People vs. Tan Tiong Meng PADILLA, J.

:
G.R. Nos. 120835-40. April 10, 1997.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TAN TIONG Accused-appellant Tan Tiong Meng alias “Tommy Tan” was charged with Illegal
MENG alias “TOMMY TAN,” accused-appellant. Recruitment in Large Scale and six (6) counts of estafa.
Labor Law; Illegal Recruitment; Evidence; Testimonies of the witnesses for the The information for large scale illegal recruitment reads:
prosecution were straightforward, credible and con-vincing.—There is no showing that any “That on or about the period comprising June 1993 to August, 1993, in the City of Cavite,
of the complainants had ill-motives against Tan other than to bring him to the bar of Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
justice. The testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were straightforward, credible named accused, using a business name RAINBOW SIM FACTORY, a private employment
and convincing. The constitutional presumption of innocence in Tan’s favor has been recruiting agency, and misrepresenting himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and
overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt and we affirm his convictions. transport Filipino workers for employment abroad with the ability to facilitate the issuance
Same; Same; Same; Definition of Recruitment and Placement.—The Labor Code and approval of the necessary papers in connection therewith, when in fact he did not
defines recruitment and placement thus: “(A)ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, possess the authority or license from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract to do so, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly for a fee, recruit in a large
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or scale and promise employment in Taiwan to the following persons, to wit:
not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee Ernesto Orcullo y Nicolas — P15,000.00
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and Manuel Latina y Nicanor — P15,000.00
placement.” Neil Mascardo y Guiraldo — P15,000.00
Same; Same; Same; Accused-appellant’s acts of accepting placement fees from job Librado C. Pozas — P15,000.00
applicants and representing to them that he could get them jobs in Taiwan constitute
Edgardo Tolentino y Vasquez — P15,000.00
recruitment and placement.—It is clear that accused-appellant’s acts of accepting
placement fees from job applicants and representing to said applicants that he could get Gavino Asiman — P15,000.00
them jobs in Taiwan constitute recruitment and placement under the above provision of as in fact, the said persons gave and delivered the abovestated amount, respectively, to the
the Labor Code. herein accused who know fully well that the aforesaid persons could not be sent to Taiwan,
Same; Same; Same; The offense committed against the six (6) complainants is illegal to the damage and prejudice of said aforementioned private complainants.” 1
recruitment in large scale.—The POEA having certified that accused-appellant is not The informations for estafa aver substantially the same allegations as follows:
authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment, it is clear that the offense “In Criminal Case No. 277-93:
committed against the six (6) complainants in this case is illegal recruitment in large scale That on or about June 7, 1993, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and
punishable under Article 39(a) of the Labor Code with life imprisonment and a fine of One within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of false
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). representations that he can secure an employment in Taiwan for Ernesto Orcullo y Nicolas
Criminal Law; Estafa; A person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor as a factory worker induced the latter to entrust to him the amount of P15,000.00, in
Code can be convicted for violation of the Revised Pe-nal Code provisions on estafa provided consideration of the promised employment, but the herein accused, once in possession of
the elements of the crime are present; Elements of Estafa.—In People v. Calonzo, the Court the amount, with intent to defraud, with grave abuse of confidence and without fulfilling
reiterated the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code his promise, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly, misapply,
can be convicted for violation of the Revised Penal Code provisions on estafa provided the misappropriate and convert the same to his own personal use and benefit and
elements of the crime are present. In People v. Romerothe elements of the crime were notwithstanding repeated demands made upon him for the return of the amount, accused
stated thus: a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of herein failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of Ernesto Orcullo y Nicolas
deceit, and b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the in the amount of P15,000.00, Philippine Currency.”2
offended party or third person. The other informations for estafa involve the following complainants and amounts:
1) Neil Mascardo — P15,000.00
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Br. 88. 2) Manuel Latina — P15,000.00
3) Ricardo Grepo — P20,000.00
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
4) Librado Pozas — P15,000.00
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant. 5) Gavino Asiman — P15,000.00
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all the informations and all seven (7) cases were
tried jointly.
On 12 May 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City rendered a
decision** the dispositive part of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. 1.In Criminal Case No. 278-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale defined and
penalized under Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended in relation to Article
39 thereof, and hereby sentences him to a penalty of life imprisonment, and to
pay a fine of P100,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;
2. 2.In Criminal Case No. 277-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315
(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to a penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum, to six (6) years as the maximum; and
to pay ERNESTO ORCULLO the sum of P15,000 as actual damages and P15,000
as moral and exemplary damages;
3. 3.In Criminal Case No. 279-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315
(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to a penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum, to six (6) years as the maximum, and
to pay NEIL MASCARDO the sum of P15,000 as actual damages and P15,000 as
moral and exemplary damages;
4. 4.In Criminal Case No. 280-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315
(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to a penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum, to six (6) years as maximum; and to
pay MANUEL LATINA the sum of P15,000 as actual damages, and P15,000 as
moral and exemplary damages;
5. 5.In Criminal Case No. 343-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315
(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to a penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum, to six (6) years as maximum; and to
pay RICARDO GREPO the sum of P20,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as
moral and exemplary damages;
6. 6.In Criminal Case No. 365-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315
(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to a penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum, to six (6) years as maximum and to
pay LIBRADO POZAS the sum of P15,000 as actual damages and P15,000 as
moral and exemplary damages;
1. 7.In Criminal Case No. 371-93, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined and penalized under Article 315
(2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to a penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) years as minimum, to six (6) years as maximum; and to
pay GAVINO ASIMAN the sum of P15,000 as actual damages and P15,000 as
moral and exemplary damages.
In addition to the foregoing penalties, the accused being an alien, shall be deported without
further proceedings after service of sentence.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited with the full time during
which he underwent preventive imprisonment, provided he voluntarily agreed in writing
to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he
shall be credited with only four-fifths (4/5) thereof (Article 29, RPC, as amended by RA No.
6127 and BP Blg. 85).
SO ORDERED.”3
On appeal to this Court, accused-appellant assigns a single error allegedly committed by
the trial court, thus:
“THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN
A LARGE SCALE UNDER CRIMINAL CASE NO. 278-93 AND ESTAFA IN CRIMINAL
CASE NOS. 277-93, 279-93, 280-93, 343-93, 365-93, AND 371-93.”4
The case for the prosecution averred the following facts:
Gavino Asiman testified that a certain Jose Percival Borja who was a friend of his
relative informed him that a job re-cruiter would be at Borja’s house at Capt. Villareal St.,
Cavite City, in case anyone was interested in an overseas job in Taiwan. Asiman further
recalled that on 18 August 1993, he and his friend, Librado Pozas went to Borja’s house
where they met the accused-appellant who told them he could get them jobs as factory
workers in Taiwan with a monthly salary of P20,000.00. Accused-appellant required them
to submit their passport, biodata and their high school diploma as well as to pay
P15,000.00 each for placement and processing fees. The former issued two (2) receipts
which he signed in the presence of Asiman and Pozas.5Accused-appellant assured them
that they could leave for Taiwan twelve (12) days later. Asiman stated that they filed the
complaints for illegal recruitment when they learned that accused-appellant was arrested
for illegal recruitment activities.
Librado Pozas corroborated the testimony of Asiman. He added that Borja had no
participation in the offense as his house was merely used as a meeting place by accused-
appellant.
Neil Mascardo testified that he met accused-appellant through a friend and also
through Jose Borja. Mascardo narrated that on 7 July 1993, he went to Borja’s house to
meet accused-appellant who assured him of getting him an employment in Taiwan at the
Rainbow Ship Co., a marble and handicraft factory with a monthly salary of P20,000.00.
He further testified that he paid P15,000.00 to accused-appellant for placement and
processing fees as shown by a receipt signed by accused-appellant.6 Accused-appellant first
told him he could leave on 15 July 1993. When he later inquired about his departure date,
accused-appellant told him he could leave by the end of July 1993. After July, accused-
appellant told him he would leave on 15 August 1993 together with his uncle Manuel
Latina. When he failed to leave on the last mentioned date and accused-appellant told him
he would leave on 28 August 1993, Mascardo told accused-appellant he wanted his money
back. Accused-appellant told him that a refund was not possible since he had already sent
the money to his brother-in-law in Taiwan. Mascardo decided to file a complaint for illegal
recruitment on 28 August 1993. On 31 August 1993, he, Manuel Latina and Ernesto
Orcullo went to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) where they
found out that accused-appellant was not a licensed or authorized overseas recruiter.
Ricardo Grepo testified that on 11 August 1993, he went to Borja’s house where he met
with accused-appellant who received from him P15,000.00 for placement and processing
fees. Accused-appellant told him he could get a job as a factory worker in Taiwan with a
monthly salary of P20,000.00. Accused-appellant gave him a signed typewritten
receipt7 and assured him he could leave for Taiwan on 28 August 1993. Accused-appellant
later told him that his visa was not yet ready and he thereafter learned from Jose Borja
that accused-appellant had been arrested for illegal recruitment activities. Grepo filed his
complaint on 30 August 1993.
Lucita Mascardo-Orcullo testified that she is the wife of Ernesto Orcullo, one of the
complainants. She stated that on 7 June 1993, she went with her husband to Borja’s house
where they gave Ernesto’s passport and other papers to accused-appellant who assured
them that Ernesto could get a job as a factory worker in Taiwan. Lucita further averred
that they paid P15,000.00 to accused-appellant for placement and processing fees as shown
by a receipt signed by accused-appellant.8
Dionisa Latina testified that she is the wife of complainant Manuel Latina. She stated
that on 9 June 1993, she and her husband went to Borja’s house to meet accused-appellant
who told them that Manuel could get a job at a toy factory in Taiwan. They paid P15,000.00
to accused-appellant who issued a receipt9 and assured them Manuel could leave on 30
June 1993. After said date, accused-appellant kept on promising them that Manuel would
be able to leave for Taiwan. The promises were never fulfilled.
Angelina de Luna, a Senior Labor Employment Officer of the POEA, testified that their
office received a subpoena from the trial court requiring the issuance of a certification
stating whether or not Tan Tiong Meng alias Tommy Tan was authorized by the POEA to
recruit workers for overseas employment. De Luna presented a certification signed by Ma.
Salome S. Mendoza, Chief, Licensing Branch of the POEA dated 7 July 1994 stating that
accused-appellant is neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for
overseas employment.10
Accused-appellant Tan Tiong Meng alias Tommy Tan was the only witness for the
defense. He testified that he is a Singaporean national married to Estelita Oribiana, a
Filipino-Chinese. He added that he works as a sales representative for Oribiana
Laboratory Supplies, a company owned by his brother-in-law which sells laboratory
equipment to various schools in Cavite.
Tan alleged that Jose Percival Borja was introduced to him by a certain Malou Lorenzo
at the office of their laboratory supplies in Sta. Cruz, Manila. Lorenzo allegedly told him
that Borja needed his help in processing job applications for abroad. When he talked to
Borja, the latter told him that he could help in convincing applicants that they could work
in Taiwan. Borja offered him a P1,000.00 commission from the amount paid by each
applicant.
Tan admitted having received money from all the complainants but he said that all the
money was turned over to Borja after deducting his commission. Tan likewise admitted
that he and his wife are respondents in about seventy (70) cases of estafa and illegal
recruitment but that it was Lorenzo who was the main recruiter.
The prosecution presented Jose Percival Borja as a rebuttal witness. Borja testified
that Tan was introduced to him by Malou Lorenzo. Accused-appellant told him that they
were direct recruiters for jobs in Taiwan and that he has relatives there. Tan’s offer was
attractive considering that he charged only P15,000.00 while the prevailing rate for job
placements was P45,000.00-P60,000.00. Borja added that he even told his friends and
relatives to apply with accused-appellant. Tan had told him that he sometimes comes to
Cavite to deliver laboratory equipment. When Tan called him up to tell him he was in the
area, Borja told him to come to his house. It was at his house where Tan accepted money
from several job applicants most of whom he (Borja) did not know. When Borja realized
that Tan had cheated the applicants, he helped set up a trap and had Tan arrested by his
neighbor Tony Guinto, a Cavite City policeman. Borja later learned that Tan had
victimized several people in Batangas and Metro Manila.
In the present appeal, accused-appellant would have the Court believe that he merely
acted as a collector of money for the principal recruiter Borja who made the representations
that he (Tan) could give the applicants jobs in Taiwan. He maintains that he merely
received commissions from the transactions and that the deceit was employed not by him
but by Borja who introduced him as a job recruiter.
The Court is not impressed by such bizarre pretensions.
Several revealing circumstances belie the version for the defense, namely:
1. 1.Neil Mascardo testified that accused-appellant told him he could no longer return
his money because he had already sent it to his brother-in-law Lee Shut Kua in
Taiwan;
2. 2.All the receipts issued to complainants were signed by accused-appellant;
3. 3.Tan admitted that he and his wife are respondents in about seventy (70) cases
for estafa and illegal recruitment in Batangas;11
4. 4.Tan executed a sworn statement dated 13 September 1993 before SPO2 Eduardo
G. Nover, Jr. in the presence of his lawyer Atty. Florendo C. Medina wherein he
admitted receiving P15,000.00 from Gavino Asiman; 12
5. 5.The complainants all pointed to Tan and not Borja as the one who had
represented to them that he could give them jobs in Taiwan.
There is no showing that any of the complainants had illmotives against Tan other than
to bring him to the bar of justice. The testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution were
straightforward, credible and convincing. The constitutional presumption of innocence in
Tan’s favor has been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt and we affirm his
convictions.
The Labor Code defines recruitment and placement thus:
“(A)ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for
employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or
entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.”13
It is clear that accused-appellant’s acts of accepting placement fees from job applicants and
representing to said applicants that he could get them jobs in Taiwan constitute
recruitment and placement under the above provision of the Labor Code.
The Labor Code prohibits any person or entity, not authorized by the POEA, from
engaging in recruitment and placement activities thus:
“(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under
Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall
be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code.
xxxx
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance
with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of
three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out
any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph
hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group.”14
The POEA having certified that accused-appellant is not authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment, it is clear that the offense committed against the six (6)
complainants in this case is illegal recruitment in large scale punishable under Article
39(a) of the Labor Code with life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00).
Accused-appellant’s guilt of six (6) separate crimes of estafa has likewise been proven.
The argument that the deceit was employed by Jose Percival Borja and not by accused-
appellant is specious, even ridiculous. All the complainants agreed that it was accused-
appellant Tan who assured them of jobs in Taiwan. The assurances were made
intentionally to deceive the would-be job applicants to part with their money.
In People v. Calonzo,15 the Court reiterated the rule that a person convicted for illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code can be convicted for violation of the Revised Penal Code
provisions on estafa provided the elements of the crime are present.
In People v. Romero16 the elements of the crime were stated thus:
1. a)that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit,
and
2. b)that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.
Both elements have been proven in this case.
One final point. The names of a certain Malou Lorenzo and Chit Paulino have been
mentioned by accused-appellant as being illegal recruiters whom he contends are either
the main recruiters or their agents. It also appears that accused-appellant’s wife Estelita
Oribiana who is a co-accused in the other illegal recruitment complaints may be a part of
a large syndicate operating in Batangas, Cavite and Metro Manila. There is nothing on the
record to show that attempts were made to investigate these three (3) people.
The campaign and drive against illegal recruiters should be continuous and
unrelenting. Government should not be content with bringing to justice but a number of
these diabolic denizens of society who thrive on the dreams of our countrymen of having a
better life. Only when the last of their tribe has been convicted and punished can the
government rightfully claim that it has fulfilled the constitutional mandate to protect the
rights and promote the welfare of workers.17
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding accused-appellant Tan Tiong
Meng alias “Tommy Tan” guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and six (6) counts of
estafa, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., On leave.
Judgment affirmed.
Note.—Since there are at least three (3) victims in this case, appellant is correctly held
criminally liable for illegal recruitment in large scale. (People vs. Bautista, 241 SCRA
216 [1995])
——o0o——
People vs. Ledesma
No. L-41522. September 29, 1976.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTE LEDESMA, accused-
appellee.
Criminal procedure: Double jeopardy; Requisites of.—Under Section 9. Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court in order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to the
benefit of an accused, the following requisites must be present in the first prosecution: (a)
a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to
the charge; (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Same; Same; Conviction of accused far estafa for having failed to turn over proceeds
of sale of radio to offended party not a bar to prosecution of same accused for estafa for
having failed to turn over two installments as payment for sewing machine to same offended
party; Reasons; Case at bar.—The accused was charged with estafa in
Criminal Case No. 439 before a competent court under a valid information and was
duly convicted as charged. He was therefore placed in legal jeopardy for the crime of estafa
in Criminal Case No. 439 for having failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale of a radio
in the amount of P230 to the offended party. When later the accused was charged and
prosecuted for estafa, this time for having failed to turn over to the offended party two
installments of P19 each paid by a buyer of a sewing machine belonging to the offended
party, the accused cannot invoke double jeopardy because he was not being prosecuted for
the same offense of estafa for which he has already been convicted but for another and
distinct offense. The first offense of the accused cannot be treated as a continuous crime.
There is no unity of criminal intent or purpose because while both offenses committed by
the accused consisted of conversion of sums of money belonging to the offended party, they
took place on different dates and under different circumstances.
Same; Continuous crime; Definition of.—A “continuous crime” is a single crime
consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not
susceptible of division. According to Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being unity of
purpose and of right violated, commits diverse acts each of which, although of a delictual
character merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular delict, such
concurrence of delictual acts is called a “delito continuado.”
Same; Same; Requisites of.—For it to exist there should be plurality of acts performed
separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated;
unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same
penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the
same criminal purpose or aim.
Same; Estafa: Daily obstructions from and diversions of employer to his own personal
use and benefit of deposits made by customers of company constitute separate acts, each
with an independent existence and criminal intent of its own; Reasons.—The abstractions
were not made at the same time and on the same occasion, but on variable dates. Each day
of conversion constitutes a single act with an independent existence and criminal intent of
its own. All the conversions are not the product of a consolidated or united criminal
resolution, because each conversion is a complete act by itself. Specifically, the abstractions
and the accompanying deposits thereof in the personal accounts of private respondents
cannot be similarly viewed as “continuous crime.”
Occidental. Rafael C. Climaco, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion ofthe Court.
Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista, Solicitors Enrique M. Reyes and Pedro A.
Ramirez for plaintiff-appellant.
MARTIN, J.:
The main issue in this appeal is whether or not the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, committed an error in holding that the conviction of the
accused Vicente Ledesma in Criminal Case No. 439 constituted as a bar to the prosecution
of the same accused in Criminal Case No. 627 which was appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA-G.R. No. 09562-CR).
On December 18, 1963, accused Vicente Ledesma, a sales agent of the Conpinco
Marketing Company with authority to sell appliances and to receive payments for them,
sold one Avegon radio for the amount of P230.00 which he failed to turn over to the
company despite repeated demands. As a result, he was charged with estafa before the
Municipal Court of Victorias, Negros Occidental in Criminal Case No. 439 and after trial
was found guilty as charged.
On June 4, 1964, accused Vicente Ledesma was again charged with estafa in the
Municipal Court of Victorias, Negros Occidental in Criminal Case No. 1592 for having
misappropriated two installments of P19.00 each or a total of P38.00 which he received
from Flaviana Bernardas as payments due on a sewing machine, and for his failure to turn
over said amount to Conpinco Marketing Company notwithstanding repeated demands.
He was sentenced to suffer three (3) months and one (1) day imprisonment of arresto
mayor and to indemnify the offended party the sum of P38.00 and to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment of fifteen (15) days in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. Accused
Vicente Ledesma then appealed said decision to the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental. In said court the Provincial Fiscal filed the corresponding information against
the accused which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 627. Upon arraignment, he entered
a plea of not guilty. Later upon order of the trial court, the Provincial Fiscal filed an
amended information.
80
80 SUPREME COURT REPORT ANNOTATED
People vs. Ledesma
On January 29, 1968, the accused Vicente Ledesma filed a motion to dismiss the amended
information against him on the ground that he has previously been convicted of estafa in
Criminal Case No. 439 for having failed to turn over to Conpinco Marketing Company the
proceeds of the sale of one (1) Avegon radio and that therefore his conviction in said
Criminal Case No. 439 constituted as a bar to his subsequent prosecution in the present
case (Criminal Case No. 627) under the so-called principle of continued or continuing
crimes.
On January 13, 1969, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss and cancelled the
bond of accused Vicente Ledesma. From said order of dismissal, the offended party
Conpinco Marketing Company appealed to the Court of Appeals which appeal the latter
has certified to this Court on a pure question of law.
The Court of Appeals1 in its resolution of May 28, 1974, by a vote of 4 to 1 ruled that
after a delay of five years from the time this case was elevated to the Court of Appeals the
case was still not ready for decision because both the offended party Conpinco Marketing
Company and the Solicitor General who filed their separate briefs failed to furnish a copy
thereof to the accused-appellee and his counsel. Associate Justice Ramon C. Fernandez
dissented and voted to certify the case to this Court as it involves question of law and so
that accused-appellee may have a chance to file his own brief. The records, however, show
that the Solicitor General subsequently furnished a copy of his brief to the counsel for
accused-appellee. In certifying the case to this Court, the Court of Appeals said: “In the
above resolution of May 28, 1974, this Court refused to order the forthright certification of
this case to the Supreme Court the issues raised being purely question of law on the ground
that accused-appellee’s brief may raise factual issues. No appellee’s brief having been filed
there is no hindrance to such certification.”
 The legal issue now before Us is whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the
conviction of accused-appellee Vicente Ledesma for the crime of estafa in Criminal Case
No. 439 committed in 1963 is a bar to the prosecution of the same accused for the crime of
estafa in Criminal Case No. 627 committed in 1964 as it would place him in double
jeopardy.
Under Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court 2 in order that the protection against
double jeopardy may inure to the benefit of an accused, the following requisites must be
present in the first prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court;
(c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted,
or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.3 In the case before Us, accused-appellee was charged with estafa in Criminal Case
No. 439 before a competent court under a valid information and was duly convicted as
charged. He was therefore placed in legal jeopardy for the crime of estafa in Criminal Case
No. 439 for having failed to turnover the proceeds of the sale of an Avegon radio in the
amount of P230.00 to the offended party. When later the accused-appellee was charged
and prosecuted for estafa, this time for having failed to turn over to the offended party two
installments of P19.00 each or a total of P38.00 paid by a buyer of a sewing machine
belonging to the offended party, accused-appellee cannot invoke double jeopardy because
he was not being prosecuted for the same offense of estafa for which he has already been
convicted but for another and distinct offense. The first offense of the accused-appellee
cannot be treated as a continuous crime. A “continuous crime” is a single crime consisting
of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of
division. According to Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being unity of purpose and of
right violated, commits diverse acts each of which, although of a delictual character merely
constitutes a partial execution of a single particular delict, such concurrence of delictual
acts is called a “delito continuado.”4 For it to exist there should be plurality of acts
performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or
violated; unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of
the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration
of the same criminal purpose or aim.5 In the case before Us, there is no unity of criminal
intent or purpose because while both offenses committed by accused-appellee consisted of
conversion of sums of money belonging to the offended party, they took place on different
dates and under different circumstances. The offense in Criminal Case No. 439 occurred
on December 18, 1963, while the offense in Criminal Case No. 627 took place on June 4,
1964. Criminal Case No. 439 refers to a conversion of the proceeds of the sale of an Avegon
radio in the amount of P230.00 while Criminal Case No. 627 refers to a conversion of two
installment payments in the amount of P38.00 on a sewing machine which accused-
appellee failed to turn over to the offended party.
In one case6 where the acts of misappropriation were committed on two different
occasions, the first in January 1955 to December 1955 and the second in January 1956 to
July 1956, the Court held that it cannot be pretended that when the accused disposed of
the palay deposit in January 1955 to December 1955, he already had the criminal intent
of disposing what was to be deposited in January 1956 to July 1956. In People vs. Cid 7 the
Court ruled that the malversations imputed to the accused as well as the falsifications in
the months of May, June, July and August 1936 were not the result of only one resolution
to embezzle and falsify, but of four or as many abstractions or misappropriations had of
the funds entrusted to his care, and of as many falsifications also committed to conceal
each of said acts because there is nothing in the record to justify the inference that the
intention of the accused when he committed the malversation in May 1936 was the same
intention which impelled him to commit the other malversations in June, July and August.
In a more recent case where 75 informations for estafa were filed by the City of Manila
against the accused for having collected and received from customers of the Units Supply
Company of which the accused was an employee sums of money in payment of goods
purchased from it and misappropriated, misapplied and converted the amounts to his own
personal use and benefits, the Court upheld the action taken by the City Fiscal’s Office in
filing the 75 informations against the accused. Said the Court:
“x x x (T)he daily abstractions from and diversions of private respondent of the deposits
made by the customers of the optical supply company from October 2, 1972 to December
30, 1972, excluding Saturdays and Sundays,which he assume ex hypothesi, cannot be
considered as proceeding from a single criminal act within the meaning of Article 48. The
abstractions were not made at the same time and on the same occasion, but on variable
dates. Each day of conversion constitutes a single act with an independent existence and
criminal intent of its own. All the conversions are not the product of a consolidated or
united criminal resolution, because each conversion is a complete act by itself. Specifically
the abstractions and the accompanying deposits thereof in the personal accounts of private
respondents cannot be similarly viewed as “continuous crime,”8
WHEREFORE, the Order of the court a quo dated January 13, 1969dismissing Criminal
Case No. 627 against accused-appellee Vicente Ledesma is set aside. Let the records of
Criminal Case No. 627 be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings without
delay. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., was designated lo sit in the First Division.
Order set aside. Case remanded to lower court for further proceedings.
