AD~~-=----...:.....;;_~.:.._...

;'-------~-
RDTE Project No. 1Ll62706A553-TA3-7
TECOM Project No. 8-C0-513-FBT-023
DPG Document No. --=D:.:...P-=-G--=S::....-...;..44..:..:5::..;..A'------

AN EVALUATION OF ENTOMOLOGICAL WARFARE

AS A POTENTIAL DANGER TO THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN NATO NATIONS (U)

By

Wi 11 i am H. Rose

March 1981

U.S. ARMY DUGWAY PROVING GROUND

Dugway, Utah 84022

-- .....
th:ND iHt JII1 STPPI (JS 1 LI I _,L- I --- -
- p
- - ----
=~~%2:CPQi;:r ;:: !: ;:: a! d;:;:ftf . . . . . . 1

CLASSIFIED BY: Multiple Sources OPG 81-41

REVIEW ON: 31 March 1997
Copy 6~ of 69 Copies
-
UNCLASSIFIED

FORE\.JORD
The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable assistance of Dr.
Robert Elbel of t~e University of Utah, Entomology Department and Mr.
George Crane of Dugway Proving Ground.

i
UNCLASSIFIED
•
UNCLASSIFIED

TA3LE OF CONTENTS

~O?EWORD . . · i

LIST OF TABLES vi

SE CTI ON 1 . EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. 1 PURPOSE . .
1.2 INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 1

1 .3 HISTORY CF EW FIELD TESTING IN THE US 2

1 .4 ASSESSMENT OF DISEASE AGENTS AND VECTORS 3

1 .5 COST COMPARISON EW VERSUS AEROSOL DISSEMINATION 3

1 .6 CONCLUSIONS ........ . 8

1.7 RECOMMENDED DEFENSIVE MEASURES 9

SECTION 2. INTRODUCTION
2. l PURPOSE 11
2.2 METHOD . 11

SECTION 3. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

3.1 HIRSCH REPORT .... 13

3.2 MASS PRODUCTION OF AEDES AEGYPTI. 13

3.3 ENTOMOLOGICAL WARFARE SYSTEM DESCRIBED 13

3.4 FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE 14

3.5 OTHER DISEASES . . . 14

3.6 INSECT MASS REARING 14

;;i

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

Page
SECTION 4. HISTORY OF EW FIELD TESTING IN THE US
4. l OPERATION BIG ITCH 15
4.2 OPERATION BIG BUZZ l5
4.3 OPERATION DROP KICK 15
4.4 OPERATION GRID IRON 16
4.5 OPERATION MAY DAY 16
4.6 AVON PARK TRIALS 17
4.7 MUNITION DISSEMINATION TESTS 21
4.8 OPERATION QUICKHENRY 21
4.9 BELLWETHER I 22
4. 10 BELLWETHER I I 23
4.11 BELLWETHER IV 24
4. 12 BELLWETHER IV PHASED 25
4 .13 MAG IC SWORD . . . . . 26
4. 14 OTHER EW STUD I ES CONDUCTED 26

SECTION 5. POTENTIAL EW DISEASES ANO THEIR VEC~ORS

5. 1 EASTERN EQUINE ENCEPHALITIS 29
5.2 YELLOW FEVER 31
5. 3 PLAGUE 33
5.4 ANTHRAX 37
5.5 FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE 39
5.6 OTHER POTENTIAL EW DISEASES 42

iv

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

S~C7IDN 6. COST COMPARISON EW VERSUS

AEROSOL DISSEMINATION
5. 1 BATTALION AREA .A.TTACK WITH -::-_~.;.XISCELLA ':~'LAFE.'.?SIS
AEROSOL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

6.2 BATTALION AREA ATTACK WITH YELLOW FEVER INFECTED

MOS QUI TOES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

6.3 CITY ATTACK WITH YELLOW FEVER INFECTED MOSQUITOES 53

6.4 CITY ATTACK \\ ITH :RANCISCE-:0..J. 7UI,ARENSIS AEROSOL

1
54

SECTION 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDED

DEFENSIVE MEASURES
7. 1 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 59
7.2 RECOMMENDED DEFENSIVE MEASURES 59

SECTION 8. APPENDICES
8.1 LITERATURE CITED 61
8.2 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 65
i
;
l 8.3 DISTRIBUTION LIST . . 67
!

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

LI ST OF TABLES
Table
Resource Cost Summary for an ~ tularer..s:s Aerosol
Attack on a Battalion 4 &47
2 Resource Cost Summary for a Yellow Fever-Infected
Mosquito Attack on a Battalion . . . . . . . . . . 4 & 52
3 Resource Cost Summary for a Yellow' Fever-Infected
Mosquito Attack on a City .......... . 5 & 54

4 Resource Cost Summary for an .-:. blar>er..2-~2 Aerosol

Attack on a City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 & 56

5 Various Estimates of Cost ser Death for an

Aerosol Attack on a City . . . . ... 8 & 57

6 Munition-Acquisition Resources for

Aerosol Battalion Attack . 46

7 Material Needed for Yellow Fever-Infected Mosquito

Production . . . . . . .... 49

8 Munition-Acquisition Resources for an F. :::.:a.l'ensis

Aerosol Attack on a City . . . 55

vi
UNCLASSIFIED
 SECTION 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (U)

1. 1 PURPOSE

(U) This report assesses the current potential threat and probability
of use of various ento~ological warfare (EW) agents against the US and
European NATO nations by a foreign power or dissident organization. It
also makes recommendations to combat or negate this potential danger.
1.2 INTELLIGENCE INFORt'!ATION
(U) The following intelligence information is indicative of possible
development of EW by the Warsaw Pact Nations.

(b)(l) •••
Il I

i
\ i

\l
\

. - - - - --- --- - - --- - - - ------------- - - _ _ __J

(U) Several exotic viruses, many of which are not problems in the
Soviet Union but which are potential EW disease agents are being studied
in the USSR. One of these, African swine fever, has been under study
since the early 1960s. This disease, which is almost 100 percent fatal
to infected swine, is not endemic in the Soviet Union (4).
(U) The Soviets have conducted a significant amount of research
with foot and mouth disease (FMD) virus. This virus infects cattle,
sheep, and hogs. It is not endemic in the US but if introduced could
cause tremendous economic damage (4).

1
 .,.~-- ~-··~----..-------...------------------------- \
i
'

;
l
j
1

l;
•1

iI
j
li
\
\ -,
''
 - -- ------

·~---------- -----
-----·--·-··-------~

3
 UNCLASSIFIED
Table 1. (U) Resource Cost Summary for an F. :;:A.ZaY'ensis
Aerosol Attack on a Battalion.

Item Cost (1976 S)

Planning 8,750
Agent Production 10,000
Munition Acquisition 9,897
Weapon Employment 5,700
TOTAL: 34,347

l .5. 1.2 (U) Attack with Yellow Fever Infected Mosquitoes. The cost of
attacking a 7.5-km 2 area (battalion) with yellow fever-infected mosqui-
toes was estimated. Where possible, costs of equipment were taken from
1976 catalogues to make the cost comparison with the aerosol attack as
valid as possible. The feasibility of area coverage 1·1ith A. cegypti
mosquitoes was based on the Avon Park, Florida mosquito trials described
in Section 4 (11,12). Approximately 223,000 infected female .4. a.egypti
are required for this hypothetical attack. The mosquitoes would be
released from a helicopter 610 m upwind of the target area. Table 2
contains the resource cost summary for this attack. See Table 6 page
46 for the estimated cost of munition items for the:. :::.rare}:sis attack
and Table 7 page 49 for the estimated cost of items to raise 225,000
yellow fever infected mosquitoes.
Table 2. (U) Resource Cost Summary for a Yellow Fever-
Infected Mosquito Attack on a Battalion.

Item Cost (1976 S)

Planning 8,750
Agent Production 9,066
Munition Acquisition 2,150
Weapon Employment 6,700
TOTAL: 26,666

(U) Tables l and 2 demonstrate the probable cost differential

for an aerosol versus EW attack when considering a given limited area
such as that occupied by a mechanized battalion in the field. In
actuality, an EW attack of this type on a military unit would probably
not be attempted because complete control of the airways would be
necessary and the attack would not be covert. The same would be true
for a pathogen aerosol attack attempted this close to the target area.

4
TTNr.T_.n~t:T~n
1.5.2 City _,'~tack.

1.5.2.l (U) Attack with Yellow Fever-Infected Mosquitoes. The cost of

attacking an urban area covertly with yellow fever-infected mosquitoes
was estimated. It was assumed the cost of planning a city attack with
yellow fever-infected ~osquitoes is comparable with the cost of planning
an aerosol attack on Washington, DC (scenario 7 of reference 10). In
the present hypothetical attack, 16 simultaneous attacks were planned
at a total planning cost of $8,750. The cost of one attack would be
5547.00 ($8.750 :- Hi).

(U) Agent producticn would involve producing 225,000 yellow fever-

infected female A. a~~~~::. This is the same number used in the hypo-
thetical battalion attack so the cost would be the same ($9,066).

(U) Munition acquisition was estimated to be $500.00 and weapon

employment (truck rental and wages of two semi-skilled people for eight
hours) was estimated to be $360.00. These costs are summarized in Table
3.

Table 3. (U) Resource Cost Summary for a Yellow Fever-

Infected Mosquito Attack on a City.

Item Cost (1976 $)

Planning 547
Agent Production 9,066
Munition Acquisition 500
Weapon Employment 360

TOTAL: 10,473

THIS TABLE IS UNCLASSJlJJJL,--~---------

\----·- -----~---·
; (b)C:1) •••
I---~-----------.........----------------._)
(U) The costs of agent production, munition acquisition, and weapon
employment were also taken from scenario 7 of reference 10. The one
exception to this was for weapon employment. Scenario 7 included the
travel and per diem costs of foreign agents traveling to the US to
conduct the attack. In the presently described scenario, people to
conduct the attack were considered to be already in the US. This makes
the costs comparable to those for the yellow fever mosquito attack on a

5
city where attack personnel were considered to be already in the US.
The costs are summarized in Table 4.

