CRITIQUE OF HUME CONCERNING THE EXISTENCE OF AN EXTERNAL

WORLD OF BODIES

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2018.

Concerning the existence of an external world of corporeal beings, the immanentist and
sensist phenomenalist David Hume (1711-1776) maintains that what we know are only our
perceptions and not extra-mental corporeal things in an external world, therefore cutting himself
off from a true intellectual-sensible knowledge of the extra-mental world of real corporeal things
and human persons (and the human person is not reducible to “mind” or “self-consciousness”
[Descartes], “sameness of consciousness itself that persists throughout a succession of past and
present conscious states” [Locke], or a “heap or collection of different perceptions, united
together by certain relations, and supposed though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect
simplicity and identity”1 [Hume], but is rather a real, extra-mental individual substance of a
rational nature [Naturæ rationalis individua substantia], an individual subsistent of rational
nature, a rational subsistent, composed of body and soul.2 St. Thomas Aquinas writes: “Persona
significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura, scilicet subsistens in rationali
natura”[Summa Theologiae, I, q. 29, a. 3]). For Hume, “la credenza nell’esistenza delle cose non
ha nessun valore oggettivo. La sola realtà di cui siamo certi è costituita dalle percezioni; le sole
inferenze possibili sono quelle fondate sul rapporto tra causa ed effetto, che si verifica, a sua
volta, solo tra percezioni. Una realtà che sia diversa dalle percezioni ed estranea ad esse non si
può affermare né sulla base delle impressioni dei sensi, né sulla base del rapporto causale. La
realtà esterna è dunque ingiustificabile; ma l’istinto a credere in essa è ineliminabile.”3 The
mediate realist Descartes (1596-1650), beginning from an immanentist point of departure in the
Cogito after his initial doubting of extra-mental reality, later on attempted to “demonstrate” the
existence of an external world of things via causality. The empiricist John Locke (1632-1704),
although maintaining that the immediate object of perception is not the extra-mental thing but
rather our idea4), still follows the procedure of mediate realism by affirming the existence of
extra-mental things via causality. Locke “will take recourse in causality to reach the extramental
world. The simple ideas that repeat themselves, for example, would furnish the proof of the
existence of an external cause.”5 Hume the sensist phenomenalist gets rid of all of this mediate
realism since, for him, we are solely confined to the realm of our perceptions and causality has
only a subjective, and not an objective, extra-mental, value, valid only among our perceptions
and not for things or beings in the extra-mental world. Copleston writes that “the main difficulty,
Hume says, which arises in connection with our notion of a world of permanently existing
objects independent of our perception, is that we are confined to the world of perceptions and
enjoy no access to a world of objects existing independently of these perceptions. ‘Now since
nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from
something antecedently present to the mind, it follows that it is impossible for us so much as to
1
D. HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature, I, 4, 2.
2
“La persona umana ha una struttura ilemorfica: non è fatta soltanto di materia e neppure soltanto di spirito (anima),
ma la sua struttura è composita e i suoi elementi costitutivi essenziali sono il corpo (materia) e l’anima (forma)”(B.
MONDIN, Manuale di filosofia sistematica, vol. 3 (Ontologia e metafisica), ESD, Bologna, 2007, p. 304.
3
B. MONDIN, Storia dell’Antropologia Filosofica, vol. 1, ESD, Bologna, 2001, pp. 543-544.
4
Cf. J. LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, 8, 8,
5
J. J. SANGUINETI, Logic and Gnoseology, Urbaniana University Press, Rome, 1987, pp. 160-161.