Notes.—(a) Basis for double jeopardy.—A defendant should not be harassed with
various prosecutions based on the same act by splitting the same into various charges, all
emanating from the same law violated, when the prosecution could easily and well embody
them in a single information. (People vs. Diaz, 94 Phil. 714, 718).
1. b)Meaning of rule on double jeopardy.—The rule of “double jeopardy” had a settled
meaning in this jurisdiction at the time our Constitution was promulgated. It
meant that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated
either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of
the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.
This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It is
embodied in the maxim of the civil law non bis in idem, in the common law of
England, and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence, and instead of
having specific origin it simply always existed. It found expression in the Spanish
 law and in the Constitution of the United States and is now embodied in our own
Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizens. (Melo vs. People, 85
Phil. 766, 768).
2. c)Continuous crime.—The notion or concept of a continuous crime has its origin in
the juridical fiction favorable to the law transgressors and in many a case against
the interest of society. For it to exist there should be plurality of acts performed
separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or
violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more
violations of the same penal provision are united in one and the same intent
leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. (People vs.
Zapata and Bondoc, 88 Phil. 689).
——o0o——
Allied Banking Corporation vs. Ordoñez
G.R. No. 82495. December 10, 1990.*
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. SECRETARY SEDFREY
ORDOÑEZ (Public Respondent) and ALFREDO CHING (Private Respondent),
respondents.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Trust Receipts Law (PD 115); Acts involving violation of trust
receipt agreements occurring after January 29, 1973 would render the accused criminally
liable for estafa under par. 1 (b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code.—In trust receipts,
there is an obligation to repay the entruster. Their terms are to be interpreted in
accordance with the general rules on contracts, the law being alert in all cases to prevent
fraud on the part of either party to the transaction. The entrustee binds himself to sell or
otherwise dispose of the entrusted goods with the obligation to turn over to the entruster
the proceeds if sold, or return the goods if unsold or not otherwise disposed of, in accordance
with the terms and conditions specified in the trust receipt. A violation of this undertaking
constitutes estafa under Sec. 13, PD115. And even assuming the absence of a clear
provision in the trust receipt agreement, Lee v. Rodil and Sia v. CA have
held: Acts involving the violation of trust receipt agreements occurring after 29 January
1973 (when PD 115 was issued) would render the accused criminally liable for estafa under
par. 1(b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant to the explicit provision in Sec. 13
of PD 115. The act punishable is malum prohibitum. Respondent Secretary's
prognostication of the Supreme Court's supposed inclination to treat trust receipts as mere
security documents for loan transactions, thereby obliterating criminal liability, appears
to be a misjudgment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The penal provision of PD 115 encompasses any act
violative of an obligation covered by a trust receipt.—In an attempt to escape criminal
liability, private respondent claims PD 115 covers goods which are ultimately destined for
sale and not goods for use in manufacture. But the wording of Sec. 13 covers failure to turn
over the proceeds of the sale of entrusted goods, or to return said goods if unsold or disposed
of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipts. Private respondent claims that at the
time of PBM's application for the issuance of the LC's, it was not represented to the
petitioner that the items were intended for sale, hence, there was no deceit resulting in a
violation of the trust receipts which would constitute a criminal liability. Again, we cannot
uphold this contention. The nonpayment of the amount covered by a trust receipt is an act
violative of the entrustee's obligation to pay. There is no reason why the law should not
apply to all transactions covered by trust receipts, except those expressly excluded. x x x
The penal provision of PD 115 encompasses any act violative of an obligation covered by
the trust receipt; it is not limited to transactions in goods which are to be sold (retailed),
reshipped, stored or processed as a component of a product ultimately sold.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the decision of the Department of
Justice.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for petitioner.
Marcial O.T. Balgos for private respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari, the interpretation by the Department of Justice of
the penal provision of PD115, the Trust Receipts Law, is assailed by petitioner. The
relevant facts are as follows:
On 23 January 1981, Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM, for short) thru its duly
authorized officer, private respondent Alfredo Ching, applied for the issuance of
commercial letters of credit with petitioner's Makati branch to finance the purchase of 500
M/T Magtar Branch Dolomites and one (1) Lot High Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle
Bricks.
Petitioner issued an irrevocable letter of credit in favor of Nikko Industry Co., Ltd.
(Nikko) by virtue of which the latter drew four (4) drafts which were accepted by PBM and
duly honored and paid by the petitioner bank.
To secure payment of the amount covered by the drafts, and in consideration of the
transfer by petitioner of the possession of the goods to PBM, the latter as entrustee, thru
private respondent, executed four (4) Trust Receipt Agreements with maturity dates on 19
May, 3 and 24 June 1981 acknowledging petitioner's ownership of the goods and its
(PBM'S) obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, if sold, or to return
the same, if unsold within the stated period.
Out of the said obligation resulted an overdue amount of P1,475,274.09. Despite
repeated demands, PBM failed and refused to either turn over the proceeds of the sale of
the goods or to return the same.
On 7 September 1984, petitioner filed a criminal complaint against private respondent
for violation of PD 115 before the office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. After preliminary
investigation wherein private respondent failed to appear or submit a counter-affidavit
and even refused to receive the subpoena, the Fiscal found a prima facie case for violation
of PD 115 on four (4) counts and filed the corresponding information in court. Private
respondent appealed the Fiscal's resolution to the Department of Justice on three (3)
grounds:
1. 1.Lack of proper preliminary investigation;
2. 2.The Provincial Fiscal of Rizal did not have jurisdiction over the case, as
respondent's obligation was purely civil;
3. 3.There had been a novation of the obligation by the substitution of the person of
the Rehabilitation Receivers in place of both PBM and private respondent Ching.
Then Secretary of Justice (now Senator) Neptali A. Gonzales, in a 24 September 1986
letter/resolution,1 held:
"Your contention that respondent's obligation was purely a civil one, is without any merit.
The four (4) Trust Receipt Agreements entered into by respondent and complainant appear
regular in form and in substance. Their agreement regarding interest, not being contrary
to law, public policy or morals, public order or good custom, is a valid stipulation which
does not change the character of the said Trust Receipt Agreements. Further, as precisely
pointed out by complainant, raw materials for manufacture of goods to be ultimately sold
are proper objects of a trust receipt. Thus, respondent's failure to remit to the complainant
proceeds of the sale of the finished products if sold or the finished products themselves if
not sold, at the maturity dates of the trust receipts, constitutes a violation of P.D. 115." 2
A motion for reconsideration alleged that, as PBM was under rehabilitation receivership,
no criminal liability can be imputed to herein respondent Ching. On 17 March 1987,
Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III denied said motion. The pertinent portion of the
denial resolution states:
"It cannot be denied that the offense was consummated long before the appointment of
rehabilitation receivers. The filing of a criminal case against respondent Ching is not only
for the purpose of effectuating a collection of a debt but primarily for the purpose of
punishing an offender for a crime committed not only against the complaining witness but
also against the state. The crime of estafa for violation of the Trust Receipts Law is a
special offense or mala prohibita. It is a fundamental rule in criminal law that when the
crime is punished by a special law, the act alone, irrespective of its motives, constitutes
the offense. In the instant case the failure of the entrustee to pay complainant the
remaining balance of the value of the goods covered by the trust receipt when the same
became due constitutes the offense penalized under Section 13 of P.D. No. 115; and on the
basis of this failure alone, the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case (Res. No. 671, s. 1981; Allied Banking Corporation vs. Reinhard Sagemuller, et
al., Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, September 18,1981).
"Likewise untenable is your contention that 'rehabilitation proceedings must stay the
attempt to enforce a liability in view of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1758.' Section 4 of P.D. No.
1758, provides, among others: 'x x x x Provided, further, that upon appointment of a
management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body, pursuant to this Decree,
all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships or associations under
management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be
suspended accordingly. "You will note that the term 'all actions for claims' refer only to
actions for money claims but not to criminal liability of offenders."3
Another motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent on 9 April 1987 to which an
opposition was filed by the petitioner. Private respondent also filed a supplemental request
for reconsideration dated 28 December 1987 with two (2) additional grounds, namely:
"x x x 3) there is no evidence on record to show that respondent was in particeps criminis in
the act complained of; and 4) there could be no violation of the trust receipt agreements
because the articles imported by the corporation and subject of the trust receipts were
fungible or consummable goods and do not form part of the steel product itself. These goods
were not procured to be sold in whatever state or condition they were in or were supposed
to be after the manufacturing process."4
Because of private respondent's clarification that the goods subject of the trust receipt
agreements were dolomites which were specifically used for patching purposes over the
surface of furnaces and nozzle bricks which are insulating materials in the lower portion
of the ladle which do not form part of the steel product itself, Justice Secretary Sedfrey
Ordoñez, on 11 January 1988, "rectified" his predecessor's supposed reversible error, and
held:
"x x x it is clear that what the law contemplates or covers are goods which have, for their
ultimate destination, the sale thereof or if unsold, their surrender to the entruster, this
whether the goods are in their original form or in their manufactured/processed state.
Since the goods covered by the trust receipts and subject matter of these proceedings are
to be utilized in the operation of the equipment and machineries of the corporation, they
could not have been contemplated as being covered by PD 115. It is axiomatic that penal
statutes are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused
(People vs. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, People vs. Terrado, 125 SCRA 648). This means that
penal statutes cannot be enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or any equitable
consideration (People vs. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651). Thus, not all transactions covered by trust
receipts may be considered as trust receipt transactions defined and penalized under PD
115.
xxx xxx xxx
Apparently, the trust receipt agreements were executed as security for the payment of
the drafts. As such, the main transaction was that of a loan. x x x In essence, therefore,
the relationship between the Bank and the corporation, consequently, the respondent
herein likewise included, is that of debtor and creditor.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, our resolution dated September 24,1986, recorded
as Resolution No. 456, series of 1986, and that dated March 17, 1987, the latter being
necessarily dependent upon and incidental to the former, are hereby abrogated and
abandoned. You are hereby directed to move for the withdrawal of the informations and
the dismissal of the criminal cases filed in court. x x x "5
This time, petitioner Allied Bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ordoñez
resolution, which was resolved by the Department of Justice on 17 February 1988,
enunciating that PD 115 covers goods or components of goods which are ultimately
destined for sale. It concluded that:
"x x x The goods subject of the instant case were shown to have been used and/or consumed
in the operation of the equipment and machineries of the corporation, and are therefore
outside the ambit of the provisions of PD 115 albeit covered by Trust Receipt agreements.
x x x Finally, it is noted that under the Sia vs. People (121 SCRA 655 (1983), and Vintola
vs. Insular Bank of Asia and America (150 SCRA 578 (1987) rulings, the trend in the
Supreme Court appears to be to the effect that trust receipts under PD 115 are treated as
security documents for basically loan transactions, so much so that criminal liability is
virtually obliterated and limiting liability of the accused to the civil aspect only.
WHEREFORE, your motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED."6
From the Department of Justice, petitioner is now before this Court praying for writs of
certiorari and prohibition to annul the 11 January and 17 February 1988 DOJ rulings,
mainly on two (2) grounds:
1. public respondent is without power or authority to declare that a violation of PD 115 is
not criminally punishable, thereby rendering a portion of said law inoperative or
ineffectual.
2. public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in holding that the goods
covered by the trust receipts are outside the contemplation of PD 115.
Private and public respondents both filed their comments on the petition to which a
consolidated reply was filed. After the submission of the parties' respective memoranda,
the case was calendared for deliberation.
Does the penal provision of PD 115 (Trust Receipts Law) apply when the goods covered
by a Trust Receipt do not form part of the finished products which are ultimately sold but
are instead, utilized/used up in the operation of the equipment and machineries of the
entrustee-manufacturer?
The answer must be in the affirmative, Section 4 of said PD 115 says in part:
"Sec. 4. What constitutes a trust receipt transaction.—A trust receipt transaction, within
the meaning of this Decree, is any transaction by and between a person referred to in this
Decree as the entruster, and another person referred to in this Decree as the entrustee,
whereby the entruster, who owns or holds absolute title or security interests over certain
specified goods, documents or instruments, releases the same to the possession of the
entrustee upon the latter's execution and delivery to the entruster of a signed document
called a 'trust receipt' wherein the entrustee binds himself to hold the designated goods,
documents or instruments in trust for the entruster and to sell or otherwise dispose of the
goods, documents or instruments with the obligation to turn over to the entruster the
proceeds thereof to the extent of the amount owing to the entruster or as appears in the trust
receipt or the goods, documents or instruments themselves, if they are unsold or not
otherwise disposed of, in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the trust
receipt, x x x."
Respondent Ching contends that PBM is not in the business of selling Magtar Branch
Dolomites or High Fired Refractory Sliding Nozzle Bricks, it is a manufacturer of steel and
steel products. But PBM, as entrustee under the trust receipts has, under Sec. 9 of PD 115,
the following obligations, inter alia: (a) receive the proceeds of sale, in trust for the
entruster and turn over the same to the entruster to the extent of the amount owing to him
or as appears on the trust receipt; (b) keep said goods or proceeds thereof whether in money
or whatever form, separate and capable of identification as property of the entruster; (c)
return the goods, documents or instruments in the event of non-sale, or upon demand of
the entruster; and (d) observe all other terms and conditions of the trust receipt not
contrary to the provisions of said Decree.7
In trust receipts, there is an obligation to repay the entruster. 8Their terms are to be
interpreted in accordance with the general rules on contracts, the law being alert in all
cases to prevent fraud on the part of either party to the transaction. 9 The entrustee binds
himself to sell or otherwise dispose of the entrusted goods with the obligation to turn over
to the entruster the proceeds if sold, or return the goods if unsold or not otherwise disposed
of, in accordance with the terms and conditions specified in the trust receipt. A violation of
this undertaking constitutes estafa under Sec. 13, PD 115.
And even assuming the absence of a clear provision in the trust receipt agreement, Lee
v. Rodil10 and Sia v. CA11 have held: Actsinvolving the violation of trust receipt agreements
occurring after 29 January 1973 (when PD 115 was issued) would render the accused
criminally liable for estafa under par. 1(b), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, pursuant
to the explicit provision in Sec. 13 of PD 115.12 The act punishable is malum
prohibitum.Respondent Secretary's prognostication of the Supreme Court's supposed
inclination to treat trust receipts as mere security documents for loan transactions, thereby
obliterating criminal liability, appears to be a misjudgment.13
In an attempt to escape criminal liability, private respondent claims PD 115 covers
goods which are ultimately destined for sale and not goods for use in manufacture. But the
wording of Sec. 13 covers failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of entrusted goods,
or to return said goods if unsold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust
receipts. Private respondent claims that at the time of PBM's application for the issuance
of the LC's, it was not represented to the petitioner that the items were intended for
sale,14hence, there was no deceit resulting in a violation of the trust receipts which would
constitute a criminal liability. Again, we cannot uphold this contention. The non-payment
of the amount covered by a trust receipt is an act violative of the entrustee's obligation to
pay.
There is no reason why the law should not apply to all transactions covered by trust
receipts, except those expressly excluded.15
The Court takes judicial notice of customary banking and business practices where
trust receipts are used for importation of heavy equipment, machineries and supplies used
in manufacturing operations. We are perplexed by the statements in the assailed DOJ
resolution that the goods subject of the instant case are outside the ambit of the provisions
of PD 115 albeit covered by Trust Receipt Agreements (17 February 1988 resolution) and
that not all transactions covered by trust receipts may be considered as trust receipt
transactions defined and penalized under PD 115 (11 January 1988 resolution). A
construction should be avoided when it affords an opportunity to defeat compliance with
the terms of a statute.
"A construction of a statute which creates an inconsistency should be avoided when a
reasonable interpretation can be adopted which will not do violence to the plain words of
the act and will carry out the intention of Congress.
 In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done
a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle, embodied in the
maxim, 'ut res magis valeat quam pereat,' that the courts should, if reasonably possible to
do so without violence to the spirit and language of an act, so interpret the statute to give
it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided,
under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed,
nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,
meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory."16
The penal provision of PD 115 encompasses any act violative of an obligation covered by
the trust receipt; it is not limited to transactions in goods which are to be sold (retailed),
reshipped, stored or processed as a component of a product ultimately sold.
To uphold the Justice Department's ruling would contravene not only the letter but the
spirit of PD 115. "An examination of P.D. 115 shows the growing importance of trust
receipts in Philippine business, the need to provide for the rights and obligations of parties
to a trust receipt transaction, the study of the problems involved and the action by
monetary authorities, and the necessity of regulating the enforcement of rights arising
from default or violations of trust receipt agreements. The legislative intent to meet a
pressing need is clearly expressed. x x x"17
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The temporary restraining order issued on 13 April
1988 restraining the enforcement of the questioned DOJ resolutions dated 11 January
1988 and 17 February 1988 directing the provincial fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
criminal case filed before the RTC of Makati, Branch 143 and the withdrawal of IS-No. 84-
3140, is made permanent. Let this case be remanded to said RTC for disposition in
accordance with this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
Note.—Estafa by abuse of confidence is committed even if deceit was employed to
evidence the creation of relationship of " trust and confidence. (Balitaan vs. Court of First
Instance of Batangas, 115 SCRA 729.)
——o0o——
G.R. No. 172820. June 23, 2010.*
DULCE PAMINTUAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Law; Estafa (Swindling); Elements; Words and Phrases; The words
“convert” and “misappropriate” connote the act of using or disposing of another’s property
as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.—
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, under which the
petitioner was charged and prosecuted, states: x x x The elements of estafa under this
provision are: (1) the offender’s receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust,
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to deliver, or to return, the same; (2) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the
money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property; (3) the
misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) demand by
the offended party that the offender return the money or property received. The essence of
this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the
prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. The words “convert” and
“misappropriate” connote the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were
one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To
misappropriate for one’s own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal advantage,
but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the
element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises
when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold
and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.
Same; Same; When the accused failed at the first instance (and in fact she continuously
failed), despite demands, to return at least the value of the ring, the crime of estafa was
consummated—the return after seven years of its value only addressed the civil liability
that the consummated crime of estafa carried with it.—The prosecution proved the third
and fourth elements through evidence of demands and the continued failure to return the
ring or its value for seven years (1996 to 2003) despite demand. Based on the records, the
return of the value of the ring came only in 2003 after the execution of the mortgage deed
that, strangely, while marked as Exh. “4,” was never offered in evidence and is thus
technically not an evidence we can appreciate. The demand letters, on the other hand, were
never disputed and thus clearly showed the failure to return the ring or its value. In fact,
even if the mortgage deed were to be given evidentiary value, it can only stand as evidence
of the return of the value of the ring in 2003, not of anything else. The basis of
the estafa charge is the failure to return the ring or to pay for its value in cash within the
period stipulated in the Katibayan.We do not find it disputed that the ring was never
returned despite demands. The value of the ring was not also made available to Jeremias
until seven years after its delivery to the petitioner. When she failed at the first instance
(and in fact she continuously failed), despite demands, to return at least the value of the
ring, the crime of estafa was consummated. The return after seven years of its value only
addressed the civil liability that the consummated crime of estafa carried with it, as the
RTC and the CA correctly stated in their decisions.
Same; Same; Evidence; Parol Evidence Rule; Under the parol evidence rule, no
additional or contradictory terms to this written agreement can be admitted to show that,
at or before the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by
the parties.—If only to address the petitioner’s issue regarding the legal significance of the
un-offered mortgage deed, we observe that it could not have raised any reasonable doubt
about the nature of the transaction between the parties. Under the circumstances, the best
evidence to ascertain the nature of the parties’ diamond ring transaction is
the Katibayan which is the written evidence of their agreement that should be deemed to
contain all the terms they agreed upon. Under the parol evidence rule, no additional or
contradictory terms to this written agreement can be admitted to show that, at or before
the signing of the document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the
parties. Thus, the terms of the Katibayan should be the prevailing terms of the transaction
between the parties, not any oral or side agreement the petitioner alleged. We consider,
too, in this regard that the post-Katibayan acts of the parties strengthened, rather than
negated, the Katibayan terms, particularly the petitioner’s obligation to return the
diamond ring; otherwise, she would not have attempted to return the value of the ring
when the criminal complaint was filed against her, nor secured the execution of the
mortgage deed, had no such obligation existed.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
BRION, J.:
We review in this Rule 45 petition the decision1 and the resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) that totally affirmed the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
2, Batangas City in Criminal Case No. 11002.
The RTC found Dulce Pamintuan (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa, penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and sentenced her to imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
The Information charging the petitioner with estafa, as defined and penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, reads:
“That on or about February 16, 1996 at Batangas City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having received in
trust and on commission from one Jeremias Victoria a diamond ring worth SEVEN
HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND (P765,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, with
the understanding and agreement that the same shall be sold by her on cash basis at a
price not less than its value and that the overprice, if any, shall be her commission and the
proceeds of the sale shall be remitted to Jeremias Victoria immediately upon sale thereof,
and if unsold, said diamond ring will be returned to Jeremias Victoria within a period of
three (3) days from the date of receipt, but said accused, far from complying with her
obligation to return the unsold diamond ring, with grave abuse of confidence, with intent
to defraud, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously convert and
misappropriate the same to her own personal use and benefit and despite demands made
upon her to return the said jewelry, she failed and refused to do so, to the damage and
prejudice of Jeremias Victoria in the aforementioned amount of P765,000.00, Philippine
Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”4
The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge; trial on the merits followed.
The Prosecution Evidence
The prosecution presented two witnesses—Jeremias Victoria and Aurora C. Realon—
to establish its case. Jeremias testified that on February 16, 1996, the petitioner received
from him a diamond ring worth P765,000.00 on the condition that it would be sold on
commission basis. At the time she received the ring, the petitioner signed a document
entitled Katibayan,5 authorizing the sale of the ring under the following express
conditions: the petitioner was to sell the ring for cash and with an overprice as her profit,
and remit the full payment to Jeremias; she would not entrust the ring to anybody; and if
unsold within three days, she must return the ring, or pay for it in cash. 6
The petitioner failed to remit payment for the diamond ring despite the lapse of the
agreed period. Neither did she return the diamond ring. Subsequently, Jeremias, through
his lawyer, sent two (2) formal demand letters7 for the petitioner to comply with her
obligations under the Katibayan. The demand letters went unheeded. Thus, the petitioner
failed to comply with her obligations to Jeremias.8
As rebuttal evidence, Jeremias claimed that the petitioner failed to return the diamond
ring because she pawned it. Jeremias also denied that he received any jewelry from the
petitioner in exchange for the diamond ring.9
The Defense Evidence
The petitioner testified in her behalf and admitted that she received the diamond ring
from Jeremias in exchange for seven (7) pieces of jewelry valued at P350,000.00 that she
also then delivered to Jeremias for cleaning and eventual sale. The petitioner likewise
stated that the delivery of the seven pieces of jewelry was evidenced by a receipt that
Jeremias signed,10 and that she subsequently tried to return the diamond ring but he
refused to accept it. Although the petitioner acknowledged signing the Katibayan, she
claimed that Jeremias entrusted the diamond ring to her before he left for abroad, and that
she only heard from him again after the criminal case had been filed against her. The
petitioner likewise claimed that she tried to return the diamond ring during the
preliminary investigation of the case, but Jeremias refused to accept it.
As sur-rebuttal evidence, the petitioner presented a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
dated August 25, 2003 (mortgage deed),11 executed by Danilo Pamintuan, the petitioner’s
husband. According to the terms of the mortgage deed, Danilo admitted that Jeremias had
entrusted the diamond ring to him on February 16, 1996, not to the petitioner, and that
the mortgage deed was constituted in consideration of Danilo’s promise to return the
diamond ring to Jeremias.
The RTC’s Ruling
The RTC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa.12 It also found
that the defense failed to refute the prosecution evidence establishing all the elements of
the crime charged. The RTC ruled, too, that the mortgage deed only served as proof of the
restitution of or reparation for the value of the diamond ring and thus addressed only the
petitioner’s civil liability, not her criminal liability. The dispositive portion of the RTC
decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, finding the accused DULCE PAMINTUAN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 1
(b) of the Revised Penal Code, without modifying circumstances, she is hereby sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Considering that there is already a settlement as to the payment of the civil liability,
as embodied in the Real Estate Mortgage executed by the parties, this Court hereby
refrains to pronounce the corresponding civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.”
The petitioner appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA agreed with the RTC that the petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of estafa and thus dismissed the petitioner’s appeal. 13 The CA ruled that the prosecution
evidence showed that Jeremias entrusted possession of the diamond ring to the petitioner,
not to her husband. The CA observed that the prosecution duly proved the petitioner’s
misappropriation by showing that she failed to return the diamond ring upon demand.
That misappropriation took place was strengthened when the petitioner failed to refute
Jeremias’ allegation that she pawned the diamond ring—an act that ran counter to the
terms of her agency under the Katibayan.
The petitioner moved to reconsider the CA decision, arguing that the CA disregarded
the legal significance of the mortgage deed, and filed the present petition after the CA
denied her motion.
The Issues
The petitioner raises the following issues:
1. whether the CA correctly disregarded the effect of the mortgage deed on her
criminal liability; and
2. whether the elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, were duly proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The petitioner asserts that the terms of the mortgage deed negated the element of
misappropriation, and the RTC and the CA did not at all consider these when they
convicted her. At the same time, she disputes the terms of the Katibayan, as its
stipulations, written in fine print, did not truly disclose the real nature of the transaction
between her and Jeremias. She also claims that she became the owner of the diamond ring
after it was turned over to her. The petitioner further insists that she signed
the Katibayan without taking heed of its terms because she trusted Jeremias.
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.546
The issues raised by the petitioner are essentially encapsulated by the second issue
outlined above—i.e., whether the crime of estafahas been sufficiently established; the first
issue relating to the mortgage deed is a matter of defense that should be considered in
resolving the second issue.
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, under which the
petitioner was charged and prosecuted, states:
“Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be[.]
xxxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or
any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property[.]”
