CANONS 5-6
transmission to the RTC.
JUDGE AQUINO SIMBULAN v.
BARTOLOME
FACTS:
A letter complaint was filed by
complainant Judge Divina Luz P. Aquino-
Simbulan with the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), alleging that
respondents Judge Nicasio V. Bartolome,
together with Romana Pascual, Milagros
Lerey, and Amor dela Cruz, Acting Clerk of
Court, retired Clerk of Court and Docket
Clerk, respectively, all of the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Maria, Bulacan,
committed grave errors and
discrepancies in processing the
surety bond for the accused Rosalina
Mercado in Criminal Case of People of
the Philippines v. Rosalina Mercado,
et al.
Above case was originally raffled to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, San
Fernando, Pampanga, where complainant
Judge presides. On September 18, 2003,
said branch of the RTC received an
Indorsement from Warrant/Subpoena
Officer PO3 Edwin Villacentino stating
that the accused Mercado voluntarily
surrendered before the MTC of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan and posted her bail
bond through Summit Guaranty &
Insurance Co., Inc., which was duly
approved by respondent Judge Bartolome
on August 21, 2003. This prompted
complainant to issue an
Order[2] dated October 29, 2003, directing
respondent Lerey, then Clerk of Court of
the MTC, to transmit to the RTC within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of said
Order, the bond which the former court
approved.
When the Clerk of Court failed to
comply, complainant Judge issued an
Order directing the former to explain in
writing within three (3) days from receipt
thereof why she should not be cited in
contempt for delaying the administration
of justice.
Then, on February 12, 2004, the RTC
received a written explanation[5] from
Lerey stating that she had misplaced
and overlooked the subject surety
bond, which resulted in the delay of its
Upon perusal of the documents,
complainant Judge discovered that
the subject surety bond bore some
erasures, and its attachments were
highly anomalous. In view of these
findings, the RTC issued a subpoena to
respondents Pascual and Lerey directing
them to appear before it to explain the
aforementioned errors.
Findings during investigation:
1.That respondent Judge issued an
Order of Release dated August 21,
2003 WITHOUT a Certificate of
Detention and Warrant of Arrest
attached to the documents presented
to him;
2. Order of Release was dated August 21,
2003, the Undertaking and Certification
from the bonding company were
dated November 22, 2003 and October
29, 2003, respectively; (malicious)
3. That it was Lerey who reviewed the
documents before the surety bond was
referred to respondent Judge for the
latter’s approval; and
After the hearing, Public Prosecutor
Otto Macabulos stated that he found
the explanation too shallow and self-
serving, and that he would file an indirect
contempt case under Rule 71, Section 3
(d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
against Lerey and Dela Cruz.
In her
manifestation/Compliance dated October
25, 2004, Lerey admitted lapses and
negligence in processing the subject
bail bond and was remorseful for
what happened. On the other hand,
Dela Cruz stated that there was no
wrongdoing on her part in the
processing of the subject bail bond
and that she merely followed instructions
in mailing the said bail bond to the RTC.
The RTC found Lerey guilty of indirect
contempt and sentenced her to pay a fine
of P10,000.00, which she duly
paid. However, it absolved Dela Cruz
from any liability as it found her
explanation meritorious.
 In the meantime, in his
1st Indorsement[12] dated February 26,
2004, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA)
Jose P. Perez referred to the Clerk of Court
of the MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan the
Orders issued by complainant Judge
relative to the surety bond for
comment. However, there was nothing
on record to show that said Clerk of Court
complied with the directive.
Afterwhich, DCA Perez also issued a
1st Indorsement[13] to respondent
Judge referring to the letter dated
April 27, 2004 of complainant Judge,
which discussed the errors and
discrepancies regarding the approval
of the bail bond of the accused in
Criminal Case No. 13360, with the
instruction to the former to submit
his comment thereto.
In compliance, respondent judge denied
liability concerning his approval of the
bond. It was Lerey who caused delay in
transmitting the bond to RTC which the
latter admitted.
OCA: In approving the surety bond of the
accused, respondent Judge violated
Section 17, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
[25]
In the instant case, the accused
Rosalina Mercado was not arrested. IN THE
CASE AT BAR, the accused must have filed
the bond w/in the province of Pampanga
or City of San Fernando. Instead,
accused Mercado filed her bond in
the Municipal Trial Court of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, where respondent
Judge presides, who approved the
same and ordered her release from
custody.
Respondent judge did not require
accused to submit the supporting
documents pertinent to the application
for a bond . It appears that there was no
Certificate of Detention presented to him;
hence, there was no legal justification
for him to issue the Order of Release
and process the bond since the
accused was not detained within his
jurisdiction.
HELD:
The Court holds that there were indeed
grave errors and discrepancies committed
by respondents Judge Bartolome and
Lerey in processing the surety bond for the
accused in Criminal Case No. 13360.
Sec. 14: “…bail may be filed also with any
regional trial court of said place, or, if no
judge thereof is available, with any
metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial
judge or municipal circuit trial judge
therein.”
Note: Sec. 16: “Whenever bail is filed
with a court other than where the case is
pending, the judge accepting the bail shall
forward the bail, the order of release and
other supporting papers to the court
where the case is pending, which may, for
good reason, require a different one to be
filed.”
