Res Judicata; Finality of Judgment
CASE FACTS
Ipekdijian Actions filed:
Merchandising v. CTA 1. Board of Tax Appeals - appeal from assessment
and CIR (BTA case No. 10)
a. Appeal denied; CIR’s decision affirmed
(J. Makalintal | 2. SC - appeal
September 30, 1963) a. Dismissed without prejudice
b. Final and executory (BTA case # 10)
c. Petition for reinstatement of appeal also
denied
3. CTA - Petition for review (CTA case #107)
a. Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
b. MR denied.
4. CIR - written claim for refund of partial payment and
request of cancellation of outstanding balance
a. Denied bc the Board of Tax Appeals
decision already final and executory
5. CA - Petition for review of CIR’s denial of refund
(CTA case #347)
a. Comm. raised as an affirmative answer that
the BTA case #10 already constituted RES
JUDICATA
b. Comm. filed a Motion for Execution of
Judgment
i. Granted.
ii. MR by [P] denied
6. SC - Petition for certiorari praying for annulment of
Order of Execution of Judgment
7. CTA - denied Action #5 bc RES JUDICATA
a. MR denied
8. SC - Petition to review
a. DISMISSED; CTA resolution in Action #7
affirmed
Ipekdijian Merchandising imported gold chains which were
later melted and converted into gold buillion, and sold.
(Jan. 11, 1951) The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
assessed and demanded from Ipekdijian the ff:
1. P97,502.25 - compensating tax and surcharge on
the processed gold chains
2. P200 - compromise penalty for violation of the Tax
AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT
ISSUE/RULING DOCTRINE
ESSENTIAL REQUISITES OF RES JUDICATA
1. The former judgment must be final
2. It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties
3. It must be a judgment on the merits
4. There must be, between the first and second actions,
a. Identity of parties
b. Identity of subject matter
c. Identity of cause of action
WON THE DECISION IN BTA CASE #10 OPERATES TO BAR CTA CASE #374 -
Yes, all requisites of res judicata are present
Petitioner’s arguments
The doctrine of res judicata, being a doctrine of expediency, is applicable only to
judgments rendered by a court or judge and does not extend to decisions of
administrative agencies, like the BTA, which are devoid of judicial functions.
SC
To say that the doctrine applies exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually
understood as courts would be to unreasonably circumscribe the scope thereof. The
more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies
upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.
Since the Board is not a court, does it have judicial powers? (Requisite #2) - Yes, as
per RA No. 1125
In the May 1963 Ipekdijian case, wherein the SC refused to annul CTA’s resolution
granting execution of judgement in BTA case #10, it was held that the Board was an
administrative body and its proceedings and decisions were administrative in
character.
But RA 1125 (June 1954) conferred judicial character on the proceedings and
decisions of the Board. Thus, the decisions of the Board in cases not subsequently
brought before the CFI or before the CTA within the 30 day period (Sec. 11, RA No.
1125) counted from the creation or organization of the CTA, received judicial
confirmation under said R.A. No. 1125 and the same should be considered final and
executory and enforceable by execution, just like any other decision of a court of
justice."
1
 Code
Pursuant to EO 401-A, s. 1951, Ipekdijian appealed to the
Board of Tax Appeals. After hearing on the merits, the Board
affirmed the Commissioner’s judgment. (BTA case No. 10)
Ipekdijian appealed to the SC, but this was dismissed without
prejudice. The dismissal became final and executory.
Ipekdijian filed a petition for reinstatement of appeal, but this
was denied.
(March 30, 1955) Petitioner filed a petition for review before
the CTA to reopen the case. (CTA case #107) The appeal
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, petitioner having failed
to maintain the necessary action
1. in the CFI pursuant to Sec. 306, Tax Code, OR
2. In the CTA within 30 days from its creation (on June
16, 1954) pursuant to Sec. 11, R.A. 1125.
MR denied.
(November 3, 1955) Petitioner made a partial payment of
P5,000.00 on its tax liability, but four days later it filed with
Commissioner a written claim for refund of the same,
requesting at the cancellation of the balance of the
assessment. This was denied by the Commissioner on the
ground that the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals was
already final and executory.
(May 10, 1957) Petitioner filed a petition for review in the CTA
of the decision of respondent Commissioner denying its
request for refund and cancellation of the balance of the
assessment. (CTA case #347)
(June 14, 1957) Commissioner filed his answer to the
petition, raising therein as affirmative defense the fact
that the decision in B.T.A. Case No. 10 operates as res
judicata to petitioner’s appeal.
(February 26, 1958) Commissioner filed a motion for
execution of judgment. Granted by CTA. MR by petitioner
denied.
Petitioner filed with the SC a petition for certiorari praying for
annulment of the order of execution of the judgment.
(December 29, 1958) CTA dismissed C.T.A. Case No. 374 on
the ground of res judicata. MR denied.
AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT
Are the respective causes of action in BTA case #10 and CTA case #374 different?
(Requisite #4c) - They’re the same. Changing the form of action does not change the
cause of action
In BTA case #10, petitioner was seeking the review of CIR’s assessment of tax with
the purpose in mind of having it reversed. In CTA case #347, after alleging the same
facts embodied in the BTA decision, with the addition of the circumstance of partial
payment, petitioner prayed that it be hold not subject to the tax and that it be refunded
partial payment and that the balance be cancelled.
The alleged cause of action in both cases is the same: appellant’s claim to non-
liability for compensating taxes. The only appreciable difference is that while in the
B.T.A. case it assailed the Collector’s decision assessing the sum of P97,502.25 as
compensating tax, etc., and holding him responsible therefore, in the C.T.A. case, he
ostensibly tried a different tack, by assailing the Collector’s denial of the claim for
refund and request for cancellation of the balance of the assessment. Nonetheless, in
both cases, the issue is the same: whether or not appellant is liable for the
compensating tax prescribed in Sec. 190 of the Tax Code. Appellant cannot, by
merely superficially changing the form of his action, plead the non- application
of the rule of bar by prior judgment.
------
Notes from B2015 reviewer:
Whenever any board, tribunal or person is by law vested with authority to judicially
determine a question, such determination, when it has become final, is as conclusive
as though the adjudication had been made by a court of general jurisdiction.
The general rule is that doctrine of res judicata may not be predicated upon
administrative or legislative action. There are, however, cases I which the doctrine of
res judicata has been held applicable to judicial acts of public executive or
administrative officers and boards. In this connection, it has been held that whenever a
final adjudication of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights
of the citizen is examined by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or certiorari, such
final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata.
2
 Petitioner filed a petition for review.
The petition for certiorari in the May 30, 1963 Ipekdjian
