THE BAGHDAD SCHOOL ON UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS 141

PETER ADAMSON

Knowledge of Universals and Particulars

in the Baghdad School*

In a recent paper, I argued that Avicenna’s celebrated discussion of God’s

knowledge of particulars must be understood in the light of the epistemology
he sets out in the Demonstration ( Burh∞n ) of his Shif∞’ 1 . According to this
epistemology, which is closely based on that of Aristotle in the Posterior
Analytics, it is unsurprising that God has no knowledge of particulars as such.
For neither do humans. Rather, both God and humans know particulars only
by subsuming them under universals ␣ ; and it is universals that are the proper
object of knowledge ( √ilm ␣ ; epistêmê) in the strict sense. In the same paper I
speculated that Avicenna would have seen himself as defending this Aristotelian
position, according to which there can be knowledge of particulars, but only
by means of universals, against a more Platonizing one, according to which
intelligibles or universals are known to the exclusion of sensible particulars.
Here I had in mind the view put forward by Arabic philosophers of a more
Neoplatonic bent, such as al-Kind± and those influenced by him2 . Less clear
to me was the position of the more thoroughly Aristotelian philosophers who
wrote in the century prior to Avicenna ␣ : the Baghdad school founded by Ab≤
Bishr Matt∞, which included the famous Muslim philosopher al-F∞r∞b± and
numerous Christian thinkers.
In this paper, I will explore the question of how several members of this
school dealt with Aristotle’s claim that knowledge consists paradigmatically
in demonstration, and that demonstration in the strict sense must have
universal and necessary premises. In particular, I want to examine whether
these philosophers were attracted by a Platonizing interpretation of Aristotle’s

* I am very grateful to Jon McGinnis for his helpful comments on a previous draft, and to
audiences in Pisa, Toronto, and King’s College London for their thought-provoking questions
and criticisms. In particular I thank Richard C. Taylor who, appropriately, was ‘the commentator’
for my paper in Toronto. Finally I would like to thank the Leverhulme Trust, with whose support
this paper was written.
1
P. A DAMSON , On Knowledge of Particulars, « ␣ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society ␣ », 105,
2005, pp. 273-294.
2
See my The Kindian Tradition␣ : the Structure of Philosophy in Arabic Neoplatonism, to be
published in Libraries of the Neoplatonists, ed. C. D’A NCONA , Brill, Leiden.
142 PETER ADAMSON

epistemology. The philosophers I will discuss are al-F∞r∞b± (d. 339/950), his
student Ya∫y∞ b. √Ad± (d. 364/974), and Ab≤ ’l-Faraj b. al-§ayyib (d. 435/1043),
a second generation student of Ibn √Ad± and the last significant figure of the
school. It is a commonplace observation that thinkers of this school and other
philosophers in the Arabic-speaking world, including Avicenna, fused their
Aristotelianism with Neoplatonic ideas. But here I will suggest that these
figures were driven towards a characteristically Platonist position — namely
realism about universals existing outside both the human mind and sensible
particulars — precisely because of their reflection on Aristotle’s own strict
requirements for knowledge in the Posterior Analytics 3 .
All three of our philosophers were able to read the Posterior Analytics
(hereafter Post. An.) in the translation of the school’s founder, Ab≤ Bishr 4 .
Aristotle says repeatedly in this work that knowing something requires that
that thing cannot be other than it is (e.g. at I, 2, 71b12␣ ; 312.14-15). And
« ␣ because that which is known in the strict sense ( al-amr alladh± al-√ilm bi-h±
√al∞ ’l-mu¥l∞q ␣ ; hou estin epistêmê haplôs) cannot be other than it is…
demonstration is a syllogism that proceeds from necessary premises ␣ » (I, 4,
73a21-24 ␣ ; 321.10-13). In order to fulfill this requirement, the premises of a
demonstration must express truths that are essential, because if A is accidental
to B, it is possible that A does not belong to B (I, 6, 74b5-12 ␣ ; 328.9-11).
Furthermore, the premises must be universal ␣ : if B is necessarily A, then every
instance of B must be A, and indeed must be A at every moment, not only some
of the time. For example, man is only necessarily animal if every man is an
animal at every time (I, 4, 73a28-32 ␣ ; 322.1-4) 5 . In short (and with the
significant exception of first principles), knowledge in the strict sense is
reached through demonstrations whose premises typically have the form ‘All
As are Bs’, where this premise is necessarily true because As are essentially Bs.

3
Here I have been inspired in part by the recent work of Richard C. Taylor, which similarly
shows how Averroes’ notorious position on the unity of the material intellect grew out of
thoroughly Aristotelian concerns, despite its apparently Neoplatonist character. See for example
his Improving on Nature’s Exemplar ␣ : Averroes’ Completion of Aristotle’s Psychology of Intellect, in
P. A DAMSON, H. BALTUSSEN , M. W. F. S TONE eds., Philosophy, Science and Exegesis in Greek, Arabic
and Latin Commentaries, 2 vols., Insititute Of Classical Studies, London 2004, vol. II, pp. 107-130.
4
This translation is edited in A. B ADAW° , Man¥iq Aris¥≤ , ␣ 2 vols., D∞r al-Kut≤b al-Miµriyya,
Cairo 1949, vol. II. Quotations from the Post. An. will be from the Arabic version, citing page and
line number from both the Greek and Arabic editions. See further M. E. M ARMURA , The Fortuna
of the Posterior Analytics in the Arabic Middle Ages, in M. A SZTELOS ET AL . eds., Knowledge and the
Sciences in Medieval Philosophy, 3 vols., Yliopistopaino, Helsinki 1990, vol. I, pp. 85-103.
5
Aristotle does seem to say at Post. An., I, 30 that demonstration can also concern what is
« ␣ for the most part ␣ », a category he contrasts to chance events. But in general the Post. An. insists
that premises of demonstrative syllogisms be necessary and thus always true.
 THE BAGHDAD SCHOOL ON UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS 143

A significant consequence of this is drawn in Post. An., I, 8 (75b21-26 ␣ ;

334.12-16) ␣ :

« ␣ Clearly it is obvious that, if the premises of which the syllogism consists are
universal, then necessarily the conclusion too must be like this demonstration,
and the conclusion of the demonstration in the strict sense is eternal ( d∞’im ␣ ;
aidion). Therefore there is no demonstration of corruptible things ( al-ashy∞’ al-
f∞sida ␣ ; tôn phthartôn), and also no knowledge of them in the strict sense ( al-
√ilm √al∞ ’l-mu¥l∞q ␣ ; epistêmê haplôs), but only accidentally, given that there is
no demonstration of them universally, but only at some given time or in some
given respect ( f± waqt m∞ wa-√al∞ jiha m∞ ␣ ; pote kai pôs) ␣ ».

Assuming that the theory of epistêmê in the Post. An. is meant to apply to the
physical sciences, this passage is rather perplexing. For it seems to tell us that
there can be demonstration only for eternal things 6 . A few items in the natural
world would qualify, such as the heavenly bodies, but what are we to say about
the study of corruptible things in the sublunary world ␣ ? One solution might be
to take the premises (we might say ‘propositions’) themselves as the eternal,
incorruptible ‘things’ in question ␣ : then Aristotle could just be making the
point that ‘all humans are animals’ is always and unalterably true, even
though no human or animal always or unalterably exists. A related, but
potentially much more metaphysically loaded, solution would be to say that
demonstrations are in the first instance about universals, and not about
particulars. For if the universal man is in some sense eternal and unchanging,
then it would be a suitable object for demonstration. However, such a
demonstration would still be incidentally or ‘accidentally’ about particulars,
as Aristotle says here. For instance, if I demonstrate that man is rational, then
I have implicitly shown that Peter is rational.
The universality requirement on knowledge raises another problem, namely
the role that sensation is able to play in our coming to have knowledge.
Presumably sensation is always of some particular object, never a universal. In
Post. An., I, 31, Aristotle draws the obvious implication ␣ : whereas sensation is
always of something that exists at a certain place and time, « ␣ the universal and
that which is in each thing cannot be grasped through the senses, since it is not
‘this’ or ‘now’ […] so it is clear that there is no route to attaining knowledge
(qub≤l al-√ilm ␣ ; epistasthai) through sensation ␣ » (I, 31, 87b28-35␣ ; 397.16-398.2) 7 .

6
Compare also the discussion of demonstrative knowledge in Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 3 and VI, 6.
7
Cf. for instance De Anima, II, 5, 417b22-23. It is worth pointing out that also in I, 31,
Aristotle anticipates Post. An., II, 19 by saying that nonetheless repeated experience of particulars
lets us grasp the universal (my thanks to Richard Taylor for stressing this). But for an example
of the anti-empiricist aspects of the passage being used selectively, see below on Ibn √Ad±.
144 PETER ADAMSON

But of course Aristotle still wants to make sensation central to his epistemology.
Famously, he makes our experience of particulars the basis for grasping ‘first
principles’ and ‘universals’ in Post. An., II, 19. But just as famously, this
chapter is an exceedingly difficult one, which falls well short of making it
clear how sensation could provide a grasp of universals. In interpreting
Aristotle, the Baghdad school were thus faced with an epistemology which
made sensation of particulars somehow crucial in achieving knowledge, but
also seemed to entail that knowledge did not apply to particulars as such.

