Cases under Property relations | Persons and family relations
ESTANISLAO SERRANO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MELCHOR SOLOMON, defendant-appellee.
June 29,1959
Appeal from CFI Ilocos Sur decision
 Alejandria Feliciano – father is in Hawaii;
entrusted to father’s friend, Estanislao Serrano
who took care of her & raised her from 12 until
she got married
 June 21, 1948 – Alejandria & Melchor Solomon
were married. Before the ceremony, Solomon
executed alleged Deed of Donation w/c stated
among others that he was donating all of his
exclusive properties to serve as capital for their
conjugal life & for the maintenance & support of
their offspring. Their children will inherit such
donation but in the absence of children, half of
the properties will go to his brothers/sisters/their
heirs if he dies before his wife or if his wife dies
before him, half will go to those who raised his
wife.
 March 2,1949 – Alejandria died.
 Few months after – Estanislao instituted action
to enforce & implement terms of alleged
donation. Being the one who raised Alejandria, he
believed he had the right to half of Melchor’s
property.
 CFI: donation was not a donation propter
nuptias because it was not made in consideration
of marriage & it was not made to one or both
parties of the marriage.
ISSUE:
WON the donation made by Melchor can be
considered as a donation propter nuptias.
HELD: No alleged donation is null & void. CFI
affirmed. Estanislao won’t get anything. Whether
you apply Art. 1327 of the old CC or Art. 126 of
the new CC, the result would be the same,
donations propter nuptias are only those
bestowed (1) before the celebration of marriage,
(2) in consideration of the same & (3) upon one
or both of the spouses. Melchor’s donation
violated conditions 2 & 3. It was not in
consideration solely of the marriage, it had
additional terms like the marriage had to be
childless and one of the spouses had to die before
the other. Also, it was not in favor of Alejandria.
Instead, it was in favor of her parents & those who
raised her. Based on Manresa’s commentary,
donations granted to persons other than the
spouses even though founded on the marriage
are excluded. It’s not a donation inter vivos
(during their lifetime) either, because donee
never accepted it by same instrument of
donation or in separate document as required by
law. It’s not a donation mortis causa (upon death)
PEEjay notes
either. It has to be governed by provisions
on the disposition execution of wills to be
appreciated as such. Besides, donor is still alive. It
will only be operational upon his death.
HARDING
vs.
COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE
COMPANY
August 10, 1918
Action to recover damages
 1913 – Levy Hermanos, Studebaker automobile
Manila agent sold automobile no. 1063 to John
Carson for P3,200.00
 Oct. 14, 1914 – Carson sold car to Henry
Harding for P1,500.00
 Nov. 19, 1914 – Mr. Harding sold car to J.
Brannigan of Los Baños, Laguna for P2,000.00
 Dec. 20, 1915 – J.C. Graham Los Baños sold
automobile to Henry Harding for P2,800.00.
 Jan. 16, 1915 – Henry gave automobile to wife.
Repaired & repainted at the Luneta Garage
amounting to P900.00.
 Luneta Garage – agent of Smith Bell & Co.,
solicited of Mrs. Harding, insurance of said
automobile. Garage manager Mr. Server,
experienced automobile mechanic testified that
automobile costs about P3,000.00, this was the
price agreed upon by both parties. Mrs. Harding
was charged sum of P150.00 / 5% ofP3,000.00
estimated value. Among the terms of the
insurance was that in cases of loss or damage of
any cause, the insurance company will indemnify
insured up to agreed amount of P3,000.00 or
value of car.
 March 24, 1916 – automobile was totally
destroyed by fire. Iron parts were sold by Smith
Bell however, no amount was tendered to
Harding until such time that court was opened for
trial. Harding furnished Smith Bell w/ proof of her
loss &interest & she likewise performed all
conditions under said policy. However, Smith Bell
did not pay. They claim that Mrs. Harding
falsified the value & ownership of the automobile.
 Lower Court – decided in favor of Harding
ISSUE/S AND RATIO:
1. WON Mr. Diehl’s testimony should be
excluded. – Not important. It merely
