Day - 1 - 1530 - Planning For Unintended Releases of Highly Hazardous Materials

PLANNING FOR UNINTENDED
RELEASES OF HIGHLY
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
Thia Cheong Meng, Risk Consultant

International Refinery Services Pte Ltd
Risk Service Group
4th July 2007
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS FAIR

& USERS CONFERENCE – 4th-5th July 2007
PAST INCIDENTS
BHOPAL – 1984
Release of methyl isocyanate
2500 deaths
Failure of ERC
Ship/Shore Loading Arm

Page 2 Proprietary info goes here…
1
THE RELEASE OF HAZARDOUS VAPOUR CLOUDS
In spite of all possible

safeguards, these events
still occur albeit very
rarely.

RELEASE OF HAZARDOUS VAPOUR CLOUDS
HAZARDOUS
VAPOUR CLOUD
TOXIC &
TOXIC FLAMMABLE
FLAMMABLE
Exposure routes Fire and explosion Fire and explosion

- Inhalation and
- Skin absorption exposure routes
- Ingestion

2
RELEASE OF HAZARDOUS VAPOUR CLOUDS
FLAMMABLE FIRE & CONTROL

CROSS WIND
CLOUD EXPLOSION ROOM
EVACUATION
SHELTER IN CONTROL
TOXIC CLOUD
PLACES ROOM
Factors
– Toxicity of material
– Quantity that can be released
– Warning systems
– Wind direction
– Escape Routes
– Protective clothing

Technical Guidance For Hazardous Analysis And

Emergency Planning For Hazardous Substances
Prevention through Process Safety Management
Prevention and mitigation
Preparedness
Response
Recovery
Cleanup of facilities

3
Technical Guidance For Hazardous Analysis And
Emergency Planning For Hazardous Substances
PREVENTION
RECOVERY PREPAREDNESS
RESPONSE

Principal of Prevention & mitigation
Community Emergency Response
Plant Emergency Response
Physical Protection (Dikes)
Physical Protection (Relief Devices)
Automatic Action SIS or ESD
Critical Alarms, Operator Supervision,

and Manual Intervention
Basic Controls, Process Alarms,

and Operator Supervision
Process Design
Note:
Protection layers for a typical process are shown in the order of
activation expected as a hazardous condition is approached.
ESD – Emergency Shutdown
SIS – Safety Interlock System

4
Prevention through Process Safety Management
Key elements and components of process safety

management system
– Accountability: Objectives and Goals
– Process Knowledge and Documentation
– Capital Project Review and Design
– Process Risk Management Hazard identification
– Management of Change
– Process and Equipment Integrity
– Human Factors
– Training and Performance
– Incident Investigation
– Incident Investigation
– Enhancement of Process Safety Knowledge
Prevention
Principal of prevention
– Process hazard recognition
• Identify chemical and physical properties
• Identify reactivity and incompatibility hazards
– Inherently safer plant
• Material substitution and attenuation
• Reduced in-process inventories
• Reduced storage capacities
– Process design modifications
• Continuous versus Batch reactions
• Pressure versus Vacuum operation
• Gas versus Liquid
• Control system strategy
• Refrigeration
5
Mitigation
Principal of mitigation
– Plant siting and buffers
– Unit siting in plant design
– Principles of mitigating chemical releases
• Release causes
• Design to mitigate releases
– Post release mitigation systems
• Secondary containment for storage, handling, and fire situations
• Remote shut off, flow limitation, transfer
• Absorbents/foam and other covers
• Catch tanks, scrubbers, flares, stacks
• Water sprays and steam curtains
• Detectors
– Principles of mitigating fires and explosions
• Fire and explosion causes
• Design to mitigate fires and explosions
PREPAREDNESS
Defining credible incidents

Screen techniques to identify focus area
Techniques for identifying credible incidents for emergency
planning
Prioritizing emergency planning incidents for consequence
assessment
Using modeling for emergency planning - assessing
consequence and impact
Review mitigation systems
Determining appropriate plan type
Training
Drill and Exercises
6
Preparedness - Defining credible incidents
Three classes of incidents are defined:
– Localized incident - Localized effect zone, limited to a single plant area
(e.g. pump fire, small toxic release).
– Major incident - Medium effect zone, limited to site boundaries (e.g.
major fire, small explosion).
– Catastrophic incident - Large effect zone, off-site effects on the
surrounding community (e.g. major explosion, large toxic release)
The catastrophic incidents represent the bounding set of incidents
or largest effect incidents that can occur. They can be further
divided into worst credible incident and worst possible incident,
which are defined as follows:
– Worst Possible Incident -The highest consequence incident identified
that is physically possible regardless of likelihood.
– Worst Credible Incident -The highest consequence incident identified
that is considered plausible or reasonably believable.
Preparedness - Screen techniques to identify focus area
NFPA Fire Hazard Indices