The elements of estafa under this provision are: (1) the offender’s receipt of money,
goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (2)
misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial
of receipt of the money or property; (3) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (4) demand by the offended party that the offender return the
money or property received.14
The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the entity to whom a return should be made. 15 The
words “convert” and “misappropriate” connote the act of using or disposing of another’s
property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that
agreed upon.16 To misappropriate for one’s own use includes not only conversion to one’s
personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without
right.17 In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of
misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to
return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.18
In this case, the petitioner asserts that the prosecution failed to sufficiently prove the
first and second elements of the crime. The petitioner also asserts that these elements were
negated by her testimony and by the mortgage deed that showed she received the diamond
ring as owner, and not as an agent. The petitioner argues that she could not have
misappropriated or converted the diamond ring precisely because she was its owner.
The First Element: Receipt of Goods in Trust
The prosecution proved the first element of the crime through the testimony of
Jeremias who related that he gave the petitioner the diamond ring for sale on commission
basis. The unequivocal terms of the Katibayan corroborated Jeremias’ testimony and
showed the fiduciary relationship between the two parties as principal and agent, where
the petitioner was entrusted with the diamond ring under the specific authority to sell it
within three days from its receipt and to return it if it remains unsold within that period.
 Significantly, the petitioner admitted the fiduciary relationship between herself and
Jeremias—an aspect of the case that the RTC and the CA duly noted through the finding
that the petitioner admitted receiving the diamond ring from Jeremias to be sold on
commission basis.19
Against the prosecution’s case, the defense submitted its own evidence and varying
theories that unfortunately suffered from serious contradictions.
First, at the earliest stages of the trial proper, the petitioner categorically admitted on
the witness stand that she received the diamond ring in order to sell it on commission
basis. Immediately after, she testified that she gave several pieces of jewelry (evidenced by
a receipt) to Jeremias in exchange for the diamond ring. As the RTC noted, however, the
written receipt of the pieces of jewelry did not support the theory that they had been given
by way of exchange for the diamond ring. The RTC observed:
“[T]here is nothing in the document to show that it was received, nor it was given to the
private complainant in exchange of the latter’s ring. There is not even, in the said list, any
valuation or costing of each [jewelry] x x x What is contained in the list are the words “for
cleaning” which purports no other meaning that would favor the cause of the accused.”20
Second, the defense next attacked the identity of the recipient of the diamond ring.
As sur-rebuttal, the petitioner presented the mortgage deed to show that the diamond ring
was entrusted to her husband, Danilo, and not to her. This mortgage deed, however, was
executed only on August 25, 2003, or long after the ring was delivered on February 16,
1996, together with the Katibayan that the petitioner duly signed. It likewise contradicted
the petitioner’s earlier admission that she took delivery of the diamond ring. Not
surprisingly, the lower courts did not give the submitted deed any evidentiary value.
Lastly, the defense propounded the theory that the petitioner and her husband jointly
owned the diamond ring, citing the mortgage deed as proof and basis of this claim. Both
the RTC and the CA recognized the theory as unmeritorious given the clear terms of the
mortgage deed. These terms did not speak of the petitioner or Danilo’s ownership of the
ring, merely of Danilo’s intended return of the ring. The mortgage deed reads:
“[T]he MORTGAGOR [DANILO PAMINTUAN], for and in consideration of my promise
to return within thirty (30) days from today to JERRY VICTORIA, Filipino citizen, of legal
age, married and a resident of San Isidro Village, Batangas City, hereinafter referred to
as the MORTGAGEE, the jewelry subject matter of Criminal Case No. 11002, in the same
order and condition when it was entrusted to me by the MORTGAGEE on February 16,
1996, hereby convey by way of first mortgage unto the said MORTGAGEE x x x” [.]21
The Second Element: The Misappropriation
The second element—the misappropriation of the diamond ring—was proven by
Jeremias’ testimony that the petitioner failed to return the diamond ring after the lapse of
the agreed period or afterwards, despite the clear terms of the Katibayan. He further
testified that the petitioner could not return the ring because she had pawned it. She
strangely did not respond to this allegation. This silence, coupled with her undeniable
failure to return the diamond ring, immeasurably strengthened the element of
misappropriation. Her silence assumes great significance since the pawning of the
diamond ring was a clear violation of the Katibayan which only gave her the authority to
sell on commission or to return the ring. Acting beyond the mandate of this agency is the
conversion or misappropriation that the crime of estafa punishes.
Third and Fourth Elements: Prejudice and Demand
The prosecution proved the third and fourth elements through evidence of demands
and the continued failure to return the ring or its value for seven years (1996 to 2003)
despite demand. Based on the records, the return of the value of the ring came only in 2003
after the execution of the mortgage deed that, strangely, while marked as Exh. “4,” was
never offered in evidence and is thus technically not an evidence we can appreciate. 22 The
demand letters, on the other hand, were never disputed and thus clearly showed the failure
to return the ring or its value. In fact, even if the mortgage deed were to be given
evidentiary value, it can only stand as evidence of the return of the value of the ring in
2003, not of anything else.
The basis of the estafa charge is the failure to return the ring or to pay for its value in
cash within the period stipulated in the Katibayan. We do not find it disputed that the ring
was never returned despite demands. The value of the ring was not also made available to
Jeremias until seven years after its delivery to the petitioner. When she failed at the first
instance (and in fact she continuously failed), despite demands, to return at least the value
of the ring, the crime of estafa was consummated. The return after seven years of its value
only addressed the civil liability that the consummated crime of estafa carried with it, as
the RTC and the CA correctly stated in their decisions.
If only to address the petitioner’s issue regarding the legal significance of the un-offered
mortgage deed, we observe that it could not have raised any reasonable doubt about the
nature of the transaction between the parties. Under the circumstances, the best evidence
to ascertain the nature of the parties’ diamond ring transaction is the Katibayan which is
the written evidence of their agreement that should be deemed to contain all the terms
they agreed upon.23 Under the parol evidence rule, no additional or contradictory terms to
this written agreement can be admitted to show that, at or before the signing of the
document, other or different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties. 24 Thus, the
terms of the Katibayan should be the prevailing terms of the transaction between the
parties, not any oral or side agreement the petitioner alleged. We consider, too, in this
regard that the post-Katibayan acts of the parties strengthened, rather than negated,
the Katibayan terms, particularly the petitioner’s obligation to return the diamond ring;
otherwise, she would not have attempted to return the value of the ring when the criminal
complaint was filed against her, nor secured the execution of the mortgage deed, had no
such obligation existed.
Viewed in their totality, we hold that the prosecution presented proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the petitioner’s guilt, and both the RTC and the CA did not err in their
conclusions. The prosecution evidence was clear and categorical, and systematically
established every element of the crime; the defense evidence, on the other hand, glaringly
suffered from contradictions, changes of theories, and deficiencies that placed its merit in
great doubt.
The Penalty
 The decisive factor in determining the criminal and civil liability for the crime
of estafa depends on the value of the thing or the amount defrauded. In this case, the
established evidence showed that the value of the diamond ring is P765,000.00. The first
paragraph of Article 315 provides the appropriate penalty if the value of the thing or the
amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, as follows:
“1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.”
With the given penalty range pegged at the maximum of prision mayor in its minimum
period and an additional one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, the
maximum imposable penalty shall exceed twenty years when computed, twenty years of
imprisonment should be imposed as maximum.
The minimum of the imposable penalty depends on the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law pursuant to which the maximum term is “that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed” under the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum shall be “within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed” for
the offense. The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty prescribed by the Code
for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the
commission of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the
sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the range of the penalty next
lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be subdivided. The
modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence.
Since the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of estafa is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then
be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years and two (2) months, while the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence
should at least be six (6) years and one (1) day because the amounts involved exceeded
P22,000.00, plus an additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00. 25
Under these norms, the penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum term, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum
term, is correct. The RTC and the CA were correct in not awarding civil liability since the
execution of the mortgage deed satisfied the value of the unreturned diamond ring.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit, and consequently
AFFIRM the decision dated January 12, 2006 and the resolution dated May 19, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28785, finding petitioner Dulce Pamintuan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio-Morales (Chairperson), Bersamin, Abad**andVillarama, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—In a prosecution for estafa, while demand is not necessary where there is
evidence of misappropriation or conversion, failure to account upon demand for funds or
property held in trust is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. (Cosme, Jr. vs.
People, 508 SCRA 190 [2006])
Where one states that the future profits or income of an enterprise shall be a certain
sum, but he actually knows that there will be none, or that they will be substantially less
than he represents, the statements constitute an actionable fraud where the hearer
believes him and relies on the statement to his injury. (Joson vs. People, 559 SCRA 649
[2008])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 174181. June 27, 2012.*
ANDRE L. D’ AIGLE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Requisites of a Valid Judgment of Conviction.—In
any event, a judgment of conviction, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,
is sufficient if it states: “1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts
committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended
its commission; 2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal,
accomplice or accessory; 3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and 4) the civil liability
or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the
offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate
civil action has been reserved or waived.” We find that all of these are sufficiently stated
in the trial court’s Decision.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Elements of Estafa Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code.—Entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements
of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC: 1. That money, goods or other
personal properties are received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return, the same; 2. That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; 3. That such misappropriation
or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and 4. That there is a demand made
by the offended party on the offender.
Same; Same; Penalties; The penalty in estafa cases as provided under paragraph 1,
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but
does not exceed P22,000.00.—The penalty in estafa cases as provided under paragraph 1,
Article 315 of the RPC is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its minimum period if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed
P22,000.00. If the amount involved exceeds the latter sum, the same paragraph provides
the imposition of the penalty in its maximum period with an incremental penalty of one
year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 but in no case shall the total penalty exceed
twenty (20) years imprisonment.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Espiritu, Vitales, Espiritu Law Office for petitioner.
 The Solicitor General for respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The “failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.”1
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeking a reversal of the Decision2 dated March 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated
January 15, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 93, San Pedro, Laguna in
Criminal Case No. 0434-SPL convicting petitioner Andre L. D’Aigle of the crime of Estafa.
Likewise assailed is the CA Resolution4 dated August 17, 2006 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration5 thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On June 5, 1997, petitioner was charged with Estafa before the RTC under the
following Information:
“That in, about and sometime prior to December 1996, in the Municipality of San Pedro,
Province of Laguna, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused being then the Managing Director of Samfit Phils. received from said Samfit,
Phils. for management, care and custody the following company properties:
a) Electric transformer worth P16,500.00
b) Two (2) units of electronic boxes and two (2) units of computer boxes worth
P490,000.00
c) Machine spare parts consisting of
- set of rack and pinion
- pair of bevel and gears MB-20-30
- pair of meter gears 42 teeth
- set of gears 32 teeth
- gear bith bearing inserted
- 3 SL 20 bearings “V” plate
- one-way clutch
- one-way bearing CSK 20HC5
- 8 of LJ 34 bearings “V” type
- roller bearing 1 x 0
- 8 pieces of 6200 ZZE bearing with a total value of P12,765.35
d) [Equipment] and raw materials – valued at P162,400.00
with a total value of SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY-ONE THOUSAND, SIX HUNDRED
SIXTY-FIVE PESOS & 35/100 (P681,665.35)
under the express obligation to use the same for a particular purpose[,] that is, exclusively
for the machinery of Samfit Phils. but accused far from complying with his obligation with
grave abuse of confidence reposed upon him by his employer, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert the aforesaid corporate
properties to his own personal use and benefit and despite several demands made upon
him, accused refused and failed and still refuses and fails to return or account for the same
to the damage and prejudice of Samfit, Phils., represented by its President, Mr. Arturo
Parducho, in the aforesaid sum of P681,665.35.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”6
Petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment and the case was set for pre-trial and
trial on the merits.
During trial, the prosecution presented as its principal witness Arturo Parducho
(Parducho), Director and President of Samfit Philippines, Inc. (SPI), a corporation
primarily engaged in the manufacture of underwires for brassieres. According to him,
petitioner was the former managing director of SPI tasked with the management of the
company as well as the management, care and custody of SPI’s personal properties. At the
time that he was holding said position, petitioner was likewise a majority stockholder of
TAC Manufacturing Corporation (TAC), an entity engaged in the fabrication of wire
bending machine similar to that being used by SPI.7
Sometime in November 1996, petitioner was divested of his duties and responsibilities
as SPI’s managing director8 due to alleged conflict of business interest. Because of this,
Parducho conducted an audit and inventory of SPI’s properties and reviewed its financial
statements, vouchers, books of account and other pertinent records. He also interviewed
some of SPI’s employees.9 These revealed that several properties of SPI such as wire
materials, electronic transformer, electronic and computer boxes, machine spare parts,
while still under the management, care and custody of petitioner, went missing and were
left unaccounted for.10 Further investigation revealed that some of SPI’s wire bending
machines, computer and electronic boxes were inside the premises of TAC. This was
confirmed by Daniel Gutierrez, a former employee of TAC, who likewise admitted that TAC
copied the wire bending machines of SPI.11
In a letter dated January 14, 1997,12 SPI’s counsel formally demanded upon petitioner
to turn over to SPI all its equipment under his care and custody. Ignoring the demand,
petitioner was thus indicted with the present case. SPI also filed a replevin case against
him for the recovery of the electronic and computer boxes. Subsequently, and by virtue of
the Writ of Replevin,13 an electronic box found inside TAC’s premises was recovered from
petitioner while a computer box was later on surrendered to the Sheriff.
In his defense, petitioner alleged that his engineering firm TAC fabricated spare parts
for SPI on a daily basis. Aside from this, it also did the repair and maintenance of SPI’s
machines. He also claimed that he had an understanding with SPI that TAC would support
SPI’s operation until its business standing improves. And since petitioner only had a 10%
share in SPI, TAC would fabricate for it two additional machines valued at $60,000.00 each
so that he could get additional 40% share therein. Under this set-up, Samfit UK would
provide the micro stepping motors and motor drives as well as the control panels. However,
petitioner was not able to finish fabricating the bending machines as he was dismissed by
SPI. As a consequence, he filed a labor case against it before the Department of Labor and
Employment.
Petitioner further claimed that SPI owes him about a million pesos for the repairs of
its machines. While he admitted that SPI’s electronic transformer, computer boxes and
motor drives were recovered while in his possession thru a writ of replevin, he reasoned
out that he did not return them to SPI after his dismissal because he intended to exercise
his right of lien over them since he has properties which were still in the possession of SPI,
collectibles amounting to P900,000.00, and unpaid one-month salary of P80,000.00.
Finally, he denied having appropriated the computer boxes for his own benefit. 14
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After trial, the RTC found that the prosecution had established the guilt of petitioner
for the crime of Estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 31515 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC).
It ratiocinated that the unjustified failure of petitioner to account for and deliver to
SPI, upon demand, the properties entrusted to his care, custody and management is
sufficient evidence of actual conversion thereof to his personal use. The dispositive portion
of the RTC Decision16 rendered on January 15, 2001 reads:
“WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sentences accused ANDRE D’ AIGLE to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty (20)
days of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusio[n] temporal as
maximum; to indemnify private complainant in the amount of P191,665.35 and to pay
costs.
SO ORDERED.”17
Aggrieved, petitioner seasonably appealed to the appellate court.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In a Decision18 dated March 31, 2006, the CA denied petitioner’s appeal and affirmed
with modification the trial court’s Decision, viz.:
“WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna (Branch
93), dated January 15, 2001, in Criminal Case No. 0434-SPL, is modified to the effect that
appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.”19
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration20 was likewise denied in a Resolution 21 dated
August 17, 2006.
Hence, this petition with the following assignment of errors:
I failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of estafa. He argues that
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER-ACCUSED’[S]
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR LACK OF VALID
REASONS/JUSTIFICATION.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
LOWER COURT, (RTC-BRANCH 93, SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA), AND AT THE SAME
TIME MODIFYING THE EXTENT OF THE PENALTY [IMPOSED] FOR THE CRIME
ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED.22
Our Ruling
After a circumspect consideration of the arguments earnestly pressed by the
petitioner vis-à-vis that of the respondent People of the Philippines (respondent), and in
the light of the practically parallel finding of facts and conclusions of the courts below, this
Court finds the instant petition partly meritorious.
Concerning the first assigned error, the Court finds no cogent reason to sustain
petitioner’s claim that the appellate court erred in denying his Motion for Reconsideration
without valid reason or justification. The reason for the appellate court’s denial of
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration is clear and simple, that is, after it made a thorough
evaluation of the issues and arguments proffered in the said motion, the CA found that
same were already passed upon and duly considered in its assailed Decision. This is very
plain from the contents of the August 17, 2006 Resolution of the CA denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. Undoubtedly, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied due to a valid reason and justifiable cause.
Petitioner also bemoans the fact that the dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision
did not expressly mention that he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. Suffice it to say, however, that a judgment is not rendered defective just because
of the absence of a declaration of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the dispositive portion.
The ratio decidendi of the RTC Decision extensively discussed the guilt of the petitioner
and no scintilla of doubt against the same was entertained by the courts below. Indeed,
petitioner’s guilt was duly proven by evidence of the prosecution. In any event, a judgment
of conviction, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, is sufficient if it states:
“1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused
and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; 2) the
participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice or accessory;
3) the penalty imposed upon the accused; and 4) the civil liability or damages caused by
his wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if
there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been
reserved or waived.” We find that all of these are sufficiently stated in the trial court’s
Decision.
Anent the second assigned error, petitioner posits that the CA erred in affirming the
said RTC Decision and in modifying the penalty imposed upon him since the prosecution
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC requires that the person charged was given juridical
possession of the thing misappropriated. Here, he did not acquire juridical possession of
the things allegedly misappropriated because his relation to SPI’s properties was only by
virtue of his official functions as a corporate officer. It is actually SPI, on whose behalf he
has acted, that has the juridical possession of the said properties.
Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand counters
that the prosecution’s evidence has fully established all the elements of the crime charged.
Based on SPI’s records, petitioner received from it various equipment of SPI on several
occasions for the sole purpose of manufacturing underwires for brassieres. However after
the conduct of an audit in December 1996, petitioner failed to properly account therefor.
Petitioner’s arguments fail to persuade.
Entrenched in jurisprudence are the following essential elements of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC:
 1. That money, goods or other personal properties are received by the offender in trust
or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return, the same;
2. That there is a misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. 23
All these elements have been sufficiently established by the prosecution.
Petitioner asserts that as majority stockholder of TAC, he entered into a business
transaction with SPI wherein it would fabricate bending machines and spare parts for the
latter. Under their agreement, SPI would provide the necessary components to be used in
the fabrication as well as the electronic devices while work would be done at petitioner’s
premises. Pursuant to this, petitioner admitted to having received from SPI an electronic
transformer, electronic box and a computer box.24 When petitioner, however, was not able
to finish the work allegedly due to his dismissal from SPI, the latter demanded for the
return of its properties. However, petitioner did not heed the demand and simply kept the
properties as lien for his claims against SPI. 25
From petitioner’s own assertions, the existence of the first and fourth of the
aforementioned elements is very clear. SPI’s properties were received by the petitioner in
trust. He received them for a particular purpose, that is, for the fabrication of bending
machines and spare parts for SPI. And when SPI made a demand for their return after
petitioner’s alleged dismissal therefrom, petitioner deliberately ignored the same.
The Court cannot agree with petitioner’s postulation that he did not acquire juridical
possession of SPI’s properties since his relation with the same was only by virtue of his
official function as SPI’s corporate officer. As borne out by the records, the equipment
subject matter of this case were received in trust by petitioner from SPI to be utilized in
the fabrication of bending machines. Petitioner was given absolute option on how to use
them without any participation on the part of SPI. Thus, petitioner acquired not only
physical possession but also juridical possession over the equipment. As the Court held
in Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals:26
“When the money, goods or any other personal property is received by the offender from
the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender
acquires both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing
received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over
the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. x x x”
With regard to the element of misappropriation or conversion, the prosecution was able
to prove this through circumstantial evidence. “Misappropriation or conversion may be
proved by the prosecution by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.” 27 The “failure
to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation.”28 As mentioned, petitioner failed to account for, upon demand, the
properties of SPI which were received by him in trust. This already constitutes
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion of said properties to petitioner’s
own personal use. Even if petitioner merely retained the properties for the purpose of
preserving his right of lien over them, same is immaterial because, to reiterate, failure to
return upon demand the properties which one has the duty to return is tantamount to
appropriating the same for his own personal use. As correctly noted by the CA:
“We are not impressed by appellant’s excuse. We note that SPI’s demand for the return
of the properties subject of this case was made on January 14, 1997. At that time, appellant
was no longer the managing director of SPI, he having been terminated from his position
on November 19, 1996. This observation, coupled with SPI’s demand for the return of its
equipment and materials, show that appellant had lost his right to retain the said
properties and the fact that he failed to return or at least account for them raises the
presumption of misappropriation and conversion. x x x”29
Lastly, it is obvious that petitioner’s failure to return SPI’s properties valued at
P191,665.35 caused damage and prejudice to the latter.
In a last ditch effort to evade liability, petitioner claims that the controversy between
him and SPI is an intra-corporate controversy considering that he was a stockholder of the
latter. Such being the case, he avers that his conviction for estafa has no basis.
Contrary, however to petitioner’s stance, by no stretch of imagination can the Court
consider the controversy between him and SPI as an intra-corporate controversy. As
correctly pointed out by the CA:
“Finally, we find no cogent basis, in law and in fact, which would support appellant’s
allegation that the acts complained of in this case were corporate acts. His allegation
without more that he had an agreement with Mr. Bernie Kelly of SPI to the effect that his
(appellant’s) share in SPI would be increased to 40% in exchange for two bending machines
does not give his act of retaining the properties a semblance of a corporate act. There is
also no evidence that he acted on behalf of TAC Manufacturing Corporation, much less of
SPI. Premises considered, we do not agree that appellant’s actuation should be considered
as a corporate act, for which he claims he could not be held personally liable. x x x”30
Regarding the credibility of prosecution witnesses, the RTC found said witnesses to be
credible and therefore their testimonies deserve full faith and credence. The CA for its
part, did not disturb the trial court’s appreciation of the same. It is a well-entrenched
doctrine “that factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate
court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between
the parties.”31 Though jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious exceptions, none of
them obtain herein which would warrant a reversal of the challenged Decision. Thus, the
Court accords deference to the trial court’s appreciation of said testimonies. Accordingly,
the RTC’s finding of petitioner’s guilt, as affirmed by the CA, is sustained.
The proper imposable penalty
The penalty in estafa cases as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the RPC
is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period if
the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00. If the amount
involved exceeds the latter sum, the same paragraph provides the imposition of the penalty
in its maximum period with an incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for every
P10,000.00 but in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty (20) years imprisonment.
In the present case, petitioner poses no serious challenge to the amount involved which
is P191,665.35. Since said amount is in excess of P22,000.00, the penalty imposable should
be within the maximum term of six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to
eight (8) years of prision mayor.32 “[A] period of one (1) year shall be added to the penalty
for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the
total penalty which may be imposed exceed twenty (20) years.”33Hence, sixteen (16) years
must be added to the maximum term of the penalty of prision mayor. And since same
exceeds twenty (20) years, the maximum term should be pegged at twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal. Applying now the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law which is prision correccional in its maximum to prision
mayor in its minimum is prision correccional in its minimum to medium periods. “Thus,
the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from six (6) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months x x x.”34
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the Court finds that the CA correctly pegged
the penalty in its maximum term of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal but erred in
imposing the minimum term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as same is
beyond the lawful range. Thus, the Court sets the minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty at four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. Accordingly, petitioner
is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25830 dated March 31, 2006 and August 17, 2006, respectively,
are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,** Leonardo-De Castro (Acting Chairperson),***
Villarama, Jr. and Perlas-Bernabe, **** JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed with modification.
Notes.—The elements of Estafa under Article 315, Paragraph 1(B) of the Revised
Penal Code are: (a) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender. (Aw vs. People, 617 SCRA 64
[2010])
The essence of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner; The words “convert”
and “misappropriate” connote an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were
one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon—to
misappropriate for one’s own use includes not only conversion to one’s personal advantage,
but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right. (Id.)
——o0o——
G.R. No. 203466. February 25, 2015.*
CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Criminal Law; Estafa; The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the offender’s receipt of money, goods, or other personal
property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by
the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the money or property;
(c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand
by the offended party that the offender return the money or property received.—Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, as amended, under which Benabaye was charged and
prosecuted, states: Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another
by any means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: 1st. The penalty of prisión
correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its minimum period, if the amount
of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions
of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be[.] x x x x 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: x x x x (b) By
misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property[.] The elements
of estafa under this provision are: (a) the offender’s receipt of money, goods, or other
personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b) misappropriation or
conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the
money or property; (c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) demand by the offended party that the offender return the money or
property received.
Same; Theft; So long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated did not pass
to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or
otherwise.—It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf
of an employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the
employee. The material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his
employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession of the employer. So long as the
juridical possession of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the
offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise. Hence, con-
 version of personal property in the case of an employee having
mere material possession of the said property constitutes theft, whereas in the
case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possessionhave been
transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes estafa.