The OCA’s Report revealed that the
accused Rosalina Mercado was not
arrested. The OCA’s Report revealed that
the accused Rosalina Mercado was not
arrested.
FAILURE TO REQUIRE SUBMISSION
OF SUPPORTING DOC. . There was no
Certificate of Detention or Warrant of
Arrest attached to the bond transmitted by
the MTC to the complainant
Judge. Moreover, the other supporting
documents were belatedly filed.
For Lerey, she admitted her negligence
when she misplaced and overlooked
the surety bond policy, resulting in
the delay in the transmission of said
documents to the RTC. Notably, she
also failed to give an explanation for the
erasures which complainant discovered on
the surety bond. By such acts, it is
evident that Lerey did not measure up to
the standards required.
ROLE OF CLERK OF COURT. Vital in the
prompt and sound administration of
justice since his or her office is the hub of
adjudicative and administrative orders,
processes, and concerns. He or she also
has the duty to ensure an orderly and
efficient record management system in
the court and to supervise the personnel
under her office to function effectively.
But, because of the negligence of the
Lerey, respondent judge CANNOT BE
EXCUSED FROM LIABILTY.
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service,[33] the acts of
respondent Judge and Lerey may be
classified as gross neglect of duty, which
is punishable by dismissal under Rule IV,
Section 52 A(2) thereof. Neglect of duty
denotes the failure of an employee to give
one’s attention to a task expected of him.
Gross neglect is such neglect which, from
the gravity of the case or the frequency of
instances, becomes so serious in its
character as to endanger or threaten the
public welfare.
NOTE: In Ulat-Marrero v. Torio, Jr. the
Court has categorized as a grave offense
of gross neglect of duty, the failure of a
court process server to serve summons
which resulted in the delayed resolution of
a case. As corollarily applied to the
present case, where respondents released
the accused on temporary liberty despite
the absence of the required supporting
documents for bail, the former are likewise
liable for gross neglect of duty.
SC: Were it not for the fact that both
respondents, Judge Bartolome and
Lerey, have retired on October 11,
2006 and August 26, 2003,
respectively, the Court would have
dismissed them from the service.
RULING: JUDGE NICASIO BARTOLOME
(RETIRED) GUILTY OF GROSS NEGLECT
OF DUTY FOR AND TO PAY P40,000.00)TO
BE DEDUCTED FROM HIS RETIREMENT
BENEFITS; AND Clerk of Court Milagros
Lerey (retired) GUILTY of GROSS
NEGLECT OF DUTY P40,000.00 to be
deducted from her retirement benefits.
RE: ORDER BY JUDGE BONIFACIO v.
GENABE
FACTS:
This administrative matter against Loida
M. Genabe (Genabe), Legal Researcher II
of the RTC of Las Piñas City, stemmed
from a Letter dated 22 December
2006 addressed to the OCA filed by
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda (Judge
Maceda) of the same trial court. Judge
Maceda attached his Order dated 21
December 2006 suspending Genabe
for 30 days by reason of neglect of
duty for attending a two-day seminar
despite a pending assignment. In the
letter, Judge Maceda requested that the
salary of Genabe be withheld for the
period 21 December 2006 to 20 January
2007 since the suspension was
immediately executory.
Escabarte (Atty. Escabarte), Branch Clerk
of Court of the same trial court, issued an
Inter-Office Memorandum to Genabe
referring to her neglect, in leaving for
Baguio City on 16 to17 November
2006 to attend a seminar for legal
researchers, without finishing her
assigned task. The assigned task
required Genabe to summarize the
statement of facts in Criminal Case Nos.
03-0059 to 03-0063 entitled “People of the
Philippines v. Marvilla, et al.,”Atty.
Escabarte (Clerk of court) reminded
Genabe that such act could not be
tolerated and that similar acts in the
future would be meted an appropriate
sanction.
ANSWER: Genabe submitted her
explanation regarding the unfinished
assigned case. She stated that she was
not able to complete the summary
due to lack of transcript of
stenographic notes (TSN). Genabe
added that she be absolved for humane
considerations.
DISRESPECT. When Judge Maceda called a
staff meeting to discuss several matters in
the agenda, including the inter-office
memorandum allegedly, even before the
staff meeting, Genabe resented the
issuance of the memorandum and
became disrespectful to the court
staff, including the clerk of court. At
the meeting, Genabe allegedly
continued her combative behavior in
total disregard of the presence of
Judge Maceda. Judge Maceda ordered
Genabe to show cause why she should not
be cited in contempt by the court and why
she should not be administratively
sanctioned for conduct unbecoming,
neglect of duty and misconduct.
REPLY: Genabe attributed the lack of
stenographers, which was beyond her
control, as the cause of the delay in the
transcriptions of the minutes of the
meeting. As a counter-charge, Genabe
claimed that Judge Maceda disciplines his
staff on a selective basis.
When a fact-finding investigation whose
agenda is focused on the charges of
contempt, conduct unbecoming, among
others was conducted by Judge Maceda to
all staff members, Genabe did not
appear despite notice. Later, she
appeared to say that she was waiving her
right to be present in the
investigation. THEN A SUSPENSION ORDER
AGAINST HER WAS ISSUED.
