FULL TITLE: FRANCEL REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. RICARDO T.

SYCIP, Respondent.

TOPIC: Jurisdiction – Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

Petitioner and Respondent entered into a contract to sell a house and lot covered by TCT No. T-281788. Upon
execution of the contract to sell, [respondent] made a down payment of P119,700.00, which was considered as monthly
rentals at the rate of P2,686.00 per month. On March 16, 1990, the townhouse subject of the contract to sell was
transferred in the name of [respondent] as evidenced by TCT No. T-281788. Despite the transfer of the title in the
name of [respondent], the latter refused to pay the balance of P250,000.00. By applying the down payment
of P119,700.00 to defendant's monthly rental starting from December 1989, said amount has been reduced to nothing.
Despite several demands made by [petitioner] to [respondent], including the demand dated December 12, 1991 made
by [petitioner's] counsel, the [respondent] refused to reconvey the subject property to [petitioner]. The [petitioner]
suffered actual damages in the form of repairs amounting to not less than P100,000.00 as well as moral and exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.

The [respondent] filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but the court below denied the motion
stating that the ground relied upon by [respondent did not appear to be] indubitable. Denying the material allegations
of the complaint, the [respondent] again invoked the court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Further, there is a pending case between the same parties and involving the same townhouse before the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board for unsound real estate business practices. Likewise, the [respondent] justified his refusal
to pay the amortizations alleging that the [petitioner] sold and delivered to him a defective townhouse unit under Sec.
3 of Presidential Decree No. After trial, the court below dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court can dismiss, after full blown trial, Civil Case No. BCV-94-2 of the RTC, Imus, Cavite,
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

RULING:

In the present case, the trial court at first denied the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent, because the grounds he
had relied upon did not appear to be indubitable. The ruling was made under the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which then provided that the court, "after hearing x x x may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment of pleading,
or may defer the hearing and determination of the motion until the trial if the ground alleged therein does not appear
to be indubitable." Moreover, the factual allegations of the Complaint that petitioner filed below for reconveyance and
damages sufficiently conformed to the jurisdictional requisites for the exercise of the MTC's authority. Thus, in accord
with the procedures then prescribed, the court conducted trial to allow all arguments and evidence to surface.

Significantly, petitioner has previously sued respondent's brother and co-complainant before the HLURB over the
same subdivision project. In Francel Realty v. Court of Appeals and Francisco Sycip, petitioner's Complaint for
unlawful detainer was premised on the failure of respondent's brother to pay monthly amortizations on the basis of his
right to stop paying them under PD 957. In that case, the Court had ruled that the issue involved a "determinative
question x x x exclusively cognizable by the HLURB"; that is, a "determination of the rights and obligations of parties
in a sale of real estate under P.D. 957."

Because an earlier Complaint had been filed by Sycip before the HLURB against Francel Realty Corporation for
unsound real estate business practices, the Court dismissed petitioner's cause of action. The reason for the dismissal
was that the Complaint should "instead be filed as a counterclaim in [the] HLURB [case] in accordance with Rule 6,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court x x x." For the same reason, this Court has ruled that a suit to collect on a promissory
note issued by a subdivision lot buyer involves the "sales of lots in commercial subdivisions"; and that jurisdiction
over such case lies with the HLURB, not with the courts
FULL TITLE: PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO, ORLANDO S.
MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA
S. JAYME, MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA
M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S. MANALO, AMALIA
MANALO and IMELDA MANALO.

TOPIC: RULE 1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14, 1992. He
was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo,
Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia
Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of legal age.1âwphi1.nêt

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in Manila and in
the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at No. 19
Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General Tinio Street, Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo,
namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a petition with the respondent
Regional Trial Court of Manila 7 of the judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for
the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the respondent trial court

RULING:
It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the
character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful srutiny
of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition
contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as
the fat of death of the late Troadio Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the
time of his said death. The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country are foundation facts
upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest. The petition is SP.PROC No. 92-
63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by
the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's prayed for in the said
petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners therein
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners may not validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2,
of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of
the petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear
enough.
FULL TITLE: MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COURT OF
APPEALS,
 CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

TOPIC: RULE 1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

This was originally a case of an action for torts and damages and specific performance with a prayer for temporary
restraining order. The damages were not specifically stated in the prayer but the body of the complaint assessed a P
78.75M. damages suffered by the petitioner. The amount of docket fee paid was only P41O.OO. The petitioner then
amended the complaint and reduced the damages to P1O M only.