1
conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions. Let us fix
our attention out of ourself as much as possible; let us chase our imagination to the heavens, or to
the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can
conceive any kind of existence, but those perceptions which have appeared in that narrow
compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor have we any idea but what is there
produced.’6 Ideas are ultimately reducible to impressions, and impressions are subjective,
pertaining to the percipient subject.”7 The position of the sensist Hume is that of immanentism,
where “the human mind attains no other immediate object than its own representations, which
are the only ‘realities’ it can know…The principle of immanence consists in the denial that being
transcends consciousness…Being is constituted from within the immanence of the thinking
subject…A great part of post-Cartesian philosophy basically holds to the principle of
immanence.8 In positions as apparently opposed to idealism as empiricism, dialectical
materialism and existentialism, one can discover – in effect – that the starting point is the
immanence of human consciousness and that these positions never attain genuine
transcendence.”9 Against immanentism and its principle of immanence (advocated by those like
Hume) and in favor of metaphysical realism, Juan José Sanguineti writes: “In quanto l’essere è
fonte d’intelligibilità e prima condizione della conoscenza, l’essere è indipendente dal venir
conosciuto e non viceversa (il che non si oppone al fatto che gli enti più nobili conoscono, poiché
la conoscenza appartiene alla pienezza dell’essere). Questo principio così ovvio è il cardine del
realismo metafisico. Le posizioni non realistiche, invece, in base all’apparente fatto che «non
possiamo uscire dal nostro pensare», ritengono che un essere indipendente dal pensiero sarebbe
incomprensibile o almeno ignoto (principio di immanenza). Viene bloccata in questo modo la
trascendenza metafisica della mente umana. La tesi immanentistica poggia sul falso principio
dell’impossibilità di trascendere il nostro intelletto pensante.

“Ma corrisponde proprio alla natura stessa del pensiero il poter raggiungere una realtà
indipendente da esso (principio di trascendenza noetica, intenzionalità) Abbondanti indizi ci
dimostrano tale indipendenza: le cose esistevano prima che noi le conoscessimo e continuano ad
esserci anche quando smettiamo di pensarle; quando siamo caduti in errore, le realtà su cui ci
siamo sbagliati continuano ad esistere, anzi sono il fondamento delle nostre successive rettifiche.
L’immanentismo porta facilmente alla tesi idealistica secondo cui la realtà o la verità sono
costruzioni o elaborazioni dello spirito umano.”10

Hume examines three possible causes for our belief in the continued and distinct
existence of extra-mental corporeal things (bodies): the senses, reason, the imagination. He then
makes an effort to show that the senses and the reason could not have been the causes of this
belief. Rather, the cause lies in the imagination which acts upon two qualities of our impressions,
namely, constancy and coherence, which present the world before us as something real and
lasting. Because we encounter a certain constancy and coherence in our impressions, the
imagination has the tendency to consider such constancy and coherence as total and complete,

6
D. HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature, I, 2, 6, L. A. Selby-Bigge edition, Oxford, 1951, pp. 67-68.
7
F. COPLESTON, A History of Philosophy, Book II, vol. 5, Image Doubleday, New York, 1985, p. 293.
8
See: C. FABRO, Introduzione all’ateismo moderno, second revised and augmented edition, Studium, Rome, 1969;
C. CARDONA, Metafísica de la opción intelectual, second edition, Rialp, Madrid, 1973.
9
A. LLANO, Gnoseology, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 2001, pp. 87, 92
10
J. J. SANGUINETI, Introduzione alla gnoseologia, Le Monnier, Florence, 2003, pp. 41-42.

2
imagining the cause to be actually existing extra-mental bodies. Gilson and Langan explain that,
for Hume, “the imagination passes insensibly from awareness of the coherence and constancy of
certain impressions to an affirmation of the coherence and constancy – and therefore the
continued existence – of their supposed bodily counterparts; once supposed to exist
continuously, beyond the interruptions of my perceptions, they are of course held to exist distinct
from my impressions of them. Hume strikes a pragmatic note in suggesting why we fall into this
habit: It is necessary for life. ‘There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after
a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse,
on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind. If these opinions become contrary, it
is not difficult to forsee which of them will have the advantage. As long as our attention is bent
upon the subject, the philosophical and studied principles may prevail; but the moment we relax
our thoughts, nature will display herself, and draw us back to our former opinion…Thus though
we clearly perceive the dependence and interruption of our perceptions, we stop short in our
career, and never upon that account reject the notion of an independent and continued
existence.’11”12