SUSPENDED. In a Letter dated 22
December 2006, Judge Maceda suspended
Genabe for a period of 30 days, using as
authority the power given to appropriate
supervisory officials in disciplining
personnel of their respective courts as
provided in Article II, Section A(2)(a) of
Circular No. 30-91. Genabe’s salary
be withheld for the period 21
December 2006 to 20 January 2007.
After 30 days, Genabe reported back to
work w/ return of salary.
HOWEVER, Judge Maceda endorsed his
Investigation Report and
Recommendation to the OCA, EVEN
WITHOUT ANY DIRECTIVE FROM THE
LATTER. The report mainly focused on
the alleged unruly conduct of Genabe
during the staff meeting.
There was no action from OCA but when
this was elevated to the SC, Judge Maceda
reasoned: that there were other
charges against Genabe, such as
“conduct unbecoming and grave
misconduct,” Thus, he endorsed the
determination of such other charges to the
OCA, including whether the heavier
penalty of dismissal or replacement might
be warranted.
OCA: Judge Mceda’s explanation was
UNSATISFACTORY.
The OCA added that it was clear from the
Guidelines that Judge Maceda had no
authority to directly penalize a court
employee. As an Executive Judge, he only
had the right to act upon and investigate
administrative complaints involving light
offenses. The power to decide and impose
a penalty, even for light offenses, rests
with the Supreme Court.
HELD:
After a careful review of the records of the
case, we find reasonable grounds to
hold both Genabe and Judge Maceda
administratively liable.
SIMPLE NEGLECT OF DUTY. The Court
found Genabe guilty of simple neglect
of duty. Simple neglect of duty has been
defined as the failure of an employee
to give attention to a task expected
of him and signifies a disregard of a
duty resulting from carelessness or
indifference. She was assigned to
summarize the testimonies of three
defense witnesses for a criminal case set
for promulgation. The records reveal
that Genabe was only able to
SUMMARIZE THE TSN OF ONE WITNESS
CONSISTING OF 46 PAGES AND FAILED TO
FINISH THE TSN OF THE OTHER TWO
WITNESSES CONSISTING OF 67
PAGES. Before leaving for Baguio, Genabe
had three working days to complete the
task. However, the assignment
remained unfinished. When such task
was assigned to another court employee,
it only took the other employee two and a
half hours to complete the TSN of the two
witnesses.
IDEM; PENALTY. As a first offense under
civil service law, we impose the penalty of
suspension without pay for a period
of one month and one day. [5] The
suspension imposed upon Genabe under
the Order dated 21 December 2006 shall
be considered as the penalty imposed.
FOR THE JUDGE. The reliance of Judge
Maceda on the provisions of this circular is
misplaced. The decision by Judge Maceda
was issued Nov. 2006, while a set of new
guidelines was already in effect insofar as
Disciplinary actions involving light
offenses are concerned. That is,
Section 1, Chapter VIII of A.M.
No. 03-8-02-SC, which states among
others: In the preceding instances, the
Executive Judge shall conduct the
necessary inquiry and submit to the
OCA the results thereof with a
recommendation as to the action to
be taken thereon, including the
penalty to be imposed, if any, within
thirty (30) days from termination of
said inquiry.
NOTE: The guidelines clearly provide that
the authority of judges to discipline erring
court personnel, with light offenses, is
limited to conducting an inquiry only.
OCA will be the one to recommend on
what action should be taken.
We hold that the penalty of fine in the
amount of P12,000 is commensurate to
Judge Maceda’s violation of A.M. No. 03-8-
02-SC.
RULING: GUILTY OF SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE.
THE REMAINING 1 DAY SHALL BE IMPOSED
UPON FINALITY OF DECISION AND
STERNLY WARNED; JUDGE WAS FINED
P12K.
SANTIAGO III v. J. ENRIQUEZ
FACTS:
Genaro Santiago III (complainant) filed
against CA Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.
(respondent), for gross ignorance of the
law and jurisprudence and gross
incompetence in connection with his
rendering of alleged unjust judgment
in “Genaro C. Santiago III versus Republic
of the Philippines.
Complainant filed a Petition for
Reconstitution of Lost/Destroyed
Original Certificate of Title No. 56,
registered in the name of Pantaleona
Santiago and Blas Fajardo. Quezon City
RTC granted the petition but People
appealed to CA.
DISSENT. J. Gonzales Sison submitted her
report which was used as basis for the
Division’s consultation and deliberation.
Respondent dissent from the report
(NOTE: Respondent justice was the
Chairperson in this div.) Justice Veloso,
who originally concurred in the Report,
requested Justice Gonzales-Sison, by
letter to TAKE A SECOND LOOK AT
RESPONDENT’S DISSENTING OPINION, as
“the reasons [Justice Enriquez] gave
are strong enough to be ignored by
plain technicality.”
However, Justice Veloso soon expressed
his concurrence with respondent’s
Dissenting Opinion.[12] Justice Bersamin
expressed his concurrence with the Report
of Justice Gonzales–Sison,[13] while Justice
Cruz expressed his concurrence with
respondent’s Dissenting Opinion.[14] WITH
THIS, THE DISSENTING OPINION BECAME
THE MAJORITY OPINION OF SUCH SPECIAL
DIVISION.