I. A L -F †R†B°

Though they are relatively little-studied, two works by al-F∞r∞b± based on

the Post. An. may be the clearest statement of his epistemological views. We
have not only a (very free) summary paraphrase of the entire Post. An.
(hereafter Burh∞n ), but also a short independent treatise entitled On the
Conditions of Certainty (hereafter Yaq±n ) 8 . I will begin by discussing the latter
text, which begins with a list of six conditions taken from the Post. An. that
must be fufilled if one is to have « ␣ absolute certainty (al-yaq±n √al∞ ’l-i¥l∞q ) ␣ » ␣ :

␣ «␣
Absolute certainty is (1) that one believes that a thing is such-and-such or
not ␣ ; (2) that one agrees that [the belief] is in accord with (mu¥∞biqan ), rather
than opposed to ( muq∞bil ), the existence ( wuj≤d ) of something external ␣ ; (3)
that one knows that it is in accord with it ␣ ; (4) that it cannot fail to be in accord
[with what is outside], and cannot be opposed [to that thing] ␣ ; (5) also that it
is not opposed [to that thing] at any moment␣ ; and (6) that this occurs not
accidentally, but essentially ␣ » ( Yaq±n , 98.1-4).

In the rest of the treatise al-F∞r∞b± explains each of these conditions. The first
three are relatively straightforward. In order for me to be certain that P, I
must obviously have a belief ( i√tiq∞d ) that P. I must agree that P holds of

8
Both edited in M. FAKHRY , Man¥iq ‘inda ’l-F∞r∞b±␣ : Kit∞b al-Burh∞n wa-Kit∞b Shar∞’i¥ al-
Yaq±n , Dar el-Machreq, Beirut 1987. There is an English translation by Fakhry of the paraphrase
in S. H. N ASR , M. A MINRAZAVI, An Anthology of Philosophy in Persia, 2 vols., Oxford University Press,
Oxford 1999, vol. I, pp. 93-110. Al-F∞r∞b± also wrote a longer commentary on the Post. An., but this
is unfortunately lost. The lack of attention paid to these texts has just been remedied by D. B LACK,
Knowledge (√Ilm) and Certainty (Yaq±n) in al-F∞r∞b± ’s Epistemology, « ␣ Arabic Sciences and
Philosophy ␣ », 16, 2006, pp. 11-45. This paper provides a much fuller discussion of the epistemology
of the Yaq±n . I am grateful to Prof. Black for showing me an advance copy␣ ; unfortunately I was
able to read this excellent piece only after writing the first draft of the present article. But my
conclusions are broadly in agreement with hers, and, I hope, not rendered superfluous insofar as
my main interest is in the ontological implications of al-F∞r∞b±’s epistemology and how his
treatise relates to discussions by other members of the Baghdad school.
 THE BAGHDAD SCHOOL ON UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS 145

something « ␣ external ( min kh∞rij ) ␣ » to the belief 9 . This may be an object out
in the world, but it need not. For example al-F∞r∞b± points out that some
beliefs are about other beliefs (99.7-10). Furthermore, I must have knowledge
( √ilm ) that P.
These three conditions might seem to the modern reader sufficient for
securing certainty, depending on what is taken to be implied by the term
‘knowledge’ in the third condition, and what ‘certainty’ means. A modern-day
externalist might think that knowledge does not in fact imply certainty, if this
is taken in the subjective sense of knowing that I know 10 . (I might know P
because I believe it on the basis of a properly functioning mechanism, but not
know whether my mechanism is functioning properly, and thus lack subjective
certainty). Al-F∞r∞b±, however, apparently thinks that if I know P, then I also
know that I know P. He considers the case in which someone believes
something is true but « ␣ is not aware ( l∞ yash√uru ) of its being true ␣ ». In such
a case, the belief is true for the believer only accidentally (99.12-13).
The next two conditions have to do with the idea that, if I have certain
knowledge of P, then not only must P be true, but it must be impossible that
P is false. Now, there are two ways to take this claim. First, it might mean
simply that if I know P with absolute certainty, I cannot be mistaken in
believing that P. As al-F∞r∞b± will emphasize later in the treatise (102.8 ff),
having certainty rules out the possibility of error. And this seems plausible ␣ :
how can I be ‘certain’ that my daughter is playing quietly in the next room if
this certainty is compatible with her being upstairs, out of earshot ␣ ? I will only
be certain of this if there is no possibility of my being mistaken. Second, and
more problematically, it might mean that P itself is necessarily true. If that is

9
What does the second condition add to the first ␣ ? I think Black, in her Knowledge and
Certainty cit., is right that the condition (2) merely adds truth ␣ : for me to be certain, obviously it
is not enough for me believe P, but rather P must also be true. But if this is what al-F∞r∞b± means,
he is not being very clear ␣ : condition (2) states not that P must be true, but that I must agree that
it is true. This suggests that one might have a ‘belief’ (al-F∞r∞b± says that we can use the terms
i√tiq∞d , ijm∞‘, or ra’y interchangably for this), thus fufilling condition (1), without agreeing
( yuw∞fiqu ) that it is true and fulfilling condition (2). It has been suggested to me that the
condition (1) might involve only some kind of weak belief, like a ‘seeming’ or Stoic ‘impression’,
whereas actually committing oneself (‘agreeing’) to the ‘seeming’ would be involved in condition
(2) — what the Stoics called ‘assent’. The Arabic terms used for ‘belief’, though, do not seem to
imply any such hesitancy on the part of the believer, and al-F∞r∞b±’s discussion of the second
condition has to do only with the idea that the belief must in fact correspond to the facts. Thus
I think that al-F∞r∞b± should simply have written in condition (2) ␣ : «␣ and that the belief is in
accord with something external ␣ », leaving out any reference to the believer’s agreement.
10
For further discussion of how his view lines up with modern externalism and internalism,
see B LACK , Knowledge and Certainty cit., and my footnote 12.
146 PETER ADAMSON

what he means, then nothing I could do would allow me to ‘know’ in the strict
sense that my daughter is playing in the next room, because even if she is
doing so, it is not a necessary truth that she is doing so.
In fact al-F∞r∞b± is happy to embrace both of these requirements on certain
knowledge ␣ ; they correspond to conditions (4) and (5). Condition (4) states
that for me to have absolute certainty that P, P must be believed with
sufficient « ␣ assuredness ( ta’k±d ) and firmness ( wath∞qa )␣ » that there is no
possibility of P’s being false (100.1-2) 11 . As Black has argued, this would seem
to mean that my belief arises in such a fashion as to guarantee its truth
(because, for example, P’s truth is part of the explanation for my coming to
believe that P) 12 . A related point is made in al-F∞r∞b±’s discussion of the sixth
and final condition ␣ : that my belief arises essentially, not accidentally. Al-
F∞r∞b± construes this as meaning that I must hold my belief for the right
reasons (100.18 ff). For example, if I believe P on the basis of the testimony
of someone else, then my belief does not count as knowledge, even if P is true.
My belief will instead be true opinion ( Ωann ), and thus not count as certain (or
as knowledge) at all — for mere opinion is always possibly in error.
Adding conditions (4) and (6) to (1), (2) and (3), then, certainly seems to
yield a set of criteria sufficient to demarcate knowledge from true belief. It is
also hard to see what notion of ‘certainty’ could fail to be satisfied by these
criteria. But al-F∞r∞b± is still not done. He adds condition (5) ␣ : I can be
absolutely certain that P only if P itself is necessarily true, which means
always true. Here, of course, he is adhering to Aristotle’s surprisingly
demanding strictures on epistêmê in the Post. An. Al-F∞r∞b± sets out the fifth
condition as follows ␣ :

« ␣ [The fifth condition] “and it is also impossible that it be opposed [to the
belief] at any moment ( wa l∞ ay∑an mumkin anna y≤jadu f± waqt muq∞bilan la-