Table 4. (U) Resource Cost Summary for an F. tularensis

Aerosol Attack on a City.

Item Cost (1976 S)

Planning 547
Agent Production 174,000
Munition Acquisition 1 ,435
Weapon Employment 3,250
TOTAL: 179,232
THIS TABLE IS UNCLASSIFIED

1 .5.3 Cost Comparison Summary.

i.,-~- -----···"--.......,---~--~=.a, ..
·-- ---~-·"'·,__.....-,I I
j
;
, ,· .: :· ~' ·, . ·!

(U) The closeness of agent and agent vector release in these two types
of attacks (610 m upwind of the target area) would preclude the advantage
of covertness. Therefore, personnel having access to protective masks
during an~- tuZarensis aerosol attack would probably have the opportun-
ity to take advantage of this method of protection.

(b)(l) •••

(U) It has been estimated that between 50 and 90 percent of a

nonimmune population bitten by infected yellow fever mosquitoes will
become infected and 30 to 40 percent of the victims will die (12). Thus
>50 percent of the perscnnel in the battalion would likely become inca-
pacitated and a large number would die.

6
 (b){l) •••

7
 "-·· ......... -.-,,,---..-·----

. ·-.:--. : ·~

(b)(l) •••

- . ~----- . ~.
. ,,.,.
_..,. _____ ., -, . .,. "!!'".-~~----..._--- i
~'
-..-.·- ··"' ...,,._ .
.,. ·' -,~..•... ' ..
------··--·-·---~· - yO .... M--r-,•.?

Table 5. (U) Various Estimates of Cost per Death for an

F. tularensis Aerosol Attack on a City.

Percent Number of Cost Per

Deaths Deaths Death (1976 S)

5 62,500 2.86
10 125,000 1. 43
20 250,000 0.72
30 375,000 0.48
40 500,000 0.36
50 625,000 0.29

THIS TABLE IS UNCLASSIFIED

1
Streptomycin, kanamycin, and chloramphenicol are a.lso effective against
F. tularensis~ although some strains of F. tularensis are resistant to
streptomycin.

8
jeath for various death :·atios 111 t ·e tulare1111a attack deoicted. -;-his tab1e
1

indicates that a death 1·2te of 20 percent per casualty would have to be

3
chieved before the cost rate per ~eath wculd be less than that estimated
in a similar yellow fever-infected Gosauito attack.

(b)(l) •..

l. 6 CONCLUSIONS
(U) Intelligence information dealing with the Warsaw Pact countries
has indicated that in the past they have attempted to produce an EW
capability. Presently, indirect evidence indicates activity in EW. The
evidence includes mass rearing of potential insect vectors and working
with microbiological agents compatible with EW agents that are not a
problem in these countries. The Warsaw Pact nations certainly have the
capability to conduct EW.
(U) The A. ae;;p~- yellow fever virus system is estimated to be
~e most likely antipersonne1 EW system that could be used by the Warsaw
Pact Countries against the US or the European NATO nations. FMD virus
is a 1ikely animal EW agent that could be effectively spread by M.
domesti2a with a resu1tant great economic loss.
_.,,,,

I
(
j
!

(b)(l) •••

(U) EW systems are not likely to be used on military units because

the agent vectors must be re1eased too close to the target area. This
wou1d make a covert attack on a military unit difficult to achieve. In
addition troops in the field are norma11y spaced further apart than
peop1e in cities which would make EW warfare less effective.
1.7 RECOMMENDED DEFENSIVE MEASURES
(U) When an EW attack on a city is suspected or when a large popu-
lation of mosquitoes or other insects unexpectedly appears in an abnormal
way, reaction must be swift. Insecticide spray operations should be

9
 UNCLASSIFIED

initiated as soon as possible. At the same time, the general population

must be warned by radio, television, and newspapers. If the insects are
mosquitoes, the warning should include advice to stay indoors and to keep
unscreened doors and windows closed at all times. Those who must venture
outside should be protected as much as possible. Suggested protection
should include wearing mosquito netting over the face and neck and the use
of mosquito repe1lant. Long-sleeved shirts with gloves tightly fastened
around the wrists should be worn. Pants should be fastened tightly around
the ankles and two oair of socks worn. Hats should be worn to protect the
tops of heads.
----- .
,,,. ..,,..,_ -- . ,-

(b)(l) •••

.~_•.r-,,. -·----.

l0
TT'P.T,-.T 7'I' rtrtT~..-...
 Ul~CLASSIFIED
~~CTION 2. ~'.:TROOUCTION (U)

2. l PURPOSE

(U) The spread of disease-causing microorganisms for the purpose of

inflicting casualties on enemy personnel, animals, or crops has been
termed biological warfare (BW). The use of insect vectors to accomplish
this task has been termed entomological warfare (EW). The purposes of
this paper are to (l) assess the current potential threat and probability
of a foreign power or dissident organization using various EW diseases
against the US and European NATO nations and (2) make recommendations
to combat or negate this potential danger.

2. 2 ;:fTHODS

(U) The purpose of this report has been accomplished by:

a. (U) Listing lhe available foreign intelligence information which
indicates Warsaw Pact interest in EW,
b. (U) Summarizing the history of US EW testing,
c. (U) Obtaining the facts relative to the more probable EW diseases
that could be used against the US or European NATO nations,
d. (ll) Giving the reasons v;hy these diseases might or might not be
employed and how they might be used,
e. (U) Comoaring the cost of conducting EW to the cost of the
aerosol mode of BW, and

~-- - - . . ,., ,. - ,.- --.- I

f. (U) Delineating some of the defensive measures that could be
used to negate an EW attack.
·----~~ ---
. ...-·-..-,,,,.~-~----- -----·~~
...

\
\

(b,Cl) ...

L~. ·----------~~---- -
~ -- ~- - ~--

11
 5:CTION 3. :·;--:-ELLIGENCE I'.'ffORMATIOrl (U)

(U) Since Wcrld War II several reports have indicated the Soviet
Union has an interest in EW.

3.1 HIRSCH REPORT

(b)(l) ...

(U) The prisoners, repor:edly in chains, were placed in an eight-

man tent which had a number of plague-infected rats and fleas under
wire nets on the floor. Most of the prisoners developed bubonic plague
after being bitten by the fleas. Ground squirrels and other rodents
were reported to have been used in similar experiments and proved to be
efficient intennediary hosts. The escape of a prisoner infected with
bubonic plague started a great epidemic among the Mongols in the summer
of 1941. Three to five thousand Mongols were reported to have died in
this epidemic and were disposed of by burning or burying with disinfec-
tants.
Ticks 1vere also reported to have been used to transfer tick-
( ' 1)
borne encephalitis to prisoners. In addition, infected fleas and other
insect vectors were dropped from aircraft in paper containers.
3.2 MASS PRODUCTION OF AEDE~ ;zGYPTI
.........~-··-·~·-!'"-· ..... - ,.,. --- .... - ·-·-
~

.
/
,,./ \
I

/
/ l
;
,.'
l
(b)(l} •••

''i
l
\ '·
' '-. I
------- --------~·-·-· --- . . -· . ~------- -- J
.J
!

---~"

13

I·
3.4 FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE (FMD)

(U) FMD is an economically important disease in livestock, espe-

cially cattle, because of losses arising from its occurrence. At
present the disease is not a problem in the US. Previous outbreaks
have been controlled by eradication of the sick and/or infected animals.
The results of Soviet research efforts to develop an effective vaccine
have been largely inconclusive. Other areas investi9ated in the USSR
include growth of the causative virus in cell culture, resistance of
the virus to the environment, inactivation by ultraviolet rays, and
disinfection of foodstuffs. Because of the susceptibility of livestock
populations in the United States, this acute, rapidly-spreading virus
has considerable potential as a BW agent (4). The virus could be
spread by insect vectors.
3.5 OTHER DISEASES
(U) Several more exotic viruses are also being examined in the
Soviet Union. Since the early 1960s, the Soviets have conducted re-
search on African swine fever. This disease, 1·1hich is not ender.lie in
the Soviet Union, is almost 100 percent fatal to infected swine. Early
work with this virus demonstrated that dried blood infected with it was
capable of causing the disease after nearly three years of cold storage
(4). This virus could also be spread by insect vectors.
3.6 INSECT MASS REARING
-~---~~~--·--.·--··--~--" --·· - . - .---.•.·-··
_.I
r

(b)(l) •••

14
 I
SECTION 4. ~ISTORY OF E.-i_ F_IELu TE5THJG rn_ THE_US_(U)

4. l OPERATION BIG I;CH (8,12)

In 1954 a series of tria1s 1\las conducted using:, ·L·:2:·',~
(u)
(fleas) in E-14 munitions \·Jith cardboard and sponge inserts.
chL:::c ·.;
The insects were dropped from altitudes of 305 and 610 mover US Army
Duqwav Provina Ground (DPG), Utah to: (1) investigate the suitability
of-the munition components for dissemination of these arthropod vectors;
(2) detennine survival and host acquisition ability of.\'. -:;,c:-·;.·:·s
disseminated from these devices; (3) plot carrier patterns produced by
E-14 munitions filled with the special carriers.
(U) The fleas were successfully reared to the appropriate stage,
then dropped on the target with little or no die-off. After release,
the insects were successful in acquiring hosts but \'Jere not active
longer than 24 hours. The sponge carriers were the most widely distri-
buted, as indicated by carrier patterns.
(U) No calculations of effects were attempted in this report.