Complainant then filed a Motion for
Disqualification on the ground that he
filed this admin complaint against
respondent. CA DENIED MOTION.
PRESENT COMPLAINT: respondent
allegedly deliberately twisted the law and
existing jurisprudence GROSS IGNORANCE
OF LAW/GROSS INCOMPETENCE is now
being filed against respondent Associate
Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.
HELD:
The complaint is bereft of merit.
PROPER REMEDY: The remedy of the
aggrieved party is not to file an
administrative complaint against the
judge, but to elevate the assailed
decision or order to the higher court
for review and correction. AN
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT IS NOT AN
APPROPRIATE REMEDY WHERE JUDICIAL
RECOURSE IS STILL AVAILABLE, such as a
motion for reconsideration, an appeal,
or a petition for certiorari, unless the
assailed order or decision is tainted with
fraud, malice, or dishonesty…
The Court has to be shown acts or
conduct of the judge clearly
indicative of the arbitrariness or
prejudice before the latter can be
branded the stigma of being biased
and partial. Thus, unless he is shown
to have acted in bad faith or with
deliberate intent to do an injustice, …
The failure to interpret the law or to
properly appreciate the evidence
presented does not necessarily render a
judge administratively liable.
NOTE: Assuming arguendo that
respondent’s citation of cases in support
of the Decision and his appreciation of the
facts and evidence were erroneous, since
there is no showing that the Decision,
reconsideration of which was still
pending at the time the present
complaint was filed, is tainted with
fraud, malice or dishonesty or was
rendered with deliberate intent to
cause injustice, the complaint must
be dismissed.
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY. Insulates judges,
and even Justices of superior courts, from
being held to account criminally,
civilly or administratively for an
erroneous decision rendered in good
faith.[25] To hold otherwise would render
judicial office untenable. No one called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in
the process of administering justice could
be infallible in his judgment.[26]
Alzua and Arnalot v. Johnson- This concept
of judicial immunity rests upon
consideration of public policy, its purpose
being to preserve the integrity and
independence of the judiciary. This
principle is of universal application and
applies to all grades of judicial officers
from the highest judge of the nation and
to the lowest officer who sits as a court.
NOTE: the filing of charges against a
single member of a division of the
appellate court is inappropriate. The
Decision was not rendered by respondent
in his individual capacity. It was a product
of the consultations and deliberations by
the Special Division of five.
CA is a collegiate court whose members
reach their conclusions in consultation and
accordingly render their collective
judgment after due deliberation
RULING: DISMISSED.
3D INDUSTRIES v. J. ROXAS
FACTS:
The verified May 13, 2005
Complaint[1] with enclosures of 3-D
Industries, Inc. (3-D), and Smartnet
Philippines, Inc. (Smartnet) represented by
Gilbert Guy (Gilbert), against CA Associate
Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Vicente
Q. Roxas, for violation of Section 3(e) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act[2] (R.A. 3019, as amended) relative
to the admission, by the Eighth Division of
the CA, of which said Justices were
members.
Antecedents from Guy v. Court of Appeal:
Herein complainant Smartnet’s
representative Gilbert is the son of the
spouses Francisco and Simny Guy. The
spouses organized Northern Islands
Co., Inc. (NICI) which is engaged in
the manufacture, distribution, and
sale of various home appliances
bearing the “3-D” trademark.
The spouses also organized Lincoln
Continental Development Corporation, Inc.
(Lincoln Continental) as a holding
company of 50% of the 20,160 shares of
stock of NICI in trust for their three
daughters Geraldine, Gladys and Grace-
sisters of Gilbert.
Finding that their son Gilbert had been
dissipating the assets of Lincoln
Continental, the Sps. Guy caused the
registration of 50% of the 20,160 shares of
stock of NICI in the names of their three
daughters, thus enabling the latter to
assume an active role in the management
of NICI.
Lincoln Continental filed a complaint
at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila against NICI and Gilbert’s
parents-the spouses Guy and three
sisters (hereafter the Guy family),
for annulment of the transfer of the 50%
NICI shares of stock to Gilbert’s
sisters. The complaint, prayed for, among
other things, the restoration of the
management of NICI to Gilbert, and
the issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to
prohibit Gilbert’s sisters from
exercising any right of ownership
over the questioned shares.
Lincoln Continental later filed a Motion
to Inhibit the Presiding Judge of RTC
Manila to which its complaint was raffled
on the ground of partiality. The Motion
was granted and the case was re-raffled to
Branch 46 of the same court.
NICI and Guy family challenged the
inhibition of the Presiding Judge of Branch
24 via Certiorari and Mandamus before
the CA in which they prayed for, among
other things, the issuance of an order
restraining the Presiding Judge of Branch
46 from further hearing.