– Health Hazards
• Inhalation toxicity relative to saturated vapor concentration
• Dermal toxicity
• Oral toxicity
• Eye and skin corrosivity
– Flammability Hazards
• Flash point
• Boiling point
• Explosive/flammable dusts
• Tendencies to readily ignite or burn rapidly
– Flammability Hazards
• Thermal or mechanical shock sensitivity
• Self-reactive/explosive
• Water-reactive/explosive
• Exothermic reaction with exposure to heat, air, light or moisture

7
Preparedness - Techniques for identifying credible incidents
for emergency planning
Informal Expert Review

Hazard review to support emergency planning
Using Process Hazard Analysis to support emergency planning
– Relative ranking
– Safety review
– Checklist analysis
– Preliminary hazard analysis
– What-If analysis (WIA)
– What-If/checklist analysis
– Hazard and operability (HAZOP) study
– Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA)
– Event tree analysis (ETA)
– Fault tree analysis (FTA)

Preparedness - Prioritizing emergency planning incidents

for consequence assessment
Likelihood Category Characteristics
Frequent A Likely to occur frequently.
Probable B Will occur several times over life of process.
Occasional C Likely to occur during lifetime of process.
Remote D Unlikely but possible.
Improbable E Very unlikely.
Severity Category Characteristics
Catastrophic I Death or system loss.
Severe injury, severe occupational illness, or major

Critical II
system damage.
Minor injury, minor occupational illness, or minor
Marginal III
system damage.
Less than minor injury, occupational illness, or system
Negligible IV
damage.

8
Preparedness - Prioritizing emergency planning incidents
for consequence assessment – risk ranking matrix
Risk Ranking Index (RRI) Matrix
Severity
Likelihood I – Catastrophic II— Critical III — Marginal IV — Negligible
a — Frequent RRI 1 RRI 1 RRI 1 RR1 3
b— Probable RRI 1 RRI 1 RRI 2 RR1 3
c — Occasional RRI 1 RR12 RR12 RR14
d — Remote RR12 RR12 RR1 3 RR14
e — Improbable RR1 3 RR1 3 RR1 3 RR14
Risk Reduction Response Guidelines

RRI Decision Criteria
1 Unacceptable
2 Undesirable
3 Acceptable with existing controls and protections and periodic review
4 Acceptable without review

Preparedness - Using modeling for emergency planning

assessing consequence and impact
Potential general outcomes

– Flash, evaporation, and/or aerosol formation
– Toxic or flammable vapor dispersion
– Fire
– Explosion
Source and dispersion modeling

9
Preparedness - Review mitigation systems
Review prevention systems for adequacy and

consider modification based on any new information.
Review mitigation systems for adequacy and

consider modification based on the new information.
Review spill containment and runoff control systems.

Preparedness - Determining appropriate plan type
Contingency plan
Response plan
Comprehensive plan
Advantages and disadvantages of the various emergencies plan types.
Plan Type Advantages Disadvantages
• Difficult to maintain if many contingency

plans exist at facility
Contingency Plan Highly focused on hazard
• Inconsistent in response and
management from contingency to
contingency
• Does not address certain aspects of

unique hazards
Allows for effective response to most
Response Plan
hazards • Does not typically deal with the
preparatory or recovery phases of an
emergency
• Very comprehensive; deals with all

phases of emergency management
• Incorporates the best elements of · If not well organized, can be

Comprehensive Emergency Plan
response and contingency plans unwieldy and overwhelming
• Single source coverage of applicable

government regulations

10
Preparedness - Training
Some key training requirements for non-emergency response

employees
– Familiarizing employees with the general principles of fire extinguisher use.
– Providing emergency plan and fire prevention plan training to employees
upon initial employment and at least annually thereafter.
– Training a sufficient number of persons to assist in the safe and orderly
emergency evacuation of employees.
– Informing employees of the hazards of the materials and processes to which
they may be exposed.
– Informing contractors, subcontractors, or their representatives of the site,
emergency response procedures and any potential fire, explosion, health,
safety, or other hazards.