4.2 OPERATION BIG BUZZ (12,14)

(U) In May 1955 a field test was conducted in Georgia to (1) demon-
strate the feasibility of mass-producing, storing, loading into muni-
tions, and disseminating mosquitoes from aircraft, and (2) to determine
if the mosquitoes 1\lould survive the airdrop and take blood meals from
humans.
(U) More than one million uninfected A. aec~~ti were produced and
.. stored for nearly two weeks. About one third of.these mosquitoes were
' placed in E-14 munitions (containing "aircomb waffles" and "loop tubes")
and in 0.76 m rocket-shaped ground release munitions, and dropped, with-
out mortality, from aircraft. The remaining mosquitoes were used in
munition loading and storage tests. Mosquitoes 1·Jere released from E-14
munitions when they were 91 m above the ground. The mosquitoes were
dispersed by the wind and their own flight and were collected as far
as 610 m dowmvind from the target release site. The female mosquitoes
were active in seeking blood meals from humans and guinea pigs.
4.3 OPERATION DROP KICK (12,15)

,i
__J
(b)(l) ••• J
-·--=--'

15
""----~·· . -

(b)(l) •••

/
/'
4.5 OPERATION MAY DAY (12,17)
(U) Operation MAY DAY consisted of studies of;. aegyp~i activity
and dispersion in an urban a"ea (Savannah, Georgia) from April to
November 1956.
(U) The tests were designed to give information on the dispersal
of .'1. c:.c:~7:•~'ti from a groun-:1 level point-source release in a short
period of time. Results were based primarily on mosquito recoveries
obtained in dry-ice baited traps. In these tests a small fraction
(0.5 percent to 7.75 percent) of the total number of mosquitoes

16

,.
 (U) There \·Jere no:.. , .!:'':r: 111 the test area before the release of
the test mosquitoes; however, a nu~ber of native species of mosquitoes
were recovered by traps and by hu~an collectors.

~-··~ -

{b)(l) •••

/ -

' \

!
\
\
'·
':~~·~·~-. ·-··-- - .

19

l
 J <• · · ~ ' .,..., ,.....,..,~

!'
j

(b)(l) •••

(U) The time of maximum biting of this species outdoors was early
in the morning and late in the evening during twilight and during
inversions when wind velocity was at a minimum. Outdoor collections
were made during these periods. Indoors, this species of mosquito
bites at any time when there is any 1 ight (natural or artificial).
Biting mosquitoes were collected in buildings from 0630 to 1930 (even
later at night in lighted buildings).

(U) The biting activity was relatively independent of temperature

except that early morning biting activity outdoors and in unheated
buildings vJas limited at temperatures below 16°C. At this temperature
and above the mosquitoes were very active and bit ferociously.

20
 -·· '- ~-

(b)(l} •••

.!
j
~~--

4.7 MUNITION DISSEMINATION TESTS (12,18)

(U) A 1957 report titled "Studies Relating to the Munition Dissemi-
nation of Insects for BW" discusses the munition dissemination of
insects. Munition loading with selected insects using aspiration of
insects was accomplished and insect survival was studied under different
environmental conditions.
(U) Field tests were carried out with mosquitoes to detennine the
optimum release height between ground level and 305 m. In field tests,
mosquitoes and houseflies dispersed up to 2.4 and 6.4 km respectively.
A minimum of five infected mosquitoes, five houseflies, and 30 fleas
or ticks per person is the preliminary estimate of the numbers of
insects required for effective coverage of a target area.
4.8 OPERATION QUICKHENRY (7)
(U) A 1960 report discusses field trials involving uninfected
female .4. aeg~p-;-: mosquitoes.

21
 (b)(l) •••

4.9 BELLWETHER I (19)

(U) Bellwether I reported on a series of 52 field trials conducted
at DPG between l September and 9 October 1959. The basic trial design
of this test series consisted of three 4.6 m radius circles, located
0.8 km apart on a crosswind line. Ten human volunteers were located
equidistantly around the perimeter of one circle, and ten traps with
guinea pigs or ten empty traps were placed around the perimeters of the
other two circles. Teri volunteers all remained seated in these trials.
One hundred mosquitoes were released in the center of each circle and
sampling was conducted for 30 minutes. A mobile meteorological station
was located 0.4 km upwind of the center circle.
(U) The primary objective of this test was to determine the effects
of major meteorological parameters on the biting rates of starved,
virgin female A. aegypti mosquitoes on troops in the open. Other objec-
tives were (a) to find out if this domesticated, house-loving tropical
mosquito could be effectively tested in hot, open, temperate desert
terrain and (b) to determine if traps could replace human samplers.
(U) For uninfected, virgin A. aeg2·~·::-:- mosquitoes, the results
obtained in these trials indicate that:
a, (U) It is feasible to test this mosquito under hot, dry desert
conditions.

22
 UNCLASSIFIED
b. (U) Although many of these trials produced erratic and unpredic-
table results, analysis of these data indicates that each of the meteor-
ological variables studied (wind speed, temperature, relative humidity,
and solar radiation) exert a significant influence on the biting activity
of the A. ae1i!'ti mosquito. All variables would have to be considered
important parameters in any model designed to predict biting activity.
However, the effects of the latter three factors were manifested only in
terms of interaction with wind speed and with each other; wind speed
alone had a direct effect upon biting activity.
c. (U) An increase of 1 .6 km/hr in the ambient wind speed was
associated with a decrease of approximately six bites in a 4.6 m radius
circle with 10 volunteers during a 30-minute time interval.
d. (U) The data suggest that the previously determined lower
temperature limit of 15cc for vector biting activity of the non-cold-
resistant strain is placed too high. However, at these lower temperatures
some other factors (at present unknown) produce erratic results.
4.10 BELLWETHER II (20)
(U) In Bellwether II, 14 field trials were conducted at DPG from
6 September to 20 October 1960 (12). Up to 100 assigned military person-
nel were used as samplers in each trial. Grid arrays involved in Bell-
wether I were incorporated into this test design.
(U) The objective of Bellwether II, using release of uninfected,
starved virgin female;. aegypti mosquitoes, were, in part:
a. (U) To evaluate the effects of varying the host distance, the
host concentration, and the vector/host ratio,
b. (U) To determine the effect of the presence or absence of overt
movement of the human samplers upon the outdoor biting rate, and
c. (U) To investigate methods of placement of human samplers in
open terrain and within built-up areas.
(U) Development and improvement of a basic entomological field
test technology were the major goals throughout the test.
(U) For the specific conditions encountered, it is concluded that:
a. (U) In a 30-minute sampling period, there was no significant
difference in vector biting activity at distances up to 30 m from the
release point, but maximum biting activity occurred at distances of
<61 m.

23
r1 UNCLASSIFIED

b. (U) Intervening hosts did not interfere with the vectors' outward
spread or biting activity.

c. (U) No conclusive findings were generated regarding the effect

of host concentration.

d. (U) When the number of vectors was increased by a factor of 10.

approximately 10 times as many bites were received and the proportion
of hosts bitten increased an average of 36 percent.

e. (U) Vector biting activity tended to be highest when the hosts

were alternately in motion and then motionless for recurring 5-rninute
periods. Biting was lowest when the hosts moved continuously.
f. (U) Hosts located near buildings were subjected to significantly
greater vector biting activity than were hosts located in open areas.

g. (U) Vectors did not tend to distribute the"'selves evenly throuqh-

out an isolated built-up area. Also, they did not tend to redislt'ibutc
themselves evenly during the interims between host occupations.

h. (U) No conclusive findings were generated regarding opti11n1111

sampling duration.

i. (U) No evidence of tv1ilight hours biting preference 1·1as obtained

in these trials.

j. (U) There 1-1ere no conclusive findings concerning the avPr,1<1e

longevity of;, ae???~i exposed to ambient desert conditions.

4.11 BELLWETHER IV (21)

(U) Belh1ether IV was conducted a: DPG and p~b1 ished in 1%:'. 11 11 '
objective of this report was to compare the Rockefeller (R) st.r.i in ° 1
.-L acg~r:;::: 1·1i th the Fort Detrick (CD) strain for biting proper1·, i I I/
(Phases A, 6, and C), dispersal (Phases Band C), and buildinri 1ll'rw1r·.i-
tion (Phase C) in a desert environment. Bellwether IV Phases A, I',, """
C consisted of 17 trials; Phase A, nine trials; P~ase 8, five 11·i.il·.;
and Phase C, three trials.
(U) The results of Phase A trials indicated :'iat the bit11111 \ln,-
pensity of strains Rand CD did not differ. Durin~ Phase B tri,1 I·,,
more bites 11ere recorded for strain CD than for strain R. llow1·v 1 • 1·,
this difference may not have been statistically si;nificant. ltw di·.-
persion of the two strains was considered to be c~~parable.
1
( U) Conflicting results 1-1ere obtained durin~ P•1ase C. Mi111v 1111
.
w •
I.
mosquito bites v1ere obtained on Trials C-2 and C-3 than on Tri.t I (
Trial C-1 v1as conducted v1ith strain CO, and Trials C-2 and L-1 1·w 1· 1 •

24
conducted v;it•; strain 2. ·>e lo·d counts received in Trials C-2 and C-3,
as compared •.ii':,", tl1ose obt.:.i:',ed in Trial C-1, could be the result of
any or a 11 of ti; e fo 11 Oi·J i ng ::: ond i ti on s :
• Comparing strain R with strain CD mos~uitoes,
• A shift in wind direction at function time in Trials C-2 and
C-3 that carried vectors east of main sampling area,
• Lower ambient temperatures, and
• Unknown factors.

4.12 BELLWETHER IV, PHASE J (22)

(U) Bellwetner IV Phase J at DPG consisted of 12 trials conducted
from 2 July to 12 August 1962 to determine and compare the building
penetration and biting propensity of the CD and R strains of.~. ,::.£,,/-;-::
mosquitoes. This was deemed necessary because of the insufficient and
inconclusive data generated during the Bellwether IV Phase C trials.

(b)(l) . . .

25
 (b)(l) ••.