Merchandising v. CTA case was dismissed by the SC.
Nasipit Lumber Co., Respondent Juanito Collado was employed by petitioner
Inc. v. NLRC Nasipit Lumber as a security guard. He was assigned as lst
Sergeant of the NALCO Security Force at Nasipit. Almost six
AIAN years after he was hired, or on August 1976, four crates of
lawanit boards containing 1,000 panels were stolen from
petitioner's premises, particularly the crating section of the
Philippine Wallboard Corporation, a NALCO affiliate.
Collado was implicated in the theft and was thereafter placed
under preventive suspension.
CASE #1:
NALCO filed a petition (application) for clearance to dismiss
Collado with the Regional Office No. X of the Department of
Labor in Cagayan de Oro City. This was opposed by Collado.
The case was set for hearing the following day, but Collado
failed to appear despite notice. NALCO presented its
evidence ex-parte.
The application for clearance to dismiss was approved by
Regional Office Officer-in-Charge Roy Seneres. The order
was based on the investigation report by the Agusan
Provincial Labor Office. COllado filed an MR on two grounds:
(1) he was not given a right to adduce evidence, and (2) he
did not participate in the theft.
OIC Seneres certified the case to the Executive Labor Arbiter
for compulsory arbitration. Both parties were notified and
submitted their position papers. The LA returned the case to
the regional office for "whatever appropriate action he may
deem fit". The LA reasoned that the MR is in fact an appeal,
ad hence should be elevated to the Secretary of Labor.
The case was elevated to the Acting Secretary, who affirmed
the OIC's decision.
CASE 2:
Instead of filing a petition for certiorari before the SC, COllado
opted to file a complaint before the Butuan District Labor
Office for illegal dismissal and reinstatement. NALCO moved
to dismiss, arguing that because Acting Secretary Inciong's
order had become final and executory, the issue of illegal
dismissal had also become res judicata.
AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT
Is there res judicata? NO-SEE DOCTRINE We hold that this is one of the cases
The requirement of a clearance to terminate wherein the pronouncement of this
employment was a creation of the Department Court thru Justice Vicente Abad
of Labor to carry out the Labor Code Santos in Razon vs. Inciong
provisions on security of tenure and applies. The Court stated therein that
termination of employment. The proceeding the principle of res judicata may not
subsequent to the filing of an application for be invoked in labor relations
clearance to terminate employment was proceedings considering that Section
outlined in Book V, Rule XIV of the Rules and 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. Regulations Implementing the Labor
The fact that said rule allowed a procedure for Code provides that such proceedings
the approval of the clearance with or without are "non-litigious and summary in
the opposition of the employee concerned nature without regard to legal
(Secs. 7 & 8), demonstrates the non-litigious technicalities obtaining in courts of
and summary nature of the proceeding. The law." Said pronouncement is in
clearance requirement was therefore consonance with the jurisprudential
necessary only as an expeditious shield dictum that the doctrine of res
against arbitrary dismissals without the judicata applies only to judicial or
knowledge and supervision of the Department quasi-judicial proceedings and not to
of Labor. Hence, a duly approved clearance the exercise of administrative
implied that the dismissal was legal or for powers.
cause (Sec. 2).
But even while said clearance was a
requirement, employees who faced dismissal
still contested said applications not only
through oppositions thereto but by filing
separate complaints for illegal dismissal.
Usually, the investigation on the application
and the hearing on the complaint for illegal
dismissal were conducted simultaneously.
What makes the present case unusual is that
the employee filed the complaint for illegal
dismissal only after the Acting Secretary of
Labor had affirmed the approval of the
application to terminate his employment.
Nonetheless, we are unprepared to rule that
such action of the Acting Secretary of Labor
barred Collado from filing the complaint for
illegal dismissal. If ever, the most that can be
attributed against Collado is laches for his
failure to question seasonably the Acting
Secretary of Labor's affirmance of the approval
3
 The Butuan labor arbiter issued an order requiring NALCO to
reinstate Collado to his former position without backwages
and without loss of seniority rights "provided he has the
necessary papers required of the service as security guard".
Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). NALCO asked for the reversal and
revocation of the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter,
while Collado prayed for a modification of the appealed
decision to include backwages and benefits in addition to
reinstatement.
The NLRC rendered a decision modifying the Executive
Labor Arbiter's decision by ordering Collado's reinstatement
to his former position with two (2) years backwages without
qualification and loss of seniority rights.
Hence, NALCO filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or a restraining order, seeking to annul the NLRC
decision and to prohibit its execution.
The Court initially dismissed the petition. NALCO filed an MR.
The SolGen filed a manifestation and motion in support of
NALCO’s MR. The court then decided to give due course to
the MR.
AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT
of the clearance to terminate. However, to
count such laches against Collado would be
prejudicial to his rights as a laborer.
Be that as it may, the possibility that there
would be two conflicting decisions on the issue
of Collado's dismissal may now be considered
academic. The requirement of a written
clearance from the Department prior to
termination was abolished by the enactment of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in 1981. Dismissal
proceedings are now confined within the
establishments. The NLRC or the labor arbiter
steps in only if the said decision is contested
by the employee.
Was he illegally dismissed? NO. Did the
NLRC err in ordering his reinstatement with
backwages? YES.
The relation between petitioner and Collado is
now strained by the latter's violation of the
trust and confidence reposed on him as a
member of the security force, a position
impressed with a high degree of trust. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt of an employee's
misconduct is not required when loss of
confidence is the ground for dismissal. It is
sufficient if the employer has "some basis" to
lose confidence or that the employer has
reasonable ground to believe or to entertain
the moral conviction that the employee
concerned is responsible for the misconduct
and that the nature of his participation therein
rendered him absolutely unworthy of the trust
and confidence demanded by his position.
In this case, petitioner supported its application
for clearance to terminate Collado's
employment with sworn statements implicating
him in the theft. Such sworn statements are
sufficient to warrant the dismissal. On the
other hand, the dropping of the qualified theft
charges against Collado is not binding upon a
labor tribunal. The sensitivity of Collado's job
as a security guard vis-a-vis the cause of his
dismissal cost him his right to be rehired to the
same position. Reinstatement is not proper
where termination of employment was due to
4