11
Al-F∞r∞b± says that this sort of condition may be fulfilled «␣ through nature or syllogism ␣ »
(100.6). Perhaps ‘nature’ here refers to something like sensation, which according to Aristotle
(De Anima, II, 6) cannot be in error about its proper object.
12
A difficult question is how condition (4) relates to condition (3). Can one know P, and be
‘aware’ that one knows P, even while it is still possible that P is false ␣ ? If so al-F∞r∞b± is asserting
some sort of fallibilism in concert with the internalist requirement of condition (3). This strikes
me as unlikely, even though it is possible for an internalist to be a fallibilist. (I am grateful to
my colleague David Galloway for discussion of this point). I suspect that, for al-F∞r∞b±,
condition (3) cannot be fulfilled without (4) also being fulfilled — and that in fact the reason I
am ‘aware’ that I know P is the fact that my belief arose in such a way that it cannot be false. In
any event, there is no doubt that for al-F∞r∞b± ‘absolutely certain’ knowledge of P requires both
that the knower knows that she knows P (an internalist constraint), and that P is believed in such
a way that P could not be false (a reliabilist constraint). Again, these issues are explored in
greater depth in Black’s Knowledge and Certainty.
 THE BAGHDAD SCHOOL ON UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS 147

h≤ )” is another, greater assuredness and firmness acquired by the belief from

the assuredness and firmness of the thing that is its subject-matter, whose
existence is outside the belief. For the previous condition might apply to
sensible things as well, and to judgments regarding existence. But this
[condition] is satisfied only by beliefs whose subject matters are intelligibles
that are absolutely necessary ( al-ma√q≤l∞t al-∑ar≤riyya √ala ’l-i¥l∞q). For sensibles
might be grasped truly, and it might be impossible that our beliefs about them
being a certain way are opposed to the way they are. Yet it is still either possible
that they stop being that way at some other, unspecified moment — for
instance Zayd’s sitting — or they might doubtlessly stop being that way at some
specified moment, for instance the eclipse of the moon which is seen right now.
And likewise for universal judgments regarding existence, for example your
saying ‘every man is white’. What cannot be opposed at any moment is found
only among necessary intelligibles. For here the belief does not become
opposed to the existence at some moment, nor can existence become opposed
to the belief at some moment ␣ » ( Yaq±n , 100.7-17).

Given that I can only be absolutely certain of P if P is always true, it would

seem that I can (almost) never have absolute certainty of any truth that
concerns a sensible particular as such. For sensible particulars as a rule exist
only for a limited period of time 13 , and there are no necessary truths about
them 14 . Thus al-F∞r∞b± says that the proper objects of absolutely certain
knowledge are « ␣ necessary intelligibles ␣ » rather than sensibles.
At first blush this sounds like a rather Platonist conclusion, despite the
thoroughly Aristotelian context. However there is an important caveat to be
made. Al-F∞r∞b± makes it clear that the certainty described here is not the only
sort of certainty one can have. Rather, it is simply the best or paradigmatic
kind. In the passage just quoted, al-F∞r∞b± has already said that condition (4)
might apply to a belief about sensible particulars ␣ ; « ␣ it might be impossible ␣ »
that I am wrong in my belief that Zayd is sitting, for example. (Suppose that

13
The only exception here would be eternally existing particulars ␣ : the heavenly bodies, the
earth itself, and the cosmos as a whole. Insofar as these particulars have enduring properties,
beliefs about those properties could constitute necessary, eternal truths. But as al-F∞r∞b± points
out in the passage just quoted, even these particulars have at least some properties which are
transient, e.g. the moon’s being eclipsed at a given moment.
14
Unless, that is, we accept a suitable form of determinism. Al-F∞r∞b± rejects determinism
in his commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation (on this see my The Arabic Sea Battle␣ : al-F∞r∞b±
on the Problem of Future Contingents, « ␣ Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie␣ », 88, 2006, pp.
163-188). On the other hand, in that same text he seems to accept Aristotle’s view that truths
about the present and past are necessary. This raises a difficulty which al-F∞r∞b± never addresses,
so far as I know. If a present or past truth about particulars is necessary, why is it not just as apt
an object of ‘absolutely certain’ belief as a universal truth ␣ ? Perhaps the answer is that it possesses
the wrong kind of necessity ␣ ; but I do not find al-F∞r∞b± himself making such a distinction.
148 PETER ADAMSON

Zayd is my best friend, I know he has no twin, I am staring straight at him in

good lighting conditions, etc.). At the end of the Yaq±n al-F∞r∞b± handles this
sort of case by introducing a category of beliefs that possess « ␣ qualified
certainty ( al-yaq±n l∞ √al∞ ’l-i¥l∞q ) ␣ » (104.6 ff). These are of two kinds ␣ : beliefs
of truths that are necessary but transient, for example the eclipse case, which
in an Aristotelian framework involves a necessarily occurring event ␣ ; and
beliefs that involve no possibility of error even though they are of contingent
truths, for example my aforementioned belief that Zayd is sitting. Of course
either sort of qualified certainty is compatible with my also knowing that the
same belief will be false if held at a future time. The astronomer knows that
the eclipse will end, and I know that Zayd will not be sitting forever, if only
because he will die at some point.
Still, their lack of permanent truth makes such beliefs second-rate 15 .
Because these beliefs go from being true to false 16 , they have no place in
demonstrative science, and it is demonstrative science that the epistemology
of the Post. An. is meant to support 17 . Al-F∞r∞b± indeed says as much himself ␣ :
« ␣ this certainty [i.e. absolute certainty] is that which is used and discovered
in philosophy, and, in general, in the theoretical sciences␣ » (101.13-14).
Notice the reference here to « ␣ theoretical sciences ( al-√ul≤m al-naΩariyya )␣ ».
This suggests the significance of the Post. An. epistemology for al-F∞r∞b±’s
treatment of practical philosophy in texts such as the Attainment of Happiness
( Ta∫µ±l al-Sa‘∞da ). There, al-F∞r∞b± says that theoretical philosophy consists
only in the grasp of intelligibles. If we wish to see these intelligibles realized

15
Compare Burh∞n, 21.14-19 ␣ : « ␣ Certainty is either necessary or not. Necessary certainty is
to believe, of something that cannot be other than it is in its existence, that it cannot at all be other
than one believes it to be, at any moment. Certainty that is not necessary is when one has certainty
of something only at a given time ( f± waqt m∞ ). The necessary cannot change so as to become false,
but is eternally ( d∞’iman) the way it is in the mind, either only denied or only affirmed ␣ ; but what
is not necessary can change so as to become false ␣ ». Later he writes, « ␣ it is obvious that the term
√ilm applies to necessary certainty more than it does (akthar min ) to what is not certain, or what
is certain but not necessarily so ␣ » (25.14-15). I note that Fakhry’s rendering (on p. 98 of his
translation) of akthar min in this passage as « ␣ more frequently ␣ » is surely wrong.
16
I take it that al-F∞r∞b±’s analysis of the situation where I believe at time t1 that Zayd is
sitting at t1 is simply that I believe ‘Zayd is sitting’. To avoid error, I must give up the belief as
soon as Zayd stands (see also the quote from the Burh∞n in the previous note). This should be
contrasted with another possible analysis, that what I believe is ‘Zayd sits at time t1’, where the
verb ‘sits’ is understood timelessly. On this analysis I could at a later time t2 have precisely the
same belief, and it would remain true, even if Zayd were standing at t2.
17
Thus al-F∞r∞b± would broadly agree with modern commentators, like Burnyeat, who see
epistêmê in the Post. An. as simply the end of a continuum, which also includes ‘knowledge’ of
lesser degrees. See M. F. BURNYEAT , Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge, in E. B ERTI ed.,
Aristotle on Science ␣ : the Posterior Analytics, Editrice Antenore, Padua 1981, pp. 97-139.
 THE BAGHDAD SCHOOL ON UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS 149

in concrete form (for instance, if we want to bring it about that the universal
perfect city is instantiated), we will need a faculty that can cope with the
accidental features that inevitably accompany particulars. This, says al-
F∞r∞b±, is the faculty of ‘deliberation’. (Here he is echoing distinctions made
by Aristotle at Ethics, VI, 1). He stresses though that all of the knowledge that
is deployed in practical contexts is in itself theoretical ␣ : for instance it is
theoretical philosophy that grasps the intelligible man and thus understands
what man’s final end is. This theoretical knowledge is the basis for excellence
in practical deliberation, but it is not strictly speaking knowledge of the
particular objects considered in such deliberation.
Now it is striking that the inferior status of both qualified certainty and
practical reasoning stems from their inextricable link with particulars. To
oversimplify, al-F∞r∞b± seems to think that the less one’s epistemic state has
to do with particulars, the better that state will be. This may seem
counterintuitive from the viewpoint of the modern epistemologist. But as I
have already suggested, the point simply illustrates the different goals of
Aristotelian epistemology (at least, as al-F∞r∞b± understood it) and modern
epistemology. The epistemology in question here is designed to explain
systematic, scientific knowledge 18 . It is not a problem that cases of ‘certainty’
about particulars, and cases where we apply our universal knowledge to
particulars in a practical context, fall short of this standard.
But there is another problem that al-F∞r∞b± does need to confront. Having
set the bar for knowledge so high, has he not made it all but impossible for us
to achieve such knowledge ␣ ? It is, after all, very hard to see how this sort of
necessary, universal knowledge could be the outcome of any process that
begins from our experience of particulars. One can hardly expect that we will
inspect every instance of each universal used in the sciences, at least in most
cases. So familiar problems of induction arise, as al-F∞r∞b± is well aware ␣ :