RTC: In favor of Lincoln (Gilbert will be
return to the mgt)
bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence in the discharge of their
judicial functions in violation of
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.[9]

NICI filed a petition for certiorari praying Finally, complainants allege that the
for the nullification of said decision. Divisions in which respondents were
sitting had mutated into a “judicial
On the other hand, herein Smartnet, one vending machine,” regularly dispensing
of the occupants of the NICI premises, TROs and injunctions at an “impressive
filed on December 16, 2004 with the maximum” of five days from the filing of
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon the pleadings by the petitioners.[12]
City a complaint for forcible Complainants add that the appellate
entry against NICI and the Guy family, court’s Eighth Division acted with undue
haste in precipitately admitting the
Gilbert later filed a complaint for two Supplemental Petitions
replevin on behalf of 3-D, before the RTC for Certiorari on the basis of the bare
of Pasig City. The complaint was given and unsubstantiated allegation that
due course RTC Pasig which issued on Gilbert was using herein complainants as
January 18, 2005 a writ of replevin in his alter egos to wrest control and
favor of 3-D, prompting the NICI and possession of the assets and properties of
the Guy family to file on January 20, NICI.
2005 before the CA-Eighth Division
a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari NOTE:. It bears noting that the
with Urgent Motion for a Writ of complaint was indorsed by the Office of
Preliminary Injunction to Include the Ombudsman to this Court specifically
Supervening Events. The Supplemental for a determination of whether
Petition[5] impleaded as additional respondents acted within their duties,
respondents herein complainant 3-D, pursuant to Fuentes v. Office of the
Judges Celso D. Laviña, Presiding Judge, Ombudsman-Mindanao
RTC, Branch 71, Pasig City and Sheriff
Cresencio Rabello, Jr., alleging that Gilbert, 2 WAYS BY WHICH RA 3019 MAY
in an attempt to circumvent the TROs and VIOLATED: There are two ways by which
injunctive writ issued by the CA-Eighth Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 may be
Division, allowed himself to be used by 3- violated,[16] viz: 1) by giving undue
D by filing, on its behalf, a complaint for injury to any party, including the
replevin. Government, 2) by causing any
private party any unwarranted
The appellate court’s Eighth Division benefit, advantage or
issued the questioned preference. These acts must be
Resolution admitting the Supplemental committed with manifest partiality,
Petition for Certiorari. evident bad faith, or gross and
inexcusable negligence.
In the present administrative complaint,
complainants allege that in issuing the MANIFEST PARTIALITY- a clear,
assailed Resolutions dated January 24, notorious or plain inclination or
2005 and April 26, 2005 (restrained the predilection to favor one side rather than
additionally impleaded respondents the other. BAD FAITH connotes not only
including Smartnet from disturbing the bad judgment or negligence, but also a
December 22, 2004 writ of preliminary dishonest purpose, a conscious
injunction), respondents caused undue wrongdoing, or a breach of duty
injury to them by, among other amounting to fraud. GROSS
things, giving the petitioners (NICI NEGLIGENCE is the want of even slight
and the Guy Family) in the new care, acting or omitting to act in a
petition for Certiorari unwarranted situation where there is a duty to act, not
benefits, advantage or preference inadvertently but willfully and
through manifest partiality, evident intentionally, with a conscious indifference
to consequences as far as other persons
are concerned.
NOTE: That the assailed Resolutions
issued by respondents favored NICI and
the Guy family does not necessarily render
respondents guilty of violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, absent proven
particular acts of manifest, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence,
good faith and regularity being generally
presumed in the performance of official
duties by public officers.
That is why administrative complaints
against judges must always be
examined with a discriminating eye
for its consequential effects are, by
their nature, highly penal, such that
they stand to face the sanction of
dismissal and/or disbarment. Subject
order or actuation of the judge in the
performance of his official duties MUST
NOT ONLY BE CONTRARY TO EXISTING
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE BUT, MORE
IMPORTANTLY, MUST BE ATTENDED BY BAD
FAITH, FRAUD, DISHONESTY OR
CORRUPTION.[23]
NOTE: Since the impleading of additional
parties, on motion of any party or motu
proprio at any stage of the action and/or
such times as are just is allowed,[24] the
Court finds that respondents’ participation
in the admission of the supplemental
petitions impleading complainants DOES
NOT RENDER THEM LIABLE. – (mere
allegation that a corporation is the alter
ego of the individual stockholders is
insufficient,” NOT EVERY MISTAKE WILL
RENDER JUDGE LIABLE.)
RULING: DISMISSED.
OCAMPO v. JUDGE CHUA (at the back)
ATTY. DESCALLAR v. JUDGE RAMAS
FACTS:
Atty. Norlinda R. Amante-Descallar, Clerk
of Court, Regional Trial Court of Pagadian
City, Branch 18, filed seven administrative
complaints against respondent Judge
Reinerio Abraham B. Ramas, of the same
court, for gross ignorance of the law,
gross negligence, and violation of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
In Misc. No. 2820, she claimed that in the
Order dated August 18, 2006, respondent
granted the motion for execution of the
prevailing party by counting the five
year period provided in Section 6 of
Rule 39 from the counsel’s receipt of
the Entry of Judgment. Complainant
averred that Rule 39 expressly provides
that the five year period is reckoned from
the date of entry of judgment; and not
from the date of receipt by counsel;
that jurisprudence is replete with rulings
that a final judgment ceases to be
enforceable after that period, but merely
gives the prevailing party a right of action
to have the same revived. Hence,
respondent should be disciplined for gross
ignorance of the law and violation of Rule
3.02[1] Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.