ISSUE:
When does a court acquire jurisdiction.

Whether or not an amended complaint vests jurisdiction in the court.

RULING:
The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket

fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment
of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading. All complaints, petitions, answers and other
similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for. Damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case.
FULL TITLE: SUN INSURANCE OFFICE V. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION,
Presiding Judge and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG.

TOPIC: RULE 1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

Petitioner Sun Insurance Office filed a complaint for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy
with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private
respondent was declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary period. On the other
hand, private respondent filed a complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment against petitioner. Although the prayer in the complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought
said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million Pesos. Only the amount of
P21O.OO was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners' counsel to raise his objection,
which was disregarded by respondent Judge. The Court thereafter returned the said records to the trial court with the
directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges to the exclusion of Judge Castro. The Court issued a Resolution
directing the judges to reassess the docket fees and requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of re-assessment of
docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered. Judge
Maximiano Asuncion, to whom Civil Case was thereafter assigned, issued an Order requiring the parties in the case
to comment on the Clerk of Court's letter-report.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion.
Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, Denying due course to the petition insofar as it seeks
annulment of the order

ISSUE:
Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.

RULING:
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket
fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the
initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. It shall be the responsibility
of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee. The
petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is instructed to reassess and determine the additional filing fee that should be
paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and the
supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private
respondent to pay the deficiency.
FULL TITLE: PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUMCORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER
OF CUSTOMS
TOPIC: RULE 1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

On 11 October 2000,8 petitioner appealed the 4 September 2000 decision of the District Collector of the BOC to the
respondent and requested for the cancellation of the assessment for the same customs duties.

However, on 29 October 2001, five years after petitioner paid the allegedly deficient import duty' it received by telefax
from the respondent a demand letter for the payment of the amount of P936,899,885.90, representing the dutiable
value of its 1996 crude oil importation which had been allegedly abandoned in favor of the government by operation
of law. Respondent stated that Import Entry No. 683-96 covering the subject importation had been irregularly filed
and accepted beyond the thirty-day (30) period prescribed by law. Petitioner protested the aforesaid demand letter on
7 November 2001 for lack of factual and legal basis, and on the ground of prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has not been paid.

RULING:
Records of this case reveal that the CTA in Division in its 19 June 2008 Decision made a pronouncement that there
was indeed fraud committed by petitioner based on the factual finding contained in the Memorandum dated 2 February
2001 issued by Special Investigator II Domingo B. Almeda and Special Investigator III Nemesio C. Magno, Jr. of the
CIIS-IPD of the BOC. Consequently, since such memorandum made such factual finding of fraud against petitioner,
the court a quo ruled that prescription does not set in even if respondent's claim was made beyond the 1-year
reglementary period.

Upon an assiduous review of the factual finding of fraud, we find petitioner's contention meritorious. Hence, the
instant case falls among the exceptions to the general rule previously mentioned which would require this Court's
judicial prerogative to review the court a quo's findings of fact.

Generally, fraud has been defined as "the deliberate intention to cause damage or prejudice. It is voluntary execution
of a wrongful act, or a willful omission, knowing and intending the effects which naturally and necessarily arise from
such act or omission. For fraud to exist, it must be intentional, consisting of deception willfully and deliberately done
or resorted to in order to induce another to give up some right. It is never presumed and the burden of proof to establish
lies in the person making such allegation since every person is presumed to be in good faith. To discharge this burden,
fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Also, fraud must be alleged and proven as a fact where the
following requisites must concur: (a) the fraud must be established by evidence; and (b) the evidence of fraud must
be clear and convincing, and not merely preponderant. Upon failure to establish these two (2) requisites, the
presumption of good faith must prevail.
FULL TITLE: MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA NOEL, vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM Davao del Norte, Branches 1 and
2, Presided by Hon. Marcial Fernandez and Hon. Jesus Matas, respectively,
PATSITA GAMUTAN, Clerk of Court, and GODOFREDO PINEDA

