in Criminal Case Q-00-93291 of murdering, in
conspiracy with others, Atty. Jun N. Valerio.4 On February 13, 2006, after
presenting only five witnesses over five years of intermittent trial, the RTC
declared at an end the prosecution’s presentation of evidence and required the
prosecution to make a written or formal offer of its documentary evidence within
15 days from notice.5 But the public prosecutor asked for three extensions of
time, the last of which was to end on July 28, 2006. Still, the prosecution did not
make the required written offer.
On August 1, 2006 petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the
case,6 complaining of a turtle-paced proceeding in the case since his arrest and
detention in 2001 and invoking his right to a speedy trial. Further, he claimed
that in the circumstances, the trial court could not consider any evidence against
him that had not been formally offered. He also pointed out that the prosecution
witnesses did not have knowledge of his alleged part in the crime charged.
Unknown to petitioner Cabador, however, four days earlier or on July 28, 2006
the prosecution asked the RTC for another extension of the period for its formal
offer, which offer it eventually made on August 1, 2006, the day Cabador filed
his motion to dismiss.7
On August 31, 2006 the RTC issued an Order treating petitioner Cabador’s
August 1, 2006 motion to dismiss as a demurrer to evidence. And, since he filed
his motion without leave of court, the RTC declared him to have waived his right
to present evidence in his defense. The trial court deemed the case submitted
for decision insofar as he was concerned. Cabador filed a motion for
reconsideration of this Order but the RTC denied it on February 19,
2007.8 Cabador questioned the RTC’s actions before the CA but on August 4,
2008 the latter denied his petition and affirmed the lower court’s actions.9 With
the CA’s denial of his motion for reconsideration, on October 28, 2008 petitioner
came to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari.
The issue in this case is whether or not petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss
before the trial court was in fact a demurrer to evidence filed without leave of
court, with the result that he effectively waived his right to present evidence in
his defense and submitted the case for decision insofar as he was concerned.
The trial proper in a criminal case usually has two stages: first, the prosecution’s
presentation of evidence against the accused and, second, the accused’s
presentation of evidence in his defense. If, after the prosecution has presented
its evidence, the same appears insufficient to support a conviction, the trial court
may at its own initiative or on motion of the accused dispense with the second
stage and dismiss the criminal action.10 There is no point for the trial court to
hear the evidence of the accused in such a case since the prosecution bears the
burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The order of dismissal
amounts to an acquittal.
But because some have in the past used the demurrer in order to delay the
proceedings in the case, the remedy now carries a caveat. When the accused
files a demurrer without leave of court, he shall be deemed to have waived the
right to present evidence and the case shall be considered submitted for
judgment.11 On occasions, this presents a problem such as when, like the
situation in this case, the accused files a motion to dismiss that, to the RTC, had
the appearance of a demurrer to evidence. Cabador insists that it is not one but
the CA, like the lower court, ruled that it is.
This Court held in Enojas, Jr. v. Commission on Elections12 that, to determine
whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the
Court must consider (1) the allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the stage of
the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing
it.
Here, the pertinent portions of petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss read as
follows:
2. On November 9, 2001, the accused was arrested and subsequently brought
to the Quezon City jail through a commitment order dated November 21, 2001
where he had been detained during the course of this case.
3. The accused was arraigned on January 8, 2002 and trial began soon after.
4. UP-OLA entered its appearance as counsel for the accused on January 20,
2005.
5. On February 10, 2006, the Honorable Court terminated the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution considering that the case has been going on for 5
years already and during that period the prosecution has only presented 5
witnesses. Moreover, xxx there had been numerous postponements due to
failure of the prosecution to ensure the presence of its witnesses.
6. In an order dated March 31, 2006, the Honorable court required the public
prosecutor to submit its formal offer of evidence within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of such order.
7. On April 17, 2006, the public prosecutor was again absent so the presentation
of evidence for the accused was reset to June 6, 2006.
8. During the same hearing, the Prosecution was again granted an additional
fifteen (15) days within which to file their formal offer of evidence.
9. On June 6, 2006, the public prosecutor again failed to appear and to file their
formal offer of evidence. In an order, the Honorable Court again extended to the
prosecution an additional fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order within which
to file their formal offer of evidence.
10. On June 28, 2006, the Honorable Court issued an order granting the
prosecution a thirty-day extension, or until July 28, 2006 within which to file their
formal offer of evidence since the public prosecutor was on leave.
11. Upon the expiration of the extension granted by the Honorable Court, the
prosecution failed to file their formal offer of evidence.
10. (Sic) Despite three (3) extensions, the prosecution failed to file formal offer
of evidence.
11. (Sic) Sec. 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that "the court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally offered." A formal offer is
necessary, since judges are required to base their findings of fact and their
judgment solely and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial
(Ong vs. CA, GR No. 117103). Hence, without any formal offer of evidence, this
Honorable Court has no evidence to consider.
12. The charge against the accused has no leg to stand on. The witnesses that
had been presented by the prosecution testified mainly on the occurrences on
the night of the incident and had no knowledge of any connection with or any
participation by the accused in the incident.
13. The hearings of the case have been delayed since 2001 through no fault of
the defense to the prejudice of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial,
mandated by no less than Art. III, Sec. 16 of the Constitution.
14. Since UP-OLA had entered its appearance in 2005, the case had been reset
for twelve (12) times, most of which are due to the fault or absence of the
prosecution. For the five year duration of the case, the prosecution still has not
presented any evidence to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Meanwhile, the accused has been unduly stripped of this liberty for more
than five (5) years upon an unsubstantiated charge.
15. The accused was injured and debilitated in the course of his arrest which
resulted in the amputation of his left leg. His movement is severely hampered
and his living conditions are less adequate. To subject him to further delays when
there is no substance to the charge against him would tantamount to injustice.13
It can be seen from the above that petitioner Cabador took pains to point out in
paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, "10 (sic)," 13, 14, and 15 above how trial in
the case had painfully dragged on for years. The gaps between proceedings
were long, with hearings often postponed because of the prosecutor’s absence.
This was further compounded, Cabador said, by the prosecution’s repeated
motions for extension of time to file its formal offer and its failure to file it within
such time. Cabador then invoked in paragraph 13 above his right to speedy trial.
But the RTC and the CA simply chose to ignore these extensive averments and
altogether treated Cabador’s motion as a demurrer to evidence because of a few
observations he made in paragraphs "11 (sic)" and 12 regarding the inadequacy
of the evidence against him.
In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the
accused’s right to speedy trial.14This denial is characterized by unreasonable,
vexatious, and oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified
postponements that unreasonably prolonged the trial.15 This was the main thrust
of Cabador’s motion to dismiss and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling
by the trial court.
Cabador of course dropped a few lines in his motion to dismiss in paragraphs
"11 (sic)" and 12, saying that the trial court "has no evidence to consider," "the
charge has no leg to stand on," and that "the witnesses x x x had no knowledge
of any connection with or any participation by the accused in the incident." But
these were mere conclusions, highlighting what five years of trial had
accomplished.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any
demurrer. He did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against
him to show in what respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of the
crime charged. His so-called "demurrer" did not touch on any particular
testimony of even one witness. He cited no documentary exhibit. Indeed, he
could not because, he did not know that the prosecution finally made its formal
offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his motion to dismiss. 16 To say that
Cabador filed a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind man,
touching the side of an elephant, and exclaiming that he had touched a wall.
Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already
rested its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, reads:
Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may
dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own
initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon
demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.
(Emphasis supplied)1awphi1
Here, after the prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits on August 1, 2006,
the same day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss, the trial court still needed to
give him an opportunity to object to the admission of those exhibits. It also
needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after such a ruling could the
prosecution be deemed to have rested its case. Since Cabador filed his motion
to dismiss before he could object to the prosecution’s formal offer, before the
trial court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case,
it could not be said that he had intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a
demurrer to evidence.
In sum, tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, the Court finds that
petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of violation of his right
to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. He cannot be declared to have
waived his right to present evidence in his defense.
On a final note, a demurrer to evidence shortens the proceedings in criminal
cases. Caution must, however, be exercised17 in view of its pernicious
consequence on the right of the accused to present evidence in his defense, the
seriousness of the crime charged, and the gravity of the penalty involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the August 4, 2008 Decision and the
October 28, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 100431 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the August 31, 2006 Order of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 is NULLIFIED. The latter court is
DIRECTED to resolve petitioner Antonio Cabador’s motion to dismiss based on
the circumstances surrounding the trial in the case.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167526 July 26, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
DANTE TAN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to set aside the June 14, 2004 Resolution 2 and February 24,
2005 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 83433.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On December 21, 2000, two Informations for violation of Rule 36 (a)-1,4 in
relation to Sections 32 (a)-15 and 566 of the Revised Securities Act, were filed
by petitioner People of the Philippines against respondent Dante Tan in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 153. They were docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832.
The Information7 in Criminal Case No. 119831 reads:
That on December 10, 1998, or thereabout, in the City of Pasig, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being the beneficial owner of 84,030,000 Best World Resources
Corporation shares, a registered security sold pursuant to Sections 4 and 8 of
the Revised Securities Act, which beneficial ownership constitutes 18.6% of the
outstanding shares of the company, way above the 10% required by law to be
reported, and covered by Certificate Nos. DT-UK 55485704 and DT-UR
55485776, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to file with
the Securities and Exchange Commission and with the Philippine Stock
Exchange a sworn statement of the amount of all BWRC shares of which he is
the beneficial owner, within ten (10) days after he became such beneficial owner,
in violation of the Revised Securities Act and/or the rules and regulations
prescribed and pursuant thereto.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The Information9 in Criminal Case No. 119832 reads:
That on June 18, 1999, or thereabout, in the City of Pasig, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused being the beneficial owner of 75,000,000 Best World Resources
Corporation shares, a registered security which has been sold pursuant to
Sections 4 and 8 of the Revised Securities Act, which beneficial ownership
constitutes 18.6% of the outstanding shares of the company, way above the 10%
required by law to be reported, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally fail to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission and with the
Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn statement of the amount of all BWRC shares
of which he is the beneficial owner, within ten (10) days after he became such
beneficial owner, in violation of the Revised Securities Act and/or the rules and
regulations prescribed pursuant thereto.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
After arraignment, respondent pleaded not guilty11 to both charges and the trial
ensued.
On November 24, 2003, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence, 12 consisting
of Exhibits "A" to "E" with sub-exhibits, Exhibits "K-1," "K-10" and "K-11," "Q,"
"R," "S," "T" and "W" with sub-exhibits, and Exhibit "X."
On December 11, 2003, the RTC issued an Order 13 admitting Exhibits "A," "B,"
"W" and "X," but denied admission of all the other exhibits on the grounds stated
therein.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied by the
RTC in an Order14 dated January 27, 2004.
In the meantime, on December 18, 2003, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion
for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence15 and to admit the attached Demurrer to
Evidence.
On January 29, 2004, the RTC issued another Order 16 granting respondents’
Motion for Leave to File the Demurrer and forthwith admitted respondent’s
attached Demurrer. The RTC also ordered petitioner to file an opposition.
On February 18, 2004, petitioner filed its Opposition 17 to the Demurrer to
Evidence. Respondent then filed a Reply.18
On March 16, 2004, the RTC issued an Order19 granting respondent’s Demurrer
to Evidence, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the Demurrer to Evidence filed by accused Dante Tan to
be meritorious, the same is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.20
On April 12, 2004,21 petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari22 before the CA
assailing the December 11, 2003, January 27, 2004, and March 16, 2004 Orders
of the RTC.
On June 14, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution denying the petition, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the context of all the foregoing considerations, it would be
futile to take further action on the herein petition, which is therefore DISMISSED
outright for evident want of merit.
SO ORDERED.23
In denying the petition, the CA ruled that the dismissal of a criminal action by the
grant of a Demurrer to Evidence is one on the merits and operates as an
acquittal, for which reason, the prosecution cannot appeal therefrom as it would
place the accused in double jeopardy.24
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however,
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated February 24, 2005.
Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the lone assignment of error, to wit:
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN PRECLUDING THE PEOPLE
FROM PROSECUTING ITS CASES AGAINST DANTE TAN.25
The petition has no merit.
Notwithstanding the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence,
petitioner contends that the CA erred in applying the rules on double jeopardy.
Specifically, petitioner argues that double jeopardy does not apply in cases
decided by the trial court without jurisdiction and in violations of petitioner’s right
to due process.26
In People v. Sandiganbayan,27 this Court explained the general rule that the
grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and is, thus, final and
unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after
the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for
an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency
to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the
case on the merits,tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of
a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for
to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being
one of acquittal, the case ends there.28
The elements of double jeopardy are (1) the complaint or information was
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the court had
jurisdiction; (3) the accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the
accused was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed without his
express consent.29
These elements are present here: (1) the Informations filed in Criminal Cases
Nos. 119831 and 119832 against respondent were sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the RTC had jurisdiction over Criminal
Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832; (3) respondent was arraigned and entered a
plea of not guilty; and (4) the RTC dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and
119832 on a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
which amounts to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v.
Laguio, Jr.,30 this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will
not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus:
x x x The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present
its case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed
of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary
proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.31
After an extensive review of previous Court decisions relevant to herein petition,
this Court finds that the abovementioned exception is inapplicable to the factual
milieu herein. This Court finds that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in the
manner it conducted the proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of
respondent’s demurrer to evidence.
Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 32
In Galman v. Sandiganbayan,33 this Court ruled that the prosecution was denied
due process of law when the trial was but a mock trial, to wit:
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the cases
at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where the
authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan
to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the
predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of all
the respondents-accused.34
In addition, in People v. Bocar,35 this Court ruled that there is no double jeopardy
when the prosecution was not allowed to complete its presentation of evidence
by the trial court, to wit:
It is evident from the brief transcript of the proceedings held on July 7, 1967 that
the parties were not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the
respondent Judge (pp. 11-17, rec.). Verily, no evidence in law had as yet been
entered into the records of the case before respondent Court. Respondent
Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary, whimsical and
capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which this Court cannot permit.
Moreover, it is clear from the same transcript that the prosecution never had a
chance to introduce and offer its evidence formally in accordance with the Rules
of Court (pp. 11-17, rec.). Verily, the prosecution was denied due process.
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case, its right to due process is thereby violated. x x x 36
Likewise, in People v. Judge Albano,37 this Court held that there is no double
jeopardy when the trial court preemptively dismissed the case, thus:
The trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it practically held that the
prosecution failed to establish the culpability of the accused in a proceeding
which does not even require the prosecution to do so. It acted with grave abuse
of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it preemptively dismissed