« ␣ People’s opinions have differed as to the ways in which they [sc. primary
cognitions ␣ : ma√∞rif awwal ] come about. But when we are using them, there is
no need for us to understand how and whence they arise, although it is clear
that for most of these universal premises, their individuals ( a√y∞n ) are sensible.
Thus some people say that [the universal premises] arise from sensation. But
here it is clear that, even if they do arise from sensation, sensation alone is not
sufficient to give rise to them completely. For if we restrict ourselves to the
scope of what we have sensed, then since we have sensed only a limited number
of individuals, it will follow that what arises for us will be particular premises,

18
Burnyeat, Barnes and others capture this by translating epistêmê as « ␣ understanding ␣ »
rather than « ␣ knowledge ␣ ».
150 PETER ADAMSON

not universal ones. But we find that universal ones have arisen, so that we can
make general judgments about the subject-matters of these premises, which
apply in common both to what we have sensed and what we have not. From this
it is clear that the soul has an activity with regard to sensibles that goes beyond
what we have sensed of them ␣ » ( Burh∞n, 24.5-14).

This text is rather frustrating, in that it remains silent on the crucial question
of how we go from the ‘limited number’ of particulars we have experienced to
universal judgments that can constitute, and be the basis for, knowledge.
Shortly after the passage just quoted, al-F∞r∞b± speaks of having to experience
« ␣ most or all ␣ » of the members of a species in order to achieve certain,
universal knowledge 19 . This does not sound very encouraging.
Filling the gap in al-F∞r∞b±’s account here would require a fuller discussion
of the role of ‘experience’ in his epistemology 20 . But no passage in the Burh∞n ,
so far as I can see, manages to explain satisfactorily the required leap from the
particular to the universal. It seems to me that al-F∞r∞b±’s attempt to explain
this is rather to be sought in his theory of intellect, as most prominently set
out in the Epistle on the Intellect ( Ris∞la f± ’l-√Aql). There, al-F∞r∞b± has
recourse to the active intellect, which is a repository of universal intelligibles,
to explain how potential intelligibles become actualized in the human mind.
A great deal of ink has rightly been spilled about how this account grows out
of the tradition of commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima. But I think we should
also recognize how crucial the epistemology of the Post. An. must have been
in pushing al-F∞r∞b± towards accepting a role for transcendent intelligibles in
his account of human knowledge. This, however, is a train of thought we will
be able to observe more explicitly in al-F∞r∞b±’s student, Ya∫y∞ b. √Ad±.

II. Y A™Y† B . √A D°

Although we do not have any extant work by Ibn √Ad± devoted to expounding
the Post. An., he alludes to the theory of knowledge set out there in several

19
« ␣ The result of experience ( tajriba ) is universal premises, of which one has this certainty
that comes from undertaking sensation of their particulars, whether a few of them or many. For
experience is examining the particulars of the universal premises to find out whether their
predicates are in every one of them, and following on to all of them or most of them, until
necessary certainty arises for us ␣ » ( Burh∞n, 24.17-21).
20
At Burh∞n, 25, he contrasts tajriba and istiqr∞’ , only the former of which yields universal
premises. See further J. J ANSSENS , ‘Experience’ (tajriba) in Classical Arabic Philosophy ( al-F∞r∞b±
- Avicenna), « ␣ Quaestio ␣ », 4, 2004, pp. 45-62. For the problem of induction in Avicenna, see J.
M C G INNIS , Scientific Methodologies in Medieval Islam, « ␣ Journal of the History of Philosophy ␣ »,
41, 2003, pp. 307-327.
 THE BAGHDAD SCHOOL ON UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS 151

writings. Probably the best known is his contribution to the famous dispute
over the relative merits of grammar and logic 21 . Ibn √Ad±’s treatise attempts
to defend the position that Ab≤ Bishr Matt∞ supposedly set out in a disastrous
debate with the grammarian al-S±r∞f±. Ab≤ Bishr’s fundamental argument in
favor of the value of logic was that logic concerns meaning ( ma√n∞ ), whereas
grammar concerns only the surface expression ( lafΩ) 22 . Expanding on this,
Ibn √Ad± organizes his treatise around the claim that an art is distinguished
by its subject-matter ( maw∑≤√ ) and its purpose ( ghara∑ ). To be distinct from
one another, two arts must have different subject-matters, different purposes,
or both. Logic and grammar differ in terms of both. Like Ab≤ Bishr, Ibn √Ad±
says that grammar has expressions as its ‘subject-matter’. Plausibly, he then
declares the purpose of grammar to be the correct usage of these expressions.
Important here is that grammar has nothing to say about whether a statement
is true, but only whether it is correctly put in the relevant language. In other
words, grammar will give its full endorsement to sentences like ‘All horses are
pink and all horses are not pink’, since there is nothing grammatically wrong
with such sentences.
What, then, are the subject-matter and purpose of logic ␣ ? Ibn √Ad± agrees
with Ab≤ Bishr that logic has something to do with the meaning of expressions,
but his account is much more extensive. The subject-matter of logic, he says,
« ␣ is expressions insofar as they refer to universal things ( huwa alf∞Ω al-d∞lla
√al∞ ’l-um≤r al-kulliyya ) ␣ » (Treatises, 422.1). The purpose of logic is ‘demon-
stration’, i.e. combining these expressions so as to reach the truth (423.2 ff.).
Let us focus on Ibn √Ad±’s discussion of the subject-matter, which has two
aspects. First, the expressions with which logic deals are referring ␣ ; second,
that to which the expression refers is something universal. The first aspect
clarifies Ab≤ Bishr’s original claim that logic is an art that concerns language

21
YA ™Y † I BN √A D ° , The Philosophical Treatises, ed. S. K HALIFAT , University of Jordan, Amman
1988, pp. 414-424. Hereafter I will cite this edition as Treatises. For this work see further the
French translation in A. E LAMRANI-J AMAL , Grammaire et logique d’après le philosophe arabe
chrétien Ya∫y∞ Ibn √Ad± (280-364 H/893-974), « ␣ Arabica␣ », 29, 1982, pp. 1-15, along with the same
author’s Logique aristotélicienne et grammaire arabe ␣ : étude et documents, J. Vrin, Paris 1983. For
another edition see G. E NDRESS , Maqalat Ya∫y∞ Ibn √Ady Ibn ™amid Ibn Zakariyya f± taby±n al-
faµl bayna µina√a ’l-man¥iq wa-’l-na∫w al-√arab± , « ␣ Journal for the History of Arabic Science ␣ », 2,
1978, pp. 181-192. And see the discussions of Endress in La controverse entre la logique
philosophique et la grammaire arabe au temps des khalifs, « ␣ Journal for the History of Arabic
Science ␣ », 1, 1977, pp. 339-351, and Grammatik und Logik ␣ : arabische Philologie und griechische
Philosophie im Widerstreit, in B. M OJSISCH ed., Sprachphilosophie in Antike und Mittelalter, B. R.
Grüner, Amsterdam 1986, pp. 163-299.
22
See D. S. M ARGOULIATH, The Discussion Between Abu Bishr Matta and Abu Sa√id al-Sirafi on
the Merits of Logic and Grammar, « ␣ Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society ␣ », 1905, pp. 79-129, at
pp. 97.21-98.1.
152 PETER ADAMSON

insofar as it is meaningful. Citing Aristotle’s On Interpretation (ch. 4, 16b ␣ ;

quoted at Treatises, 422.12-14), Ibn √Ad± says that logic’s ultimate aim is a
syllogism made up of assertions, which refer because they are made up of
referring expressions.
The second aspect is more important for our purposes. Why does logic deal
with expressions only insofar as they refer to universal things␣ ? The answer is
as follows ␣ :

« ␣ That the subject-matter of [the art of logic] is expressions insofar as they refer
to universal things is clear from the fact that — since demonstration obviously
consists only of referring expressions, and every referring expression must refer
either to a particular or universal meaning ( ma√n∞ ), and demonstration is a
syllogism that possesses certainty ( qiy∞s yaq±n± ), and every syllogism that
possesses certainty is free of ambiguity and unmixed with doubt, and anything
unmixed with ambiguity is distinct and separated from it [sc. ambiguity], and
what is like this is defined ( ma∫d≤d ) — therefore whatever is known by
demonstration is defined. But the defined is the certain ( al-mutayaqqin), and
none of the particulars (al-juz’iyy∞t) is certain, so therefore none of the particulars
is demonstrated. (By ‘demonstrated’ I mean here whatever is such as to receive
the form of demonstration, even if it has not received such a form). Every
subject-matter for the art of logic is demonstrated, so that none of the particulars
is a subject-matter for the art of logic. Therefore the subject-matter for the art
of logic is expressions that refer to universal things␣ » (Treatises, 422.1-9).

