Professional Documents
Culture Documents
AT SHAH ALAM
BETWEEN
AND
3. PUSHPALEELA R. SELVARAJAH
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Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd v. CGU Insurance Bhd [2007]
2 CLJ 1 FC (refd)
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Au Meng Nam & Anor v. Ung Yak Chew & Ors [2007] 4 CLJ 526
CA (refd)
Boonsom Boonyanit v. Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd [1995] 4 CLJ 45
HC (refd)
Chu Choon Moi v. Ngan Sew Tin [1985] 1 LNS 134 FC (refd)
Kerajaan Malaysia & Ors v. Lay Kee Tee & Ors [2009] 1 CLJ 663
FC (refd)
Ong Ban Chai & Ors v. Seah Siang Mong [1998] 3 CLJ 637 CA
(refd)
Overseas Realty Sdn Bhd v. Wong Yau Choy & Ors [2014] 8 CLJ
107 HC (refd)
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Penn v. Bristol & West Building Society [1987] 3 AER 470 (refd)
Pekan Nenas Industries Sdn Bhd v. Chang Ching Chuen & Ors
[1998] 1 CLJ 793 FC (refd)
Teoh Kim Heng v. Tan Ong Ban [2014] 8 CLJ 316 CA (refd)
Tsoi Ping Kwan v. Medan Juta Sdn Bhd & Ors [1996] 4 CLJ 553 CA
(foll)
Uptown Properties Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah
Persekutuan & Ors [2012] 83 CLJ 271 HC (refd)
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Version Buy Sdn Bhd v. Thong Wee Kee & Anor [2014] 8 CLJ 840
FC (refd)
Yap Ham Seow v. Fatimawati Ismail & Ors And Another Appeal
[2013] 9 CLJ 577 CA (refd)
Yew Foo Chun v. Wong Nye Keong & Ors [2014] 1 LNS 189 HC
(refd)
Yong Tim v. Hoo Kok Chong & Anor [2005] 3 CLJ 229 FC (refd)
GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT
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Introduction
1. This is another and the second land scam case after Soon Poy Yong @
Soon Puey Yong v. Westport Properties Sdn Bhd & 18 Ors [2014]
2. The Plaintiff herein was the registered proprietor of the piece of land -
Lot 4965 Mukim Kapar, 5 th Mile Sungai Binjai Road, Daerah Klang
Selangor Darul Ehsan (“Land”) and claims in this suit that unknowing to
her, she was swindled of the Land by various persons including a woman
4. The Second Defendant purchased the Land from the bogus Plaintiff and
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6. The Fifth Defendant and Sixth Defendant are state agencies involved in
land administration.
the firm Omar Hussein & Co as legal assistant who handled the
8. The trial of this case took 8 days on 17 and 18 April, 30 June, 21 July, 7
Plaintiff
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ii) Sithambaram a/l Muthiah (PW2), the Plaintiff’s family friend and runner;
son; and
iv) Senthi a/l Muthumaran Chettiar (PW4), the Plaintiff’s eldest son.
First Defendant
ii) Mohd Kamil Bin Yahya (DW5), an officer from CIMB Bank Bhd
iii) Zainal Abidin Bin Hamzah (DW6), an officer from RHB Bank Bhd; and
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i) Siti Nadirah Binti Mohd Nor (DW8), a deputy administrator of the Fifth
Defendant.
Seventh Defendant
11. After the conclusion of the trial, the parties submitted their respective
written closing submissions in chief and in reply. Oral clarification was held
Background Facts
12. The Plaintiff who once held Indian Passport no. X205536 was
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Karuppiah Chettiar s/o Murugappa Chettiar. She presently and at all other
material times holds the original manual issue document of title EMR 6527
P4. She has never parted with the possession of IDT1 and never appointed
any real estate agent or solicitor to sell or deal with the Land in any way.
13. The Plaintiff’s son, PW3 on 1 March 2001 lodged a private caveat on
the Land by reason that his father who was the closest beneficiary of the
14. From 1988 to 2006, the Plaintiff paid the quit rent payable in respect of
the Land based on the annual quit rent statement received by the Plaintiff
the name of the Plaintiff (“IDT2”). Photocopies of the certified true copy of
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16. Also in the meantime, the Second Defendant by a written sale and
purchase agreement dated 20 October 2005 purchased the Land from the
12 April 2006 and the Land was registered in the name of the Second
2006, the First Defendant purchased the Land from the Second Defendant
19. The transfer of ownership of the Land was registered in the name of
the First Defendant and charged to CIMB Bank Bhd who financed the First
the computerized issue document of title GM 9890 in the name of the First
227-228 (“IDT4”).
20. By March 2007, the Plaintiff did not receive the quit rent statement in
respect of the Land for 2007 but only the statement of rates payable from
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the Klang Municipal Council. PW2 on 26 March 2007 paid the rates on
behalf of the Plaintiff and also enquired from the Fifth Defendant as to why
the Plaintiff did not receive the quit rent statement for 2007.
PW2 was informed by the Fifth Defendant that the Land was already
Accordingly PW2 there and then conducted a title search on the Land and
discovered that the Land had been transferred to the Second Defendant on
21. The Plaintiff on 28 March 2007 lodged a private caveat to protect her
March 2007 and the Fifth Defendant thereafter on 3 July 2007 also entered
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24. From the pleadings, the Plaintiff contended that the transfer of the
claim. In gist the Plaintiff neither knew nor dealt with the Second Defendant
at all. Further in this connection, the Plaintiff contended that she never
engaged the services of the Third Defendant and/or the Fourth Defendant.
concert with the Third and/or Fourth Defendant for having facilitated and
Alternatively, the Plaintiff contended that the Third Defendant and/or the
The Plaintiff also contended that the transfer of the Land to the Second
acts of fraud or deception of others but without prior proper inquiry by the
application for the duplicate title and the proper identity of the applicant.
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25. The Plaintiff further contended that the First Defendant was not a bona
fide purchaser of the Land for valuable consideration from the Second
Defendant.
26. Finally, the Plaintiff contended that the Fifth Defendant and Sixth
Defendants were negligent in breach of the National Land Code 1965 by
having registered the transfer of the Land to the Second Defendant and
then to the First Defendant notwithstanding that the Land was encumbered
of claim sought and prayed for the following declarations and orders:
i) that the Plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the Land and the true
lawful owner thereof;
ii) that the transfer in favour of the Second Defendant and the Second
Defendant’s purported title to or interest in the Land was void ab initio;
iii) that the transfer in favour of the First Defendant and the First
Defendant’s purported title to or interest in the land is void ab initio;
iv) that the Land was transferred from the Plaintiff to the Second
Defendant and ultimately to the First Defendant by means of fraud and/or
by forgery and/or by means of insufficient instrument or void instrument;
v) that the Second Defendant is not a bona fide purchaser of the land for
valuable consideration;
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vi) that the First Defendant is not a bona fide purchaser of the land for
valuable consideration;
vii) that the duplicate title to the land is a nullity and/or void ab initio; and
accordingly
viii) that the purported title and interest of the First Defendant and Second
ix) that the Fifth Defendant and Sixth Defendant cancel the entries or
memorials in the register of land titles in favour of the First Defendant and
Second Defendant and restore the Plaintiff as the registered owner of the
Land.
28. Generally all the Defendants denied the Plaintiff’s claims and put her to
strict proof.
29. The First Defendant further contended that the First Defendant was the
bona fide purchaser of the Land from the Second Defendant for valuable
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30. The First Defendant also counterclaimed against the Plaintiff for the
wrongful lodgment of the private caveat on the Land on 28 March 2007 and
31. The Second Defendant similarly contended that the Second Defendant
was the bona fide purchaser of the Land from the Plaintiff for valuable
consideration and hence the title to the Land that was registered in the
32. The Third Defendant and Fourth Defendant contended that they did
not owe a duty of care to the Plaintiff. In any event, they have at all material
33. The Fifth and Sixth Defendants contended that they were not the
correct parties to be sued in this suit. In any event, the Fifth Defendant
contended that the Fifth Defendant had conducted all the dealings in
relation to the Land with due care in accordance with land administration
provisions in the National Land Code 1965 and normal practice to avoid
public complaints of delay. The Fifth and Sixth Defendants emphasized that
they were only tasked with administrative duties that did not involve any
investigative function.