Preparedness - Training
Regardless of the regulations, training at a minimum

might cover the following:
– Personal protective equipment
– Identifying hazardous circumstances
– Leak warning signs (odor, smoke, sounds, etc.)
– Emergency reporting procedures
– Evacuation and assembly procedures
– Proper fire extinguisher use

11
Preparedness - Drill & Exercises
The objectives of a drill and exercise program are to:

– Test the adequacy of plans and procedures.
– Test the effectiveness of emergency training and personnel

proficiency.
– Test the adequacy (quantity and quality) of existing emergency

facilities, supplies, and equipment.
– Describe the type and frequency of drills and exercises.
– Increase coordination with off-site emergency response agencies.
– Identify and correct any deficiencies in plan through post drill

critique.

RESPONSE
Incident command system

Strategy development
Response team decontamination
– Type of contamination
– Prevention of contamination
– Decontamination methods
– Determining Effectiveness
– Planning for decontamination
Medical decontamination/triage/treatment
Using dispersion modeling during emergencies
Mutual aid
Communication system operation
Termination

12
Response - Incident command system
An effective ICS system consists of the following

characteristics and advantages:
– Modular expansion
– Manageable span of control
– Common terminology and communications
– Unity of command
– Economy of resources
– Safety of operations
– Common command post
– Consolidated action plan

Response - Strategy development
Assessment and decision making

Identify Chemical/Hazard
Identify Critical Areas
– Human exposure considerations
– On-site critical systems considerations
– Environmental considerations:
– Property
– Critical off-site systems
– Response Team Work Areas
Response Team Work Areas

13
Response - Response team decontamination
Types of contamination
– Solid
– Liquid
– Gas
Prevention of contamination
Decontamination methods
– Dilution
– Disposal
– Physical removal
– Neutralization
– Adsorption
– Physical Isolation
Determining Effectiveness
Planning for decontamination
– Decontamination Locations
– Decon Equipment

Response - Medical decontamination/triage/treatment
The selection of a decontamination and triage area should be based at a

minimum on the following three criteria:
– The location should be upwind to avoid exposure to chemical fumes,
vapors, and smoke.
– The location should be uphill to avoid runoff from fire-fighting water
and chemical spills.
– The location should be accessible to emergency vehicles.
Facilities can anticipate three categories of patients during an incident
involving hazardous chemicals:
– Patients with physical trauma who are not contaminated.
– Patients with minor or no physical trauma, but who are chemically
contaminated.
– Patients who are severely injured and chemically contaminated.

14
Response - Using dispersion modeling during emergencies
The principal use of dispersion modeling during an

emergency is to determine the likely direction the
release may travel and the concentrations
throughout the plume during various times.
Problem with modeling
– weather data at the incident scene may be quite different
from a point 180 meters away (to overcome this problem
more than one meteorological points are required)
– actual release information might not be known, thereby
resulting in an under- or overestimation of the plume.

Response - Mutual aid
Mutual-aid agreements should define the following

additional items:
– Command responsibility and incident management system
– Insurance requirements
– Communications and terminology
– Standard Operating Procedures
– Equipment requirements
– Alarm response requirements

15
Response - Communication system operation
Must be able to operate under extreme conditions,

including loss of site power, foul weather, fire, and
chemical release.
Consideration for one redundant and one backup

system is important.
Standard terminology and communication protocols

must be adopted that are consistent with any
mutual-aid agreements

Response - Termination
Good managerial practice indicates that emergency

incidents be brought to a safe, orderly, and
organized conclusion.
Conducts the termination activity in three phases:
– On-site debriefing
– Critique
– Critique (after-action) report
Conducts an on-site debriefing once the incident is

under control, but before releasing responders.

16
RECOVERY
Management during recovery

Scene Security and safety
Employee assistance
Damage assessment
Process data collection
Incident Investigation
Restoring safety and emergency systems
Insurance
Public information and communication

Recovery - Management during recovery
Representative from the Critical recovery functions:

following – Scene security and safety
– Engineering – Employee assistance
– Maintenance – Damage assessment
– Production – Process data collection
– Purchasing – Incident investigation
– Environmental – Damage assessment
– Safety and health – Clean-up
– Human resources – Legal
– Public relations – Insurance and financing
– Legal (expedited)
– Loss adjustor
– Public information and
communication

Page 34
17
Recovery - Scene Security and safety
Once the emergency response phase is over, it is essential to isolate the

incident scene for the following reasons:
– The site may present a physical danger to anyone who is in the area.
– The incident investigation team needs to determine the incident's cause;

therefore, physical evidence must not be disturbed or destroyed.
– If there have been serious injuries or fatalities, an official investigation

will likely take place.
– Other regulatory agencies may also investigate.
– Insurance companies will want to determine the extent of damages.
– Engineers need to examine the area to determine the extent of damage

and identify salvageable equipment.