Here we have a compressed summary of the epistemology of the Post. An.,

emphasizing, as did al-F∞r∞b±, the close link between universality and
certainty 23 . Because logic’s purpose is to facilitate demonstration, because
demonstration yields certainty, and because there can only be certainty about
the universal, the logician does not deal with expressions concerning
particulars. Here Ibn √Ad± has perhaps overstated his point, since of course
Aristotle does talk about various types of assertion regarding particulars in
the Organon. But he is on firm ground in insisting that such assertions do not
appear in demonstrative science, as it is envisioned in the Post. An. And
demonstrative science, according to Ibn √Ad±, is the ultimate purpose of logic.
Obviously the point of this treatise is to insist on the great value of logic,
especially as compared with the relatively trivial art of grammar. Yet one is
at first inclined to say that Ibn √Ad±’s claims for logic are far too extravagant.
By saying that logic’s goal is finding truth through demonstration, he makes
it sound as if demonstrative science and logic were the same thing. But of

23
Though the requirement for certainty is not something stressed by Aristotle himself, as
B URNYEAT , Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge cit. points out.
 THE BAGHDAD SCHOOL ON UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS 153

course this must be wrong ␣ : sciences like geometry, physics, psychology, and
metaphysics are not parts of logic, though they are (at least ideally)
demonstrative. Logic by itself does not in fact demonstrate anything, but
merely lays down the rules that govern demonstration 24 . I think, however,
that Ibn √Ad± has not gotten carried away in his defense of logic. Remember
that logic deals not with the ‘universal things’, but with the expressions that
refer to those things. Thus, if man is the universal referred to, what logic
studies is the referring expression ‘man’ and statements involving this
expression, like ‘all men are rational animals’. It tells us how such statements
can be combined with others to yield truth ␣ ; but it will be other sciences that
actually include the truths in question.
I will return to this point below. Let us first, though, consider the question
of what Ibn √Ad± means by ‘universal things’. Ibn √Ad± uses the words amr
(plural um≤r ) and ma√n∞ (plural ma√∞n± ) to refer to these things. Neither term
is very helpful. The former, translated above as ‘thing’, is probably chosen
precisely because it is so vague, while the latter is a notoriously ambiguous,
indeed all but untranslatable, word. I have so far rendered it ‘meaning’, but
it can also signify ‘concept’, or the actual thing out in the world that is meant
or conceptualized 25 . It will be safer simply to use the Arabic term in what
follows. Now, Ibn √Ad± takes the view that a ma√n∞ such as man or animal is
in fact neither intrinsically universal nor intrinsically particular. This point
is made in a reply Ibn √Ad± wrote in answer to an objection aimed at Aristotle’s
Categories 26 . According to Aristotle, so long as animal is predicated of man, it
will a fortiori be predicated of any particular man. And if color is predicated
of body, then it is predicated of any particular body. But, the objection goes,
there are things true about animal and man that are not true about a
particular man ␣ : for instance animal is a genus, man is a species, but I am
neither. Thus Aristotle cannot say that anything predicated of the species man
is predicated of the individual man ␣ : animal is, but being-a-species ( naw√iyya )
is not (171.2-5).
Ibn √Ad±’s response to this is as follows ␣ :

24
In another treatise, On the Four Questions Regarding Logic, Ibn √Ad± explains that the
purpose of logic is to show how we should make inferences from first principles and other
previously acquired knowledge. Again, logic does not establish truths by itself, but merely shows
that certain truths imply others. For this text see N. R ESCHER , F. S HEHADI , Ya∫y∞ Ibn √Ad± ’s
Treatise ‘On the Four Scientific Questions Regarding the Art of Logic’, « ␣ Journal of the History of
Ideas ␣ », 25, 1964, pp. 572-578.
25
I am grateful to Rotraud Hansberger for stimulating discussion of the term ma√n∞ in the
context of this treatise.
26
Edited at Treatises, pp. 170-171, as part of a collection of questions with replies by Ibn
√Ad±. The question does not cite Aristotle exactly, but seems to be inspired by ch.5, 2a19ff.
154 PETER ADAMSON

« ␣ The answer is that because e.g. universal animal (al-hayaw∞n al-kull± ),

insofar as it is a whole ( kull ), subsists in the soul, it is therefore a specification
( makhµ≤µ ) composed e.g. from the ma√n∞ of animal (which is what is indicated
by our saying ‘a body which has a soul, which is capable of sensation and is
moved by volition’) and the ma√n∞ of universal. So by means of this specification
it departs from being the absolute ma√n∞ of animal ( ma√n∞ al-hayaw∞n al-
mu¥laq ), i.e., what the definition of animal indicates, in that the ma√n∞ of
universal is present in it ␣ » (Treatises, 171.6-13).

If I understand this correctly, Ibn √Ad± is saying that universality is something

that we apply to a ma√n∞ only « ␣ in our souls ␣ », i.e. by mentally associating the
ma√n∞ of man with that of universal. In itself, man is not universal, nor,
presumably, is it even a species. So being-a-species is not in fact predicated of
man in itself ␣ ; and this is why being-a-species is not predicated of a particular
man. By parity of reasoning, it seems clear that particularity must likewise be
extrinsic to the ma√n∞ ␣ ; otherwise we would get a contradiction when we apply
universality to man in our souls. (We would wind up with a notion like
universal particular rational animal). The ma√n∞ in itself, then, which Ibn √Ad±
calls « ␣ absolute (mu¥l∞q ) ␣ », is neither universal nor particular 27 . Notice too
that the definition of man is primarily a definition of the absolute ma√n∞ ,
rather than of the universal or particular.
This leaves us, apparently, with a three-fold analysis for each ma√n∞ ␣ : the
ma√n∞ as instantiated by a particular, as conceived universally in the soul,
and as ‘absolute’. That this is Ibn √Ad±’s view is confirmed by a treatise entitled
Exposition of the Existence of General Things (F± Taby±n Wuj≤d al-Um≤r al-
√∞miyya , hereafter Taby±n ), which has recently been the subject of a superb
article by Marwan Rashed 28 . For a full analysis and discussion of the
importance of this treatise as background for Avicenna’s metaphysics, I refer
the reader to Rashed’s piece. Here I will make only a few general points, and
then focus on a passage relevant to the epistemological issues I have been
pursuing in this paper.
The Taby±n confirms what some readers will already have suspected ␣ : Ibn
√Ad±’s position on universals is indebted to the Neoplatonic theory of the three
aspects or states of the forms, namely in themselves, in sensible things, and
in our minds. As we will see, the later Ibn al-§ayyib also knew of this theory,
which is found in commentaries from the school of Ammonius on the

27
As Richard Taylor has pointed out to me, here mu¥l∞q could well be rendered ‘without
qualification’, in other words, specified neither as universal nor as particular.
28
M. R ASHED , Ibn √Ad± et Avicenne␣ : sur les types d’existants, in V. C ELLUPRICA, C. D’A NCONA
eds., Aristotele e i suoi esegeti Neoplatonici, Bibliopolis, Naples 2004, pp. 109-171. Rashed
provides a French translation. For the Arabic text see Treatises, pp. 148-159.
 THE BAGHDAD SCHOOL ON UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS 155

Eisagôgê and Categories 29 . Notice however that, strictly speaking, for Ibn √Ad±
it would be wrong to speak here of three states of the universal, since
universality is relevant only for the ma√n∞ in our souls. This is probably the
reason why he instead uses the more vague word √∞mm (‘common’ or ‘general’)
to refer to the ‘things’ ( um≤r , as in his defense of logic) that have these three
states 30 . For convenience I will simply call them by the neutral term ‘forms’.
The three states of forms are labelled ‘natural’, ‘logical’, and ‘divine’ ␣ :

« ␣ ‘Existence ( wuj≤∑ )’ is an ambiguous term, which refers to different ma√∞nin .

First, natural ( ¥ab±√± ) existence, which is the existence of ma√∞n± in matter,
together with accidents. Second, logical ( man¥iq± ) existence, which is the
existence of ma√∞n± formally, in the soul ( µuwaran f± ’l-nafs ). Third, essential
[existence], which is [also] called ‘divine ( il∞h± )’, which is the existence of
ma√∞n± as that which their definitions indicate ␣ » (Treatises, 154.17-20).