showed alleged actual value of the
automobile. This evidence is irrelevant.
2. WON donation/Mr. Harding’s act of
giving the automobile to his wife is void.
– NO
a. defendant claims that gift is void
under CC Art. 1334 w/c states
that “All gifts between spouses
during the marriage shall be
pg. 1
Cases under Property relations | Persons and family relations
void. Moderate gifts w/c the
spouses bestow on each other
on festive days of the family are
not included in the rule. Thus,
they claim that she has no
interest in the issuance of the
policy.
b. In Cook vs. McMicking, the SC
held that parties who have no
relation to the property owners
at the time of transfer or those
who do not have any interest in
the properties involved, cannot
challenge the validity of the
transfer.
c. Burden of proof that the gift
doesn’t fall under the exception
(moderate gifts) falls on
defendant who raised this as a
defense. A car may be a
moderate gift depending on the
circumstances of the parties.
Such info is not disclosed by the
records.
3. WON value of automobile was falsified. –
NO.
a. There’s even proof that it cost
more than the amount
mentioned. (purchase price of
P2,800.00 + P900.00 for repairs
& repainting is more than stated
amount of P3,000.00.
b. Unfair to hold it void simply
because outlay represented was
made by Mr .Harding & not his
wife, to whom he had given his
old vehicle.
c. Value did not actually come from
Mrs. Harding. In fact, she only
acted upon information given
her by her husband and by Mr.
Server, the manager of Luneta
Garage w/c is an agent of Smith
Bell. There was even an examiner
who inspected the automobile
before policy was issued.
d. In Union Insurance Company vs.
Wilkinson, the SC held that it is
normal for insurance agencies to
rely on their agents to deal with
their clients that these clients
often do not know anything
about the company or its
officers. But despite this set-up
the company will still be
responsible to the clients for acts
of its agents will be construed as
acts of the principal/company
itself. Same ruling in Rowley vs.
PEEjay notes
Empire Ins. Co. which held that
Though risk in policies
technically proceeds from
insured, it will still be regarded as
act of insurers.
e. Value = market price if offered
for sale. In insurance policies,
assured can only estimate such
value. It’s enough that the
assured carries out terms of the
contract and observed good
faith in doing his
duties/obligations.
f. Insurance law (Act No. 2427),
Sec. 163 states that effect of
valuation in policy of fire
insurance is similar to policy of
marine insurance (Sec. 149) w/c
states that valuation is conclusive
if insured had an insurable
interest & was not guilty of fraud.
HOLDING: Commercial Union Assurance
Company is bound by their contract w/ Mrs.
Harding. She had an insurable interest and she
did not use employ fraud in procuring the
insurance. Lower Court affirmed.
CLARA TORELA AND SILVERIANA TORELA,
appellants-petitioners,
vs.
FELIMON TORELA, MARCIANA GEPANAGO
AND MARCOS MAHILUM AND THE COURT
OF APPEALS, appellees-respondents.
 December 21, 1929, Decree No. 440157 was
issued in favor of Felimon Torela, married to
Graciana Gallego, decreeing that he is the owner
of a certain parcel of land (Lot No. 3770)
 March 5, 1958, Felimon Torela, filed a Motion
Ex-Parte alleging that Lot No. 3770 of the
Cauayan Cadastre having been acquired by him
by way of inheritance prior to his marriage to his
first wife. He, therefore, prayed that the court
order the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental
to change his (movant's) civil status, appearing on
the face of the original certificate of title, "from
Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego to
Felimon Torela, married to Marciana Gepanago"
 Court granted the motion
 Felimon, Torela executed a definite deed of sale
whereby, for and in consideration of P3,000.00, he
sold Lot No. 3770 of the Cadastral Survey of
Cauayan to Marcos P. Mahilum and Maria Luna
Mahilum
 Petitioners (children) claim that the land was
conjugal property and they were entitled to the
proceeds. They claim that while in their youth
they had seen their father Felimon and their
pg. 2
Cases under Property relations | Persons and family relations PEEjay notes