For Hume, the work of memory would also add to the work of the imagination, not
merely by ‘feigning’ the continued existence of bodies, but by believing it. For him, “memory
presents us with a great number of instances of similar perceptions which recur at different times
after considerable interruptions. And this resemblance produces a propensity to look upon these
interrupted perceptions as the same. At the same time it also produces a propensity to connect the
perceptions by means of the hypothesis of a continued existence, in order to justify our ascription
of identity to them and in order to avoid the contradiction in which the interrupted character of
our perceptions seems to involve us. We have, therefore, a propensity to feign the continuous
existence of bodies. Further, since this propensity arises from lively impressions of the memory,
it bestows vivacity on this fiction, ‘or, in other words, makes us believe the continued existence
of body.’13”14 Copleston explains Hume’s full position concerning the source of the belief in the
continued and independent existence of extra-mental bodies in his A Treatise of Human Nature
as follows: “In the first place the senses cannot be the source of the notion that things continue to
exist when they are unperceived. For in order for this to be the case, the senses would have to
operate when they have ceased to operate. And this would involve a contradiction. Nor do the
senses reveal to us bodies which are distinct from our perceptions; that is, from the sensible
appearances of bodies. They do not reveal to us both a copy and the original. It may, indeed,
seem that I perceive my own body. But ‘properly speaking, it is not our body we perceive, when
we regard our limbs and members, but certain impressions, which enter by the senses; so that the
ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, or to their objects, is an act of the
mind as difficult to explain as that which we examine at present.’15 It is true that among the
classes of impressions we ascribe a distinct and continuous existence to some and not to others.
Nobody attributes distinct and continuous existence to pains and pleasures. The ‘vulgar,’ though
not ‘philosophers,’ suppose that colours, tastes, sounds and, in general, the so-called secondary
qualities possess such existence. Both philosophers and the vulgar alike suppose figure, bulk,

11
D. HUME, op. cit., I, 4, 2.
12
É. GILSON and T. LANGAN, Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant, Random House, New York, 1963, p. 265.
13
D. HUME, op. cit., I, 4, 1.
14
F. COPLESTON, op. cit., p. 297.
15
D. HUME, op. cit., I, 4, 2, p. 191.

3
motion and solidity to exist continuously and independently of perception. But it cannot be the
senses themselves which lead us to make these distinctions; for, as far as the senses are
concerned, all these impressions are on the same footing.

“In the second place it is not reason which induces us to believe in the continuous and
distinct existence of bodies. ‘Whatever convincing arguments philosophers may fancy they can
produce to establish the belief of objects independent of the mind, it is obvious these arguments
are known but to very few; and that it is not by them that children, peasants, and the greatest part
of mankind are induced to attribute objects to some impressions and deny them to others.’16 Nor
can we rationally justify our belief, once we have it. ‘Philosophy informs us that everything
which appears to the mind is nothing but a perception, and is interrupted and dependent on the
mind.’17 And we cannot infer the existence of objects from perceptions. Such an inference would
be a causal inference. And for it to be valid we should have to be able to observe the constant
conjunction of those objects with these perceptions. And this we cannot do. For we cannot get
outside the series of our perceptions to compare them with anything apart from them.

“Our belief in the continued and independent existence of bodies, and our habit of
supposing that objective and independent counterparts of certain impressions exist, must be due,
therefore, neither to the senses nor to the reason or understanding but to the imagination. The
question thus arises, which are the features of certain impressions that work on the imagination
and produce our persuasion of the continued and distinct existence of bodies? It is useless to
refer this belief or persuasion to the superior force or violence of certain impressions as
compared with others. For it is obvious that the majority of people suppose that the heat of a fire,
placed at a convenient distance, is in the fire itself, whereas they do not suppose that the intense
pain caused by too great proximity to the fire is anywhere else but in the impressions of the
percipient subject. Hence we have to look elsewhere for the peculiar features of certain
impressions, which work upon the imagination.