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As to the Fifth Defendant effecting the transfers of the Land to the Second
lodged in 2001, it was contended that that the transfer was not restrained
by reason that the caveat was lodged by the Plaintiff’s own son. In addition,
it was contended that the caveat was invalid by reason that the Plaintiff’s
34. The Seventh Defendant contended that the Seventh Defendant had at
all material times acted in good faith, diligently with due care in respect of
the Land dealings between the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant and
35. From the pleadings, list of issues and closing submissions of the
parties, the following principal issues can be distilled and I will deal with
them seriatim:
i) I will firstly determine as to who was at all material times the Plaintiff who
has locus standi to maintain this suit and claim to be the registered owner
of the Land;
ii) Next, I will consider whether the duplicate title produced by the Fifth
Defendant and used for the transfer of the Land from the Plaintiff to the
Second Defendant was invalid or in other words void ab initio, and if so
whether this and the subsequent transfer of the Land to the First Defendant
were nullities;
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iii) I will then determine whether the transfer of the Land to the Second
Defendant was fraudulent and the registration thereof in the name of the
Second Defendant was indefeasible by reason that the Second Defendant
claimed to be the bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration;
iv) Simultaneously with (iii), I will also determine whether the Seventh
viii) Finally, I will determine whether the Fifth and Sixth Defendants were
correctly enjoined in the suit and if so, whether they were negligent in
effecting the transfer and registration of the Land notwithstanding that there
was a subsisting private caveat lodged on the Land by the Plaintiff’s son in
2001.
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36. PW1, the Plaintiff maintained that she is at all material times the
registered proprietor Rajamani d/o Meyappa Chettiar with Indian passport
no. X205536 as seen in IDT1 as well as the register document of title
(“RDT1”) of the Land, a photocopy of which is found in bundle B1 page
308. This is confirmed by the fact that she is presently still in possession of
the original IDT1. She also produced the original quit rents receipts of the
Land in court.
37. The Second Defendant and the Seventh Defendant have however
raised that the Plaintiff in the intitulement to the cause papers is Rajamani
a/p Meyappa Chettiar but PW1 who attended and testified in court for the
Plaintiff bore a different name, Muthuraman Chettiar Rajamani and carried
Malaysian permanent resident identity card in that name which is exhibit
P7. It was further pointed out that there was no documentary evidence
such as an official instrument or court order to establish that PW1,
Muthraman Chettiar Rajamani is Rajamani a/p Meyappa Chettiar. PW1
was only able to produce her current original Indian passport no. E8742969
in the name of Muthumaran Chettiar Rajamani found in bundle B1 pages
151-154 but not the earlier original Indian passport no. X205536 contained
in bundle B1 pages 144-146.
Accordingly, it was submitted that the Plaintiff did not have the required
locus standi to maintain or even commence this suit.
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38. From the examination in court, PW1 explained that Rajamani a/p
Muthuraman Chettiar and Meyappa Chettiar were her husband and father
39. Furthermore, I observe that the photograph of the bearer of both Indian
both the passports also look similar and they resemble that signed by PW1
40. Consequently I find and hold that Rajamani a/p Meyappa Chettiar and
Muthuraman Chettiar Rajamani is one and the same person on the balance
of probabilities. It follows that the Plaintiff had locus standi to bring and
maintain this suit. Also I find and hold that the PW1, the Plaintiff was the
41. In this regard, the Plaintiff submitted that the Land comprised of one
lot, hence there ought to have been only one title to the Land as provided in
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(1) For the purpose of the alienation of land under this Act under final title,
there shall be prepared in accordance with section 86 or, as the case may
be, 87:-
(b) an issue document of title, which shall be issued to the proprietor of the
land in accordance with the provisions of section 90.
(a) in the case of land to be alienated under Registry title, by the Registrar,
and
(b) in the case of land to be alienated under Land Office title, by the
Land Administrator; and (except where it relates to a rural holding under
the Land (Group Settlement Areas) Act, 13 of 1960) each such document
shall relate to one lot.”
Accordingly since there were several titles issued in respect of the Land,
the later titles were invalid and defeasible pursuant s. 340(2)(c) of the
National Land Code.
42. Unknown to the Plaintiff, besides IDT1 which was in her possession,
there were however two other titles to the Land prepared by the Fifth
Defendant, to wit IDT2 and IDT3 on 24 May 2002 and 16 May 2006
respectively.
43. According to the Plaintiff, DW8 the sole witness for the Fifth and Sixth
Defendants confirmed that IDT2 had never been issued but remained in the
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computer system of the Fifth Defendant and would only be issued when the
landowner surrendered the original manual issue document of title of the
Land.
44. Thus the Plaintiff argued that the IDT2 was invalid because it had not
been properly issued for the following reasons:
(b) cause copies of the notice to be served on every person or body having
a registered interest in the land, and to be published in accordance with the
provisions of section 433.
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(i) on the land and on the penghulu's office or balai in the area in which the
land is situated; and
(ii) in that area, on such court-houses and mosques (if any) and in such
markets and other public places (if any) as the State Director thinks fit; and
ii) The Fifth or Sixth Defendant did not give notice to the Plaintiff to
handover the original manual title and to take delivery of the computerized
title pursuant to rule 8(9) of the Fourteenth Schedule (section 5A) to the
National Land Code;
iii) The Plaintiff had not surrendered the original manual title as required
by rule 8(9)(c) of the Fourteenth Schedule (section 5A) to the National Land
Code; and
iv) The Fifth or Sixth Defendant did not comply with s. 170(2)(a) of the
National Land Code that requires a title in continuation be prepared in the
name of the person last registered as proprietor in the subsisting register
document of title as well as s. 170(2)(c) that requires the title in continuation
to contain like memorials, endorsements and other entries as contained in
the subsisting registered document of title. S. 170 of the National Land
Code reads:
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The Plaintiff argued that IDT2 was prepared in the name of the Second
Defendant and not the Plaintiff who was the last registered proprietor of the
Land and did not contain the private caveat which was still effective and
endorsed on the subsisting title.
45. In respect of IDT3, the Plaintiff further submitted it was plainly invalid
as the IDT3 was the replacement title for IDT2 which had not been issued
at all by the Fifth or Sixth Defendant. The Plaintiff also pointed out that
DW8 had conceded that the Fifth Defendant should not have entertained
the application for the replacement title, let alone process and approve it.
The replacement application was based on the police report made on 27
October 2005 which stated that IDT2 was lost on 27 October 2005.
46. I have noted that the Plaintiff has included in her contention that the
title was invalid or void ab initio because IDT 2 was wrongly issued by the
Fifth and Sixth Defendant. This is in expansion to her original stance that
the duplicate title was wrongly issued to replace the allegedly lost title as
pleaded which resulted in the annulment of all subsequent dealings. The
First Defendant further pointed out that this was not even in the agreed
issues between them and hence ought to be discarded following Malaysia
Building Society Berhad v. Dato Yusuf Sudin [2013] 1 LNS 1284. I am of
the view that the lists of agreed issues in this case was not plainly stated to
be exhaustive and therefore understood as such. Furthermore, it seems to
be captured in the first item of the list of agreed issues between the Plaintiff
and the Second Defendant which if decided might at law have an impact on
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the First Defendant. Consequently I am of the view that justice and fairness
require this contention of the Plaintiff be addressed.
47. As to the law, I have earlier in Soon Poy Yong @ Soon Puey Yong v.
Westport Properties Sdn Bhd (supra) similarly been faced with the
contention that the land title therein was void ab initio. After analyzing and
reconciling the cases of Shayo (M) Sdn Bhd v. Nurlieda Binti Sidek &
Ors [2013] 7 MLJ 555, Uptown Properties Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah
Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors [2012] 8 MLJ 713, Yap Ham Seow v.