.,i!
I ~

;i
,]
11
Ii
ii

'---------------------------------·-·--------_)

26
 UNCLASSIFIED

~I__pr:·;_~POTENT;;L rn DISEASES_AND_THEIR_VECTORS (U)_

5.1 EASTERN EQU: 1\E rncEPHALITIS (EEE) VIRUS

5.1.1 Disease Characteristics.
(U) EEE vfrus is a group A arbovirus that causes an acute encepha-
litis with a high mortality in humans and horses. After an incubation
period of 7-10 days (in humans), there is a sudden onset of high fever,
headache, nausea, and vomiting. This progresses rapidly into drowsiness
to delirium and finally coma. Other symptoms are stiff neck, absent or
hyperactive reflexes, and muscle spasticity in the extremities.
Patients, if conscious, may be unable to speak or swallow and often
experience excessive salivation.
(U) The mortality rate for EEE infected individuals that are hos-
pitalized is 50 percent or higher. Survivors often have pennanent
damage to nerves regulating muscular control of one or more of the
ex t rem i t i e s .
(U) Although persons with inapparent infections have been found
in EEE outbreaks, most cases have overt clinical symptoms. In a 1959
outbreak of EEE in New Jersey, inapparent infections, frequently
accompanied by a history of minor illness, were detected by serological
methods in 3.1 to 3.6 percent of the people tested. Among 55 household
contacts of overt cases of encephalitis, 7.3 percent had experienced an
inapparent infection (24). Results of serum surveys from other countries
have indicated a much higher rate of EEE positives from clinically in-
apparent infections. Thus the morbidity rate for EEE is uncertain.
5.1.2 Area of Endemicity.
(U) EEE is found throughout Eastern Canada and the Eastern and
Southern US east of the Mississippi River, and has spread into Nebraska,
Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, Mexico, Panama, Brazil, Dominican
Republic, Cuba, and Trinidad. Additional cases have been recorded in
Michigan and Wisconsin (25,26,27).
(U) Most epidemics occur in horses or pheasants. The human cases
that have occurred have been along the Eastern coast of the US from
Northern Florida to Canada. However sporadic cases have occurred in
the Caribbean islands.
(U) EEE is also enzootic in birds and mammals in Europe (28).

29

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

5.1 .3 Epidemiology
(U) Wild birds are the principal enzootic host of EEE (29). They
do not suffer apparent ill effects from the virus, although it circu-
lates in their blood and provides the basis for further infection via
mosquito vectors.
(U) The 1959 epidemic of EEE in New Jersey is a typical example of
a human epidemic of this disease (30). During his outbreak the swamp
mosquito Culcscta malunura served as the primar'.' sylvan vector carrying
EEE virus from enzootic swamp foci to peri-domLil iar wild and domestic
hosts in the epidemic (coastal) and epizootic (inland) areas. Aedes
soll-icitana served as the primary epidemic vector in the coastal area
where most of the human cases occurred, obtaining its infection from
peri-domiciliar avian reservoirs (including chickens) and transferring
it to humans. /\ccles vcxan<J served as the primary rpizootic vector in
the inland area and may have occasionally infected humans.
(U) C. malunum is attracted to and feeds primarily on birds,
although it has been known to feed on marrrnals (31). It is not persis-
tent in feeding activity (32). ;L soU-icitana frequents the salt
marshes of the eastern and southern US and is apparently much more
likely to feed on mammals (33).
(U) Culex pipiens pipiens is the enzootic vector of EEE in Europe.
This mosquito feeds principally on birds (31). Apparently this disease
has not been transmitted to humans in Europe because a mosquito that
is susceptible to EEE and that bites both birds and humans does not
exist in sufficient numbers. Murine (rats and mice) EEE endemic centers
do exist in Europe, however (28).
5.1.4 Disease Transmission.
(U) Three mosquito species (A. sollicitans, :L aegypti, and Aedes
tPiseriatus) have been shown to be capable of transmitting EEE virus to
>50 percent of the animals they bite (12). Chamberlain et al. were
able to infect 28 of 48 (58 percent) of exposed chicks using EEE infec-
ted IL ac~ypt-i (34). They found the A. acgypli animal threshold to be
around 10 and the 50 percent infection level to be 10 6 infectious
viral particles. The extrinsic incubation time in A. aegypti for EEE
virus has been reported to be between 8 and 34 days, depending on the
temperature; the mosquito apparently remains infective for life (12).
5.1.5 Ecological and Epidemiological Problems.
(U) EEE is endemic in the Eastern, Southern, and portions of the
mid-11Jestern US. This disease is uncommon in humans, in spite of its
frequency in the wild bird population, because the mosquito C. malunura
(the principal enzootic vector) does not usually bite humans.

30
UNCLASSIFIED
 (U) If a foreiqn oov:er used E~~-infected .:. :.~::·; · :_ to attack any
of the areas of the US or Europe where EEE is endemic, the problem
would orobably exist onlv as long as the infected A. ~cau0ti survived.
~ - ·~ ~ j._

~ith the aid of modern insecticides it should be easy to control; .

•... _; in a local populated area, the type of area where these mosqui-
to~~ normally persist. Even if these~. ~cgypti were able to establish
themselves and persist for a significant time they are not known to pass
the virus to their offspring. Because-~· .ieq'jpti does not normally feed
on birds, there would probably not be a permanent threat to local human
populations.

(b)(l} •••

,.
l

/
·----
5.2 YELLOW FEVER
5.2.1 Disease Characteristics
(U) Yellow fever virus is a Group B arbovirus that causes an acute
disease characterized by sudden onset, prostration, moderately high fever,
severe headache, backache, and leg pains. Severe cases often exhibit
vomiting of altered blood (black vomit), albuminuria, and jaundice.
The incubation period is from 3 to 6 days. The fatality rate in endemic
regions is less than 5 percent, but ranges from 30 to 40 percent among

31
I·
persons in non-endemic areas. lhe morbidity for unvaccinated individuals
in non-indiginous areas is considered to be bet~ieen 50 and 90 percent,
but with vaccination it is less than 1 percent (37).

5.2.2 Area of Endemicity

(U) Except for a few cases in Trinidad, West Indies in 1954, no out-
break of urban ~ellow fever has been transmitted by~. aegypti in the
Americas since 1942 (33). Urban yellow fever outbreaks are still reported
from Africa in areas contiguous to rain forest regions where jungle yellow
fever is endemic.
(U) Jungle yellow fever is enzootic in the A~azon basin of Brazil,
including parts of Columbia and the eastern regions of Peru and Bolivia.
It has occurred from time to time in all mainland American countries, from
Mexico to Argentina, with the exception of El Salvador, Uruguay, and Chile.
In Africa, it extends from the west coast south of the Sahara Desert to
Angola and east to Somalia, Kenya, and Tanzania.
5.2.3 Epidemiology
Yellov1 fever occurs in humans in tv,o main epidemiologic pat-
(ll)
terns. In the first, the virus is transmitted fron one human to
another by certain domestic or sen1idomestic species of Aedes. The
classic urban yellow fever belongs to this type, with A. aeg~;;~ as the
vector. The second type is sylvatic or jungle yellow fever in which
humans are only incidentally infected in the course of a virus cycle
involving wild animals, particularly monkeys, and forest mosquitoes.
(U) In urban yellow fever, the~. ~aau~ti transmits the virus by
biting a human host during the initial per"iod of viremia and later
biting a susceptible person. An extrinsic incubation period of nine
to twelve days is necessary before the mosquito can transmit infection
by bite. Humans and mosquitoes are the reservoirs of infection in
urban yellow fever. Monkeys are the reservoir of the sylvatic form of
the disease. Some soecies of monkeys are more susceptible to the virus
and usually die; other species become ill but not fatally so.

\I
.\
(b)(l) •••

32

,_
5.2.S Ecoloqical and EDidernioloaical Problems.
(U J Animals ::i:he·· than primates are not susceptible to yell0\'1
fever •;irus infec:ic:L Because l01·1er nrimates do not normally exist in
an urban environment. a yellow fever virus attack in an urban area
should not cause !~e virus to become endemic, except in the hJman popu-
lation. The cities i:; the US and Eurooe 1-.,ould soon eliminate the .l.
:~·:-J:-. -:· population once cases of yellov1 fever 1·1ere diagnosed, given the
mosquito abatement che~icals and equipment that are available in these
cities.
(U) Therefore, oermanent ecological damage from a yellow fever
virus attack would be very unlikely. However, an attack on a southern
US city or an Italian city where;. ~egyp:i might already be present
could result in a sianificant soread of yellow fever virus among the
human population before the disease was brought under control.

(b)(l) •••

5.3 PLAGUE
5.3.1 Disease Characteristics and Epidemiology
(U) Plague is an infectious disease caused by the bacterium
T1·10 types of plague exist, bubonic (usually transmit-
Yers'>[:i. ;;est:.s.
ted via insect bite, generally fleas), and pneurronic (generally contrac-
ted from infected persons).
(U) Bubonic olague, if untreated, has a mortality rate of 25 to
50 percent but the pneumonic form of the disease is almost always fatal.
Modern chemotheraoy is effective against both disease types only if
treatment is begun vii thin approximately 24 hours of the onset of symp-
toms.
(U) Wild rodents are the natural reservoir of plague but the
disease is at times harbored by domestic rats in urban areas. Bubonic
plague is occasionally transmitted from infected rodents to humans via
the bite of an infected flea. The oriental rat flea (Xenopsylla cheopis)
is the most frequent and also the most efficient vector. Pneumonic
plague is spread by contact or by the airborne route from patients with
primary pneumonic plague, or from patients with bubonic plague who
developed terminal olague pneumonia. In humans the incubation period

33

I·
 -------------------

is two to six days for bubonic plague and two to four days for pneomon-
ic plague. Susceptibility to plague is general, and immunity after
recovery is only temporary (38).
(U) After the rat flea bites an infected rat, the plague bacillus
multiolies inside the flea. The extrinsic incubation time of Y. Jestis
in the flea is temperature dependent. Research (39,40) has shown· that
at l9°C, 21 days were required for the flea to become infective, but
for fleas kept at 27°C, the required time was only 11 days. Other
fleas of the same species kept at 22-27°( were capable of transmitting
plague 15 days after they had been infected. The flea reaches the stage
it can infect when its proventriculus (esophagus) is blocked and it can
no longer effectively feed. After blockage, the fleas live for only 3
to 4 days under optimum conditions. Only about 58 percent of the X.
cheo-;;-c's fleas became blocked from feeding on infected guinea pigs.
However, this percentage is much higher than that recorded for other
species of fleas (39,40).
(U) The!. ~~cc~~a flea survives best in a moderately warm and
mo~st climate. One -investigator established optimum conditions for
survival of this flea on Madagascar at 15 - 20°C and a relative humidity
of 85 to 95 percent. Another investigator, dealing with the US, found
that x. c;,eo-::-:s populations were prevalent in warm, humid zones, and
increasingly" sparse in cold, arid areas. The incidence of X. chw?is
was generally highest in localities where the January mean temperature
was 4.5°C. Plaque epidemics in India have been reported to die out if
the temperature is >27°C and the humidity begins to decrease (40).
5.3.2 Area of Endemicity.
(U) Sylvatic (wild rodent) plague is endemic in the western third
of the US. Between 1908 and 1974, some 145 human plague infections
associated with wild rodents occurred in the US (36). US urban epidemics
have occurred in San Francisco, California (1900-1904 and 1907-1925);
Seattle, Washington (1907 and 1919); New Orleans, Louisiana (1914-1920);
and Pensacola, Florida (1925) (39,41).
(U) Plague is not endemic in Europe today, but during the Middle
Ages, an estimated 25 million or about one-fourth of the total European
population perished from this disease.