Recovery - Employee assistance
Recovery issues for the employees

– Ensuring that adequate medical or psychological assistance is provided
to employees following the emergency.
– Ensuring that families of injured or deceased employees are cared for in
accordance with company practice.
– If the emergency has affected an employee's family or residence
ensuring that the employee has time, or is otherwise assisted, in
recovering from his or her personal loss.
Services to be provided to employees:
– Cash advances
– Salary continuation
– Flexible or reduced work hours
– Crisis counseling
– Care packages
– Day care

18
Recovery - Damage assessment
Assess damage, focusing on how to repair and restore the plant after an
accident
Use of damage assessment checklist as a guide.
– Everything in the checklist may not be applicable to a specific
incident but this list can be used as an idea list of what to look at
after an emergency.
– The checklist provides several columns for recording information
about repairs to equipment and areas.
– This will serve as a reference tool for plant modifications by the
engineering department.
– The team should determine which repairs or replacements should be
made and the order of priority.

Recovery - Process data collection
Collect all pertinent process data leading to and during the incident.
These data typically can include:
– Inventories of materials involved
– Process conditions prior to the incidents
• Temperatures
• Pressures
• Flow rates
– Unusual observations by operators (or others)
• Noises
• Leaks
• Weather conditions

19
Recovery - Incident Investigation
Focuses on how and why the incident happened, with a diligent search
for root causes
Identify any changes in procedures, work environment, or safety
management that could be made to prevent recurrence.
The investigation team should perform the following steps:
– Survey the scene.
– Collect and preserve evidence.
– Identify and interview witnesses.
– Review photographs and videos of incident scene.
– Review process data.

Recovery - Incident Investigation
If any of the following conditions apply, a formal and extensive incident

investigation is conducted:
– A fatality, a serious injury, or extensive property damage has
occurred.
– Initial observations reveal information that point toward a high
potential for a similar accident in the future.
– The investigation reveals that more serious consequences could
occur in the event of a similar accident.
– Hazards are revealed that were previously unrecognized.
– Risks of exposure appear much greater than previous estimates.
– Additional technical information or skills are needed to analyze the
accident's roots.

20
Recovery - Restoring safety & emergency systems
Safety or emergency system be checked and immediately repaired
following an emergency
Purchasing should expedite all repair orders regarding these systems
(gas detectors, CCTVs, electrical cables, sprinklers, ventilation, process
controls, signal systems, etc).

Recovery - Legal
Following any significant emergency, it is likely that issues pertaining to

liability and regulatory compliance should be a concern
Obtaining the advice of counsel should help ensure compliance with

pertinent regulations.

21
Recovery - Insurance
Insurance is an integral part of the recovery process.
While many firms are self-insured, there is usually

secondary coverage and therefore, the company's
insurance, risk management or loss control
representatives should be contacted.
The coverage provided by an insurance carrier could

play a significant part in the decisions about the size
and scope of the recovery.

Recovery - Public information & communication
Open and maintain a dialogue with the public and other stakeholders.
This will include:
– Local emergency officials
– Neighbors and the general public
– Other community officials
– Employees
– Owners
– Customers
– Suppliers
Communication methods to be used may include :
– Press releases
– Television and radio appearances
– Tours of the facility
22
CLEANUP OF FACILITIES
Preventing the spread of contamination
Decontamination Methods
– Small-scale decontamination
– Large-scale decontamination
Contractor qualification for cleanup

Cleanup - Preventing the spread of contamination
Some common engineering and administrative methods used to prevent the spread of
contamination within the plant are to:
– Install a high efficiency particulate filter on ventilation exhausts to remove particulates
– Block ventilation dampers to shut off supply and exhaust ducting.
– Divert contaminated effluent or runoff to a holding tank or pond.
– Close floor and dike drains to prevent contaminants from entering drain system.
– Add sufficient secondary containment ponds with adequate capacity for the quantity
of material being stored.
– Consider sealing concrete surfaces in the clean areas adjacent to the contaminated
area with an impermeable coating such as epoxy to prevent contaminants from
migrating into and through the concrete.
– Conduct a smoke survey of process, sanitary, and storm sewer systems to ensure all
entrances and exits are identified.
– Consider weather effects on contaminant emissions.
– Install temporary detection equipment on new containment area.