Fatimawati Ismail & Ors [2013] 9 CLJ 577 and Overseas Realty Sdn
Bhd v. Wong Yau Choy [2014] 3 AMR 703, I came to the view that the
land title would be void ab initio, if and only if, the land registry had in
blatant breach of its duty under the National Land Code wrongfully
registered any land in the register document of title and issued the
replacement issue document of title in the name of a third party. The title
would not however be void ab initio if the land registry had been duped into
issuing a replacement title in continuation as happened in the court of
appeal case of Yap Ham Seow (supra) where the title was issued
pursuant to a crafty scheme by fraudsters claiming that the original title was
lost. And in Overseas Realty Sdn Bhd (supra), it did not matter so long
the impugned title was issued by the land registry in the name of the
original owner.
48. The parties here also pointed to the case of Yew Foo Chun v. Wong
Nye Keong & Ors [2014] 1 LNS 189 which was decided shortly after but
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did not refer to Yap Ham Seow (supra) where Shayo (M) Sdn Bhd
(supra) and Uptown Properties Sdn Bhd (supra) were also distinguished
in that the title in continuation were issued in the registered proprietor’s
name and not a third party’s name and hence not void ab initio.
49. On the facts herein and as submitted by the Fifth and Sixth Defendant,
ss. 166 to 168 and s. 5A of the National Land Code are to be read together
in harmony with the latter taking precedence in the event of conflict with
respect to computerized land titles. IDT2 was generated when the
computerized land registration system was implemented. The new
computerized issue document of title need not be issued to the registered
proprietor so long the old manual issue document of title was not
surrendered to the land registry. The Fourteenth Schedule (section 5A) to
the National Land Code provides:
(1) Upon the coming into force of the Computerized Land Registration
System in a land Registry, the Registrar shall convert the existing
register documents of title to the computer printed register
documents of title and shall sign and seal the same.
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computer printed issue document of title is prepared and issued to
the proprietor.
(4) Any registered proprietor whose land comes within the jurisdiction of a
land Registry in which the Computerized Land Registration System is
implemented may at any time apply for conversion of an existing issue
document of title to a computer printed issue document of title by lodging
the existing issue document of title at the said land Registry.
(5) The Registrar may on his own accord convert any existing issue
document of title without there being an application made under
subparagraph (4).
(6) In respect of an existing document of title prepared under the National
Land Code, the computer printed document of title shall be prepared as in
Form 5BK, 5CK, 5DK, 5EK, 11AK or 11BK, as the case may be, with the
plan of the land in Form B1 or B2, as the case may be.
(b) endorse across the face of the existing register document of title to the
effect that the title in question had been converted to the computer printed
register document of title; and on the making of such endorsement the
existing register document of title shall be deemed to have been cancelled;
(c) call upon the proprietor to take delivery of the computer printed
issue document of title and the plan of the land; provided that where
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(d) cancel and destroy the existing document of title when submitted to
him.”
50. DW8 testified that IDT2 was in the computer system. Nonetheless, it is
my view that DW8 was not in the position to confirm the true status of IDT 2
including whether it was issued at the material time in 2002 as she was not
then attached to the Fifth Defendant. In other words, she had no personal
knowledge of it: see Datuk Bandar Kuala Lumpur v. Zain Azahari Bin
Zainal Abidin [1997] 2 MLJ 17. The registrar or the deputy district officer
Azlina Binti Aziz was however not called by any of the parties to testify in
court.
51. From the documentary evidence adduced, IDT2 was produced by the
Fifth Defendant on 24 May 2002. There is the certified true copy of IDT2
(bundle B1 pages 173-174). By s. 383(2) of the National Land Code, I am
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52. I have no qualms with the Plaintiff that there can only be a title to a
single lot of land as provided in s. 85(2) of the National Land Code.
However the Plaintiff’s contention that the preparation of IDT2 was made
without prior notification to the Plaintiff and thereby contravened ss. 168 and
433 of the National Land Code is in my view misconceived. S. 168 is only
applicable if the circumstance in s. 166(c) or (d) is invoked which was not
the case. S 166 provides:
…(c) where, by a notice or notices under section 15, the Registrar or Land
Administrator had called upon the proprietor and any chargee, lienholder or
other person or body whom he may have reason to believe to be in
possession thereof, to produce the issue document of title, and notice or
notices have not been complied with;
(d) where an application therefor had been made by any person or body in
accordance with the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), on the grounds
that the issue document of title had been lost, or wholly or partially
destroyed, or is being improperly or wrongfully withheld;…”
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53. As to the Plaintiff’s contention that the IDT1 had never been
surrendered to the Fifth Defendant, it is in my view clear from rule 9(c) of
the Fourteenth Schedule (section 5A) of the National Land Code that the
surrender of the title would only be required if IDT2 was to be given to the
Plaintiff in exchange. Nevertheless it is plain from rule 5 that the Fifth or
Sixth Defendant could on its own volition produce IDT2 prior thereto. There
is no evidence that IDT2 was issued or given to anyone including the
Plaintiff.
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55. In the circumstances, I find and hold that the Fifth and Sixth
Defendants have not contravened the National Land Code in any way in
respect of the preparation of IDT2.
56. As for the Plaintiff’s allegation that IDT3 was wrongly issued as the
replacement title for IDT2 which had not been issued at all by the Fifth or
Sixth Defendant, I find as a matter of fact that there was an application to
the Fifth Defendant for the issuance of a replacement title on 6 January
2006 on the ground that the original title was lost. The bogus Plaintiff
further on 25 May 2006 authorized Omar Hussein & Co in writing to collect
the replacement title on her behalf.
57. I find and hold in the circumstances that there was no replacement title
issued for the purportedly lost title. IDT3 was instead a new issue
document of title prepared pursuant to rule 16 of the Fourteenth Schedule
(section 5A) of the National Land Code. In this process, the registrar by s.
299 (1)(a) of the National Land Code was empowered to register the
transfer by dispensing with the preparation of the original document of title
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which I so find and hold by inference to have occurred because the original
title was lost as claimed and pending replacement at that material time.
58. Consequently, I again find that that the Fifth and Sixth Defendants
have not contravened the National Land Code in any way in respect of the
59. Accordingly and from the case authorities, I find and hold that the titles
prepared and/or issued by the Fifth Defendant were not invalid or void ab
the Plaintiff. Furthermore the titles in issue were prepared in the names of
the correct parties, to wit the Plaintiff and the Second Defendant for IDT2
60. The transfer of the Land here to the Second Defendant was pursuant
Sum Yok Eng v. Adorna Properties Sdn Bhd [1995] 2 AMR 1828 and
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62. The burden of proof that the Land was fraudulently transferred lies on
the Plaintiff and the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. This is
made clear by Steve Shim CJ (Sabah & Sarawak) in the Federal Court case
of Yong Tim v. Hoo Kok Chong & Anor [2005] 3 CLJ 229 at 233-235:
This position on the standard of proof is again affirmed by the Federal Court
in Asean Security Paper Mills Sdn Bhd v. CGU Insurance Bhd [2007] 2
CLJ 1.
63. Earlier in the federal court case of Tai Lee Finance Co Sdn Bhd v.
Official Assignee & Ors [1983] 1 MLJ 81, Abdul Hamid FJ (as he then
was) explained at 83 and 85 that:
“...It would seem to us that their case depended on whether there was
fraud within the meaning of subsection (2) of section 340 of the National
Land Code. It was founded on the basis of constructive fraud alleging that
the appellant had constructive notice of their prior interests. On the material
before the court the learned judge did conclude that the appellant had
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Furthermore, Syed Agil Barakbah SCJ in the Supreme Court case of Chu
Choon Moi v. Ngan Sew Tin [1986] 1 MLJ 34 at 38 clarified as follows:
“We agree that fraud whether made in civil or criminal proceedings must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt and cannot be based on suspicion and
conjecture (Narayanan v. Official Assignee, Rangoon; Saminathan v.