Same; Estafa; There is an essential distinction between the possession of a receiving
teller of funds received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the
proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal.—In Chua-
Burce v. CA, 331 SCRA 1 (2000),the Court acquitted therein petitioner Cristeta Chua-
Burce (Chua-Burce) of estafa on the ground that the element of juridical possession was
absent. As a bank cash custodian, the Court ruled that she had no juridical possession over
the missing funds. Relative thereto, in Guzman v. CA, 99 Phil. 703 (1956), where a
travelling sales agent was convicted of the crime of estafa for his failure to return to his
principal the proceeds of the goods he was commissioned to sell, the Court had occasion to
explain the distinction between the possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes
of determining criminal liability for estafa, viz.: There is an essential distinction between
the possession of a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the bank,
and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency
by his principal. In the former case, payment by third persons to the teller is
payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds
received, and has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as
against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own
principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain the money or goods received in
consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he
has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; While it is true that only Benabaye was
able to successfully perfect her appeal, the rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding
throws the whole case open for review of all its aspects, including those not raised by the
parties.—While it is true that only Benabaye was able to successfully perfect her appeal,
the rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review
of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties. Considering that under Section
11(a),
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as abovequoted, a favorable
judgment, as in this case, shall benefit the co-accused who did not appeal or those who
appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction
became final and executory, Benabaye’s discharge for the crime of estafa is likewise
applicable to Tupag. Note that the dismissal of the estafa charge against Tupag is similarly
without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charge against him as may be
warranted under the circumstances pertinent to him.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Public Attorney’s Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated August 31,
2011 and the Resolution3 dated September 6, 2012 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA)
in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 00722-MIN which sustained the conviction of petitioner for the crime
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The Facts
Petitioner Cherry Ann Benabaye (Benabaye) was the Loans Bookkeeper of Siam Bank,
Inc., Iligan City Branch
(Siam Bank). As such, she was authorized to collect and/or accept loan payments of
Siam Bank’s clients and issue provisional receipts therefor, 4 accomplish a cash transfer
slip at the end of each banking day detailing the amounts of money that she has received,
and remit such payments to Jenkin U. Tupag (Tupag), her supervisor. 5
Sometime in 2001, Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation of its loan transactions
for the period December 1, 2000 to June 15, 2001, and thereby found out that fraud and
certain irregularities attended the same. Specifically, it discovered the non-remittance of
some loan payments received from its clients based on the provisional receipts issued by
its account officers, as well as the daily collection reports corresponding to the said
provisional receipts.6 Based on the audit, 853 provisional receipts in the aggregate amount
of P470,768.00 were issued by Benabaye but were unreported, and, more significantly, the
corresponding payments were unremitted based on the daily collection reports on file.7
Thus, in a memorandum8 dated July 13, 2001, Siam Bank directed Benabaye to
explain, among others, the discrepancies between the provisional receipts she had issued
and the unremitted money involved. Likewise, Siam Bank made a final demand upon her
to return the amount of the money involved. In her written explanation 9 dated July 18,
2001, Benabaye claimed, among others, that the discrepancies could be clarified by her
supervisor, Tupag, to whom she had submitted her daily cash transfer slips together with
the corresponding provisional receipts.
Meanwhile, Siam Bank also sent a memorandum10 dated July 13, 2001 to Tupag
requiring him to explain, among others, the same discrepancies between the provisional
receipts and daily collection reports that were submitted to him; it further demanded the
return of the amount involved. In his written explanation11 dated July 16, 2001, Tupag
admitted his accountability and, while claiming that some of his co-employees were privy
to the acts which resulted in the discrepancies, he did not disclose their identities.
Apparently dissatisfied with their explanations, Siam Bank terminated12 the
employment of both Benabaye and Tupag and subsequently filed a criminal case
for estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 4 (RTC), docketed as Crim.
Case No. 9344, against them. On March 5, 2002, they were charged in an
Information13 which reads:
That sometime between the period from December 1, 2000 up to June 15, 2001, in the
City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud Siam Bank, Inc. in the following manner, to wit: the said accused being
then employed as Micro Finance Unit Supervisor and Loans Bookkeeper, respectively of
Siam Bank, Inc.-Iligan Branch and authorized to collect and receive payments of loans, did
collect and receive payments from the bank’s borrowers or clients in the total amount of
P688,833.00, under the express obligation on the part of said accused to remit the amount
collected to the bank, but once in possession of said amount and far from complying with
their obligation, said accused converted, misapplied said amount to their own use and
benefit, and despite repeated demands, they failed and refused and still fails and refuses
to pay the said amount of P688,833.00, to the damage and prejudice of the said Siam Bank,
Inc. in the aforesaid amount of P688,833.00, Philippine currency.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.14
In her defense, Benabaye reiterated15 the contents of her written explanation dated
July 18, 2001 that she remitted the provisional receipts together with the corresponding
amounts collected, as well as the daily cash transfer slips, to her supervisor, Tupag, at the
end of each banking day. Unfortunately, she was required to make only one (1) copy of the
daily cash transfer slips, which were all remitted to and remained in the possession
of Tupag.16 She asseverated, however, that when she was allowed to inspect the files of the
bank after the audit, she learned that Tupag had reissued several provisional receipts, for
which she had previously issued provisional receipts, which were unremitted to the
bank.17 At the dorsal portion of the reissued provisional receipts, Tupag had annotated the
numbers of the unremitted ones that she had issued. 18 She also claimed that other Siam
Bank employees were authorized to issue provisional receipts, e.g., their janitor, the bank
manager, and even on-the-job trainees (OJTs), asserting that it was the bank’s standard
operating procedure.19
As for Tupag, he was unable to testify, hence, the trial was concluded sans his
testimony.20
The RTC’s Ruling
In a Decision21 dated July 31, 2000, the RTC found both Benabaye and Tupag guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), and sentenced each
of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prisión mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. They were likewise ordered to indemnify Siam Bank the total amount of
P688,833.00 as actual damages.22
In so ruling, the RTC found that all the elements of the crime charged have been
established, to wit: (a) that any goods or other personal property is received by the offender
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion
of such money or property to the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there
is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.23 From the evidence presented,
the RTC found that both Benabaye and Tupag held the loan payments of Siam Bank’s
clients in trust for the latter, with the obligation to remit it to the Bank, in the total amount
of P688,833.00 insofar as Benabaye is concerned and P25,955.00 on the part of
Tupag.24 However, they misappropriated the same to the damage and prejudice of Siam
Bank, and despite demand, failed to account for the money. As for Benabaye, while she
claimed that she remitted the loan payments to Tupag, she failed to offer evidence that
Tupag had actually received the said amount.25
Dissatisfied, Benabaye appealed26 her conviction to the CA, maintaining her innocence
on the grounds that: (a) her possession of the money comprising the loan payments of Siam
Bank’s clients was merely material, not juridical, hence, she cannot be validly indicted
for estafa; (b) the RTC erred in holding that the acts described in the Information
constituted only one (1) single offense; and (c) there was no conspiracy between her and
Tupag.27
On the other hand, Tupag likewise appealed 28 his conviction, but was however denied
by the RTC in an Order29 dated October 9, 2009. The RTC held that Tupag lost his remedy
to appeal under Section 6, Paragraph 5, Rule 12030 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Records of this case were then elevated to the CA. 31
The CA’s Ruling
In a Decision32 dated August 31, 2011, the CA affirmed Benabaye’s conviction in
toto, similarly finding that all the elements of estafa through misappropriation have been
established. It ruled that Benabaye, together with Tupag, held the money collected in
trust for Siam Bank.33 Likewise, the CA found that while there were 853 unremitted
provisional receipts involved in this case, Benabaye’s “continuing intention to
commit estafa constituted a single intention although committed on different
dates.”34 Thus, her crime was a “continuing offense” as all the acts of misappropriation
were part of a “single criminal design.”35 Finally, the CA ruled that conspiracy between
Benabaye and Tupag was sufficiently established, considering that both had access and
facility to determine if payments made by Siam Bank’s clients were properly remitted. 36 As
such, if there were unremitted payments, both of them would likewise be aware thereof.
Moreover, while Benabaye claimed that she remitted the provisional receipts and
corresponding payments to Tupag, she however failed to show, through sufficient evidence,
that Tupag actually received the same.37
Benabaye moved for reconsideration,38 which the CA denied in a Resolution39 dated
September 6, 2012, hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining
Benabaye’s conviction for the crime of estafa through misappropriation.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, as amended, under which Benabaye was
charged and prosecuted, states:
 Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000
pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos;
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be[.]
xxxx
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or
any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property[.]
The elements of estafa under this provision are: (a) the offender’s receipt of money,
goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same; (b)
misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial
of receipt of the money or property; (c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the
prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the offended party that the offender return the
money or property received.40
Under the first element, when the money, goods, or any other personal property is
received by the offender from the offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for
administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession and juridical
possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which
gives the transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even
against the owner.41
It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an
employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee.42 The
material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a
recognition of the juridical possession of the employer. So long as the juridical possession
of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed
remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise.43 Hence, conversion of personal property
in the case of an employee having mere material possession of the said property
constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and
juridical possession have been transferred, misappropriation of the same
property constitutes estafa.44
In this case, Benabaye maintains that the first element of estafa through
misappropriation has not been established, insisting that her possession of the collected
loan payments was merely material and not juridical; therefore, she cannot be convicted
of the said crime.45
The Court agrees.
Records show that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from Siam Bank’s
clients. At the end of every banking day, she was required to remit all cash payments
received together with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her supervisor, Tupag.46As
such, the money merely passes into her hands and she takes custody thereof only for the
duration of the banking day. Hence, as an employee of Siam Bank, specifically, its
temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank teller,47 she had no juridical
possession over the missing funds but only their physical or material possession.
In Chua-Burce v. CA,48 the Court acquitted therein petitioner Cristeta Chua-Burce
(Chua-Burce) of estafa on the ground that the element of juridical possession was absent.
As a bank cash custodian, the Court ruled that she had no juridical possession over the
missing funds. Relative thereto, in Guzman v. CA49 where a travelling sales agent was
convicted of the crime of estafa for his failure to return to his principal the proceeds of the
goods he was commissioned to sell, the Court had occasion to explain the distinction
between the possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal
liability for estafa, viz.:
There is an essential distinction between the possession of a receiving teller of funds
received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of
sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former
case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the
teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no
independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. An
agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent,
autonomous, right to retain the money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as
when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him
for damages suffered without his fault.50(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
Thus, being a mere custodian of the missing funds and not, in any manner, an agent
who could have asserted a right against Siam Bank over the same, Benabaye had only
acquired material and not juridical possession of such funds and consequently, cannot be
convicted of the crime of estafa as charged. In fine, the dismissal of the estafa charge
against Benabaye should come as a matter of course, without prejudice, however, to the
filing of the appropriate criminal charge against her as may be warranted under the
circumstances of this case. Separately, in light of the foregoing, Benabaye’s supervisor and
co-accused in this case, Tupag, who likewise was not appointed as an agent of Siam Bank
and thus had no juridical possession of the subject sums, must also be discharged of the
same estafa charge in view of Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, which states:
SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.—
(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did
not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable
to the latter.

While it is true that only Benabaye was able to successfully perfect her appeal, the rule
is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review of all its
aspects, including those not raised by the parties. 51 Considering that under Section 11(a),
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as abovequoted, a favorable judgment,
as in this case, shall benefit the co-accused who did not appeal or those who appealed from
their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction became final
and executory,52 Benabaye’s discharge for the crime of estafa is likewise applicable to
Tupag. Note that the dismissal of the estafa charge against Tupag is similarly without
prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charge against him as may be warranted
under the circumstances pertinent to him. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
The Decision dated August 31, 2011 and the Resolution dated September 6, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 00722-MIN are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The criminal charges against petitioner Cherry Ann M. Benabaye and her co-
accused, Jenkin U. Tupag, in Crim. Case No. 9344, are DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin and Perez, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside. Criminal charges
against petitioner Cherry Ann M. Benabaye and co-accused Jenkin U. Tupag dismissed
without prejudice.
Notes.—The essence of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner. (Tabaniag
vs. People, 589 SCRA 441 [2009])
A unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case is that the appeal throws the whole
case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct, cite and appreciate
errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. (People vs.
Morales, 616 SCRA 223 [2010])
——o0o——
Koh Tieck Heng vs. People
G.R. Nos. 48535-36. December 21, 1990.*
KOH TIECK HENG, petitioner, us. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Criminal Law; Estafa; The use of the spurious checks is by itself fraud or deceit, one
of the two essential requisites of the crime of estafa.—Basically, the two essential requisites
of fraud or deceit and damage or injury must be established by sufficient and competent
evidence in order that the crime of estafa may be established. Deceit is the false
representation of a matter of fact (whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed) which deceives or
is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. The fact that
appellant was the possessor and utterer of the checks in question (Exhibits "A" and "H")
and having benefited from the subsequent withdrawals, as well as having attempted to
gain by trying to withdraw an amount thereon, the inevitable conclusion would be that he
was the one who falsified said Exhibits "A" and "H" Ineluctably, the use of the spurious
checks is by itself fraud or deceit.
Same; Same; Respondent Court correctly convicted accused of attempted estafa, as
only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself has been shown.—Although one
of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party, in the
absence of proof thereof the offender would at least be guilty of attempted estafa. Appellant
commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but he failed to perform all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of his own spontaneous desistance
but because of his apprehension by the authorities before he could obtain the amount. Since
only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself has been shown, respondent
court correctly convicted appellant of attempted estafa.
Evidence; Witnesses; Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from a credible
witness but must, in addition, be credible in itself.—As repeatedly expounded by this Court,
evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from a credible source but must, in
addition, be credible in itself. And by this is meant that it shall be natural, reasonable and
probable as to make it easy to believe. No better test has yet been found to determine the
value of the testimony of a witness than its conformity to the knowledge and common
experience of mankind. As bewailed by the court below, the theory espoused by appellant
"is taxing too much the credulity of this Court, an insult to the humble intelligence and the
common sense of this Court."
Criminal Law; Estafa; Falsification; When it is proved that a person has in his
possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption is justified that
such person is the forger.—The court a quo, as well as respondent court, posed the question
as to the identity of the forger, and we are satisfied that both courts did not err in relying
upon the presumption that the possessor of a falsified document is presumed to be the
author thereof. It is an established rule that when it is proved that a person has in his
possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference
is justified that such person is the forger. The petitioner has been shown to have been the
possessor and utterer of the two checks (Exhibits "A" and "H") when he made use of and
benefited therefrom by his withdrawals of and attempt to withdraw funds through said
checks. The circumstance, therefore, that appellant made use of and benefited from the
falsified document is a strong evidence that he either himself falsified it or caused the same
to be falsified, he being criminally responsible in either case. Since appellant is the only
person who stood to be benefited by the falsification of the document that was found in his
possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of such falsification.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. Melencio-
Herrera, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jose V. Dela Rama for petitioner.
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari impugns the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 16246-47-CR1 which affirmed the judgment of the former Court of First Instance
of Manila in Criminal Cases Nos. 15006 and 15007 convicting herein accused-petitioner of
estafa and attempted estafa, respectively.
The facts as found by the trial court and adopted by respondent court are as follows:
"From the evidence extant on the record, the following facts appear undisputed: That
accused Koh Tieck Heng, alias Tomas P. Flores opened Savings Account No. 26580, with
the Security Bank and Trust Company, Escolta St., Manila, hereinafter called SBTC in
short, with an initial deposit of P500.00, made on 21 Feb. 1973, for which he was given a
pass book in his name of Tomas P. Flores (see Exh. C). He made a second deposit of P400.00
then a withdrawal of P500.00 then a deposit of P775.00, and then a withdrawal of
P1,000.00 (Entries on Exh. C).
"On 13 March (sic, August) accused went to SBTC and filled up or accomplished and
signed a deposit slip (Exh. B) for a deposit of P18,060.00 in check. With the deposit slip, he
submitted to Urbana Ramos de Ferrer, Teller No. 2 of SBTC, his pass book (Exh. C) and a
Philippine Bank of Communications Check No. U-186378, dated August 9, 1973 (Exh. A)
for P18,060.00, appearing to have been signed and issued by 'F. Dycaico', who was then
maintaining with the Philippine Bank of Communications, hereinafter referred also as
PBC, a checking account No. 13360. This check was signed and indorsed by the accused,
Upon deposit of this check for P18,060.00, the said sum was posted in the pass book (Exh.
C), as shown in Exhibit C-1. (T.s.n., pp. 5-15, Oct. 10, 1973, hearing).
" "On 16 August 1973, the accused withdrew from this Savings Account No. 26580, the
sum of P10,000.00 upon submission to Margarita Tiongson, Teller No. 3, of a withdrawal
slip (Exh. E) accomplished and signed by him. Such withdrawal was posted in the pass
book (Exh. C), shown by Exhibit C-2. Upon receipt of the amount withdrawn, the teller
caused the accused to sign at the back of the withdrawal slip and which signature is
marked Exhibit E-1. On the next day, 17 August 1973, the accused withdrew another
amount of P5,500.00 upon defendant's submission to Teller No. 3 of a withdrawal slip (Exh.
F) and the pass book. The withdrawal was posted in the pass book as shown by Exhibit C-
3. Upon receipt of the sum withdrawn, the teller caused the accused to sign at the back of
the withdrawal slip and which signature is marked Exhibit F-1. (T.s.n., pp. 21-30; 32-39,
id.).
"On 18 August 1973, the accused went again to the SBTC to deposit another Philippine
Bank of Communications Check No. U186414 (Exh. H), dated 11 August 1973 for
P18,060.00 which appears to be signed by 'F. Dycaico' against Checking Account No. 13360.
Accused, therefore, filled up and accomplished a deposit slip (Exh. I) for P18,060.00. After
accomplishing Exhibit I, accused submitted the check (Exh. H), the pass book (Exh. C) and
the deposit slip (Exh. I) to Candida Abella Villanueva, Teller No. 5. The deposit of
P18,060.00 was thus posted at the pass book (Exh. C), as shown by Exh. C-4 (T.s.n., pp.
60-70, Id.).
"Sometime in that month of August 1973, Florencio Dycaico, who maintains the
Checking Account No. 13360 with the Philippine Bank of Communications saw his
Statement of Account and came upon an amount of P18,060.00 debited against his account.
He complained to the PBC that he never issued a check for that much. With this
information PBC informed SBTC that the check, Exh. A, was a spurious check. So, SBTC
officials instructed their bank tellers to watch for Tomas P. Flores. NBI agent Mamerto
Espartero was also assigned to crack down on check forgers or passers in company with an
informer, at the premises of SBTC, in coordination with SBTC officials. (T.s.n., pp. 3-7, 12,
16-17, Nov. 12, 1973, hearing).
"Then, came the pay off. The accused appeared in the SBTC premises on 22 August
1973. He filled up, accomplished and signed a withdrawal slip (Exh. K) for P1 5,500.00,
and after that he submitted his passbook (Exh. C) with the withdrawal slip to Maria
Victoria Soriano, SBTC Teller No. 7. Forewarned to watch for the accused Tomas P. Flores,
she asked the accused to sign his name in Exh. K, and he did sign it as requested. He
signed his name of Koh Tieck Heng (See Exh. K-3). After that, Teller No. 7 brought the slip
and the pass book of Tomas P. Flores. Teller No. 7 returned to her cage and then called up
for Tomas P. Flores. The accused went to Teller No. 7. Teller No. 7 asked the accused to
sign his name at the back, and which signature is marked Exh. K-2. After he signed Exh.
K-2, the NBI agent Espartero swooped down on the accused and apprehended him. The
accused was brought inside the Cashier's Office. He was interviewed and then later
brought to the NBI office where he was investigated. In the course of his investigation, he
executed a written statement now marked Exh. M. (T.s.n., pp. 3-20, Oct. 22, 1973,
hearing)."2
Based on the facts narrated, appellant Koh Tieck Heng, alias Teddy Koh, alias Tomas P.
Flores, was charged in Criminal Case No. 15006 before the then Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XII, with the crime of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document
in an information which reads: "That on or about and during the period comprised between
August 13, 1973 and August 17, 1973, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, conspiring and confederating with one whose true name, identity and present
whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping each other, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to defraud, commit acts of falsification on
a commercial document in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, after opening a
savings account with the Security Bank and Trust Company, under Savings Account No.
26580 in the name of Tomas P. Flores, and having somehow illegally obtained possession
of Philippine Bank of Communications Check No. U-186378, dated July 14, 1973, pay to
cash, in the amount of P225.00, issued by F. DYCAICO, and therefore a commercial
document, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously forge and falsify and/or
cause to be forged and falsified the aforesaid check by then and there erasing and altering
and/or causing to be erased and altered the date and amount of said check and
superimposing or causing to be superimposed over the original date and amount of said
check the following: 'Aug. 9' after the printed word 'MANILA', the figures '73' after the
figures 19', the figures 'P18,060.00' after the sign 'P' and the words 'Eighteen Thousand
Sixty Only' after the printed word 'PESOS', thus causing it to appear as it did appear that
said check was issued on August 9, 1973, for the amount of P18,060.00, when in truth and
in fact as the said accused well knew, the correct date of said check is July 14, 1973, and
the real amount of the check so drawn and issued by said F. DYCAICO is only for
P225.00, thereby making or causing to be made alterations and changes in a genuine
document which altered or changed its meaning: that once the aforesaid check had been
forged and falsified, altered or otherwise changed in the manner above set forth, said
accused affixed the signature Tomas P. Flores at the back thereof and deposited said check
in his account with the Security Bank and Trust Company, Escolta Branch, this City,
which check was cleared by the Philippine Bank of Communications upon presentation
thereof believing that said check is genuine; and thereafter, said accused, with intent to
defraud, withdrew from said account the amounts of P10,000.00 and P5,500.00 on August
16, 1973 and August 17, 1973 respectively, or a total of P15,500.00, which amount, once in
his possession, said accused misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Security Bank and Trust
Company and/or the Philippine Bank of Communications in the aforesaid amount of
P15,500.00, Philippine currency." (Italics supplied.)3
On the same date, appellant was also charged in Criminal Case No. 15007 with attempted
estafa thru falsification of a commercial document before the same court under the
following information:
"That on or about and during the period comprised between August 18, 1973 and 'August
22, 1973, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a
depositor of the Security Bank and Trust Company, Escolta Branch, this City, under
Savings Account No. 26580, conspiring and confederating together with one whose true
name, identity and present whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping each
other, with intent to defraud, commenced the commission of the crime of estafa thru
falsification of commercial document directly by overt acts, to wit: the said accused having
somehow obtained possession of Philippine Bank of Communications Check No. U-186414,
dated August 11, 1973, pay to cash, in the amount of P2,030.00 issued by F. DYCAICO,
and therefore a commercial document, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously forge and falsify and/or cause to be forged and falsified the aforesaid check by
then and there erasing and altering and/or causing to be erased and altered the amount of
said check and superimposing or causing to be superimposed over the original amount of
said check the figures 'P18,060.00' after the sign 'P' and the words 'Eighteen Thousand
Sixty Only' after the printed word 'Pesos', thus causing it to appear, as in fact it did appear,
that said check was issued for the amount of P18,060.00, when in truth and in fact as the
accused well knew, the correct and real amount of the check so drawn and issued by said
F. DYCAICO is only for P2,030.00 thereby making or causing to be made alterations and
changes in a genuine document which altered or changed its meaning; that once the
aforesaid check had been forged and falsified, altered or otherwise changed in the manner
above set forth, said accused affixed the signature Tomas P. Flores at the back of said check
and deposited the same in his account with the Security Bank and Trust Company, the
latter believing that said check is genuine, accepted the same for deposit, and thereafter,
the said accused with intent to defraud, accomplished a withdrawal slip for the sum of
P15,500.00 and presented the same to the teller of the Security Bank and Trust Company
for the purpose of withdrawing the said amount, but the said accused did not perform all
the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of estafa thru falsification of a
commercial document by reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous desistance,
that is, by the timely discovery made by the officials and/or employees of said bank of the
forgery and falsification made on the aforesaid check before payment could be made which
led then and there to the apprehension of said accused." (Emphasis ours.) 4
Appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned in both cases, which were subsequently
ordered consolidated. In his defense at the trial, and later adopted for the same purpose in
his brief, appellant claims:
'That on August 9, 1973, he went to the Supersonic Auto Supply, situated at the corner of
España and P. Leoncio Sts., Sampaloc, Manila. He went there to buy auto spare parts as
he is engaged in the buying and selling of auto spare parts. When he was at this store, a
person whom accused claimed to know later as Jimmy Go, was also buying tires. The store
did not have tires for sale, and so the tire salesman pointed to the accused as one who is
selling such stuff. So, this man went to the accused and asked him if he had tires for sale.
Accused asked the man who introduced himself to the accused as Jimmy Go, how many
tires he needed. This man told the accused he needed twenty-four (24) pieces of tires.
Accused told this 'Jimmy Go' that he had the 24 tires but that he needed cash. Accused
told 'Jimmy Go' that he does not accept checks for payment, especially he did not know
him. Accused claims that that was the first time he had met this man 'Jimmy Go'. 'Jimmy
Go', however, told the accused that he can issue the check and he can deliver the tires only
after having encashed the same. To this proposition, the accused agreed. 'Jimmy Go',
therefore, brought out a check, now Exh. A, and then signed it in his presence. He signed
the name 'F. Dycaico'. He then crossed the check at the upper left hand corner of the check.
Accused claims that except the signature and the lines used to cross the check as
aforementioned all the other handwritten portions of the check were already there when
'Jimmy Go' signed it.
"After signing Exh. A, 'Jimmy Go' handed it to the accused. Seeing the amount to be
big, as the cost price of the 24 pieces of tires was only about P3,000.00, more or less, the
accused told 'Jimmy Go' that he has no cash to return for the difference. 'Jimmy Go' told
him to just deliver the difference after he has encashed it. So the accused got the check and
they parted.
"He claimed he went to the SBTC on 13 August 1973 as he deposited the check (Exh.