Two remarks are in order here. First, notice that Ibn √Ad± again says that
the definition of a form is primarily directed to the form in itself, i.e. to the
ma√n∞ considered ‘absolutely’. Second, notice that the forms in the soul are
called ‘logical’, which fits with the above considerations about the second-
order status of logic. That is, logic deals with the forms insofar as they are, for
instance, universal, and expressed in propositions that form syllogisms. In
other words it deals with them as they are in the soul 31 .
The aim of the Taby±n is to argue for a realist interpretation of forms in
the third, ‘divine’ sense. Ibn √Ad± wants to insist that such things are actually
existents, although they are, as Aristotle would say, ‘separate’ from
particulars. Ibn √Ad± knows that his fidelity to Aristotle on this point is
questionable. He admits that Aristotle seems to be among those who believe

29
For references see R ASHED , Ibn √Ad± et Avicenne cit., p. 131, n. 53. As Rashed points out in
n.54, Ibn √Ad± wrote a (now lost) work whose title confirms his awareness of the theory.
30
Cf. R ASHED , Ibn √Ad± et Avicenne cit., p. 121. Ibn √Ad± also uses the word ma√n∞ to refer to
these things in the present treatise. It should be noted that he does sometimes use the word kull±
as well as √∞mm , even for the ‘absolute’ forms.
31
I am grateful to Jon McGinnis for drawing to my attention a passage in Ibn √Ad± which uses
this terminology again, and confirms that properties like ‘being a genus’ attach only to the
‘logical’ ma√n∞ , not to the ‘natural’ ma√n∞ . This passage is in Ibn √Ad±’s work On the Infinite, at
Treatises, p. 136 ␣ : « ␣ Generality ( al-√um≤miyya ) does not belong to the universal nature insofar as
it is existent naturally, but belongs only to the form of the universal nature conceived in the soul,
so that it becomes, for instance, animal which is considered to have the character of a genus
( alladh± ya√ru∑u la-h≤ al-jinsiyya ), rather than animal which is natural. It [sc. animal as a genus]
is existent in the individuals insofar as they are logical, that is, conceived in the power of logic.
But this [sc. animal] is [also] natural, that is, in matter and together with proper accidents… The
animal which has the character of a universal is the form of animal separated from the matter
and freed from the accidents, not the animal which is the form of the animal in the matter ␣ ».
156 PETER ADAMSON

that there are only universals in the ‘logical’ sense (Treatises, pp. 154.21-
155.8). However Aristotle must admit the real existence of forms that are
neither in the soul nor in particulars. For otherwise, knowledge as defined
in the Post. An. will be impossible ␣ :

« ␣ He shows in the Posterior Analytics that there is no demonstration of particulars,

because they are corruptible (f∞sida ). There is demonstration only of eternal
things ( al-ashy∞’ al-d∞’ima ), and things whose existence is necessary ( al-um≤r
allat± wuj≤duh∞ ∑ar≤r± ). Therefore the universal is that for which, and from
which, there is demonstration. It is also shown in the Posterior Analytics that
universal demonstrations are better than particular ones. And he says that ‘there
is no knowledge of what does not exist’. So if it were his view that universal
things, like universal animal for instance, do not exist, then — given that what
does not exist is not known — it would follow for him that universal things are
not known. But if they are not known then there is no scientific syllogism (qiy∞s
√ilm±) for them, i.e. no demonstration. And if there is no demonstration for them,
then their demonstrations are not ‘better’␣ » (Treatises, p. 156.3-9).

In this passage Ibn √Ad± explicitly lays out an argument for a ‘Platonist’
view of forms, based entirely on Aristotle’s epistemology. For Aristotle,
knowledge can be only of eternal, necessary things, which means there must
be objects to be known that are not mere sensible particulars. Though in this
passage he calls these objects ‘universals’, it would seem that such a form is
to be identified not only with the divine ma√n∞ but also with the ‘absolute’
ma√n∞ described in other texts we examined above. Strictly speaking, this
divine form will be neither universal nor particular ␣ ; it will be an existent in
its own right, not dependent on particulars for its continued subsistence ␣ ; and
it will be that which is primarily indicated by a definition.
Let us consider for a moment the implications of Ibn √Ad±’s calling these
independently existing forms ‘divine’. Unfortunately this is not explained at
all in the Taby±n . But we might guess that, like al-F∞r∞b±, Ibn √Ad± believes
that these necessary, eternal forms must reside in a transcendent intellect,
namely (in this case) God’s intellect. If this is right, it would have important
consequences for Ibn √Ad±’s theory of divine knowledge. Indeed it would
suggest that Ibn √Ad± anticipates the view of Avicenna that God does not know
particulars as such — rather, we would have to say, God knows the absolute
essence which each particular instantiates. Now, there are plentiful passages
in Ibn √Ad±’s extant corpus where he affirms that God is knowledgeable and
wise, as is shown by His providential care for the world 32 . But in only one

32
See for instance the discussion of the Creator in a work entitled On Existents, at Treatises,
pp. 266ff., with explanations of His ‘wisdom’ at pp. 266.20-21 and 267.11-15.
 THE BAGHDAD SCHOOL ON UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS 157

place, as far as I am aware, does Ibn √Ad± directly discuss the question of God’s
knowledge of particulars, and here he does not seem to take a position like
Avicenna’s. The work in question is a short reply to an interlocutor, Ibn
D∞d±sh≤√, who has asked four questions (§1-5) 33 . (1) Does the Creator know
( ya√limu ) particulars ( al-juz’iyy∞t ) ␣ ? (2) If so, how ␣ ? (3) How would His
knowledge of particulars differ from His knowledge of universals ␣ ? (4) Given
that « ␣ the knower and known become one in subject ( w∞∫idan bi-’l-maw∑≤√ ) ␣ »,
would not God become a horse when he knows a horse, become an ox when
he knows an ox, and so on ␣ ?
Ibn √Ad± replies that (1) God does know particulars, as is shown by His
providential creation of these particulars in a way that is « ␣ fitting and
suitable ␣ » (§11). For example, man has body parts that are well-designed in
size and shape ␣ ; Ibn √Ad± refers us to Galen’s On the Usefulness of the Parts for
further elucidation of the point. He then goes on ␣ :

« ␣ It has been established that the Creator is wise ( ∫ak±m ), and the meaning of
‘wise’ is ‘knowing all things that are such that one may be wise about them’. So
if He is wise, He knows man, who has limbs, which are evidence that He is wise.
It is obvious that these limbs, which are evidence of this [sc. His wisdom], are
each individually ( kh∞µµan ) the limbs of single people, but not of the universal
man ( al-ins∞n al-kull± ), since the universal man has no limbs. So his limbs
provide evidence that the Creator is wise. It has then been shown that the
Creator does know particulars, and universals as well, since universals are
parts of the definitions of their particulars. And clearly it is necessary that one
who knows the quiddities ( m∞hiyy∞t ) of particulars knows the universals as
well, since their definitions are completed through [the universals] ␣ » (§14-22).

It is striking that Ibn √Ad± here in fact argues for God’s knowledge of universals
on the basis that God must know particulars, rather than the other way around
(as Avicenna will do) 34 . Indeed, this is something for which Ibn ‘Ad± must
argue ␣ : for, as we saw above, the ‘divine forms’ are neither universal nor
particular. If these divine forms are the objects of God’s cognition, then it is not
any more obvious that God grasps universals than it is that He grasps particulars.
Also striking is the strangeness of Ibn √Ad±’s argument for God’s (apparently
direct) knowledge of particulars. His proof is that there are features of
individuals that are providentially ordered by God, such as the arrangement

33
Ed. and trans. in K. S AMIR , Science divine et théorie de la connaissance chez Ya∫y∞ ibn √Ad± ,
« ␣ Annales de Philosophie ␣ », 7, 1986, pp. 75-114. Cited by his section numbers.
34
Cf. Treatises, p. 401.1-10, where (in a different work) Ibn √Ad± argues that God does create
universals, on the basis that He creates particulars and that universals are dependent for their
existence on particulars.
158 PETER ADAMSON

of their body parts. Since these features hold only of the particulars and not
the universals, God must have direct cognitive awareness of the particulars.
I say the argument is strange, because one might have thought that it does
belong to a universal knowledge of man to know how human body parts are
arranged. Either Ibn √Ad± means that the limbs of individual people are very
specifically well-ordered (my arms are just the right length for me), or he
believes that in general facts about human limbs are not included at all within
an intellectual grasp of the species man.
Ibn √Ad± disposes of the next two questions quickly␣ : (2) How does God
know particulars ␣ ? (3) What is the difference between His knowledge of
particulars and His knowledge of universals ␣ ? Regarding (2) Ibn √Ad± says that
for anyone, including God, to know something is for the form of that thing to
be present in the knower (§23-26). Regarding (3), he says, « ␣ the difference
between the two knowledges is the very same ( bi-√aynih± ) difference as that
between the two things known, since the knowledge of something known is
nothing else than the presence of its form in the essence of the knower␣ » (§28-
29). This is not very clear, but might be taken to imply that there can in fact
be two kinds of forms in the mind of any knower, including God, one kind of
form for particulars, and another for universals. This sharpens the final
question ␣ : (4) if God (or any knower) literally takes on the form of a particular,
then won’t He just become His object of knowledge ␣ ? No, says Ibn √Ad± ␣ :

« ␣ By ‘the form of the object of knowledge’ we mean only that which is indicated
by a statement that describes the quiddity of [the object of knowledge]. And the
quiddity of every single thing is its essence, and that through which it is what it
is. […] Therefore, the essence of the object of knowledge, through which the
object is what it is, and the form of the knower, through which the knower is
knowing, are one and the same essence ( hiya dh∞t w∞∫id bi-√aynih∞). There is no
need to imagine that it follows, from the statement that the knower and the
object of knowledge come to be one and the same in subject, that man, for
example, when he knows ass or horse or ox, becomes an ass, a horse or an ox. For
it has been shown that what we mean by this statement is that that by which the
object of knowledge becomes the object of knowledge in actuality is the very
same thing as that by which the knower becomes knowing in actuality ␣ » (§36-43).