23
Cleanup – Small scale decontamination methods
Can generally be accomplished using ordinary cleaning and

decontamination methods
– mops, brooms, soap and water, sponges, vacuum cleaners,
Some characteristics of good decontamination solutions include:
– The solution reacts with the contaminant to produce less harmful or

harmless reaction products,
– The contaminant dissolves in the solution, thereby removing the

contaminant from the surface,
– The solution neutralizes or renders harmless the contaminant, or
– The solution possesses a combination of the above.

Cleanup – Large scale decontamination methods
Large-scale decontamination is a two-phase operation.
The first phase will remove or reduce the gross levels of contamination
over large areas.
The second phase consists of localized small-scale decontamination as

described earlier.

24
The following table lists some decontamination methods for large-scale

operations
Method Comments
Water washing Water must be collected and processed. Not good around electrical equipment or
insulation. Ideal for paved areas, roofs, metal surfaces, and external walls. Should not be
used on porous surfaces.
Exhaust from vacuum must be filtered. Applicable to open areas. As efficient as water
Vacuum washing for paved areas. Effective for porous and nonporous surfaces. Vacuum removes
materials with little excess spillage.
Neutralization Care should be taken to avoid uncontrolled reactions.
Absorption/ adsorption Creates a disposal issue. Potential for reaction problems, if materials are incompatible.
Grading, scraping Creates large quantities of material requiring disposal. Removes uncontaminated materials
as well as contaminated materials. May create an airborne dust hazard.

Method Comments
Very effective for most nonporous surfaces and contaminants. Runoff must be collected for
Steam cleaning
disposal.
CO2 pellet blasting Very effective for most nonporous surfaces and contaminants.
Very effective for most nonporous surfaces and contaminants. Runoff must be collected for
High pressure washing
disposal.
Sand blasting/ abrasive

Effective for nonporous surfaces. Sand used becomes contaminated and requires disposal.

25
Cleanup – Contractor qualification for cleanup
Key qualifications to look for include:

– Knowledge/skills in the technologies needed for cleanup
– Appropriate equipment
– Adequate trained personnel, documentation of training of employees

to be involved
– Enforced safety and health policies to protect their employees
– Safety history
– Complete familiarity with and observance of the environmental

regulations involved
– Financial responsibility

Thank you for your attention.

26

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PLANNING FOR UNINTENDED

Thia Cheong Meng, Risk Consultant

4th July 2007

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS FAIR

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS FAIR

In spite of all possible

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS FAIR

RELEASE OF HAZARDOUS VAPOUR CLOUDS

Exposure routes Fire and explosion Fire and explosion

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS FAIR

FLAMMABLE FIRE & CONTROL

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS FAIR

Technical Guidance For Hazardous Analysis And

Prevention through Process Safety Management

Prevention and mitigation

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS FAIR

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS FAIR

Principal of Prevention & mitigation

Community Emergency Response

Plant Emergency Response

Physical Protection (Dikes)

Physical Protection (Relief Devices)

Automatic Action SIS or ESD

Critical Alarms, Operator Supervision,

Basic Controls, Process Alarms,

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS FAIR

Key elements and components of process safety

Defining credible incidents

Preparedness - Screen techniques to identify focus area

NFPA Fire Hazard Indices

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS FAIR

Informal Expert Review

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS FAIR

Preparedness - Prioritizing emergency planning incidents

Likelihood Category Characteristics

Frequent A Likely to occur frequently.

Probable B Will occur several times over life of process.

Occasional C Likely to occur during lifetime of process.

Remote D Unlikely but possible.

Improbable E Very unlikely.

Severity Category Characteristics

Catastrophic I Death or system loss.

Severe injury, severe occupational illness, or major

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS FAIR

Risk Ranking Index (RRI) Matrix

a — Frequent RRI 1 RRI 1 RRI 1 RR1 3

b— Probable RRI 1 RRI 1 RRI 2 RR1 3

c — Occasional RRI 1 RR12 RR12 RR14

d — Remote RR12 RR12 RR1 3 RR14

e — Improbable RR1 3 RR1 3 RR1 3 RR14

Risk Reduction Response Guidelines

3 Acceptable with existing controls and protections and periodic review

4 Acceptable without review

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS FAIR

Preparedness - Using modeling for emergency planning

Potential general outcomes

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS FAIR

Review prevention systems for adequacy and

Review mitigation systems for adequacy and

Review spill containment and runoff control systems.

TECHNOLOGY INNOVATIONS FAIR

Preparedness - Determining appropriate plan type

Plan Type Advantages Disadvantages