Pappa). Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond
the shadow of doubt. The degree of proof need not reach certainty but
it must carry a high degree of probability. What it means is that the
evidence adduced is such that the Court believes its existence or
a prudent man considers its existence probable in the circumstances
of the particular case. If such proof extends only to a possibility but not in
the least a probability, then it falls short of proving beyond reasonable
doubt. (See “proved” at section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1950 and Liew
Kaling & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor) In the present appeal before us, the
facts and circumstances of the case in relation to the part played by the
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respondent point to the probability that any prudent man would under the
circumstances accept it to be fraudulent.” (emphasis added)
64. The adduction of direct evidence of fraud is often difficult and not
practicably procured. Nevertheless circumstantial evidence may suffice and
in Ng Pak Cheong v. Global Insurance Co Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 AMR 50,
Mohamed Dzaiddin bin Haji Abdullah J (as he then was) dealt with the
reception of circumstantial evidence at 2673:
“In the famous Singapore case of Sumitomo Bank Ltd v. Kartika Ratna
Thahir [1993] 1 SLR 735, Lai Kew Chai J, in dealing with the burden of
proof for allegations of fraudulent or criminal nature in civil cases, held,
allowing a substantial part of Pertamina's claim, that the legal and
evidential burden of proof that Pertamina had paid Siemens and Klockner
rests with Pertamina. Whilst it is necessary for Pertamina to prove their
case to a higher standard than that required in a non-fraud case (there
being allegations of a fraudulent or criminal nature), it is not the law
of evidence that every step in the allegation of fraud had to be proved
by calling live and admissible evidence nor is it the law that fraud
cannot be inferred in the appropriate case. The inference, however,
should not be made lightly; the circumstantial evidence must be so
compelling and convincing that bearing in mind the high standard of
proof the inference is nevertheless justified…” (emphasis added)
65. From the evidence adduced by the Plaintiff, she is able to satisfy me
that she was in possession of the original manual issue document of title, to
wit IDT1 at the material time when the transfer of the Land took place. She
did not have the intention to sell and never dealt with anyone for the sale or
transfer of the Land including with solicitors.
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66. From the Defendants’ witnesses, the Plaintiff established that she was
not the person represented by the Third and Fourth Defendants. DW9, the
Third Defendant unmistakably confirmed the fact that PW1, the Plaintiff
was not the person she dealt with during the transaction of the Land. I am
satisfied from the evidence adduced before me and find that the Plaintiff did
not execute the sale and purchase agreement dated 20 October 2005 or
the instrument of transfer (form 14A) of the Land before her. They were
instead executed by another lady, the bogus Plaintiff in the name of
Meyappa Chettiar Rajamani, the bearer of Indian passport no. F4495077
(bundle B1 pages 156-161) who impersonated the Plaintiff.
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68. Based on the evidence adduced, I find the following facts that emerged
in respect of the transfer of the Land to the Second Defendant:
ii) Since the Second Defendant was interested to purchase the Land, there
was the first meeting held with the two directors of the Second Defendant,
DW1, DW2 and the Seventh Defendant. Omar Hussein & Co was
appointed to act on behalf of the Second Defendant. The Seventh
Defendant was the legal assistant of the law firm Omar Hussein & Co
assisted by the firm’s conveyancing department manager, DW2. The
transaction was dealt by DW2 but overseen by the Seventh Defendant. The
photocopy of the cancelled register document of title as proof of the Land
title was given to the Seventh Defendant at the meeting. DW2 requested
for further documentation and the Second Defendant consequently
furnished them such as director’s resolution, forms 24 and 49, etc. at the
subsequent second meeting with the Seventh Defendant.
iv) It was followed by the third meeting on 12 October 2005 attended by the
same two directors of the Second Defendant, DW1, Karim, the bogus
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Plaintiff, DW2 and the Seventh Defendant. The sale and purchase
agreement of the Land was discussed. The bogus Plaintiff brought
photocopies of her Indian passport, Malaysian immigration departure card,
statutory declaration affirmed on 20 August 2005 and form 14A dated 6
April 1988. The Seventh Defendant advised her to appoint her own
solicitors and recommended the Third Defendant to her.
v) The sale and purchase agreement between the bogus Plaintiff and the
Second Defendant as prepared by DW2 was executed by the directors of
the Second Defendant on 19 October 2005 after several prior exchanges of
letters on the terms between solicitors. The bogus Plaintiff thereafter
executed and dated it 20 October 2005. She also executed the instrument
of transfer (form 14A) dated 25 October 2005 as well as the stamping
proforma. The execution was done before the Third Defendant.
viii) The bogus Plaintiff herself confirmed by letter dated 9 March 2006 that
the balance of the purchase price under the sale and purchase agreement
had been received and the Seventh Defendant proceeded to effect the
registration of the transfer.
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69. From these facts as found and as strenuously pointed out by the
Plaintiff, I find several factors bizarre which to my mind point to a dishonest
and concerted scheme planned by several persons other than the bogus
Plaintiff to cheat and deprive the Plaintiff of the Land. They are as follows:
ii) Secondly, the oddity is that none of those present at the meeting on 12
October 2005 particularly the Second Defendant and Seventh Defendant or
DW2 were concerned or suspicious that the bogus Plaintiff was not in
possession of the original or even photocopy of the issue document of title
of the Land albeit other documents were produced including the form 14A
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iii) Thirdly another major peculiarity pertains to the police report of the
bogus Plaintiff made on 27 October 2005 stating that she lost IDT2 on 27
October 2005 based on an earlier statutory declaration dated 20 October
2005 declaring it lost. In this respect, counsel for the Plaintiff aptly
submitted that “Only a prophet could have achieved this feat.” Besides, I
am mindful that IDT2 although prepared was never yet issued to anyone by
the Fifth and Sixth Defendants. It is also obvious that the bogus Plaintiff
must have had the assistance of someone else in the preparation of this
statutory declaration since she neither speak nor write Bahasa Malaysia or
English Language. The Third and Fourth Defendants who were her
solicitors however did not appear to know of the purported lost title. The
Second Defendant instead knew of it and requested the Seventh
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iv) Fourthly, the terms of the sale and purchase agreement made between
the bogus Plaintiff and the Second Defendant were also not in the ordinary.
The Second Defendant allegedly paid a substantial sum of RM800,000
(2/3 of the purchase price) to the bogus Plaintiff (a foreign national no less)
in advance of the transaction. Moreover, the final balance of the purchase
price was allegedly paid directly to the bogus Plaintiff and not through the
Third and Fourth Defendants as is the norm. I observed that there is no
cogent independent evidence produced on the payments made by the
Second Defendant to the bogus Plaintiff such bank statements on the fund
flow and am hence doubtful if the purchase price of the RM1,200,000 was
ever paid to the bogus Plaintiff at all.
v) Fifthly, I have also noted that the Second Defendant had within about 4
months from the date of registration of the title in its name entered into a
sale and purchase agreement with the First Defendant for RM1,800,000
thereby making a handsome profit of RM600,000 (50% on the assumption
that the RM1,200,000 purchase price was actually paid to the bogus
Plaintiff). In fact the title of the Land was never collected by the Second
Defendant but kept at all times by Omar Hussein & Co ever since it was
issued by the Fifth Defendant. In other words, the Second Defendant
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wasn’t interested to keep the Land but rather more concerned to dispose of
it soonest possible.
71. I also observed that the Second Defendant did not call any witness to
testify at the trial notwithstanding that an unsigned witness statement of its
director, Datuk Mazlan bin Yusof was filed pre-trial. This was in spite that
there wasn’t submission of no case to answer by the Second Defendant at
the close of the Plaintiff’s case. I am aware that Datuk Mazlan passed away
during the course of the trial but there is still the other surviving director
Azizi Bin Abdul Hamid who was privy to the transaction of the Land. It
would be necessary for him to explain the bizarre factors highlighted above.
He was also not subpoenaed by the Seventh Defendant. I believe that
further damning evidence would emerge if the Azizi Bin Abdul Hamid was
put under cross examination at trial. Thus his presence in court was
withheld or suppressed; see Robin Van Beurle & Anor v. La Reve
(Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2012] 5 CLJ 61.