the cases and, as a consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution of its right
to prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating its fundamental right to due
process." With this violation, its Orders, dated 28 October 1976 and 20
December 1976, are therefore null and void. Likewise, for being null and void,
said orders cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. 38
In Saldana v. Court of Appeals,39 this Court ruled that the prosecution’s right to
due process is violated when the trial court aborted its right to complete its
presentation of evidence, thus:
The order of the Court of Appeals reinstating the criminal case for further hearing
by the trial court does not violate the rule on double jeopardy. One of the
elements of double jeopardy is a competent court. The trial court in this case
was ousted from its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to
due process by aborting its right to complete the presentation of its evidence.
Hence, the first jeopardy had not been terminated. The remand of the case for
further hearing or trial is merely a continuation of the first jeopardy. It does not
expose the accused to a second jeopardy. x x x 40
Thus, the question to be resolved, given the factual molding of herein petition, is
"did the RTC violate petitioner’s right to due process?" On this note, this Court
rules that petitioner was given more than ample opportunity to present its case
as gleaned from the factual antecedents which led to the grant of respondent’s
demurrer.
On September 18, 2001, petitioner completed its presentation of evidence and,
on the day after, filed its formal offer of evidence. On January 21, 2002,
respondent filed an opposition to petitioner’s formal offer. Instead of filing a reply
as directed by the RTC, petitioner filed a "Motion to Withdraw Prosecution’s
Formal Offer of Evidence and to Re-open Presentation of Evidence."41 Said
motion was granted by the RTC and petitioner thus continued its presentation of
evidence.
On January 28, 2003, petitioner ended its presentation of additional witnesses
and was then ordered by the RTC to formally offer its exhibits. On February 26,
2003, petitioner filed a request for marking of certain documents and motion to
admit attached formal offer of evidence.42 The motion was initially denied by the
RTC, but on motion for reconsideration the same was granted by the RTC. The
RTC, thus, ordered petitioner to file anew its formal offer of evidence. Finally, on
November 24, 2003, petitioner filed its Formal Offer of Evidence.43
After respondent filed its Demurer to Evidence, the RTC, in an Order dated
January 29, 2004, directed petitioner to file its opposition thereto. On February
18, 2004, petitioner filed its Opposition44 to the demurrer.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the RTC never prevented petitioner from
presenting its case. Unlike in Bocar and Saldana where the prosecution was
prevented from completing its presentation of evidence, petitioner was given the
opportunity to present its case, formally offer its evidence and oppose
respondent’s demurrer. It even bears to point out that the RTC even allowed
petitioner to withdraw its formal offer of evidence after having initially rested its
case and then continue its presentation by introducing additional witnesses.
Thus, no grave abuse can be attributed to the RTC as petitioner’s right to due
process was not violated. Even Galman finds no application to the case at bar
as clearly such trial cannot be considered a sham based on the abovementioned
considerations.
Petitioner argues that the RTC displayed resolute bias when it chose to grant
respondent’s demurrer to evidence notwithstanding that it had filed a "Motion to
Hold in Abeyance the Resolution of Accused Dante Tan’s Demurrer to Evidence
and The Prosecution’s Opposition Thereto."45 Petitioner contends that instead of
acting on the motion, the RTC peremptorily granted respondent’s demurrer to
evidence which prevented petitioner from its intention to file a petition for
certiorari to question the December 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004 Orders of
the RTC.
While it would have been ideal for the RTC to hold in abeyance the resolution of
the demurrer to evidence, nowhere in the rules, however, is it mandated to do
so. Furthermore, even if this Court were to consider the same as an error on the
part of the RTC, the same would merely constitute an error of procedure or of
judgment and not an error of jurisdiction as persistently argued by petitioner.
Errors or irregularities, which do not render the proceedings a nullity, will not
defeat a plea of antrefois acquit.46 We are bound by the dictum that whatever
error may have been committed effecting the dismissal of the case cannot now
be corrected because of the timely plea of double jeopardy. 47 To reiterate, the
only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction which
cannot be attributed to the RTC simply because it chose not to hold in abeyance
the resolution of the demurrer to evidence. Consequently, petitioner’s attempt to
put in issue the December 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004 Orders of the RTC
which denied admission of certain documentary exhibits in evidence must fail.
As correctly manifested by the CA, the said Orders have already been overtaken
by the March 16, 2004 Order, which already granted respondent’s demurrer to
evidence. Hence, this Court would be violating the rules on double jeopardy if
the twin orders were to be reviewed after a finding that the CA did not commit
any grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer to evidence.
Lastly, even if this Court were to review the action taken by the RTC in granting
the demurrer to evidence, no grave abuse can be attributed to it as it appears
that the 29-page Order granting the demurrer was arrived at after due
consideration of the merits thereto. As correctly observed by the CA, the RTC
extensively discussed its position on the various issues brought to contention by
petitioner. One of the main reasons for the RTC’s decision to grant the demurrer
was the absence of evidence to prove the classes of shares that the Best World
Resources Corporation stocks were divided into, whether there are preferred
shares as well as common shares, or even which type of shares respondent had
acquired, thus:
To secure conviction for the violations of RSA Secs. 32 (a-1) and 36 (a), it is
necessary to prove the following: (1) the BW Resources Corporation ("BW") has
equity securities registered under the Revised Securities Act; [2] that the equity
securities of BW Resources Corporation are divided into classes, and that these
classes are registered pursuant to the Revised Securities Act; (3) the number of
shares of BW Resources Corporation (authorized the number of shares of BW
Resources (authorized capital stock) and the total number of shares per class of
stock; (4) the number of shares of a particular class of BW stock acquired by the
accused; (5) the fact of the exact date, the accused [becomes] the beneficial
owner of ten (10%) percent of a particular class of BW shares; and (6) the fact,
the accused failed to disclose his ten (10%) percent ownership within ten days
from becoming such owner.
It is very clear from the evidence formally offered, that the foregoing facts were
not proven or established. These cases were for Violations of RSA Rule 32 (a)-
1 and Section 56 of Revised Securities Act, however, it is very surprising that the
prosecution never presented in evidence the Article of Incorporation of BW
Resources Corporation. This document is very vital and is the key to everything,
including the conviction of the accused. Without the Article of Incorporation, the
Court has no way of knowing the capitalization authorized capital stock of the
BW Resources Corporation, the classes of shares into which its stock is divided
and the exact holdings of Dante Tan in the said corporation. Its not being a
prosecution’s evidence renders impossible the determination of the ten (10%)
percent beneficial ownership of accused Dante Tan, as there is no focal point to
base the computation of his holdings, and the exact date of his becoming an
owner of ten (10%) percent.48
There is no showing that the conclusions made by the RTC on the sufficiency of
the evidence of the prosecution at the time the prosecution rested its case, is
manifestly mistaken. Assuming, however, that there is an error of judgment on
the denial of admission of certain exhibits of the prosecution and the appreciation
of the prosecution’s case, there is to this Court’s mind, no capricious exercise of
judgment that would overcome the defense of double jeopardy.
Withal, it bears to stress that the fundamental philosophy behind the
constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant,
who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from government
oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. 49 While petitioner insists
that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, this Court finds that none can
be attributed to the RTC. Consequently, the CA did not err when it affirmed the
assailed Orders of the RTC.
On a final note, this Court is aware of this Court’s Third Division Decision dated
April 21, 2009 entitled Dante Tan v. People of the Philippines 50 wherein
respondent argued that his right to a speedy trial was violated by the prosecution.
This Court denied the petition and ruled for the remand of the case to the RTC
for further proceedings. It must be pointed out that said decision involves
Criminal Case No. 119830,51 which is distinct and separate from Criminal Case
No. 119831 and Criminal Case No. 119832 which are the subject matter of
herein petition. Thus, the resolution of the case at bar is without prejudice to the
proceedings that are being conducted in Criminal Case No. 119830 at whatever
stage it may be.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The June 14, 2004
Resolution and February 24, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 83433 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160067 November 17, 2010
NELSON IMPERIAL, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
MARICEL M. JOSON, ET AL. Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 170410
SANTOS FRANCISCO Petitioners,
vs.
SPS. GERARD AND MARICEL JOSON Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 171622
NELSON IMPERIAL, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
HILARION FELIX, ET AL., Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the consolidated
petitions for review on certiorari at bench primarily assail the decisions rendered
in the following cases, viz.: (a) Decision dated 4 September 2003 of the then
Tenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 74030;1 (b)
Decision dated 26 October 2005 of said Court’s then Special Eighth Division in
CA-G.R. No. 81262;2 and, (c) Decision dated 17 February 2006 of the same
Court’s then Special Sixth Division in CA-G.R. No. 87906.3
The Facts
At or about 2:00 o’clock in the morning of 11 May 2001, along the portion of the
National Highway in Barangay Concepcion, Sariaya, Quezon, an Isuzu ten-
wheeler truck collided with a Fuso six-wheeler truck. Owned by petitioner Nelson
Imperial, the Isuzu ten-wheeler truck was then being driven by petitioner Santos
Francisco, while the Fuso six-wheeler truck was driven by respondent Santiago
Giganto, Jr. who was, at the time, accompanied by a helper or pahinante,
respondent Samuel Cubeta. After colliding with the Fuso six-wheeler truck, the
Isuzu ten-wheeler truck further rammed into a Kia Besta Van which was, in turn,
being driven by respondent Arnel Lazo. The KIA Besta Van was owned by Noel
Tagle who was then on board said vehicle, together with the following
passengers, namely, Gloria, Jonathan, Jaypee, Jervin, Jerald and Lydia, all
surnamed Felix; Marvin, Martin and Jan-Jon, all surnamed Sadiwa; Antonio
Landoy; and, respondents Evelyn Felix, and Jasmin Galvez.4
There were multiple damages on the vehicles. Much more tragic than that, the
accident resulted in the death of Noel Tagle, the owner of the KIA Besta Van,
and seven of its passengers, namely, Gloria, Jonathan, Jaypee, Jervin, Jerald
and Lydia, all surnamed Felix; and, Antonio Landoy. Although they survived the
mishap, on the other hand, respondents Arnel Lazo, Evelyn Felix and Jasmin
Galvez all suffered serious physical injuries and were immediately brought to the
nearest hospital for treatment.
As a consequence of the collisions, a criminal complaint for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical Injuries
and Damage to Property was filed against petitioners Santos Francisco and Noel
Imperial on 16 May 2001. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-99
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sariaya, Quezon.5
On 3 July 2001, a complaint for damages was also filed by petitioners Francisco
and Imperial against respondents Giganto and Cubeta, the driver and pahinante
of the Fuso six-wheeler truck, respondent Leticia Pedraja, its alleged registered
owner, and respondent Maricel Joson, its alleged present owner. Anchored on
the supposed fact that the accident was caused by the recklessness and gross
negligence of respondent Giganto, the complaint was docketed as Civil Case
No. 2001-0296 before Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City.
In turn alleging that the mishap was attributable to the negligence of the driver
of the Isuzu ten-wheeler truck, respondent Giganto joined respondent Maricel
Joson and her husband, respondent Gerard Ferdinand Joson, in filing against
petitioners Francisco and Imperial the complaint for damages docketed as Civil
Case No. 8314 before Branch 82 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Valenzuela City.6
On 6 August 2001, respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson moved for the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 2001-0296 before the Naga RTC, on the ground of
litis pendentia. Invoking the "interest of justice rule", said respondents argued
that Civil Case No. 8314 before the Valenzuela MeTC should be maintained
despite petitioners’ earlier filing of their complaint for damages before the Naga
RTC. Likewise invoking litis pendentia and relying on the earlier filing of their
complaint, on the other hand, petitioners filed a motion dated 28 September
2001, seeking the dismissal of the complaint for damages respondents Giganto
and Spouses Joson filed against them before the Valenzuela MeTC. In a
supplement to their motion to dismiss dated 4 February, 2002, however,
respondents Giganto and the Spouses Joson argued that it was the case before
the Naga RTC which should be dismissed since petitioners not only failed to
implead their respective spouses and that of respondent Pedraja but had already
received payment from their insurer, the Standard Insurance Company, Inc., for
the damages sustained by the Isuzu ten-wheeler truck.7
With the Valenzuela MeTC’s 28 February 2002 dismissal of the complaint filed
against them by respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson, petitioners amended
their complaint before the Naga RTC for the purpose of impleading the following
additional defendants: (a) the respective spouses of respondents Giganto,
Cubeta, Maricel Joson and Leticia Pedraja; (b) the driver of the KIA Besta Van,
respondent Lazo; and (c) the surviving spouse of the registered owner thereof,
respondent Agnes Tagle. In said amended complaint, petitioners averred,
among other matters, that the vehicular accident was caused by negligence of
respondents Giganto and Lazo, the drivers of the Fuso six-wheeler truck and the
KIA Besta Van, respectively. In a motion dated 16 March 2002, however,
respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson sought the reconsideration of the
dismissal of their complaint by the Valenzuela MeTC on the ground that
petitioners’ claim of priority was effectively discounted by the fact that their
amended complaint in Civil Case No. 2001-0296 did not retroact to the date of
filing of their original complaint before the Naga RTC.81avvphi1
In the meantime, respondents Lazo, Tagle, Felix and Galvez joined respondents
Gregorio Felix and Antonio Landoy, the heirs/relatives of the deceased
passengers of the KIA Besta Van, in filing a complaint for damages against
petitioners on 13 September 2001. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-0325 before
Branch 74 of the RTC of Parañaque City, said complaint asseverated that
petitioner Francisco’s negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the
mishap. In a motion filed on 19 November 2001 before the Parañaque RTC,
however, petitioners sought the dismissal of said complaint in view of the
complaints for damages then still pending before the Naga RTC and the
Valenzuela MeTC. In turn utilizing the pendency of Civil Case No. 01-0325
before the Parañaque RTC alongside their complaint before the Valenzuela
MeTC, respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson filed a motion dated 18 March
2002 praying for the dismissal of petitioners’ amended complaint before the
Naga RTC on the ground of litis pendentia.9
On 2 August 2002, the Naga City RTC issued an order dismissing petitioners’
amended complaint on the ground that the same was barred by the complaint
for damages filed against them before the Parañaque RTC. Differentiating said
pleading from a supplemental pleading which only serves to bolster or add
something to a primary pleading, the Naga RTC ruled that petitioners’ amended
complaint supplanted and did not retroact to the time of their original
complaint.10 Subsequent to the Naga RTC's 16 September 2002 denial of
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order, 11 the Valenzuela
MeTC went on to issue an order dated 30 September 2002 reconsidering its
earlier dismissal of Civil Case No. 8314 and requiring petitioners to file their
answer to the complaint filed by respondents Giganto and the Spouses
Joson. 12 In view of the Parañaque RTC's further issuance of the 7 October 2002
order denying their motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-0325,13 petitioners
assailed all of the foregoing orders in the petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. SP No. 74030.14
On 4 September 2003, the CA's then Tenth Division issued a decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 74030 to the following effect: (a) nullifying the Valenzuela MeTC's
30 September 2002 order which reinstated Civil Case No. 8314; (b) affirming the
2 August 2002 and 16 September 2002 orders issued by the Naga RTC which
dismissed petitioners' amended complaint in Civil Case No. 2001-0296 on the
ground of litis pendentia; and, (c) affirming the Parañaque RTC's 7 October 2002
order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-0325. Finding that
the damages in the aggregate sum of ₱576,876.03 asserted by respondents
Giganto and Spouses Joson in Civil Case No. 8314 were beyond the
jurisdictional amount then cognizable by the Valenzuela MeTC, the CA Tenth
Division ruled that no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed against the Naga
RTC and the Parañaque RTC whose combined orders gave premium to Civil
Case No. 01-0325 over Civil Case No. 2001-0296. In the absence of proof that
the greater number of cases pending thereat would actually result in the violation
of petitioners' right to a speedy trial, the jurisdiction of the Parañaque RTC was
upheld with the added ground that it was the venue most accessible to majority
of the parties.15
Aggrieved, petitioners assailed the foregoing order in the 9 November 2003
petition for review on certiorari docketed before this Court as G.R. No.
160067.16 In the meantime, the Sariaya MTC proceeded to conduct the
mandatory pre-trial conference in Criminal Case No. 01-99 after petitioner
Francisco entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment scheduled in the
case.17 Thru his counsel, Atty. Aristotle Dominguez, petitioner Francisco
proposed the following facts for stipulation with the prosecution, to wit:
"(a) that the assistant public prosecutor had told the undersigned counsel inside
the courtroom during a court break[sic] (upon undersigned's inquiry) that he had
already interviewed Arnel Lazo (the driver of the Besta Van carrying the people
who were injured and several others who eventually died);
(b) That Arnel Lazo declared during said interview to Prosecutor Zabella that, as
opposed to the affidavits of the driver and 'pahinante' of the FUSO 6-wheeler
truck, Arnel Lazo clearly saw the driver of the FUSO 6-wheeler truck attempt an
overtake, which attempt was rendered unsuccessful because it was hit by the
on-coming 10-wheeler truck driven by the accused herein; and
(c) that for some reason, (the) prosecutor did not and still does not believe the
version of events as declared to him by Arnel Lazo in that interview."18
In view of Prosecutor Rodolfo Zabella, Jr.’s refusal to stipulate on the foregoing
matters, the Sariaya MTC went on to issue a pre-trial order dated 14 August
2001 stating, in part, that "1.Atty. Dominguez made a proposal for stipulation and
admission to the effect that sometime after the arraignment of the accused, he
(Atty. Dominguez) was able to talk and interview Arnel Lazo, the driver of the
Besta Van who admitted to him that it was his 6-wheeler truck which attempted
to overtake another vehicle thereby causing the vehicular (accident) subject of
the instant case. The Public Prosecutor did not agree."19 As a consequence,
petitioner Francisco filed on 30 August 2001 a motion styled as one "to compel
and disqualify Prosecutor Zabella and to correct the pre-trial order" on the ground
that the latter cannot refuse to stipulate on matters of which he has personal
knowledge and that the Judge’s recollection of the proposed stipulation was
different from that actually proposed.20 With the Sariaya MTC’s denial of said