A) in his bank account (passbook, Exh. C), filling up therefor a deposit slip (Exh. B.). The
accused claimed that on 13 August 1973, he went to withdraw P10,000.00, accomplishing
Exh. E. After withdrawing P10,000.00, the accused went to España St. and delivered to
'Jimmy Go' the P10,000.00. He delivered the tires in the afternoon. On that same day,
'Jimmy Go' told the accused that he needed the balance of the money and so he said that
he delivered the balance of P5,500.00 on 16 August 1973. On this date, 16 Aug. 1973, as
per his claim, 'Jimmy Go' again delivered to him another check (Exh. H) as 'Jimmy Go' was
buying another fifty (50) pieces of tires. So, he took the check and deposited it with SBTC
on his account (passbook, Exh. C). He claims he could not get the proceeds of the checks
because at the time he was withdrawing from his deposit, two men approached him and
immediately handcuffed him"5
On November 26, 1973 the trial court rendered judgment6 finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the felonies charged in both cases, the decretal portion of its decision
reading as follows:
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court finding the guilt of the
accused for the crime charged in both cases (No. 15006 and 15007) to have been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, and there being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances to affect his penal liability, hereby imposes upon the accused and sentences
him to suffer:
(a) In Crim. Case. No. 15006
an indeterminate penalty of from FOUR (4) years and TWO (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) years and ONE (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify the Security Bank
and Trust Company the sum of P18,060.00, sans subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs; and
(b) In Crim. Case No. 15007
an indeterminate penalty of from TWO (2) years, FOUR (4) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum, with all the
accessory penalties of the law, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00 and to suffer a subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 a day, but in no case shall it exceed
one-third (1/3) of the term of the sentence nor shall it continue for more than one year, and
to pay the costs.
"The accused shall first serve the sentence imposed in Crim. Case No. 15006, to which
shall be credited four-fifths (4/5) of his preventive imprisonment in the service of his
sentence.
SO ORDERED."7
Not satisfied therewith, petitioner interposed an appeal with respondent Court of Appeals,
docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 16246-47-Cr. Respondent court, in a decision promulgated
on September 26, 1977, affirmed the judgment of conviction but modified the penalties in
both cases as follows:
"In Criminal Case No. 15006
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of prision
mayor, as maximum, with all the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the Security
Bank and Trust Company in the sum of P18,060.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; and to pay the costs; and
In Criminal Case No. 15007
to suffer the penalty of four (4) months and twenty (20) days of arresto mayor, and to
pay the costs.
"The Accused shall first serve the sentence imposed in Criminal Case No. 15006 and
shall be credited with the term of his preventive imprisonment in accordance with Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 61 27.
SO ORDERED."8
Culled from the submissions of both parties in the present appeal and the established facts
of these cases, the issues raised and submitted for determination by us may be synthesized
into whether or not respondent court erred—
(1) In supposedly changing the tenor and/or nature of the accusation and convicting
appellant on the basis of this new accusation without having informed him of the nature
and cause of the accusation;
(2) In holding that there is a crime of attempted estafa and convicting appellant of such
crime in the absence of the essential elements of deceit and damage; and
(3) In arriving at a conclusion of guilt of the crimes of attempted estafa and estafa, both
thru falsification of commercial documents, on the basis merely of a presumption of law,
despite the absence of evidence showing that appellant committed, or had knowledge of,
the crimes charged, in violation of the constitutional presumption of innocence and
doctrinal jurisprudence on proof beyond reasonable doubt in favor of appellant.
Parenthetically, this petition for review on certiorari was formerly denied in a
Resolution of this Court, dated August 18, 1978,9 but was later on given due course on a
Motion for Reconsideration and/or for New Trial,10 based inter alia, on an alleged letter of
one Jimmy Go dated August 14, 1978, which appellant supposedly received on August 21,
1978 and which he claims he could not have discovered and produced during the trial of
the cases despite diligent efforts to produce the same. Mere zerox copies of the supposed
letter and the mailing envelope were appended to said motion.
We do not, however, deem it proper to include the aforesaid matter in the issues above
enumerated considering that the requirement in the 1964 Rules of Court11, which was then
in force, to the effect that a motion for new trial must be supported by affidavits of the
witnesses by whom such evidence is expected to be given, has not been complied with; and
(b) the judgment of conviction will not in any way be affected by such evidence the
authenticity and credibility whereof have not been established, aside from the obvious fact
that the tenor thereof is inherently improbable and such a letter could easily be concocted.
Coming now to the first issue, appellant alleges that there is a variance between the
allegations in the information and the evidence adduced, thereby depriving him of the right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The rule that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense not charged or included in
the information is based upon the right to be informed of the true nature and cause of the
accusation against him.12 However, respondent court exhaustively discussed this issue and
lucidly explained the facts upon which its judgment of conviction was predicated, thus:
"It is a fact that under the two informations, the mode of falsification attributed to the
Accused is that of having erased and altered the dates and amounts of the checks in
question, and superimposing or causing to be superimposed over the original dates and
amount of said checks other dates and amounts, thereby making alterations and changes
in genuine documents which changed their meaning, Clearly, therefore, the offense
charged is that penalized under Article 172 in relation to Article 171 (6) of the Revised
Penal Code.
"It is to be noted, however, that presented in evidence by the prosecution for the First
Case were two checks, Exhs. 'A' and 'O', which both bear the identical Check No. U-186378
but the former bears the amount of P225.00, while the latter that of P18,060.00, both
drawn and issued by 'F. Dycaico'. For the Second Case, two checks were likewise presented,
Exhs. 'H' and 'P' which bear the identical Check No. U-186414, but the former bears the
amount of P2,030.00, while the latter that of P18,060.00, both drawn and issued by 'F.
Dycaico'.
"Prosecution witness, Florencio Dycaico, admitted that he issued the checks, Exhs. 'O'
and 'P', in the amounts of P225.00 and P2,030.00, respectively, but denied having issued
at all the checks, Exhibits 'A' and 'H', both in the respective amounts of P18,060.00.
"It has to be conceded, therefore, as alleged by the defense, and as likewise admitted by
the People, that considering the evidence adduced, there were no erasures nor alterations
nor superimpositions as alleged in both Informations, but that Exhibits 'A' and 'H' were
forgeries in toto. In other words, while the Accused has been charged of Estafa and
Attempted Estafa thru Falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 in
relation to Article 171, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code, reading—
'Art. 171. x x x shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
'x x x
'6. Making any alterations or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its
meaning/
based on the evidence, the accusation would fall under either paragraph 1 or 2 of Article
171 of the same Code which reads:
1. '1.Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. '2.Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate.'
"Be that as it may, as pointed out by the State, the aforementioned variance affects
solely the charge of Falsification, of which the Accused should not have been convicted
under the time-honored rule that an Accused should be informed of the true nature and
cause of the accusation against him. However, with respect to the charges of Estafa and
Attempted Estafa, respectively, (complexed under the two Informations with Falsification
of a Commercial Document) conviction would still be proper, the two essential requisites
of Estafa, namely fraud or deceit and damage to another, having been charged and
proven."13
On the second issue, appellant contends that .respondent court erred in convicting him of
attempted estafa in Criminal Case No. 15007 when it admitted in its decision that
appellant was not able to withdraw the value of the second check as he was apprehended
in the act of withdrawing the same. From this, he argues that having failed to withdraw
the sum as part value of the second check, no amount whatsoever was taken by him, hence
no damage or prejudice was suffered by the bank. Absent such damage, he concludes, he
can not be convicted of attempted estafa.
This is specious argumentation.
Basically, the two essential requisites of fraud or deceit and damage or injury must be
established by sufficient and competent evidence in order that the crime of estafa may be
established.14Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact (whether by words or
conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon
it to his legal injury.15 The fact that appellant was the possessor and utterer of the checks
in question (Exhibits "A" and "H") and having benefited from the subsequent withdrawals,
as well as having attempted to gain by trying to withdraw an amount thereon, the
inevitable conclusion would be that he was the one who falsified said Exhibits "A" and "H".
Ineluctably, the use of the spurious checks is by itself fraud or deceit.
Although one of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended
party,16 in the absence of proof thereof the offender would at least be guilty of attempted
estafa. Appellant commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but he failed to perform
all the acts of execution which would produce the crime, not by reason of his own
spontaneous desistance but because of his apprehension by the authorities before he could
obtain the amount. Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself has
been shown, respondent court correctly convicted appellant of attempted estafa.
Lastly, appellant insists that there is no evidence whatsoever pointing to him as the
person who falsified the two checks in question (Exhs. "A" and "H"), as the prosecution
failed to refute his version regarding the circumstances under which he allegedly took
possession of the said checks. He further posits the view that while the courts may apply
the presumptions of law in some cases, the presumption that the possessor of a falsified
document is presumed to be the forger does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt
and cannot be applied in his case, allegedly because the provisions not only of the
Constitution but also of the Rules of Court must be the basis of the judgment. We disagree.
While it may appear that the prosecution failed to directly contradict the claim of
appellant as to how he came into possession of the two checks, it is understandable that
the prosecution would not always have the means for obtaining such direct evidence to
confute acts contrived clandestinely. Undoubtedly, too, as a general rule, positive
testimony as to a particular fact, uncontradicted by anyone, should control the decision of
the court. Where, however, there is such an inherent improbability in the testimony or
theory of the witness, the court may properly disregard such evidence, even in the absence
of any direct conflicting testimony. We agree with respondent court that the People's
version of the facts deserves more credence and it is more in consonance with human
experience.
As repeatedly expounded by this Court, evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only
proceed from a credible source but must, in addition, be credible in itself. And by this is
meant that it shall be natural, reasonable and probable as to make it easy to believe.17 No
better test has yet been found to determine the value of the testimony of a witness than its
conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind. 18 As bewailed by the
court below, the theory espoused by appellant "is taxing too much the credulity of this
Court, an insult to the humble intelligence and the common sense of this Court." 19
The checks in question (Exhibits "A" and "H") were undeniably spurious, or were
forgeries in toto. Prosecution witness Florencio Dycaico categorically testified that he did
not issue said checks but only those checks in the amount of P225.00 and P2,030.00
(Exhibits "O" and "P"). The disclaimer by Dycaico of his alleged signatures on the aforesaid
checks is prima facie evidence of falsification and consequently shifts the burden of
evidence to appellant to prove otherwise, but which burden appellant has not discharged.
 The court a quo, as well as respondent court, posed the question as to the identity of
the forger, and we are satisfied that both courts did not err in relying upon the presumption
that the possessor of a falsified document is presumed to be the author thereof. It is an
established rule that when it is proved that a person has in his possession a falsified
document and makes use of the same, the presumption or inference is justified that such
person is the forger.20 The petitioner has been shown to have been the possessor and
utterer of the two checks (Exhibits "A" and "H") when he made use of and benefited
therefrom by his withdrawals of and attempt to withdraw funds through said checks. The
circumstance, therefore, that appellant made use of and benefited from the falsified
document is a strong evidence that he either himself falsified it or caused the same to be
falsified,21 he being criminally responsible in either case.22 Since appellant is the only
person who stood to be benefited by the falsification of the document that was found in his
possession, it is presumed that he is the material author of such falsification. 23
It is thus apparent that the refusal of respondent Court of Appeals to give credence to
the theory of the defense is substantially supported by the ambient circumstances and the
evidence on record. Besides, this being a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of
respondent court rendered in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the
decision of the trial court, said decision of respondent court is "final", subject only to our
power of review on questions of law.24
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed judgment of respondent
Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., (Chairman), No part. "Ponente" in Court of Appeals.
——o0o——
Abejuela vs. People
G.R. No. 80130. August 19, 1991.*
BENJAMIN ABEJUELA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
Criminal Law; Intent; Accomplice; Knowledge of the criminal intention of the
principal is indispensable in order to hold a person liable as an accomplice.—In a number
of cases decided by this Court, it has been held that knowledge of the criminal intention of
the principal is indispensable in order to hold a person liable as an accomplice. Thus: “It
appearing that the accused who drove the taxicab in which the other accused rode did not
actually take part in the conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery but only furnished the
means through which the robbery could be perpetrated, with knowledge of the said
criminal design, he is not guilty as principal of the crime of robbery with homicide but is
an accomplice therein.” “There is no evidence that appellant had conspired with the
malefactors, nor that he actually participated in the commission of the crime. He cannot,
therefore, be considered as a principal. But in going with them, knowing their criminal
intention and in staying outside of the house with them while the others went inside the
store to rob and kill, appellant effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral
aid, making him guilty as an accomplice.”
Same; Evidence; Evidence necessary to convict; In criminal proceedings, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary before a judgment of conviction can be rendered.—It is
axiomatic that in criminal proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary before
a judgment of conviction can be rendered. Not an iota of doubt must cloud the Court’s mind.
A conviction of a criminal offense must be based on clear and positive evidence and not on
mere assumptions.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Rule that the civil liability is not extinguished by
acquittal where the same is based on reasonable doubt or where the court has expressly
declared that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature.—We decree
the acquittal of Abejuela because we seriously doubt whether he had knowledge of the plan
of Balo to defraud Banco Filipino by means of posting false deposits and withdrawing these
later. Because of this doubt, however, his exoneration will not extinguish his civil liability.
Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the same is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases, or where the
court has expressly declared that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil
in nature.
Criminal Law; Estafa thru falsification of commercial documents; Damages;
Although petitioner was unaware of the criminal workings in the mind of Balo, he
nevertheless unwittingly contributed to their eventual consummation by recklessly
entrusting his passbook to Balo and by signing the withdrawal slips.—It has been
satisfactorily established that Banco Filipino suffered damage in the amount of
P176,145.25 representing the fictitious deposits posted by Glicerio Balo, Jr. and
systematically withdrawn through the passbook of petitioner Abejuela. Although Abejuela,
was unaware of the criminal workings in the mind of Balo, he nevertheless unwittingly
contributed to their eventual consummation by recklessly entrusting his passbook to Balo
and by signing the withdrawal slips. Abejuela failed to exercise prudence and care.
Therefore, he must be held civilly accountable.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Vicente Y. Bayani for petitioner.
FERNAN, C.J.:
In this petition for review by certiorari, petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated September 16, 1987 which affirmed in toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch VII of Palo, Leyte, dated January 11, 1984, convicting him
as an accomplice in the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document
under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 172
thereof.1
The facts of this case are uncontroverted.
 Petitioner Benjamin Abejuela, a businessman engaged in the manufacture and
fabrication of hand tractors and other agricultural equipment, had a savings deposit with
Banco Filipino, Tacloban Branch. Sometime in April or May 1978, petitioner was
befriended by Glicerio Balo, Jr., an employee of Banco Filipino in the same Tacloban
Branch. On several occasions, petitioner Abejuela and Balo would dine together, go to
nightclubs or have drinking sprees.2 They became close friends. Balo even became the
godfather of Abejuela’s daughter.3 Moreover, Balo offered Abejuela financial assistance in
the latter’s welding business, claiming that he was expecting a large sum of money out of
the insurance policy of his late father.
On August 3, 1978, Balo went to Abejuela’s welding shop to borrow the latter’s
passbook. Abejuela was surprised and thought that it was not possible for Balo to use his
passbook. Balo showed Abejuela some checks purporting to be the proceeds of his father’s
insurance policy. He wanted to deposit the checks in Abejuela’s account with Banco
Filipino. Abejuela then suggested that Balo open his own account. However, Balo explained
that he was prohibited from opening an account with Banco Filipino since he was employed
with that bank as a savings bookkeeper. Abejuela advised Balo to open an account instead
with another bank but Balo insisted that he wanted the checks deposited with Banco
Filipino so that he could facilitate their immediate encashment as well as avail himself of
some privileges. Balo assured Abejuela that there was nothing wrong in allowing him to
use his passbook and even reassured Abejuela that he would accompany him to the bank
to make the deposit.
Accepting Balo’s explanations and assurances, Abejuela entrusted his passbook to Balo.
On August 8, 1978, Balo returned Abejuela’s passbook where a deposit in the amount of
P20,000.00 was already reflected. Once again, Balo assured Abejuela that there was
nothing wrong with the deposit, and stated that he just deposited one of his checks. On the
same, day Balo requested Abejuela himself to withdraw, in the former’s behalf, money from
his account with Banco Filipino. Again with assurances from Balo, Abejuela reluctantly
agreed. He went to Banco Filipino and withdrew the amount of P15,000.00 which he gave
to Balo at a restaurant called Felisa’s Cafe.
Balo’s practice of depositing and withdrawing money using Abejuela’s passbook
continued for quite some time. During the month of August 1978, the account of Abejuela
with Banco Filipino reflected a total deposits of P176,145.00 and a total withdrawal of
P175,607.96.
In the meantime, Abejuela borrowed P20,000.00 from Balo, payable within 90 days
from August 9, 1978. But feeling apprehensive over Balo’s constant use of his passbook,
Abejuela decided to pay his loan on August 31, 1978 by borrowing P10,000.00 from his
father and taking the other P10,000.00 from his business profits. 4 Abejuela also closed his
account with Banco Filipino by surrendering his passbook and withdrawing the balance of
his deposit.
Thereafter, the bank’s accountant and interest bookkeeper discovered a discrepancy
between the interest reconciliation balance and the subsidiary ledger balance. The interest
bookkeeper could not locate the posting reconciliation and the proof reconciliation. He also
notice that Account No. 6701-0160 in the name of Benjamin Abejuela reflected four (4)
large deposits on various dates from August 3, 1978 to August 23, 1978, totaling
P176,145.25, but the deposits slips thereof could not be located.
After further examination of the bank records, the manager, accountant and interest
bookkeeper were convinced that the irregularities were caused by Balo who was the
savings bookkeeper at that time and who had access to Abejuela savings account ledger.
They concluded that Balo was able to manipulate the ledger, by posting the fictitious
deposits after banking hours when the posting machine was already closed and cleared by
the bank accountant.
The bank officials confronted Balo, who feigned ignorance and initially denied the
accusations, but later admitted having posted the false deposits. Petitioner Abejuela was
also implicated because he was the owner of the passbook used by Balo in accomplishing
his fraudulent scheme. On December 5, 1978, an information was filed against Glicerio
Balo, Jr. and Benjamin Abejuela for the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents.5 Separately arraigned, both pleaded “not guilty” to the crime charged.6 Trial
followed.
On May 29, 1979, acting on an application by Banco Filipino, the trial court issued an
order of preliminary attachment against all the properties of accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. and
Benjamin Abejuela not exceeding P176,145.25 in value, the amount allegedly embezzled
or misappropriated. On September 4, 1979, the Deputy Sheriff of Palo, Leyte, filed a return
of service and submitted an inventory of the goods taken from the two accused and which
goods were placed in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation. While the
refrigerator and television set taken from the residence of Abejuela would not command a
good price on account of their poor condition, the goods seized from Balo were appraised at
P62,295.00.7
In the meantime, accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. was reportedly killed by members of the
New People’s Army in the mountains of Mat-i, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, on suspicion
that he was a PC informer and a collaborator. This information came from a rattan
gatherer and former NPA member whose testimony before the court a quo was never
impeached. Consequently, on February 25, 1981, the trial court dismissed the case against
Glicerio Balo, Jr., pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, but without prejudice
to a civil action for recovery of damages arising from the offense which may be instituted
by Banco Filipino and without prejudice also to the reinstatement of the instant criminal
action in the event the accused would turn out to be alive. 8 On September 7, 1981, Banco
Filipino filed a motion praying for the forfeiture in its favor of the goods seized from the
accused which were in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation. On November
5, 1981, the trial court, thru District Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy, granted the motion and
ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to deliver the seized goods to Banco Filipino.
In addition, the bank was authorized to withdraw the savings deposit of Glicerio Balo, Jr.
for eventual reversion to said bank.9 Thereafter, trial continued with respect to petitioner
Abejuela. On January 11, 1984, the lower court adjudged petitioner Abejuela guilty. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Benjamin Abejuela guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as accomplice of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a commercial
document under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 172 thereof
and as the amount involved is more than P22,000 he is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of not less than fifteen (15) years, three months and 11 days to not
more than sixteen (16) years, eight months and 21 days of reclusion temporal, to indemnify
Banco Filipino, Tacloban Branch, in the sum of One Hundred Seventy Six Thousand One
Hundred Forty Five Pesos and Twenty Five Centavos (P176,145.25), without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay one half of the costs.
“On May 29, 1979, the court issued a writ of preliminary attachment of the properties
of defendants Glicerio Balo, Jr. and Benjamin Abejuela. This Attachment is hereby made
permanent.”10
Abejuela appealed to the Court of Appeals. On September 16, 1987, the Appellate Court
affirmed the decision of the trial court. 11 A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
was denied in a resolution dated October 7, 1987. Hence the instant appeal.
Petitioner Abejuela contends that the Appellate Court erred in not acquitting him for
the following reasons:
1. “(1)Accused-petitioner has no knowledge of the criminal intent of his co-accused,
Glicerio Balo, Jr., hence, there being no conspiracy, he cannot be convicted as
principal, neither as accomplice, nor did he benefit from the effects of the crime,
hence, he cannot be convicted even as an accessory.
2. “(2)The lending of the accused-petitioner of his passbook was made in good faith,
and after he was deceived by co-accused Glicerio Balo, Jr. that it is necessary
because as employee of Banco Filipino he cannot deposit in the said Bank.
3. “(3)The presumption of innocence and the ‘equipoise rule’ apply
in favor of accused-petitioner.”12
Respondents, in their comment, maintain that petitioner Abejuela had knowledge of the
fraudulent acts of Glicerio Balo, Jr. They asseverate that petitioner is an intelligent
individual who can take care of his concerns, considering that he is a businessman who
finished third (3rd) year college (commerce).13
Respondent also point out that Abejuela should not only have been convicted as an
accomplice but as a principal by indispensable cooperation, because without the
withdrawal slips which he executed allegedly in spite of his many doubts and
apprehensions, Glicerio Balo, Jr. could not have succeeded in his scheme.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that he had no knowledge at all of the fraudulent
machinations of Balo, and that his act of lending his passbook was done in good faith.
After carefully weighing the arguments of both parties as well as taking into
consideration the evidence on record, we are inclined to believe that petitioner Abejuela
was completely unaware of the malevolent scheme of Balo. From Balo’s own admissions, it
was he who deceived Abejuela through sweet talk, assurances, drinking sprees and parties
and cajoled him into giving in to his requests. Furthermore, during that time, nobody
would have questioned Balo’s source of money and since he had a perfect alibi, i.e. the
insurance proceeds of his later father. When Balo showed Abejuela some checks purporting
to be his father’s insurance proceeds, Abejuela was hoodwinked into believing that Balo
indeed had money. Balo’s request to borrow Abejuela’s passbook in order to facilitate the
encashment of the checks seemed reasonable enough, considering that they were close
friends and “compadres”, Abejuela’s acquiescence to Balo’s overtures is understandable.
Furthermore, the court takes judicial notice of the practice of banks in allowing
anybody to deposit in an account even without the owner’s passbook, as long as the account
number is known. Thus, even without Abejuela’s passbook, the false deposits could still
have been posted by Balo in the savings account ledger of Abejuela. After all, the ledger is
the record of the bank reflecting the transactions of the depositor, while the passbook is
the record of the depositor. More often than not, it is the ledger which is more accurate and
up-to-date. This is the reason why depositors have their passbooks updated for unrecorded
transactions like interests, checks deposited beyond clearance cut-off time and bank
charges.
In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution clearly points at Balo as the one
who had posted the bogus deposits in Abejuela’s ledger. He was also the one who wisely
manipulated petitioner Abejuela in order that the fictitious deposits could be placed at his
(Balo) disposal. Thus, when Balo requested Abejuela to withdraw the amount he had
earlier placed in the latter’s account, Abejuela had no choice but to give in. He actually
believed that the money was really owned by Balo and he did not want Balo to think that
he was interested in it. Thus, the prosecution miserably failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that Abejuela had knowledge of the fraudulent scheme of Balo. The most that could
be attributed to Abejuela was his negligence in lending his passbook and his utter
gullibility.
Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal (in this case, Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is
essential in order that petitioner Abejuela can be convicted as an accomplice in the crime
of estafa thru falsification of commercial document. To be convicted as an accomplice, there
must be cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
However, the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance rendered knowingly or
intentionally, which assistance cannot be said to exist without the prior cognizance of the
offense intended to be committed.
In a number of cases decided by this Court, it has been held that knowledge of the
criminal intention of the principal is indispensable in order to hold a person liable as an
accomplice. Thus:
“It appearing that the accused who drove the taxicab in which the other accused rode did
not actually take part in the conspiracy to commit the crime of robbery but only furnished
the means through which the robbery could be perpetrated, with knowledge of the said
criminal design, he is not guilty as principal of the crime of robbery with homicide but is
an accomplice therein.”14
“There is no evidence that appellant had conspired with the malefactors, nor that he
actually participated in the commission of the crime. He cannot, therefore, be considered
as a principal. But in going with them, knowing their criminal intention and in staying
outside of the house with them while the others went inside the store to rob and kill,
appellant effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him
guilty as an accomplice.”15
It is axiomatic that in criminal proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary
before a judgment of conviction can be rendered. Not an iota of doubt must cloud the
Court’s mind. A conviction of a criminal offense must be based on clear and positive
evidence and not on mere assumptions.16
In the light of the facts and the evidence on record, we believe that the guilt of petitioner
Abejuela has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt for which reason he must be
acquitted. The question that must be resolved now is the effect of Abejuela’s acquittal on
his civil liability.
The Rules provide: “The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction
of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the
civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against
the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for
the damage suffered.”17
We decree the acquittal of Abejuela because we seriously doubt whether he had
knowledge of the plan of Balo to defraud Banco Filipino by means of posting false deposits
and withdrawing these later. Because of this doubt, however, his exoneration will not
extinguish his civil liability. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where
the same is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in
civil cases, or where the court has expressly declared that the liability of the accused is not
criminal but only civil in nature.18
In Banal vs. Tadeo, Jr.,19 we declared: .1s1
“While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil
liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another.
Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability
is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently,
whether or not the same be punishable by law.”