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74. In the pleadings, the Plaintiff also contended that the Seventh
Defendant committed fraud in concert with the Third and Fourth
Defendants but it was clarified at the clarification on 14 January 2015 that
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the allegation of fraud is now confined against the Seventh Defendant since
fraud was not in the list of agreed issues between the Plaintiff and the Third
and Fourth Defendants and not pursued in the closing arguments.
75. Since I have found the Second Defendant liable for fraud, the Seventh
Defendant will also be liable if he was a party or privy to the fraud; see Tai
Lee Finance Co Sdn Bhd v. Official Assignee & Ors (supra). The
distinction between them is subtle. The Seventh Defendant would be a
party to the fraud if he was also in cahoots in joint enterprise with his firm’s
client, the Second Defendant. However, he would be privy to it if he shared
the knowledge of his client; see The Concise Oxford English Dictionary
where “privy” has been described as “sharing in the knowledge of
(something secret)”. Hence it seems to me that the former requires active
participation in the fraud whereas knowledge of the fraud suffices in the
latter.
76. On the facts of this case, it is clear that the Seventh Defendant worked
with, if not dependent upon DW2 in the undertaking of the conveyancing
transaction of the Land. Thus I do not expect the Seventh Defendant to
know the minute details but he must have been aware of the broader
picture. Moreover he cannot shun away the obvious facts particularly if they
were very shady and suspicious.
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77. In my view, all the bizarre factors discussed above are obvious facts
that were telling that something in the conveyancing transaction of the Land
was amiss that smacked of fraud. I noticed that the Seventh Defendant had
however in his testimony dismissed them as casual and nothing that
aroused suspicion. I have carefully watched him and am not convinced
from his facial expression and manner of answering that he actually
believed what he said.
In the old Privy Council case of Assets Company Ltd v. Mere Roihi [1905]
A.C. 76 Lord Lindley said:
“…the mere fact that he might have found out fraud if he had been more
vigilant, and had made further inquiries which he omitted to make, does not
itself prove fraud on his part. But if it be shown that his suspicions were
aroused and that he abstained from making enquiries for fear of learning
the truth, the case is very different, and fraud may be properly ascribed to
him.”
but I noted that the rigour of His Lordship’s speech has been somewhat
watered down in the court of appeal case of Rabiah Lip & Ors v. Bukit
Lenang Development Sdn Bhd and Other Appeals [2008] 3 CLJ 69. In
my view, abstention to enquire on suspicions is not sufficient to find
commission of fraud by the defendant where actual and not constructive or
equitable fraud is required. But I am of the view that this can be
distinguished and robustly applied to justify that the defendant is instead
privy to the fraud. In any case, I find from the testimony of the Seventh
Defendant that he had actual and not only constructive knowledge of the
fraud of the Second Defendant.
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78. Consequently in the circumstances, I find and hold that the Seventh
Defendant was privy to the scheme of the Second Defendant in cahoots
with the bogus Plaintiff. I reiterate that the Seventh Defendant had actual
over and above constructive knowledge of the aforesaid scheme here.
However he had chosen to appear oblivious in his self-interest to serve his
client regardless of the consequences. Though he might not have actually
participated in the fraudulent scheme of the Second Defendant, I am
nonetheless satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he was privy to it.
80. From the evidence adduced, I am not satisfied that there was the joint
agreement between the Seventh Defendant and the Third and Fourth
Defendant in collusion to defraud the Plaintiff even though I have found that
the Seventh Defendant was privy to the fraud of the Second Defendant. I
find that the Third and Fourth Defendant was merely appointed by the
bogus Plaintiff on the suggestion of the Seventh Defendant, probably to
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divert the glaringness of the scheme and diminish his responsibility from
the knowledge he possessed. I further find that the Third and Fourth
Defendants were unaware of the scheme as the Third Defendant was not
privy to all of the bizarre factors discussed above. In other words, they
acted for the bogus Plaintiff as another normal referred client including
settling the terms of the sale and purchase agreement and reminding her of
the balance of the payment due.
81. In the premises but with reluctance, I do not find the Seventh
Defendant liable to the Plaintiff as pleaded because the charge of
conspiracy to defraud in collusion with the Third and Fourth Defendants
has not been made out.
82. Besides fraud and since I have found that the Third and Fourth
Defendant dealt with the bogus Plaintiff and not the Plaintiff, all the
documentation such as the sale and purchase agreement and the
instruments of dealing in the Land must necessarily also have been
procured by forgery. The signature of the bogus Plaintiff on these
documents was passed off as that of the Plaintiff and I accordingly find and
hold that these documents were procured through forgery too.
83. The legal effect is contained in s. 340 of the National Land Code which
reads:
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“340. Registration to confer indefeasible title or interest, except in
certain circumstances
(1) The title or interest of any person or body for the time being registered
as a proprietor of any land, or in whose name any lease, charge or
easement is, for the time being registered shall, subject to the following
provisions of this section shall be indefeasible.
(2) The title or interest of any such person or body shall not be
indefeasible:-
(c) where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired by the person or body
in the purported exercise of any power or authority conferred by any written
law.
(3) Where the title or interest of any person or body is defeasible by reason
of any of the circumstances specified in sub-section (2):-
(a) it shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body to
whom it may subsequently be transferred; and
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect any title or interest
acquired by any purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration, or
by any person or body claiming through or under such a purchaser.
(a) the exercise in respect of any land or interest of any power of forfeiture
or sale conferred by this Act or any other written law for the time being in
force, or any power of avoidance conferred by any such law; or
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84. Mokhtar Sidin JCA in the Court of Appeal case of Ong Ban Chai &
Ors v. Seah Siong Mong [1998] 3 MLJ 346 said at 372 that:
85. By reason of my finding that the fraud was committed by the Second
Defendant as well as forgery by the bogus Plaintiff, s. 340 (2)(a) and (b) of
the National Land Code are accordingly attracted. Thus the transfer and
title to the Land that was registered in the name of the Second Defendant is
defeasible.
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86. It was also submitted that the Second Defendant was a bona fide
that I have found. In any event, even if the culprit was only the bogus
indefeasible title following the federal court decision of Tan Ying Hong v.
Tan Sian San & Ors [2010] 2CLJ 269 because the proviso in s. 340(3)
87. The Plaintiff contended that the First Defendant’s title to the Land is
it is the Plaintiff’s case that the First Defendant was not the bona fide
acquired the Land by fraud and/or forgery, the sale and transfer of the Land
tainted.
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90. Richard Malanjum JCA (now CJ Sabah & Sarawak) had in the Court of
Appeal case of State Tailor Sdn Bhd v. Nallapan [2005] 2 MLJ 589
defined bona fide purchaser as follows at 603:
“The term ‘bona fide purchaser’ had been used in a host of cases. Simply
put it means a buyer in good faith. And the basis element of good
faith is the absence of fraud, deceit or dishonesty and the knowledge
or means of knowledge of such at the time of entry of the transaction.
But the overriding consideration is the ‘Particular circumstance of
each case’...” (emphasis added)
“Had the learned trial judge taken the above facts and circumstances into
consideration, he cannot possibly conclude that the 1 s t defendant was
a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, so as to be protected
under s. 340(3) of the Code. To me, the 1 st defendant had acted hastily.
He concluded the sale without any proper investigation into the title or the
persons claiming to be proprietors. No doubt he had every right to take
advantage of the low price that was offered to him but he took the risk.
When he embarked into such risk, it cannot be at the expense of the
plaintiffs. This is because while he had a choice, the plaintiffs had none. In
fact, the plaintiffs were helpless. The plaintiffs could not do anything to
prevent the fraud. Even locking the title in a safe would not had help the
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92. And in another recent court of appeal case of Teoh Kim Heng v. Tan
Ong Ban [2014] 8 CLJ 316, Aziah Ali JCA said as follows:
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valuable consideration and good faith in the conveyance of the property lies
on the appellant (see Yap Ham Seow v. Fatimawati Ismail & Ors And
Another Appeal [2013] 9 CLJ 577).