TOPIC: RULE 1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

These were two separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for recovery of possession
(accion publiciana) against three defendants, namely Antonio Noel, Ponciano Panes, and Maximo Tacay. Pineda was
the owner of 790 sq. meter land evidence by TCT No. T-56560. The previous owner of such land allowed the three
defendants to use or occupy the same by mere tolerance. Pineda having himself the need to use the property, demanded
the defendants to vacate the premises and pay reasonable rental therefore, but such demands were refused. The
complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant alleging that it did not specify the amounts
of actual, nominal and exemplary damages, nor the assessed value of the property, that being a ground to bar the
determination of the RTC’s jurisdiction in deciding the case. The Motions to Dismiss were denied and the claims for
damages in the complaint were expunged for failure to specify the amounts. Thus, the defendants filed a Joint Petition
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, as well as a temporary restraining order against the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the amount of damages claimed and the assessed value of the property are relevant in the determination
of the court’s jurisdiction in a case for recovery of possession of property.

RULING:

Yes. Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed
on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. The Court acquires
jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees,
or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within
such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the meantime. But where-as in
the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of
the related damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not be dismissed.
The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by the
circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because of lack of
specification thereof. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are
stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the
complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees
therefore within the relevant prescriptive period.
FULL TITLE: Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. v. Security Bank Corporation

TOPIC: RULE 1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

Spouses Lim took a loan from Security Bank. Unable to pay on time, the Lims assigned to the Bank their real properties
including a building and lot. The Bank then offered to lease said property to the Lims through Do-All Metals
Industries, Inc. (DMI) primarily for business and partly as Lim's residence. A 2-year lease contract was executed on
the condition that the Bank has the right to pre-terminate the lease and should the Bank decide to sell the property,
DMI shall have the right of first refusal.

Months before the lease was up, the Bank notified DMI that it was pre-terminating it. While negotiations were
ongoing, the Lims claim that they continued to use the property but the Bank posted security guards at the said place
and the guards, on instructions of the Bank, padlocked the entrances and barred the Lims and DMI’s employees from
entering, even pointing gun at one employee. Because of this, DMI was unable to close several projects with potential
clients and Lims were unable to retrieve personal items left at the property. DMI and Lims (DMI) then filed a
complaint with RTC Pasig for damages with prayer for the issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction against the
Bank.

RTC directed the Bank to allow DMI to enter the building and get their machineries, equipment and personal things
but DMI was unable to find their properties. In a supplemental complaint, DMI alleged that the Bank surreptitiously
took such properties, resulting in additional actual damages of over P27M. RTC ruled in favor of DMI, ordering the
Bank to pay the P27M actual damages, plus moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

The Bank moved for reconsideration of the decision, questioning among other things the RTC’s authority to grant
damages considering DMI’s failure to pay the filing fees on their supplemental complaint. The RTC denied the motion.
On appeal, CA ruled in favor of the Bank and denied the subsequent MR, hence this petition.

ISSUE:
W/N the RTC acquired JURISDICTION on the supplemental complaint against the Bank considering DMI and Lims'
failure to pay the filing fees on the amounts of damages they claim in it;

RULING:

YES. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over their action from the moment they filed the original complaint accompanied
by the payment of the filing fees due on the same. Their non-payment of the additional filing fees due on their
additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.

The Bank belittles the testimonies of the DMI’s witnesses for having been presented ex parte but the ex parte hearing,
having been properly authorized, cannot be assailed as less credible. It was the Bank’s fault that it was unable to attend
the hearing. It cannot profit from its lack of diligence. Employees of DMI testified regarding the Bank guards’
unmitigated use of their superior strength and firepower and such were never refuted. Police testified finding Lim
locked in the building and being told by a Bank representative that they had instructions to prevent anyone from taking
any property out of the premises. While the lease may have already lapsed, the Bank had no business harassing and
intimidating the Lims and DMI employees.