It has been satisfactorily established that Banco Filipino suffered damage in the amount
of P176,145.25 representing the fictitious deposits posted by Glicerio Balo, Jr. and
systematically withdrawn through the passbook of petitioner Abejuela. Although Abejuela,
was unaware of the criminal workings in the mind of Balo, he nevertheless unwittingly
contributed to their eventual consummation by recklessly entrusting his passbook to Balo
and by signing the withdrawal slips. Abejuela failed to exercise prudence and care.
Therefore, he must be held civilly accountable.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, Benjamin Abejuela is hereby ACQUITTED of the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents. However, the writ of
preliminary attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court of Leyte on May 29, 1979
against petitioner’s properties and those of his coaccused Glicerio Balo, Jr. to satisfy their
civil obligation in the amount of P176,145.25 and which was subsequently made
permanent by the said court stands. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., Please see concurring and dissentingstatement.
Bidin, J., In the result.
——o0o——
Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111656. March 20, 1996.*
MANUEL MANAHAN, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Contracts; Lease; A lessor’s acquiescence to lessee’s continued possession of a personal
property is in effect a continuation of the contract under the concept of an implied new lease
on a month to month basis under Article 1670 of the Civil Code.—Thus, when IFC filed
Civil Case No. 26078, it correctly pursued its remedy, and the court, after upholding IFC,
aptly awarded damages to the latter. IFC, however, neither opted to cancel its lease
contract with petitioner nor to see to the execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 26078,
the net effect of which failure was to permit the contract to remain in force in accordance
with Article 1659 of the Civil Code. The decision, it should be noted, was promulgated on
03 April 1978 within the period of the lease contract, i.e., for thirty-six months from May
1976 or until April 1979. IFC’s acquiescence thereafter to petitioner’s continued possession
was, in effect, a continuation of the contract under the concept of an implied new lease on
a month to month basis under Article 1670, of the Civil Code. The contract subsisted until
IFC demanded the return of the equipment on 23 June 1981. From that moment, petitioner
could well be made to answer for the corresponding civil liabilities of a possessor in bad
faith, such as for the loss or deterioration of the thing leased regardless of the cause of such
loss or deterioration, i.e., whether on account of his fault or not.
Same; Same; The Civil Code provisions on the lease of real property which are not
peculiar to immovable property could be made applicable to personal property.—While the
Civil Code contains no special provisions covering personal property, its provisions,
however, on the lease of real property which are not peculiar to immovable property could
be made applicable.
Same; Same; Criminal Law; Estafa; Elements of Estafa under Article 315(b) of the
Revised Penal Code.—The elements of this crime are: (a) that personal property is received
in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed
by a bond; (b) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has
so received it or a denial on his part that he received it; (c) that such conversion, diversion
or denial is to the injury of another; and (d) that there be demand for the return of the
property.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Although a contract of lease is not fiduciary in
nature, still the clause “any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return” personal property is broad enough to include a “civil obligation.”—Petitioner did
receive the dump truck from IFC under a lease contract with the specific provision under
paragraph 10 thereof requiring petitioner to return the equipment to IFC “at the expiration
of the period or extended period hereof or earlier termination of (the) agreement.” Although
a contract of lease is not fiduciary in nature, still the clause “any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return” personal property is broad enough to include a
“civil obligation.”
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Equally essential before the offense of estafa under
Art. 315(b) of the Revised Penal Code can be considered committed, is that the refusal or
failure to deliver or return is, in turn, predicated on misappropriation or conversion by the
accused of the subject of the obligation.—Equally essential, however, before the offense can
be considered committed, is that the refusal or failure to deliver or return is, in turn,
predicated on misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the subject of the
obligation. The appellate court has ruled that petitioner’s “unexplained failure to return
the truck to IFC during all the long time that he indisputably could have done so
constituted abuse of confidence and virtual conversion.” This conclusion looks to be too
sweeping. Although, clearly, petitioner has incurred default in his obligation to return the
leased unit, it is, nonetheless, unrebutted that he did exert all efforts to recover and
retrieve, albeit belatedly and to no avail, the dump truck from Gorospe. The facts on record
contrast, in our view, to the idea of a refusal to comply with an undertaking to return the
property on account of misappropriation or conversion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for it to
be a felony—ineptitude should not be confused with criminal intent.—Not to be overlooked
is that this felony falls under the category of mala in se offenses that require the
attendance of criminal intent. Evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for it to be a
felony. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. Petitioner might have been an inept
businessman in failing to promptly obtain possession of the dump truck in Tarlac following
the expiration of the sublease in favor of Gorospe; such ineptitude, nevertheless, should
not be confused with criminal intent.
Criminal Law; Civil Liability; Damages; An acquittal based on reasonable doubt that
the accused committed the crime charged does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability
where a mere preponderance of evidence is required.—An acquitted person, nevertheless,
cannot always escape from civil liability in the attendance of facts from which such liability
might arise. Corollarily, an acquittal based on reasonable doubt that the accused
committed the crime charged does not necessarily exempt him from civil liability where a
mere preponderance of evidence is required. Petitioner must, therefore, be held responsible
for the value (P55,000.00) of the lost dump truck.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Homer N. Mendoza for petitioner.
VITUG, J.:
Petitioner Manuel L. Manahan, Jr., seeks, in a petition for review on certiorari, the
reversal of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification the judgment
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 58,2 which has found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa.
On 10 May 1976, petitioner, as lessee, and IFC Leasing and Acceptance Corporation
(“IFC”), as lessor, entered into an Equipment Lease Agreement (Contract No. LC-2644)
over an Isuzu dump truck (Motor No. E120-206525 and Serial No. TMK47E-1732972). The
lease was for a period of thirty-six (36) months from May, 1976, at a monthly rental of
P3,541.20 with an initial “deposit” of P24,000.00. 3 The dump truck was delivered to
petitioner on 30 April 1976.4 The parties, on 16 September 1976, entered into another
Equipment Lease Agreement (Contract No. LC-2729) over one unit of Kimco Hough
JH65CN Payloader (Motor No. 10282261 and Serial No. JH65CN8484)5 to last for forty-
eight (48) months beginning September of 1976 at a monthly rental of P5,311.80.6
On 15 March 1977, IFC filed a complaint for a sum of money, with replevin and
damages, against petitioner before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Civil Case No.
26078).7 IFC averred that petitioner had incurred “several defaults” and owed, in rentals
and expenses, the sum of P160,110.18 as of 20 February 1977 on the lease of the dump
truck and another P249,975.44 as of 05 March 1977 on the lease of the payloader. Aside
from said amounts, IFC also prayed for 12% interest thereon, plus an equivalent of 20% of
the sum, conformably with the terms of the two lease agreements.
On 03 April 1978, the court8 rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which stated:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant (a) confirming the right of the plaintiff to the ownership and possession of the
personal properties heretofore described; (b) ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff:
“(1) On the first cause of action: The sum of P160,110.18, plus interest at 12% from
February 20, 1977 until fully paid, and a further amount equivalent to 20% of the amounts
due, as attorney’s fees; “(2) On the second cause of action: The sum of P249,975.44, plus
interest thereon at 12% from March 5, 1977 until fully paid, and the further sum
equivalent to 20% of the amount due as attorney’s fees; and
“(c) To pay the costs.
“SO ORDERED.”9
It would appear that an execution of the decision was not pursued. Instead, on 23 June
1981, IFC’s counsel, Attorney Jose Redoblado, sent a letter to petitioner about his still
unsettled accounts under the two contracts. Since the demand had not been heeded, IFC,
this time, charged petitioner with estafa. The information was filed on 15 March 1983 and
raffled to Branch 58 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati; it read:
“That in or about and during the period from April 30, 1976 and September 7, 1976, in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in accordance to a Lease Agreement received
from IFC-LEASING AND ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION One (1) Unit Isuzu Dump
Truck and One (1) Unit Kimco Hough JH65CN Payloader all valued at P110,000.00, with
the obligation to pay rentals as agreed upon and to return the said equipments upon
termination of the lease period, but accused far from complying with his obligation, with
intent of gain, grave abuse of confidence and to defraud the herein complainant, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to
his own personal use and benefit the said equipments, and despite demands failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to return the said equipments, to the damage and
prejudice of said IFC-LEASING AND ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, represented by
one ARMANDO M. MARCELO, in the aforementioned amount of P110,000.00.
“Contrary to law.”10
When arraigned on 25 July 1983, petitioner pleaded “not guilty” to the charge. At the trial,
Melecio Rayosa, records custodian of the IFC, and Leonardo Gado, a security guard and
liaison officer of the Bureau of Land Transportation (“BLT”), were presented by the
prosecution at the witness stand. Rayosa identified the lease agreement covering the Isuzu
dump truck11 and the delivery receipt showing that petitioner received the equipment on
30 April 1976.12 Rayosa said that the collection department of IFC demanded from
petitioner the payment of unpaid monthly rentals, and that the demand was followed by a
letter, dated 23 June 1981, of Atty. Redoblado to petitioner asking that the latter’s separate
accounts under the lease contracts be settled.13 Rayosa confirmed the civil case previously
filed by IFC against petitioner.14 Gado testified, mainly, that the original registration
certificate15 of the Isuzu dump truck was surrendered to the BLT.16
Parenthetically, the payloader, the leased equipment under Contract No. LC-2729,
would appear to have, in fact, been recovered by IFC and later disposed of by it.
Petitioner admitted having entered into the lease contracts with IFC, receiving the
subject units and failing to return the dump truck.17 Apparently, the truck was subleased
to one Mr. Gorospe for the hauling of aggregate materials. After the sublease was
terminated, petitioner tried to retake possession of the unit but he was unsuccessful.
Testimony was adduced that in June 1983, malefactors, numbering about ten persons,
allegedly “men of Gorospe and Espino,” dismantled the truck, loaded the parts into another
truck, and left only its chassis. The matter was reported to the barangay captain but
“nothing happened.” Petitioner was furious when informed of the incident but there was
not much, he said, that he could do.18
On 27 July 1989, the trial court rendered its decision convicting petitioner of estafa;
hence—
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and hereby sentences him to an indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum and to indemnify
the offended party the amount of P55,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
“SO ORDERED.”19
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals contending, among other things, that the
fourth element of the crime of estafa, namely, the misappropriation or conversion by the
accused of the thing received to the prejudice of another, was not present in this case. He
averred that his failure to return the dump truck was due to circumstances beyond his
control, and that it was not he but other persons, particularly Gorospe and Espino and
their men, who unlawfully detained the vehicle.20
On 21 May 1993, the Court of Appeals21 promulgated its decision which affirmed,
except for the penalty which was modified, the trial court’s judgment; thus:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered affirming the appealed decision, with the
modification that the proper penalty which the appellant should suffer is the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Costs against appellant.
“SO ORDERED.”22
The appellate court ratiocinated that—
“Under Article 315, subdivision 4, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements
of estafa with abuse of confidence are:
1. “1)that money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
2. “2)that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. “3)that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
4. “4)that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
“x x x xxx x x x.
“ ‘All the foregoing elements are present in this case. The dump truck, a personal property
was received by the accused who was under obligation to pay rentals as agreed upon and
to return the said equipment upon the termination of the lease period. Accused did not
return the equipment to the offended party as accused subleased it to a certain Mr.
Gorospe, although accused has no authority to sub-lease the equipment to a third person.
Granting therefore that Manuel Manahan, Jr. has no intention of defrauding the owner of
the truck, accused certainly committed abuse of confidence when he sub-leased the
equipment without the knowledge and consent of the owner. In sub-leasing the truck to
Mr. Gorospe, accused assumed the right to dispose of it as if it is his (Viada, 446) thereby
committing conversion.’ (p. 3, Appealed Decision)
“The appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of the
owner thereof, is the essence of estafa through misappropriation. The words ‘convert’ and
‘misappropriate’ connote an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were
one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. (Saddul,
Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 192 SCRA 277).
“Appellant’s contention that one element of estafa, that is, misappropriation or
conversion, is not present in the case at bar, is untenable. It must be recalled that under
the lease agreement entered into by and between complainant and appellant, any breach
of the lease by the latter as lessee would entitle the lessor, upon demand, to the return and
possession of the vehicle in question (Exh. ‘A,’ p. 175, Records). Admittedly, appellant failed
to pay the stipulated monthly rentals. Despite IFC’s demand for the return of the vehicle
and the decision rendered in its (IFC’s) favor in Civil Case No. 26078, appellant, had failed
to give the equipment back to its rightful owner. From that time on, appellant Manahan
could already be considered to have committed the crime of estafa. His allegation that he
could not return the chattel because it had been taken by certain persons, namely, Mr.
Gorospe and Capt. Espino, fails to persuade. He received IFC’s demand letter on July 6,
1981 (p. 157, Records). The judgment in Civil Case No. 26078 confirming said corporations’
right to ownership and possession of the subject leased equipment was rendered on April
3, 1978 (p. 191, ibid.). The alleged taking of the vehicle was in June, 1983 (TSN, p. 5, March
16, 1988). Had appellant returned the truck to IFC upon the latter’s demand, such taking
of the dump truck by Gorospe, if it were true, would not have occurred. Clearly, accused’s
unexplained failure to return the truck to IFC during all the long time that he
undisputably could have done so constituted abuse of confidence and virtual conversion.
“Appellant’s contention that he did not sublease the truck to another cannot relieve him
of any liability in the present case either. For, during the time that said vehicle remained
in the possession of the appellant, the complainant had been deprived of its right to use
the same. In other words, there had been a disturbance of the property rights of the
offended party. To repeat, the words ‘convert’ and ‘misappropriate’ connote an act of using
or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own.”23
On a motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals, 24 finding no sufficient reason to
modify its decision, refused to reconsider.25
The petition before us would fault the appellate court in concluding that petitioner is guilty
of estafa given the circumstances heretofore narrated. Petitioner argues that the mere act
of subletting the dump truck to another person without the knowledge and consent of the
lessor does not necessarily constitute estafa.
There is merit in the petition.
There could be no question about the fact that petitioner, in subletting the dump truck,
violated the lease contract with IFC. The pertinent paragraph of the contract, Exhibit A,
provided:
“2. UTILITY: The Lessee agrees that the equipment under lease shall be installed and/or
utilized at its premises in Manila or such other places as may be designated in the
Schedule, and shall not, under any circumstances be removed therefrom without the
consent of the Lessor first obtained in writing. The Lessee further agrees not to part with
the possession of, sub-lease, pledge, or otherwise encumber or dispose of the leased
equipment; x x x. If Lessee uses or allows the leased property to be used for illegal purposes
or for purposes not permitted under this lease, Lessee agrees to reimburse Lessor for all
damages sustained by Lessor as a result of such misuse including, without limitations,
payment of any fine or fines which may be imposed on Lessor. In addition to, and
notwithstanding its right to such reimbursement, Lessor may in such event at its option
cancel this lease by notifying Lessee to (sic) such cancellation in writing.”26 (Italics
supplied.)
Thus, when IFC filed Civil Case No. 26078, it correctly pursued its remedy, and the court,
after upholding IFC, aptly awarded damages to the latter. IFC, however, neither opted to
cancel its lease contract with petitioner nor to see to the execution of the decision in Civil
Case No. 26078, the net effect of which failure was to permit the contract to remain in force
in accordance with Article 1659 of the Civil Code. 27 The decision, it should be noted, was
promulgated on 03 April 1978 within the period of the lease contract, i.e., for thirty-six
months from May 1976 or until April 1979. IFC’s acquiescence thereafter to petitioner’s
continued possession was, in effect, a continuation of the contract under the concept of an
implied new lease on a month to month basis under Article 1670, of the Civil Code. 28 The
contract subsisted until IFC demanded the return of the equipment on 23 June 1981. From
that moment, petitioner could well be made to answer for the corresponding civil liabilities
of a possessor in bad faith,29 such as for the loss or deterioration of the thing leased
regardless of the cause of such loss or deterioration, i.e., whether on account of his fault or
not.
But did petitioner likewise incur criminal liability, specifically under Article 315(b) of
the Revised Penal Code, for estafa? Respondents reply in the affirmative, allegedly in
petitioner’s—
“x x x misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any
other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.”30
The elements of this crime are: (a) that personal property is received in trust, on
commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to
make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond;
(b) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received
it or a denial on his part that he received it; (c) that such conversion, diversion or denial is
to the injury of another; and (d) that there be demand for the return of the property. 31
Petitioner did receive the dump truck from IFC under a lease contract with the specific
provision under paragraph 10 thereof requiring petitioner to return the equipment to IFC
“at the expiration of the period or extended period hereof or earlier termination of (the)
agreement.”32 Although a contract of lease is not fiduciary in nature, still the clause “any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return” personal property is
broad enough to include a “civil obligation.”33 Equally essential, however, before the offense
can be considered committed, is that the refusal or failure to deliver or return is, in turn,
predicated on misappropriation or conversion by the accused of the subject of the
obligation.
The appellate court has ruled that petitioner’s “unexplained failure to return the truck
to IFC during all the long time that he indisputably could have done so constituted abuse
of confidence and virtual conversion.”34 This conclusion looks to be too sweeping. Although,
clearly, petitioner has incurred default in his obligation to return the leased unit, it is,
nonetheless, unrebutted that he did exert all efforts to recover and
retrieve, albeit belatedly and to no avail, the dump truck from Gorospe. The facts on record
contrast, in our view, to the idea of a refusal to comply with an undertaking to return the
property on account of misappropriation or conversion.
Not to be overlooked is that this felony falls under the category of mala in se offenses
that require the attendance of criminal intent. Evil intent must unite with an unlawful act
for it to be a felony. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35 Petitioner might have been
an inept businessman in failing to promptly obtain possession of the dump truck in Tarlac
following the expiration of the sublease in favor of Gorospe; such ineptitude, nevertheless,
should not be confused with criminal intent.36
At any rate, any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Indispensable for conviction is—
“x x x such proof ‘to the satisfaction of the court, keeping in mind the presumption of
innocence, as precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to
support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that
the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of
the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty—a certainty that convinces and satisfies the
reason and the conscience of those who are to act upon it.’ ”37
An acquitted person, nevertheless, cannot always escape from civil liability in the
attendance of facts from which such liability might arise. 38 Corollarily, an acquittal based
on reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime charged does not necessarily
exempt him from civil liability where a mere preponderance of evidence is
required.39 Petitioner must, therefore, be held responsible for the value (P55,000.00) of the
lost dump truck.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa under Article
315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal
Code but he shall pay the IFC Leasing and Acceptance Corporation the amount of
P55,000.00 representing the value of the lost dump truck with 12% interest per
annum from July 1981 (the month following the demand of 23 June 1981) until full
payment of said amount. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Petitioner acquitted but ordered to pay P55,000.00 to IFC Leasing and Acceptance
Corporation.
Notes.—When the implementing sheriff seized the items not mentioned in the writ of
replevin on his own initiative, he acted beyond the scope of his authority. (Normal Holdings
and Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 383[1991])
The crime of estafa committed by an agent against his principal is separate from the
crimes of estafa committed against individual lot buyers. (Ilagan vs. Court of Appeals, 239
SCRA 575 [1994])
——o0o——
Saddul, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 91041. December 10, 1990.*
JOSE A. SADDUL, JR., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Law; Estafa; The appropriation or conversion of money or property received,
to the prejudice of the owner thereof, is the essence of estafa through misappropriation.—
One of the ways of committing the crime of estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence is: "(b) By misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another, money,
goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of
or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a
bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property."
(Art. 315, par. 1 subpar. b, Rev. Penal Code.) The appropriation or conversion of
money or property received, to the prejudice of the owner thereof, is the essence of estafa
through misappropriation (Ramirez, 9 Phil. 67). The words "convert" and "misappropriate"
connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of
devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate to one's
own use includes, not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt
to dispose of the property of another without right. (Webber vs. Court of Appeals, 57 OG
2937; People vs. Panes, 37 Phil. 118.)
Same; Same; Same; Conversion takes place when p, person actually appropriates the
property of another to his own benefit, use and enjoyment.—Conversion is an unauthorized
assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels belonging
to another, resulting in the alteration of their condition or the exclusion of the owner's
rights. It takes place when a person actually appropriates the property of another to his
own benefit, use, and enjoyment (Trinidad vs. Court of Appeals, 53 OG 731 citing Bouvier's
Law Dictionary).
Same; Same; Estafa with Abuse of Confidence, Elements of.—Theelements of the
crime of embezzlement or estafa with abuse of confidence are: (a) that personal property is
received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other circumstance
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is
guaranteed by a bond; (b) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the
person who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it; (c) that such
conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another, and (d) that there be demand for
the return of the property, (p. 247, Vol. III, 1988 Ed., Revised Penal Code by R.C. Aquino)
PETITION to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Eduardo R. Robles for petitioner.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Before the Court is the Second Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner, Jose A.
Saddul, Jr., praying that we set aside our resolution of April 16, 1990 denying his petition
for review of the decision promulgated on September 1,1989 by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 06234, entitled: "The People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff-Appellee vs. Jose A. Saddul, Jr., Accused-Appellant" which affirmed on appeal the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, finding him guilty of estafa under Article
315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. After deliberating on the motion for
reconsideration and the respondents' comments, the Court resolved to grant the motion
and set aside its resolution of April 16,1990.
In 1973, the petitioner became a vice-president and director of Amalgamated Motors
(Phils.) Inc. (AMPI for brevity) (p. 5, tsn, February 15, 1988). AMPI was then a wholly-
owned subsidiary of British Leyland (p. 31, tsn, November 9,1989). It was the sole
distributor in the Philippines of British and Japanese heavy equipment, trucks, farm
implements, spare parts, and other automative products and machines manufactured by
Leyland International, Land Rover Ltd. (LAND ROVER for brevity), Avelyn Barfourd,
Mitsubishi, and Furokawa (p. 7, tsn, February 15, 1988; p. 6, tsn, November 9, 1987).
Since 1980, Felimon R. Cuevas had been a dealer of AMPI for government sales. In
1981, he bought into the company and became its majority stockholder and president (p.
5, tsn, February 15, 1988). Upon Cuevas' ascendancy in the corporation, Saddul was made
a director as well as Executive Vice-President and General Manager. As such, he was in
charge of the operations of the company and was "delegated" to make sales of some units
and spare parts (p. 7, tsn, November 9,1989). As distributor not only of British but also
Japanese automotive products, AMPI carried an inventory of some P15 to P20 million
worth of spare parts of the companies it represented in the Philippines (p. 37, tsn,
November 9, 1987).
In 1985, LAND ROVER supplied P1.5 million worth of spare parts to the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) through AMPI, but the merchandise were returned to AMPI
because they were not the correct items needed by the AFP (p. 27, tsn, February 15, 1988).
The parts were kept by AMPI pending disposal instructions from LAND ROVER.
On March 4, 1985, Erwin Lyndsay, LAND ROVER's area manager for Southeast Asia,
sent the following letter to Saddul, Executive Vice-President and General Manager of
AMPI, regarding the spare parts rejected by the AFP:
"Dear Joe:
"Further to my letter dated 27 February 1985, we have now given consideration to the
matter of disposal of the Land Rover parts wrongly supplied to A.F.P. and currently
held by Ampi on our behalf, pending disposal instructions from us.
"As agreed in principle during our meeting, we now authorize you to undertake the
disposal of the parts at the best possible prices available from your local market.
"We would expect you to detail to us all sales of part number, quantity sold and price
obtained.
"We agree that a sum amounting to 20% of the sale value be retained by Amalgamated
Motors as a handling charge and that the balance is placed into a separate client
account which will be available to LRPE or any other party authorized by LRPE.
"I trust that these arrangements meet with your approval and will satisfactorily solve the
problem of the AFP parts disposal.
"If you have any problems with the above arrangements or need any further
authorizations at this stage, please do not hesitate to contact me.
"Yours sincerely.
"(SGD)
"ERWIN LYNDSAY
Area Manager
South East Asia" (Italics ours: Exh. I or F. pp. 126,141 RTC Record.)
Saddul sold some of the spare parts (worth P143,085.00) to Rover Motor Parts (a
different entity from LAND ROVER) whose president was Jose P. Garcia. The sales were
evidenced by AMPI Sales Invoices (Exhs. A, A-1, to A-8) and summarized in the Statement
of Accounts dated June 9,1986 (Exh. B) sent by AMPI to Rover Motor Parts. Payments
were made by the buyer to Saddul. AMPI's 20% handling commission on the sale amounted
to P28,617.
Pursuant to LAND ROVER's directive that sale value of these spare parts be "placed
into a separate client account which will be available to LRPE or any other party
authorized by LRPE" (Exh. 1 or F), Saddul did not deposit the proceeds of the sales in
AMPI's account but held them in trust for LAND ROVER. Saddul testified thus:
"ATTY. ROBLES:
"Q Is there any reason why you have not remitted to Amalgamated Motors
Philippines this 20% handling charge?
"A The reason is this transaction covered a lot of spare parts and the
P143,085.00 was only a part of the entire shipment so that there is still an
amount due to Land Rover Ltd. I was requested by Land Rover Ltd. to hold
on to the 20% until a proper account of the other side could be made and
proceeds of items which I do not know, only they would know, how much is
owing Amalgamated Motors Philippines, Inc." (p. 10, tsn, February 15,
1988.)
"ATTY. CALIMA:
"Q So, in other words, the instructions were given to you before you sold to
Rover Motor Parts?
"A Generally, the instruction was to sell it for Land Rover and which I did, sir.
Subsequently, when sales proceeds were received, I asked them what will I
do with the money and they said, keep the money until I can give you the
necess ary authority to open account for Land Rover.
"Q My question to you is when did you receive the instruction from Land
Rover? After the sale or before the sale was effected to Rover Motor Parts?
"A Instructions for what?
"Q To withhold the proceeds and not to remit the proceeds?