mother Graciana Gallego clean the lot in question

 Felimon Torela declared that he and his first
wife Graciana were married in 1915 and the land
in question was decreed in the name of Felimon
Torela, married to Graciana Gallego,. According to
Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code, the following
properties belong to the conjugal partnership: 1.
Property acquired for a valuable consideration
during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition is made
for the partnership or for one of the spouses only;
2. Property obtained by the industry, wages or
work of the spouses or of either of them; 3. The
fruits, income, or interest collected or accrued
during the marriage, derived from the
partnership’s property, or from that which
belongs separately to either of the spouses.
 Felimon Torela testified that he inherited the
contested property from his parents

ISSUE: Whether or not the parcel of land herein

involved is a conjugal property of the spouses
Felimon Torela and Graciana Gallego (plaintiffs'
mother)

HELD: the property in question is not one of

those enumerated in Article 1401 of the Old Civil
Code. On the other hand, as it was inherited by
Felimon from his parents and brought to the
marriage with his first wife, the same is deemed
his separate property (Art, 1396, Old Civil Code).
For these reasons, defendant Felimon Torela had
lawfully disposed of his property to the exclusion
of his children by his first marriage

Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals failed

to take into account Article 1407 of the Spanish
Civil Code, which now correspond to Article 160
of the New Civil Code, and which reads as follows:
Art. 1407, All property of the spouses shall be
deemed partnership property in the absence of
proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband
or to the wife. Petitioners claim that since the lot
in question was registered in the name of Felimon
Torela, married to Graciana Gallego, it must be
presumed to be the conjugal property of Felimon
and Graciana so that one-half thereof should be
adjudicated to them as their inheritance from
their mother. While it is true that all property of
the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as
above stated, nonetheless the party who invokes
the presumption must first prove that the
property was acquired during the marriage. This
proof is a condition sine qua non for the
application of the presumption.