Dulay v. Minister of The case stemmed from two cases decided by the Office of
Natural Resources the President (both have already attained finality)
1. Re: DANR Case No. 2898 “Angeles Dico v Juan
AC Quibete”
There was a barter agreement between Quibete and
Padios in 1932. Quibete exchanged his parcel of land for
Padios’ fishpond area.
Quibete applied for a Fish and Game special permit
but was disapproved because the area was not available for
fishpond purposes. The records were lost during ww2and
Quibete had to renew application which was approved.
Dico then filed her application to occupy the area
covered by the petitioners lease agreement but was
disapproved because it was already awarded to Quibete. MR
was denied. Quibete then transferred the rights over the
fishpond to Retirado.
Dico filed a protest with the PH Fisheries
Commission claiming that Quibete was occupying an area
which was not covered by his fishpond permit AND his
transfer of rights was done without the approval of the Sec of
Agribultural and Natural Resources. This was dismissed.
Case was brought to the Secretary of DANR but was also
dismissed. MR was also denied. She then appealed to the
Office of the President who also denied her appeal.
2. DANR Case No. 3447 “Dico vs Angeles”
While the first case was still pending, Dico filed with
the Drector of Lads a patent application for a portion of the lot
covered by Quibete’s Fishpond permit. Quibete protested this
and the application was rejected as well as the MR.
Dico appealed the case to the Secretary who
affirmed the decision of the Director of Lands (WHY – the
land in question was also covered by the first case). MR was
denied.
(Bakit si Dulay yung nasa case? – Retirado was the
successor-in-interest of Quibete because of the transfer of
right. Retireado then transferred his rights over the property
to Dulay)
Dulay then was issued a fishpond lease agreement over the
lot. Dico then petitioned to reopen the fishpond conflict of
Dico vs Quibete, Retirado, and Dulay based on newliy
discovered evidence alleging that Quibete’s permit did not
cover the area in Sitio Talaba-an but in Barrio Luna.
AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT
breach of trust and confidence
Should the petition be granted? – YES
It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence
that the decisions and orders of administrative
agencies rendered pursuant to their quasi-
judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the
force and binding effect of a final judgment
within the purview of the doctrine of res
judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids
the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as
well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of
public, executive or administrative officers and
boards acting within their jurisdiction.
The first and second cases were not brought
to the courts for judicial review and have long
become final and executory.
Private respondent points out that the Director
of Lands, Ramon N. Casanova, treated her
motion for reconsideration as a petition for
relief from judgment. That may be so but
Director Casanova's action was not in accord
with the administrative rules on appeal.
The next step that private respondent should
have taken from the July 9, 1970 Decision of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources was to appeal the same to the
Office of the President within 30 days from
receipt of said Decision. Private respondent
received the Decision on September 21, 1970,
and should have been appealed the same by
October 24, 1970, the last day of filing. Instead
she filed a motion for reconsideration only on
November 3, 1970. Clearly, the July 9, 1970
decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources in DANR Case No. 3447
had become final and executory.
The matter of which lot Juan Quibete improved
as a fishpond and which rights he sold to
Retirado was investigated TWICE after the
5
 (What are the new evidence? –Order of PH
Fisheries Commissioner Rolden recognizing the fishpond
application of the private respondent over an area in Barrio
Daga; plan of the Bureau of Lands for the entire area in which
the subject area is a portion of; Fishpond application of
Quibete for an area in Barrio Daga which was denied
because Quibete was already a holder of a previously
approved application; plan of the lot; affidavits of three people
claiming that Quibete’s fishpond area was in Barrio Luna
(who are these people? The Municipal Sec of Cadiz, a
member of the Cadiz policeforce, and the son of Quibete)
Petitioner moved to dismiss this petition on the ground of res
judicata.
The director held the motion to dismiss in abeyance and
reserved to resolve the motion until after the termination of
the investigation brought about by private-respondent’s
petition.
The MTD and MR was denied and because of the Director’s
insistence in conducting an investigation, Dulay then filed the
instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order claiming that unless
one is immediately issued respondent will proceed with the
investigation as planned and if Dulay fails to appear by
reason of this petition, respondents will proceed with the
investigation and reception of evidence ex parte as
threatened by the Director.
Phil. American On September 1985 the Davao Union Marketing Corp.
General Insurance shipped on board the vessel "Crazy Horse", operated by the
Company Inc. v. CA Transpacific Towage, cargo consisting of 9,750 (P1.08
million) GI sheets and 86,860 bags (P4.3 million) of Pozzolan
May 17, 1993| Padilla and Portland Cement. The cargo was consigned to the Bicol
Union Center of Pasacao, Camarines Sur.
The cargo was insured by the Philippine American General
Insurance Co., Inc. covering 86,000, of Pozzolan and
POrtland cement for the amount of P3.4 million.
"Crazy Horse" arrived as scheduled (sept 11) at the port of
Pasacao, Camarines Sur. Upon arrival the shipmaster
notified the consignee's "Notify-Party" that the vessel was
ready to discharge the cargo. The discharging could not be
affected immediately and continuously because the ff
reasons:
1. the buoys were installed only on sept 11;
AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT
Philippine Fisheries Commission reinstated
private respondent's Fishpond Application No.
18206 in its Order of May 12, 1964. Both
investigations - more than three years apart
with investigators from different offices -
showed that Juan Quibete occupied and
improved Lot 489-C although in the different
documents, including maps, which make up
this case, it was designated as Lot 487. Thus,
no merit can be given to private respondent's
alleged pieces of evidence as all these HAD
already been studied thoroughly by both