"A The instruction to hold, it is after the sale, sir." (p. 23-24, tsn, February 15,
1988.)
"ATTY. CALIMA:
"Q And inspite (sic) of the fact that Amalgamated Motors Philippines, Inc. can
retain 20% handling charge you were still instructed not to remit the 20% to
Amalgamated Motors?
"xxx xxx xxx.
"J. SADDUL JR.:
"A Yes, sir, I was told pending full accounting of the entire volume of the
transaction. As soon as the entire transaction is worked out through the
accounting process then we will know whether Land Rover will owe Mr.
Cuevas or Mr. Cuevas will owe Land Rover.
"Q But again Mr. Witness, you will agree to this portion referring to the
handling charge, it is not qualified by proper accounting?
"A No, it is not, sir. In the letter, it is not." (p. 28, tsn, February 15, 1988.)
Saddul was "terminated" by AMPI in the early part of 1986 for cause or causes that Cuevas
did not disclose, but, according to Edgar Guilatco, a prosecution witness, Saddul "left the
company" (pp. 6-7, tsn, January 6,1988). He thereupon formed his own outfit which he
named "Multipart Motors International, Inc." What appears in the record is that on May
30, 1986, Lyndsay wrote a letter to Saddul enclosing "a note which effectively authorizes
you to act as our distributor" (Exh. 5).
This appointment, although not yet official, must have leaked to, and deeply wounded
AMPI's President Felimon Cuevas. It was presumably the reason why in a letter of the
same date, May 30, 1986, through counsel Atty. Benjamin G. Calima, AMPI demanded
from Saddul an accounting of the spare parts supposedly worth P575,053.50 sold by him
to Rover Motor Parts "during the time when you were still connected with the company"
(Exh. E).
On November 10, 1986, Lyndsay wrote a letter to Cuevas requesting for a statement
on AMPI's inventory of British Leyland spare parts, indicating:
1. "1.Opening stock by part number.
2. "2.Sales made by part number and price obtained.
3. "3.Net proceeds credited to client account.
4. "4.Present stock holding by part number." (p. 127; Exh. G, RTC Record.)
Cuevas replied by telex that some of those spare parts had been sold by Saddul who did
not turn over the proceeds to AMPI, and that he (Cuevas) filed a criminal case against
Saddul "to recover the money so I can remit immediately" (Exh. H). On March 26, 1987,
Lyndsay sent a reply-telex requesting information as to "which items have been sold and
at what price and which items remain in stock" and sought "a reconciliation of this stock"
(Exh. I).
On June 3, 1987, based on Cuevas' complaint, an information for estafa in the amount
of P143,085.00 (I.S. No. 86-20607) was filed against Saddul in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila:
"That in or about and during the period comprised between February 12, 1985 and
September 10, 1985, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud AMALGAMATED MOTORS
(PHILS.), INC., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Republic
of the Philippines with business address at Leyland House, 21st corner Railroad Sts., Port
Area, this City, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, being then the Executive
Vice-President and General Manager of said Amalgamated Motors (Phils.), Inc., having
been authorized by Land Rover Parts & Equipment Ltd., England, to undertake disposal of
rejected spare parts and engines at the best possible prices available in the local
market, which rejected spare parts and engines were then held by Amalgamated Motors
(Phils.), Inc. in behalf of the Land Rover Parts &Equipment Ltd. pending disposal and
instructions from the latter company, actually disposed and offered the said parts and
engines for sale to a certain Jose P. Garcia and obtained from the latter the sum of
P143,085.00 as purchase price of the same, and the said accused, once in possession of the
said sum of P143,085.00, far from complying with his obligation to turn over the proceeds
of the sale to said Amalgamated Motors Phils,, Inc., failed and refused, and still fails and
refuses to do so notwithstanding demands made upon him, and instead, with intent to
defraud, he wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and
converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of
said AMALGAMATED MOTORS (PHILS.) INC. in the aforesaid total amount of
P143,085.00, Philippine currency." (Emphasis supplied; p. 1, RTC Record).
On August 6, 1987, Lyndsay wrote Cuevas requesting that all British Leyland parts in the
possession of AMPI be delivered to Saddul's Multipart Motors Philippines, Inc. "who is our
new parts distributor for the Philippines." He further advised Cuevas that "in view of the
change in distributorship to Multipart Motors, we will not hold you (AMPI) liable" for the
proceeds (P143,085.00) of the spare parts sold by Saddul to Rover Motor Parts. The letter
reads as follows:
"6 August 1987
"Amalgamated Motors (Phils.) Inc.
Railroad Street Corner 21st Street
Port Area
Manila
Philippines
Attention Col. Felimon R. Cuevas
Dear Sirs,
'We have been advised that Security Bank and Trust Co. have obtained a Writ of
Attachment over your properties and assets. We further understand that the parts
supplied in error to Philippine Armed Forces and returned to Amalgamated Motors for
safe keeping have been included under the Attachment. We therefore request that you
inform the bank and the Court that these parts do not form part of your properties and
assets and should in consequence, be released from the Attachment.
"We should also be pleased if you would transfer these parts to: "Multipart Motors
Philippines Inc. who is our new parts distributor for the Philippines.
"We would take this opportunity to raise the matter of the parts and major units which
were already disposed of before the granting of the Writ of Attachment.
"We have been advised by Mr. Jose A. Saddul that he is holding proceeds of sale,
amounting to Pesos 143,084.00, of some of the subject parts in line with instructions
contained in our letter dated 4 March 1985. We believe that you are aware of this
arrangement. Please note that in view of the change in distributorship to Multipart Motors,
we will not hold you liable for this amount, but will accept accounts from Mr. Saddul
covering the parts he has sold. As agreed, we will provide Amalgamated Motors with a
handling charge amounting to 20% of the proceeds and sale of these parts.
"With regard to the balance of parts held by you, we shall be grateful if you will provide
to us an account detailing sales made. Upon receipt we will settle your handling charges at
20% of sales as agreed.
"We look forward to hearing from you.
"Yours sincerely,
(SGD)
ERWIN LYNDSAY
Regional Manager
Export Sales" (Italics supplied; Exh. 2, pp. 142-143, RTC Record)
Despite the advice from Land Rover, AMPI prosecuted the criminal case against Saddul.
On August 29, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding him guilty of estafa with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence (Art. 315, subpar. 1-b, Rev. Penal Code). The
dispositive part of the decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jose A. Saddul, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code, involving the amount of P28,617.00 and in the absence of any
modifying circumstance, hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
of prision mayor, as maximum, to indemnify the offended party, Amalgamated Motors
(Phils.), Inc., in the amount of P28,617.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs." (p. 26, Rollo.)
Saddul appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No. 06234.) On September 1, 1989,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, this petition for review. The
Court has carefully considered the petition for review on certiorari and its annexes, as well
as the comments of the public respondent, including the original records which the Court
caused to be elevated for examination. We find merit in the petition for review.
One of the ways of committing the crime of estafa with unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence is:
"(b) By misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any
other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property." (Art. 315, par. 1
subpar. b, Rev. Penal Code.)
The appropriation or conversion of money or property received, to the prejudice of the
owner thereof, is the essence of estafa through misappropriation (Ramirez, 9 Phil. 67). The
words "convert" and "misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's
property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that
agreed upon. To misappropriate to one's own use includes, not only conversion to one's
personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without
right. (Webber vs. Court of Appeals, 57 OG 2937; People vs. Panes, 37 Phil. 118.)
Conversion is an unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership over
goods or personal chattels belonging to another, resulting in the alteration of their
condition or the exclusion of the owner's rights. It takes place when a person actually
appropriates the property of another to his own benefit, use, and enjoyment (Trinidad vs.
Court of Appeals, 53 OG 731 citing Bouvier's Law Dictionary).
The elements of the crime of embezzlement or estafa with abuse of confidence are:
1. (a)that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or
under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return
the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond;
2. (b)that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so
received it or a denial on his part that he received it;
3. (c)that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another, and
4. (d)that there be demand for the return of the property, (p. 247, Vol. III, 1988 Ed.,
Revised Penal Code by R.C. Aquino)
The first element of the crime does not exist in this case because Saddul did not receive
the Leyland Automotive spare parts from Cuevas or AMPI in trust, on commission, for
administration, or under a duty to make delivery of, or return the same. Saddul received
the Leyland spare parts from the AFP in trust for LAND ROVER which authorized him to
sell them ("we now authorize you to undertake the disposal of the parts at the best possible
prices available from your local market"—Exh. 1 or F, p. 126, RTC Record).
Since Saddul did not convert or divert the property (he sold them in accordance with
the authority given to him by Land Rover) nor did he deny that he received them, the
second element of the crime was also not present.
Saddul's failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale of the spare parts to AMPI or Cuevas
did not constitute a conversion or diversion to the injury of the latter who, not being the
owner of the property, incurred no loss and suffered no injury on account of Saddul's
retention of the said proceeds while awaiting Land Rover's instructions regarding the
special account where he should deposit them. Saddul simply complied with the directive
in Land Rover's letter of March 4, 1985 that the proceeds be "placed into a separate client
account which will be available to LRPE or any other party authorized by LRPE" (Exh. 1
or F). Implicit in this directive was an injunction not to deliver the proceeds to AMPI. The
third element of the crime charged is absent.
The fourth and final element of demand for the return of the property is also lacking.
AMPI or Cuevas made no demand for the return of the spare parts sold by Saddul because
Cuevas knew that those spare parts were to be sold for the account of Land Rover.
While it is true that under Lyndsay's letter of March 4, 1985 (Exh. 1 or F) AMPI was
entitled to a handling commission of 20% of the sale value of the spare parts (equivalent
to P28,617.00) which Saddul failed to deliver to AMPI, Saddul explained that he
subsequently received instructions from Land Rover to hold the 20% commission until
AMPI shall have given an accounting of the remaining Leyland spare parts (worth P1.2
million) still held by AMPI. (pp. 10, 23-28, tsn, February 15, 1988.)
That testimony of Saddul was not controverted by the complainant. On the contrary, it
was confirmed by Lyndsay's letter dated August 6, 1987 to AMPI or Cuevas (Exh. 2) asking
for an accounting of "balance of the parts held by you x x x upon receipt (of which) ** we will
settle your handling charges at 20% of sales as agreed."
By obeying the instructions of Land Rover to withhold payment of AMPI's 20%
handling charge (P28,617.00) Saddul did not become liable for embezzlement to AMPI for
he did not receive that sum from AMPI. It was part of the price he received from Rover
Motor Parts, the buyer of the spare parts.
'Where the accused did not receive the money from the complainant for safekeeping or on
commission or for administration and in trust, he is not criminally liable for failure to
return the money." (Jose Barredo vs. Court of Appeals, 54 OG 1037).
AMPI's recourse, in order to recover its 20% handling charge, is to file a civil action to
collect that amount from its erstwhile principal, Land Rover, not this criminal action for
estafa against Saddul.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated April
16, 1990 is granted. The decision dated September 1, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. 06234 is hereby reversed and set aside. The petitioner is acquitted of the crime
charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ.,concur.
Motion granted. Decision reversed and set aside.
Note.—Prima facie evidence of misappropriation is rebutted, for missing funds not put
to personal uses of accused. (Villacorta vs. People, 145 SCRA 425.)
——o0o——
Celino vs. Court ofAppeals
No. L-77569. June 29,1988.*
RICARDO CELINO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Criminal Law; Estafa under Art. 315, 2(a) of RPC; Case at bar.—There is no merit to
the petitioner's pretense that the transaction between him and the complainant was one
of "joint venture" and that if he had any liability at all, it is civil in nature. The evidence
presented in this case conclusively shows that Ricardo Celino, together with his two sons,
Zosimo (deceased) and Requerido, led the complainant to believe that there was a hidden
treasure underneath his lot; that a dwarf whose spirit supposedly entered the body of
Zosimo directed the digging operations; that to obtain said treasure and upon instructions
of the "dwarf," it was necessary for the complainant to give the accused money which
amounted to P41,300.00 all in all and to pray in the church for three (3) consecutive days.
Under the abovestated facts, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that that
there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that the act committed by the petitioner
constitutes the crime of estafa defined and punished under Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit: Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: x x x 2. By means of any
of the following false pretenses of fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud: (a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
Same; Same; Same; The case of U.S. vs. Clarin is not applicable since there was no
evide?ice adduced that petitiojier and complainant were partners in a "joint venture"
transaction.—Furthermore, no evidence was adduced by petitioner in support of his
contention that he and the complainant were partners in a "joint venture" transaction. The
case of U.S. v. Clarin, 117 Phil. 85 (1910)1 cited by the . petitioner is therefore not
applicable. The facts clearly show that petitioner together with his sons pretended to
possess power to find hidden treasure in order to fleece the complainartt of his hard-earned
money. Contrary to the petitioner's allegation, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly applied the law and jurisprudence laid down by this Court on the matter. Under
the cases ofPeople v. Scott [62 Phil. 553 (1935)] and [7.S. u. de los Reyes [34 Phil. 693
(1916)] bearing similar facts as the case at bar, the acts committed by the petitioner
constitute a classic case of swindling under Art. 315 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code
aforequoted.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
CORTES, J.:
On August 14,1981, the, First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Laguna filed with the Court
of First Instance, Eight Judicial District, Branch IV, Calamba, Laguna, an information for
ESTAFA against Zosimo Celino, Ricardo Celino and Requerido Celino. The information
alleged the following:
That sometime on or about March 17, 1978 and subsequently thereafter, at Brgy. San
Nicolas, Bay, Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to defraud and by means of false pretenses, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously conspiring, confederating and helping with each other
and falsely pretending to possess power, influence and/or imaginary transaction, induced
one JOSE TAN KAPOE to believe that hidden treasures can be recovered in the latter's
yard and as a consequence thereof, demands the sum of P50,230.00 in exchange to such
treasures, as in fact said accused received said amount in trust, and once in possession
thereof, thru deceitful means misappropriated and misapplied said amount to their own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of JOSE TAN KAPOE in the
aforementioned amount of P50,230.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, Rollo.)
Assisted by their counsel, Ricardo Celino and Zosimo Celino pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. During the arraignment accused Requerido Celino remained at large. It appears
that only Ricardo Celino, the petitioner, stood for trial inasmuch as on July 20, 1983, the
trial court dismissed the case against Zosimo Celino who died on June 11,1983.
In a decision dated May 29, 1985, the trial court found accused Ricardo Celino guilty of
the crime charged and sentenced him as follovvs:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the prosecution having established the
participation of accused Ricardo Celino as co-principal, beyond reasonable doubt, in the
commission of the crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code,
the Court hereby finds accused Ricardo Celino guilty thereof and hereby sentences him to
suffer imprisonment, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to two (2) years,
eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional as the MINIMUM to eight (8)
years of prision mayor as the MAXIMUM; and to return to complainant Jose Tan Kapoe
the amount of P41,300.00, and to pay the costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED. (p. 9, Rollo.)
The prosecution's version of the facts as testified to by complainant Jose Tan Kapoe, his
employee-overseer, Feliciano Batitis, his driver, Ricardo de la Cruz and Pat. Jose Batacan,
is summarized in the trial court's decision as follows:
Complainant Jose Tan Kapoe testified that on March 17, 1978, accused Zosimo and Ricardo
Celino together with two (2) other companions went to his house and informed him that
there was a hidden treasure under his lot located in the poblacion of Calauan, Laguna;
that accused Zosimo and Ricardo Celino told him that a certain dwarf entering the body of
Zosimo isgiving instructions to the latter as to the digging operations; that he will be given
millions of pesos; that because he and accused Ricardo Celino as well as their fathers were
close friends, he believed them; that they dug a hole in his ricemill up to May 31, 1978;
that they told him that they discovered a treasure, a jar full of gold; that both accused
Ricardo and Zosimo did not allow him to see it by covering it with a sack and white cloth;
that both Ricardo and Zosimo told him to give Pl0,000.00 and he got the money from his
safety vault, placed it in a white envelope, 6x3 inches, and gave it to the accused Zosimo;
that both Ricardo and Zosimo went inside the little room under the stairs of his house
where they brought the jar filled with treasure and placed the raoney on the treasure; that
Ricardo and Zosimo stayed in the room for about 1/2 hour and then they went out of the
room and closed the door; that Zosimo told him that they are going back upon instructions
of the dwarf and that they will communicate with him again; that the second time, he was
told by the two (2) brothers, Requerido and Cipriano Celino to give P5,000.00 which he also
placed in a white envelope; that he gave the money to Zosimo who together with his father,
accused Ricardo, went inside again the room and they said that they placed the money on
the treasure; that he was forbidden to enter or touch the treasure because the dwarf will
be angry; that the third time, it was Requerido Celino who advised him to give money
allegedly upon instructions of the dwarf and he withdrew money from the Bank of the
Philippine Islands and they went through the same procedure in placing the money in the
white envelope and entering the room; that Zosimo required him to go to the church of
Landayan, located at San Pcdro, Laguna for three (3) consecutive days; that the Celinos
continued to ask for money to be put in the jar and he got from said bank (Exh. A-l); that
all in all, the money which he had given to the accused amounted to P50,230.00 (Exh. A);
that when his savings in the bank was exhausted, he asked them to set a deadline and he
was told May 30, 1979; that he was hoping by that time, he will get back the money and
the gold; that they did not fulfill their promise on May 30, 1979 and so he opened the jar
and found that it contained only newspaper, comics, rocks and soil; that thereafter, he
wrote a letter to Zosimo to return his money through his driver Batitis (Exh. B) and Zosimo
wrote back that he will return the money (Exh. C), (TSN, Hearings of April 28,1982 and
April 21,1983.) Prosecution witness Feliciano Batitis who is working for complainant Tan
Kapoe as an overseer confirmed the fact that he was instructed by complainant to go to the
house of Ricardo and Zosimo at Barrio Maslit and bring the letter (Exh. B) after the jar
was opened and complainant found nothing; and, the fact that Zosimo wrote a letter signed
by "Apo Dapo" the alleged name of the dwarf who were (sic) possessing ("sumasapi") Zosimo
(Exh. C). He likewise testified that he had seen Ricardo and his sons Zosimo and Requerido
in the house of complainant many times in 1978 but he did not hear what they were talking
about; that he saw them after that excavating and digging inside the ricemill; that he saw
complainant give the amounts of P10,000.00 and P5,000.00 to accused Zosimo and Ricardo.
(TSN, HearingofMayl6,1983.)
The third prosecution witness, Ricardo dela Cruz is the driver of herein complainant.
He testified that he saw the three (3) accused digging inside the ricemill; that he
accompanied complainant to get money from the Bank of Philippine Islands; that he saw
complainant give an envelope to accused Ricardo who handed the same to Zosimo and the
latter went inside the room under the stairs, that after Zosimo got out of the room,
complainant was told not to touch the envelope containing money which he left inside the
room; that accused Ricardo was present when this was said; that he saw only ihe giving of
P10,000.00 (TSN. Hearing of July 20,1983.)
Pat. Jose Batacan merely attested to the fact that upon his investigation when the
matter was reported to the police by complainant, he found a hole dug in the ricemill of
complainant; that he saw the jar containing sand and pieces of paper. (TSN, Hearing of
Octoberl9,1983.)
On the other hand, the defense relied on the testimonies of accused Ricardo Celino and one
Gualberto Libres:
In his defense, accused Ricardo Celino testified that he never discussed with complainant
about a hidden treasure; that if indeed complainant gave money to his son Zosimo Celino
(now deceased), he did not know anything about it; that complainant got angry with him
because complainant wanted him to return the money given to his son Zosimo; that when
he asked his son Zosimo if complainant gave him money, Zosimo denied it; that
complainant told him that he had given money to Zosimo and if they will not admit that
he gave money, he will file a case against them; that he told complainant not to include
him in the case he will file because he had not done anything wrong to him and
complainant told him that if he (accused Ricardo) will not return the money, he will be
included in the charge; that he answered him why will he return the money whcn his son
did not give him any money; that witnesscs Batitis and dcla Cru.z testified against him
because they are complainant's servants; that he and his son Zosimo were likewise charged
of estafa at San Pablo City where his son pleaded guilty and the case against him
dismissed. (TSN, Hearing of June 20,1984.)
Gualbertp Libres testified that he is a neighbor of accused Ricardo Celino and that his
house is onc (1) metcr away from the house of Ricardo; that when complainant was looking
for Zosimo, he never asked about accused Ricardo Celino. (TSN, Hearing of January 23,
1985.)
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court finding the accused Ricardo
Celino guilty beyond rcasonable doubt. The case is now before this Court for review. There
arc two (2) errors allegedly committed by the appellate court, to wit:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING PROVISIONS OF LAW AND
THE JURISPRUDENCE LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT, IN THE CASE AT
BAR.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ARRIVING AT A CONCLUSION WHICH IS
CONTRARY TO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE.
After a careful scrutiny of the record of this case, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in affirming Ricardo Celino's conviction.
There is no merit to the petitioner's pretense that the transaction between him and the
complainant was one of "joint venture" and that if he had any liability at all, it is civil in
nature. The evidence presented in this case conclusively shows that Ricardb Celino,
together with his two sons, Zosimo (deceased) and Requerido, led the complainant to
believe that there was a hidden treasure underneath his lot; that a dwarf whose spirit
supposedly entered the body of Zosimo directed the digging operations; that to obtain said
treasure and upon instructions of the "dwarf," it was necessary for the complainant to give
the accused money which amounted to P41,300.00 all in all and to pray in the church for
three (3) consecutive days.
Under the abovestated facts, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that
that there was proof beyond reasonable doubt that the act committed by the petitioner
constitutes the crime of estafa defmed and punished under Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses of fraudulent acts executed prior to
or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using a fictitious name, or falsely prctending to possess power, influence,
qualifkations, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of
other similar deceits. (Italics supplied).
xxx
Furthermore, no evidence was adduced by petitioner in support of his contention that he
and the complainant were partners in a "joint venture" transaction. The case of U.S. v.
Clarin [17 Phil. 85 (1910)] cited by the petitioner is therefore not applicable. The facts
clearly show that petitioner together with his sons pretended to possess power to find
hidden treasure in order to fleece the complainant of his hard-earned money. Contrary to
the petitioner's allegation, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly applied the
law and jurisprudence laid down by this Court on the matter. Under the cases of People v.
Scott [62 Phil 553 (1935)] and U.S. v. de los Reyes [34 Phil. 693 (1916)] bearing similar
facts as the case at bar, the acts committed by the petitioner constitute a classic case of
swindling under Art. 315 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code aforequoted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit. The Gourt of
Appeals decision dated November ll,1986isAFFIRMED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., on leave.
Petition denied. Decision affirmed.
Note.—Where the element of deceit in the estafa charge in the information took place
in Olongapo City, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City has jurisdiction. (People vs.
Go Bio,Jr., 142 SCRA 238.)
——oOo——
G.R. No. 164538. August 9, 2010.*
METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs.ROGELIO REYNADO
and JOSE C. ADRANDEA,** respondents.
Criminal Law; Estafa; Novation; Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a
compromise or novation of contract.—In a catena of cases, it was ruled that criminal
liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise or novation of contract. In Firaza v.
People, 518 SCRA 681 (2007) and Recuerdo v. People, 493 SCRA 517 (2006), this Court
ruled that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement or belated payment to the offended party of
the money swindled by the accused does not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter.
We also held in People v. Moreno, 314 SCRA 556 (1999), and in People v. Ladera, 344 SCRA
647 (2000), that “criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of
contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the
Government on its own motion even though complete reparation should have been made
of the damage suffered by the offended party.” Similarly in the case of Metropolitan Bank
and Trust Company v. Tonda, 338 SCRA 254 (2000), cited by petitioner, we held that in a
crime of estafa, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amount misappropriated, after
the commission of the crime, affects only the civil liability of the offender, and not his
criminal liability.
Same; Criminal Procedure; Probable Cause; Preliminary Investigation; Definition of
Probable Cause; Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in
the conduct of a preliminary investigation; Exception.—“Probable cause is defined as such
facts and circumstances that will engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.”
Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide latitude of discretion in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation. By way of exception, however, judicial review is allowed where
respondent has clearly established that the prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion
that is, when he has exercised his discretion “in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law.” Tested against these guidelines, we find that this case falls under the exception
rather than the general rule.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; A preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining
the existence of probable cause is “not a part of the trial”; A finding of probable cause does
not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.—
The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint are
matters of defense best left to the trial court’s deliberation and contemplation after
conducting the trial of the criminal case. To emphasize, a preliminary investigation for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is “not a part of the trial. A full and
exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence is not required, but only such as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof.” A “finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The presence or absence of the elements of the crime is
evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon of the a full-blown
trial on the merits.—In the case at bar, as analyzed by the prosecutor, a prima facie case
of estafa exists against respondents. As perused by her, the facts as presented in the
Complaint-Affidavit of the auditor are reasonable enough to excite her belief that
respondents are guilty of the crime complained of. In Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas,
460 SCRA 38 (2005), we had occasion to rule that the “presence or absence of the elements
of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon
after a full-blown trial on the merits.”
Same; Same; Prosecution of Offenses; Public prosecutors, not the private complainant,
are the ones obliged to bring forth before the law those who have transgressed it.—Suffice it
to say that it is indubitably within the discretion of the prosecutor to determine who must
be charged with what crime or for what offense. Public prosecutors, not the private
complainant, are the ones obliged to bring forth before the law those who have
transgressed it.
Same; Same; Same; The law makes it a legal duty for prosecuting officers to file the
charges against whomsoever the evidence may show to be responsible for the offense.—
Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court mandates that all criminal actions must be
commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines
against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor. Thus the law makes it a legal
duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against whomsoever the evidence may show
to be responsible for the offense. The proper remedy under the circumstances where
persons who ought to be charged were not included in the complaint of the private
complainant is definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in the
information.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alfonso M. Cruz Law Offices for petitioner.