motion in an order dated 18 October 2001,21 petitioner Francisco filed a motion
for reconsideration on 19 November 2001.22
On 9 January 2002, the Sariaya MTC issued an order which, while denying
petitioner Francisco’s motion for reconsideration, directed that the pre-trial
conference be set anew in view of the reassignment of the case to Prosecutor
Francis Sia and the appearance of a new private prosecutor in the
case.23 Dissatisfied, petitioner Francisco filed on 1 April 2002 the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus docketed as Civil Case No. 2002-37 before
Branch 58 of the Lucena City RTC. Likewise contending that the nine
postponements of the pre-trial conference in Criminal Case No. 01-99 were
capricious, vexatious and oppressive, petitioner Francisco further moved for the
dismissal of the case on 14 March 2004, on the ground that his constitutional
right to a speedy trial had been violated. Upon the Sariaya MTC’s 17 April 2002
denial of said motion as well as the motion for reconsideration he subsequently
interposed, petitioner Francisco filed yet another petition for certiorari and
prohibition which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2002-90 before Branch 58 of
the Lucena RTC and, later, consolidated with Civil Case No. 2002-37.24
On 23 June 2003, the Lucena RTC rendered a consolidated decision in Civil
Case Nos. 2002-37 and 2002-90, dismissing petitioner Francisco’s petitions for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus for lack of merit.25 Elevated by petitioner
Francisco to the CA via the petition for certiorari thereat docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 81262, said decision was upheld in the 26 October 2005 decision
rendered in the case by said court's then Special Eighth Division. 26 Brushing
aside the grave abuse of discretion petitioner Francisco imputed against the
Lucena RTC, the CA ruled that: (a) the pre-trial order cannot be corrected in the
absence of evidence of the error supposedly reflected therein; (b) the Public
Prosecutor cannot be compelled to enter into any stipulation that would
substantially affect the theory of the prosecution; and, (c) the postponements of
the hearings a quo were brought about by the assignment of at least three Public
Prosecutors to the case and cannot, therefore, be considered capricious and
violative of petitioner Francisco’s right to a speedy trial.27 Undaunted, the latter
filed the petition for review on certiorari docketed before this Court as G.R. No.
170410.28
In Civil Case No. 01-0325, on the other hand, petitioners Francisco and Imperial
filed with the Parañaque RTC their 14 December 2002 answer, with motion to
admit the third-party complaint therein incorporated against respondents
Pedraja, Joson, Giganto, Cubeta and their respective spouses. 29 Upon receipt
of the Parañaque RTC’s 2 June 2003 order requiring them to pay the necessary
filing and other docket fees relative to their third-party complaint,30petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration dated 17 June 2003, pleading as ground for
non-payment of said fees the pendency of their petition for certiorari assailing,
among other matters, the Naga RTC’s dismissal of Civil Case No. 2001-
0296.31 Having issued the 14 November 2003 order holding petitioners’ payment
of the same fees in abeyance pending the final outcome of said petition for
certiorari,32 the Parañaque RTC, upon the motion dated 20 May 2004 filed
respondents Felix, Galvez, Tagle, Lazo and Landoy, 33 issued the 8 June 2004
notice setting the case for pre-trial conference on 16 August 2004 and requiring
the parties to file their pre-trial briefs.34
However, for failure of petitioners and their counsel to attend the pre-trial
conference and to file their pre-trial brief, the Parañaque RTC issued the order
dated 16 August 2004 authorizing respondents Hilarion and Gregorio Felix as
well as respondents Tagle and Landoy to present their evidence ex parte. In said
order, respondent Evelyn Felix was likewise declared non-suited alongside
respondents Galvez and Lazo whose complaints were, as a consequence,
dismissed without prejudice in view of their failure to attend the same pre-trial
conference.35Aggrieved by the Parañaque RTC’s 6 October 2004 denial of their
motion for reconsideration of said order,36petitioners filed the petition for
certiorari and prohibition which, under docket of CA-G.R. SP No. 87906, was
subsequently denied for lack of merit in the 17 February 2006 Decision
eventually rendered by CA’s then Special Sixth Division. 37 Petitioners’ petition
for review on certiorari questioning said decision rendered by the CA was
docketed before this Court as G.R. No. 17162238 and, pursuant to the 16 May
2006 report submitted by the Clerk of Court of this Court's Second
Division,39 was consolidated with G.R. Nos. 160067 and 170410.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 160067, petitioners Francisco and Imperial essentially fault the CA
for upholding the jurisdiction of the Parañaque RTC over the Naga RTC with
respect to the parties’ causes of action for damages against each other. Calling
attention to the lesser case load of the Naga RTC, petitioners argue that the
cause for the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the case will not be
served by the Parañaque RTC. Despite said court’s relative proximity to majority
of the parties, petitioners likewise maintain that majority of the witnesses material
to the complete disposition of the case live closer to the Naga RTC.40
In G.R. No. 170410, on the other hand, petitioner Francisco argues that the CA
erred in failing to appreciate the fact that the nine postponements of the pre-trial
conference in the case attributable to the prosecution amounted to a violation of
his constitutional right to a speedy trial.41
In G.R No. 171622, petitioners Francisco and Imperial maintain that the CA
incorrectly discounted grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Lucena RTC
when it authorized Hilarion and Gregorio Felix as well as respondents Tagle and
Landoy to present their evidence ex parte in Civil Case No. 01-0325.42
The Court’s Ruling
It bears emphasizing at the outset that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition
petitioners filed before the CA were all anchored on the grave abuse of discretion
supposedly imputable against the RTCs of Naga, Lucena and Parañaque for
issuing the rulings therein assailed. Like prohibition,43 however, the rule is settled
that certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Because
their function is limited to keeping inferior courts within the bounds of their
jurisdiction,44 the writs therefor may be issued only in cases of lack of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the
context of said special civil actions, it has been consistently held that grave
abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility.45
In G.R. No. 160067, petitioners Francisco and Imperial argue that grave abuse
of discretion is imputable against both the Naga and Parañaque RTCs for,
respectively, dismissing Civil Case No. 2001-0296 and denying the motion to
dismiss they have filed in Civil Case No. 01-0325. Contending that the speedy
disposition of the parties’ causes of action for damages against each other will
be better achieved by the Naga RTC, petitioners contrast said court’s 121
pending cases as of 31 October 200246 to the Parañaque RTC’s 1,019 pending
cases as of September 2002.47While conceding that the Parañaque RTC is
nearer to the respective residences of all the parties, 48 petitioners also maintain
that the cause for inexpensive resolution of the parties’ cases would be best
served by the Naga RTC which is purportedly more accessible to the material
witnesses whose testimonies are indispensable to the just resolution of the case,
namely, Santiago Carale and Manuel Nacion, respondent Francisco's two
pahinantes,; and, Martin, Marvin and Jan-Jon Sadiwa, the passengers of the KIA
Besta Van.49
Although the Constitution concededly guarantees that "(a)ll persons shall have
the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies",50 it is evident that petitioners’ arguments in G.R. No.
160067 have more to do with the wisdom of the assailed rulings of the RTCs of
Naga and Parañaque than said courts’ jurisdiction to issue the same. Consistent
with its function as a remedy for the correction of errors of jurisdiction,51 however,
the rule is settled that errors of judgment involving the wisdom or legal
soundness of a decision are beyond the province of a petition for certiorari. 52 Not
being intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling,53 a writ of
certiorari cannot be exercised in order to review the judgment of the lower court
as to its intrinsic correctness, either upon the law or the facts of the case.54 As
long as the trial court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged error committed in
the exercise of its discretion will, therefore, amount to nothing more than mere
errors of judgments, correctible by an appeal and not by a petition for certiorari.55
Even prescinding from the foregoing considerations, our perusal of the record
also shows that, by filing their answer and third-party complaint against
respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto and Cubeta in Civil Case No. 01-0325,
petitioners have already submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
Parañaque RTC. In addition, petitioners have filed before said court the following
motions and incidents, viz.: (a) 17 June 2003 motion for reconsideration of the 2
June 2003 order directing the payment of the filing and other docket fees for said
third-party complaint; (b) 11 June 2003 opposition to set the case for
hearing;56 and, (c) 2 September 2004 urgent motion for reconsideration and to
set aside order of default.57 Having filed their third-party complaint as aforesaid
and repeatedly sought positive relief from the Parañaque RTC, it stands to
reason that petitioners' should no longer be allowed to question said court's
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 01-0325 which, unlike the suit for damages
pending before the Naga RTC, additionally involves all the parties indispensable
to the complete resolution of the case.
Under the "interest of justice rule", moreover, the determination of which court
would be "in a better position to serve the interests of justice" also entails the
consideration of the following factors: (a) the nature of the controversy; (b) the
comparative accessibility of the court to the parties; and, (c) other similar
factors.58 Considering that majority of the parties live closer to the Parañaque
RTC,59 we cannot hospitably entertain petitioners’ insistence that the abatement
of the case before said court in favor of the one they filed before the Naga RTC
would promote the expeditious and inexpensive disposition of the parties’
complaints for damages against each other which are indisputably personal in
nature. Even assuming that they would all be called to testify regarding the
circumstances surrounding the subject vehicular accident, it also appears that,
as residents of Brgy. Inocencio Salud, General Emilio Aguinaldo (GMA), Cavite
City, the witnesses Martin, Marvin and Jan-Jon Sadiwa60 live closer to the
Parañaque RTC rather than the Naga RTC.
In G.R. No. 170410, on the other hand, we find that petitioner Francisco is
similarly out on a limb in insisting that the Lucena RTC gravely abused its
discretion in upholding the Sariaya MTC’s denial of his motion to dismiss
Criminal Case No. 01-99 on the ground that his constitutional right to a speedy
trial has been violated. Designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by
holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time and to
prevent delays in the administration of justice, said right is considered violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays.61 In the case of Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan, 62 this Court significantly
ruled as follows:
"While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly,
expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long
in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is consistent
with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the accused,
but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind
that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court
are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to that intent.
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused
necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad
hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a)
length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion of his
right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant." xxxx
Petitioner Francisco claims that his right to a speedy trial was violated when the
Public Prosecutors assigned to the case failed to attend the nine hearings
scheduled by the Sariaya MTC on 10 and 17 October 2001, 7 November 2001,
23 January 2002, 13 March 2002, 4 September 2002, 6 November 2002, 15
January 2003 and 5 March 2003. Far from being vexatious, capricious and
oppressive, however, the delays entailed by the postponements of the aforesaid
hearings were, to a great extent, attributable to petitioner Francisco’s own pursuit
of extraordinary remedies against the interlocutory orders issued by the Sariaya
MTC and the assignment of at least three public prosecutors to the case, namely,
Prosecutors Rodolfo Zabella, Jr., Francis Sia and Joel Baligod. Indeed, the
record shows that, on 30 August 2001, petitioner filed a motion styled as one to
compel Prosecutor Zabella to agree to his proposed stipulations and/or to
disqualify him from the case as well as to correct the pre-trial order issued on 14
August 2001.63 Considering that said motion was denied by the Sariaya MTC
only on 18 October 2001,64 we find that Prosecutor Zabella's absence at the 10
and 17 October 2001 pre-trial conference in the case can hardly be considered
capricious, vexatious and oppressive.
The record further shows that, upon the Sariaya MTC’s issuance of the 9
January 2002 order denying his motion for reconsideration of said 18 October
2001 order and setting anew the pre-trial conference in the case,65 petitioner
Francisco proceeded to file on 1 April 2002 the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus docketed as Civil Case No. 2002-37 before Branch 58 of the
Lucena City RTC.66 Although Prosecutor Sia, as replacement of Prosecutor
Zabella, failed to attend the 7 November 2001, 23 January, 2002 and 13 March
2002 hearings scheduled in the case, petitioner Francisco cannot, consequently,
complain of violation of his right to speedy trial in view of his pending petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus which raised, among other matters,
issues pertinent to the conduct of the pre-trial conference by the Sariaya MTC.
Without even taking into consideration the additional time Prosecutor Sia
understandably needed to study the case, we find that the foregoing
developments justified the Sariaya MTC’s 17 April 2002 denial of the motion to
dismiss filed by petitioner Francisco on the ground that the cancellation of the
hearings on the aforesaid dates violated his right to the speedy disposition of the
case.67
With the Sariaya MTC’s 18 July 2002 denial of his motion for reconsideration of
said 17 April 2002 order, petitioner Francisco once again elevated the matter to
Branch 58 Lucena RTC via the petition for certiorari and prohibition which, under
docket of Civil Case No. 2002-90, incorporated a prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to stop further proceedings
in Criminal Case No. 01-99.68 The same prayer for provisional relief petitioner
was reiterated in his 2 January 2003 and 14 March 2003 supplement to the
petition which, respectively, took issue against the absence of a prosecutor
and/or the complaining witnesses at (a) the 4 September 2002 and 6 November
2001 pre-trial conferences before the Sariaya MTC;69 and, (b) the similar
settings scheduled for 15 January 2003 and 5 March 2003. 70 To our mind,
petitioner Francisco’s harping on his right to a speedy trial before the Sariaya
MTC is materially attenuated by his motion for the disqualification of Prosecutor
Zabella from the case and, later, his repeated prayer for the stoppage of the
proceedings a quo in his petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Lucena
RTC.
Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates
commencement of the trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order71 and
the continuous conduct thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days, 72Section 3
a (1), Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies
against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the time within which
trial must commence. In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial,
moreover, courts are "required to do more than a mathematical computation of
the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case" and to give
particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.73 Viewed
in the context of the above discussed procedural antecedents as well as the
further reassignment of the case to Prosecutor Baligod as a consequence of
Prosecutor Sia’s subsequent transfer to another government office, we find that
the CA correctly brushed aside petitioner Francisco's claim that the
postponements of the pre-trial conferences in the case before the Sariaya MTC
were violative of his right to a speedy trial.
Finally in G.R. No. 171622, petitioners Francisco and Imperial take issue against
the Parañaque RTC's issuance of the 8 June 2004 order setting the pre-trial
conference in Civil Case No. 01-0325 and requiring the parties to file their
respective pre-trial briefs. Calling attention to the fact that respondents Pedraja,
Joson, Giganto, Cubeta had yet to file an answer to the third-party complaint
incorporated in their 14 December 2002 answer, petitioners argue that the
Parañaque RTC's issuance of said 8 June 2004 order was both premature and
attended with grave abuse of discretion. Further claiming that they did not
receive a copy of said 8 June 2004 order, petitioners asseverate that CA should
have nullified the Parañaque RTC's 16 August 2004 order which: (a) authorized
respondents Hilarion and Gregorio Felix, Tagle and Landoy to present their
evidence ex parte; and, (b) dismissed the complaint without prejudice insofar as
it concerned respondents Evelyn Felix, Galvez and Lazo who were declared
non-suited.
Despite the Parañaque RTC's issuance of the 14 November 2003 order holding
in abeyance the payment of the filing and other docket fees for petitioners' third-
party complaint, the record is, indeed, bereft of any showing that summons were
issued requiring respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto and Cubeta to file their
answer to the aforesaid pleading. If only in the interest of the orderly, expeditious
and complete disposition of the parties' complaints for damages against each
other, we find that the Parañaque RTC should have first awaited the full joinder
of the issues before its 8 June 2004 grant of the motion to set the case for hearing
filed by respondents Felix, Galvez, Tagle, Lazo and Landoy. More so, when it is
borne in mind that the necessity for respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto and
Cubeta to be accorded a chance to participate in the case was rendered
imperative by the Naga RTC's 2 August 2002 dismissal of Civil Case No. 2001-
0296 and the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8314 before the Valenzuela MeTC
pursuant to the 4 September 2003 decision rendered by the CA's Tenth Division
in CA-G.R. SP No. 74030.
Although what constitutes a valid ground to excuse litigants and their counsel is
also subject to the sound discretion of the judge, 74 the fact that petitioners have
filed their answer and third-party complaint in Civil Case No. 01-0325 also
militates against the Parañaque RTC's 16 August 2004 order which, at bottom,
amounted to their being declared in default. Inasmuch as procedural rules are
tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases, courts have likewise been
exhorted to afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to have their cases
justly determined, free from the constraints of technicalities.75 Time and again,
this Court has espoused a policy of liberality in setting aside orders of default
which are frowned upon, as a case is best decided when all contending parties
are able to ventilate their respective claims, present their arguments and adduce
evidence in support thereof.76 Thus, the issuance of the orders of default should
be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of
obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court. 77
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160067 and
170410 are both DENIED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 171622, the petition is
GRANTED and the 17 February 2006 decision in CA-G.R. No. 87906 is,
accordingly, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered
NULLIFYING the Parañaque RTC's 16 August 2004 order and directing said
court to: (a) order petitioners Francisco and Imperial to pay the filing and other
docket fees for their third-party complaint; (b) order the issuance of summons to G.R. No. 174504 March 21, 2011
respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto and Cubeta with respect to said third-party
complaint; and, thereafter, (c) to conduct the mandatory pre-trial conference PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
without further delay. vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third division) and MANUEL G.
SO ORDERED. BARCENAS, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The dismissal order arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to
an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in
double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