This seems to cast some doubt on Ibn √Ad±’s previous forthright affirmation
of divine knowledge of particulars. For, presumably, any two particular
humans are the same in quiddity ( m∞hiyya ) or essence ( dh∞t ). If God’s
knowledge of Zayd is knowledge of the essence man, and His knowledge of
√Amr is knowledge of the very same essence, then we will be back to the view
that God knows essences which in themselves are not particular. This
interpretation is especially tempting in light of the fact that (at §22, quoted
 THE BAGHDAD SCHOOL ON UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS 159

above) Ibn √Ad± says that a quiddity is what is designated by a definition. That
suggests that we should assimilate the quiddity or essence discussed here to
the ‘divine’ form mentioned in the Taby±n . Still, Ibn √Ad± seems to be going out
of his way to avoid the obvious implication of this, namely that God has no
grasp of the particular as such.

III. I BN AL -§ AYYIB

Our final philosopher, Ab≤ ’l-Faraj b. al-§ayyib, was a student of Ibn √Ad±’s
student Ibn Zur√a. Ibn al-§ayyib wrote a massive commentary on the
Categories 35 and also a commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagôgê 36 , as well as many
other commentaries on Aristotle which are unfortunately now lost. Both of
Ibn al-§ayyib’s commentaries are heavily indebted to the Greek commentary
tradition. Despite the fact that these commentaries were written by
Neoplatonists, Ibn al-§ayyib is fairly clear in adopting a non-Platonizing
interpretation of Aristotle’s epistemology.
Let us begin with the last problem we considered when discussing al-
F∞r∞b±, namely the question of how the experience of particulars can give rise
to universal knowledge. Recall that according to al-F∞r∞b±, knowledge must
be of objects that do not undergo change. This, more than any other
consideration, rules out particulars as the primary object of ‘absolutely
certain’ knowledge. Nevertheless, so long as particulars do instantiate
universals, there is room for saying that I can derive universal knowledge
from even a single particular. I may not be eternally human, since I will not
live forever, but I instantiate humanity as long as I remain alive. So I am one
instance from whom one could extrapolate universal truths about humanity.
For example, I am rational, because I am human. Since the same goes for

35
For the Categories commentary see C. FERRARI , Die Kategorienkommentar von Ab≤ l-Faraj
√Abdall∞h ibn a¥-- §ayyib , Brill, Leiden 2006 ␣ ; cited by page and line number from her Arabic
edition. See also C. F ERRARI , Der Duft des Apfels. Ab≤ l-Faraj √Abdall∞h Ibn a¥-§ayyib und sein
Kommentar zu den Kategorien des Aristoteles, in C ELLUPRICA , D’A NCONA , Aristotele e i suoi esegeti
Neoplatonici cit., pp. 87-106.
36
For the Eisagôgê commentary see the Arabic edition in K. G YEKYE , Ibn al-§ayyib ’s
Commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge, Dar el-Machreq, Beirut 1975, and the English translation
in K. G YEKYE , Arabic Logic ␣ : Ibn al-§ayyib ’s Commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge, SUNY Press,
Albany 1979. I will cite by section number from the Arabic edition. (Be warned that the section
numbers in Gyekye’s English translation do not correspond to those in his Arabic edition, since
the translation omits the preface). This commentary was previously thought to be by al-F∞r∞b±,
and was presented as such in D. M. D UNLOP , The Existence and Definition of Philosophy␣ : from an
Arabic Text Ascribed to al-F∞r∞b±, « ␣ Iraq ␣ », 13, 1951, pp. 76-93, which provides a translation of
the preface. But its authorship was determined by S. M. S TERN , Ibn al-§ayyib ’s Commentary on
the Isagoge, « ␣ Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies ␣ », 19, 1957, pp. 419-425.
160 PETER ADAMSON

every human, it is universally true that man is rational, even though each
individual human instantiates rationality for only a limited time.
Ibn al-§ayyib explicitly raises and answers an objection to this sort of
account, an objection which (as I have discussed elsewhere) was decisive in
leading other Arabic authors towards a relatively Platonizing epistemology37 .
The objection is that sensible particulars are subject to constant change, or
‘flux’. For this to be a good objection, the flux theory being proposed must be
radical. It must claim that no sensible particular ever instantiates any universal
in such a way that we can grasp it. If an apple, say, were to instantiate the
property red even momentarily, then it should be just as good a source for our
knowledge of redness as something that is red for a period of many years.
Thus the objection needs to be that every sensible object is changing at every
time and in every respect, and furthermore, that it follows from this that no
sensible object ever has any property to the exclusion of its contrary.
Ibn al-§ayyib seems to understand this. He mentions the problem of flux
twice in the preface to his commentary on the Eisagôgê, while raising potential
objections to the possibility of doing philosophy at all. The first version of the
objection is brief and general ␣ : « ␣ philosophy is the knowledge of things (al-
um≤r ), but things are in flux ( sayal∞n ), and what is in flux cannot remain
stable so as to be known ␣ » (in Isag., §3). The response on behalf of Aristotle is
in part as follows ␣ :

« ␣ Things are divided into these that are individual, sensible, and concrete on
the one hand, and on the other hand the universal forms that arise in the soul
from these [particulars]. What is in flux is only these individual things, but the
forms in the soul are eternal, everlasting, and remaining in a single condition ␣ ;
and knowledge deals only with these␣ » (in Isag., §4).

Of course this response merely invites a more pointed version of the same
difficulty, namely that if particulars are in flux they cannot give rise to such
knowledge. But Ibn al-§ayyib subsequently explains why this is wrong, and
how it is possible to glean knowledge from natural things ␣ :

« ␣ [Natural things] are not always ( abadan) in flux. For there is some duration
between generation and corruption, indeed there is a long time from Zayd’s
generation to his corruption. And in general, Aristotle has shown in the Physics
that between any two contrary motions there is doubtlessly rest, so that
physical things are not always in flux. And if they are not in flux, then they are

37
See my The Kindian Tradition ␣ : the Structure of Philosophy in Arabic Neoplatonism cit., and
also ch. 5 of my Al-Kind± , Oxford University Press, New York 2007.
 THE BAGHDAD SCHOOL ON UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS 161

known. Furthermore, knowledge deals with natural things only by means of the
forms that arise in the soul from them, and these are unaltering and
incorruptible ␣ » (in Isag., §9).

In keeping with these passages, Ibn al-§ayyib later (in Isag., §92) gives a
detailed explanation of how it is that we grasp universal forms on the basis of
particulars, or even a single particular. The intellect takes a form from
sensation, ‘purifies’ it of accidental features, and isolates the various
characteristics of a given particular (e.g. Socrates’ animality, his rationality,
his whiteness, etc.). It then generalizes these characteristics to yield «␣ universal
forms ( µuwar kulliyya ) ␣ ». Ibn al-§ayyib is even willing to speak of the initial
stage, in which we grasp sensibles, as a kind of knowing ( ma√rifa ). On the
other hand, he admits that sensation and imagination are subject to error,
whereas intellection is not (in Isag., §32-34). For this reason he is careful to
use the term ma√rifa, rather than √ilm , as a general term covering any instance
where we have a cognitive grasp of things, whether this be by means of
sensation, imagination or intellect. Of these three types of cognition, only
intellectual knowing ( ma√rifa al-√aqliyya ) by means of demonstration is to be
called √ilm , which here must mean knowledge in the strict sense 38 . Elsewhere
in the commentary Ibn al-§ayyib is consistent in maintaining the Aristotelian
line that √ilm (see e.g. in Isag., §178) and indeed philosophy itself (see in Isag.,
§42) deal only with the universal.
He also recognizes that the ontological status of the universals is
controversial (in Isag., §133-137). An excursus in the commentary discusses
the three-fold theory of forms that was taken over from the Platonists by Ibn
√Ad±. According to this theory, as we saw, forms exist in particulars, in our
souls, and in themselves (or « ␣ in the many, after the many, and before the
many ␣ »). Ibn al-§ayyib ascribes this theory to Plato himself ␣ : « ␣ he believed that
the forms exist with the Creator before He created what He created, for he
believed that with the Creator was the form of man, ass, and gold, according
to the patterns of which nature has done as it did ␣ » (in Isag., §135). The
connection between this and Ibn √Ad±’s calling the forms in themselves
‘divine’ is obvious enough. But unlike his predecessor, Ibn al-§ayyib rejects
this as an interpretation of Aristotle ␣ :

