HE CHAIRMAN and EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT, and THE PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT, Petitioners
vs.
EJERCITO LIM DOING BUSINESS AS BONANZA AIR SERVICES, AS REPRESENTED BY
HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, CAPT. ERNESTO LIM, Respondent

Facts:

Petitioners were the public officials tasked with the duty of executing and implementing A.O. No.
00-05 and the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order, while the PCSD was the government
agency responsible for the governance, , implementation, and policy direction of the Strategic
Environment Plan (SEP) for Palawan. The PCSD issued A.O. No. 00-05 on February 25, 2002
to ordain that the transport of live fish from Palawan would be allowed only through traders and
carriers who had sought and secured accreditation from the PCSD. The respondent was the
operator of a domestic air carrier doing business under the name and style Bonanza Air
Services who had continued his trade without securing the PCSD-required accreditation. The
respondent filed a petition for prohibition in the CA and was contested by the petitioners which
argued that the petition for prohibition should have been dismissed because A.O. No. 00-05 was
in accord with the mandate of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7611.

Issue:

Whether or not A.O. No. 00-05, Series of 2002; Resolutionis No. 03-211; and the the Notice of
Violation and Show Cause Order is null and void for having been issued in excess of the
PCSD’s authoity.

Held:

No, R.A. No. No. 7611 has adopted the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan
consistent with the declared policy of the State to protect, develop, and conserve its natural
resources. Under RA 7611

“SEC. 19. Powers and Functions. - In order to successfully implement the provisions of this
Act, the Council is hereby vested with the following powers and functions:

8. Adopt, amend and rescind such rules and regulations and impose penalties therefor for
the effective implementation of the SEP and the other provisions of this Act;”

The PCSD had the explicit authority to fill in the details as to how to carry out the objectives of
R.A. No. 7611 in protecting and enhancing Palawan's natural resources consistent with the
SEP.
GIL G. CAWAD, MARIO BENEDICT P. GALON, DOMINGO E. LUSAYA, JEAN V. APOLINARES, MA.
LUISA S. OREZCA, JULIO R. GARCIA, NESTOR M. INTIA, RUBEN C. CALIWATAN, ADOLFO Q.
ROSALES, MA. LUISA NAVARRO, and the PHILIPPINE PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Petitioners,
vs.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM); ENRIQUE T. ONA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Health (DOH); and FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, in his capacity as Chairman of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), Respondents

Cawad vs Abad

Facts

Facts:
On March 26, 1992, RA 7305, aka The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers was signed into
law. On September 3, 2012, the respondents DBM and CSC issued DBM-CSC Joint Circular No.
1, Series of 2012, to prescribe rules on the grant of Step Increments. The joint circular
provided that “an official or employee authorized to be granted longevity pay under an
existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step Increment due to length of service.” Then on
November 29, 2012, DBM and DOH issued DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1 Series of 2012, which
provided for the definition of hazard pay and that it may only be granted to public health
workers (PHWs) if the nature of their duties and responsibilities actually expose them to
danger. It also stated that the longevity pay should be granted only when the following
criteria are met:

a. The PHW holds a position in the agency plantilla of regular positions; and
b. He/She has rendered at least satisfactory performance and has not been found guilty of
any administrative or criminal case within all rating periods covered by the 5-year period.

In short, the joint circulars diminished and limited the benefits granted by the Magna Carta to
PHWs.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents issuance of DBM-DOH Joint circular no. 1, s.2012 is null and void
for being an undue exrescise of legislative powers.

Held:
No, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The DBM-DOH Joint Circular, insofar as it
lowers the hazard pay at rates below the minimum prescribed by Section 21 of RA No. 7305
and Section 7.1.5 (a) of its Revised IRR, is declared INVALID. The DBM-CSC Joint Circular,
insofar as it provides that an official or employee authorized to be granted Longevity Pay under
an existing law is not eligible for the grant of Step Increment Due to Length of Service, is
declared UNENFORCEABLE. The validity, however, of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular as to the
qualification of actual exposure to danger for the PHW's entitlement to hazard pay, the rates of
₱50 and ₱25 subsistence allowance, and the entitlement to longevity pay on the basis of the
PHW' s status in the plantilla of regular positions, is UPHELD.