(b)(l) ••• ,
l
\,

'' ~
I
l
'
=--·"-- .. .
l
\.__.,._,,,. ~··-·

34
- .. ~ ,: ,,,.._. .

···---··---_J
l·
 (b)(l) •••
_-.--...

5.4 ANTHRAX

5.4.1 Disease Characteristics.

a. (U) In Humans
(U) Anthrax, an acute bacterial disease caused by Bc:ci:::1.s
.~~~~~cis usually affects the skin. On rare occasions it may involve
the lungs or gastrointestinal tract. Itching of an exposed skin surface
occurs early, followed by a lesion which becomes macular (spotty), then
vesiculated (blistered) and in two to six days develops into a depressed
black eschar (scab). Pain is unusual, and if present is related to
edema or secondary infection. Jntreated infections may spread to re-
oional lymph nodes and the bloodstream with an overwhelming septicemia.
Untreated cutaneous anthrax has a fatality rate of 5 to 20 percent, but
with antibiotic therapy few deaths occur.
(li) Initial symptoms of inhalation anthrax are mild and nonspe-
cific, resembling common upper respiratory infection. Acute symptoms
of respiratory distress, fever, and shock follow in three to five days,
with death shortly thereafter. If penicillin therapy is not begun
before serious symptoms develop, death occurs in almost 100 percent of
the cases.
(U) .Gastrointestinal anthrax is more difficult to recognize, ex-
cept !hat,! tends !o occur in explosive outbreaks. In the typical case,
abdominal distress 1s followed by fever, signs of septicemia, and death.
In developed countries, this type of anthrax is rare in humans.
(U) Preliminary diagnosis of cutaneous anthrax is usually based
on the uniqueness of the black eschar and the patient's past history
of handling animals or animal products. Diagnosis of inhalation or
gastrointestinal anthrax is usually too late to save the patient's
life. Laboratory confirmation is by direct demonstration of the
causitive organism in blood, lesions, or discharges; by culture; or by
inoculation of mice, guinea pigs, or rabbits.
b. (U) In Animals
(U) B. 1~~r.racis is capable of infecting virtually all animals.
Cattle, norses, sheep, goats, and wild herbivores are most contllonly
affected. Humans and swine appear to possess a greater natural resis-
tance to the disease (43). Infection in cattle, horses, mules, sheep,
and goats usually is the result of feeding on infected pasture land.

37
 (U) Anthrax is worldwide in distribution. In the US there are
large recognized areas of infection in South Dakota, Nebraska, Arkansas,
Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and California. Small areas exist in a
number of other states.
(U) Clinical signs of anthrax vary according to the species of
animals affected and the acuteness of the attack. The average period
of incubation is one to five days. The disease may occur in a peracute,
acute, subacute, chronic, or cutaneous form. The peracute, apoplectic,
or fulminant form (most conman in cattle, sheep, and goats) occurs at
the beginning of an outbreak and is characterized by its sudden onset
and raridly fatal course. Victims display symptoms of cerebral
apoplexy (sudden staggering, difficult breathing, trembling, collapse,
and a few convulsive movements) and die, frequently without showing any
previous evidence of illness. The acute form usually ends in death in
a day or two, while the subacute form may lead to death in three to
five days or lonqer, or to complete recovery. The chronic form of
anthrax (which features local lesions in the tongue and throat) is ob-
served mostly in swine, but occurs occasionally in cattle, horses, and
dogs.

--""*'\,

--·

(b)(l) .••

38
 (b){l} •••

5.5 FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE

~.5.1 Disease Characteristics.
(U) 8'10 virus infects all cloven footed animals, e.g. cattle,
sheep, pigs, and goats, but rarely man. The disease is characterized
by the formation of vesicular lesions in the mouth and muzzle, on the
feet, and on the udders of cows. The virus may also infect the
parenchyma of the mammary gland, resulting in complete loss of function.
(U) FMD virus is spread by contact with other animals or fomites,
and one or more primary vesicles are formed where contact is made. The
virus then gains entrance into the blood stream and is distributed to
all parts of the body, localizing chiefly in the skin and mucous mem-
branes and producing a large number of vesicles.
(U) FMD is extremely contagious, expecially among cattle. Vesicu-
lar fluid, saliva, blood, milk, urine, and feces of febrile cattle all
contain the causative virus. The severity of the disease varies with
the strain of virus and the susceptibility of the animal population, but
the morbidity rate usually approaches 100 percent in an infected herd.
The mortality rate is generally only about 5 percent, but great econo-
mic loss results from the deterioration of animals. Mortalities as
high as 50 percent have been reported in the malignant form of the
disease in which the virus attacks muscular tissue, particularly of the
heart. Secondary bacterial infection of the ruptured vesicles occurs.
Other complications are abortion, mastitis, pneumonia, and septicemia.
The seriousness of FMD is emphasized by the fact that treatment of the

39

l-
 UNCLASSIFIED
disease in the US is forbidden. Under federal law, infected and exposed
animals must be destroyed. Similarly, prophylactic vaccines and sera
must not~used (43).
(U) In continental Europ~ where the disease is enzootic and it is
not economically feasible to institute such drastic measures of eradi-
cation, control is based on a modified system of quarantine and vacci-
nation, using vaccines specific for the type of virus involved. The
irrrnunity from these vaccines lasts only about four to six months.
(U) The concern US authorities show for keeping FMD virus out of
the country is evident in a recent article in a 1978 issue of Science
(46). The only laboratory in the US where work with FMD virus is allowed
is at the US Department of Agriculture Experimental Station, Plum
Island, New York. The laboratory is a "P4 containment facility
11

and the most elaborate means and equipment are employed to keep all
microorganisms contained within the facility. The article describes an
incident \·1here cattle at Plum Island began showing symotoms of FMD.
Elaborate decontamination procedures, including destruction of the
cattle and issuing decontaminated clothing to all workers before they
were allowed to leave the island, were followed to prevent the virus
from spreading past the confines of the facility.
5.5.2 Potential of FMD in EW.
(U) The extreme contagiousness of FMD would make it possible for
this disease to be very rapidly disseminated throughout the country.
For instance, there are 41 large market locations in the continental
US where cattle, calves, hogs, and sheep are auctioned. All of these
animals are susceptible to FMD virus infection. Most of these animals are
subsequently slaughtered and butchered for their meat. However, many
of the younger animals bought are taken to ranches. If these animals
were infected at the cattle auction they vJOuld act as disease carriers
and subsequently infect the herds they were taken to. Because these
animals go to ranches all over the country this very communicable
disease would soon become very widespread and the economic damage would
be tremendous.
(U) The economic impact of natural eaidemics in the past has been
significant. Between 1902 and 1929 FMD virus gained entrance into the
US six times. Each time it was eradicated, but it took the lives of
over 325,000 domestic animals a1d 22,000 deer - a loss of 390 million
dollars based on the economy at that time. Between 1947 and 1956 the
US spent 135 million dollars to help eradicate the disease in Mexico
to prevent its entrance into the US and similarly 683 million dollars
to protect US livestock from a Canadian outbreak in 1952. The US
Department of Agriculture estimated that a natural outbreak in 1961
would probably cost over a half billion dollars {47). In 1980 that
figure would be much greater and an artificially started outbreak could
be much larger than a naturally occurring one.

40

UNCLASSIFIED
 (U) The Cll'OSS :,ational u1·~ ::,;ct (G,JP) of the US in 1977 ',;as listed
1

as S1900 billion anj the total .alJe of all the cattle, hogs, ~igs, and
sheeo in the US fc:· that year,·._-:::; eC'ti ''ated at $2.'3.4 hillion. The
1

"'.:arqet por.ulation c:1erefore is about 1.6 percent of the GNP of the US.
'.Jaturally, all of t~ese livestock 1·1ould not be infected, but if the
attacks ~ere at a "'.:ime of the year when most livestock ranches buy
animals, a significant number of herds would be infected and thus forced
to be slauahtered.
(U) Fortunately, the incubation period for FMD is short (normally
tv:o to five days). Thus, anir1als 1·1ould start to exhibit FMD symptoms
in about two days. It would likely take at least another day or two to
detennine the source of the vins and to stop additional animals from
entering the animal pens of the auction markets and becoming infected.
The incoming cattle would then be rerouted to cattle pens at other lo-
cations or returned to their original locations. Regardless of desti-
nation, the ani1:1.als could likely still be infected.
(U) Another target for an enemy agent trying to cause large econo-
mic losses would be feeder lots. Wherever large numbers of cattle,
sheep, or pigs are penned or pastured in relatively small ar2as, they
would make good targets. Many of the cattle sold at auctions for
slaughter probably would develop SMD symptoms before slaughter and thus
not be useful for consumption. In addition, much money and time would
have to be spent to decontaminate areas and to dispose of diseased
cattle. Slaughter houses would become contaminated and have to be
disinfected.

(b)(l) •••

.-·---··--.J,,,,,,11,'i
(U) FMD virus is quite resistant to aging and drying. It will
remain infective for one month on hair, four to five months on hay and
grains, and for one month or more in the soil. In one instance the
survival of the virus was demonstrated on a farm 345 days after an out-
break (48).
(U) FMD virus is infective to animals via the three routes
mentioned. Furthermore, flies released in the general area of cattle
or other animals tend to seek them out. Radioactive isotopes as
markers showed that flies can travel as far as 32 km from their source,

41
but that their dispersion capacity is usually 1 imited to 0.8 to 3.2 km
(49). Fli~~ can ~a~ily be external1y infected with dried virus. Their
feet are coated with a sticky mucus-like substance that al lows dry
material to adhere. They also have many hairs that would tend to hold
the virus to their bodies. Flies normally are attracted to animals and
crawl on them so that the animals would soon become infected whether via
a cut, swallowing an item that the fly had contaminated, or breathing
in virus the fly had released near the animals' nostrils.
' '
1
-

(b)(l) •••
/,
\
..... ~·~

(U) Although there are no known data on the longevity of FMD virus
exposed to sunlight, it probably does not differ markedly from other
viruses that exhibit similar survival characteristics. One such virus,
Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE), was tested under outdoor conditions
(50). VEE was tested for longevity on the soil surface when exposed to
the harsh desert summer conditions (air temperatures 12 to 36°C). It
survived for an average of approximately 40 hours when placed on the
soil in high concentrations in the early part of the night. Thus, FMD
virus on flies would probably survive throughout the night and a con-
siderable portion of the day. FMD virus would be able to survive at
least long enough for the flies to find, contaminate, and infect animals
that were located nearby.

(U) Adult :-1,s'J_~ } ..J""'.2s::c::. are inactive at temperatures belo1t1 7':JC

and are killed by temperatures slightly below freezing. Activity begins
at 7 to l0°C and flight at about lPC . .'iormal activity probably does
not occur until air temperature reaches about 21°C and maximum activity
is reached at 32°C. Above 32~c activity decreases and flies seek
cooler temperatures indoors or in shaded areas. Death or paralysis
occurs from 44 to 46"C (51 ). The US Statistical Abstract (52) indi-
cates that summer nighttime temperatures sufficient to support fly
activity commonly exist throughout the US. The coldest July tempera-
ture on record in any of the representative cities listed in the US
Statistical Abstract, 1°C in Reno, 1:evada, would allow fly survival.
5.6 OTHER POTENTIAL EW DISEASES

(U) Several other infective organis~s have potential for being

used in EN. Some of these are incapacitating diseases such as dengue
and VEE. VEE is efficiently spread by several different mosquitoes and
could be used in EW. However VEE is efficiently spread by the aerosol
route and very low amounts are infective via the respiratorv route.
Therefore, the aerosol route would be a ~uch more likely means of use.

42
 Ui~CLASSIFIED

(U) Tht! ,11,e,c >- ,'crength .,f ~'.: lies in deployment of le;:hal bio-
logical aqents. ·:·ubabl1 cc.1,e1'S too sriall an arec1 for effective use
of an incapacitat · .'.rient . .·\ET·Jsol dissemination covers a -.vider 1rca
than E'·!, allmvinc ::'-·-·ective use cJ an incapacitating agent. _:;1so,
modern mosquito i,~,.::2 .. ent methods are so effective that it is unlikely
1

that naturally OC,' .. ··:,ing mosquitces \·JOuld greatly extend an epidemic

started in the US :·· Europe.

(U) !-/estern 2.:.,ineencephalitis (\·IEE) and malaria are tl'JO addi-

tional potential E. jiseases. !EE is a viral disease and !i'ialaria is
caused by a proto::211. Both are transmitted by mosquitoes. Insuffi-
cent time was alc::ed to this s;:Jdy for complete investigation of these
t\·Jo di seas es but ': appears they do have some rn potent i a 1. Among
untreated childre,, 2nd nonimmune adults, fatalites may exceed 10 per-
cent for the falcj~'arum or mali~nant tertian fonn of malaria (36). The
mortality rate a1·;2 1g patients \·Jith '.~EE may reach 10 percent. l,.nopheles
1

species of mosqui::2s have been shown to transmit the malaria parasite.

::: :.-:.2·2ec~-~ is : 11 e principal vector of \~EE in the US.

(U) While ~EE and malaria do possess some of the attributes neces-
sary for use in E~. several factors make their use less probable than
EEE or yellov; fe1,e1'. These factors are:

• Their ·c1·:ality rates are lower.

0

• A fairly effective treatment exists for malaria.

e The mos~Jito vectors that normally spread WEE and malaria are
not as easily raised as A. a.6qypti.
(U) Because of their limited mobility and thus low area coverage,
ticks have a very low potential as EW disease vectors. Thus tick borne
diseases such as ~ocky Mountain Spotted Fever and Russian Spring and
Summer Encephalit:s which are primarily spread by ticks are considered
to have a low EW threat potential.
\ \

\
\

(b)(l) ..•

43

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION 6. COST C~''.P.,'\RIS0iJ FC:;:. ~:·! VERSUS AEROSOL DISEMINATION ( U)

6.1 sAiTALIOt~ A~rA ~TTAC~ \.JIT~ -:-:''}f!!;';t!'f:'l'U T!'LtREJJ.~I.S AEROSOL

(U) To make a cost comparison between a BW attack with an aerosol
release and an EW (mosquito) attack, an area 3 km by 2.5 km (7.5 km 2 )
was chosen (see scenario 3 of reference 10). This area is about the
size a ~echanized battalion with 1,000 perso~nel occupies in the field.
However, bomblets, which are not as cost effective as an aerosol spray
system, were used in Scenario 3. Therefore, an aerial spray system
similar to that described in Scenario 4 of reference 10 was used for
the cost compairson.

(U) To make the comparison of an aerosol versus a mosquito release

as valid as possible, the aerosol was calculated as being released 610 m
upwind of the tarqet. or the saffie distance from the target as is the
m?squito release (see Section 6.4). Accordingly, the aerosol release
l~ne w~s a~sume~ to be 4.5 km long. (It would be much longer, if the
d1ssem1nat1on line were farther from the target.) For the cloud touch-
down to take place within 610 m of release, the aerosol release height
would be as close to the ground as possible.
(U) As in scenario 4 of reference 10, agent delivery was calculated
from an internally-mounted spray tank on a low performance aircraft.
Compressed air would provide the atomizing pressure to the liquid agent;
ten nozzles would be attached to a boom beneath the aircraft. The
entire setup vJas assumed to be assembled from commercial components
(see Table 6 for components and cost).
(U) Facilities and equipment include the items necessary for
making three trial runs to test the system. This would be necessary to
ensure that sufficient microorganisms in the right size particles are
being disseminated over each unit length of the dissemination line.
Impingers to sample the aerosol test clouds could be placed on an
existing tower structure, such as used for collection of meteorological
data.
(U) It was calculated in scenario 4 that 303 t cf F. tuZarer:.sis
slurry was necessary to produce an adequate aerosol over the required
dissemination line of 32 km. :\n additional 17 i were added to this for
test purposes. For this comparison the dissemination line is only 4.5
km long, so 43 £ of slurry will be necessary. If 17 i are added for test
purposes, a total of 60 £ will be required. This can be produced for
approximately $10,000 (in 1976 dollars) using the fermenter tank pro-
cess ( l 0) .
(U) The cost of major activities involved in an aerosol attack on
a battalion area, other than agent production, should be approximately
the same as for scenario 4 of reference 10. The major items are listed

45

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

Table 6. (U) Munition-Acquisition Resources for F. tularensis Aerosol

Battalion Attack.
Estimated
Resource Item Co st ( 1976 $ )
Hard1t1are 10 nozzles 130
spray tank 1 20
pressurized gas cylinder 25
3 regulators and guages 132
retractable boom 50
set of plumbing 50
Facilities 10 impingers 250
and
Equioment 10 vacuum pumps 1 , 240
10 batteries 350
test tower (a)
1 measurement 1abora tory ( 4 days) 200
aircraft (6 hours) 600
Labor R&D: physical scientist (20 days) 2,500
engineer (20 days) 2,000
Fabrication: 2 technicians (10 days) 500
Test: 1 microbiologist (4 days) 500
10 lab technicians & assistants 1,000
pilot ( 2 days) 250
TOTAL $9,897
(a) A previously existing tower is assumed available so no cost is
estimated.

46
in Table l, along with cost estimates and the estimated cost for agent
production. The total cost of sucn an attack would be approximately
$34,347 (1976 dollars).

Table 1. (U) Resource Cost Summary for an F. tularensis

Aerosol Attack on a Battalion.

Item Cost (1976 $)

Planning 8,750
Agent Production l O, 000
Munition Acquisition 9,897
i,,Jeapon Employment 5,700
TOTAL: 34,347

THIS TABLE IS UNCLASSIFIED

6.2 BATTALION AREA ATTACK WITH YELLOW FEVER-INFECTED MOSQUITOES

.. ___ '

(b)(l} •••
.~~ - ----- - -' ...... -~ -· - . --~--- .-
(U) During the Avon Park Trial, approximately 225,000 female
mosquitoes released 1·1ere estimated to have spread over an area of 7. 77
km 2 (samplers confirmed most of this area coverage). Furthermore, it
was estimated that 90 to 100 percent of the 700 personnel in the area
were bitten at least once, and most personnel several times.
(U) Because of the almost identical area coverage achieved in the
Avon Park Trials, as compared to the area coverage needed to attack a
battalion in the field (7.77 km 2 versus 7.5 km 2 ), the cost estimate for
a yellow fever-infected mosquito attack used the same number of mosqui-
toes as in the Avon Park Trial. This was then compared with the cost
estimated to attack the same area using F. tularensis (10). Costs are
in 1976 dollars because reference 10 is a 1976 publication and lists
costs for that year.

