Philo 604: Advanced Epistemology

Alisaca, Ryan Vincent F.

Look at yourself in a mirror. Think to yourself, “That person looks so fine.” But do
you really know, on the basis of what you see, that you are thinking? You see a face
staring back at you. How do you know it is thinking, let alone it is thinking what you
are thinking? “Ah, but I know from within that I am really thinking,” you might say.
Nevertheless, do you know that the face you see is a reflection of yours? Maybe
yours is quite different. Have you ever seen your face other than using something
reflective, like a mirror? How do you know that mirrors do not seriously distort? Is
this a way in which you can fail to know that you are thinking?

Perhaps we might reduce the question to its main part. I think that the question in its main
part puts into question the reliability of our sources of knowledge e.g. the senses, and things that
aid our senses e.g. a mirror as in the case when we wish to look at our physical appearance since
our bare sense of sight cannot do this for us. Do you really know, on the basis of what you see,
that you are thinking? Perhaps an implied question may be drawn out: Is reasoning based on our
senses entirely reliable? This I will try to answer here.
How do we know? Perhaps it is helpful if we call to mind St. Thomas’ words pertaining
to the origin of the things in our mind, “Nothing is in the intellect that was not previously in the
sense.”1 Perhaps this is not entirely true, and perhaps there might actually be innate ideas in our
minds which we know independently from our senses. We might find all objections pertinent to
our quotation above. It should, however, be admitted that when we speak of knowledge, we must
also be aware of the role of our senses. Indeed, if we must make an investigation on knowledge,
then we must first make general claims first which should be able to cover up all our knowledge
claims. We might indeed make a sweeping general claim about knowledge if we examine the
sources of our knowledge, i.e. the senses.2
Indeed, it might not be so difficult for us to say that we know p because my senses tell me
that p is the case. Apparently, we actually consider our senses a reliable source of knowledge.
Traditional philosophers, however, would tell us that a Cartesian reading of the capacity of our
senses would warrant us to doubt even the data of our experience. But that is not actually so.
Admittedly our senses err, but we are actually able to acknowledge these errors if we just discern
the special cases in which we might be deceived by our senses. 3 Thus I say in the spirit of
1 Thomas Aquinas, Questiones Disputatae De Veritate, trans. Robert W. Mulligan S.J. (Chicago: Henry
Regnery Company, 1952), Q. 3, Art. 2, Arg. 19.
2 Barry Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism (Oxford: Clarnedon Press, 1985), 7.
3 Ibid., 9.
Goldman: It cannot be denied that over a hundred times, a million times even, our sensual
experience has actually given us correct information. My bag is black, and my laptop is alit. This
I know because I am aware that my sense of sight is functioning properly and appropriately, and
that I have not developed eye severe problems pertaining to my visual health. This very same
sense of sight allows me to read musical notes and words in literature. My senses are very
reliable at this point in time, and there is no reason for me to suppose otherwise. Hence, I think
that my belief is justified because it is produced reliably.4
The deceptions by the senses are actually not a problem at all. In fact, Descartes carries
on to tell us about the clarity of his activity there in a warm room, in his dressing gown, with a
pen in his hand. And yet, as he began his considerations, it dawned into him that there is actually
no clear demarcation line between dreaming and real experience. In other words, he cannot tell
just by his senses whether or not he is actually dreaming or experiencing reality. 5 Indeed, for
anyone who believes that he knows that he is sitting but is actually just dreaming, even when he
is actually truly sitting in reality, there is really no knowledge but simply a belief which happens
to be aligned with reality, “…which happens to be true.” 6 If we were to push this possibility to
the extreme, we may perhaps consider the Cartesian demon or the brain-in-a-vat situation.
Thus, on the basis of what I see, do I actually know that I know? Apparently the answer is
no. What we are missing here is a justification for our apparent knowledge of things which we
know through our senses, because all of them might really just be the product of deceptions.
Here I assert that I find the idea of a deceiving being irrelevant, not so much because it may be
too far-flung an objection to be proposed, but because whether or not we are being deceived by
an evil demon would not really affect how I know. Indeed, we would not know it at all, and we
would carry on with our lives happily and merrily. That is how I would like to interpret G.E.
Moore’s response. When we are challenged that we do not actually know, but it is very clear that
we do know. I know I exist, I know I have a finger. Common sense dictates us that. If that is so,
then those who say that we do not know at all must be wrong. 7 Even when we consider the
possibility of an evil Cartesian demon, we cannot know that at all, and our belief in that demon
becomes unjustified. It is no knowledge at all and it cannot account for any objections.
Do I see my reflection? Yes indeed, and from my reflection I know that I see, and I know
that I know. My senses tell me so, and there is no reason for me to suppose that what I see is not
really myself. Is it (my reflection) thinking? In so far as it is merely a reflection, it cannot think.
It is not thinking. But if we ask whether or not the real person which is the source of such
reflection (me) can actually know that he thinks on the basis that he sees himself in the mirror,
then the answer is yes.
A final objection stands in our way. How do I know that the face on the mirror is mine?
How do I know that mirrors do not seriously distort? And indeed, how do I know? My senses

4 Noah Lemos, An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004), 86.
5 Stroud, The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, 10-12.
6 Ibid., 15.
7 Lemos, An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 144.
might be a reliable source of knowledge, but that might not be the case for the things that aid my
senses. Here I would like to quote Goldman:

A person knows that p, I suggest, only if the actual state of affairs in which p
is true is distinguishable or discriminable by him from a relevant possible
state of affairs in which p is false. If there is a relevant possible state of affairs
in which p is false and which is indistinguishable by him from the actual state
of affairs, then he fails to know that p.8

Hence, I do know that the face on the mirror is mine because I have always seen the same
face every time I look at the different mirrors. Could all those mirrors be deceiving me? Highly
improbable I would say (and we have already dealt with the Cartesian demon earlier). But not
only that, I do recognize that some types mirrors do distort my image. When I look at my
reflection on a stainless kettle, I recognize that the image of me getting an enlarged forehead is
not really an accurate reflection of me. Hence, I am able to discriminate from a possible state of
affair which might make my knowledge untrue. Do I know that it is my reflection? Do I know
that mirrors do not seriously distort? Do I know that I am thinking? Do I know that I know that I
am thinking? The answers to these questions follows from our discussion: yes, yes, yes, and yes!

Bibliography

8 Alvin I. Goldman, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge” [1976] in Metaphysics and Epistemology:
A Guided Anthology, ed. Stephen Hetherington (Wiley, 2014), 271.
Aquinas, Thomas. Questiones Disputatea De Veritate. Translated by Robert W. Mulligan
S.J. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952.
Goldman, Alvin. “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.” [1976] in Metaphysics and
Epistemology: A Guided Anthology. Edited by Stephen Hetherington. Wiley, 2014.
269-272
Lemos, Noah. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004.

Stroud, Barry. The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford: Clarnedon Press,

1985.