Santos & Luceres for respondent Jose C. Adrandea.
Isip, Baria, Alcid & Associates for respondent Rogelio Reynado.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
“It is a hornbook doctrine in our criminal law that the criminal liability for estafa is not
affected by a compromise, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished
by the government on its own motion, even though complete reparation [has] been made
of the damage suffered by the private offended party. Since a criminal offense like estafa is
committed against the State, the private offended party may not waive or extinguish the
criminal liability that the law imposes for the commission of the crime.”1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks the
reversal of the Court of Appeals’ (CA’s) Decision 2 dated October 21, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 58548 and its further Resolution3 dated July 12, 2004 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.4
Factual Antecedents
On January 31, 1997, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company charged
respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the crime
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code. In the affidavit 5of
petitioner’s audit officer, Antonio Ivan S. Aguirre, it was alleged that the special audit
conducted on the cash and lending operations of its Port Area branch uncovered
anomalous/fraudulent transactions perpetrated by respondents in connivance with client
Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal); that respondents were the only voting
members of the branch’s credit committee authorized to extend credit accommodation to
clients up to P200,000.00; that through the so-called Bills Purchase Transaction,
Universal, which has a paid-up capital of only P125,000.00 and actual maintaining
balance of P5,000.00, was able to make withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.00 6 against
uncleared regional checks deposited in its account at petitioner’s Port Area branch; that,
consequently, Universal was able to utilize petitioner’s funds even before the seven-day
clearing period for regional checks expired; that Universal’s withdrawals against
uncleared regional check deposits were without prior approval of petitioner’s head office;
that the uncleared checks were later dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason
“Account Closed”; and, that respondents acted with fraud, deceit, and abuse of confidence.
In their defense, respondents denied responsibility in the anomalous transactions with
Universal and claimed that they only intended to help the Port Area branch solicit and
increase its deposit accounts and daily transactions.
Meanwhile, on February 26, 1997, petitioner and Universal entered into a Debt
Settlement Agreement7 whereby the latter acknowledged its indebtedness to the former in
the total amount of P50,990,976.278 as of February 4, 1997 and undertook to pay the same
in bi-monthly amortizations in the sum of P300,000.00 starting January 15, 1997, covered
by postdated checks, “plus balloon payment of the remaining principal balance and interest
and other charges, if any, on December 31, 2001.”9
Findings of the Prosecutor

Following the requisite preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor Winnie M.
Edad (Prosecutor Edad) in her Resolution10dated July 10, 1997 found petitioner’s evidence
insufficient to hold respondents liable for estafa. According to Prosecutor Edad:
“The execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement puts complainant bank in estoppel
to argue that the liability is criminal. Since the agreement was made even before the filing
of this case, the relations between the parties [have] change[d], novation has set in and
prevented the incipience of any criminal liability on the part of respondents.” 11
Thus, Prosecutor Edad recommended the dismissal of the case:
“WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, it is respectfully recommended that the
case be dismissed.”12
On December 9, 1997, petitioner appealed the Resolution of Prosecutor Edad to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) by means of a Petition for Review. 13
Ruling of the Department of Justice
On June 22, 1998, the DOJ dismissed the petition ratiocinating that:
“It is evident that your client based on the same transaction chose to file estafa only
against its employees and treat with kid gloves its big time client Universal who was the
one who benefited from this transaction and instead, agreed that it should be paid on
installment basis.
To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification under
the law which will result in grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your client
agreed that no estafa was committed in this transaction with Universal who was the
principal player and beneficiary of this transaction[,] more so with herein respondents
whose liabilities are based only on conspiracy with Universal.
Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how
respondents misappropriated the P53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after
its checks deposited with Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover, fraud is not present
considering that the Executive Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank were
duly notified of these transactions which they approved. Further, no damage was caused
to your client as it agreed [to] the settlement [with] Universal.” 14
A Motion for Reconsideration15 was filed by petitioner, but the same was denied on
March 1, 2000 by then Acting Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero. 16
Aggrieved, petitioner went to the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari & Mandamus.17
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
By Decision18 of October 21, 2002, the CA affirmed the twin resolutions of the Secretary
of Justice. Citing jurisprudence wherein we ruled that while novation does not extinguish
criminal liability, it may prevent the rise of such liability as long as it occurs prior to the
filing of the criminal information in court.20 Hence, according to the CA, “[j]ust as
Universal cannot be held responsible under the bills purchase transactions on account of
novation, private respondents, who acted in complicity with the former, cannot be made
liable [for] the same transactions.”21 The CA added that “[s]ince the dismissal of the
complaint is founded on legal ground, public respondents may not be compelled
by mandamus to file an information in court.”22
Incidentally, the CA totally ignored the Comment23 of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) where the latter, despite being the statutory counsel of public respondent DOJ,
agreed with petitioner that the DOJ erred in dismissing the complaint. It alleged that
where novation does not extinguish criminal liability for estafa neither does restitution
negate the offense already committed.24
Additionally, the OSG, in sharing the views of petitioner contended that failure to
implead other responsible individuals in the complaint does not warrant its dismissal,
suggesting that the proper remedy is to cause their inclusion in the information. 25 This
notwithstanding, however, the CA disposed of the petition as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED due course and, accordingly, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and March 1, 2000 of the Secretary of
Justice are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.”26
Hence, this instant petition before the Court.
On November 8, 2004, we required27 respondents to file Comment, not a motion to
dismiss, on the petition within 10 days from notice. The OSG filed a Manifestation and
Motion in Lieu of Comment28 while respondent Jose C. Adraneda (Adraneda) submitted
his Comment29 on the petition. The Secretary of Justice failed to file the required comment
on the OSG’s Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment and respondent Rogelio
Reynado (Reynado) did not submit any. For which reason, we issued a show cause
order30 on July 19, 2006. Their persistent non-compliance with our directives constrained
us to resolve that they had waived the filing of comment and to impose a fine of P1,000.00
on Reynado. Upon submission of the required memorandum by petitioner and Adraneda,
the instant petition was submitted for resolution.
Issues
Petitioner presented the following main arguments for our consideration:
1. Novation and undertaking to pay the amount embezzled do not extinguish criminal
liability.
2. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to implead all persons who appear criminally
liable for the offense charged.
Petitioner persistently insists that the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement
with Universal did not absolve private respondents from criminal liability for estafa.
Petitioner submits that the settlement affects only the civil obligation of Universal but did
not extinguish the criminal liability of the respondents. Petitioner thus faults the CA in Thus, the doctrine that evolved from the aforecited cases is that a compromise or
sustaining the DOJ which in turn affirmed the finding of Prosecutor Edad for committing settlement entered into after the commission of the crime does not extinguish accused’s
apparent error in the appreciation and the application of the law on novation. By liability for estafa. Neither will the same bar the prosecution of said crime. Accordingly, in
petitioner’s claim, citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tonda,31 the “negotiations such a situation, as in this case, the complaint for estafa against respondents should not
pertain [to] and affect only the civil aspect of the case but [do] not preclude prosecution for be dismissed just because petitioner entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement with
the offense already committed.”32 Universal. Even the OSG arrived at the same conclusion:
In his Comment, Adraneda denies being a privy to the anomalous transactions and “Contrary to the conclusion of public respondent, the Debt Settlement Agreement
passes on the sole responsibility to his co-respondent Reynado as the latter was able to entered into between petitioner and Universal Converter Philippines extinguishes merely
conceal the pertinent documents being the head of petitioner’s Port Area branch. the civil aspect of the latter’s liability as a corporate entity but not the criminal liability of
Nonetheless, he contends that because of the Debt Settlement Agreement, they cannot be the persons who actually committed the crime of estafa against petitioner Metrobank.
held liable for estafa. x x x”40
The OSG, for its part, instead of contesting the arguments of petitioner, even prayed
before the CA to give due course to the petition contending that DOJ indeed erred in Unfortunately for petitioner, the above observation of the OSG was wittingly glossed
dismissing the complaint for estafa. over in the body of the assailed Decision of the CA.
Given the facts of the case, the basic issue presented before this Court is whether the
execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement precluded petitioner from holding Execution of the Debt Settlement
respondents liable to stand trial for estafa under Art. 315 (1)(b) of the Revised Penal Agreement did not prevent the
Code.33 incipience of criminal liability.

Our Ruling Even if the instant case is viewed from the standpoint of the law on contracts, the
disposition absolving the respondents from criminal liability because of novation is still
erroneous.
We find the petition highly meritorious. Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, “contracts take effect only between the parties,
their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
Novation not a mode of extinguishing contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.”
criminal liability for estafa; Criminal The civil law principle of relativity of contracts provides that “contracts can only bind the
liability for estafa not affected by com- parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is
promise or novation of contract. aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof.” 41
In the case at bar, it is beyond cavil that respondents are not parties to the agreement.
Initially, it is best to emphasize that “novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by The intention of the parties thereto not to include them is evident either in the onerous or
the Revised Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability.” 34 in the beneficent provisions of said agreement. They are not assigns or heirs of either of
In a catena of cases, it was ruled that criminal liability for estafais not affected by a the parties. Not being parties to the agreement, respondents cannot take refuge therefrom
compromise or novation of contract. In Firaza v. People35 and Recuerdo v. People,36 this to bar their anticipated trial for the crime they committed. It may do well for respondents
Court ruled that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement or belated payment to the offended to remember that the criminal action commenced by petitioner had its genesis from the
party of the money swindled by the accused does not extinguish the criminal liability of alleged fraud, unfaithfulness, and abuse of confidence perpetrated by them in relation to
the latter. We also held in People v. Moreno37 and in People v. Ladera38 that “criminal their positions as responsible bank officers. It did not arise from a contractual dispute or
liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public matters strictly between petitioner and Universal. This being so, respondents cannot rely
offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion even on subject settlement agreement to preclude prosecution of the offense already committed
though complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended to the end of extinguishing their criminal liability or prevent the incipience of any liability
party.” Similarly in the case of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda39 cited by that may arise from the criminal offense. This only demonstrates that the execution of the
petitioner, we held that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement of or compromise as to the agreement between petitioner and Universal has no bearing on the innocence or guilt of
amount misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, affects only the civil liability the respondents.
of the offender, and not his criminal liability.
Determination of the probable cause, a func-
tion belonging to the public prosecutor;
judicial review allowed where it has been
clearly established that the prosecutor com-
mitted grave abuse of discretion.
In a preliminary investigation, a public prosecutor determines whether a crime has
been committed and whether there is probable cause that the accused is guilty
thereof.42 The Secretary of Justice, however, may review or modify the resolution of the
prosecutor.
“Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances that will engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.”43 Generally, a public prosecutor is afforded a wide
latitude of discretion in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. By way of exception,
however, judicial review is allowed where respondent has clearly established that the
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion that is, when he has exercised his
discretion “in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.”44 Tested against these guidelines, we
find that this case falls under the exception rather than the general rule.
A close scrutiny of the substance of Prosecutor Edad’s Resolution dated July 10, 1997
readily reveals that were it not for the Debt Settlement Agreement, there was indeed
probable cause to indict respondents for the crime charged. From her own assessment of
the Complaint-Affidavit of petitioner’s auditor, her preliminary finding is that “Ordinarily,
the offense of estafa has been sufficiently established.”45 Interestingly, she suddenly
changed tack and declared that the agreement altered the relation of the parties and that
novation had set in preventing the incipience of any criminal liability on respondents. In
light of the jurisprudence herein earlier discussed, the prosecutor should not have gone
that far and executed an apparent somersault. Compounding further the error, the DOJ
in dismissing petitioner’s petition, ruled out estafa contrary to the findings of the
prosecutor. Pertinent portion of the ruling reads:
“Equivocally, there is no estafa in the instant case as it was not clearly shown how
respondents misappropriated the P53,873,500.00 which Universal owed your client after
its checks deposited with Metrobank were dishonored. Moreover, fraud is not present
considering that the Executive Committee and the Credit Committee of Metrobank were
duly notified of these transactions which they approved. Further, no damage was caused
to your client as it agreed [to] the settlement [with] Universal.”46
The findings of the Secretary of Justice in sustaining the dismissal of the Complaint
are matters of defense best left to the trial court’s deliberation and contemplation after
conducting the trial of the criminal case. To emphasize, a preliminary investigation for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is “not a part of the trial. A full and
exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence is not required, but only such as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof.”47 A “finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed
that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.” 48 So we held
in Balangauan v. Court of Appeals:49
“Applying the foregoing disquisition to the present petition, the reasons of DOJ for
affirming the dismissal of the criminal complaints for estafaand/or qualified estafa are
determinative of whether or not it committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. In requiring “hard facts and solid evidence” as the basis for a
finding of probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand trial for
the crime complained of, the DOJ disregards the definition of probable cause—that it is a
reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state
of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and
prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term
does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely
based on opinion and reasonable belief; that is, the belief that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. While probable cause demands more than
“bare suspicion,” it requires “less than evidence which would justify conviction.” Herein,
the DOJ reasoned as if no evidence was actually presented by respondent HSBC when in
fact the records of the case were teeming; or it discounted the value of such substantiation
when in fact the evidence presented was adequate to excite in a reasonable mind the
probability that petitioners Bernyl and Katherene committed the crime/s complained of.
In so doing, the DOJ whimsically and capriciously exercised its discretion, amounting to
grave abuse of discretion, which rendered its resolutions amenable to correction and
annulment by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.”
In the case at bar, as analyzed by the prosecutor, a prima faciecase of estafa exists
against respondents. As perused by her, the facts as presented in the Complaint-Affidavit
of the auditor are reasonable enough to excite her belief that respondents are guilty of the
crime complained of. In Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas50 we had occasion to rule that
the “presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a
matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.”51
Thus confronted with the issue on whether the public prosecutor and the Secretary of
Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in disposing of the case of petitioner, given the
sufficiency of evidence on hand, we do not hesitate to rule in the affirmative. We have
previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal
violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
Non-inclusion of officers of Universal
not a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint.
The DOJ in resolving to deny petitioner’s appeal from the resolution of the prosecutor
gave another ground—failure to implead the officers of Universal. It explained:
“To allow your client to make the choice is to make an unwarranted classification under
the law which will result in grave injustice against herein respondents. Thus, if your client
agreed that no estafa was committed in this transaction with Universal who was the
principal player and beneficiary of this transaction[,] more so with herein respondents
whose liabilities are based only on conspiracy with Universal.” 52
The ratiocination of the Secretary of Justice conveys the idea that if the charge against
respondents rests upon the same evidence used to charge co-accused (officers of Universal)
based on the latter’s conspiratorial participation, the non-inclusion of said co-accused in
the charge should benefit the respondents.
The reasoning of the DOJ is flawed.
Suffice it to say that it is indubitably within the discretion of the prosecutor to
determine who must be charged with what crime or for what offense. Public prosecutors,
not the private complainant, are the ones obliged to bring forth before the law those who
have transgressed it.
Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court53 mandates that all criminal actions must be
commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the People of the Philippines
against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor. Thus the law makes it a legal
duty for prosecuting officers to file the charges against whomsoever the evidence may show
to be responsible for the offense. The proper remedy under the circumstances where
persons who ought to be charged were not included in the complaint of the private
complainant is definitely not to dismiss the complaint but to include them in the
information. As the OSG correctly suggested, the proper remedy should have been the
inclusion of certain employees of Universal who were found to have been in cahoots with
respondents in defrauding petitioner. The DOJ, therefore, cannot seriously argue that
because the officers of Universal were not indicted, respondents themselves should not
likewise be charged. Their non-inclusion cannot be perversely used to justify desistance by
the public prosecutor from prose-
_______________
53 SEC. 2. The complaint or information.—The complaint or information shall be in
writing, in the name of the People of the Philippines and against all persons who appear
to be responsible for the offense involved.
106
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Reynado
cution of the criminal case just because not all of those who are probably guilty thereof
were charged.
Mandamus a proper remedy when reso-
lution of public respondent is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.
Mandamus is a remedial measure for parties aggrieved. It shall issue when “any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station.”54 The writ of mandamus is not available to control discretion neither may it be
issued to compel the exercise of discretion. Truly, it is a matter of discretion on the part of
the prosecutor to determine which persons appear responsible for the commission of a
crime. However, the moment he finds one to be so liable it becomes his inescapable duty to
charge him therewith and to prosecute him for the same. In such a situation, the rule loses
its discretionary character and becomes mandatory. Thus, where, as in this case, despite
the sufficiency of the evidence before the prosecutor, he refuses to file the corresponding
information against the person responsible, he abuses his discretion. His act is tantamount
to a deliberate refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. The Secretary of Justice, on the
other hand, gravely abused his discretion when, despite the existence of sufficient evidence
for the crime of estafa as acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he completely
ignored the latter’s finding and proceeded with the questioned resolution anchored on
purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard of the concept of probable cause as pointed
out in Balangauan. To be sure, findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review
unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.55 The present case calls for the
application of the exception. Given the facts of this case, petitioner has clearly established
that the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of
discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58548 promulgated on October 21, 2002 affirming the
Resolutions dated June 22, 1998 and March 1, 2000 of the Secretary of Justice, and its
Resolution dated July 12, 2004 denying reconsideration thereon are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The public prosecutor is ordered to file the necessary information
for estafa against the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin*** and Perez, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Note.—Determination of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor. (Baltazar vs. People, 560 SCRA 278 [2008])
——o0o——
G.R. No. 198012. April 22, 2015.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANGEL MATEO y JACINTO and
VICENTA LAPIZ y MEDINA, accused-appellants.
Criminal Law; Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale; Elements of.—The offense of illegal
recruitment in large scale has the following elements: (1) the person charged undertook
any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA 8042; (2) accused did not have
the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment of workers; and (3)
accused committed the same against three or more persons individually or as a group.
These elements are obtaining in this case. First, the RTC found appellants to have
undertaken a recruitment activity when they promised private complainants employment
in Japan for a fee. This factual finding was affirmed by the CA. “The time-tested doctrine
is that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge.” And when his findings have been affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon the Supreme
Court. Second, the Certification issued by the POEA unmistakably reveals that appellants
neither have a license nor authority to recruit workers for overseas employment. Notably,
appellants never assailed this Certification. Third, it was established that there were five
complainants. Clearly, the existence of the offense of illegal recruitment in large scale was
duly proved by the prosecution.
Same; Illegal Recruitment; Money is not material to a prosecution for illegal
recruitment considering that the definition of “illegal recruitment” under the law includes
the phrase “whether for profit or not.”—Appellants’ argument that there was no proof that
they received money from the private complainants deserves no credence. Suffice it to say
that money is not material to a prosecution for illegal recruitment considering that the
definition of “illegal recruitment” under the law includes the phrase “whether for profit or
not.” Besides, even if there is no receipt for the money given by the private complainants
to appellants, the former’s respective testimonies and affidavits clearly narrate the latter’s
involvement in the prohibited recruitment.
Same; Same; Estafa; Well-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal
recruitment under the law may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).—Anent the charge for estafa, “[w]ell-
settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the [law] may, for
the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the [Revised
Penal Code]. The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.”
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellants.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the February 17, 2011 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02366, which denied the appeal brought therewith and affirmed the
May 31, 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila Branch 40 in Criminal
Cases Nos. 99-176598 and 99-176599 to 603. The RTC convicted Angel Mateo y Jacinto
(Mateo) and Vicenta Lapiz y Medina (Lapiz) a.k.a. “Vicky Mateo” (appellants) of the crime
of illegal recruitment in large scale under Republic Act No. 8042 (RA 8042), otherwise
known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, and of five counts
of estafa.
Factual Antecedents
Sometime during the period from January to March 1998, the five private
complainants, namely, Abel E. Balane (Abel), Emilio A. Cariaga (Emilio), Victorio D.
Flordeliza (Victorio), Manuel Oledan (Manuel) and Virgilio N. Concepcion (Virgilio), met
appellants on separate occasions at Plaza Ferguzon, Malate, Manila to apply for overseas
employment. Appellant Mateo, representing himself to have a tie-up with some Japanese
firms, promised them employment in Japan as conversion mechanics, welders, or fitters
for a fee. Appellants also promised that they could facilitate private complainants’
employment as direct hires and assured their departure within three weeks. However,
after the private complainants paid the required fees ranging from P18,555.00 to
P25,000.00, appellants failed to secure any overseas employment for them. Appellants
likewise failed to return private complainants’ money. This prompted Manuel to go to the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) where he was issued a
Certification3 stating that appellants are not licensed to recruit applicants for overseas
employment. Thereupon, the private complainants filed their Complaint and executed
their respective affidavits with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The NBI
referred the charges to the Department of Justice which subsequently found probable
cause against appellants for large scale illegal recruitment and estafa4 and accordingly
filed the corresponding Informations5 for the same before the RTC of Manila.
For their defense, appellants proffered denials. Mateo claimed that he is a legitimate
car importer and not a recruiter. Lapiz, on the other hand, denied knowing any of the
private complainants whom she claimed to have met for the first time at the Prosecutor’s
Office.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC disposed of the cases in its Decision6 rendered on May 31, 2006 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 99-176598 for Illegal Recruitment, this Court
finds both accused ANGEL MATEO y JACINTO and VICENTA
LAPIZ y MEDINA a.k.a. “VICKY MATEO” GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
recruitment in large scale and hereby sentences each of them to life imprisonment and to
pay P500,000.00 fine each as well as to indemnify private complainants (1) Manuel Oledan
the sum of P25,000.00, and (2) Emilio A. Cariaga, (3) Abel E. Balane, (4) Virgilio N.
Concepcion, and (5) Victorio D. Flordeliza the sum of P18,555.00 each.
This Court finds both accused also GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Cases
Nos. 99-176599,
99-176600, 99-176601, 99-176602 and 99-176603 for five (5) counts of Estafa and each
accused is hereby sentenced in each case to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prisión correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prisión mayor, as maximum.
The [Philippine] Overseas and Employment Administration (POEA) shall be furnished
with certified copy of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
 In their appeal before the CA, appellants essentially claimed that the prosecution failed
to prove the elements of the crimes for which they were charged. They contended that Abel
has not shown any receipt to prove that they received money from him; that there is
likewise no proof that Virgilio borrowed money from a friend of his aunt which money he,
in turn, gave to them; that the testimony of Emilio that appellants were holding office
inside the van of Abel cannot be easily accepted; and that their transactions with Manuel
and Victorio were limited to the processing of their travel documents.
The CA, however, denied appellants’ appeal in its Decision 8dated February 17,
2011, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40,
dated May 31, 2006 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, the present appeal.
Per Resolution10 dated September 19, 2011, the Court required both parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs. Appellants filed their Supplemental Brief, 11 while appellee
People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opted not to file any
and just adopted the appellee’s brief it filed before the CA.12
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal utterly lacks merit.
The offense of illegal recruitment in large scale has the following elements: (1) the
person charged undertook any recruitment activity as defined under Section 6 of RA 8042;
(2) accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment
of workers; and (3) accused committed the same against three or more persons individually
or as a group.13 These elements are obtaining in this case. First, the RTC found appellants
to have undertaken a recruitment activity when they promised private complainants
employment in Japan for a fee. This factual finding was affirmed by the CA. “The time-
tested doctrine is that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand
is best and most competently performed by the trial judge.” 14 And when his findings have
been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon
the Supreme Court.15 Second, the Certification issued by the POEA unmistakably reveals
that appellants neither have a license nor authority to recruit workers for overseas
employment. Notably, appellants never assailed this Certification. Third, it was
established that there were five complainants. Clearly, the existence of the offense of
illegal recruitment in large scale was duly proved by the prosecution.
Appellants’ argument that there was no proof that they received money from the
private complainants deserves no credence. Suffice it to say that money is not material to
a prosecution for illegal recruitment considering that the definition of “illegal recruitment”
under the law includes the phrase “whether for profit or not.” Besides, even if there is no
receipt for the money given by the private complainants to appellants, the former’s
respective testimonies and affidavits clearly narrate the latter’s involvement in the
prohibited recruitment.16
Anent the charge for estafa, “[w]ell-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal
recruitment under the [law] may, for the same acts, be separately convicted
for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the [Revised Penal Code]. The elements
of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation.”17 All these elements are likewise present in this case. As aptly held
by the CA:
Here, the appellants Mateo and Lapiz committed deceit against the private
complainants by making it appear as though they had the authority and resources to send
them to Japan for employment; that there were available jobs for them in Japan for which
they would be hired although, in truth, there were none; and that by reason or on the
strength of such assurance, the private complainants parted with their money in payment
of the placement fee, documentation and hotel accommodations. All these representations
were actually false and fraudulent and thus, the appellants must be made liable under
par. 2(a), Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code.18
With this ratiocination, Lapiz’s defense of not knowing any of the complainants must
necessarily fail. As noted by the RTC and the CA, she was present in all of the transactions,
serving as runner of Mateo and was even the one keeping the money entrusted by the
private complainants to appellants.
She would also often pacify the private complainants’ uneasiness about the absence of
receipts for each of the amounts given and repeatedly assure them they would be deployed
to Japan. In short, she was an indispensable participant and effective collaborator of Mateo
in the illegal recruitment of the private complainants.
In view of the foregoing, the Court sustains the lower courts’ conviction of appellants
for the crimes charged.
It must be noted, however, that both the RTC and the CA failed to award interest on
the money judgment in Criminal Case No. 99-176598 for Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale. Following prevailing jurisprudence, the Court, therefore, imposes interest at the
rate of 6% per annum on each of the amounts awarded from the date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 17, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02366 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the amounts ordered restituted in Criminal Case No. 99-176598
shall each earn an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Mendoza and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Appeal dismissed, judgment affirmed with modification.
Notes.—It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and
convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa — illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum while estafa is malum in se.(People vs. Comila, 517 SCRA 153 [2007])
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