pg. 3
Cases under Conjugal partnership of gains | Persons and family relations
HONESTO ALVAREZ, ET AL.,
vs.
PEDRO K. ESPIRITU,
Property brought in installment
Facts: The lot in question located in Caloocan City
originally formed part of the Friar Lands.
Evangelista bought the lot for P242.04. The
balance of P182 for the full payment of the lot was
to be paid in 18 annual installments. Consolacion
Evangelista married Pedro K. Espiritu. During their
marriage, some of the installments on the price of
the lot were paid with conjugal funds and all the
installments were completed. Consolation
Evangelista made a deed of assignment, having
Pedro Espiritu as the assignee of the above-
mentioned lot. The lot was then registered in the
name of the spouses and Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 14527 was issued to them. Thereafter,
the spouses sold a half portion of the lot reserving
to themselves the right to redeem it within 12
years. However, before they could exercise their
right of redemption, Consolacion Evangelista
died, leaving a will in which she bequeathed to
her husband her half interest in the remaining
unsold portion of lot. She was survived by her
husband, Pedro K. Espiritu, and by the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs claimed that the lot was the paraphernal
property of Consolacion Evangelista which she
brought to her marriage with Pedro K. Espiritu.
They, therefore, contended that, as heirs of
Consolacion Espiritu, they were entitled to three
fourths (3/4) of the lot, only one-fourth (1/4)
having been disposed of in the will. On the other
hand, Pedro K. Espiritu claimed that the lot was
their conjugal property, one-half of which was his
share, in addition to one-fourth given to him in
his wife's will.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lot in question was the
paraphernal property of the late C. Evangelista or
was property of her conjugal partnership with P.
Espiritu.
HELD: The court held that Lot No. 292 was the
paraphernal property of Consolacion Evangelista.
Since only one-fourth (1/4) of this lot had been
given by will, there still remains undisposed three-
fourths (3/4) of the same. In the case of Lorenzo
v. Nicolas, 91 Phil. 686, the court held that friar
lands bought by a woman before her marriage
were her paraphernal properties, although some
of the installments on their price were paid for
with conjugal funds during their marriage. The
conjugal partnership would only be entitled to
reimbursement for the expenses, (Civil Code Art.
1410) The lower court's reliance on the certificate
of title being issued in the names of the spouses
is misplaced, because sec. 70 of Land Registration
PEEjay notes
Act provides that "nothing contained in this Act
shall in any way be construed to relieve registered
land or the owners thereof from any rights
incident to the relation of husband and wife.
"Because of the feeling of trust existing between
spouses, certificates of title are often secured in
the names of both, or of either, regardless of the
source of the purchase money. However, such
registration shall not repudiate the true
ownership of the other spouse despite having the
title in the name of both spouses. (Paterna Vda.
de Padilla v. Bibby de Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).
Rivera v. Batallones(C.A.) 40 O.G. 2090
FACTS: A was leasing part of the Friar’s Estate
(belonging to the government) and as a
consequence of said lease and possession, he was
given an option to buy. A then got married, and
during the marriage, he bought the land using
conjugal funds.
ISSUE: Who owns the land?
HELD: The conjugal partnership because the
acquisition by onerous title was done thru the use
of conjugal funds. In a case like this, only the
origin, the ownership of the money invested on
the property given in exchange, may be inquired
into to find out if the property acquired was
conjugal or separate. It does not matter that the
husband’s lease or possession may have given
him the right to buy the land. This possession is
at most a secondary consideration. Before the
actual sale, all the husband had was a temporary
naked possession, possessing no title to the land.
After the sale, ownership passed — but not to
him. The conjugal partnership became the owner
pg. 4
 Cases under Property regime of unions w/o marriage | Persons and family relations | PEEjay notes
Valdes vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221
FACTS: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez
were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children.
Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of
nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code, which was granted hence,
marriage is null and void on the ground of their
mutual psychological incapacity. Stella and
Joaquin are placed under the custody of their
mother while the other 3 siblings are free to
choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the
decision regarding the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in “unions
without marriage”. During the hearing on the
motion, the children filed a joint affidavit
expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime
should be based on co-ownership.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that in a void
marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the
property relations of the parties are governed by
the rules on co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in
the acquisition of the property shall be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly
if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family.
JUAN SEVILLA SALAS, JR., petitioner, vs. EDEN
VILLENA AGUILA, respondent. [G.R. No. 202370.
September 23, 2013.]
FACTS: Juan Salas and Eden Aguila were married
in September 1985. Five months after, Aguila
gave birth to their daughter, Josan Jiselle. Salas
left their conjugal dwelling and since then no
longer communicated with Aguila or their
daughter. In 2003, Aguila filed a petition for
nullity of marriage, stating that they have “no
conjugal properties whatsoever”. In 2007, the RTC
rendered a decision declaring the nullity of
marriage. After this declaration, Aguila filed a
manifestation stating that she discovered two
properties belonging to Salas. The registered
owner of the Discovered properties is “Juan S.
Salas”, married to Rubina C. Salas. Rubina is Salas’
common-law wife. The RTC granted the petition
of the said discovered properties that are among
the conjugal properties to be partitioned and
distributed between Salas and Aguila. However,
Rubina filed a Complaint-in-Intervention,
claiming that the Discovered Properties are her
paraphernal properties. She claims that she
authorized her brother to purchase the same, but
because he was not well-versed with legal
documentation, he registered the properties in
the name of “Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C.
Salas”.
The RTC found that Salas failed to prove his
allegation that Aguila transferred the Waived
Properties to third persons. The RTC emphasized
that it cannot go beyond the TCTs, which state
that Salas is the registered owner of the
Discovered Properties. The RTC further held that
Salas and Rubina were at fault for failing to
correct the TCTs, if they were not married as they
claimed. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether Rubina owns the Discovered
Properties
HELD/RATIO: No On both Salas and Rubina's
contention that Rubina owns the Discovered
Properties, we likewise find the contention