This is a Petition for Certiorari which seeks to nullify the Sandiganbayan’s July
26, 2006 Resolution1 which granted private respondent’s demurrer to evidence.

Factual Antecedents

On May 21, 2004, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 89
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 14452 before the Sandiganbayan. The
Information reads —

That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent
thereto at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MANUEL G. BARCENAS, a
high-ranking public officer, being a Vice-Mayor of Toledo City, and committing
the offense in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City
Government of Toledo in the total amount of SIXTY-ONE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE PESOS (₱61,765.00), Philippine Currency, which he
received by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same
within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash
advances of ₱61,765.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage
and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.3

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 27990 and raffled to the Third
Division. On October 20, 2004, private respondent was arraigned for which he
pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented its lone witness, Manolo Tulibao
Villad, Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditor. Thereafter, the prosecution
filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.
On April 20, 2006, private respondent filed a motion4 for leave to file demurrer to
evidence. On June 16, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 5 granting
the motion. On June 30, 2006, private respondent filed his demurrer6to evidence.
Sandiganbayan’s Ruling
On July 26 2006, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Resolution, viz:
WE find the demurrer to evidence well taken.
The testimony of the prosecution’s lone witness City Auditor Manolo Tulibao
confirming his Report (Exhibit "D") that the accused had indeed liquidated his
cash advances did not help the prosecution but rather weakened its cause of
action against the accused. At the time this case was filed in Court, the accused
had already liquidated his cash advances subject matter hereof in the total
amount of ₱61,765.00. Hence, We find the element of damages wanting in this
case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted and
this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.7
Issue
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in giving due course to and eventually granting the
demurrer to evidence.8
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner contends that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements
of the offense defined and penalized under Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445: (1) the
private respondent, an accountable officer, received cash advances in the total
amount of ₱120,000.00 to defray the expenses of the Public Assistance
Committee and Committee on Police Matters covering the period January-March
1993, (2) the purpose of the cash advance has been served, (3) the private
respondent settled his cash advances only in March 1996, (4) the city auditor
sent a demand letter to the private respondent to settle the cash advance within
72 hours from receipt thereof, and (5) the private respondent received said letter
on December 22, 1995 but failed to liquidate the same within the aforestated
period.
Although it concedes that the private respondent eventually settled the subject
cash advances sometime in March 1996, petitioner theorizes that damage is not
one of the elements of the offense charged. Hence, the settlement of the cash
advance would not exonerate the private respondent but only mitigate his
criminal liability. Otherwise, the purpose of the law would be rendered futile since
accountable officers can easily make cash advances and liquidate the same
beyond the period prescribed by law without being penalized for doing so.
Finally, petitioner argues that double jeopardy does not lie in this case because
the order of dismissal was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
Private Respondent’s Arguments
Private respondent counters that the grant of a demurrer to evidence is
equivalent to an acquittal from which the prosecution cannot appeal as it would
place the accused in double jeopardy. Further, assuming that the
Sandiganbayan erroneously granted the demurrer, this would, at most,
constitute an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction.
Thus, certiorari does not lie to correct the grant of the demurrer to evidence by
the Sandiganbayan.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
An order of dismissal arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence has the
effect of an acquittal unless the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer9 is tantamount to an acquittal and the
dismissal order may not be appealed because this would place the accused in
double jeopardy.10 Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still
reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 11 For
the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was
a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void. 12 The burden is on the
petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority
to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 13
In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence on the
ground that the prosecution failed to prove that the government suffered any
damage from private respondent’s non-liquidation of the subject cash advance
because it was later shown, as admitted by the prosecution’s witness, that
private respondent liquidated the same albeit belatedly.
Sections 89 and 128 of P.D. No. 1445 provide—
SECTION 89. Limitations on Cash Advance. — No cash advance shall be given
unless for a legally authorized specific purpose. A cash advance shall be
reported on and liquidated as soon as the purpose for which it was given
has been served. No additional cash advance shall be allowed to any official or
employee unless the previous cash advance given to him is first settled or a
proper accounting thereof is made.
SECTION 128. Penal Provision. — Any violation of the provisions of Sections
67, 68, 89, 106, and 108 of this Code or any regulation issued by the
Commission [on Audit] implementing these sections, shall be punished by
a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos or by imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) months, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, COA Circular No. 90-33114 or the "Rules and Regulations on
the Granting, Utilization and Liquidation of Cash Advances" which implemented
Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 pertinently provided–
5. LIQUIDATION OF CASH ADVANCES
5.1 The AO (Accountable Officer) shall liquidate his cash advance as follows:
5.1.1 Salaries, Wages, etc. - within 5 days after each 15 day/ end of the month
pay period.
5.1.2 Petty Operating Expenses and Field Operating Expenses - within 20 days
after the end of the year; subject to replenishment during the year.
5.1.3 Foreign Travel - within 60 days after return to the Philippines.
Failure of the AO to liquidate his cash advance within the prescribed period shall
constitute a valid cause for the withholding of his salary.
xxxx
5.7 When a cash advance is no longer needed or has not been used for a period
of two (2) months, it must be returned to or deposited immediately with the
collecting officer.
5.8 All cash advances shall be fully liquidated at the end of each year. Except
for petty cash fund, the AO shall refund any unexpended balance to the
Cashier/Collecting Officer who will issue the necessary official receipt.
xxxx
9. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COA AUDITOR
xxxx
9.6 Upon failure of the AO to liquidate his cash advance within one month for
AOs within the station and three months for AOs outside the station from date of
grant of the cash advance, the Auditor shall issue a letter demanding liquidation
or explanation for non-liquidation.
9.7 If 30 days have elapsed after the demand letter is served and no liquidation
or explanation is received, or the explanation received is not satisfactory, the
Auditor shall advise the head of the agency to cause or order the withholding of
the payment of any money due the AO. The amount withheld shall be applied to
his (AO's) accountability. The AO shall likewise be held criminally liable for failure
to settle his accounts.15 (Emphasis supplied.)
As can be seen, contrary to the findings of the Sandiganbayan, actual damage
to the government arising from the non-liquidation of the cash advance is not an
essential element of the offense punished under the second sentence of Section
89 of P.D. No. 1445 as implemented by COA Circular No. 90-331. Instead, the
mere failure to timely liquidate the cash advance is the gravamen of the offense.
Verily, the law seeks to compel the accountable officer, by penal provision, to
promptly render an account of the funds which he has received by reason of his
office.16
Nonetheless, even if the Sandiganbayan proceeded from an erroneous
interpretation of the law and its implementing rules, the error committed was an
error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. Petitioner failed to establish that the
dismissal order was tainted with grave abuse of discretion such as the denial of
the prosecution’s right to due process or the conduct of a sham trial. In fine, the
error committed by the Sandiganbayan is of such a nature that can no longer be
rectified on appeal by the prosecution because it would place the accused in
double jeopardy.17
In United States v. Kilayko,18 the accused was charged with a violation under
Section 12 of the Chattel Mortgage Law19 which prohibited the mortgagor from
selling the mortgaged property without the consent of the mortgagee while the
debt secured remained outstanding. The accused was arraigned for which he
pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, he moved to dismiss the Information. After the
prosecution and defense entered into a stipulation of facts, the trial court
dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution to this Court, we
acknowledged that the trial court erred in interpreting Section 12 when it ruled
that the subsequent payment of the secured debt extinguished the accused’s
criminal liability arising from the unlawful sale of the mortgaged property.
Nonetheless, we ruled that the judgment dismissing the Information, although
based upon an erroneous interpretation of the law, was in effect a judgment on
the merits from which no appeal lay on the part of the prosecution as it would
place the accused in double jeopardy.201avvphi1
In another case, People v. City Court of Silay,21 after the prosecution had
presented its evidence and rested its case, the accused filed a motion to dismiss
for insufficiency of evidence. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed
the case. On appeal by the prosecution to this Court, we were of the view that
the dismissal order was erroneous and resulted to a miscarriage of justice.
However, we ruled that such error cannot be corrected because double jeopardy
had already set in:
In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge
against them was one on the merits of the case which is to be distinguished from
other dismissals at the instance of the accused. All the elements of double
jeopardy are here present, to wit: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged, (2) a court of competent
jurisdiction, and (3) an unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the
prosecution had rested its case, amounting to the acquittal of the accused. The
dismissal being one on the merits, the doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea
of double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
It is clear to Us that the dismissal of the criminal case against the private
respondents was erroneous.
As correctly stated in the Comment of the Acting Solicitor General, the accused
were not charged with substitution of genuine "tarjetas" with false ones. The
basis for the accusation was that the accused entered false statements as to the
weight of the sugar cane loaded in certain cane cars in "tarjetas" which were
submitted to the laboratory section of the company. The act of making a false
entry in the "tarjetas" is undoubtedly an act of falsification of a private document,
the accused having made untruthful statements in a narration of facts which they
were under obligation to accomplish as part of their duties - Ernesto de la Paz,
as overseer of Hda. Malisbog, and the other accused as scalers of the offended
party, the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, thereby causing damage to the latter.
However erroneous the order of respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage
of justice resulted from said order, to paraphrase Justice Alex Reyes in People
vs. Nieto, 103 Phil. 1133, such error cannot now be righted because of the timely
plea of double jeopardy.22
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172777 October 19, 2011
BENJAMIN B. BANGAYAN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SALLY GO BANGAYAN, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 172792
RESALLY DE ASIS DELFIN, Petitioner,
vs.
SALLY GO BANGAYAN, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
These are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the March 14, 2006
Decision1 and the May 22, 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 83704 entitled "Sally Go-Bangayan v. Hon. Luisito C. Sardillo, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Caloocan City, Branch 126, Benjamin
B. Bangayan, Jr. and Resally de Asis Delfin."
The Facts
This case stemmed from a complaint-affidavit filed by respondent Sally Go-
Bangayan (Sally Go) accusing petitioners Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin,
Jr.) and Resally de Asis Delfin (Resally) of having committed the crime of
bigamy.3
On March 7, 1982, Benjamin, Jr. married Sally Go in Pasig City and they had
two children.4 Later, Sally Go learned that Benjamin, Jr. had taken Resally as
his concubine whom he subsequently married on January 5, 2001 under the
false name, "Benjamin Z. Sojayco."5 Benjamin, Jr. fathered two children with
Resally. Furthermore, Sally Go discovered that on September 10, 1973,
Benjamin, Jr. also married a certain Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan
City.
The City Prosecutor of Caloocan City conducted a preliminary investigation and
thereafter issued a Resolution dated June 5, 2002 recommending the filing of an
information for bigamy against Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for having contracted
a marriage despite knowing fully well that he was still legally married to Sally
Go.6 The information was duly filed on November 15, 2002 and was raffled to
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 126 (RTC) where it was
docketed as Criminal Case No. C-66783.7
After the arraignment, during which petitioners both pleaded not guilty to the
charge against them, the prosecution presented and offered its evidence.8 On
September 8, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. and Resally separately filed their respective
motions for leave to file a demurrer to evidence.9 This was granted by the RTC
in its Order dated September 29, 2003.10
On October 20, 2003, Benjamin, Jr. filed his Demurrer to Evidence, praying that
the criminal case for bigamy against him be dismissed for failure of the
prosecution to present sufficient evidence of his guilt. 11 His plea was anchored
on two main arguments: (1) he was not legally married to Sally Go because of
the existence of his prior marriage to Azucena; and (2) the prosecution was
unable to show that he and the "Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr.," who married Resally,
were one and the same person.12
In its December 3, 2003 Order,13 the RTC dismissed the criminal case against
Benjamin, Jr. and Resally for insufficiency of evidence. 14 It reasoned out that the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Benjamin, Jr. used the
fictitious name, Benjamin Z. Sojayco Jr., in contracting his marriage with
Resally.15Corollarily, Resally cannot be convicted of bigamy because the
prosecution failed to establish that Resally married Benjamin, Jr. 16
Aggrieved, Sally Go elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari. On
March 14, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision17 granting her petition and
ordering the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings. The CA held
that the following pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution were
sufficient to deny the demurrer to evidence: (1) the existence of three marriages
of Benjamin, Jr. to Azucena, Sally Go and Resally; (2) the letters and love notes
from Resally to Benjamin, Jr.; (3) the admission of Benjamin, Jr. as regards his
marriage to Sally Go and Azucena; and (4) Benjamin, Jr.’s admission that he
and Resally were in some kind of a relationship.18 The CA further stated that
Benjamin, Jr. was mistaken in claiming that he could not be guilty of bigamy
because his marriage to Sally Go was null and void in light of the fact that he
was already married to Azucena. A judicial declaration of nullity was required in
order for him to be able to use the nullity of his marriage as a defense in a bigamy
charge.19
Petitioners’ motions for reconsideration were both denied by the CA in a
Resolution dated May 22, 2006.20
Hence, these petitions.
The Issues
Petitioner Benjamin, Jr. raises the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals in a certiorari proceedings
may inquire into the factual matters presented by the parties in the lower court,
without violating the constitutional right of herein petitioner (as accused in the
lower court) against double jeopardy as enshrined in Section 21, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not the order of the trial court that granted the Demurrer to
Evidence filed by the petitioners as accused therein was issued with grave abuse
of discretion that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction as
to warrant the grant of the relief as prayed for in the Petition for Certiorari filed
by respondent Sally [Go-Bangayan].
3. Whether or not the prosecution was indeed denied due process when the trial
court allegedly ignored the existence [of the] pieces of evidence presented by
the prosecution.21
On the other hand, petitioner Resally poses the following questions:
1. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious errors of
law in giving due course to the petition for certiorari notwithstanding the lack of
legal standing of the herein respondent (petitioner therein) as the said petition
was filed without the prior conformity and/or imprimatur of the Office of the
Solicitor General, or even the City Prosecutor’s Office of Caloocan City
2. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious errors of
law in ordering the further proceedings of the case as it would violate the right of
the accused against double jeopardy.22
Essentially, the issues which must be resolved by this Court are:
1. Whether Sally Go had the legal standing to file a petition for certiorari before
the CA despite the lack of consent of either the Office of the Solicitor General or
the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Caloocan.
2. Whether petitioners’ right against double jeopardy was violated by the CA
when it reversed the December 3, 2003 RTC Order dismissing the criminal case
against them.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court finds merit in the petitions.
Only the OSG, and not the private offended party, has the authority to question
the order granting the demurrer to evidence in a criminal case.
Petitioner Resally argues that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for
certiorari before the CA because the case against them (Resally and Benjamin,
Jr.) is criminal in nature. It being so, only the OSG or the OCP of Caloocan may
question the RTC Order dismissing the case against them. 23 Respondent’s
intervention as the offended party in the prosecution of the criminal case is only
limited to the enforcement of the civil liability.24
Sally Go counters that as the offended party, she has an interest in the
maintenance of the criminal prosecution against petitioners and
quotes Merciales v. Court of Appeals25 to support her position: "The right of
offended parties to appeal an order of the trial court which deprives them of due
process has always been recognized, the only limitation being that they cannot
appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place the accused in double
jeopardy." Moreover, the OSG and the OCP had impliedly consented to the filing
of the petition before the CA because they did not interpose any objection.26
This Court leans toward Resally’s contention that Sally Go had no personality to
file the petition for certiorari before the CA. It has been consistently held that in
criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against
him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the
State.27 The private complainant or the offended party may question such
acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is
concerned.28 As explained in the case of People v. Santiago:291awphil
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is
limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the
complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal
case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State
through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the
People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or
complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the
rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case,
the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so
he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not
bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be
prosecuted in name of said complainant. [Emphases Supplied]
A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by Sally Go before the CA discloses
that she sought reconsideration of the criminal aspect of the case. Specifically,
she prayed for the reversal of the trial court’s order granting petitioners’ demurrer
to evidence and the conduct of a full blown trial of the criminal case. Nowhere in
her petition did she even briefly discuss the civil liability of petitioners. It is
apparent that her only desire was to appeal the dismissal of the criminal case
against the petitioners. Because bigamy is a criminal offense, only the OSG is
authorized to prosecute the case on appeal. Thus, Sally Go did not have the
requisite legal standing to appeal the acquittal of the petitioners.
Sally Go was mistaken in her reading of the ruling in Merciales. First, in the said
case, the OSG joined the cause of the petitioner, thereby meeting the
requirement that criminal actions be prosecuted under the direction and control
of the public prosecutor.30 Second, the acquittal of the accused was done without
due process and was declared null and void because of the nonfeasance on the
part of the public prosecutor and the trial court.31 There being no valid acquittal,
the accused therein could not invoke the protection of double jeopardy.
In this case, however, neither the Solicitor General nor the City Prosecutor of
Caloocan City joined the cause of Sally Go, much less consented to the filing of
a petition for certiorari with the appellate court. Furthermore, she cannot claim to
have been denied due process because the records show that the trial court
heard all the evidence against the accused and that the prosecution had formally
offered the evidence before the court granted the demurrer to evidence. Thus,
the petitioners’ acquittal was valid, entitling them to invoke their right against
double jeopardy.
Double jeopardy had already set-in
Petitioners contend that the December 3, 2003 Order of dismissal issued by the
RTC on the ground of insufficiency of evidence is a judgment of acquittal. The
prosecution is, thus, barred from appealing the RTC Order because to allow such
an appeal would violate petitioners’ right against double jeopardy.32 They insist
that the CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to the lower court for further
proceedings because it disregarded the constitutional proscription on the
prosecution of the accused for the same offense.33
On the other hand, Sally Go counters that the petitioners cannot invoke their
right against double jeopardy because the RTC decision acquitting them was
issued with grave abuse of discretion, rendering the same null and void. 34
A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the
trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the
prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants
the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which
is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused. 35 Well-established is the rule that
the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence and
acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to do
so will place the accused in double jeopardy. 36
The right of the accused against double jeopardy is protected by no less than
the Bill of Rights (Article III) contained in the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant
had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or
the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.37 However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the
dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused, to
wit:
(1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused
after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits
and operates as an acquittal.
(2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the
denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute. 38
The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right
against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such
as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case
against the accused or where the trial was a sham.39 For instance, there is no
double jeopardy (1) where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation
of the prosecution's evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for
insufficiency of evidence;40and (2) where the case was dismissed at a time when
the case was not ready for trial and adjudication.41
In this case, all four elements of double jeopardy are doubtless present. A valid
information for the crime of bigamy was filed against the petitioners, resulting in
the institution of a criminal case against them before the proper court. They
pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and subsequently, the case was
dismissed after the prosecution had rested its case. Therefore, the CA erred in
reversing the trial court’s order dismissing the case against the petitioners
because it placed them in double jeopardy.
As previously discussed, an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not
appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy. However, it
may be subject to review only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court showing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.42
Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as that capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. "The abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."43 The party questioning the
acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly establish that the trial court
blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to
dispense justice.44
The CA determined that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
ignoring the evidence presented by the prosecution and granting petitioners’
demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish by
sufficient evidence the existence of the crime.45 An examination of the decision
of the trial court, however, yields the conclusion that there was no grave abuse
of discretion on its part. Even if the trial court had incorrectly overlooked the
evidence against the petitioners, it only committed an error of judgment, and not
one of jurisdiction, which could not be rectified by a petition for certiorari because
double jeopardy had already set in.46
As regards Sally Go’s assertion that she had been denied due process, an
evaluation of the records of the case proves that nothing can be further from the
truth. Jurisprudence dictates that in order for a decision of the trial court to be
declared null and void for lack of due process, it must be shown that a party was
deprived of his opportunity to be heard.47 Sally Go cannot deny that she was
given ample opportunity to present her witnesses and her evidence against
petitioners. Thus, her claim that she was denied due process is unavailing.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The March 14, 2006 Decision and
the May 22, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The December 3, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126,
Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66783, granting the Demurrer to
Evidence of petitioners Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr. and Resally de Asis Delfin
and dismissing the case against them is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191015 August 6, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Petitioner,
vs.
JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D.
NECOMEDES,** Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with
great caution, because not only the rights of the accused - but those of the
offended party and the public interest as well - are involved. Once granted, the
accused is acquitted and the offended party may be left with no recourse. Thus,
in the resolution of demurrers, judges must act with utmost circumspection and
must engage in intelligent deliberation and reflection, drawing on their
experience, the law and jurisprudence, and delicately evaluating the evidence
on hand.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the September 30,
2009 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 101823, entitled
"People of the Philippines, Petitioner, versus Hon. Concepcion Alarcon-Vergara
et al., Respondents," as well as its January 22, 2010 Resolution 3 denying
reconsideration of the assailed judgment.
Factual Antecedents
The following facts appear from the account of the CA:
On October 14, 1998, the Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP) issued Resolution No. 1427 ordering the closure of the Orient Commercial
Banking Corporation (OCBC) and placing such bank under the receivership of
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). PDIC, as the statutory
receiver of OCBC, effectively took charge of OCBC’s assets and liabilities in
accordance withits mandate under Section 30 of Republic Act 7653.
xxxx
While all the aforementioned events were transpiring, PDIC began collecting on
OCBC’s past due loans receivable by sending demand letters to its borrowers
for the immediate settlement oftheir outstanding loans. Allegedly among these
borrowers of OCBC are Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared
to have obtained a loanof [P]10 Million each. A representative of Timmy’s, Inc.
denied being granted any loan by OCBC and insisted that the signatures on the
loan documents were falsified. A representative of Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied
having applied, much less being granted, a loan by OCBC.
The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a finding that
the loans purportedly in the names of Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.
were released in the form of manager’schecks in the name of Philippine
Recycler’s and Zeta International, Inc. These manager’s checks were then
allegedly deposited to the savings account of the private respondent Jose C. Go
with OCBC and, thereafter, were automatically transferred to his current account
in order to fund personal checks issued by him earlier.
On September 24, 1999, PDIC filed a complaint4 for two (2) counts of Estafa thru
Falsification of CommercialDocuments in the Office of the City Prosecutor of the
City of Manila against the private respondents in relation to the purported loans
of Timmy’s, Inc.and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. On November 22, 2000, after finding
probable cause, the Office of the City Prosecutor of the City of Manila filed
Informations5 against the private respondents which were docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 in the RTC in Manila.
Upon being subjected to arraignment by the RTC in Manila, the private
respondents pleaded not guilty to the criminal cases filed against them. A pretrial
was conducted. Thereafter, trial of the cases ensued and the prosecution
presented its evidence. After the presentation of all of the prosecution’s
evidence, the private respondents filed a Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to
Evidence and a Motion for Voluntary Inhibition. The presiding judge granted the
private respondents’ Motion for Voluntary Inhibition and ordered the case to be
re-raffled to another branch. The case was subsequently re-raffled to the branch
of the respondent RTC judge.6
In an Order dated December 19, 2006, the respondent RTC judge granted the
private respondents’ Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence. On January
17, 2007, the private respondents filed their Demurrer to Evidence7praying for
the dismissal of the criminal cases instituted against them due to the failure of
the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On July 2, 2007, an Order8 was promulgated by the respondent RTC judge
finding the private respondents’ Demurrer to Evidence to be meritorious,
dismissing the Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 and acquitting all
of the accused in these cases. On July20, 2007, the private prosecutor in
Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 moved for a reconsideration of
the July 2, 2007 Order but the same was denied by the respondent RTC judge
in an Order9 dated October 19, 2007.10
Surprisingly, and considering thathundreds of millions of Orient Commercial
Banking Corporation (OCBC) depositors’ money appear to have been lost –
which must have contributed to the bank’s being placed under receivership, no
motion for reconsideration of the July 2, 2007 Order granting respondents’
demurrer to evidence was filed by the handling public prosecutor, Manila
Prosecutor Marlo B. Campanilla (Campanilla). Only complainant Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and
the same lacked Campanilla’s approval and/or conformé; the copy of the Motion
for Reconsideration filed with the RTC11 does not bear Campanilla’s
approval/conformé; instead,it indicates thathe was merely furnished with a copy
of the motion by registered mail.12 Thus, while the prosecution’s copy of
PDIC’sMotion for Reconsideration13 bore Campanilla’s subsequent approval
and conformity, that which was actually filed by PDIC with the RTC on July 30,
2007 did not contain the public prosecutor’s written approval and/or conformity.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On January 4, 2008, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed anoriginal Petition for Certiorari14 with the CA assailing the July 2,
2007 Order of the trial court. Itclaimed that the Order was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lackor excess of jurisdiction; that it was issued
with partiality; that the prosecution was deprived of its day in court; and that the
trial court disregarded the evidence presented, which undoubtedly showed that
respondents committed the crime of estafa through falsification ofcommercial
documents.
On September 30, 2009, the CA issued the assailed Decision with the following
decretal portion: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition
filed in this case is hereby DENIED and the assailed Orders of the respondent
RTC judge are AFFIRMED and deemed final and executory.
SO ORDERED.15
Notably, in dismissing the Petition, the appellate court held that the assailed July
2, 2007 Order of the trial court became final since the prosecution failed to move
for the reconsideration thereof, and thus double jeopardy attached. The CA
declared thus –
More important than the fact that double jeopardy already attaches is the fact
that the July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court has already attained finality. This
Order was received by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila on July 3, 2007
and by the Private Prosecutor on July 5, 2007. While the Private Prosecutor filed
a Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order, the Public Prosecutor did not
seek for the reconsideration thereof. It is the Public Prosecutor who has the
authority to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order and the Solicitor
General who can file a petition for certiorari with respect to the criminal aspect
of the cases. The failure of the Public Prosecutor to file a Motion for
Reconsideration on or before July 18, 2007 and the failure of the Solicitor
General to file a Petition for Certiorarion or before September 1, 2007 made the
order of the trial court final.
As pointed out by the respondents, the Supreme Court ruled categorically on this
matter in the case of Mobilia Products, Inc. vs. Umezawa (452 SCRA 736), as
follows:
"In a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the offended party is limited to the civil liabilityarising
therefrom. Hence, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is
an acquittal, a reconsideration of the order of dismissal or acquittal may be
undertaken, whenever legally feasible, insofar as the criminal aspect thereof is
concerned and may be made only by the public prosecutor; or in the case of an
appeal, by the State only, through the OSG. The private complainant or offended
party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the
criminal aspect ofthe case. However, the offended party or private complainant
may file a motion for reconsideration of such dismissal or acquittal or appeal
therefrom but only insofar as the civil aspect thereof is concerned. In so doing,
the private complainant or offended party need not secure the conformity of the
public prosecutor. If the court denies his motion for reconsideration, the private
complainant or offended party may appeal or file a petition for certiorarior
mandamus, if grave abuse amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown
and the aggrieved party has no right of appeal or given an adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law."16
In addition, the CA ruled that the prosecution failed to demonstrate that the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the demurrer, or that it was
denied its day in court; that on the contrary, the prosecution was afforded every
opportunity to present its evidence, yet it failed to prove that respondents
committed the crime charged.
The CA further held that the prosecution failed to present a witness who could
testify, based on personal knowledge, that the loan documents were falsified by
the respondents; that the prosecution should not have relied on "letters and
unverified ledgers," and it "should have trailed the money from the beginning to
the end;"17 that while the documentary evidenceshowed that the signatures in
the loan documents were falsified, it has not been shown who falsified them. It
added that since only two of the alleged 13 manager’s checks were being
questioned, there arose reasonable doubt as to whether estafa was committed,
as to these two checks; instead, there is an "inescapable possibility that an
honest mistake was made in the preparation of the two questioned manager’s
checks since these checks were made out to the names of different payees and
not in the names of the alleged applicants of the loans."18 The appellate court
added –
x x x Finally, the petitioner failed to present evidence on where the money went
after they were deposited to the checking account of the private respondent Jose
C. Go. There is only a vague reference that the money was used to fund the
personal checks earlier issued by x x x Go. The petitioner should have gone
further and identified who were the recipients of these personal checks and if
these personal checks were negotiated and honored. With all the resources of
the public prosecutor’s office, the petitioner should have done a better job of
prosecuting the cases filed against the private respondents. It isa shame that all
the efforts of the government will go for naught due to the negligence of the
public prosecutors in tying up the chain of evidence in a criminal case. 19
As a final point, the CA held that if errors were made inthe appreciation of
evidence, these are mere errors of judgment – and not errors of jurisdiction –
which may no longer be reviewed lest respondents be placed in double jeopardy.
The OSG moved for reconsideration, but in the assailed January 22, 2010
Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition was instituted.
Issues
In the Petition, it is alleged that –
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT –
(a) NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY
RESPONDENT RTC JUDGE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE;
(b) THE ORDER OF ACQUITTAL HAS ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY WHEN
IT WAS NOT CHALLENGED IN A TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE MANNER;
AND
(c) THE LOWER COURT MERELY COMMITTED ERRORS OF JUDGMENT
AND NOT OF JURISDICTION.20
Petitioner’s Arguments
Petitioner argues that the public prosecutor actually filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed July 2,2007 Order of the trial court granting
respondents’ demurrer – that is, by "joining"the private prosecutor PDIC in the
latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration. Nonetheless,it admitted that
while it joined PDIC in the latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration, it
had only until July 18, 2007 within which to seek reconsideration since it received
the order on July 3, 2007, while the private prosecutor received a copy of the
Order only on July 5, 2007; it pleads thatthe two-day delay in filing the motion
should not prejudice the interests of the State and the People.
Petitioner assumes further that, since it was belated in its filing of the required
Motion for Reconsideration, it may have been tardy as well in the filing of the
Petition for Certiorariwith the CA, or CA-G.R. SP No. 101823. Still, it begs the
Court to excuse its mistake in the nameof public interest and substantial justice,
and in order to maintain stability in the banking industry given that the case
involved embezzlement of large sums ofdepositors’ money in OCBC.
Petitioner goes on to argue that the CAerred in affirming the trial court’s finding
that demurrer was proper. It claims that it was able to prove the offense charged,
and it has shown that respondents were responsible therefor.
In its Reply,21 petitioner claims thatthe July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court
granting respondents’ demurrer was null and void to begin with, and thus it could
not have attained finality. It adds thatcontrary to respondents’ submission, the
private prosecutor’s Motion for Reconsideration contained the public
prosecutor’s written conformity, and that while it may be saidthat the public
prosecutor’s motion was two days late, still the trial court took cognizance thereof
and passed upon its merits; by so doing, the trial court thus validatedthe public
prosecutor’s action of adopting the private prosecutor’sMotion for
Reconsideration as his own. This being the case, it should therefore besaid that
the prosecution’s resultant Petition for Certiorariwith the CA on January 4, 2008
was timely filed within the required 60-day period, counted from November 5,
2007,or the date the public prosecutor received the trial court’s October 19, 2007
Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner submits further that a Petition for Certiorariwas the only available
remedy against the assailed Orders of the trial court, since the granting of a
demurrer in criminal cases is tantamount to an acquittal and is thus immediately
final and executory. It adds that the denial of its right to due process is apparent
since the trial court’s grant of respondents’ demurrer was purely capricious and
done with evident partiality, despite the prosecution having adduced proof
beyond reasonable doubt that they committed estafa through falsification of
commercial documents. Petitioner thus prays that the assailed CA dispositions
be reversed and that Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 be
reinstated for further proceedings.
Respondents’ Arguments
Praying that the Petition be denied, respondents Jose C. Go (Go), Aida C. Dela
Rosa (Dela Rosa), and Felecitas D. Necomedes (Nicomedes) – the accused in
Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 – argue in their Comment22 that
the trial court’s grant of their demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal; any
subsequent prosecution for the same offense would thus violate their
constitutional right against double jeopardy. They add thatsince the public
prosecutor failed to timely move for the reconsideration of the trial court’s July 2,
2007 Order, it could not have validly filed an original Petition for Certiorariwith
the CA. Nor can it be said that the prosecution and the private prosecutor jointly
filed the latter’s July 20, 2007 Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court
because the public prosecutor’s copy of PDIC’smotion was merely sent through
registered mail. Therefore if it were true that the public prosecutor gave his
approval or conformity to the motion, he did so only afterreceiving his copy of
the motion through the mail, and not at the time the private prosecutor actually
filed its Motion for Reconsideration with the trial court.
Next, respondents submit that petitioner was not deprived of its day in court; the
grant of their demurrer to evidence is based on a fair and judicious determination
of the facts and evidence bythe trial court, leading it to conclude that the
prosecution failed to meet the quantum of proof required to sustain a finding of
guilt on the part of respondents. They argue thatthere is no evidence to show
that OCBC released loan proceeds to the alleged borrowers, Timmy’s, Inc. and
Asia Textile Mills, Inc., and that these loan proceeds were then deposited in the
account of respondent Go. Since no loans were granted to the two borrowers,
then there is nothing for Go to misappropriate. With respect to the two manager’s
checks issued to Philippine Recycler’s Inc. and Zeta International, respondents
contend that these may not beconsidered to be the loan proceeds pertaining to
Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.’s loan application because these checks
were not in the name of the alleged borrowers Timmy’s, Inc.and Asia Textile
Mills, Inc. as payees. Besides, these two checks were never negotiated with
OCBC, either for encashmentor deposit, since they did not bear the respective
indorsements or signatures and account numbers of the payees; thus, they could
not be considered to havebeen negotiated nor deposited with Go’s account with
OCBC.
Next, respondents argue that the cash deposit slip used to deposit the alleged
loan proceeds in Go’s OCBC account is questionable, since under banking
procedure, a cash deposit slip may not be used to deposit checks. Moreover, it
has not been shown who prepared the said cash deposit slip. Respondents
further question the validity and authenticity of the other documentary evidence
presented, such as the Subsidiary Ledger, Cash Proof, 23 Schedule of Returned
Checks and Other Cash Items (RTCOCI), etc.
Finally, respondents claim that not all the elementsof the crime of estafa under
Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code have been established;
specifically, it has not been shown that Goreceived the alleged loan proceeds,
and that a demand was made upon him for the return thereof.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 for estafa through falsification of
commercial documents against the respondents are based on the theory that in
1997, fictitious loans in favor of two entities – Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills,
Inc. – were approved, after which two manager’s checks representing the
supposed proceeds of these fictitious loans were issued but made payable to
two different entities – Philippine Recycler’sInc. and ZetaInternational – without
any documents issued by the supposed borrowers Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile
Mills, Inc. assigning the supposedloan proceeds tothe two payees. Thereafter,
these two manager’s checks – together with several others totaling
₱120,819,475.0024 – were encashed, and then deposited in the OCBC Savings
Account No. 00810-00108-0 of Go. Then, several automatic transfer deposits
were made from Go’s savings account to his OCBC Current Account No. 008-
00-000015-0 which were then used to fund Go’s previously dishonored personal
checks.
The testimonial and documentary evidenceof the prosecution indicate that
OCBC, a commercial bank, was ordered closed by the BSP sometime in October
1998. PDIC was designated as OCBC receiver, and it took over the bank’s
affairs, assets and liabilities, records, and collected the bank’s receivables.
During efforts to collect OCBC’s pastdue loan receivables, PDIC as receiver sent
demand letters to the bank’s debtor-borrowers on record, including Timmy’s, Inc.
and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. which appeared to have obtained unsecured loans of
₱10 million each, and which apparently remained unpaid. In response to the
demand letters, Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied having obtained
loans from OCBC. Timmy’s, Inc., through its designated representative, claimed
that while it is true that it applied for an OCBC loan, it no longer pursued the
application after it was granted a loan by another bank. When the OCBC loan
documents were presented to Timmy’s, Inc.’s officers, it was discovered that the