1
The actual number released was slightly less than 320,000 because
some of the mosquitoes died before release.

47
 ·-·. -·-~

6.2.2 Resources Needed.

·- ....
~ ~ .,
j

(b)(l) •••

(U) The price of the laboratory equipment required for ra1s1ng

mos qui toes was estimated from laboratory and ha rd~vare cata 1ogs. Any
pan, 5 cm deep, will suffice for raising mosquito larvae (51). Gerberg
mosquito cages, 70 x 70 x 70 cm may be bought for $30.00 each (1980
prices). These cages hold about 67,500 A. aegypti without overcrowd-
ing (49). If this size cage were used, about eight cages would be
necessary for 480,000 female mosquitoes, plus a few males. However, an
equivalent cage may be made very inexpensively with window screen, a
few wooden slats, and a little muslin for a sleeve (51). For the con-
struction of eight cages, $80.00 was allotted.
(U) Pans 137 x 51 x 5 cm can be used to raise about 15,000 larvae
(53). In 1975 blued steel pans (43 x 41 x 6 cm) could be purchased for
$1 .68 each from McMaster-Carr Supply Co. On a proportional surface
area basis, it should take 318 of these pans to raise 1,200,000 larvae,
at a cost of $534.24 (1975 dollars). To make sure there is no rusting,
the pans should be paraffin coated.

48
 UNCLASSIFIED

Table 7. (U) Material for Yellow Fever-Infected Mosquito Production.

Estimated
Item Number Cost (1976 $)

Rhesus Monkeys 2 750

Mosquito Cages 8 80
Guinea Pig Cage 20

Mosquito Larvae Food 25

Building Space l (3 mo.) 1,200

Mosquito Aspirator 1 250

Technicians 2 (3 mo.) 5,000

Guinea Pigs 3 40
Humidifiers 2 35
Shelving and Pans l, 506

Mi see 11 aneous 160

TOTAL $9,066

49

UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED

(U) In 1975 the McMaster-Carr Co. also listed steel shelves 191 cm
high x 91 cm wide x 46 cm deep for $34.72, with five shelves. Extra
shelves were listed at $4.94 per shelf. If 9 cm between shelves is
allowed, there will be 21 shelves to a unit. Each unit will cost
$113.76, and it will accommodate 42 pans. Seven full units will be
needed plus one extra unit with 12 shelves to accomodate the needed
318 pans. The total cost of shelving at 1975 prices is $865.62.
' '

(U) The combined price of shelves and pans (1975 prices) is

I $1,399.86. However, during the last five years the prices listed in
the McMaster-Carr Co. catalogue have increased about 7.6 percent per
year. The price increase from 1975 to 1976 would be $106.39, for a
total price (1976) of $1,506.25 for the shelves and pans.
(U) Purina Dog Chow with some yeast added is a good food for
raising mosquito larvae (51), Twenty-five dollars v1as allotted for
mosquito larvae food.
(U) Adult mosquitoes may be raised from hatched eggs in 12 days
under controlled conditions and 13 days is adequate for the yellow
fever extrinsic incubation time in A. aeqypti after biting a viremic
animal (12). Allowing a few days for hatching and maturation, about
30 days is sufficient time to develop infected mosquitoes from eggs.
About 45 days would be sufficient time to develop 1,200,000 eggs from
a few thousand mosquito eggs (12). An additional 15 days would be
needed to procure, set up, and later dispose of the equipment. The
entire mosquito rearing process could be completed in about 90 days.
(U) The total area needed for the she1ving for the rearing pans is
approximately 5 m2 • The basement of an ordinary home would provide
sufficient room for this equipment and would have a thermostatically-
controlled heating system. Assuming that a house of this type could
be rented in most areas for about $400.00 a month in 1976 and that the
rearing process takes three months, $1,200 would be needed.
(U) Assuming $10,000 per year wages for a laboratory assistant
(10), and that two technicians could handle the mosquito rearings,
$5,000 would be needed for the two technicians for three months.
(U) An aspirator is required to remove the mosquitoes from the
cages into the munition box. A vacuum cleaner can easily be modified
into an adequate aspirator (53). About $250 would be needed for this.
(U) The animal blood required for the egg-laying mosquitoes to
produce the eggs required for this project could be obtained from three
guinea pigs. In 1975, guinea pigs sold for $12.50 each. Forty dollars
would be needed for guinea pigs.

50
UNCLASSIFIED
 (U) The humidity in a mosquito insectary must be kept high, pre-
ferably about 80 to 90 percent. About $35 would be needed for two
humi di fi ers.
(U) Many miscellaneous items would also be required, including:
yellow fever virus and syringes to infect the monkeys, sugar and cotton
to feed the mosquitoes; plasma extender, food for monkeys and guinea
pigs, paraffin for coating the larvae rearing trays, volumetric pipettes
for removing mosquito larvae, a hose for filling mosquito larvae trays,
and a sizing screen for sexing mosquito larvae. About $160 would be
needed for these items. Table 7 summarized these items and their
estimated costs.

(b)(l) •••

..

51
difference in the two modes of attack, with the mosquito attack being
the cheaper. Table 2 contains the resource cost summary for the yellow
fever-infected mosquito attack on a battalion area.

Table 2. (U) Resource Cost Summary for a Yellow Fever-

Infected Mosquito Attack on a Battalion.

Item Cost (1976 $)

Planning 8,750
Agent Production 9,066
Munition Acquisition 2,150
\./eapon Employment 6,700
TOTAL: 26,666

THIS TABLE IS UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Because of the closeness of agent release with respect to

the target area, these attacks would not be covert. Many personnel in
the target area would therefore probably be able to protect themselves
with masks. Because mosquitoes are able to bypass the protective mask
a mosquito attack in this case would likely be the more successful.
(U) Complete control of the airways would be necessary in order
to release agents as close to the target as is described in the fore-
going two attacks. Therefore it is more likely that a plan of attack
on a similar area would call for the release of agents farther from the
target. This would be possible with the aerosol release of a BW agent,
but because a longer dissemination line would be required would be more
costly. An effective attack featuring release of infected mosquitoes
far enough from a similar military target to assure a covert attack
would probably not be possible.

(b)(l) ••• ..
-...... ··~.,. .. ----4

52
l
J (b)(l) •••

I
(U) An additional factor to consider in comparing the F. b~larensis
aerosol attack with the yellow fever mosquito attack on a battalion is
that yellow fever has a fatality rate of 30 to 40 percent in a non-
immune oopulation and cannot be treated effectively. In contrast, tularemia
can be treated effectively with antibiotics. Under such treatment, tularemia
has an estimated fatality rate of <5 percent. Furthermore, there are few
potential BW agents that are lethal and cannot be treated with antibiotics.
Smallpox, rabies, and lassa fever are all lethal diseases that can be spread
by aerosols and are not treatable by antibiotics, but their LDso s are 1

not known. Rabies also has the BW disadvantage of an extremely long

incubation period.

6.3 CITY ATTACK WITH YELLOW FEVER-INFECTED MOSQUITOES

(b)(l) •••

j 1
... ,- , .....__ .,..,..,-·,-~! :w-a!I

(U) Assuming the cost of planning a city attack with yellow fever-
infected mosquitoes is comparable to the cost of planning a battalion
attack, and 16 simultaneous city attacks are planned, the cost of any
one attack would be $547.00 ($8750 f 16).

\
,(
'\
:/

(b)(l) •••

53
 (U) The cost of munition acquisition may vary slightly from that
required for the aerial mosquito release because the mosquitoes must be
released gradually at a rate appropriate for the vehicle speed rather
that all at once. Therefore, instead of four large containers a series
of smaller containers that could be opened sequentially probably would
be needed. The cost of such an apparatus probably would not be signi-
ficantly higher than the $150.00 allotted for munition acquisition in
the aerial mosquito release. Three hundred dollars was estimated to be
sufficient for construction of such an apparatus with an additional
$200.00 necessary for testing or a total of $500.00 for munition
acquisition.

Table 3. (U) Resource Cost Summary for a Yellow Fever-

Infected Mosquito Attack on a City.

Item Cost (1976 $)

Planning 547
Agent Production 9,066
Munition Acquisition 500
Weapon Employment 360
TOTAL: 1o,473

THIS TABLE IS UNCLASSIFIED

,- 1 .... ·--/---- "·~

1' / \
; ., .

.•
/

(b)(l) •••
'·

54
 UNCLASSIFIED

Table 8. (U) Munition-P1cquisition Resources for an F. blarensis Aerosol

Attack on a City.

Estimated Cost In
Cost Integrated
Category ( $) Attacka

Hardware 2 agent tanks ($77 each) 154

10 nitrogen-pressure tanks
($25 each) 250
4 regulators and guages
i ( S44 each) 176 [680]b 680
2 sets of pipes and orifices
(S50 each) 100
I
l
l Facilities 2 vans (15 days) 525

I and
Equipment
20 impingers ($25 each)
20 vacuum pumps (S124 each)
20 batteries ($35 each)
500
2,480 [4,455]
700 -16
= 278
1 measurement laboratory
(5 days) 250

Labor R&D: 1 physjcal scientist

( 1 5 days) 1 ,875
1 engineer (15 days) 1,500
Fab: 2 technicians (10 days) 500 [7, 6?.§.J = 477
Test: 1 microbiologist 16
(10 days) 1,250
10 technicians 2,500

TOTAL 12,760 1 ,435

aif 16 simultaneous attacks are planned, some of the costs are divided
by 16 to give the cost per attack
bTotal cost, by category.

55

UNCLASSIFIED
 (b)(l} •••

Table 4. (U) Resource Cost Summary for an F. ~~larensis

Aerosol Attack on a City.