Investigator Alelis and Atty. Bautista in these
separate investigations.
W/N Res Judicata applies? NO
The resolution of the present case is not barred by the judgment of the Board of Marine
Inquiry. One of the requisites of the principle of res judicata is that there must be,
among other things, identity of subject matters and causes of action between a
first and second case in order that the judgment in the prior case may bar that in the
subsequent case.
The cause of action in the marine protest was to enforce the administrative liability of
the shipmaster/captain of M/V "Crazy Horse", its officers and crew for the wreckage
and sinking of the subject vessel. On the other hand, the cause of action at bar is to
enforce the civil liability of private respondent, a common carrier, for its failure to
unload the subject cargo within a period of time considered unreasonably long by the
petitioner. While it may be true that the Court is bound to accord great weight to factual
findings of the Board, we hold that the protest filed before it and the present case
assert different causes of action and seek different reliefs.
6
 2. the discharge permit was secured by the consignee
only on sept 13
3. a wooden catwalk and an extension to the wharf had
to be made, which was completed only on
September 26;
4. the discharging was not continuous because there
were intermittent rains and the stevedores supplied
by the consignee did not work during the town fiesta.
On October 16, 1985, super typhoon "Saling" entered the
Philippine area of responsibility and was felt in the eastern
coast of the country on October 17. It had a strength of 240
KPH and Pasacao was placed under Storm Signal No. 3. The
discharging of the cargo had to be suspended due to the
heavy downpour, strong winds, and turbulent sea. To prevent
damage to the cargo all hatches of the vessel were closed
and secured. Only 59,625 bags of cement and 26 crates of GI
Sheets were successfully discharged
In further preparation the shipmaster ordered the vessel to be
moved 300 meters seaward in order that it would not hit the
cat walk, wooden bridge, wharf, or rocks.
According to the shipmaster, the radius of the storm was so
wide that there was no way it could be evaded. The
shipmaster ordered the maneuvering of the ship on October
18 but it could not be steered on account of the strong winds
and rough seas. The vessel's lines snapped, causing her to
be dragged against the rocks, and the anchor chain stopper
gave way. The vessel sustained holes, causing water to leak
into the engine room and a power failure in the vessel.
The shipmaster had no choice but to order the ship to be
abandoned.He tried to request police assistance from the
Mayor’s office to help guard the cargo against looters but
such was denied. The vessel was continuously being
pounded by strong waves against the rocks causing the
vessel to break in half and to sink partially.
The shipmaster reported the incident to the Philippine Coast
Guard but despite the presence of 3 coast guards and the
shipcrew, nothing could be done about the pilferage on the
vessel and its cargo by the barrio folk. As a result of the
incident the cargo of cement was damaged while the GI
sheets were looted and nothing was left of the undischarged
pieces.(26k pcs of cement bags and 4k Gi sheets were lost)
Because the cargo was insured by it the petitioner paid the
AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT
W/N Transpacific Towerage is liable for the loss?
NO
The CA summarized the reasons which adversely affected the completion of the
unloading of the cargo from the time the vessel arrived at the Pasacao area namely:
first, the buoys were installed only on 11 September 1985; second, the consignee
secured the discharge permit only on 13 September 1985; third, a wooden catwalk had
to be installed and the extension of the wharf had to be made, which was completed
only on 16 September 1985; fourth, there were intermittent rains and the stevedores
supplied by the consignee did not work during the town fiesta of the Virgin of
Penafrancia, hence, the unloading was not continuous.
We respect the above-mentioned factual findings of the CAt as to the natural
conditions of the port of Pasacao were the vessel was docked, and several other
factors which harshly affected the completion of the discharge of the cargo, as these
findings of fact are substantially supported by evidence.
While it is true that there was indeed delay in discharging the cargo from the vessel,
we agree with the CA that neither of the parties herein could be faulted for such delay,
for the same was due not to negligence, but to several factors earlier discussed. The
cargo having been lost due to typhoon "Saling", and the delay incurred in its unloading
not being due to negligence, private respondent is exempt from liability for the loss of
the cargo, pursuant to Article 1739 of the Civil Code:
In order that the common carrier may be exempted from responsibility, the
natural disaster must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss.
However, the common carrier must exercise due diligence to prevent or
minimize loss before, during and after the occurrence of flood, storm, or other
natural disaster in order that the common carrier may be exempted from
liability for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods.
The records also show that before, during and after the occurrence of typhoon
"Saling", private respondent through its shipmaster exercised due negligence to
prevent or minimize the loss of the cargo, as shown by the following facts:
(1) at 5:20 a.m. of 18 October 1985, as typhoon "Saling" continued to batter
the Pasacao area, the shipmaster tried to maneuver the vesel amidst strong
winds and rough seas;
(2) when water started to enter the engine room and later the engine broke
down, the shipmaster ordered ths ship to be abandoned, but he sought police
assistance to prevent pilferage of the vessel and its cargo;
(3) after the vessel broke into two (2) parts and sank partially, the shipmaster
reported the incident to the Philippine Coast Guard, but unfortunately, despite
the presence of three (3) coast guards, nothing could be done to stop the
pilferage as almost the entire barrio folk came to loot the vessel and its cargo,
including the G.I. sheets.
7
 shipper Davao Union Marketing Corporation the sum of
P1,511,210.00. Thereafter, the said insurer made demands
upon the Transpacific Towage, Inc. for the payment of said
amount as subrogee of the insured, claiming that the loss of
the cargo was directly and exclusively brought about by the
fault and negligence of the shipmaster and the crew of "Crazy
Horse". Transpacific refused to pay, so Phil Am insurance
filed the a complaint.