DMI's stand is that the RTC correctly admitted the supplemental complaint even if they had not paid the filing fees
due on it since such fees constituted a lien anyway on the judgment award. But this after-judgment lien, which implies
that payment depends on a successful execution of the judgment, applies to cases (1) where the filing fees were
incorrectly assessed or paid or (2) where the court has discretion to fix the amount of the award. NONE of these
circumstances are present in this case.
FULL TITLE: NATIONAL STEEL CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS
 and

NSC-HDCTC EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION-FFW

TOPIC: RULE 1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

Disagreement between petitioner National Steel Corporation and the respondent NSC-HDTC Monthly/Daily
Employees Organization-FFW (Union) arose regarding the giving of year-end incentives and Productivity and Quality
Bonus to the employees of NSC. Having agreed on the submission of the case for voluntary arbitration, the parties
appeared before the voluntary arbitrator, Rene Ofreneo, who found no merit in the demand of the Union for a
productivity and quality bonus, but ordered NSC to distribute the year-end award, as according to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and such practice having been done for four years by petitioner. Upon this decision, petitioner
filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration regarding the award of the year-end incentive, which Motion was denied
by Ofreneo. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. The CA, for its part, dismissed petitioner’s
petition on the ground of failure to comply with the requirements of law regarding the law on forum-shopping. It held
that Atty. Padilla, one of the counsels of record of petitioner was a mere retained counsel, who had no direct interest
with the outcome of the suit. As such, said the CA, Atty. Padilla had no authority under the law to sign the certification
in behalf of the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for review should be denied.

RULING:

In the instant case, the certification was signed by NSC’s counsel. NSC argues that contrary to the findings of the
Court of Appeals, NSC’s counsel of record was duly authorized to represent them not only before the Voluntary
Arbitrator but also to prepare the petition for review filed before the Court of Appeals. To support this claim, petitioner
attached to its petition before this Court a Secretary’s Certificate. Counsel of petitioner, Atty. Padilla also submitted
a Verification cum Certification where he stated that he prepared the petition upon the explicit instructions of the VP-
Marketing & Resident Manager of petitioner corporation. While it is admitted that the authorization of petitioner’s
counsel was submitted to the appellate court only after the issuance of its Resolution dismissing the petition based on
non-compliance with the Circular regarding forum-shopping, the Supreme Court holds that in view of the peculiar
circumstances of the present case and in the interest of substantial justice, the procedural defect may be set aside, pro
hac vice. As held by the Court: "Technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice. While
the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an even more urgent
ideal." By recognizing the signature of the authorized counsel in the certification, no circumvention of the rationale,
that is to prevent the ills of forum shopping, is committed.
FULL TITLE: Spouses GREGORIO GO and JUANA TAN GO vs. JOHNSON Y. TONG;
COURT OF APPEALS; and Honorable Judge JUAN NABONG of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Manila.

TOPIC: RULE 1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

Petitioner Juana Tan Go (petitioner Juana) purchased a cashier’s check dated September 13, 1996 from the Far East
Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) Lavezares, Binondo Branch in the amount of ₱500,000.00, payable to Johnson
Y. Tong (private respondent).

"On petitioner Juana’s instruction, the cashier’s check bore the words ‘Final Payment/Quitclaim’ after the name of
payee private respondent allegedly to insure that private respondent would honor his commitment that he would no
longer ask for further payments for his interest in the ‘informal business partnership’ which he and she had earlier
dissolved.

"After the check was delivered to private respondent, he deposited it with the words ‘Final Payment/Quitclaim’ already
erased, hence, it was not honored.

"Private respondent’s counsel subsequently wrote the manager of FEBTC Lavezares Branch informing that the words
‘Final Payment/Quitclaim’ on the check had been ‘inadvertently erased without being initialed by your bank or the
purchaser thereof’ and thus requesting that the check be replaced with another payable to ‘Johnson Tong-Final
Settlement/Quitclaim’ with the same amount, the bank charges therefor to be paid by his client-private respondent.

"FEBTC did not grant the request of private respondent’s counsel, hence, private respondent filed a complaint against
FEBTC and petitioner Juana and her husband Gregorio Go at the Manila RTC, for sum of money, damages, and
attorney’s fees, subject of the case at bar.

"Answering the Complaint, therein defendants-herein petitioners Juana and her husband and FEBTC alleged that the
erasure of the words ‘Final Payment/Quitclaim’ was intentional on private respondent’s part, reflective of his intention
to collect more from petitioner Juana, hence, the non-issuance of a replacement check was justified, unless private
respondent was sincere in abiding with the ‘terms agreed upon.’