[2]
Complainant averred that respondent’s
conduct was contrary to the provisions on
plea bargaining in Section 2 of Rule 116,
Rules on Criminal Procedure[5] and
Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 8493, [6] and
Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98. [7] She
argued that it was unclear whether the
offended party consented and whether the
prosecutor has proper authority to enter
into such agreement; and that plea
bargaining is limited to a plea to a lesser
offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged.[8]
In Misc. No. 2824, complainant alleged
that the validity and propriety of the plea
entitled “People v. Dumpit” and the
dismissal of one case as a consequence
thereof are questionable. Respondent
approved the plea bargaining agreement
entered into by the prosecution and the
accused[9] and dismissed Crim. Case No.
5760-2K and Crim. Case No. 5762-2K as a
consequence of plea bargaining. Upon
arraignment,[10] accused pleaded guilty to
the sale of shabu. Thereafter, respondent
issued a Decision[11] finding the accused
guilty of selling shabu in Crim. Case No.
5761-2K. The next day, the accused
applied for probation and was released on
recognizance.[12]
In Misc. No. 2860, complainant
alleged that on the strength of Search
Warrant No. 87-04,[18] the accused in
Criminal Case No. 7235-2K4 was arrested
after a search conducted in his
residence. After arraignment, accused
filed a Motion to Quash the Search
Warrant and Suppress
Evidence. However, the prayer[19] in said
motion inadvertently asked for the
quashal of another search warrant issued
in another case.  respondent exhibited
gross ignorance in issuing Search Warrant
87-04 and thereafter invalidating the
same for failing to comply with the
requisites of a Search Warrant; and that
respondent issued several search warrants
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of his
court which were eventually invalidated
thereby putting the efforts of the arresting
officers to naught.
ISSUE: Whether respondent judge is
administratively liable for the alleged
erroneous rulings and issuances made by
him in the exercise of his judicial
functions?
HELD:
ELEMENTARY RULE: not every error or
mistake that a judge commits in the
performance of his duties renders him
liable, unless he is shown to have acted in
bad faith or with deliberate intent to do an
injustice. Good faith and absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper
considerations are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of
the law can find refuge. In Maquiran v.
Grageda,[26] the Court held that alleged
error committed by judges in the exercise
of their adjudicative functions cannot be
corrected through administrative
proceedings but should instead be
assailed through judicial remedies.
Established doctrine and policy is that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal
actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a
substitute for, these judicial remedies,
whether ordinary or extraordinary. 
EXHAUSTION OF JUDICIAL REMEDIES IS A
PRE-REQ.FOR THE TAKING OF OTHER
MEASURES AGAINST JUDGES.
NOTE: It is only after the available judicial
remedies have been exhausted and the
appellate tribunals have spoken with
finality, that the door to an inquiry
into his criminal, civil, or
administrative liability may be said to
have opened, or closed.
Law and logic decree that “administrative”
or criminal remedies are neither
alternative nor cumulative to judicial
review where such review is available, and
must wait on the result thereof. WHY?
Since judges must be free to judge,
without pressure or influence from
external forces or factors, they should
not be subject to intimidation, the
fear of civil, criminal or
administrative sanctions for acts they
may do and dispositions they may
make in the performance of their
duties and functions.
In Misc. No. 2820, the Court agrees with
the OCA that the ruling of the
respondent as to the interpretation of
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court does not automatically subject
him to administrative liability for
gross ignorance of the law. WHY? (1)
There is no showing that parties to
the case have exhausted judicial
remedies against the alleged
erroneous ruling- the parties still have
available remedies to contest said ruling.
An administrative complaint is NOT AN
APPROPRIATE REMEDY where judicial
recourse is still available, such as a
motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a
petition for certiorari, unless the assailed
order or decision is tainted with fraud,
malice, or dishonesty. The remedy of
the aggrieved party is to elevate the
assailed decision or order to the
higher court for review and
correction.[27] Second, there was no
showing and neither was it alleged that
the issuance of the ruling was attended
with bad faith, malice, or dishonesty.
As regards Misc. No. 2825 and Misc. No. 2887, the
Court finds that respondent violated the basic
and fundamental constitutional principle of
due process when he granted the motions filed
by the accused in the criminal cases subject of
these administrative complaints without giving
the prosecution its day in court. Worse,
respondent disregarded the period he gave for the
prosecution to file comment on the motions. Such
action cannot be characterized as mere deficiency in
prudence, or lapse of judgment but a blatant
disregard of established rules.
Though not every judicial error
bespeaks ignorance of the law and
that, if committed in good faith, does
not warrant administrative sanction.
SCOPE: the same applies only in
cases within the parameters of
tolerable misjudgment.
WHEN IS GROSS IGNORANCE? Where the
law is straightforward and the facts so
evident, not to know it or to act as if one
does not know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law
With respect to Misc. No. 2821 and Misc.
No. 2824. At the time the assailed rulings
were issued, the prohibition on plea-
bargaining provided in Section 20-A of
R.A. No. 6425, as amended, is not
absolute. It applies only when the person is
charged under R.A. No. 6425 where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to
death. Though Sections 15 and 16 of the said
law, under which the accused was charged,
provide that the sale and possession of these
drugs is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death, these penalties may only be imposed if
the same were of the quantities enumerated in
Section 20.[32] If the quantity involved is less
than that stated, the penalty shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending on the quantity.[33]
It is to be noted that the decision to
accept or reject a plea bargaining
agreement is within the sound discretion
of the court subject to certain
requirements of statutes or rules.