[19] Section 340 of the NLC states as follows:
(1) The title or interest of any person or body for the time being registered
as proprietor of any land, or in whose name any lease, charge or easement
is for the time being registered, shall, subject to the following provisions of
this section, be indefeasible.
(2) The title or interest of any such person or body shall not be indefeasible:
(a) in any case of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person or body,
or any agent of the person or body, was a party or privy; or
(c) where the title or interest was unlawfully acquired by the person or body
in the purported exercise of any power or authority conferred by any written
law.
(3) Where the title or interest of any person or body is defeasible by reason
of any of the circumstances specified in sub-section (2):
(a) it shall be liable to be set aside in the hands of any person or body to
whom it may subsequently be transferred; and
(b) any interest subsequently granted there out shall be liable to be set
aside in the hands of any person or body in whom it is for the time being
vested;
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall affect any title or interest
acquired by any purchaser in good faith and for valuable consideration, or
by any person or body claiming through or under such a purchase.
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[21] The appellant says that he had paid the full purchase price to
Mohd Ismail. The respondent disputes this. However there is no
evidence that Mohd Ismail had instituted any action against the
appellant for payment of the balance of the purchase price. Further
the fact that the appellant is in possession of the property is not
challenged. We are of the considered view that there is sufficient
evidence to show that the sale and purchase transaction between the
appellant and Mohd Ismail had been completed.
[23] W e find that th e appel lant had show n tha t h e was a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice and therefore he is clothed with the
statutory protection accorded by s. 340 NLC. Consequently the appellant
had acquired an indefeasible title to the property.” (emphasis added)
From the evidence adduced, I find that the First Defendant had at all
material times neither knowledge nor notice of the commission of the fraud
by the Second Defendant in cahoots with the bogus Plaintiff that resulted in
the transfer of the Land to the Second Defendant.
In respect of the sale of the Land by the Second Defendant to the First
Defendant, the First Defendant appointed its solicitors T.S. Teoh &
Partners. Both the First Defendant and T.S. Teoh & Partners conducted
land searches on the Land before the entry of the sale and purchase
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agreement between the First Defendant and the Second Defendant. The
searches done on 13 July 2006 and 21 July 2006 revealed that the title was
clean and free from caveats including the private caveat lodged by the
Plaintiff’s son on 1 March 2001.
The First Defendant was also represented by T.S. Teoh & Partners at all
material times in respect of the sale and purchase agreement that was
executed on 18 August 2006 for the purchase price of RM1,800,000 and
the subsequent conveyancing of the Land including the presentation of
registration of the transfer of the Land.
According to DW4 and the valuation report produced in court, the market
value of the land was RM1,800,000 and this was unchallenged by the
Plaintiff. The stamp duty for the land was also adjudicated based on the
market value of RM1,800,000. I find that this was a fair valuation of the
Land at the material time.
For financing of the purchase of the Land, the First Defendant obtained a
loan from CIMB Bank and both transfer and charge on the Land in favour of
the First Defendant and CIMB bank respectively were registered on 14
December 2006. The payment of the purchase of the Land had been paid
in full by the First Defendant.
I also observed that the First Defendant through another related company
Eng Beng Manufacturing (M) Sdn Bhd had purchased two other pieces of
land nearby from different sellers in 2005 and 2009 respectively and this
fortifies that the purchase of the Land was made bona fide.
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94. I noticed the Plaintiff also argued that this purchase of the Land by the
First Defendant was questionable due to the non withholding of the portion
of the purchase price, thereby allegedly an attempt by the First Defendant
to circumvent payment of real property gains tax, hence defrauding the
Inland Revenue Board.
95. S. 21B of the Real Property Gains Tax Act 1976 which was in force at
the material time of the transaction provides:
(a) the acquirer shall, until he receives the Director General's certificate of
clearance under section 21A, retain the whole of that money (subject to the
reservation that the money retained shall not exceed a sum calculated at
the rate at which the tax is for the time being chargeable, on the total value
of the consideration);
(b) the Director General may, at any time, before he sends the certificate of
clearance, serve upon the acquirer a written requisition in the prescribed
form calling upon him to pay the whole or any part of the sum retained
under paragraph (a) (or, where the acquirer had failed to comply with that
paragraph, the sum which should have been so retained) within a time
specified in the requisition;
(c) in a case where paragraph (b) applies, the acquirer shall deliver the
sum stated in the requisition to the Director General within the time
specified in the requisition.
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(3) An acquirer who is required under this section to deliver to the Director
General a sum which he should have, but had not retained under
subsection (1)(a), shall, on complying with the requisition, be deemed for
the purposes of section 16(3) to have been assessed in the sum under
section 16(1) and to have paid that sum in pursuance of that assessment.”
96. The terms of the sale and purchase agreement between the First
Defendant and Second Defendant were drawn up by T.S. Teoh & Partners
and the First Defendant merely complied with the settled terms. There was
no provision to withhold the portion of the real property gains tax agreed
therein. In fact the First Defendant entered into similar terms in its other
land purchases. In the circumstances, I find and hold that the Plaintiff’s
allegation on the circumvention of fiscal statue to defraud the revenue is
misconceived. I also agree with the following dicta of Lee Swee Seng J in
Yew Foo Chun v. Wong Nye Keong & Ors (supra):
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(RPGT) is a matter for the Inland Revenue Board. I quite agree with mr P M
Lee, that even if the above conduct of the D1 and d2 vis-à-vis D5 and D6,
amounts tM defrauding the Inland revenue where RPGT is concerned, that
cannot be equated with defrauding the plaintiff or that as a result they
ceased to be bona fide purchasers.”; see also Pekan Nenas Industries
Sdn Bhd v. Chang Ching Chuen (supra).
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question if asked and answered, would indicate one way or the other
the bona fides of the purchaser or the lack of it.
98. Consequently I find and hold that the First Defendant’s Land title IDT3
is indefeasible.
99. The First Defendant had counterclaimed that the private caveat
entered by the Plaintiff on 28 March 2007 was unlawful if the land title of
100. According to the First Defendant, the Land was purchased with plans
to construct a factory for purposes of sale, lease or tenancy at a profit. This
project was halted by reason of the entry and subsistence of the private
caveat as notified to the First Defendant on 8 May 2007 by the Fifth
Defendant. The Plaintiff did not withdraw or remove the caveat
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T.S. Teoh & Partners. In addition a registrar’s caveat was also entered on
the Land on 3 July 2007 following the police report made by the Plaintiff.
Defendant’s title is valid and indefeasible, it follows and I find and hold that
the private caveat was wrongfully and unlawfully entered by the Plaintiff;
[1974] 1 MLJ 128. However the removal of the private caveat is no longer
an issue presently by reason that it has lapsed after six years on 29 March
2013 pursuant to s. 328 of the National Land Code. The registrar’s caveat
still subsists and ought now to be removed since the rights of the parties
102. Nonetheless I also find and hold that the First Defendant ought in the
Land Code. Moreover the Plaintiff should also be prohibited from lodging
further private caveats on the Land; see s. 329(2) of the National Land
Code.
103. Though the Plaintiff had pleaded that the Seventh Defendant acted in
concert with the Third and Fourth Defendant, the Plaintiff has clarified that
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she is only pursuing against the Third and Fourth Defendant not for fraud
104. As for acting without authority, it seems that the Plaintiff has
abandoned the claim from the list of agreed issues. Be that as it may, it is
plain from the evidence adduced that the Third and Fourth Defendants
were appointed by the bogus plaintiff and not the Plaintiff. In such situation,
Contracts Act 1950. The Plaintiff had not cited any case authority to
105. The Plaintiff has also contended that the Third and Fourth Defendants
were negligent by reason of the failure on their part to take the necessary
steps to verify the true identity of their client, the bogus Plaintiff before
attesting to her signature on the instrument of transfer (form 14A). They did
not have sight of the original issue document of title nor conducted and
Rethinasamy [1984] 1 MLJ 126 submitted that the Third and Fourth
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106. The Third and Fourth Defendants principally relied instead on the
court of appeal case of Yap Ham Seow v. Fatimawati Binti Ismail & Ors
(supra) that the solicitor who acted for the fraudster did not owe a duty of
care to the real owner of the land. In that case Raus Shariff PCA held that:
“[89] However, assuming there were suspicion on DW5’s part, is she duty
bound to inform Messrs Rajagopalu and can she be held negligent in her
failure to do so? Our answer to this is thus: the second defendant’s
solicitors owe a duty of care to her client (the forger) which she derived
from the retainer. This duty certainly does not include informing a
prospective solicitor who might take over any irregularities or discrepancies
in the file.