ROBERTO G. ROSALES v. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, GR No. 201852, 2016-

04-05

Facts:
petition... seeks to declare the illegality and unconstitutionality of the Members' Contribution for
Capital Expenditures (MCC), later renamed as Reinvestment Fund for Sustainable Capital
Expenditures (RFSC), which is being imposed by on-grid Electric Cooperatives (ECs)
Issues:
the issue for petitioners is not about the nomenclature of MCC/RFSC or how such funds are
utilized but in the ERC's treatment of MCC/RFSC as a subsidy/funds for capital expenditures
(CAPEX) or contribution in aid of construction (CIAC) instead of patronage capital, which is an
equity or investment that must be accounted for and could be withdrawn by the member-
consumers upon termination of their contract with respondent ECs.
Ruling:
The petition is dismissed.
Legal standing of petitioners
Only petitioners Ping-ay and Ramirez satisfy the requirement of locus standi.
Petitioners have no legal standing to file this petition in their capacity as NACEELCO Board
members. It was not shown that respondent ECs are members of NACEELCO. Further, while
petitioners claim that they represent nine million member-consumers of the ECs, they have not
attached to the petition any documentary proof as regards their purported authority to file the
case on their behalf.
Also, petitioners Payuyo and Rosales have no legal standing to file the case as member-
consumers of the Palawan Electric Cooperative, Inc. (PALECO) and Agusan Del Norte Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (ANECO), respectively.
While the Court held that legislators have the standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to
question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as
legislators... there was no specific allegation of usurpation of legislative function in this case.
We do not view that the procedural rules on standing should be waived on the ground that the
issues raised in this petition are of transcendental importance
To consider a matter as one of transcendental importance, all of the following must concur: (1)
the public character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear
case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and
specific interest in the questions being raised
Despite the legal standing of petitioners Ping-ay and Ramirez, their choice of remedy to
question the validity of RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14 is inexcusably inapposite.
the ERC exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial function. In issuing and implementing the
RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14, it was not called upon to adjudicate the rights of contending
parties to exercise, in any manner, discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature. Instead,
RSEC-WR and Resolution No. 14 were done in the exercise of the ERC's quasi-legislative and
administrative functions. It was in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated in the
exercise of its delegated power.
Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the promulgation of
rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-
delegation of powers flowing from the separation of the branches of the government.
Particularly, the ERC applied its rule-making power as expressly granted by Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9136
All actions taken by the ERC, pursuant to R.A. No. 9136, are subject to judicial review. As an
independent quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, its judgment,
final order or resolution is appealable to the Court of Appeals via Rule 43 of the Rules, and, if
still unfavorable, to this Court via Rule 65.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies allows administrative agencies to carry
out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their
respective competence. The doctrine entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier
resolution of controversies. Therefore, direct recourse to the trial court, when administrative
remedies are available, is a ground for dismissal of the action.The doctrine, however, is not
without exceptions. Among the exceptions are: (1) where there is estoppel on the part of the
party invoking the doctrine; (2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that
will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (4) where the amount involved is relatively so small
as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (5) where the question involved is purely legal
and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (6) where judicial intervention is
urgent; (7) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (8)
where the controverted acts violate due process; (9) where the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies had been rendered moot; (10) where there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy; (11) where strong public interest is involved; and (12) in quo warranto
proceedings.
Assuming, for argument's sake, that this case falls under any of the recognized exceptions, just
the same, the petition must be dismissed for being filed out of time.
Under the Rules, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice
of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. In this case, Resolution No. 20, which
adopted the RSEC-WR, and Resolution No. 14 were issued by the ERC on September 23, 2009
and July 6, 2011, respectively.
There being no meritorious reason for Us to suspend the rules of procedure, any discussion on
substantive issues raised for resolution are unnecessary.

GLOBE TELECOM, INC. (GLOBE) and ISLA COMMUNICATIONS CO., INC. (ISLACOM),
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (The Former 6th Division) and the NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.

Facts:

The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of telecommunications
services.

The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and three certified true copies thereof furnished the UP Law
Center. It was published in the newspaper, The Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000. Meanwhile,
the provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale and use of prepaid cards and
the unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service took effect 90 days from the effectivity of
the Memorandum Circular.

On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service
(CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of
stealing of cellular phone units. This was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6,
2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities.

Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino Telephone Corporation filed against the National
Telecommunications Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner
Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration of
nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular) and the NTC
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order.

Petitioners alleged that NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as
the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry
under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory
and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process
of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service
by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the
requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are
unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.

Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention and this was granted by the trial court.

Respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of
petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Likewise, Globe and Islacom filed a
petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 152063, assigning the following errors. Thus, two
petitions were consolidated in a Resolution dated February 17, 2003.

Issues:

1. Whether NTC has a jurisdiction and not the regular courts over the case; and
2. Whether Billing Circular issued by NTC is unconstitutional and contrary to law and public
policy.

Held:

Jurisdiction: NTC vs. RTC

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or

administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make
rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice
has been to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of
ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute administered.

Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. Q-00-42221.
The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing the
case.

Constitutionality of the Circular

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative

agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle
applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to
its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-
legislative power.

However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued
by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular
courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or
set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making
power.

Ruling:

Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not entail
highly technical matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a
basic familiarity with the workings of the cellular telephone service, including prepaid SIM and
call cards – and this is judicially known to be within the knowledge of a good percentage of our
population – and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the Constitution.

Hence, the consolidated petitions are granted but the decision of the Court of Appeals on the
civil cases are reversed and set aside. Thus, it is remanded to the court a quo for continuation
of the proceedings.