« ␣ Aristotle, though, paid no heed to these principles, but rather to what we said
above, namely that forms exist in the many, as natural genera and species. But
Aristotle did not believe even this, for he did not believe that genera and species

38
The translation at D UNLOP , The Existence and Definition of Philosophy cit., p. 88 (his §18)
fails to make this clear.
162 PETER ADAMSON

actually exist ( anna f± wuj≤d ajn∞san wa-anw∞√an ), but rather that what exists
are these sensible, particular individuals. And there is a form that exists after
the many, namely logical ( man¥iqiyya ) genera and species, which are forms
discovered by the soul from likenesses which it finds in natural things. And
these were what Aristotle believed genera and species are ␣ » (in Isag., §136-137).

Here Ibn al-§ayyib uses the same terminology as Ibn √Ad± (calling the forms
in our souls ‘logical’ and the forms in particulars ‘natural’), yet insists that
sensibles are a sufficient ontological grounding for knowledge. He also
distances himself from any suggestion that there are universal forms existing
‘in’ the particulars.
Ibn al-§ayyib’s commentary on the Categories also rejects the idea that
universals are part of the furniture of the external world. The commentary
says many times that ‘universals’ exist only as forms in the soul, which are
abstracted from individual, sensible things 39 . A related point is Ibn al-
§ayyib’s insistence that the Categories (and logic generally) deals only with
sensible particulars, and not with God, matter or form. This follows from the
fact that the Categories is intended to deal with words that designate universals,
and universals are drawn exclusively from sensible particulars 40 . On many
other points, we find agreement between the Categories commentary and
works by Ibn √Ad±, for example Ibn al-§ayyib’s explanation of the purpose of
logic and its distinction from grammar 41 . Yet there is no hint in the commentary
that Aristotle’s logic or theory of knowledge might require the postulation of
a third category of ‘absolute’ forms, as Ibn √Ad± held 42 . With regard to the

39
See e.g. in Cat., 71.4ff., 77.23ff., 129.3ff., 135.8 ␣ ; at 129.28 he compares the presence of
universals in the soul to the presence of reflected images in a mirror.
40
See especially 126.24ff., which divides substance into the ‘simple’ and ‘composed’. The
former are either noble (divine substances), and studied in metaphysics, or inferior (matter and
form), and studied in physics. The latter are sensible particulars, which are studied in logic,
though only indirectly by way of the simple expressions that refer to their universals. All of this
helps Ibn al-§ayyib to answer the question of how the Categories relates to Aristotle’s other
works. His solution, obviously, goes back ultimately to that of Porphyry.
41
« ␣ The subject of the art of logic is simple expressions which indicate universal things (al-
alf∞Ω al-bas±¥a al-d∞lla √al∞ ’l-um≤r al-kulliyya ) ␣ » (in Cat., 18.8-9 ␣ ; see also 18.5-6) ␣ ; « ␣ both
grammar and logic study things and expressions, but logic studies expressions insofar as they
refer, whereas grammar studies them not insofar as they refer ␣ » (in Cat., 24.8-10).
42
The most ‘Platonizing’ passage I discovered (on an admittedly incomplete survey of this rather
vast commentary, using the very helpful summary-paraphrase of Cleophea Ferrari) is at in Cat.,
133.22. Here Ibn al-§ayyib is posing an objection he will shortly refute␣ : how can Aristotle say that
sensible particulars are primary, given that there are also «␣ divine substances, the substance of the
intellect, and the Forms of which Plato speaks ␣ » ␣ ? Predictably Ibn al-§ayyib simply avoids the
dilemma by saying that logic does not deal with these things, but only with the universals drawn
from sensible particulars. Obviously, the dialectical nature of the passage should make us cautious
about drawing any conclusions about Ibn al-§ayyib’s own commitments regarding Platonic Forms.
 THE BAGHDAD SCHOOL ON UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS 163

‘natural’ forms in the particulars, Ibn √Ad± and Ibn al-§ayyib do seem to be in
agreement ␣ : such forms are not universals, because universality only applies
to the ‘logical’ form in the soul 43 . But whereas Ibn √Ad± goes on to take a
Platonist position by positing a third type of ‘divine’ form, Ibn al-§ayyib
acknowledges only universals in the mind and particulars in nature. Their
disagreement here is a disagreement over how to interpret Aristotle, and in
particular, what ontological entities need to be postulated in order to undergird
Aristotle’s epistemology.

There are, I think, several wider lessons to be drawn from this survey of
epistemological issues in three members of the Baghdad school. First,
‘Platonizing’ interpretations of Aristotle in Arabic were not always because of
a Greek Neoplatonic filter. To some extent, Aristotle’s own words invited the
Platonizing. Indeed, of our three authors the one who made the most extensive
use of Neoplatonist commentaries, Ibn al-§ayyib, was the only one who
clearly rejected a Platonizing reading of Aristotelian universals. Second,
there were points of doctrinal disagreement between members of the Baghdad
school, not over mere technicalities but over such momentous questions as
the ontological status of universals 44 . Each of these thinkers therefore needs
to be studied in his own right, a process that is fairly advanced with respect
to al-F∞r∞b± but scarcely begun with respect to other members of the school.
Third, and conversely, the thought of these ‘Baghdad Aristotelians’ will often

43
In one passage from the commentary, Ibn al-§ayyib considers a difficulty closely related to
one we saw in Ibn √Ad± ␣ : why does a property like ‘being-a-species’ attach to the species man, but
not a particular man ␣ ? Here is a translation of the relevant passage (in Cat., 147.12-17) ␣ : «␣ How can
Aristotle claim that the essence of the secondary substances are the essence of the primary
substances ␣ ? For it would then follow that the genus is particular, and the particular is genus,
which is absurd. The solution is as follows ␣ : the ma√n∞ of being-a-genus ( al-jinsiyya ) in animal is
not essential for it, nor is the ma√n∞ of being-primary ( al-awwaliyya) in Zayd essential for him.
Rather, in both cases they are accidents, and are an extraneous thing superadded to the essences␣ ».
44
This has some bearing on the sense in which we should use the word ‘school’ for the
Baghdad philosophers. Like the school of Ammonius, which produced both Philoponus and his
bitter critic Simplicius, the Baghdad school was perhaps unified more by overall purpose
(commenting on Aristotle) and by interpersonal relationships between teachers and students,
than it was by any unifying set of doctrines. Further research on the ‘Baghdad Physics’, a
manuscript containing comments by several members of the school, may shed more light on this
question. On this text see E. G IANNAKIS , The Structure of Ab≤ l-™usayn al-Baµr± ’s Copy of
Aristotle’s Physics, « ␣ Zeitschrift für Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften ␣ », 8,
1993, pp. 251-258 and, by the same author, Fragments from Alexander’s Lost Commentary on
Aristotle’s Physics, « ␣ Zeitschrift für Geschichte der arabisch-islamischen Wissenschaften ␣ », 10,
1995/96, pp. 157-185. For an Arabic edition see A. B ADAW ° ed., Aris¥≤¥∞l±s Ê: al-¥ab±√a , al-D∞r al
Qawmiyya li-’l-§iba√∞ wa-’l-Nashr, Cairo 1964. For an English paraphrase of the comments see
P. L ETTINCK , Aristotle’s “Physics” and its Reception in the Arabic World, Brill, Leiden 1994.
164 PETER ADAMSON

emerge most clearly by comparing them with one another. This is a lesson
that needs above all to be applied when we are reading al-F∞r∞b±. He is,
naturally enough, usually treated as a philosophical giant (the ‘second teacher’)
who is to be read alongside other giants like Plato, Aristotle, Avicenna,
Averroes and Maimonides. I would not suggest for a moment that this is
illegitimate. Nor would I deny that al-F∞r∞b± was the most interesting and
philosophically sophisticated member of the Baghdad school (though the
works of Ibn √Ad± will need more study before we can assert this with complete
confidence). But giant or no, al-F∞r∞b± was also just one member of a highly
scholastic school whose chief aim was to carry on the Alexandrian project of
interpreting the works of Aristotle. We will understand al-F∞r∞b± better if we
read him in the context of his school, and indeed in the context of the
complicated wider developments in falsafa and kal∞m in the 4 th/10th century.