[90] As can be gleaned from the above cited cases and at the risk of
repeating ourselves, we must reiterate here that DW5’s duty of care is
confined to the forger alone and not the plaintiff.” (emphasis added)
107. I find that the facts are closely similar and bound by this decision of
the court of appeal. Moreover, I do not find the English cases of Penn v.
Bristol & West Building Society [1987] 3 AER 470 and Al-Sabah v. Ali
[1999] 3 EGCS 11 cited by the Plaintiff in rebuttal to be of assistance to
displace this legal position. The former concerns an action for breach of
warranty of authority which is obviously not the case here whilst the latter
was based on the concession by the parties that a duty of care existed.
Nonetheless the facts are also distinguishable. In that case the solicitor had
the duty to satisfy himself that the instructions came from the client and not
a third party that represented the client. This is plainly different from the
case herein where the Third and Fourth Defendants met their client
personally.
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108. In addition I hold that the case of Neogh Soo Oh & Ors v. G.
Rethinasamy (supra) originally relied upon by the Plaintiff is also
inapplicable by reason that it was a case concerning the purchasers and
their own solicitor.
109. In the premises and in the absence of a duty of care, I find and hold
that the Plaintiff’s claim against the Third and Fourth Defendants is
unsustainable and it is not necessary to look into the other elements of the
tort particularly whether the duty had been breached.
110. For completeness, if there was a duty of care on the part of the Third
and Fourth Defendant owed to the Plaintiff, I do not find that all their actions
or omissions as suggested by the Plaintiff amounted to breaches of that
duty. The bogus Plaintiff had presented to the Third Defendant her current
passport which carried the same name as the Plaintiff and the Land title.
However the Third Defendant’s failure to further investigate into her identity
might in my view be negligent on her part. This is because as an
experienced legal practitioner, she should have been alerted to the
worthless statutory declaration that necessarily linked the earlier passport
of the bogus Plaintiff to the Land title. This is justified in my view because
the land registry has mainly only an administrative function as provided in
ss. 297 to 301 of the National Land Code and depended on advocates and
solicitors to attest to the instruments of registration executed by the parties
to the transaction. The ascertainment of the true identity of the party
concerned must be done at the attestation stage.
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As to the several other conveyancing tasks such as land searches and the
handing over of the issue document of title that were already done or taken
over (by reason that the title was allegedly lost and needed replacement)
respectively by the Seventh Defendant, who is an advocate and solicitor,
this is in my view unobjectionable and not negligent on her part.
If there was a duty of care that was breached here by the Third and Fourth
Defendants, the loss and damage suffered by the Plaintiff is a given being
the loss of the Land.
111. In the premises, I find and hold that the negligence alleged by the
Plaintiff against the Third and Fourth Defendant has not been established
and is hence unsustainable.
112. The Plaintiff’s contention against the Fifth and Sixth Defendants is
that they breached the National Land Code 1965 by having registered the
transfer of the Land to the Second Defendant and then to the First
Defendant notwithstanding that the Land was encumbered by the private
caveat lodged by the Plaintiff’s son in 2001. According to the Plaintiff, the
law imposes a duty on public authorities to exercise due care in carrying
out their functions and day to day operations and the Plaintiff argued that it
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Kereta-kereta Motor, Melaka & Ors v. KS South Motor Sdn Bhd [2000]
MLJ 540.
113. The defence put up by the Fifth and Sixth Defendants are both
procedural and substantive.
114. On the procedural aspect, the Fifth and Sixth Defendants relied on ss.
5 and 6 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 which read:
Subject to this Act, the Government shall be liable for any wrongful act
done or any neglect or default committed by any public officer in the same
manner and to the same extent as that in which a principal, being a private
person, is liable for any wrongful act done, or any neglect or default
committed by his agent, and for the purposes of this section and without
prejudice to the generality thereof, any public officer acting or purporting in
good faith to be acting in pursuance of a duty imposed by law shall be
deemed to be the agent of and to be acting under the instructions of the
Government.
(2) Any written law which negatives or limits the amount of the liability of
any public officer in respect of any act, neglect or default committed by that
officer shall, in the case of proceedings against the Government under
section 5 in respect of such act, neglect or default of such officer, apply in
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(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) the expression “appropriate financial
officer” means, in respect of the Federal Government, the Minister of
Finance, and in respect of the Government of a State, the State Financial
Officer, and, in the case of the States of Sabah and Sarawak, the State
Minister responsible for finance.”
“Thus I entirely agree with the views expressed by Abdul Aziz J (later FJ) in
Haji Abdul Rahman, supra. Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeal,
Haji Abdul Rahman was correctly decided and should be upheld.
Therefore, on the proper construction of ss. 5 and 6 of Act 359, in any claim
in tort against the Government who was responsible for the alleged
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tortuous act must be a party and his liability be established before the
Government can be made vicariously liable as principal. It would be
insufficient to merely identify the officer without joining the officer as a party
because liability by evidence needs to be established. It is only upon a
successful claim against the officer personally can a claim be laid against
the Government.
In the present case, all the eight causes of actions are action in tort or tort-
based premised on the act or omission of an individual. None of the
Governments sued is capable of committing the wrong pleaded. Since the
Governments’ liability in tort can only be vicarious by virtue of ss. 5
and 6 of the Act 359, and as officers who were responsible for the
alleged wrongdoing were not joined as defendants to the action, it is
therefore not possible in law to maintain a successful claim in tort
against the Government as primary tortfeasors. That being so, the
applicant’s application to strike out the respondents’ actions is
meritorious… In this respect, I agree with the appellants that this is
not just a case of joining wrong parties but bringing an action against
the wrong parties…” (emphasis added)
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116. Furthermore, the Fifth and Sixth Defendants submitted that they were
the wrong parties sued by the Plaintiff. The proper party should be the
Director of Lands and Mines of the State. In this respect, the Fifth and Sixth
Defendants relied on s. 16 of the National Land Code which provides:
(1) The State Director may, on behalf of the State Authority, commence,
prosecute and carry on in the name of his office any action, suit or other
proceeding relating to:-
(2) Any action, suit or other proceeding relating to land in which it is sought
to establish any liability on the part of the State Authority shall be brought
against the State Director in the name of his office.
(3) In any action, suit or other proceeding to which this section applies, the
State Director may appear personally, or may be represented by any
advocate and solicitor, any Federal Counsel, the State's Legal Adviser or
any Land Administrator or other officer appointed under sub-section (1) of
section 12.”
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“At the inception of the hearing the State Legal Adviser who appeared for
the State Government and the Director of Lands and Mines took a
preliminary objection to the joinder of the State Government as a party to
the proceedings in view of the provisions of s. 16(2). The learned Judge
deferred his decision on this point until the conclusion of the trial and in his
reserved judgment dismissed it on the grounds that 'because of the various
declarations sought against it' the State Government 'should be a proper
and necessary party and ought to be heard, for the purpose of completely
adjudicating on all the issues herein'. We must with respect say that this is
a paralogism as it involves the fallacy of petitio principii; it begs the
question as there can be no question of any relief being accorded against
the State Government if it is not a proper party. The State Government as
such has nothing to do with proceedings under the Code. It is the State
Authority that is the pertinent entity, and State Authority is defined in
s. 5 to mean the Ruler or Governor of the State, as the case may be.