Respondent was also charged w/ gross
negligence in Misc. No. 2824 and Misc.
No. 2860. Misc. No. 2824 relates to the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 40-03
where the name of the accused in the
caption differs from that mentioned in the
body. On the other hand, Misc. No.
2860 relates to the Order quashing a
Search Warrant in another criminal case
and reproducing the Prayer in the Motion
to Quash filed as its dispositive
portion. The errors committed by
respondent judge in the mentioned cases
could have been avoided had he exercised
diligence and prudence expected of him
before affixing his signature.  As held by
the Court in Padilla v. Judge Silerio,
[37]
in “the discharge of the functions of his
office, a judge must strive to act in a
manner that puts him and his conduct
above reproach and beyond suspicion. He
must act with extreme care for his office
indeed is laden with a heavy burden of
responsibility.
RULING:
1) of gross ignorance of the law in
Misc. No. 2825 and Misc. No. 2887, for
which he is suspended from office for six
(6) months without salary and other
benefits;
2) of negligence in Misc. No. 2860 and
Misc. No. 2824, for which he is meted a
FINE of P5,000.00. Respondent is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
TIERRA FIRMA ESTATE v J. QUINTIN
FACTS:
This is a complaint filed against Judge
Edison F. Quintin, Presiding Judge of
the MTC Branch 56, Malabon, Metro
Manila, for failure to decide Civil Case
No. JL00-026, entitled “Tierra Firma
Estate & Development Corporation v.
Consumer Commodities International,
Inc.,” within 30 days after it was
submitted for decision, as required
under Rule 70, §9 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
It appears that on September 14, 2000, a
complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed by complainant against
Consumer Commodities International,
Inc. in the MTC of Malabon, Metro Manila.
After the defendant had filed its answer,
the case was set for preliminary
conference on December 7, 2000.
Despite due notice, THE DEFENDANT DID
NOT APPEAR. Consequently, respondent
judge considered the case submitted for
decision. However, notwithstanding the
motions for the early resolution of the
case filed by complainant on March 2,
2001 and March 22, 2001, judgment was
not rendered in the case until July 10,
2001.
CONTENTION; REASON FOR DELAY: he
has a heavy caseload resulting from
the expanded jurisdiction of the MTC;
that he also had to preside over the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Navotas, Branch
54, as acting judge thereof since March
15, 1999; and that, as a result of a fire
which destroyed the courthouse in
July 2000, he had to hold proceedings
in his original station in a single
cramped room with no partitions and
with the barest of facilities
COMPLAINANT: no intricate questions of fact
and of law that would justify the delay of
210 days and that respondent judge
tolerated dilatory tactics by the defendant
by entertaining motions which are
prohibited under Rule 70, §13 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
HELD:
Actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer are governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure, which was designed
to ensure the speedy disposition of
these cases. Indeed, these cases involve
perturbation of the social order which
must be restored as promptly as possible.
[2]
For this reason, the speedy resolution of
such cases is thus deemed a matter of
public policy.
In this case, was submitted for decision on
December 7, 2000. However,
respondent judge rendered his
decision only on July 10, 2001, or 215
DAYS AFTER THE CASE WAS
SUBMITTED FOR DECISION, way
beyond the 30-day period provided in Rule
70, §9 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. Likewise, §11 of the same rule
provides that the court shall render
judgment within 30 days after receipt of
the affidavits and position papers, or the
expiration of the period for filing the same.
NOTE: Contention as to heavy case load,
the Court said: the designation of a
judge to preside over another sala is
an insufficient reason to justify delay
in deciding a case.
What respondent judge appears to
overlook is that the delay in the
disposition of the case is due in part
to the fact that he entertained
motions,[5] some of which are
prohibited by the Rule on Summary
Procedure, filed by the defendant
which further protracted the
resolution of the case
AS TO THE COMPLAINANT: the continuing
delay in the resolution of the case has
already caused grave damage to it
considering that the defendant
continued to occupy the leased
property without paying rent and the
accumulated unpaid rent has already
reached more than P350,000.00, to the
detriment of complainant.
JUSTICE DELAYED IS NOT JUSTICE DENIED.
Delay in the disposition of cases
undermines the people’s faith and
confidence in the judiciary. Hence,
judges are enjoined to decide cases with
dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes
gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanctions on
them
RULING: GUILTY OF INEFFICIENCY IN
DISPOSITION OF CASES;REPRIMANDED
AND WARNED.
RICON v MARQUEZ
FACTS:
CONSOLIDATED CASES: We resolve the
present consolidated administrative
complaints – (1) A.M. No. RTJ-10-2253,
filed, on August 22, 2002, by Atty.
Perseveranda L. Ricon, Clerk of Court,
charged Judge Placido C. Marquez, RTC,
Branch 40, Manila, with Grave Abuse of
Discretion/Authority, Grave Misconduct
and Conduct Unbecoming a Judge;[1] and
(2) A.M. No. P-06-2138, dated May 13,
2005[2] filed by Judge Marquez against
Atty. Ricon, for Gross Mismanagement and
Neglect, and Falsification
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2253, Ricon v.