LC>TransPacific Tow guilty of contributory Negligence. CA

reversed decision of LC, it held that TT not liable for loss of
cargo caused by a fortuitous event.

PR’s Contentions:
1. Not liable for loss because it exercised due diligence
and the loss was caused by a fortuitous event.
2. Res Judicata applies because the Board of Marine
Inquiry rendered a decision, acting on a marine
protest, that the shipmaster was not guilty of
negligence, hence recommending that the captain
and cre be absolved them from any admin. Liability
arising from the event.

Manila Electric Co. v. 1974: former President Marcos, with the objective of
Phi. Consumers enabling the grantees of electric franchises to reduce their
Foundation, et al rates "within the reach of consumers",promulgated
Presidential Decree No. 551 providing for the reduction from
5% to 2% of the franchise tax paid by electric companies
January 23, 2002|
SANDOVAL- 1982: BOE Case No. 82-198 -> "Petition for Specific
GUTIERREZ, J.: Performance, Damages and Violation of P. D. No. 551":
the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., (PCFI) filed with
the Board of Energy (BOE) a "Petition for Specific
Performance, Damages and Violation of P. D. No. 551"
SHIELLA against the (Meralco).
PCFI sought for the immediate refund by Meralco to its
customers of all the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551,
through the reduction of its franchise tax from 5% to 2%, with
interest at the legal rate; and for the payment of damages and
a fine in the amount of P50, 000.00 for violating P.D. 551. It
moored its petition on Section 4 of P.D. No. 551 which
provides: All the savings realized by electric franchise holders
from the reduction of the franchise tax under Section 1 and
tariff reductions and tax credits under Sections 2 and 3, shall
be passed on to the ultimate consumer.
MERALCO’S ANSWER: alleged that it was duly authorized
RATIO AND RULING: The petition is
meritorious. The issue - whether or not
Meralco is duly authorized to retain the
savings resulting from the reduction of the
franchise tax under P.D. No. 551 as long as
its rate of return falls below the 12 %
allowable rate recognized in this
jurisdiction has long been settled. Thus,
the relitigation of the same issue in the
Petition for Declaratory relief (Civil Case
No. Q-89-3659) cannot be sanctioned under
the principle of res judicata.
All the requisites are extant in the records and
thus, beyond dispute.
Re: FIRST REQUISITE - there must be a
final judgment:
•It is beyond question that this Courts
Resolution dated October 22, 1985 in G.R. No.
63018, sustaining the BOEs Decision dated
November 25, 1982 in BOE Case No. 82-198
which dismissed PCFI's petition, attained
finality on December 4, 1985.
•As a matter of fact, this Court had long ago
issued an Entry of Judgment stating that the
Interest republicae ut sit finis
litium - it is to the interest of the
public that there should be an end to
litigation by the same parties and
their privies over a subject fully and
fairly adjudicated. From this
overwhelming concern springs the
doctrine of res judicata an obvious
rule of reason according stability to
judgments.
------
[RES JUDICATA]:
Res judicata means a matter
adjudged, a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment. In res judicata,
the judgment in the first action is
considered conclusive as to every
matter offered and received therein,
as to any other admissible matter
which might have been offered for
that purpose, and all other matters
that could have been adjudged
therein.

AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT 8
 by the BOE in its Order dated March 10, 1980 in BOE Case
No. 79-692 to retain the disputed savings; and that the said
Order had long become final.
1982 BOE DECISION: dismissing PCFI's petition, declaring
that Meralco was indeed authorized by the BOE, in BOE
Case No. 79-692, to retain the disputed savings under P.D.
551.
It is at once evident from the foregoing controlling facts and
circumstances, particularly the Order of this Board dated
March 10, 1980, as confirmed by the reply-letter dated March
3, 1981, that Meralco has been duly authorized to retain the
savings realized under the provisions of P.D. 551. The
authority granted in the said Order and letter is so clear and
unequivocal as to leave any room for contradictory
interpretation. "It is noteworthy to mention also that the
registered oppositors in BOE Case No. 79-692 (formerly
BPW Case No. 72-2146), where the respondent herein
originally filed its motion requesting for authority to defer the
passing on to its customers of the franchise tax reduction
benefits under P.D. No. 551, have done nothing to seek relief
from or to appeal to the appropriate forum, the said Order of
March 10, 1980. As a consequence, the disposition contained
therein have long become final.
PCFI FILED A MR-> denied by the BOE.
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI: Hence, PCFI filed a Petition
for Certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 63018-
> DISMISSED for lack of merit:
When this petition was filed on January 27, 1983, the
November 25, 1982 ruling was already final and executory.
Moreover, the March 10, 1980 judgment rendered in BOE
Case No. 79-692, where Meralco had filed a motion for
authority to defer passing on to customers the savings from
the reduction of franchise taxes, was not appealed or
questioned by the petitioners. Instead, they filed BOE Case
No. 82-198 on February 5, 1982 or almost two years later,
raising the same issues against the same parties. BOEs
questioned decision in Case No. 82-198 used the facts in
BOE Case No. 79-692 for its conclusions. Not only had the
March 10, 1980 decision confirmed the findings of the
Minister of Finance on Meralcos accounts and finances but in
filing the second case, the petitioners were asking for a
readjudication of the same issues in another challenge to
these same findings .x x x.
said Resolution "became final and executory
and is x x x recorded in the Book of Entries of
Judgements." Prior thereto, or on March 10,
1980, the BOE's Order in BOE Case No. 79-
672 became final when the oppositors therein
did not appeal.
Re: SECOND REQUISITE - the court which
rendered the final judgment must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties:
•There is no question that the BOE has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties herein. Under P.D. No. 1206, The BOE
is the agency authorized to "regulate and fix
the power rates to be charged by electric
companies."
•As such, it has jurisdiction over Meralco, an
electric company, and over the savings it
realized under P.D. No. 551.
•It bears stressing that P.D. No. 551 was
passed precisely to enable the grantees of
electric franchises to reduce their rates within
the reach of consumers.
•Clearly, the matter on how the disputed
savings should be disposed of in order to
realize a reduction of rates is within the
competence of the BOE.
Re: THIRD REQUISITE - it must be a
judgment or order on the merits:
•After according both parties the opportunities
to be heard, the BOE disposed of the
controversy by resolving the rights of the
parties under P.D. No. 551. In its Decision, the
BOE declared in clear and unequivocal
manner that Meralco "has been duly
authorized to retain the savings realized under
the provisions of P.D. No. 551" and that
private respondent PCFIs argument to the
contrary is "untenable." The BOE's Decision
was upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 63018.
Hence, The BOE's Decision in BOE Case No.
82-198 is a judgment on the merits.
Re: FOURTH REQUISITE - there must be
between the two cases identity of parties,
For a claim of res judicata to
prosper, the following requisites
must concur:
1) there must be a final judgment or
order;
2) the court rendering it must have
jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties;
3) it must be a judgment or order on
the merits; and
● A judgment is on the merits
when it determines the
rights and liabilities of the
parties based on the
disclosed facts, irrespective
of formal, technical or
dilatory objections.
4) there must be, between the two
cases identity of parties, subject
matter and causes of action.
● Re parties: A party by
bringing forward, in a
second case, additional
parties cannot escape the
effects of the principle of res
judicata when the facts
remain the same. Res
judicata is not defeated by a
minor difference of parties,
as it does not require
absolute but only substantial
identity of parties.
● Re Subject Matter: The
subject matter of an action
refers to the thing, wrongful
act, contract or property
which is directly involved in
the action, concerning which
the wrong has been done

AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT 9

PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF: 4 years
thereafter, PCFI and a certain Edgardo S. Isip, private [R]
herein, filed with [R] RTC-QC , a petition for declaratory
relief, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-3659.
Private [R] prayed for a ruling on who should be entitled to
the savings realized by Meralco under P.D. No. 551. Once
again, they insisted that pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No.
551, the savings belong to the ultimate consumers.
MERALCO’S MTD: prayed for the dismissal of the petition on
the ground of res judicata, citing this Court's Resolution in
G.R. No. 63018 which affirmed the BOE's Decision in BOE
Case No. 82-198.
RTC DECISION: declaring null and void the Resolution of
this Court in G.R. No. 63018 and on the basis of the
Dissenting Opinion of the late Justice Claudio
Teehankee, held that the disputed savings belong to the
consumers, thus:
Respondent Meralco’s theory is devoid of merit. As correctly
stated in the dissenting opinion of the late Chief Justice
Claudio Teehankee in the October 22, 1985 resolution of the
Supreme Court in SC G.R. No. 63018, the decision of the
Board of Energy is ultra vires, hence, null and void. x x x.
“PD 551 merely ordered the Minister of Finance to issue
implementing rules and regulations. He cannot amend or
modify the clear mandate of the law. The act therefore of the
Minister of Finance was ultra vires, hence, null and void.
Considering that said act became the basis of the Board of
Energys decision, it follows that said decision is likewise null
and void and the Supreme Court resolution affirming said
decision is also null and void having proceeded from a void
judgment, hence, cannot be considered as valid judgment
that will be a bar to the present action."
MERALCO FILED MR-> DENIED.
Hence, Meralco's petition for review on certiorari .
Challenging a) Decision in Petition for Declaratory Relief/
Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 of the RTC-QC and b) its Order
denying the MR of the said Decision.
AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT
subject matter and causes of action: and with respect to which
the controversy has arisen.
[PARTIES]:
o BOE Case No. 82-198 was a contest ● Re Cause of Action:
between PCFI, as petitioner, and Meralco, as Clearly, the test of identity of
respondent. causes of action lies not in
oCivil Case No. Q-89-3659 involves the same the form of an action. The
contenders, except that respondent Edgardo difference of actions in the
Isip joined PCFI as a plaintiff. aforesaid cases is of no
moment. The doctrine of res
But his inclusion as such plaintiff is judicata still applies
inconsequential. A party by bringing forward, in considering that the parties
a second case, additional parties cannot were litigating for the same
escape the effects of the principle of res thing and more importantly,
judicata when the facts remain the same. Res the same contentions.
judicata is not defeated by a minor difference
of parties, as it does not require absolute but
only substantial identity of parties.
[SUBJECT MATTER]: In both cases, the
controversy is how the disputed savings shall
be disposed of - whether they shall be retained
by Meralco or be passed on to the consumers.
[CAUSES OF ACTION]: In both cases, the act
alleged to be in violation of the legal right of
private respondents is Meralco's retention of
the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551.
While it is true that BOE Case No. 82-198 is
one for specific performance, while Civil Case
No. Q-89-3659 is for declaratory relief - in the
ultimate - both are directed towards only one
relief, i.e., the refund of the disputed savings to
the consumers. To seek a court's declaration
on who should benefit from the disputed
savings (whether Meralco or the consumers)
will result in the relitigation of an issue fairly
and fully adjudicated in BOE Case No. 82-198.
HENCE, RTC's Decision granting PCFI and
Isip's petition for declaratory relief is in
direct derogation of the principle of res
judicata.
Twice, it has been settled that Meralco is
duly authorized to retain the savings it
10
 realized under P.D. No. 551 as long as its
rate of return falls below the 12% allowable
rate. The pronouncement of the BOE in
BOE Case No. 82-198 finding such fact to
be "beyond question" is clear and not
susceptible of equivocation. This
pronouncement was sustained by this
Court in G.R. No. 63018.

--------------OTHER ISSUES DISCUSSED------

------

ANOTHER ARGUMENT RAISED BY [R]: that

G.R. No. 63018/Petition for Certiorari merely
decreed the postponement of the passing of
Meralco's savings to the consumers until it
could increase its rate charges.

SC: On this point, this Court categorically ruled

"X x x. And finally, as stated by the Solicitor
General, if only to put the issue to final rest,
BOEs decision authorizing Meralco to retain
the savings resulting from the reduction of
franchise tax as long as its rate of return falls
below the 12% allowable rate is supported by
P.D. No. 551, the rules and administrative
orders of the Ministry of Finance which had
been duly authorized by the decree itself and
by directives of the President to carry out the
provisions of the decree, and most of all by
equitable economic considerations without
which the decree would lose its purpose and
viability."
---------
[WON DECLARATORY RELIEF PROPER?
NO. It may be entertained only before the
breach or violation of the statute, deed,
contract etc., to which it refers.