signatures therein of the corporate officers were forgeries. In their defense and
to clarify matters, Timmy’s, Inc.’s corporate officers executed affidavits and
furnished official documents such as their passports and the corporation’s
Articles of Incorporation containing their respectivesignatures to show PDIC that
their purported signatures in the OCBC loan documents were forgeries. After its
investigation into the matter, PDIC came to the conclusion that the signatures on
the Timmy’s, Inc. loan documents were indeed falsified.25
On the other hand, in a written reply26 to PDIC’s demand letter, Asia Textile Mills,
Inc. vehemently denied thatit applied for a loan with OCBC. On this basis, PDIC
concluded that the AsiaTextile Mills, Inc.loan was likewise bogus. Moreover,
PDIC discovered other bogus loans in OCBC.
Through the falsified loan documents, the OCBC Loan Committee – composed
of Go, who was likewise OCBCPresident, respondent Dela Rosa (OCBC Senior
Vice President, or SVP, and Chief Operating Officer, or COO), Arnulfo Aurellano
and Richard Hsu – approved a ₱10 million unsecured loan purportedly in favor
of Timmy’s, Inc. After deducting finance charges, advance interest and taxes,
DelaRosa certified a net loan proceeds amounting to ₱9,985,075.00 covered by
Manager’s Check No. 000000334727 dated February 5, 1997.28 The face of the
check bears the notation "Loan proceeds of CL-484," the alpha numeric code
("CL-484")of which refers to the purported loan of Timmy’s, Inc. 29 However, the
payee thereof was not the purported borrower, Timmy’s, Inc., but a certain "Zeta
International". Likewise, on even date, Manager’s Check No. 0000003340 30 for
₱9,985,075.00 was issued, and on its face is indicated "Loan proceeds of CL-
477", which alpha numeric code ("CL-477") refers to the purported loan of
AsiaTextile Mills, Inc.31 Manager’s Check No. 0000003340 was made payable
not to Asia Textile Mills, Inc., but to "Phil. Recyclers Inc."
On the same day that the subject manager’s checks were issued, or on February
5, 1997, it appears that the two checks – together with other manager’s checks
totaling ₱120,819,475.00– were encashed; on the face ofthe checks, the word
"PAID" was stamped, and at the dorsal portion thereof there were machine
validations showing thatManager’s Check No. 0000003347 was presented at
6:16 p.m., while Manager’s Check No. 0000003340 was presented at 6:18 p.m.32
After presentment and encashment, the amount of ₱120,819,475.00 – which
among others included the ₱9,985,075.00 proceeds of the purported Timmy’s,
Inc. loan and the ₱9,985,075.00 proceeds of the supposed Asia Textile Mills,
Inc. loan – was deposited in Go’s OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0
at OCBC Recto Branch, apparently on instructions of respondent Dela
Rosa.33 The deposit is covered by OCBC Cash Deposit Slip 34 dated February 5,
1997, with the corresponding machine validation thereon indicating that the
deposit was made at 6:19 p.m.35 The funds were credited to Go’s savings
account.36
It appears that previously, or on February 4, 1997, seven OCBC checks issued
by Go from his personal OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 totaling
₱145,488,274.48 were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. 37 After Manager’s
Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, along with several other manager’s
checks, were encashed and the proceeds thereof deposited in Go’s OCBC
Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 withautomatic transferfeature to his OCBC
Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0, funds were automatically transferred
from the said savings account to the current account, which atthe time contained
only a total amountof ₱26,332,303.69. Go’sOCBC Current Account No. 008-00-
000015-0 was credited with ₱120,819,475.00, and thereafter the account
registered a balance of ₱147,151,778.69. The seven previously dishonored
personal checks were thenpresented for clearing, and were subsequently
cleared that sameday, or on February 5, 1997.38 Apparently, they were partly
funded by the ₱120,819,475.00manager’s check deposits – which include
Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347.
During the examination and inquiry into OCBC’s operations, oron January 28,
1998, Go issued and sent a letter39 to the BSP, through Maria Dolores
Yuviengco, Director of the Departmentof Commercial Banks, specifically
requesting that the BSP refrain from sending any communication to Timmy’s,
Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc., among others. He manifested that he was "willing
to assume the viability and full payment"of the accounts under investigation and
examination, including the Timmy’s, Inc. and AsiaTextile Mills, Inc. accounts.
Demurrer to the evidence40 is "an objection by one of the parties in an action, to
the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point
of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party
demurring challenges the sufficiencyof the whole evidence to sustain a verdict.
The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer,
is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence
to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. x x x Sufficient evidence
for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character,
weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded
according to the circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the
evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise
degree of participation therein by the accused."41 Thus, when the accused files
a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is
sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.42
"The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of
the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence
of a grave abuse of such discretion."43 As to effect, "the grant of a demurrer to
evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would
place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorariif
it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of
jurisdiction."44 When grave abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a
demurrer becomes null and void.
As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence
amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the
grant thereof would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.
For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by
granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence,its judgment is considered void, as
this Court ruled in People v. Laguio, Jr.:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of
trial courts granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via
the special civil action of certiorariunder Rule 65 based on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal
order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when
the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original
special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy
is not violated.
In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, we
deem its consequent order of acquittal void.45
Grave abuse of discretion is defined as "that capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. ‘The abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and hostility.’ The party questioning the acquittal of an
accused should be able toclearly establish that the trial court blatantly abused
its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense justice." 46
In the exercise of the Court’s "superintending control over inferior courts, we are
to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case ‘as the ends of
justice may require.’ So it is that the writ will be granted where necessary to
prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice."47
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, the Court declaresthat the CA grossly
erred in affirming the trial court’s July 2, 2007 Order granting the respondent’s
demurrer, which Order was patently null and void for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion and manifest irregularity, thus causing substantial
injury to the banking industry and public interest.1avvphi1 The Court finds that
the prosecution has presented competent evidence to sustain the indictment for
the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and that
respondents appear to be the perpetrators thereof. In evaluating the evidence,
the trial court effectively failed and/or refused to weigh the prosecution’s
evidence against the respondents, which it was duty-bound to do as a trier of
facts; considering that the case involved hundreds of millions of pesos of OCBC
depositors’ money – not to mention that the banking industry is impressed with
public interest, the trial court should have conducted itself with circumspection
and engaged in intelligent reflection in resolving the issues.
The elements of estafa through abuse ofconfidence under Article 315, par. 1(b)
of the Revised Penal Code48 are: "(a) that money,goods or other personal
property is received by the offender in trust oron commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation orconversion of such
money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that
such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender."49
Obviously, a bank takes its depositors’ money as a loan, under an obligation to
return the same; thus, the term "demand deposit."
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions
of the Civil Code on simpleloan. Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides
that "x x x savingsx x x deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall
be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan." There is a debtor-
creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor
and the depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the
bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. x x x50
Moreover, the banking laws impose high standards on banks in view of the
fiduciary nature of banking."This fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s
obligation to observe ‘high standards ofintegrity and performance’ is deemed
written into every deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The
fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of diligence
higher than that of a good father of a family."51
In Soriano v. People,52 it was held that the President of a bank is a fiduciary with
respect to the bank’s funds, and he holds the same in trust or for administration
for the bank’s benefit. From this, it may beinferred that when such bank president
makes it appear through falsification that an individual or entity applied for a loan
when in fact such individual or entity did not, and the bank president obtains the
loan proceeds and converts the same, estafa is committed.
Next, regarding misappropriation, the evidence tends to extablish that Manager’s
Check Nos.0000003340 and 0000003347 were encashed, using the bank’s
funds which clearly belonged to OCBC’s depositors, and then deposited in Go’s
OCBC Savings Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch – although
he was not the named payee therein. Next, the money was automatically
transferred to Go’s OCBC Current Account No. 008-00-000015-0 and used to
fund his seven previously-issued personal checks totaling ₱145,488,274.48,
which checks were dishonored the day before. Simply put, the evidence strongly
indicates that Go converted OCBC funds to his own personal use and benefit.
"The words ‘convert’ and ‘misappropriate’ connote an act of using or disposing
of another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for one’s own use includes
not only conversion to one’s personal advantage, but also every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without right. x x x In proving the element of
conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises
when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items
to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.Thus, the
merepresumption of misappropriation or conversion is enough to conclude thata
probable cause exists for the indictment x x x."53
As to the third element of estafa, there is no question that as a consequence of
the misappropriation of OCBC’s funds, the bank and its depositors have been
prejudiced; the bank has been placed under receivership, and the depositors’
money is no longer under their unimpeded disposal.
Finally, on the matter of demand, while it has not been shown that the bank
demanded the return of the funds, it has nevertheless been held that "[d]emand
is not an element of the felony or a condition precedent tothe filing of a criminal
complaint for estafa. Indeed, the accusedmay be convicted ofthe felony under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code if the prosecution proved
misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the money or property subject
of the Information. In a prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary where
there is evidence of misappropriation or conversion."54 Thus, strictly speaking,
demand is not an element of the offense of estafa through abuse of confidence;
even a verbal query satisfies the requirement.55 Indeed, in several past rulings
of the Court, demand was not even included as anelement of the crime of estafa
through abuse of confidence, orunder paragraph 1(b).56
On the other hand, the elements of the crime of falsification of commercial
document under Art. 17257 are: "(1) that the offender is a private individual; (2)
that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification; and (3) that the act of
falsification is committed ina commercial document."58 As to estafa through
falsification of public, official or commercial documents, it has been held that –
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of
committing Estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to
defraud another, the crime of Falsification has already been consummated,
damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words, the crime
of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official
or commercial document todefraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused
by the commission of Estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore,
the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary
means to commit the estafa.59
Simulating OCBC loan documents – such as loan applications, credit approval
memorandums, and the resultant promissory notes and other credit documents
– by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate, and by counterfeiting or imitating their
handwriting or signatures constitute falsification of commercial and public
documents.
As to the respondents’ respective participation in the commission of the crime,
suffice it to state that as the beneficiary of the proceeds, Go is presumed to be
the author of the falsification. The fact that previously, his personal checks
totaling ₱145,488,274.48 were dishonored, and the day after, the amount of
₱120,819,475.00 was immediately credited to his account, which included funds
from the encashment of Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347
or the loan proceeds of the supposed Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.
accounts, bolsters this view. "[W]henever someone has in his possession
falsified documents [which he used to] his advantage and benefit, the
presumption that he authored it arises."60
x x x This is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so
closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may be
proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close
connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery.
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of
a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger.
Certainly, the channeling of the subjectpayments via false remittances to his
savings account, his subsequent withdrawals of said amount as well as his
unexplained flight at the height of the bank’s inquiry into the matter more than
sufficiently establish x x x involvement in the falsification.61
Likewise, Dela Rosa’s involvement inthe scheme has been satisfactorily shown.
As OCBC SVP and COO and member of the OCBC Loan Committee, she
approved the purported Timmy’s, Inc.loan, and she certified and signed the
February 2, 1997 OCBC Disclosure Statement and other documents. 62 She
likewise gave specific instructions to deposit the proceeds of Manager’s Check
Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347, among others, in Go’s OCBC Savings
Account No. 00810-00108-0 at OCBC Recto Branch.63 Finally, she was a
signatory to the two checks.64
On the other hand, respondent Nicomedes as OCBC Senior Manager for
Corporate Accounts – Account Management Group, among others prepared the
Credit Approval Memorandum and recommended the approval of the loans.65
In granting the demurrer, the trial court – in its assailed July 2, 2007 Order –
concluded that based on the evidence adduced, the respondents could not have
falsified the loan documents pertaining toTimmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills,
Inc. since the individuals who assert that their handwriting and signatures were
forged were not presented incourt to testify on such claim; that the prosecution
witnesses – Honorio E. Franco, Jr. (Franco) of PDIC, the designated Assisting
Deputy Liquidator of OCBC, and Virginia Rowella Famirin (Famirin), Cashier of
OCBC Recto Branch – were not present when the loan documents were
executed and signed, and thus have no personal knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the alleged falsification; and as high-ranking officers
of OCBC, respondents could not be expected to have prepared the
saiddocuments. The evidence, however, suggests otherwise; it shows that
respondents had a direct hand in the falsification and creation of fictitious loans.
The loan documents were even signed by them. By disregarding what is evident
in the record, the trial court committed substantial wrong that frustrates the ends
of justice and adversely affects the public interest. The trial court’s act was so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law.
An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse
of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation
of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion and personal hostility. x x x66
On the charge of estafa, the trial court declared that since the payees of
Manager’s Check Nos. 0000003340 and 0000003347 were not Asia Textile
Mills, Inc. and Timmy’s, Inc., respectively, but other entities– Phil. Recyclers Inc.
and Zeta International, and there are no documents drawn by the borrowers
assigning the loan proceeds to these two entities, then it cannot besaid that there
were loan proceeds released to these borrowers. The trial court added that it is
doubtful that the two manager’s checks were presented and negotiated for
deposit in Go’s savings account, since theydo not contain the required
indorsements of the borrowers, the signatures of the tellers and
individuals/payees who received the checks and the proceeds thereof, and the
respective account numbers of the respondents; and the checks were presented
beyond banking hours. The trial court likewise held that the fact that a cash
deposit slip – and not a check deposit slip – was used to allegedly deposit the
checks raised doubts as to the truth of the allegation that the manager’s checks
were deposited and credited to Go’s savings account.
The CA echoed the trial court’s observations, adding that the evidence consisted
of mere "letters and unverifiedledgers" which were thus insufficient; that there
was an "inescapable possibility that an honest mistake was made" in the
preparation and issuance of Manager’s CheckNos. 0000003340 and
0000003347, since these two checks are claimed to be just a few of several
checks – numbering thirteen in all – the rest of which werenever questioned by
the receiver PDIC. The appellate court added that the prosecution should have
presented further evidence as to where the money went after being deposited
inGo’s savings and current accounts, identifying thus the recipients of
Go’spersonal checks.
What the trial and appellate courts disregarded, however, is that the OCBC funds
ended up in the personal bank accountsof respondent Go, and were used to
fund his personal checks, even as he was not entitled thereto. These, if not
rebutted, are indicative ofestafa, as may be seen from the afore-cited
Sorianocase.
The bank money (amounting to ₱8million) which came to the possession of
petitioner was money held in trust or administration by him for the bank, in his
fiduciary capacity as the President of said bank. It is not accurate to say that
petitioner became the owner of the ₱8 million because it was the proceeds of a
loan. That would have been correct if the bank knowingly extended the loan to
petitioner himself. But that is not the case here. According to the information for
estafa, the loan was supposed to be for another person, a certain "Enrico
Carlos"; petitioner, through falsification, made it appear that said "Enrico Carlos"
applied for the loan when infact he ("Enrico Carlos") did not. Through such
fraudulent device, petitioner obtained the loan proceeds and converted the
same. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that petitioner became the
legal owner of the ₱8 million. Thus, petitioner remained the bank’s fiduciary with
respect to that money, which makes it capable of misappropriation or conversion
in his hands.67
Thus, it is irrelevant that the proceeds of the supposed loans were made payable
to entities other than the alleged borrowers.1âwphi1 Besides, the manager’s
checks themselves indicate that they were the proceeds of the purported
Timmy’s, Inc.’s and Asia Textile Mills, Inc.’s loans, through the alpha numeric
codes specifically assigned to them that are printed on the face of the checks;
the connection between the checks and the purported loans is thus established.
In the same vein, the CA’s supposition that there is an "inescapable possibility
that an honest mistake was made inthe preparation of the two questioned
manager’s checks" is absurd; even so, the bottom line is that they were
encashed using bank funds, and the proceeds thereof were deposited in Go’s
bank savings and current accounts and used to fund his personal checks.
Furthermore, as correctly pointed outby petitioner, it issuperfluous to require that
the recipients of Go’s personal checks be identified. For purposes of proving the
crime, it has been shown that Goconverted bank funds to his own personal use
when they were deposited in his accounts and his personal checks were cleared
and the funds were debited from his account.1âwphi1 This suffices. Likewise,
the Court agrees that the prosecution’s reliance on the supposed loan
documents, subsidiary ledgers, deposit slip, cash proof, RTCOCI and other
documents was proper. They are both public and private documents which may
be received in evidence; notably, petitioner’s documentary evidence was
admitted in full by the trial court.68 With respect to evidence consisting of private
documents, the presumption remains that "therecording of private transactions
has been fair and regular, and that the ordinary course of business has been
followed."69
Go’s January 28, 1998 letter to the BSP stating that he was "willing to assume
the viabilityand full payment" of the accounts under examination – which
included the Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. accounts, among others –
is an offer of compromise, and thus an implied admission of guilt under Rule 130,
Section 27 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.70
In addition, appellant’s act of pleading for his sister-in-law’s forgiveness may be declared null and void, and the said cases are ordered REINSTATED for the
considered as analogous to an attempt to compromise, which in turn can be continuation of proceedings.
received as an implied admission ofguilt under Section 27, Rule 130 x x x. 71
SO ORDERED.
As a result of the Court’s declaration of nullity of the assailed Orders of the trial
court, any dissection of the truly questionable actions of Prosecutor Campanilla
– which should merit appropriate disciplinary action for they reveal a patent
ignorance of procedure, if not indolence or a deliberate intention to bungle his
own case – becomes unnecessary. It is conceded that the lack of Campanilla’s
approval and/or conforméto PDIC’s Motion for Reconsideration should have
rendered the trial court’s assailed Ordersfinal and executory were it not for the
fact that they were inherently null and void; Campanilla’s irresponsible actions
almost cost the People its day in court and their right to exact justice and
retribution, not to mention that they could have caused immeasurable damage
to the banking industry. Just the same, "[a] void judgment or order has no legal
and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it
is non-existent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or
proceeding whenever it is involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to
vacate or avoid a void judgment or final order; it may simply be ignored."72 More
appropriately, the following must be cited:

x x x Clearly, the assailed Order of Judge Santiago was issued in grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. A void order is no order at all. It
cannot confer any right or be the source of any relief. This Court is not merely a
court of law; it is likewise a court of justice.

To rule otherwise would leave the private respondent without any recourse to
rectify the public injustice brought about by the trial court's Order, leaving her
with only the standing to file administrative charges for ignorance of the law
against the judge and the prosecutor. A party cannot be left without recourse to
address a substantive issue in law.73

Finally, it must be borne in mind that "[t]he granting of a demurrer to evidence

should x x x be exercised with caution, taking into consideration not only the
rights of the accused, but also the right of the private offended party to be
vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the accused
is acquitted and the private complainant is generally left with no more remedy.
In such instances, although the decision of the court may be wrong, the accused
can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges are reminded to be
more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their duties as members of
the Bench xx x."74

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The September 30, 2009 Decision

and January 22, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The July 2, 2007 and October 19, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 49 in Criminal Case Nos. 00-187318 and 00-187319 are
G.R. No. 174471
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JERRY PEPINO y RUERAS and PRECIOSA GOMEZ y CAMPOS, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is an appeal filed by Jerry Pepino (Pepino) and Preciosa
Gomez (Gomez) assailing the June 16, 2006 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02026.
ANTECEDENTS
The prosecution evidence showed that at 1:00 p.m., on June 28, 1997, two men
and a woman entered the office of Edward Tan at Kilton Motors Corporation in
Sucat, Parafiaque City, and pretended to be customers. When Edward was
about to receive them, one of the men, eventually identified as Pepino pulled out
a gun. Thinking that it was a holdup, Edward told Pepino that the money was
inside the cashier's box. Pepino and the other man looted the "'cashier's box,
handcuffed Edward, and forced him to go with them.2 From the hallway, Jocelyn
Tan (mentioned as "Joselyn" in some parts of the record), Edward's wife, saw
Pepino take her husband. She went to the adjoining room upon Edward's
instructions.3
Pepino brought Edward to a metallic green Toyota Corolla where three other
men were waiting inside. The woman (later identified as Gomez) sat on the front
passenger seat.4 The abductors then placed surgical tape over Edward's eyes
and made him wear sunglasses. After travelling for two and a half hours, they
arrived at an apartment in Quezon City. The abductors removed the tape from
Edward's eyes, placed him in a room, and then chained his legs. Pepino
approached Edward and asked for the phone number of his father so that he
could ask for ransom for his (Edward's) liberty. Edward told Pepino to negotiate
with his wife, but the latter insisted on talking to his father.5
At around 5:00 p.m. of the same day, the kidnappers called Edward's father and
demanded a P40 million ransom for his release. Edward's father told the
kidnappers that he did not have that amount. The abductors negotiated with
Jocelyn who eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom. The kidnappers told
Jocelyn to pack the money into two packages and to drop these at a convenience
store in front of McDonald's at Mindanao Avenue. They further demanded that
Edward's vehicle be used to bring the money.6
After four days, or on July 1, 1997, Antonio Gepiga (the family driver) brought
the agreed amount to the 7-Eleven convenience store at Mindanao A venue as
instructed.7 That evening, three men and Gomez blindfolded Edward, made him
board a car, and drove around for 30 minutes. Upon stopping, they told Edward
that he could remove his blindfold after five minutes. When Edward removed his
blindfold, he found himself inside his own car parked at the UP Diliman Campus.
He drove home and reported his kidnapping to Teresita Ang See, a known anti-
crime crusader.8
After five months, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI!) informed Edward
that they had apprehended some suspects, and invited him to identify them from
a lineup consisting of seven persons: five males and two females. Edward
positively identified Pepino, Gomez, and one Mario Galgo. 9 Jocelyn likewise
identified Pepino.10
Pepino and Gomez did not testify for their defense. The defense instead
presented Zeny Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino, NBI Special Investigator Marcelo
Jadloc and P/Sr. Insp. Narciso Quano (mentioned as "Qano" in some parts of
the record).
Zeny testified that she and her husband, Jerry Pepino, were inside their house
in Cebu City on December 7, 1997, when about 20 heavily armed men entered
their house looking for Jerry. When Jerry asked them if they had a warrant of
arrest, one of the men pointed a gun at him and handcuffed him; the armed men
then hit him with the butt of an armalite and punched him. The men also took
Pepino' s wristwatch and wallet, as well as Zeny's bag and watch. Some of the
armed men searched the second floor of the house, and found a .45 caliber gun.
The armed men brought Zeny and Pepino outside their house where Zeny saw
Renato Pepino and Larex Pepino already handcuffed. The armed men brought
them to the Cebu City Police Headquarters before bringing them to the NBI
Headquarters in Manila. The following day, Jerry, Renato, and Larex were
brought to the Department of Justice (DO.I). Zeny, on the other hand, was
released after being detained at the NBI for three (3) days.11
Reynaldo's testimony was summarized by the CA as follows:
x x x On December 6, 1997, he accompanied accused-appellant Gomez to his
brother's sister-in-law who happens to work in a recruitment agency. While they
were inside the latter's house at Lot 2, Block 15, Marikina Heights, Marikina City,
they heard a noise at the gate. When he peeped through the window, he saw
two (2) motorcycles and two (2) Vannette vans. Shortly thereafter, someone
kicked the back door and several armed men emerged therefrom and
announced their arrest. When he asked them if they had any warrant, they
replied: "Walang warrant, warrant. Walang search, search." They were then
hogtied and made to lie face down. Five (5) of them then went upstairs and
seized his personal belongings together with his briefcase which contained
P45,000.00, documents of accused-appellant Gomez, and his .45 caliber pistol
as well as his license and permit to carry the same. No receipts were issued for
their personal effects which were confiscated. They were subsequently brought
to Camp Crame and subjected to torture. The following day, they were brought
to the Department of Justice and a case for kidnapping was filed against him.
Upon reinvestigation, however, he was discharged from the Information and the
court dismissed the case against him.12
SI Jadloc and Police Senior Inspector Quano, Jr. were presented as hostile
witnesses.
Jadloc declared on the witness stand that NBI Assistant Director Edmundo
Arugay dispatched a team to Cebu City to investigate a kidnap-for-ransom case.
The team immediately conducted surveillance operations when they arrived at
Calle Rojo, Lahug, Cebu City. One of the team members saw Renato and Larex
Pepino with guns tucked in their waists. When the team approached them, the
two men ran inside their house. The team went after them and on entering the
house, they saw Jerry in possession of a .45 caliber gun. The team arrested
Jerry, Renato and Larex, and then brought them to the NBI Headquarters in
Manila.13
Quano testified that he was designated as the leader of a team tasked to arrest
members of a kidnap-for-ransom group at their safe house in Lot 2, Block 50,
Marikina Heights, Marikina City. When they arrived there, they introduced
themselves as police officers. The police forcibly opened the door after the
occupants of the house refused to open the ground floor door. During their
search at the second floor, the operatives found an armalite and a .45 caliber
gun. The members of the team handcuffed Gomez and Reynaldo, and then
brought them to Camp Crame.14
The prosecution charged Preciosa Gomez, Jerry Pepino, Reynaldo Pepino,
Jessie Pepino, George Curvera, Boy Lanyujan, Luisito "Tata" Adulfo, Henriso
Batijon (a.k.a. Dodoy Batijon), Nerio Alameda, and an alias Wilan Tan with
kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 259, Paranaque City.15 Reynaldo was subsequently
discharged after reinvestigation. Only Pepino, Gomez, and Batijon were
arraigned; their other co-accused remained at large.
In its May 15, 2000 decision, the RTC convicted Pepino and Gomez of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code (as amended) and sentenced them to suffer the death penalty. The RTC
also ordered them to pay Edward P700,000.00 representing the amount extorted
from him; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P50,000 as exemplary damages.
The trial court acquitted Batijon for insufficiency of evidence.
The R TC held that Edward positively identified Pepino and Gomez as two of the
persons who forcibly abducted him at gunpoint inside Kilton Motors, and who
consequently detained him somewhere in Quezon City for four (4) days until he
was released inside the UP Diliman Campus after the payment of ransom. The
RTC added that Jocelyn corroborated Edward's testimony on material points. It
also pointed out that Edward identified both Pepino and Gomez at the lineup
conducted inside the NBI compound, although Jocelyn only recognized Gomez.
The R TC further ruled that the accused were already estopped from questioning
the validity of their arrest after they entered their respective pleas.
The case was automatically elevated to this Court in view of the death penalty
that the R TC imposed. We referred the case to the CA for intermediate review
pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.16
In its decision dated June 16, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision with the modification that the amounts of moral and exemplary damages
were increased from P300,000.00 and Pl00,000.00, respectively.
The CA held that Pepino and Gomez were deemed to have waived any objection
to the illegality of their arrests when they did not move to quash the information
before entering their plea, and when they participated at the trial.
The CA further ruled that Pepino and Gomez conspired with each other to attain
a common objective, i.e., to kidnap Edward in exchange for ransom.
While the case was under review by the Supreme Court, Pepino filed an urgent
motion to withdraw his appeal, which the Court granted.17 Only Gomez's appeal
is now pending before us.
In her brief18 and supplemental brief,19 Gomez maintained that it was impossible
for Edward to have seen her in the front seat of the getaway car because he
(Edward) was blindfolded. She also alleged that the prosecution failed to prove
that she had conspired with the other accused.
Gomez further claimed that Edward's identification of her during trial "may have
been preconditioned x x x by suggestive identification"20 made at the police
lineup. She further argued that the death penalty imposed on her is no longer
proper due to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346.
THE COURT'S ·RULING
We affirm Gomez's conviction, but we modify the penalty imposed and the
awarded indemnities.
Illegality of the Arrest
We point out at the outset that Gomez did not question before arraignment the
legality of her warrantless arrest or the acquisition of RTC's jurisdiction over her
person. Thus, Gomez is deemed to have waived any objection to her warrantless
arrest.
It is settled that [a]ny objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the
acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed
waived.21 As we held in People v. Samson:22
[A ]ppellant is now estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his
arrest as he failed to move for the quashing of the information before the trial
court. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest was cured when he
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea
of "not guilty" and by participating in the trial.23
At any rate, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from
error. Simply put, the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State
of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their
culpability. It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest
after a valid information had been filed, the accused had been arraigned, the trial
had commenced and had been completed, and a judgment of conviction had
been rendered against her.24
Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence
a. Elements of kidnapping proved
The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual;
(2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of
his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three (3) days; or (b) it is committed
by simulating public authority; or (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the
person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his
detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained
for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is also of no
moment and the crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if
none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 is
present.25
All these elements have been established by the prosecution. Edward positively
identified Gomez and Pepino - both private individuals - as among the three
persons who entered his office and pretended to be Kilton Motors'customers. He
further declared that Pepino pointed a gun at him, and forcibly took him against
his will. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY. WILLIAM CHUA:
Q: Can you tell us if anything unusual happened to you on June 28, 1997?
EDWARD TAN:
A: I was kidnapped.
xxxx
Q: Can you tell this Court how the kidnapping was initiated?
A: At around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, there were three persons who entered
the office of Kilton Motors and pretended to be customers.
Q: What was the gender of these three persons that you are referring to?
A: Two men and a woman.
Q: After they pretended to be customers, tell us what happened?
A: · They told me they were going to pay but instead of pulling out money, they
pulled out a gun.
Q: How many people pulled out guns as you said?
A: Only one, sir.
Q: Will you look around this courtroom now and tell us if the person who pulled
out a gun is in court?
A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A PERSON AT THE RIGHT SECTION, SECOND
ROW WHO, WHEN ASKED HIS NAME, ANSWERED JERRY PEPINO)
Q: Now, you said that there were two men and a woman who went up the Kilton
Motors Office and you pointed to one of the men as Jerry Pepino, can you look
around the courtroom and tell us if any of the two others are in court?
A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A WOMAN INSIDE THE COURTROOM WHO,
WHEN ASKED HER NAME, ANSWERED AS PRECIOSA GOMEZ)
xxxx
Q: You said Mr. Pepino pulled out his gun, what happened after he pulled out
his gun?
A: He told me just to be quiet and go with him.
Q: What was your reaction when he pointed a gun to you and he stated those
words?
A: I thought it was only a holdup and so I told him there was money with the
cashier and told him to get it.
Q: What happened after you told him the money was in the cashier's box?
A: His companion took the money and told me to still go with them.
Q: When they told you to go with them, what happened next? A: I told them why
should I still go with them and then, I was handcuffed and was forced to go down.
xxxx
Q: As they were bringing you down, what happened next, Mr. Witness?
A: When we went down nearing his car, I was boarded on [in] his car.
xxxx
Q: When they boarded you inside that car, what did they do to you, Mr. Witness?
A: They put surgical tape on my eyes and also sunglasses.
xxxx
Q: Who was at the passenger's front seat of the car?
A: It was Preciosa Gomez.26
xxxx
Edward further declared on the witness stand that Pepino, Gomez, and their
other co-accused brought him to a safe house in Quezon City; detained him
there for four (4) days; and demanded ransom from his (Edward's) family.
It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of placing
a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him of his liberty
in any manner. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is
restrained from going home. Its essence is the actual deprivation of the victim's
liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such
deprivation.27
Notably, Jocelyn corroborated Edward's testimony on the following points:
Pepino poked a handgun at Edward while they were on the second floor of Kilton;
Pepino and his companion brought him downstairs and out of the building, and
made him board a car; and the kidnappers demanded ransom in exchange for
Edward's release.
Both the RTC and the CA found the respective testimonies of Edward and
Jocelyn credible and convincing. We affirm the credibility accorded by the trial
court (and affirmed by the CA) to these prosecution witnesses, in the absence
of any showing that this factual finding had been arbitrarily arrived at. There is
nothing in the records that would put the testimonies of Edward and Jocelyn
under suspicion. We recall that Edward had close contacts with Pepino at Kilton
Motors and at the safe house. He also saw Gomez (a) seated at the front seat
of the getaway Toyota Corolla vehicle; (b) at the safe house in Quezon City; and
(c) inside the car before the kidnappers released him.
Jocelyn, for her part, stated that she was very near Pepino while he was taking
away her husband.
In People v. Pavillare,28 the Court found the testimonies of the private
complainant Sukhjinder Singh and his cousin, Lakhvir Singh, to be credible and
convincing, and reasoned out as follows:
Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the kidnappers and to
remember their faces. The complainant had close contact with the kidnappers
when he was abducted and beaten up, and later when the kidnappers haggled
on the amount of the ransom money. His cousin met Pavillare face to face and
actually dealt with him when he paid the ransom money. The two-hour period
that the complainant was in close contact with his abductors was sufficient for
him to have a recollection of their physical appearance. Complainant admitted in
court that he would recognize his abductors if he sees them again and upon
seeing Pavillare he immediately recognized him as one of the malefactors as he
remembers him as the one who blocked his way, beat him up, haggled with the
complainant's cousin and received the ransom money. x x x It bears repeating
that the finding of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses is given utmost
respect and as a rule will not be disturbed on appeal because it had the
opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of the witness in court. 29
b. Admissibility of Identification
We find no merit in Gomez's claim that Edward's identification of her during
trial might have been preconditioned by the "suggestive identification" made
during the police lineup.
In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,30 the Court explained the procedure for out-of-court
identification and the test to determine the admissibility of such identifications in
this manner:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done
thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness
for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x x x In
resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal
at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between
the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.31
ATTY. CORONEL:
Q: You stated that you were able to see one of the persons who kidnapped your
husband, if you see this person again, would you be able to identify him?
JOCELYN SY TAN:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you look around the courtroom and see if the person you are referring to
is here today?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you point to him?
A: (WITNESS POINTED TO A MALE PERSON INSIDE THE COURTROOM
WHO WHEN ASKED HIS NAME ANSWERED AS JERRY PEPINO).
Q: Ms. Witness, what role did this person whom you identified and gave his name
as Jerry Pepino, what role did he play in the kidnapping of your husband?