Section 12(1) provides for the State Authority to appoint a
Director of Land and Mines for the State and sub-section (3) of that
section specifies his functions, powers, duties and responsibilities.
Section 16 enacts provisions for actions by and against the State
Authority, and sub-section (2) thereof specifically stipulates that any
action, suit or other proceeding relating to land in which it is sought
to establish any liability on the part of the State Authority shall be
brought against the Director of Lands and Mines of the State in the
name of his office. It is accordingly abundantly clear that the
State Government should never have been joined in the proceedings and
on the preliminary objection taken it should have been discharged as a
party thereto. There appears to be a popular misconception on this
aspect of the matter and on the role of the Government of a State as such
in relation to the Code with the resultant indiscriminate misjoinder of State
Governments as parties in proceedings thereunder, and we expect due
heed to be taken of the point we make in this regard.”
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In short and since the Plaintiff’s case is one in tort, it seems to me that the
proper parties here ought to be the Director of Land and Mines of Selangor
joined together with the officer(s) who committed the tort. Generally, the
joining of both the employee and employer is essential to impute liability of
the employee vicariously onto the employer.
118. I am again bound by the decisions of the higher courts on this aspect
and I do not think that the misjoinder and non-joinder can be overcome by
estoppel due to the participation of the Fifth and Sixth Defendants at the
trial as submitted by the Plaintiff or to apply Order 15 rule 6 of the Rules of
Court 2012 to rectify the problem. In any case, I am not aware of the
identity of the relevant officers at the material time even if the court may
wish to do so on its own motion following Tsoi Ping Kwan v. Medan Juta
Sdn Bhd & Anor [1996] 3 MLJ 367. There is also in my view no necessity
that a striking out application must have been made pre-trial although the
Fifth and Sixth Defendants have the option to do so. In other words, this
misjoinder and non-joinder can be raised at any time including post trial. As
it stands, the Plaintiff’s case against the Fifth and Sixth Defendants is bad
procedurally.
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Land Code. I noticed that in their substantive defence, the Fifth and Sixth
Defendants were taken as synonymous - as the Fifth/Sixth Defendants. It
is pointed out in Selvaraju Velasamy & Anor v. Abdullah Ali Kutty [2009]
2 CLJ 753 that the governmental bodies did not have the expertise to
determine the authenticity of the documents presented. In that case,
Vernon Ong JC (now JCA) at 780 said:
I am wholly in agreement with His Lordship’s views and wish to add that the
responsibility should lie on the solicitors undertaking the conveyancing
transaction.
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121. Though it sounded logical, I find it difficult to accept that the private
caveat entered by the son could be synonymously treated as if it was a
caveat entered by his mother in the absence of documentary evidence to
link that common intention.
122. As to the lack of caveatable interest on the part of the Plaintiff’s son, I
accept following Version Buy Sdn Bhd v. Thong Wee Kee & Anor [2014]
8 CLJ 840 that the registrar was only administratively tasked and was not
obliged to enquire into the validity of the cavaeator’s interest at the time the
private caveat was lodged. I further find and hold that as the result, the
caveat is susceptible to be removed pursuant to ss. 326 to 327 of the
National Land Code; see also Ahmad Shazilly Ismail Bakti v. Nik Salma
Zaidah Hj Mohd Zaid [2014] 5 CLJ 817. There is however no power on
the part of the Fifth/Sixth Defendant here to ignore or discard the
subsistence of the caveat to restraint any dealing on the land unless the
caveat has lapsed, withdrawn or removed as per the provisions of the
National Land Code.
123. I wholly agree with the dicta of Prasad Abraham J (now JCA) in
Uptown Properties Sdn Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan
& Ors [2012] 8 MLJ 733 at 731 [28] in the context of land searches:
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could have dire consequences for trade and economic activity in this
country.”
I will not hesitate to extend the duty of the land registry to unwaveringly
give the desired effect of caveats to restrain dealings, otherwise the loss of
confidence and consequences would be similarly dire as is the case here.
The loss and damage suffered by the Plaintiff here is a given being the loss
of the Land.
124. In the premises, I find that substantively the Fifth/Sixth Defendant was
grossly negligent including in breach of statutory duty by having registered
the transfer of the Land notwithstanding so restrained by a subsisting
private caveat.
125. Save for the aforesaid breach of duty, I however find that the
Fifth/Sixth Defendant was not negligent for not having issued the
replacement title notwithstanding the application by the bogus Plaintiff for
one as explained in paragraphs 54 and 55 above.
No officer appointed under this Part shall be liable to be sued in any civil
court for any act or matter done, or ordered to be done or omitted to be
done, by him in good faith and in the intended exercise of any power, or
performance of any duty, conferred or imposed on him by or under this
Act.”,
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I find that this section is inapplicable here by reason that the relevant
officers have not been named as parties, see paragraphs 111 to 115
above. This section will only be attracted to exempt the named officers from
liability if these officers have been named and found to be negligent. It
follows that the principal should also then be vicariously exempted if the
officers are exempted. The reliance on the application of s. 22 requires the
officers to have acted in good faith. If applicable here, the burden of proof
to establish good faith rests on the Fifth/Sixth Defendant but I again
observed that the relevant officers were not call as witnesses to testify in
court.
127. Put simply, I find and hold that s. 22 of the National Land Code cannot
be invoked here based on the case as presented before the court.
128. In summing up, I find that the Fifth and Sixth Defendants are not
liable in negligence because of procedural defect notwithstanding that the
Fifth Dhas been grossly negligent in registering the transfer.
Summary of Findings
i) The Plaintiff had locus standi to maintain this suit and claim to be the
registered owner of the Land;
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ii) The duplicate title produced by the Fifth Defendant and used for the
transfer of the Land from the Plaintiff to the Second Defendant was not
invalid or in other words void ab initio and hence, this and the subsequent
transfer of the Land to the First Defendant were not nullities;
iii) The transfer of the Land to the Second Defendant was procured through
fraud as well as forgery of the Second Defendant and the registration
thereof in the name of the Second Defendant was therefore defeasible;
iv) The Seventh Defendant did not act fraudulently in concert with Third and
Fourth Defendants in the transfer of the Land to the Second Defendant;
v) The subsequent transfer of the Land to the First Defendant and the
registration thereof in the name of the First Defendant was indefeasible by
reason that the First Defendant was the bona fide purchaser for valuable
consideration;
vi) Accordingly, the registrar’s caveat entered on the Land in 2007 ought
to be removed. The Plaintiff must compensate the First Defendant for
damages as the result thereof;
vii) The Third and Fourth Defendant did not act without authority and was
not negligent vis a vis the Plaintiff; and
viii) The Fifth and Sixth Defendants were incorrectly enjoined in the suit
and thus they were not liable for negligence in effecting the transfer and
registration of the Land notwithstanding that there was a subsisting private
caveat lodged on the Land by the Plaintiff’s son in 2001.
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Conclusion
130. Just as in the my earlier case of Soon Poy Yong @ Soon Puey Yong
v. Westport Properties Sdn Bhd & 18 Ors (supra), I sympathize with the
Plaintiff for not being able to recover the Land. Her remedies are only
131. In the premises and based on the foregoing reasons, I allow the
Plaintiff’s claim to the extent that the Second Defendant shall pay the
June 2007 to full realization to be assessed by the registrar. The rest of the
declarations and orders sought by the Plaintiff as prayed are not allowed.
132. As for the counterclaim of the First Defendant, I allow the prayers in
paragraphs 25.3 to 25.5 save that the interest is fixed at 5% per annum. In
addition, I order that the Fifth Defendant removes the registrar’s caveat and
cancel the entry thereof on the register document of title and note thereon
133. The parties shall further submit on the applicability of the Bullock or
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JUDICIAL COMMISSIONER
COUNSEL:
For the first defendant - Pang Kong Leng, (Shelby Chin with him);
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For the third and fourth defendants - Leong Wai Hong (David Tan
Ehsan
For the seventh defendant - Low Chi Cheng (Sharifah Nadia Aljafril
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