It may be entertained only beforethe breach or

violation of the statute, deed, contract etc., to
which it refers.The petition gives a practical
remedy in ending controversies which have
not reached the stage where other relief is
immediately available. It supplies the need for
a form of action that will set controversies at
rest before they lead to repudiation of
obligations, invasion of rights, and the

AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT 11
 commission of wrongs.

Here, private respondents brought the petition

for declaratory relief long after the alleged
violation of P.D. No. 551.
----
[RE RTC’S ADHERENCE TO THE
DISSENTING OPINION -> NEGATES THE
PRINCIPLE OF HIERARCHY OF COURTS
AND NULLIFIES THE ESSENCE OF
REVIEW; GROSS VIOLATION OF BASIC
CIVPRO]:
Lastly, we are dismayed by respondent RTC's
adherence to the Dissenting Opinion, instead
of the Majority Opinion, of the members of this
Court in G.R. No. 63018, as well as its temerity
to declare a Resolution of this Court "null and
void" and "cannot be considered as valid
judgment that will be a bar to the present
action."

A lower court cannot reverse or set aside

decisions or orders of a superior court,
especially of this Court, for to do so will negate
the principle of hierarchy of courts and nullify
the essence of review. A final judgment, albeit
erroneous, is binding on the whole world.
Thus, it is the duty of the lower courts to obey
the Decisions of this Court and render
obeisance to its status as the apex of the
hierarchy of courts.

"A becoming modesty of inferior courts

demands conscious realization of the
position that they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of the integrated
judicial system of the nation.". "There is
only one Supreme Court from whose
decisions all other courts should take their
bearings," as eloquently declared by
Justice J. B. L. Reyes.

Respondent RTC, and for this matter, all lower

courts, ought to be reminded that a final and
executory decision or order can no longer be
disturbed or reopened no matter how
erroneous it may be. Although judicial
determinations are not infallible, judicial error

AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT 12
 should be corrected through appeals, not
through repeated suits on the same claim[ In
setting aside the Resolution and Entry of
Judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 63018,
respondent court grossly violated basic rules
of civil procedure.

Facura v. CA

(February 16, 2011 |

Mnedoza, J.)

KLOSTER

Heirs of Maximo Derla

v. Heirs of Catalina
Derla vda. De Hipolito

April 13, 2011 |

LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO, J.

SAMMIE

Writ of Execution; Mandamus

CASE FACTS ISSUE/RULING DOCTRINE

Apolega v. Hizon

MARA

GSIS v. CSC

ALAYZA

Clavano v. HLURB, Jose Clavano Inc sold under a contract to sell a house Doctrine: Except in the case of judgments which are void ab initio or null per se for lack of
and Sps Tenazas and lot in Cebu City to spouses Tenazas. The spouses jurisdiction which can be questioned at any time - and the HLURB Decision here is not of this
paid 50% of the purchase price but encountered character - once a decision becomes final, even the court which has rendered it can no
February 27, 2002 | problems in paying the balance. Alleging default on the longer alter or modify it, except to correct clerical errors or mistakes.
Bellosillo part of the spouses, petitioner refused to accept
subsequent payments and sued them instead for First, assailed rulings of the HLURB and the CA pertain to proceedings which have for their
rescission of their contract to sell and forfeiture of all purpose the execution of the HLURB Decision. Obviously the Decision has long become final
prior payments made thereon. The suit was dismissed. and has also been completely satisfied. HLURB is thus left with no other authority but to
AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT 13