Marquez
Atty. Ricon (Clerk of court) alleged that
before Judge Sablan retired, the two of
them paid a courtesy call on Judge
Marquez, then the pairing judge of Branch
39.
Thereafter, or in the first week of March
2002, Judge Marquez set a meeting with
the staff of Branch 39 and Judge
Sablan. The first thing Judge Marquez
asked at the meeting was who among
the staff had already rendered five
(5) years of service in the
government. Most of the staff proudly
raised their hands, but they felt insulted
when Judge Marquez said that
employees who have been in the
public service for five years are
“corrupt, gago, tamad at makakapal
ang mga mukha
The staff were shocked, but did not
react to Judge Marquez’s tirade out of
respect for him. Judge Marquez then
instructed Atty. Ricon to schedule the
court’s cases for hearing on Thursdays
and Fridays, which she did, but Judge
Marquez commenced hearing the cases
only in June 2002.
Atty. Ricon further alleged that Judge
Marquez laid down so many rules and
regulations in the court, and one such
rule required the changing of the
covers of case records, which she
found unreasonable.  . Every time
Judge Marquez discovered case
records not prepared according to his
specifications, he would get mad and
voice out offensive remarks like
“tamad, hindi ginagawa ang mga
trabaho (even in the presence of
other people and even during
hearings).
UTTERED: “nilalahat ko na ang mga
huwes na naupo dito, walang nagawang
tama! Mali silang lahat, mga walang
alam!”
Atty. Ricon disagreed as the respondent
judge’s predecessors were all honest,
efficient, and considerate.
Atty. Ricon also claimed that Judge
Marquez would often tell people that he is
a “basurero”[7] in the office, picking all the
mess left by his predecessors and the
staff.
UNSATISFACTORY RATING. Further, Atty.
Ricon claimed that she received the
biggest blow in her life when Judge
Marquez gave her an “unsatisfactory”
rating, together with other members of
the staff. Further: the lowest rating that
she got from the previous judges was
“very satisfactory” and, before she retired,
Judge Sablan gave her a rating of
“outstanding.”
UNREASONABLE RATING. Atty. Ricon
wondered how Judge Marquez could
correctly rate the staff, as he did, when he
conducted hearings only two days a week
and the longest time that he stayed with
them was five hours, inclusive of the
hearing of cases; in short, when Judge
Marquez made the ratings, he had stayed
with the staff for only 40 hours.
Finally, Atty. Ricon alleged that there were
reports that Judge Marquez was using his
chambers as living quarters, sleeping and
eating within the court’s premises and
was, in fact, accosted by a roving
policeman at the Manila City Hall at about
two o’clock in the morning.
JUDGE: Denied allegations of uttering
words like “basurero” alleging that Atty.
Ricon’s allegations concerning his other
unsavory remarks were a twisted and
perverted version of the truth and were
pure concoctions, malicious and devilish.
Also, denied using his chambers as living
quarters. He explained that he had to work
overnight to beat the 90-day deadline in
deciding cases; during those sleepless
nights, he stayed in his chambers and had
oats for dinner.
RATING - In regard to the staff’s
performance ratings, Judge Marquez
explained that he had nothing to do with
the signing of the rating forms, as it was
the clerk of court who took charge of the
matter; he was not aware of any rule
requiring confrontation between the
supervisor and the ratee or between him
and the whole staff regarding the
unsatisfactory ratings he gave them.
HELD:
We approve and adopt Justice Carandang’s
recommendations. The findings and
conclusions on which they were based
were the result of a thorough and
painstaking investigation.
Use of insulting, unsavoury and intemperate
language to Atty. Ricon and other litigants
deviated from the proper and accepted
decorum of a magistrate.  Such was
unprofessional and unethical.
Other charges against respondent judge should
be dismissed. The judge cannot be made
liable for grave abuse of
discretion/authority or for grave
misconduct for the unsatisfactory ratings
he gave to Atty. Ricon and the other
members of the staff, and for laying down
“many rules and regulations” in Branch 39
to improve record keeping and case
management.
JUDGE’S PREROG RE ASSESSMENT; FILING.
that it was Judge Marquez’s prerogative,
given a pre-determined set of standards,
to give his staff ratings which, in his
honest assessment, are commensurate to
their performance in the office, ratings
which were subsequently upheld by the
OCA PERC. Also, we cannot fault Judge
Marquez in devising ways to straighten out
the file of case records in the court, even
through the mundane task of changing the
colors of case folders. For his resolve to
put in order the court’s record
keeping and case management, he
should be commended, not criticized.
CONVERTED TO LIVING HEADQRTRS. J.
Marquez remained in the court after office
hours to do his work as a judge especially
at the time when he was directed by the
Court to act on cases left by Judge
Sablan. Certainly, he cannot be made
liable for the effort.
NO EVID FOR GROSS MISMGT. OF
RECORDS. Even if records are not properly
arranged  attributed this to the limited
space and facilities as the ones principally
responsible for the situation.
RULING: FINED OF P1K. ALL OTHER
CHARGES ARE DISMISSED.