unmeritorious. The TCTs state that "Juan S. Salas,
married to Rubina C. Salas" is the registered
owner of the Discovered Properties. A Torrens
title is generally a conclusive evidence of the
ownership of the land referred to, because there
is a strong presumption that it is valid and
regularly issued. The phrase "married to" is merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered
owner. Furthermore, Salas did not initially dispute
the ownership of the Discovered Properties in his
opposition to the manifestation. It was only when
Rubina intervened that Salas supported Rubina's
statement that she owns the Discovered
Properties. Considering that Rubina failed to
prove her title or her legal interest in the
Discovered Properties, she has no right to
intervene in this case. The Rules of Court provide
that only "a person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of
the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may,
with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action." In Diño v. Diño, we held that Article 147
of the Family Code applies to the union of parties
who are legally capacitated and not barred by any
impediment to contract marriage, but whose
marriage is nonetheless declared void under
Article 36 of the Family Code, as in this case.
Article 147 of the Family Code provides:
pg. 5
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
G.R. No. 221029 Promulgated: April 24, 2018
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was previously married
in the Philippines to a Japanese national named
Yoshino Minoro. A case for divorce was filed by
the petitioner Manalo in Japan and after due
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6,
2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court.
Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of
marriage in the civil registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce
rendered by a japanese court and that she be
allowed to return and use her maiden surname,
Manalo.
Ruling of the RTC
RTC denied the petition for lack of merit. It ruled
that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan
should not be recognized based on Article 15 of
the New Civil Code which does not afford
Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether
they are in the country or living abroad, whether
married to a filipino or to foreigners or if they
celebrated they marriage in the Philippines or in
another country and that unless Filipinos are
naturalized citizens of another country, Philippine
laws shall have control over issues related to
Filipinos’ family rights and duties, together with
the determination of the condition and legal
capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations
including marriages.
Ruling of the CA
The Court of Appeals overturned the RTC
decision and held that Article 26 of the Family
code of the Philippines is applicable even if it was
Manalo who filed for Divorce against her
Japanese husband because the Decree they
obtained makes the latter no longer maried to the
former, capacitating him to remarry; that the fact
that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is
inconsequetial. CA ruled that the meaning of the
law should be based on the intent of the
lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent
behind Article 26, it would be the height of
injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the
Japanese National, who in turn is no longer
married to her.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT UNDER ARTICLE 26
OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES A
FILIPINO CITIZEN HAS THE CAPACITY TO
REMARRY AFTER INITIATING A DIVORCE
PROCEEDING ABROAD AND OBTAINING A
FAVORABLE JUDGMENT AGAINST HIS OR HER
ALIEN SPOUSE.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
Yes, the filipina spouse who initiated the divorce
and has successfully obtained a divorce decree
against an alien spouse may remarry under Art.
26 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
Laws should be construed as not to defeat but
to carry out its intent and purposes
The Purpose of Article 26 (2) of the Family code
of the Philippines is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree
that is effective in the country where it was
rendered is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse.
Even if the word obtained should be interpreted
to mean that the divorce proceeding must be
actually initiated by the alien spouse, still the
court will not follow the letter of the statute when
to do so would depart from the true intent of the
legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.
Indeed, where the interpretion of a statute
according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the
clear purpose of the legilature, it should be
construed according to the spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may, therefore be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms,
so long as they come within its spirt or intent.
Whether the filipino spouse initiated the foreign
divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his
or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same
result. Therefore, the subject provision shall not
make a distinction.
The Nationality Principle is not absolute and
unbending rule
The existence of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code
of the Philippines is a testament that the state
may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover,
blind adherence to the nationality principle must
be disallowed if it would cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain classes
of individuals whose rights are equally protected
by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the
laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only
if they are constitutional.
pg. 6
 Article 26(2) of the Family Code violates one of
the essential requisites of the equal protection

The limitation of the provision only to a foreign

divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is
unreasonable as it is based on superficial,
arbitrary and whimsical classification.

There is no real and substantial difference

between a filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceedings and a filipino who obtained a divorce
decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. To make a distinction between them
based merely on superficial difference of whether
they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is
utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue
favor to one and unjustly discrimate against the
other. Further, the differentiation is arbitrary.
There is inequality in treatment because a foreign
divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by
a filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse
would not be recognized even if based on
grounds similar to Articles 35,36, 37 and 38 of the
family court.

A prohibited view of Article 26(2) would do more

harm than good

The state cannot effectively enforce its obligation

to protect and defend among others the right of
the children from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation and other conditi ons
prejudicial to their development if the court will
limit the application of the subject provision only
to those foreign divorce initiated by the alien
spouse. Moreover, the court must not lose sight
of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity
of every human person, guarantee full respect for
human rights and ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.

pg. 7