Item Cost (1976 $)

Planning 547
Agent Production 174,000
Munition Acquisition 1,435
Weapon Employment 3,250
TOTAL: 179,232

THIS TABLE IS UNCLASSIFIED

/
r
;

(b)(l) ••• ,,

l..r

56
 (b)(l) •••

Table 5. (U) Various Estimates of Cost per Death for an

F. tuZarensis Aerosol Attack on a City.

Percent Number of Cost per

Deaths Deaths Death($)

5 62,500 2.86
10 125,000 1.43
20 250,000 0.72
30 375,000 0.48
I
I 40 500,000 0.36
'
I
j 0.29
50 625,000

THIS TABLE IS UNCLASSIFIED

57
 UNCLASSIFIED

SECTION 7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDED DEFENSIVE MEASURES

7. l CONCLUSIONS
(U) Intelligence information gathered about the Warsaw Pact ccuntries
indicates that in the past, they have attempted development of an EW
capability. Indirect evidence, e.g., mass rearing of potential insect
vectors and working with microbiological agents compatible with EW
that are not a problem in these countries, comprises the evidence
available to indicate present activity in this area. The Warsaw Pact
nations certainly have the capability to conduct EW.
(U) The A. aegypti/yellow fever virus system is estimated to be the
most likely antipersonnel EW system that could be used by the Warsaw Pact
countries against the United States or the European NATO nations. Foot
and mouth disease virus is a likely animal EW agent that could be effec-
tively spread by M. comes-::ica.
(U) In the magnitude of the city attack scenarios described in this
report, i.e., 16 simultaneous attacks on urban areas, the A. aea~cti/
yellow fever virus EW attack system was estimated to be less co;f effec-
tive than the F. rularensis aerosol mode of attack in casualties produced,
but it may be more cost effective when considering mortalities produced.
The A. aeqypti/yellow fever virus attack system becomes more cost effec-
tive in relation to the?. tularensis aerosol attack mode if the magnitude
of the attack becomes smaller, and less effective when the magnitude
becomes greater. The A. aegypti/yellow fever virus EW attack system
also requires less expertise to develop and employ than the F. ~~larensis
aerosol system

(U) EW systems are not likely to be employed on military units

because the agent vectors must be released too close to the target
area. This would make a covert attack on a military unit very difficult
to achieve. E\.J could be very effectively used against civilian urban
populations or it could be used to cause great economic losses in the
cattle and livestock industry.
7.2 RECOMMENDED DEFENSIVE MEASURES
(U) When an EW attack on a city is suspected or when a large popu-
lation of mosquitoes or other insects unexpectedly appears in an abnor-
mal way, reaction must be swift. Insecticide spray operations should
be initiated as soon as possible. At the same time, the general popu-
lation must be warned by radio, television, and newspapers. If the
insects are mosquitoes the warning should include advice to stay indoors
and the keep unscreened doors and windows closed at all times. Those
who must venture outside should be protected as much as possible.
Suggested protection should include wearing mosquito netting over face

59

UNCLASSIFIED
 --~--------------------

UNCLASSIFIED
and neck and the use of mosquito repellant. Long sleeve shirts with
gloves tightly fastened around the wrists should be worn. Pants should
be fastened tightly around the ankles and two pairs of socks worn. Hats
should be worn to protect the tops of heads.
(U) Where possible, insecticide spraying should be started in
individual dwellings. In the event of an EW plague attack, people
should be assured that it is treatable and in the event of plague symp-
toms, antibiotic treatment must not be delayed. If sufficient evidence
is available that a plague flea attack has occurred, and if sufficient
antibiotics are available, antibiotic treatment of flea-bitten individ-
uals might even be given before the appearance of symptoms.
(U) Panic is one of the most important things to prevent in the
event of an EW attack on the general population. People must be
assured that, ordinarily, the best procedure for them to follow is not
to flee the area but to stay and receive proper treatment, or if mos-
quitoes are the vector, to stay inside and stay protected.

60
 SECTION 8. 2PPENDICES (U)

8.1 LITERATURE CITED

..,.;-
,
.. - . . . - . . ,..
/
. .•)

(b)(l) •••

8. Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, UT, BWALR 6-A Technical Report,

Operation Big Itch (U), November 1954. UNCLASSIFIEn

•··
(b)(l) •••
.I
al

61
 UNCLASSIFIED
··- ....

• ..::r ....

14. U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Fort Detrick, Frederick, MD, Special
Report 253, Operation Big Buzz (U), Technical Development Laboratories,
Savannah, GA, and AS Division, November 1955. UNCLASSIFIED
,
t

(b)(l) •••

18. U.S. Army Chemical Corps Biological Laboratories, Fort Detrick,

Frederick, MO, Special Report 280, Studies Relating to the Munition
Dissemination of Insects for BW, AS Division, AD 502 637, May 1957.
UNCLASSIFIED
19. U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, UT
Outdoor Mosquito Biting Activity Studies, Project Bellwether I, BW
459, Technical Report 259, AD 596 046L, December 1960. UNCLASSIFIED
20. U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Dugway Proving Ground, Dugway, UT,
Entomological Field Test Technology, Bellwether II, Bio 531, Technical
Report 293, AD 5960506, December 1961. UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(l) •••

..
.

24. Goldfield, M., The 1959 Outbreak of Eastern encephalitis (EE) in

New Jersey: 4. CF reactivity following overt and inapparent infection,
Amer. J. E~idem. 8 7( l ) : 23-31 , 1968. UNCLASS IF I Fl

25. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC, Mosquitoes of

Medical Importance, Agriculture Handbook No. 152, July 1959. UNCLASSI-
FIED

62
UNCLASSIFIED
 UNCLASSIFIED
26. Lord, R.D. and C.H. Calisher, FJrther evidence of southvvard trans-
port of arboviruses by :iigratory birds, :..mer. J. 2;,idem. 92:73-78,
1970. UNCLASSIFIED
27. Korstad, L., et al., Eastern equine encephalitis studies in
1.~i scans in, j. of Inf. ~~s. l 06( l): 53-59, 1960. UNCLASSIFIED
28. Ising, E., Zoological aspects of the epidemiology of eastern
equine encephalitis viruses in Europe, z. Angew. Zool. 62(4):419-434,
1975. UNCLASSIFIED
29. Grady, G.F., et al., Eastern equine encephalitis in Massachusetts,
1957-1976, A prospective study centered upon analysis of mosquitoes,
Am. J. of E-;:r:dem. 107(2):170-178, 1978. UNCLASSIFIED

30. Hayes, R.O., et al., Entomological aspects of the 1959 Outbreaks

of Eastern Encephalitis in New Jersey, Amer. J., TY'ov. Med. and n'ig.
11(1):115-121, 1962. UNCLASSIFIED -
31. Hayes, R.O., Host preferences of CuZiseta r.aZa.nw•a and allied
mosquitoes. ::osquito !.'c..:s 21:179-187, 1961. UNCLASSIFIED
32. Wallis, R.C., :uZ~se~a maZanuY'~ (Coquillett) and Eastern Equine
Encephalitis in Connecticut, ;.:osq:,.ito News 19(3):157-158, 1959.
UNCLASSIFIED
33. Horsfall, W., Mosquitoes Their Bionomics and Relation to Disease,
The Ronald Press Co. New York, 1955. UNCLASSIFIED
34. Chamberlain, R.W., et al., Studies on the North American arthro-
pod-borne encephalitides VI Quantitative determinations of virus
vector relationships, t.m. J. Hyg. 60:278-285. 1954. UNCLASSIFIED
35. US Army Chemical Corps Biological Laboratories, Fort Detrick,
Frederick,MD, Eastern Equine Encephalitis Virus A Survey and Analysis
of the Literature by V.W. Andrew, M.A. Dailey and D.G. Smith, Technical
Study 32, April 1961. UNCLASSIFIED
36. Beeson, P.B. and W. Mc Dermott editors, Textbook of Medicine,
W.B. Saunders Co., Philadelphia, PA, Fourteenth Edition, 1975.
UNCLASSIFIED
------ .~

(b)(l) •••

38. American Public Health Association, Washington D.C., A.S. Benenson

Editor, Control of Communicable Diseases in Man, -12th Edition 1975.
UN CLASS IF I ED
39. Gordon, J.E., Control of Conmunicable Diseases in Man, American
Public Health Association, New York, 10th Edition, 1965. UNCLASSIFIED

63
. . . . . 9.,J/1111119 W' _....._ I U EL I;...-.,
 CONFIDENTIAL
40. Pollitzer, R., Plague, World Health Association, Geneva, Switzer-
land, 1954.

41. Stark, H.E., Hudson, B.W. and Pittman, B., Plague Epidernology,
National Communicable Disease Center, Atlanta, Georgia, 1969.
UNCLASSIFIED
t)

(b)(l) •••
43. The Merck Veterinary Manual, Third Edition, O.H. Siegmund Editor,
Merck and Co. Inc. Rathway N.J. 1967. UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(l) •••

45. Fothergill, L.D., This is the Biological \·larfare Threat, presented

at the Symposium on Non-Military Defense, American Chemical Society,
Cleveland, Ohio, 8 April 1960. UNCLASSIFIED
46. News and Comment, "Cattle Virus Escapes from a P4 Lab", Science
202:290, 20 Oct 1978. UNCLASSIFIED
47. United States Department of Agriculture, Agriculture Research
Service, A Leader's Guide to Aqriculture s Defense Against Biological
1

Warfare and Other Outbreaks, ARS 22-75, Dec. 1961. UNCLASSIFIED

48. Marchant, I.A. and R.A. Packer, Veterinary Bacteriology and
Virology, Iowa State University Press, Ames, Iowa, 1963. UNCLASSIFIED
49. Schoof, H.F. and R.E. Silverly, "Multiple Release Studies on the
Dispersion of Mu.sea. Domestica at Phoenix, Arizona", tJ. of Economic
Entomology, 47(5):830-838, 1954. UNCLASSIFIED

- (b)(l) ••• \
. . -·- .-,j

51. Personal Communication, Or. Robert Elbel, Department of Entomology,

University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112.
52. US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States, 100th edition, 1979. UNCLASSIFIED
53. American Mosquito Co ntrc l Association Inc. , Mosquito Rearing and
Experimental Techniques, by Gerberg, Technical Bulletin No. 5, 1970.
UNCLASSIFIED

64
 UNCLASSIFIED

8.2 (LI) LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION TER.t.1

Aedes aegyp-t:i

B\4 biological warfare

DPG Dugway Proving Ground

EEE eastern equine encephalitis

EH entomological warfare

FMD foot and mouth disease

Francisceiia ~ularensis

VEE Venezuelan equine encephalitis

WEE western equine encephalitis

X. cheo;:s Xencpsy i ia cheo-pis

65

UNCLASSIFIED