Applying the totality-of-circumstances test, we find Edward's out-of-court A: Siya po bale 'yang nakayakap sa husband ko tapos nakatutok ng baril.
identification to be reliable and thus admissible. To recall, when the three
individuals entered Edward's office, they initially pretended to be xxxx
customers,32and even asked about the products that were for sale.33 The three
had told Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino "pulled out a gun" A TTY. ESTRUCO:
instead.34 After Pepino' s companion had taken the money from the cashier's
box, the malefactors handcuffed Edward and forced him to go down to the Q: When Jerry Pepino was at Kilton Motors, he embraced your husband?
parked car. From this sequence of events, there was thus ample opportunity for
Edward - before and after the gun had been pointed at him - to view the faces of
JOCELYN SY TAN:
the three persons who entered his office. In addition, Edward stated that Pepino
had talked to him "[a]t least once a day"35 during the four days that he was
A: Yes, sir. And pointed a gun at my husband.
detained.
Q: And he was not blindfolded at that time?
Edward also saw Gomez seated at the front seat of the getaway metallic green
Toyota Corolla vehicle. In addition, the abductors removed the tape from
A: No, he was not blindfolded, he was only wearing a cap.
Edward's eyes when they arrived at the apartment, and among those whom he
saw there was Gomez. According to Edward, he was able to take a good look at
Q: You are very sure that he is Jerry Pepino?
the occupants of the car when he was about to be released.
A: Yes, I am very, very sure. I could not forget his face.
On the part of Jocelyn, she was firm and unyielding in her identification of Pepino
as the person who pointed a gun at her husband while going down the stairs,
and who brought him outside the premises of Kilton Motors. She maintained that Q: You are very sure?
she was very near when Pepino was taking away her husband; and that she
could not forget Pepino's face. For accuracy, we quote from the records: A: Yes, sir. Kahit sa nightmare ko, kasama siya.
xx x x36 A: No, sir.

We add that no competing event took place to draw Edward's and Jocelyn's
attention from the incident. Nothing in the records shows the presence of any
distraction that could have disrupted the witnesses' attention at the time of the
incident.37
Jurisprudence holds that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to
strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the
crime was committed. As the Court held in People v. Esoy:38
Q: You mean to say you were face to face with the alleged kidnappers?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the persons who allegedly kidnapped
you, you conferred with the NBI agents?
A: The NBI agents told me not to be afraid.

It is known that the most natural reaction of a witness to a crime is to strive to Q: No, my question is, you conferred with the NBI agents?
look at the appearance of the perpetrator and to observe the manner in which
the offense is perpetrated. Most often the face of the assailant and body A: Yes, sir.
movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased
from a witness's memory. Experience dictates that precisely because of the Q: What is the name of the NBI agent?
unusual acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can
remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals at any given A: I cannot remember, sir.
time.39
Q: And how many were lined up?
While this pronouncement should be applied with great caution, there is no
compelling circumstance in this case that would warrant its non-application. A: Seven, sir.

Contrary to what Gomez claimed, the police lineup conducted at the NBI was not Q: And the NBI agent gave the names of each of the seven?
suggestive. We note that there were seven people in the lineup; Edward was not
compelled to focus his attention on any specific person or persons. While it might A: No, sir.40
have been ideal if there had been more women included in the lineup instead of
only two, or if there had been a separate lineup for Pepino and for Gomez, the We also note that Jocelyn's and Edward's out-of-court identifications were made
fact alone that there were five males and two females in the lineup did not render on the same day. While Jocelyn only identified Pepino, the circumstances
the procedure irregular. There was no evidence that the police had supplied or surrounding this out-of-court identification showed that the whole identification
even suggested to Edward that the appellants were the suspected perpetrators. process at the NBI was not suggestive. To directly quote from the records:
The following exchanges at the trial during Edward's cross-examination prove ATTY. ESTURCO:
this point:
Q: How about the alleged kidnappers, where were they placed during that time?
ATTY. ESTURCO:
JOCELYN TAN:
Q: When they were lined up at the NBI, where were they placed, in a certain
room? A: They were in front of us.
EDWARD TAN: Q: Without any cover?
A: Yes, sir. A: None, sir.
Q: With a glass window? One way? Q: Without any glass cover?
A: See-through glass window.
Q: One-way mirror?
A: Not one way, see-through.
Q: And before you were asked to pinpoint the alleged kidnappers, you were
already instructed by the NBI what to do and was told who are the persons
to be lined up?
A: No, sir.
xxxx
Q: And between the alleged length of time, you were still very positive that
it was Gerry (sic) Pepino inside the NBI cell?
A: At first, I did not know that he was Jerry Pepino but we know his face.
Q: At first, you did not know that it was Jerry Pepino?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxx
Q: It was the NBI officer who told you that the person is Jerry Pepino, am I
correct?
A: They identified that the person we identified was Jerry Pepino. We first
pinpointed na heto ang mukha at saka sinabi na 'yan si Jerry Pepino.
xx x x41
These exchanges show that the lineup had not been attended by any
suggestiveness on the part of the police or the NBI agents; there was no
evidence that they had supplied or even suggested to either Edward or Jocelyn
that the appellants were the kidnappers.
We are not unaware that the Court, in several instances, has acquitted an
accused when the out-of-court identification is fatally flawed. In these cases,
however, it had been clearly shown that the identification procedure was
suggestive.
In People v. Pineda,42 the Court acquitted Rolando Pineda because the police
suggested the identity of the accused by showing only the photographs of Pineda
and his co-accused Celso Sison to witnesses Canilo Ferrer and Jimmy Ramos.
According to the Court, "there was impermissible suggestion because the
photographs were only of appellant and Sison, focusing attention on the two
accused."43
Similarly, the Court in People v. Rodrigo44 acquitted appellant Lee Rodrigo since
only a lone photograph was shown to the witness at the police station. We thus
held that the appellant's in-court identification proceeded from, and was
influenced by, impermissible suggestions in the earlier photographic
identification.
The lack of a prior description of the kidnappers in the present case should not
lead to a conclusion that witnesses' identification was erroneous. The lack of a
prior description of the kidnappers was due to the fact that Jocelyn (together with
other members of Edward's family), for reasons not made known in the records,
opted to negotiate with the kidnappers, instead of immediately seeking police
assistance. If members of Edward's family had refused to cooperate with the
police, their refusal could have been due to their desire not to compromise
Edward's safety.45 In the same manner, Edward, after he was freed, chose to
report the matter to Teresita Ang See, and not to the police.
Given these circumstances, the lack of prior description of the malefactors in this
case should not in any way taint the identification that Edward and Jocelyn made.
c. The Right to Counsel
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and is intended to preclude the
slightest coercion that would lead the accused to admit something false. The
right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or
confessions or admissions from the accused.46
Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is
singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime under investigation. 47 As
a rule, a police lineup is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right
to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation
and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police lineup.
Our ruling on this point in People v. Lara48 is instructive:
x x x The guarantees of Sec. 12(1 ), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-
called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under
custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun
to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
inte1Togation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating
statements. Police line-up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this
stage.49
Defense witness Reynaldo, however, maintained that Pepino and Gomez were
among those already presented to the media as kidnapping suspects by
the DOJ a day before the police lineup was made. In this sense, the appellants
were already the focus of the police and were thus deemed to be already under
custodial investigation when the out-of-court identification was conducted.
Nonetheless, the defense did not object to the in-court identification for
having been tainted by an irregular out-of-court identification in a police
lineup. They focused, instead, on the legality of the appellants' arrests.
Whether Edward and Jocelyn could have seen Pepino and Gomez in various
media fora that reported the presentation of the kidnapping suspects to the
media is not for the Court to speculate on. The records merely show that when
defense counsel, Atty. Caesar Esturco, asked Jocelyn during cross-examination
whether she was aware that there were several kidnap-for-ransom incidents in
Metro Manila, the latter answered that she "can read in the newspapers."50 At no
time did Jocelyn or Edward ever mention that they saw the appellants from the
news reports in print or on television.
At any rate, the appellants' respective convictions in this case were based on
an independent in-court identification made by Edward and Jocelyn, and
not on the out-of-court identification during the police lineup. We reiterate
that the RTC and the CA found the court testimonies of these witnesses to be
positive and credible, and that there was no showing that their factual findings
had been arrived at .arbitrarily. The in-court identification thus cured whatever
irregularity might have attended the police lineup.
As the Court ruled in People v. Algarme:51
Even assuming arguendo the appellants' out-of-court identification was
defective, their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have
initially attended it. We emphasize that the "inadmissibility of a police lineup
identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an
independent in-court identification." We also stress that all the accused-
appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitnesses during the
trial.
It is also significant to note that despite the overwhelming evidence adduced by
the prosecution, Pepino and Gomez did not even testify for their respective
defenses.1âwphi1
d. The Presence of Conspiracy
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. It may be proved by direct or
circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words, or conduct of the alleged
conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a
common design or purpose.
Proof of the agreement does not need to rest on direct evidence, as the
agreement may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.
Corollarily, it is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together
and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful
scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out. 52
In the present case, the records establish the following facts: Pepino, Gomez,
and another man entered Edward's office, and initially pretended to be
customers; the three told Edward that they were going to pay, but Pepino pulled
out a gun. After Pepino' s companion took the money from the cashier's box, the
malefactors handcuffed him and forced him to go down to the parked car; Gomez
sat at the front passenger seat of the car which brought Edward to a safe house
in Quezon City; the abductors removed the tape from Edward's eyes, placed him
in a room, and then chained his legs upon arrival at the safe house; the abductors
negotiated with Edward's family who eventually agreed to a P700,000.00 ransom
to be delivered by the family driver using Edward's own car; and after four days,
three men and Gomez blindfolded Edward, made him board a car, drove around
for 30 minutes, and left him inside his own car at the UP Diliman campus.
The collective, concerted, and synchronized acts of the accused before, during,
and after the kidnapping constitute undoubted proof that Gomez and her co-
accused conspired with each other to attain a common objective, i.e., to kidnap
Edward and detain him illegally in order to demand ransom for his release.
The Proper Penalty:
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates the imposition of
the death penalty when the kidnapping or detention is committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. Ransom, as employed
in the Jaw, is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money
or other thing of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption
of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment that releases one from captivity. 53
In the present case, the malefactors not only demanded but received ransom for
Edward's release. The CA thus correctly affirmed the RTC's imposition of the
death penalty on Pepino and Gomez.
With the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled ''An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines" (signed into law on June 24,
2006), the death penalty may no longer be imposed. We thus sentence Gomez
to the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to A.M.
No. 15-08-02-SC.54

The reduced penalty shall likewise apply to the non-appealing party, Pepino,
since it is more favorable to him.

The Awarded Indemnities:

In the case of People v. Gambao55 (also for kidnapping for ransom), the Court
set the minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition
of the death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by R.A. No. 9346, as follows: (1)
Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) Pl00,000.00 as moral damages which the
victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and (3) Pl00,000.00
as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good. These amounts
shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the
finality of the Court's Resolution until fully paid.

We thus reduce the moral damages imposed by the CA from P300,000.00 to

Pl00,000.00 to conform to prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping cases. This
reduced penalty shall apply to Pepino for being more favorable to him. However,
the additional monetary award (i.e., P100,000.00 civil indemnity) imposed on
Gomez shall not be applied to Pepino.56

We affirm the P700,000.00 imposed by the courts below as restitution of the

amount of ransom demanded and received by the kidnappers. We also affirm
the CA's award of Pl00,000.00 as exemplary damages based on Gambao.

WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, we AFFIRM the challenged June
16, 2006 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02026 with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) the penalty imposed on Gomez and Pepino shall be reduced from death
to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;

(2) they are jointly and severally ordered to pay the reduced amount of
PI00,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) Gomez is further ordered to pay the victim Pl00,000.00 as civil indemnity;
and

(4) the awarded amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of the finality of the Court's Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.