“Hume mentions two such peculiar features, namely, constancy and coherence. ‘Those
mountains and houses and trees which lie at present under my eye have always appeared to me in
the same order; and when I lose sight of them by shutting my eyes or turning my head, I soon
after find them return upon me without the least alteration.’18 Here we have constantly recurring
similar impressions, But, obviously, bodies often change not only their positions but also their
qualities. However, even in their changes there is a coherence. ‘When I return to my chamber
after an hour’s absence, I find not my fire in the same situation in which I left it; but then I am
accustomed, in other instances, to see a like alteration produced in a like time, whether I am
present or absent, near or remote. This coherence, therefore, in their changes, is one of the
characteristics of external objects, as well as their constancy.’19 Hume’s meaning is, I think,
sufficiently clear. My impressions of the mountain which I can see through the window are
constant, in the sense that, given the requisite conditions, they are similar. From the point of view
of perception the mountain remains more or less the same. But the impression which I receive of
the fire in my room at 9 p.m. is not the same as the impression which I receive when I return to

16
Ibid., p. 193.
17
D. HUME, op. cit., I, 4, 2, p. 193.
18
Ibid., p. 194.
19
Ibid., p. 195.

4
the room at 10:30 p.m. The fire, as we say, has died down in the meantime. On the other hand,
these two separate impressions agree with the two separate impressions which I receive at the
same interval of time on another evening. And if I watch the fire for a stretch of time on two or
more occasions, there is a regular pattern of coherence between the different series of
impressions.

“Hume is not, however, satisfied with an explanation of our belief in the continuous and
independent existence of bodies, which rests simply and solely on the actual course of our
impressions. On the one hand our impressions are in fact interrupted, while on the other hand we
habitually believe in the continuous existence of bodies. And the mere repetition of interrupted,
though similar, impressions cannot by itself produce this belief. We must look there for ‘some
other principles,’ and Hume, as we would expect, has recourse to psychological considerations.
‘The imagination, when set into any train of thinking, is apt to continue even when its object fails
it, and, like a galley put in motion by the oars, carries on its course without any new impulse.’20
Once the mind begins to observe a uniformity or coherence among impressions, it tends to render
this uniformity as complete as possible. The supposition of the continued existence of bodies
suffices for this purpose and affords us a notion of greater regularity and coherence than is
provided by the senses. But though coherence may give rise to the supposition of the continuous
existence of objects, the idea of constancy is needed to explain our supposition of their distinct
existence; that is, of their independence of our perceptions. When we have been accustomed to
find, for example, that the perception of the sun recurs constantly in the same form as on its first
appearance, we are inclined to regard these different and interrupted perceptions as being the
same. Reflection, however, shows us that the perceptions are not the same. Therefore, to free
ourselves from this contradiction, we disguise or remove the interruption ‘by supposing that
these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real existence, of which we are insensible.’21

“These observations are not, it is true, very enlightening. And Hume endeavors to make
his position more precise and clear. To do this, he distinguishes between the opinion of the
vulgar and what he calls the ‘philosophical system.’ The vulgar are ‘all the unthinking and
unphilosophical part of mankind, that is, all of us at one time or other.’22 These people suppose,
says Hume, that their perceptions are the only objects. ‘The very image which is present to the
senses is with us the real body; and it is to these interrupted images we ascribe a perfect
identity.’23 In other words, the vulgar know nothing of Locke’s material substance; material
objects are for them simply what they perceive them to be. And to say this is, for Hume, to say
that for the vulgar objects and perceptions are the same. This presupposed, we are then faced by
a difficulty. On the one hand, ‘The smooth passage of the imagination along the ideas of the
resembling perceptions makes us ascribe to them a perfect identity.’24 On the other hand, the
interrupted manner of their occurrence or, as Hume says, appearance, leads us to consider them
as distinct entities. But this contradiction gives rise to an uneasiness, and it must therefore be
resolved. As we cannot bring ourselves to sacrifice the propensity produced by the smooth
passage of the imagination, we sacrifice the second principle. It is true that the interruptions in

20
Ibid., p. 198.
21
Ibid., p. 199.
22
D. HUME, op. cit., I, 4, 1, p. 205.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.

5
the appearance of similar perceptions are often so long and frequent that we cannot overlook
them; but at the same time ‘an interrupted appearance to the senses implies not necessarily an
interruption in the existence.’25 Hence we can ‘feign’ a continued existence of objects. Yet we do
not merely feign this; we believe it. And, according to Hume, this belief can be explained by
reference to memory. Memory presents us with a great number of instances of similar
perceptions which recur at different times after considerable interruptions. And this resemblance
produces a propensity to look upon these interrupted perceptions as the same. At the same time it
also produces a propensity to connect the perceptions by means of the hypothesis of a continued
existence, in order to justify our ascription of identity to them and in order to avoid the
contradiction in which the interrupted character of our perceptions seems to involve us. We have,
therefore, a propensity to feign the continuous existence of bodies. Further, since this propensity
arises from lively impressions of the memory, it bestows vivacity on this fiction, ‘or, in other
words, makes us believe the continued existence of body.’26 For belief consists in the vivacity of
an idea.

“But though we are led in this way to believe in the continued existence of ‘sensible
objects of perceptions,’ philosophy makes us see the fallacy of the supposition. For reason shows
us that our perceptions do not exist independently of our perceiving. And they have no more a
continued than an independent existence. Philosophers, therefore, have made a distinction
between perceptions and objects. The former are interrupted and dependent on the percipient
subject: the latter exist continuously and independently. But this theory is arrived at by first
embracing and then discarding the vulgar opinion, and it contains not only all the difficulties
attaching to the latter but also some which are peculiar to itself. For instance, the theory involves
postulating a new set of perceptions. We cannot, as has been seen earlier, conceive of objects
except in terms of perceptions. Hence, if we postulate objects as well as perceptions, we merely
reduplicate the latter and at the same time ascribe to them attributes, namely, uninterruptedness
and independence, which do not belong to perceptions.

“The upshot of Hume’s examination of our belief in the continued and independent
existence of bodies is, therefore, that there is no rational justification for it. At the same time we
cannot eradicate the belief…we have an inevitable and ineradicable propensity to believe in the
continuous and independent existence of bodies. This propensity produces belief, and this belief
operates in the vulgar and the philosophical alike. All attempts to give a rational justification of
this belief are failures. There may be something apart from our perceptions, but we cannot prove
that this is the case. At the same time nobody does or can live his life on sceptical principles.
Natural belief inevitably prevails.”27

Hume not only maintains that secondary qualities are subjective but also the primary
qualities of motion, solidity and extension. He states that “if colours, sounds, tastes and smells be
merely perceptions, nothing we can conceive is possessed of a real, continued and independent
existence; not even motion, extension and solidity, which are the primary qualities chiefly
insisted on.”28 Defending the objectivity of sense knowledge and the reality of sense qualities,

25
Ibid., pp. 207-208.
26
Ibid., p. 209.
27
F. COPLESTON, op. cit., pp. 294-299.
28
D. HUME, op. cit., I, 4, 4, p. 228.

6
Alejandro Llano writes: “Contemporary biological anthropology has demonstrated the objective
nature of sense knowledge with careful descriptions.29 Arnold Gehlen, one of its more
outstanding representatives, in spite of the deficiencies of his anthropology, maintains that
objects are not presented to us only as the cause or origin of sense impressions, but above all as
objective things, autonomous and effectively existing unities, to which perception points. The
object has an independent and – in some sense – ‘absolute’ character. It is certain, for example,
that colors are known through the light which affects our eyes; but in primary perception this
relation does not appear at all. What I grasp is not the medium through the which the object is
given to me, but the object itself, as something which is before me and is distinct from me and
from my sensation.30

“St. Thomas, commenting on Aristotle, maintains – against subjectivist positions – that

‘movement according to quantity is not the same thing as movement according to quality or
form. And even if it be granted that things are in continuous movement according to quantity,
and that all things are always invisibly in movement in this way, nonetheless, according to
quality or form not everything is always moving. And thus there can be definite knowledge of
things, because things are known more by their species or form than by their quantity.’31 Things
really have qualities which inhere in them as accidents and which we perceive in an immaterial
way, in accordance with the formal object and the range of each sense faculty, but not arbitrarily,
and always with an objective aspect. We perceive the qualities of things – some, not all of them –
immediately, because they are what primarily and properly affects our sense organs; by means of
these qualities we grasp quantities concomitantly and immediately, but indirectly.

“The denial of the extra-subjective scope of our knowledge of qualities completely

compromises gnoseological realism since intellectual knowledge starts, in the final analysis,
from the grasping of proper sensibles. In sense knowledge there is stability and in it there is no
contradiction. For example, a thing never seems sweet and bitter at the same time; and of itself,
sweetness is always the same thing. What can happen – without this being a denial of the reality
of sense knowledge – is that, because of the deficiencies of our organic constitution, we do not
perceive something properly at a given moment.

“The external senses immediately know their object as something trans-subjective: this is
unquestionably evident. Immediately, and without hesitation, we know that the known is
something real and distinct from our knowledge. External sense knowledge is the intuition of an
object which is physically present, without the mediation of an expressed species. Like all
knowing faculties, the external senses are active; however they are not productive of their objects
but – in this respect – receptive: they produce their object neither according to its matter nor
according to its form, nor according to its presence (as the different idealisms would have us
believe), but rather know their object in its objective reality. They produce only their own proper

29
Cf. A. LLANO, Para una Antropología de la objetividad, “Estudios de Metafísica,” 3 (1971-1972).
30
A. GEHLEN, Der Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt, Athenaëum, Frankfurt, 1966, pp. 137 and
164.
31
In IV Metaphysicorum, lect. 13, n. 668.

7
cognitive action, which is a praxis by which they attain their proper object. And this complete
trans-subjectivity of sense objects is not only apparent, but real, true.32”33

Sanguineti on the Objectivity of External Perception: “«Vedo un bicchiere di spumante,

sul tavolo, dove sono seduti gli invitati a cena…». Con i nostri sensi esterni vediamo oggetti in
moto, in attività, tutto ciò che costituisce il nostro mondo esterno, di cui ci riconosciamo una
parte integrante. Tutte le nostre facoltà concorrono per arrivare a tale percezione globale e
complessa. Ma esaminiamo il contenuto dei sensi esterni. Essi ci forniscono un’informazione
specifica, secondo il loro oggetto formale, circa insiemi collegati di aspetti qualitativi,
dimensionali e numerici, poiché le qualità (colori, luci, suoni) sono sempre quantificate, e gli
aspetti quantitativi (distanze, dimensioni, numero) sono di cose qualitative. La luce occupa uno
spazio, le variazioni luminose servono per delimitare la forma degli oggetti in moto, e così via.
La percezione degli oggetti è globale. Si percepiscono strutture qualitativo-quantitative in moto e
nel tempo, ma sono discernibili aspetti specifici (un colore, una superficie), poi separati
dall’analisi.

“Tale informazione qualitativo/quantitativa e spazio-temporale in continuo movimento è

la base primaria della conoscenza sensitiva. Le scienze fisico-matematiche si concentrano sugli
aspetti quantitativi dei dati sensitivi, cercando un grado di precisione in confronto del quale le
sensazioni ordinarie appaiono grossolane. Ma la fisica considera altresì la base materiale degli
stimoli che colpiscono i nostri sensi (radiazione elettromagnetica per la vista, onde acustiche per
l’udito), rendendo così ragione delle nostre sensazioni soggettive dal punto di vista della loro
costituzione fisica materiale.

“Questo fatto provocò nella storia della filosofia una crisi della fede nell’oggettività delle
qualità sensibili, agli albori dello sviluppo della fisica moderna (…Locke). Le tradizionali qualità
direttamente colte dai sensi (colori, temperatura, suoni, odori) sembravano essere esclusive del
soggetto senziente. Il suono, ad esempio, non sarebbe una qualità reale del mondo fisico. Il
fruscio delle foglie di un bosco non esisterebbe se nessuno lo ascoltasse, e in tal caso si
ridurrebbe alle onde sonore (variazione di pressione dell’aria sulle nostre orecchie) prodotte dalla
vibrazione di certi corpi detti «sonori». Il suono, la luce, la temperatura, si ridurrebbero
fisicamente a un certo tipo di moti dei corpi. Così nacque il problema dell’oggettività delle
qualità dei sensi. La negazione di tale oggettività solitamente era legata alla concezione
meccanicista della natura (riduzione della natura dei corpi a moto, spazio, urti e aspetti
puramente quantitativi).

“La soluzione di questo problema gnoseologico si colloca sul binario di quanto abbiamo
detto sulla natura della percezione sensibile. Conosciamo le cose nella misura in cui si
presentano a noi, ma le conosciamo veramente. Le sensazioni esterne sono come i messaggi che
le cose inviano al nostro corpo senziente. Questi messaggi non sono unicamente nostri, ma sono
delle cose stesse in quanto stanno comunicando con il nostro corpo senziente. Ma si può
discernere tra la qualità in quanto sentita e la qualità in quanto proprietà dei corpi fisici. Una
cosa è la sensazione di caldo e un’altra la temperatura oggettiva di un corpo. Questi due elementi

32
Cf. J. GREDT, Unsere Aussenwelt. Eine Untersuchung über den gegenständliche Wert der Sinneserkenntnis,
Tyrolia, Innsbruck, 1921, pp. 165-184.
33
A. LLANO, Gnoseology, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 2001, p. 76-77.

8
possono anche separarsi: possiamo sentire freddo solo nel nostro corpo, vedere luci del tutto
soggettive e, viceversa, ci possono essere suoni, colori e temperature nei confronti dei quali
siamo insensibili (ultrasuoni, luce infrarossa). Discerniamo ugualmente tra sensazioni
semplicemente causate dai corpi (l’ago che produce un dolore nella pelle) e sensazioni il cui
contenuto si attribuisce alle cose stesse (la mela è rosa). Queste ultime costituiscono un’autentica
informazione circa il mondo esterno.

“La domanda critica è la seguente: i colori, la temperatura, la durezza, possono dirsi

autentiche qualità dei corpi? Non sarebbero piuttosto gli effetti provocati in noi da certe
caratteristiche dinamiche dei corpi (per esempio, la temperatura sembra ridursi, se consideriamo i
corpi stessi, all’energia cinetica delle molecole dei corpi)?34 La risposta a queste domande è
duplice:

“a) Le qualità sensibili sono proprietà dei corpi in quanto si presentano immediatamente
ai nostri sensi. Questa relatività è oggettiva, non soggettiva. Possiamo descrivere in modo
oggettivo e vero (oppure falso) le cose materiali indicandone le qualità sensibili (colori,
temperatura, suoni). Infatti esistono parti della fisica che studiano tali qualità in maniera fisica e
non psicologica: l’acustica, l’ottica, la termologia.

“La relatività delle qualità sensibili non rende mediata la nostra conoscenza sensibile.
Sarebbe inadeguato dire che, quando vediamo un oggetto colorato o ascoltiamo un suono,
abbiamo primariamente un’informazione sul nostro corpo. Le nostre sensazioni esterne sono
immediatamente intenzionali. Quando tocchiamo un corpo, sentendone la durezza, la forma, la
temperatura, siamo subito rimandati alla realtà esterna, di cui otteniamo un’autentica
informazione. Ma, ricordiamolo, in questo caso stiamo conoscendo la realtà nella misura in cui
si presenta attivamente al nostro corpo, sebbene fatto possa talvolta passare inosservato. La
relatività oggettiva della conoscenza sensibile è indissociabile dalla sua immediatezza
intenzionale. «Quindi – qualcuno potrà domandare – conosciamo le cose non in se stesse, ma in
quanto date a noi?» Questa domanda è fuorviante, poiché conosciamo le cose in se stesse proprio
in quanto date a noi. Non ha senso contrapporre «la cosa in se stessa» alla «cosa data a noi».
Tale contrapposizione crea falsi problemi.

“b) La fisica studia la struttura causale delle sensazioni qualitative. In qualche modo, si
potrebbe anche dire che la fisica arriva alla natura della qualità sensibile, almeno da un certo
punto di vista. La scienza infatti considera se la luce visibile possiede una struttura corpuscolare,
ondulatoria, quantistica, in quanto fa parte della radiazione elettromagnetica. La prospettiva
scientifica raggiunge una maggiore oggettività in quanto risolve le qualità sensibili in certe
strutture della materia più complesse di quanto ci viene offerto alla percezione immediata.
Dunque grazie alla fisica siamo consapevoli della relatività delle qualità sensibili al corpo
senziente – ciò è già, si badi bene, una conoscenza assoluta – e inoltre siamo in grado di ampliare
il cerchio delle proprietà dei corpi al di là della loro presentazione immediata ai nostri sensi.
Così, mentre la conoscenza comune ci fa pensare ai colori delle superfici dei corpi come qualità
semplicemente statiche, la scienza ci spiega come i colori riflessi della superficie degli oggetti
illuminati risultino, tra l’altro, dalla sottrazione delle radiazioni assorbite da quelle incidenti
(superficie «nera» è quella che assorbe tutte le radiazioni). Ma non si deve pensare che in questo
34
Cfr., sul tema, G. CHALMETA, Fenomenología de la sensación, in «Sapientia», 40 (1985), pp. 33-48.

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modo le scienze «rendono oggettive le qualità soggettive», perché piuttosto si passa da
un’oggettività ad un’altra, mentre si mantiene una relatività di base della nostra conoscenza, dal
momento che tutta la scienza dipende dalla nostra conoscenza sensibile esterna.

“…Per quanto riguarda la percezione degli aspetti quantitativi delle cose (distanze,
dimensioni, forma, collocazione, movimento, tempo, numero), valgono gli stessi criteri
psicologici e critici menzionati in queste pagine. L’estensione o dimensionalità dei corpi viene
colta nell’esperienza primaria del movimento locale. Non esiste una sorta di spazio o tempo
puro, vuoto, a priori, come se fosse una struttura mentale entro la quale collochiamo le cose,
contrariamente a quanto pensava Kant. Le nostre prime oggettivazioni spaziali e temporali sono
elementari, concrete, e sono legate alla maturazione della nostra esperienza tattile, visiva,
uditiva, sia attiva che passiva. Muovendo le mani, camminando, afferando oggetti, spostandoli,
impariamo a percepire le distanze, le configurazioni geometriche, gli spazi, nella prospettiva del
nostro corpo che si muove in un certo ambiente, superando di volta in volta i nostri errori nel
giudicare la quantità. Ben presto viene in aiuto la ragione, che paragona gli aspetti quantitativi
delle cose e così ci porta a misurare la quantità tramite l’immaginazione e certe oggettivazioni
come i numeri e le figure geometriche ideali.

“Lo sviluppo culturale, tecnologico e scientifico di una civiltà genera certe forme di
misurazione quantitativa di spazi, tempi, o di oggettivazione della quantità, che finiscono –
grazie all’educazione e alla vita pratica politica, economica, lavorativa – per imporsi in modo
collettivo. Si forma così una modalità culturale di percezione quantitativa che è un autentico
abito socioculturale. I tempi della società in cui viviamo sono abitualmente misurati in base alle
unità astratte dei calendari e degli orologi (minuti, ore, giorni della settimana, mesi, anni), mentre
una società primitiva misura il tempo utilizzando periodi più immediatamente legati a fenomeni
naturali (il sorgere del sole, le stagioni).

“Grazie all’insegnamento scientifico, può darsi che nasca nelle persone la

rappresentazione astratta di uno spazio vuoto o di un tempo vuoto uniforme, come se fosse il
riferimento assoluto dell’operazione di situare le cose, come si suol dire, «nello spazio e nel
tempo». Tale spazio e tempo assoluti sono astrazioni matematiche basate sul supporto
dell’immaginazione quantitativa. Sono una forma di oggettivazione collegata culturalmente a
uno stadio della fisica (la meccanica newtoniana). Ma non sono indispensabili per la percezione
concreta dei tempi e degli aspetti estesi dei corpi. Kant, come abbiamo detto, errò nell’assumerli
come una sorta di cornice strutturale della nostra mente.”35

Sanguineti on the Immediateness of the Perception of the World, Immediate Realism: “La
nostra percezione attraverso i sensi esterni è immediata, quindi è anche immediata la nostra
conoscenza intellettiva del mondo materiale. Quando vedo il telefono sulla mia scrivania, arrivo
immediatamente alla realtà extramentale del telefono. La mediazione psicologica delle
rappresentazioni intenzionali non comporta la necessità di una mediazione inferenziale. Da
quanto si è visto, risulta privo di senso sostenere che conosciamo con certezza giustificata
soltanto i fenoneni, cioè le nostre rappresentazioni soggettive…”36

35
J. J. SANGUINETI, op. cit., pp. 70-74.
36
J. J. SANGUINETI, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

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