The spouses filed a complaint for specific performance
with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) regional office against petitioner to compel it
to honor their contract to sell. The spouses alleged that
they had tendered enough money to pay for the
balance which petitioner unreasonably refused to
accept. They asked for judgment compelling Jose
Clavano Inc. to accept their payment and execute in
their favor the deed of absolute sale for the property,
and for damages.
The HLURB Regional Office found the spouses’
complaint meritorious and ordered petitioner to accept
the amount and execute the deed of sale. Damages
were also granted
HLURB upheld the decision, and later on the Office of
the President likewise sustained the decision but
deleted the award of moral damages. The MR filed was
denied. The petition for review of petitioner with the CA
was dismissed for insufficiency of the certificate of non-
forum shopping. The SC dismissed the petition for
review on certiorari of the CA decision for failure of
petitioner to submit a written explanation for substituted
service thereof upon the spouses and the CA.
The HLURB decision, as modified by the OP, lapsed
into finality and ripened for execution. The HLURB
Regional Office issued a writ of execution to enforce
the judgment, and petitioner was constrained to
surrender to the spouses an unnotarized deed of
absolute sale over the property, the original owners
duplicate of the TCT in petitioners name, tax
declaration certificates, managers check for costs and
attorneys fees, miscellaneous documents, and keys to
the house.
The spouses filed a motion with the HLURB
complaining about several defects in the housing unit
as well as the delivery of an unnotarized deed of
absolute sale, and the TCT which was still titled in the
name of the petitioner. They also asked that the
petitioner pay for expenses of the notarization, and
taxes and fees necessary in recording the title in their
name. HLURB granted the motion.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the HLURB
AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT
enforce the dispositive part of its Decision which it can no longer amend, modify or alter in a
manner affecting the merits of the judgment. Since the instant petition alleges the
amendment or modification of the HLURB Decision which was beyond the authority of the
HLURB and the CA to do, the proper remedy clearly is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Secondly, the subsequent Orders of the HLURB requiring petitioner to pay for the expenses
incurred by private respondents in securing the transfer of title in their name do not fall within
the ambit of the HLURB Decision whether expressly or by necessary inference, i.e.,
whatever then is necessary to be done to carry out the decision should be ordered. The
Orders are completely separate from and independent of the Decision and do not merely
enforce it. The Orders cannot therefore be considered part of the Decision which must be
executed against petitioner. Fundamental is the rule that execution must conform to that
ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision; consequently, where the
order of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it
life, the order has pro-tanto no validity.
While the Decision commands petitioner to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the
spouses and deliver the corresponding TCT to them, we cannot infer from these directives
that petitioner should also pay for the expenses in notarizing the deed and in obtaining a new
certificate of title. The obligation to pay for such expenses is unconnected with and distinct
from the obligations to execute and deliver the deed of absolute sale and the certificate of
title. Since there is no qualification that the duties to execute and to deliver shall also compel
petitioner to assume the expenses for transferring the pertinent title in favor of private
respondents, the ordinary and literal meaning of the words execute and deliver should
prevail, that is, for petitioner to perform all necessary formalities of the deed of sale and give
or cede the res of the certificate of title (that certificate which naturally must be in their
possession since petitioner cannot give what it does not have) to the actual or constructive
control of private respondents.
Petitioner can discharge these obligations without settling for its own account the expenses
which private respondents are demanding. Petitioner can appear before the notary public for
notarization of the deed of absolute sale and assist in the cancellation of the certificate of title
in its name by giving this certificate together with the deed of absolute sale to private
respondents for presentation at the Registry of Deeds, which it has several times expressed
willingness to do.
Clearly, there is nothing in the body much less in the dispositive portion of the HLURB
Decision nor in the pleadings of the parties from where we may deduce that petitioner must
pay for the amounts spent in transferring title to private respondents. It is well settled that
under these circumstances no process may be issued to enforce the asserted legal
obligation.
Third, the HLURB or the CA cannot order petitioner at this late stage to reimburse the
charges and fees relative to the transfer of title to spouses of the subject house and lot when
the spouses did not allege this obligation nor pray for this relief in their complaint and other
pleadings and did not attempt to prove this cause of action one way or the other. It is
elementary that a judgment must conform to, and be supported by, both the pleadings and
the evidence, and be in accordance with the theory of the action on which the pleadings are
14
 Order and argued that it amended the final HLURB
Decision which as far as petitioner was concerned had
been fully executed. The MR was denied.
Petitioner elevated the HLURB Orders on a Rule 65
certiorari to the CA. The CA dismissed the petition,
ruling that by virtue of the HLURB decision petitioner
was mandated to pay for or refund, as the case may
be, the expenses for the transfer of title of the subject
house and lot to private respondents. The sheriff
demanded from petitioner the reimbursement of P232k
for the alleged actual expenses of private respondents
in notarizing and registering with the Register of Deeds
the deed of absolute sale for the property and of
recording the corresponding Torrens title in private
respondents name. The MR was denied, hence the
instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT
framed and the case was tried. The judgment must be secundum allegata et probata.
Fourth, neither can we imply such obligation from the HLURB Decision since private
respondents complaint in the proceedings a quo only sought the enforcement of the mutually
binding contract to sell so that they could finally own the house and lot but did not, never, ask
for the transfer of the title of the immovable property in their name at petitioners expense.
We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the HLURB, affirmed by the CA, in ordering
petitioner to settle the expenses for the transfer of title whereby private respondents obtained
such relief by filing a mere motion during the execution proceedings. In the case at bar, none
of the circumstances* which this Court used in the past exist to justify evidentiary hearings of
new allegations during the execution of judgment as nonetheless being part of the
segmented proceedings in the suit.
In the instant case, we are not concerned with just varying or replacing the means of
executing the Judgment but with attempts to compel an altogether different relief apart from
those adjudged in the HLURB Decision.
Likewise, the assailed Orders do not involve supervening events where the court a quo is
allowed to admit evidence of new facts and circumstances and thereafter to suspend
execution of the judgment and grant relief as may be warranted which may or may not result
in its modification. Supervening events refer to facts which transpire after judgment has
become final and executory or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment
has acquired finality, including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during
the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time.
Clearly, the responsibility for the expenses for registering and titling the subject house and lot
does not qualify as a supervening event which would have justified such post-judgment
hearings as those undertaken by the HLURB and validated by the Court of Appeals.
In the case at bar, private respondents should have asserted in the strongest language and
at the earliest possible opportunity, i.e., in the complaint for specific performance, their
reasons for requiring petitioner to shoulder the expenses of transferring title to them since, as
the records clearly show, the same contract to sell for which they sought specific
performance categorically imposed the burden at least prima facie upon them.
In addition to alleging them in the complaint, should have also been heard during the trial on
the merits before the HLURB where the parties could have proved their respective claims.
Fifth, the assailed Orders of the HLURB did not merely interpret for purposes of execution
but actually changed, amended or modified the HLURB Decision. The assailed Orders
granted an entirely new relief which significantly affected the obligations of petitioner as
judgment-debtor; petitioner was not only to execute the deed and deliver the documents of
title but must also shell out money to settle the expenses incurred in the process of
transferring title to private respondents.
Since the Orders in question are a wide departure from the final and at least executory
HLURB Decision, they are pro tanto void and absolutely unenforceable for any
15
 purpose. It is well settled that after the decision has become final and executory, it can no
longer be amended or corrected by the court except for clerical errors or mistakes.

If neither the HLURB nor the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to impose such obligation
upon petitioner, then the same would hold true for this Court. Under the circumstances, we
have no authority to unsettle the final and perhaps satisfactorily executed Decision of the
HLURB. As we have consistently ruled, the general power of courts to amend their
judgments or orders to make them conformable to justice cannot be invoked to correct an
oversight or error as a judicial error may not be considered as a mere ambiguity, curable
without a proper proceeding filed before the judgment had become final.

*Circumstances:
1. Where private respondents are enforcing subsidiary liability of an employer in a
criminal case for negligence
2. Where the defense or claim sought to be heard on execution has been raised or
tried before the trial court
3. Where the post-judgment evidentiary hearings are meant to address the
impossibility of exacting compliance with the judgment as specified therein

Vda. De Corpuz v. The

Commanding General

HAF

Ambrosio v. Salvador

AIAN

Merano v. Tutaan

AC

AZIS | CABREROS | DISOMANGCOP | ESTIOCO | MONTEMAYOR | MONTERO | REAL | SAISES | TAMAYO | YAMAT 16