"During the pendency of the case, petitioner’s son, George Tan Go, filed a criminal complaint against private
respondent for falsification of the check. The criminal complaint was dismissed, however, by the Manila Prosecutor’s
Office.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed grave and serious errors which [are] tantamount to grave
abuse of discretion when it upheld the validity of the Orders

RULING:

The CA was likewise correct in finding that petitioners had failed to assail, within the prescribed period, the Order
allowing the release of the money. The Manifestation of Deposit was received and approved by the RTC on November
18, 1998. On February 5, 1999, private respondent, through his counsel, made his oral manifestation to withdraw the
amount deposited. It was only on May 30, 2000, upon the filing of their Petition for Certiorari with the CA, when
petitioners questioned the Order allowing the withdrawal of the deposit.

If petitioners honestly believed that respondent judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion when he issued the
Order, why did they allow more than one year to lapse before assailing it? In fact, they had not even filed a motion
for reconsideration. Elementary is the rule that before certiorari may be availed of, a petitioner must have filed with
the lower court a motion for reconsideration of the act or order complained of This requirement enables the lower
court to pass upon and correct its mistakes in the first instance, without the intervention of the higher tribunal. While
there are exceptions to this rule, petitioners have not convinced this Court that they are entitled thereto.

Petitioners claim that they learned of the existence of the Order only after more than one year had passed, and of the
withdrawal of the deposit only after their new counsel had appeared.

We are not persuaded. It is undeniable that petitioners actively prosecuted their case during the period when they were
allegedly still ignorant of the existence of the Order dated February 5, 1999. Whether such ignorance was due to
negligence or mere oversight will not release them from its effects.
FULL TITLE: Mijares v. Ranada Recognition of Foreign Judgments

TOPIC: RULE 1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

Ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and
rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime, filed with the US District Court, Hawaii,
against the Estate Ferdinand E. Marcos. Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a Final Judgment and an award
of compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of the plaintiff class with an award of a total of One Billion Nine
Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90)
The present petitioners filed Complaint with the Makati RTC for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. Respondent
Judge Ranada of the Makati RTC issued the subject Orderdismissing the complaint without prejudice. He opined that
the subject matter of the complaint was capable of pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a
foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy determination of the value of the
foreign judgment. The RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two
Million Pesos, which obviously had not been paid. Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation as the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection
of a sum of money or recovery of damages. They also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay Four Hundred
Seventy Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render inutile the liberal construction
ordained by the Rules of Court, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every action.

ISSUE:
What provision, if any, then should apply in determining the filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign judgment?

RULING:

Respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he concluded that the filing fees should be computed on the
basis of the schematic table of Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to a claim against an estate based on
judgment. A proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a foreign judgment in this jurisdiction. The
rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final
judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries.

The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment has remained
unchanged.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For an action in
rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action inpersonam, the foreign
judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.

Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in
the local forum. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.

Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
FULL TITLE: ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER vs. ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER

TOPIC: RULE 1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

The holographic will of Alice O. Sheker was admitted for probate in the RTC of Iligan City. Thereafter, the RTC
issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate.
In compliance, petitioner, Allan Sheker filed a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to
approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate of Alice Sheker,
and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by Allan Sheker in the
course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced by
respondent. Allan Sheker filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied . Hence, the petition for review
on certiorari.

Allan Sheker maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees
upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions
are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner

ISSUE:
Whether or not Allan Sheker’s contention that rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special
proceedings is entirely correct.

RULING:

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the
rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special
proceedings.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in
the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall
be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
The word “practicable” is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice,
done or accomplished.1[4]

This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special
proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings.
Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or
merely suppletory to special proceedings.
Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory
pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims
against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings
such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.
FULL TITLE: LU v. LU YM

TOPIC: RULE 1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS:

The holographic will of Alice O. Sheker was admitted for probate in the RTC of Iligan City. Thereafter, the RTC
issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate.
In compliance, petitioner, Allan Sheker filed a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to
approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate of Alice Sheker,
and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by Allan Sheker in the
course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds advanced by
respondent. Allan Sheker filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied . Hence, the petition for review
on certiorari.

Allan Sheker maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees
upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary actions
are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner

ISSUE:
Whether or not Allan Sheker’s contention that rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special
proceedings is entirely correct.

RULING: