Petitioner Vs Vs Respondents: en Banc

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 163556. June 8, 2004.]
CONG. RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ , petitioner, vs . SENATE OF THE

PHILIPPINES [represented by Franklin Drilon, President of the
Senate], HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al. , respondents.
RESOLUTION
Gentlemen :
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc June 8,
2004.
G.R. No. 163556 — CONG. RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ v . SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES [represented by Franklin Drilon, President of the Senate], HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, et al.
Before the Court is a Petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to nullify
Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress, dated May 28,
2004, creating a Joint Committee which shall preliminarily canvass the votes of the
candidates for President and Vice-President during the May 10, 2004 elections.
At the outset, the Court stresses that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
this controversy, because the herein Petition contains su cient allegations claiming
violations of the Constitution. Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the
allegations of the initiatory pleading, like the complaint or petition.
However, after careful deliberation on the merits of the Petition and the Comments
led by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, Speaker Jose C. De Venecia and the O ce of
the Solicitor General, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the Petition on the ground that it
failed to show that Congress gravely abused its discretion in creating such Joint
Committee.
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress "to
promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certi cates." In Arroyo v. De Venecia (277
SCRA 268, August 14, 1997), the Court ruled that it had no power to review the internal
proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution. Likewise,
Santiago v. Guingona, (298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998) held that the Court — under the
doctrine of separation of powers — has "no authority to interfere" in the "exclusive realm" of
a co-equal branch, absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion. The Court has no
authority to restrict or limit the exercise of congressional prerogatives granted by the
Constitution.
The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be
said to have deprived petitioner and the other members of Congress of their
congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules under attack, the decisions and
nal report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint session of
both Houses of Congress, voting separately (See Sections 19, 23, 24 and 27 of the Rules).
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2018 cdasiaonline.com
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED . No costs.
SO ORDERED.
(As above-worded, the foregoing Resolution was approved unanimously, 14 to 0, by
the Court. In addition, individual opinions, copies of which are attached hereto, were written
by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.; Justice Reynato S. Puno, joined by Justices Angelina
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. who concurs in a Separate Opinion, and
Adolfo S. Azcuna; Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing; Justice Conchita Carpio-Morales;
Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. and Justice Dante O. Tinga.) DHATcE
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

Clerk of Court
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR. , C.J.:
In his petition for prohibition and mandamus led on 2 June 2004, Ruy Elias C.
Lopez, Representative representing the 3rd Legislative District of the City of Davao, asks
this Court to declare unconstitutional the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May
10, 2004 Elections (hereafter, Canvassing Rules), which the Senate and the House of
Representatives, in joint session, approved, after much debate, on 28 May 2004.
Petitioner alleges that the Canvassing Rules was adopted by both Houses of
Congress with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
that he had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy other than this petition. He
requests the Court to issue a temporary restraining order directing Respondents to cease
and desist from implementing, executing, and/or enforcing the Canvassing Rules.
In the resolution of 4 June 2004, the Court, by a unanimous vote, denied the
application for a temporary restraining order, and by a vote of 9-4 required Respondents
and the Solicitor General to comment on the petition by 12 noon on Monday, 7 June 2004.
The Senate, the House of Representatives and the O ce of the Solicitor General
seasonably filed their separate comments.
The prefatory statement of petitioner summarizes the main arguments found
throughout his petition:
Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed
among three (3) independent branches of government. The very important and
delicate power and authority to open all certi cates of canvass of votes for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates are solely and
exclusively vested by the Constitution in the President of the Senate, just as the
very important and delicate power and authority to determine the authenticity and
due executions (sic) of all certi cates of canvass and to canvass the votes cast
for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates are solely and exclusively vested
by the Constitution in the Congress as one whole body ." Any attempt to delegate
these powers or a portion thereof to any other person or entity — whether within or
without the Congress — is unconstitutional on the principle that potestas delegata
non potest delegari. 1
Petitioner thus contends that the Canvassing Rules are unconstitutional because: 1)
It constitutes a delegation of legislative power to a Joint Committee of Congress; 2) It
constitutes an amendment of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; 3) It deprives him of
his rights and prerogatives as a Member of Congress; and 4) By the passage of the
Canvassing Rules, Congress has neglected to perform an act which the Constitution
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office.
The arguments of respondents, the Solicitor General, the Senate, and the House of
Representatives, are similar in that they agree that the adoption of the Canvassing Rules
are internal matters of Congress which is beyond this Court's scope of judicial inquiry.
They are likewise unanimous in their argument that there has been no invalid delegation to
the Joint Committee of the Constitutional duties of Congress.
This Court's jurisdiction over the issue raised in this case is founded on Section 1 of
Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that judicial power includes the duty "to
determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government". This
duty does not do away with the "political question" doctrine. It only clari es it by limiting it
to its de nition laid down in Tañada v. Cuenco . 2 That case de nes political questions as
those "which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government." The clari cation became necessary
because prior to the 1987 Constitution, as long as an act or measure was invoked as
involving a political question, the courts a rmed such invocation rather than risk the
separation of powers. The result, then, was that the legality of an act or measure was
likewise left to the political branch in question. 3
Thus, now plainly stated in the 1987 Constitution, the mere invocation of a political
question does not warrant an immediate or summary dismissal of a case. It falls, as it
always has, within judicial power to determine for itself whether the legality and the limits
of the exercise of a power have been observed and respected.
The contested provisions of the Canvassing Rules pertain to the functions of the
Joint Committee, as follows:
SEC. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created composed of eleven (11)
members from the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate and
eleven (11) members from the House of Representatives to be appointed by the
Speaker. The Members of Each House panel shall elect from among themselves
their respective Chairman in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee may sit en
banc or, in its discretion, in two division of eleven (11) members each composed
of a chairman, ve (5) members from the Senate and ve (5) members from the
House of Representatives: Provided, That a member of Congress who is a
candidate for President or Vice-President shall not be eligible for appointment to
the Joint Committee. Each division shall be chaired by a Chairman of the Joint
Committee.
The Joint Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certi cates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the votes of
candidates for the offices of the President and Vice-President.

The Representatives of the province or city whose certi cate of canvass is
being canvassed shall be an ex o cio member of the Joint Committee, without
voting rights, for the duration of the canvassing of the aforesaid certi cate of
canvass.
It is petitioner's position that the formation of a Joint Committee, which determines

the authenticity and due execution of the certi cate of canvass of the Presidential and
Vice-Presidential candidates and thereafter canvasses the votes, is a transfer or surrender
to an entity of a duty imposed by the Constitution exclusively upon Congress as a whole
body — that is, "in joint public session assembled." 4 Accordingly, petitioner claims that
such transfer violates the principle that a delegated power cannot again be delegated, 5
potestas delegata non delegari potest.
The source of the duty of Congress to act as the National Board of Canvassers for
the o ce of the President and Vice-President is in paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides:
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certi ed
by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certi cates
of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the
day of the election, open all certi cates in the presence of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes. caTESD
It is true that where the Constitution has vested powers in a branch of government
there can be no further delegation of such authority by that branch to any other body.
Originating from the law on agency, the principle has evolved in Constitutional law as a
natural corollary to the separation of governmental powers. 6 Thus, the foundation of the
principle of potestas delegata non delegari potest in Constitutional law lies in the
sovereignty that resides in the people from which all governmental authority emanates. 7 It
is invoked as a prohibition against the three major branches of government — the
executive, legislative, or the judiciary — from transferring the powers and duties conferred
by the people upon it to another branch; neither does it allow any branch to invest in itself
or its members the powers and duties belonging to another. 8
Moreover, there is no distinction as to what kind of power is delegated by the
Constitution. Although the three branches of government each have its general functions in
accordance with the principle of separation of powers, the system of checks and balances
imposes upon each branch — or its members — powers outside of its usual functions. 9
Thus, even when the legislature is performing a non-legislative act as a National Board of
Canvassers, its inability to delegate such function to another branch of government
remains intact.
In this context, the principle does not apply in this case insofar as no other branch of
government has been tasked with the duties of Congress as a National Board of
Canvassers.
As to whether there has been are invalid delegation of power "within" Congress, such
argument, and the basis of petitioner's discussion, is an imprudent one. From a cursory
reading of the Canvassing Rules, it can readily be seen that there has been no delegation or
abdication of any Constitutional authority, even within Congress itself. Key provisions
throughout the Canvassing Rules reveal the nature of the Joint Committee and its relation
to the duties of Congress, whether referring to the determination of the authenticity and
due execution of the certi cates of canvass or the canvassing of the votes itself. Some of
these provisions, however, are conveniently omitted by petitioner in his arguments. For
one, Section 19 thereof provides: SCEDaT
Sec. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in divisions, shall decide
any question involving the Certi cate of Canvass by a majority vote of its
Members, each House panel voting separately. Any such decision shall be subject
to approval by the joint session, the Senate and House of Representatives voting
separately. In case the two Houses disagree, the decision of the President of the
Senate, in consultation with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
prevail." [Emphasis supplied]
As to the canvassing of votes, paragraph 2, of Sec. 13, provides that "[t]he Joint
Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
certi cates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the votes of candidates for the o ces of
President and Vice-President." And again, in Sec. 23, the nal report of the Joint
Committee "shall be submitted by the Joint Committee en banc to the joint public
session for its approval, each House voting separately."
Further, in Section 27, we find that:
Upon termination of the canvass and approval of the Joint Committee
report and the accompanying resolution by majority of all the Members of both.
Houses voting separately in the joint public session, Congress through the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
forthwith proclaim the President-elect and the Vice-President-elect. [Emphasis
supplied]
Since the Canvassing Rules subjects the acts of the Joint Committee to the
a rmation of Congress, the Committee's report is preliminary and recommendatory in
nature.
The Canvassing Rules leaves to both Houses of Congress, as an entire body, the
nal act of determining the authenticity in the manner provided by law, and due execution
of the certi cates of canvass, and the proclamation of the President-elect and Vice-
President-elect.
Anent to his argument that the Canvassing Rules is an unlawful delegation of power,
petitioner claims that the creation of the Joint Committee deprives him of his rights and
prerogatives as a member of Congress to be present during the canvassing of genuine
certi cates of canvass, and to participate in its deliberations. He argues that by excluding
him from the proceedings, the Canvassing Rules likewise deprives his constituents — the
sovereign people — of representation and a voice in the affairs of government.
Unfortunately, petitioner once again relies on his misreading of the Canvassing
Rules. The fact that the ndings of the Joint Committee are subject to a nal act of
Congress, then, by casting his vote and declaring his approval or disapproval of the nal
report, petitioner exercises his prerogatives as a Member of Congress. By claiming a
sovereign duty to be present in all stages of the proceedings, petitioner confuses his
rights as a Member of the Congress with the powers given to Congress itself.
Under the Constitution, it is Congress that, in accordance with the law and its rules,
canvasses the certi cates of canvass certi ed by the Boards of Canvassers of provinces
and cities after determining their authenticity and due execution in the manner provided by
law. Being a member of Congress, his participation is likewise determined by the internal
rules of congressional proceedings, and, in general, is determined by his vote. The quality
of his participation is determined by such means as Congress deems t to ensure the use
of discretion when his vote is cast.
As for the Canvassing Rules itself, petitioner's third argument is that Congress
amends the Constitution by investing itself with powers beyond what was granted therein.
He cites the three constitutional functions of Congress as a National Board of Canvassers:
1) the opening by the President of the Senate of all the certi cates of canvass in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives in joint public session; 2) the
determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certi cates of canvass; and 3)
the canvassing of votes based on said certi cates. It is his observation that with the
enumeration of these three duties, the Constitutional mandate is speci c, thereby
foreclosing the need for implementing or procedural rules. The argument is bereft of merit.
DCcHIS
The authority of Congress to adopt its own rules of procedure under par. (3), Sec.
16, Art. VI 10 is a right that has been recognized to apply regardless of whether Congress
is exercising its legislative power or its other duties, such as in this case when it acts as
the National Board of Canvassers. 11
Here, apart from the general authority of Congress to promulgate its internal rules,
the Constitution itself speci cally leaves it to Congress to determine the conditions and
procedures of ful lling its duty as a National Board of Canvassers. The sixth paragraph of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, plainly and clearly states: "The Congress shall
promulgate its rules for the canvassing of certificates. "
The reason for the insertion of this provision, and its relation to the determination of
the authenticity and due execution of the certi cates of canvass, was likewise explained
during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission.
MR. DAVIDE:
On page 2, between lines 22 and 23, I propose to insert a new paragraph to read
as follows: CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE
CANVASSING OF THE CERTIFICATES.
MR. SUMULONG:
Will Commissioner Davide repeat the proposed amendment?
MR. DAVIDE:
CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE CANVASS OF THE

CERTIFICATES.
THE PRESIDENT:
Is this accepted by the Committee?

MR. REGALADO:
For the bene t of the other Commissioners, will Commissioner Davide explain
this proposal?
MR. DAVIDE:
This is necessary in order that Congress will have the authority now to
promulgate the necessary rules for the canvassing of the certi cates of
canvass for the Offices of the President and the Vice-President.
MR. REGALADO:
How will that tie up with line 16 regarding the determination of the authenticity
and due execution of the certi cates of canvass in the manner provided by
law?
MR. DAVIDE:
That is entirely a different matter, Madam President, because it would relate to
the rules concerning the determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof, whereas the other one would be the rules of procedure.
12 [Emphasis supplied]
As regards the determination of authenticity and due execution of the certi cates of
canvass, the scope of the duty of Congress is to be de ned by a law to be enacted by it.
This was made clear during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explaining
the inclusion of this provision in the 1987 Constitution, thus:
MR. MAAMBONG. . . . The Committee had to insert the phrase "in the
manner provided by law" so that the legislature itself will nd out and will make it
very speci c as to what aws or de ciencies in the certi cates of canvass can be
taken cognizance of by the canvassing board of tellers, because as of now the
guiding regulations that govern the National Assembly, as I mentioned in the
Committee, are: the rules and regulations of the COMELEC, the Omnibus Election
Code, the jurisprudence from the decisions of the Supreme Court. All these things
taken together, the legislature is given a notice by using the phrase "in the manner
provided by law," so that it will make a determination now of what are the points
which the board of tellers can take cognizance of, because it is not very clear right
now under the laws and regulations, and as a matter of fact, that was one of the
controversies which arose during the canvassing of the votes of President Aquino
and former President Marcos in the last Batasan. 13 [Emphasis supplied]
The law referred to is R.A. No. 7166, 14 which was enacted on 26 November 1991.
Section 30 thereof provides the aws over which Congress would take cognizance, as well
as the manner by which it would do so, thus:
Sec. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the
Election of President and Vice-President: Determination of Authenticity
and Due Execution of Certi cates of Canvass . — Congress shall determine
the authenticity and due execution of the certi cate of canvass for President and
Vice-President as accomplished and transmitted to it by the local boards of
canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each certi cate of canvass was executed,
signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the board of
canvassers and transmitted or caused to be transmitted to Congress by them; (2)
each certi cate of canvass contains the names of all of the candidates for
President and Vice-President and their corresponding votes in words and in
gures; and (3) there exists no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the
certi cate of canvass or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and
figures in the certificate.
TcaAID
When the certi cate of canvass, duly certi ed by the board of canvassers
of each province, city or district, appears to be incomplete, the Senate President
shall require the board of canvassers concerned to transmit by personal delivery,
the election returns from polling places that were not included in the certi cate of
canvass and supporting statements. Said election returns shall be submitted by
personal delivery within two (2) days from receipt of notice.
When it appears that any certi cate of canvass or supporting statement of

votes by precinct bears erasures or alterations which may cast doubt as to the
veracity of the number of votes stated therein and may affect the result of the
election, upon request of the Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate concerned
or his party, Congress shall, for the sole purpose of verifying the actual number of
votes cast for President and Vice-President, count the votes as they appear in the
copies of the election returns submitted to it.
Contrary to petitioner's argument, therefore, whether Congress deems it t to

require its entire membership to examine each certi cate of canvass, raise their
comments and objections thereto, or engage in parliamentary debate before reaching its
conclusions, or else leave preliminary matters to be discussed and argued according to
different rules, must be left to the wisdom of Congress. So long as the ultimate power to
canvass remains lodged in the body tasked to perform it, congressional rules adopted to
address matters of expediency or the orderly conduct of proceedings is precisely the
purpose of such rules. 15
Congress remains the body exercising its canvassing duties, and delegating
preliminary determinations to expedite proceedings. Where the rules of Congress have
thus been passed within the limits of constitutional and legal boundaries, everything else
remains internal and procedural, and to which petitioner is bound. As procedural rules, "
[t]hey may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, mere failure to
conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body)
when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure. 16
In claiming that the creation of a Joint Committee is an unlawful delegation of
authority, petitioner asserts that the determination of the authenticity and due execution of
certi cates is a function that requires the exercise of discretion on the part of the
individual members of Congress. He implies that a ministerial function can be delegated
whereas the determination of the authenticity and due execution, being more than
ministerial, cannot. The distinction is facetious since petitioner argues throughout his
petition that none of the duties of Congress under par. 4, Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution
can be delegated "whether within or without" Congress.
On the contrary, respondents argue extensively that the nature of canvassing, as well
as determining the authenticity and due execution of the certi cates of canvass, are
ministerial functions, which can be delegated in any case.
The difference between a ministerial and discretionary function was amply cited in
the Comment of Respondent Senate:
Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right
conferred upon them by law of acting o cially, under certain circumstances,
according to the dictates of their judgments and consciences, uncontrolled by the
judgments or consciences of others. A purely ministerial act of duty, in
contradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an o cer or tribunal performs
in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public
officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed,
such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when
the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of o cial discretion nor
judgment." 17
Referring, once again, to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission: SHEIDC
MR. NOLLEDO:
I am referring to the use of the words "upon determination of the authenticity and
due execution thereof" on lines 7 and 8, page 2, referring to the certi cates
of canvass of the President and Vice-President. Am I right if I say that
because of the use of these words, the duty of the legislature to canvass is
no longer ministerial?
MR. MAAMBONG:
Madam President, the word "ministerial" has always been interpreted by the
Supreme Court as applicable to the canvass made by the National
Assembly, and the reason why we did not put the word "ministerial" in the
Article is, it has been understood in the case of Lopez v. Roxas and in other
cases. When we used the words "authenticity" and "genuineness," the
question refers to the problem of whether or not the ministerial function is
already nonministerial. The answer is, it is still ministerial but when we say
"authenticity and "due execution," what it really means is that the National
Assembly will look at the certificates of canvass and find out from the face
of the document whether there are aws in the execution and authenticity
of the document. That is what it means.
MR. NOLLEDO:
Madam President, in the event that the legislature nds out that there are serious
defects in the certi cates of canvass — as when the seals are broken, there
are a lot of erasures and then many of them are unsigned and, therefore,
authenticity appears to be questionable — what will happen?
MR. REGALADO:
The answer to that is in the phrase "in the manner provided by law. . . ." 18
[Emphasis supplied] TIcAaH
Indeed, the inclusion in the 1987 Constitution of the duty of Congress to be the
National Board of Canvassers for the election of the President and the Vice President
meant that Congress was to have expanded powers. These expanded powers did not
necessarily mean that the nature of the power changed from a ministerial to a
discretionary one. However, nor can the power of Congress to determine authenticity and
due execution of the canvass of votes be deemed purely ministerial, as whether there has
been tampering or not, or, as according to Sec. 30 of R.A. No. 7166, or determining when
there is 'doubt' requires some degree of discretion.
The distinction made in Lopez v. Roxas 19 was a distinction made between the
duties of Congress and that of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the latter charged with
judging all contests relating to the election, returns, and quali cations of the Presidential
and Vice-Presidential candidates, under Section 1, R.A. No. 1793:
Needless to say, the power of congress to declare who, among the
candidates for President and/or Vice-President, has obtained the largest number
of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not inconsistent with the
jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral Tribunal by Republic Act No. 1793.
Congress merely acts as a national board of canvassers, charged with the
ministerial and executive duty to make said declaration, on the basis of the
election returns duly certi ed by provincial and city boards of canvassers. Upon
the other hand, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal has the judicial power to
determine whether or not said duly certi ed election returns have been irregularly
made or tampered with, or re ect the true result of the elections in the areas
covered by each, and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and, incidentally thereto,
pass upon the validity of each ballot or determine whether the same shall be
counted, and, in the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has power to do."
20
Thus, while petitioner correctly maintains that the 1987 Constitution sought to
expand the power of Congress by requiring it to determine the genuineness of the
certi cates of canvass, the act of discretion was done upon determining the rules of
authenticity and due execution. That accomplished, the National Board of Canvassers
could only act within the parameters and according to the criteria speci cally provided by
the law.
Nevertheless, even if, for purposes of argument, the determination of the
authenticity and due execution of the certi cates of canvass were more than a ministerial
function, the Canvassing Rules, as discussed earlier, does not delegate nor abdicate such
determination to the Joint Committee, nor for that matter any of the other duties Congress
prescribed under Sec. 4, Art. VII. Therefore, discussion on the accusation against Congress
regarding its neglect of duty because of the adoption of its Canvassing Rules would now
be superfluous.
What remains for petitioner, as a member of Congress and a representative of his
constituents, is in the opportunities to make the informed judgments provided by the
Canvassing Rules itself. The Canvassing Rules provides safeguards, which would enable
petitioner to responsibly perform his individual duty as a Member of Congress and
properly represent the interests of his constituents. A declaration of yea and nay or the
raising of hand to express protest or approval is a diminished prerogative only when it is
not exercised with the full weight of the trust of the people and the powers of reason and
conscience. aTcIAS
Finally, the challenged Canvassing Rules is similar, for the most part, to the
Canvassing Rules for the Presidential and Vice Presidential Election of 1998. 21 That
canvassing Rules was unanimously approved by the Senate and the House of
Representatives at its joint session. In attendance at that session were Senators, same of
whom are now incumbent Senators Edgardo Angara, Gregorio Honasan, Sergio Osmeña III
and Vicente Sotto III, 22 and opposition Representatives Bella or Angara-Castillo, Didagen
Dilangalen and Rolando Zamora, among others. 23 Indeed, I cannot understand why an
almost the same Rules is now assailed on constitutional grounds. I cannot likewise
understand why Congress should promulgate separate Canvassing Rules for every
Presidential elections. It should have promulgated one set of Canvassing Rules for all such
elections, thereby ensuring stability and avoiding delays and confusion in future
Presidential elections.
WHEREFORE , I vote to dismiss the petition for its utter failure to show that the
Rules of the Joint Public Session on Congress on Canvassing the Votes for Presidential
and Vice Presidential abuse of discretion by both the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint session.
PUNO , J.:
The facts are sparse but su cient. We held our national election last May 10, 2004.
The candidates for President were President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, actor Fernando
Poe, Jr., Senator Pan lo Lacson, former Secretary of Education Raul Roco, and religious
leader Bishop Eddie Villanueva. The candidates for Vice-President were Senator Noli de
Castro, Senator Loren Legarda, former Congressman Herminio Aquino and Mr. Rodolfo
Pajo.
Congress thereafter convened itself in joint session to canvass the results of the
Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections. It approved the Rules of the Joint Public
Session of Congress on Canvassing Votes for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections. ETAICc
On May 2, 2004, petitioner, a member of the House of Representatives representing

the 3rd Legislative District of the City of Davao, led the instant petition for prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for issuance of a status quo ante order, temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction. He assailed said Rules as constitutionally in rmed
allegedly because they: (1) constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
to a Joint Committee of Congress; (2) constitute an unconstitutional amendment of Article
VII, Section 4 of the Constitution; (3) constitute an unconstitutional deprivation and
derogation of his rights and prerogatives as a member of the House of Representatives;
and (4) by the passage of the Rules, Congress has unlawfully neglected the performance
of an act which the Constitution specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office.
In their respective Comments, public respondents defended the validity of their act.
The Senate, represented by the President of the Senate, Honorable Franklin M. Drilon,
submits that the Legislature's formulation and implementation of its own rules affecting
its internal operation are beyond the ambit of judicial scrutiny. And, contrary to petitioner's
contention, the Rules are in complete accord with the Constitution as they do not remove
from Congress the power to determine the authenticity and due execution of the
certi cates of canvass and to canvass the votes of the candidates for President and Vice-
President, which power is still reposed in Congress as a whole, nor do they curtail the
rights and prerogatives of any member of Congress to participate in the canvassing.
Neither does the creation of the Joint Committee constitute an undue delegation of a
legislative function since the canvassing of votes is not an exercise of the legislative
function of Congress. In ne, the Senate President believes that the instant petition is a
mere disguised attempt to change the rules and delay the canvassing of votes. CaTcSA
Respondent House of Representatives, through the Speaker of the House of

Representatives, Honorable Jose C. De Venecia, maintains that the constitutional grant of
the power to canvass the votes for the President and the Vice-President and the
corresponding mandate to formulate its own rules of procedure authorize Congress which
has the sole discretion to create a Joint Committee to preliminarily canvass the votes to
expedite the proceedings. Similarly, the Speaker is of the view that the creation of the Joint
Committee is not violative of the well-known maxim delegata potestas non delegari 1
which nds application only when what is delegated is legislative power, and not an
electoral function such as canvassing of votes.
The Solicitor General argues that the constitutionality of the act of Congress in
assigning the preliminary canvassing of votes for President and Vice-President is a
political question. It is Congress, and not the Judiciary, which gets to decide what
procedures are proper in this circumstance. And, while the Constitution assigns to
Congress the power to canvass the votes, it does not mean that the whole Congress, as a
body, should actually canvass the votes. Congress has the discretion to follow its previous
practice of using a joint committee to canvass the certi cates of canvass and does not
abdicate its power because the Joint Committee, apart from being a part thereof, will just
come out with a nal report which will be submitted to the whole Congress, in joint public
session, for approval. Finally, there is no delegation of legislative power since delegation of
legislative power applies only when there is transfer of power from one department of
government to the other departments. In this case, Congress did not delegate its power to
the Executive or Judicial department.
In short, the petition poses two hinge issues: (1) whether it hoists a political
question over which the Court has no jurisdiction; and (2) assuming the issue raised is
justiciable, whether the Rules violate Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution.
Let us keep a full eye on the Rules. The pertinent parts provide:
RULE VIII
JOINT COMMITTEE
SEC. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created composed of eleven (11)

Speaker. The Members of each House panel shall elect from among themselves
their respective Chairman in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee may sit en
banc or, in its discretion, in two divisions of eleven (11) members each composed
of a chairman, ve (5) members from the Senate and ve (5) members from the
House of Representatives: Provided, That a Member of Congress who is a
candidate for President or Vice-President shall not be eligible for appointment to
the Joint Committee. Each division shall be chaired by a Chairman of the Joint
Committee.
candidates for the offices of President and Vice-President.
The Representative of the province or city whose certi cate of canvass is

being canvassed shall be an ex o cio member of the Joint Committee, without
canvass.
SEC. 14. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions, shall satisfy itself
that each certi cate of canvass was duly executed, signed and thumb marked by
the Chairman and Members of the provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers
concerned; that it contains the names of all the candidates for President and Vice-
President and their corresponding votes in words and in gures; and there exists
no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certi cate of canvass or
discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and gures in the same
certificate. TIcAaH
SEC. 15. When the certi cate of canvass, duly certi ed by the Board of
Canvassers of each province, city or district, appears to be incomplete, the Senate
President shall require the Board of Canvassers concerned to transmit by
personal delivery, the election returns from polling places that were not included
in the certi cate of canvass and supporting documents. Said election returns
shall be submitted by personal delivery within two (2) days from receipt of notice.
SEC. 16. In case of omission in the certi cate of canvass of the name of
any candidate and/or the votes obtained by any candidate, the President of the
Senate shall summon, in the most expeditious manner, the provincial, city or
district Board of Canvassers concerned to supply the missing data in the
certi cate of canvass and to authenticate the same by a xing their signatures
thereon.
SEC. 17. When it appears that any certi cate of canvass or supporting
statement of votes by precinct bears erasures or alterations which may cast
doubt as to the veracity of the number of votes stated therein and may affect the
result of the election, upon request of the Presidential or Vice-Presidential
candidate concerned or his party, Congress shall, for the sole purpose of verifying
the actual number of votes cast for President and Vice-President, count the votes
as they appear in the copies of the election returns submitted to it.
SEC. 18. In case the copy of the certi cate of canvass for Congress is
delayed, the President of the Senate shall obtain said delayed certi cate of
canvass from the provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers concerned within
a period of two days. In case the certificate of canvass has been lost, destroyed or
is otherwise unavailable, the Joint Committee shall immediately request the
Commission on Elections for its authentic copy of said certificate of canvass.
SEC. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in divisions, shall decide
any question involving the certi cate of canvass by a majority vote of its
Members, each House panel voting separately. Any such decision shall be subject
to approval by the joint session, the Senate and House of Representatives voting
separately. In case the two Houses disagree, the decision of the President of the
Senate, in consultation within the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall
prevail.
SEC. 20. The Joint Committee en banc or in divisions, may, by a majority
vote of its Members each House panel voting separately, punish for contempt any
person who commits disorderly behavior during its session. Any member of the
provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers who refuses without reasonable
cause to obey any order issued by the President of the Senate as provided in
Sections 15, 16, 18 and 21 hereof, may likewise be punished for contempt by the
joint public session upon recommendation of the Senate President.
SEC. 21. The chairmen of the Joint Committee shall request from the
Commission on Elections technical assistance for purposes of the canvassing of
votes. A list of the names, specimen signatures and thumb marks of the chairmen
and members of the provincial, city and district Boards of Canvassers shall be
obtained from the Commission on Elections for the determination of the
authenticity and due execution of certi cates of canvass. When there is any
doubt regarding the authenticity and due execution of the certi cate of canvass,
the Joint Committee, en banc or any of its divisions, may require the personal
appearance of the chairmen and members of the provincial, city of district Board
of Canvassers concerned.
SEC. 22. The Joint Committee en banc shall tabulate the votes and, for this
purpose, may avail of the services of an independent accounting/auditing rm to
assist in the tabulation and canvass of votes.
After the certi cates of canvass and the statement of votes have been
tabulated, any Member of Congress may request in writing for copies thereof
from the Secretariat prior to the consideration of any interim or nal report to the
joint session. TSaEcH
SEC. 23. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions, shall meet eight (8)
hours a day from Monday to Friday until all the certi cates of canvass referred to
it by the joint public session shall have been canvassed. The nal report shall be
submitted by the Joint Committee en banc to the joint public session for its
approval, each House voting separately.
RULE IX
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE

SEC. 24. Notwithstanding the fact that not all certi cates of canvass have
been received, the Joint Committee may submit to the joint public session its nal
report with the recommendation to terminate the canvass if the total number of
registered voters corresponding to the province, city or district covered by the
certi cates of canvass not yet transmitted would no longer affect the result of the
election. Congress in joint public session, voting separately, shall immediately act
on the final report.
The Joint Committee may, in its discretion, submit interim report to the
joint public session whenever there is a need for guidance or direction from
Congress. Provided, That objections raised and rulings made therein shall no
longer be included in the final report.
SEC. 25. At least a majority of the Members from each House panel shall
sign the nal report of the Joint Committee. Every Member shall be provided with
a copy of the nal report and shall be given twenty-four (24) hours within which
to submit his concurring or dissenting opinion.
SEC. 26. During the joint public session, the Member designated by the
Joint Committee shall speak for not more than one hour on the report and the
accompanying resolution approving the report of the Joint Committee, declaring
the results of the canvass and proclaiming the President-elect and Vice-President-
elect. The Member designated by those against the report shall also speak for not
more than one hour. Subsequent speakers for or against the resolution shall be
allowed to speak for not more than three hours; Provided, That one (1) speaker for
each candidate shall be given the opportunity to speak for not more than twenty
minutes.
RULE X
PROCLAMATION
SEC. 27. Upon termination of the canvass and approval of the Joint
Committee report and the accompanying resolution by majority of all the
Members of both Houses voting separately in the joint public session, Congress
through the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall forthwith proclaim the President-elect and Vice-President-
elect.
I respectfully make the following submissions:
I
The petition poses a justiciable issue
over which this Court has jurisdiction.
The rst issue is whether the petition involves a political question, hence, this Court
is bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of it. This is not the rst time, and it will not be
last, when the Court will wrestle with the political question defense. As early as 1957, in the
landmark case of Tañada v. Cuenco , 2 this Court has held that political question
connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, a question of policy. It refers to "those
questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom not legality of a particular measure." For this reason ". . . courts will not
normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a
clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution." 3 We have a
continuous river of rulings that the political question doctrine cannot be invoked when the
issue is whether an executive act or a law violates the Constitution. 4 Thus, in Tatad v.
Secretary of the Department of Energy , 5 we emphatically explained that "the principle
of separation of powers mandates that challenges on the constitutionality of a law should
be resolved in our courts of justice while doubts on the wisdom of a law should be
debated in the halls of Congress." IaDcTC
When the Constitution is violated, even an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of
government has to be struck down. Our government operates both under the principle of
separation of powers and the principle of checks and balances. In less esoteric terms, this
means that our three branches of government, vis-à-vis each other, follow the rule of
trust the two but trust no one absolutely . Thus, in Arroyo v. de Venecia , 6 this Court,
citing U.S. v. Ballin, Joseph & Co. , 7 and speaking thru Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,
held that "[t]he Constitution empowers each house to determine its proceedings. It may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established
by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained." In the recent case of Francisco,
Jr. v. The House of Representatives, et al. , 8 promulgated on November 10, 2003, it
was also pointed out, viz.:
To be sure, the force to impugn the jurisdiction of this Court becomes more
feeble in light of the new Constitution which expanded the de nition of
judicial power as including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." As well observed by retired Justice Isagani
Cruz, this expanded de nition of judicial power considerably constricted the
scope of political question. He opined that the language luminously suggests that
this duty (and power) is available even against the executive and legislative
departments including the President and the Congress, in the exercise of their
discretionary powers.
We shall not be breaking grounds in striking down an act of a co-equal
branch of government or an act of an independent agency of government done in
grave abuse of discretion. Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides,
inter alia, that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) shall be the
"sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns, and quali cations of
the members of the House. In Bondoc v. Pineda, et al. this Court declared null
and void the Resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election of Congressman Camasura as a member
of the HRET. His expulsion from the HRET by the House of Representatives was
held not to be for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the
tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the
HRET's decision in his favor. This Court found that the House of Representatives
acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura. Its
action was adjudged to be violative of the constitutional mandate which created
the HRET to be the "sole judge" of the election contest between Bondoc and
Pineda. We held that a showing that plenary power is granted either department
of government is not an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise
or the abuse thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a
constitutional grant of authority is not unusually unrestricted, limitations being
provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be accomplished,
necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether
the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental
law. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political."
We further explained that the power and duty of courts to nullify, in
appropriate cases the actions of the executive and legislative branches does not
mean that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It does
mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into
the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a
justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been
aggrieved or prejudiced by such action. It is "a plain exercise of judicial power, the
power vested in courts to enable them to administer justice according to law. . . . It
is simply a necessary concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a case or
controversy properly before the court, to the determination of which must be
brought the test and measure of the law."
I n Angara v. Electoral Commission , we also ruled that the Electoral
Commission, a constitutional organ created for the speci c purpose of
determining contests relating to election returns and quali cations of members of
the National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while
acting within the limits of authority, but this Court has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and
extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests
relating to the election and quali cations of the members of the National
Assembly.
Similarly, in Arroyo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

(HRET) and Augusto Syjuco , we nulli ed the HRET's decision declaring private
respondent Syjuco as the duly elected Congressman of Makati for having been
rendered in persistent and deliberate violation of the Tribunal's own governing
rules and the rules of evidence.
To be sure, this Court has reviewed not just acts of the HRET but also of
the House of Representatives itself. We passed upon the issue of whether the
procedure for passing a law provided by the Constitution was followed by the
House of Representatives and the Senate in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, et al. involving R.A. No. 7716 or the VAT law. We ruled that the VAT
law satis ed the constitutional provision requiring that all appropriation, revenue
and tariff bills originate from the House of Representatives under Article VI,
Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution. We also interpreted the constitutional
provision requiring the reading of a bill on three separate days "except when the
President certi es to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." and held that
this requirement was satis ed when the bill which became R.A. No. 7716
underwent three readings on the same day as the President certi ed the bill as
urgent. Finally, we interpreted the Rules of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and held that there was nothing irregular about the conference
committee including in its report an entirely new provision not found either in the
House bill or in the Senate bill as this was in accordance with the said Rules. TADCSE
The recent case of Macalintal v. COMELEC on absentee voting a rmed

the jurisdiction of this Court to review the acts of the legislature. In said case, the
Court settled the question of propriety of the petition which appeared to be visited
by the vice of prematurity as there were no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal,
board or before a government o cial exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions as required by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court
considered the importance of the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner,
and quoted Tañada v. Angara stating that "where an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute." (citations
omitted) HSaIET
This line of thought enjoys the unanimous view of the Court. It is therefore futile to
contend that this Court has no jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the ground that it
poses a political question. The petition assails the creation by Congress of a Joint
Committee for the purpose of determining the authenticity and due execution of the
certi cates of canvass appertaining to the positions of President and Vice-President in
our last May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner contends that the creation violates Article
VII, Section 4 of the Constitution under which it is alleged that only Congress, in joint
public session, can exercise the said power. Petitioner also argues that the creation of
the Joint Committee deprives him of his constitutional right to participate in the
canvass of the results of the last Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections. The
issue raised by petitioner calls for the proper interpretation of Article VII,
Section 4 of the Constitution vis-à-vis the Rules of the Joint Public Session of
Congress or Canvassing the Votes Cast for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential
Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections. Since time immemorial, the jurisdiction of
this Court to interpret the Constitution has never been successfully ayed. Indeed, this
authority has been broadened by the expanded de nition of judicial power in the 1987
Constitution. In expanding the judicial power of this Court, we said that "[t]o a great
degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine
when it expanded the power of judicial review of this Court not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government." 9
We even held that the Constitution "did not just grant the Court the power of doing
nothing." 10 Stubborn thoughts that still insist this Court has no jurisdiction on issues
that involve the interpretation of the Constitution should now be consigned to the
museum of memories.
II
Creation of Canvassing Committee constitutes
no grave abuse of discretion.
The next issue is whether the creation of a Joint Committee on Canvassing
constitutes grave abuse of discretion for being violative of Article VII, Section 4 of the
Constitution which relevantly states:
xxx xxx xxx
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and
Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certi ed
by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certi cates
of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the
day of the election, open all the certi cates in the presence of the Senate and the
House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed
elected, but in case of two or more shall have an equal and highest number of
votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates:
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner also contends that the Rules deprived him of his rights and prerogatives as a
member of Congress. STcHDC
The nature of the work of the Joint Committee deserves minute examination. The
purpose of the Joint Committee is spelled out in no uncertain terms in Rule VIII, Section 13,
viz.: "The Joint Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution
of the certi cates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the votes of candidates for the
o ces of the President and Vice-President." The key word is "preliminarily" which
means its work is preparatory , 11 a mere prelude . The preliminary work is performed by
the Joint Committee by satisfying itself — (1) that each certi cate of canvass was duly
executed, signed and thumb marked by the Chairman and Members of the provincial, city
or district Board of Canvassers concerned; (2) that it contains the names of all the
candidates for President and Vice-President and their corresponding votes in words and
gures; and (3) that there exists no discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certi cate
of canvass or discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and gures in the same
certificate. 12
Provisions were then crafted to deal with certain concrete problems . Rule VIII,
Section 15, deals with the situation when the certi cate of canvass, duly certi ed by the
Board of Canvassers of each province, city or district, appears to be incomplete . In this
case, the Senate President shall require the Board of Canvassers concerned to transmit
by personal delivery, the election returns from polling places that were not included in the
certi cate of canvass and supporting documents. Rule VIII, Section 16, applies when there
is an omission in the certi cate of canvass of the name of any candidate and/or the votes
obtained by any candidate. In this case, the President of the Senate is mandated by the
rule to summon, in the most expeditious manner, the provincial, city or district Board of
Canvassers concerned to supply the missing data in the certi cate of canvass and to
authenticate the same by a xing their signatures thereon. Rule VIII, Section 17, is apt
when it appears that any certi cate of canvass or supporting statement of votes by
precinct bears erasures or alterations which may cast doubt as to the veracity or
authenticity of the number of votes stated therein and may affect the result of the election.
Upon request of the Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate concerned or his party, the
rule requires Congress itself , for the sole purpose of verifying the actual number of votes
cast for President and Vice-President, to count the votes as they appear in the copies of
the election returns submitted to it. Rule VIII, Section 18, deals with the situation when the
transmittal of the copy of the certi cate of canvass is delayed . The rule directs the
Senate President to obtain said delayed certificate of canvass from the provincial, city or
district Board of canvassers concerned. The same Section 18 likewise addresses the
situation when the certi cate of canvass has been lost, destroyed or is otherwise
unavailable . The rule requires the Joint Committee to immediately request the
COMELEC for its authentic copy of said certificate of canvass.
The Rules give the Joint Committee the necessary powers to discharge its duty.
Rule VIII, Section 20, grants it the power of contempt . It can punish for contempt any
person who commits disorderly behavior during its session. Rule VIII, Section 21, accords
to it the right to request from the COMELEC technical assistance for purposes of the
canvassing of votes. When there is any doubt regarding the authenticity and due execution
of the certi cate of canvass, the Joint Committee, may require the personal appearance of
the chairmen and members of the provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers. Rule VIII,
Section 22, empowers the Committee to avail of the services of an independent
accounting/auditing firm to assist in the tabulation and canvass of votes.
The Rules then provide for the Report to be submitted by the Joint Committee. Two
kinds of reports can be submitted by the Committee to the joint public session: One is the
interim report which the Committee, in its discretion , may submit whenever there is a
need for guidance or direction from Congress . Second is the nal report containing
the objections raised on certain certi cates of canvass and the rulings of the Committee.
Rule IX, Section 25, requires that every member of the Committee shall be provided a copy
of the nal report and shall be given twenty-four (24) hours within which to submit his
concurring or dissenting opinion. At least a majority of the members from each House
shall sign the nal report. The nal report shall then be submitted to the joint public
session for its approval. aDATHC
Rule IX, Section 26, then provides the manner on how the nal report shall be
debated by the joint public session. Various speakers are allowed to speak for or
against the nal report during the joint public session. First, the member designated by
the Joint Committee shall speak in favor of the nal report for not more than one (1) hour.
Second, the member designated by those against shall be given the same time. Third,
subsequent speakers for or against the report shall be allowed to speak for not more
than three (3) hours. Fourth, one (1) speaker for each candidate shall be given the
opportunity to speak for not more than twenty (20) minutes. After the debates, the Joint
Committee report and the accompanying resolution have to be approved by majority
of all the members of both Houses voting separately in the joint public session .
The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall then be p ro claimed through the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
The Constitution, the Rules, as well as jurisprudence, inform us of the nature of the
work of Congress as the national canvassing board of the votes cast for the highest
elective positions in the land and how it should be discharged . They establish the
following indubitable postulates, viz.:

First. When Congress convenes in joint public session as a national canvassing
board, it is not meeting as a lawmaking body . Its function as a canvassing board is not
to make laws but to count the votes cast by the electorate for the Presidency and the Vice-
Presidency. As we succinctly held in Cordero v. Judge of First Instance of Rizal , 13
while the Board of Canvassers is made up of legislators, it does not act in its capacity as a
maker of laws but as an entirely different and distinct entity organized for a speci c
purpose. The Board of Canvassers exists for a speci c function, that is, to canvass the
result of the election as shown in the election returns and to proclaim the winning
candidates. 14 The exercise of the power of canvassing of votes is more akin to the
discharge of an administrative power.
Second. As canvassers of votes for the positions of President and Vice-President,
our lawmakers are to discharge their duties with fairness and impartiality . Canvassing
is an important part of the process of determining the choice of our sovereign people on
who ought to be our President and Vice-President, the two highest elective posts in our
country. Thus, in making the canvass, our lawmakers should act more as
representatives of the people and less as partisans of political parties . For this
reaso n, Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution did not give any
signi cance to the political a liation of the lawmakers when they are
discharging their duty as canvassers . In cadence, Rule VIII, Section 13, bars a member
of Congress who is a candidate for President or Vice-President from sitting in the Joint
Committee. Stated otherwise, lawmakers when canvassing votes, should keep their
eyes open but should shut them off to any political light . The members of city,
provincial and district boards of canvassers canvass the votes appertaining to our lesser
elective o cials yet they are enjoined to be non partisan in the discharge of their duties.
No less can be expected from members of Congress acting as the national board of
canvassers. In ne, when our legislators acting as canvassers add 1 + 1, the sum
should be 2, regardless of their political affiliation .
Third. Congress can only proclaim as President-elect and Vice-President-elect
they who, on the basis of the election documents required by law, such as the certi cates
of canvass, election returns and statements of votes, have established, at the very least, a
prima facie title to said o ces. No candidate who has failed to establish a colorable
legal title to the positions of President and Vice-President can be proclaimed and be
endowed with the awesome mandate to govern our people. Democracy disdains the rule
and reign of the unelected.
Fourth. In canvassing the votes, our lawmakers are to determine the authenticity
and due execution of the certi cates of canvass in the manner provided by law .
Republic Act No. 7166, Section 30, prescribes the manner by which certi cates of
canvass are deemed authentic and duly executed. Read as a whole, Section 30 states that
Congress must examine each certi cate of canvass not only on its face, but also vis-à-vis
the statement of votes and election returns when necessary. This law is binding on
Congress acting as a canvassing body. Rightly, the relevant provisions of R.A. No. 7166
were incorporated in the Rules.
As a canvassing body, Congress has no lawmaking power and hence cannot amend
or repeal R.A. No. 7166. It has therefore no discretion to disregard R.A. No. 7166. The
Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections have to be
read, interpreted and enforced in consonance with R.A. No. 7166.

Fifth. The determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certi cates of
canvass cannot be done in a robotic manner . R.A. No. 7166 and the Rules look upon our
lawmakers not as unthinking slot machines when conducting the canvass. For this reason,
the law and the rules require that due consideration be given not only to the certi cates
of canvass but also to the election returns and the statement of votes. In other words,
the search for the truth about the true will of the electorate should not be
con ned to the four corners of the certi cates of canvass . The truth, if blocked by
the opaque face of the certi cates of canvass, must be extracted from the election returns
and statements of votes. It is self-evident that discovering and distilling the truth of who
were really elected by our people for the positions of President and Vice-President
deserve more than a mechanical effort.
Sixth. The determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certi cates of
canvass calls for the exercise of discretion . It is self-evident that reconciling
discrepancies in the certi cates of canvass vis-à-vis, among others, the election returns
and statements of votes involves intelligent judgment . It is for this reason that in the
discharge of its functions, the Joint Committee was clothed with certain powers. It can
request technical assistance from the COMELEC. It can require the personal appearance
of the chairmen and members of the provincial, city or district Board of Canvassers. It can
avail of the services of an independent accounting or auditing rm. It has the awesome
power to punish for contempt any person who commits disorderly behavior during its
session. More importantly, the Rules require that our lawmakers decide the authenticity
and due execution of the certi cates of canvass only after a full debate by members of
Congress. In ne, determining the authenticity and due execution of certi cates of canvass
cannot be done by adding machines. cHSIAC
Seventh. The primary consideration in determining the authenticity and due

execution of the certi cates of canvass is accuracy — accuracy in determining the
sovereign will of the people. The need to fast track the determination of the will of the
people pales in comparison with this consideration. It is a travesty of democracy for the
people to be governed by people without a mandate. The nation can endure a slow but
trustworthy tally. It may not survive an indefensible count, however speedy it
may be .
Eight. The determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certi cates of
canvass is governed by a distinct process to insure that when it reaches its end, the ones
who will be proclaimed President-elect and Vice-President-elect can, at the very least, have
a colorable claim to said offices. This colorable claim can only be established after
full debate on the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass in light of
other election documents such as election returns and statements of votes and the
testimonies of the chairmen and members of the provincial, city, or district board of
canvassers, in appropriate cases. The debate contemplated is one that will elicit the
truth as to the choice of the people , hence, the Rules provide the following, viz.: (a)
each candidate is allowed two (2) watchers who shall have access to an unimpeded view
of the entire proceedings; (b) each candidate is likewise allowed lawyers who may argue
and question any certi cate of canvass; (c) upon the opening of the certi cates of
canvass, observations and objections of any member of Congress with reference to the
condition of their envelope, seal and serial number shall already be entered into the
records and shall be considered during the proceedings of the Joint Committee ;
(d) the Joint Committee is composed of eleven (11) members from the Senate to be
appointed by the President of the Senate and eleven (11) members from House of
Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker. To insulate it from partisan politics, a
member of Congress who is a candidate for President or Vice-President is barred from
appointment to the Joint Committee; (e) the Representative of the province or city whose
certi cate of canvass is being canvassed is made ex-officio member of the Joint
Committee, without voting rights, for the duration of the canvassing of the aforesaid
certi cate of canvass; (f) remedies are provided for in cases where a certi cate of
canvass is incomplete or with omissions or where it is lost destroyed or otherwise
unavailable; (g) the Joint Committee is given the authority to avail of the technical
assistance of the COMELEC and of the services of an independent accounting or auditing
rm for the proper discharge of its task; (h) after the Certi cate of Canvass and statement
of votes have been tabulated by the Committee, any member of Congress may request in
writing for copies thereof from the secretariat prior to the consideration of any interim or
nal report to the joint public session; (i) the interim and nal report shall contain the
objections raised and the rulings thereon by the Joint Committee; (j) every member of the
Joint Committee is given twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the nal report within
which to submit his concurring or dissenting opinion; (k) the nal report is then forwarded
to the joint public session for debate. A member of the Joint Committee is given one (1)
hour to speak in favor of the nal report; another member of the Committee is given also
one (1) hour to speak against the report; other speakers for or against the report are
further allowed to speak for not more than three (3) hours; and one (1) speaker for each
candidate is given the opportunity to speak for not more than twenty 20 minutes; (1) after
full debate, the nal report is submitted to a vote by the joint public session, each House
voting separately. In case the two Houses disagree, the decision of the President of the
Senate, in consultation with the Speaker of the House of Representatives, will prevail.AEIcTD
The process may be long and laborious but it has a purpose. It is designed to give
our lawmakers all the facts and all the arguments necessary for an informed and
intelligent judgment in determining the authenticity and due execution of the certi cates
of a canvass. It demands that the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the
applicable law should be meticulously weighed by the lawmakers before they pass
judgment on whether to canvass the votes in the certi cates of canvass. The objections to
their authenticity and due execution should be given their appropriate consideration. An
unreasoned or unreasonable judgment by Congress runs the risk of rejection in
the parliament of the street of the people. And the danger is that we may not
just face a mute multitude.
Ninth. The laws and the rules give clear rights to the candidates . Candidates to
the position of the President and Vice-President cannot be denied due process . Thus,
they are allowed watchers. They are entitled to lawyers who can question any certi cate of
canvass before the Joint Committee. When the nal report is up for voting by the joint
public session of Congress, they can have speakers to defend their interest. Candidates
are also entitled to the equal protection of the law . They cannot be subjected to
discriminatory treatment. All these and their other constitutional rights are not
suspended during the canvass .
Tenth. The law and the rules likewise impose duties on Congress as a canvassing
board. Congress must be an outpost of openness. The canvassing must be transparent.
Lawmakers must conduct the canvassing without a taint of arbitrariness . The worse
type of arbitrariness is arbitrariness that runs roughshod over the sovereign will of the
people.
Prescinding from these predicates, I nd no di culty in voting to dismiss
the petition at bar . The Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing the
Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections
do not violate Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution. To begin with, the
Constitution grants Congress the power to promulgate its own rules for the
canvassing of election certi cates. The Rules enjoy the presumption of legality and the
petitioner has miserably failed to overcome this presumption.
The argument that the creation of the Joint Committee constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power is an egregious error. As a canvassing board,
Congress exercises no legislative power and therefore did not delegate any .
In creating the Joint Committee, Congress did not abdicate its constitutional
duty to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certi cates of President and
Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 election. Even a side-glance at the powers and
prerogatives of the Joint Committee will subvert petitioner's submission. The function of
the Joint Committee is laid down in Rule VIII, Section 14. To stress again, it shall satisfy
itself that (1) each certi cate of canvass was duly executed, signed and thumb marked by
the Chairman and members of the provincial, city or district board of canvassers
concerned; (2) it contains the names of all the candidates for President and Vice-President
and their corresponding votes in words and gures; and (3) there exists no discrepancy in
other authentic copies of the certi cate of canvass or discrepancy in the votes of any
candidate in word and gures in the same certi cate. In the performance of this function,
the Joint Committee has to prepare a Report which will contain the objections raised by
the parties on the admission of the certi cates of canvas concerned and its rulings
thereon. Rule VIII, Section 13, emphasizes that the canvass of the Joint Committee is a
mere preliminary canvass . The rulings of the Joint Committee re ected in its Report are
merely recommendatory in nature. Its Report is yet to be submitted to the joint public
session of Congress for approval , each House voting separately. The constitutional
canvassing duty of Congress is therefore preserved and remains undiminished .
cAHDES
Nor is the right of petitioner as lawmaker — canvasser unduly prejudiced by the

creation of the Joint Committee. The proceedings of the Joint Committee are open and
transparent. Under Rule VIII, Section 22, after the certificates of canvass and the statement
of votes have been tabulated by the Joint Committee, petitioner, like any other member of
Congress, may request in writing for their copies prior to the consideration of any report
by the Committee to the joint public session. Under Rule IX, Section 26, petitioner may
speak for or against the nal report of the Joint Committee whose ndings and rulings are
non-binding to the joint public session of Congress. His right to vote for or against
the nal report of the Joint Committee therefore stands undiluted . In truth, the
creation of a Joint Committee to preliminarily canvass the results of the Presidential and
Vice-Presidential election is compelled by the need to hasten the canvass considering that
our laws have set a deadline for proclamation. History is studded with insights. The
practice of creating a Joint Committee was resorted to by Congress in the 1961, 1965,
1992 and 1998 elections. Its effectiveness has been proven.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING , I vote to dismiss the petition.
QUISUMBING , J.:
In this petition before us for prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, petitioner invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction and duty of the Supreme Court
pursuant to the Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2, "to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." SIaHDA
Yet, basing on his arguments, we can say that the pith of petitioner's plea goes
deeper than the averment of personal exclusion from the select panel tasked as "a joint
committee of Congress to Canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential
candidates in the May 10, 2004 national elections." He assails the Rules * that Congress
passed on May 28, 2004 because, in his view, the Rules "effectively amends and
abrogates" certain provisions of the Constitution, particularly Section 4, Article VII, which
give Congress the power and authority to promulgate rules for said committee as the
Board of National Canvassers. Further, he charges the Congress of unlawful neglect in the
performance of duty enjoined by the Constitution because, by its passage of said Rules,
Congress as a whole delegated unlawfully its tasks as canvasser at the highest level to a
mere joint committee of eleven Senators and eleven Congressmen. *
Noteworthy, he raises expressly before us only one issue:
"Whether or not the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing the Votes Cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential Candidates in
the May 10, 2004 Elections are Valid, Legal, and Constitutional."
He marshals his arguments abovecited to advance the thesis that said Rules are
invalid, illegal, and unconstitutional. But by prefacing his plea to us on the principle of the
tripartite separation of powers of government and the principle of potestas delegata non
potest delegari, he also triggers implicitly a second issue: whether the court possesses
jurisdiction over the subject matter he brings.
In the Resolution dated 4 June 2004, we denied petitioner's prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order. Without giving due course to the petition, we required
respondents herein and the Solicitor General to comment. On June 7, 2004, before
noontime, we received the Comment of respondent Senate of the Philippines, the
Comment/Opposition by respondent House of Representatives, and the Comment by the
O ce of the Solicitor General. * After a thorough dissection of the issue raised by
petitioner, we find that the respondents rightly prayed for dismissal of the petition outright,
"for lack of constitutional and legal basis" ** and "for lack of merit". *** ADECcI
In denying the issuance of a temporary restraining order, we were not unmindful of

the prevailing air of anxiety and popular perception that the canvass of votes for the two
highest positions of government is overdue. Announcement of the election results cannot
be delayed for weeks by mere technicalities. At the same time, a majority of nine members
of the Court were of the considered opinion that the views of the opposition parties need
to be fairly and fully ventilated in a neutral forum that could render the appropriate relief.
Despite prevailing doubts on the possible pre-emption of the functions reserved by the
Constitution, Article VII, Sec. 4, to the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, we could not let the
petitioner go away empty handed simply because he failed to attach his affidavit of service
to the petition. Majority of the Court members believe it is in the public interest that
comments on the petition be required from herein respondents as well as the people's
tribune, the Solicitor General. Thereafter, the Court could promptly rule on the merits of the
petition, provided the members are satis ed that the vital requirements of constitutional
litigation, including the existence of a case and controversy, lis mota, ripeness, locus standi
and justiciability, are clearly met.
As a member of the House of Representatives, believing that he was prejudiced
gravely by that chamber's action, petitioner has in his favor the requisite personality ( locus
standi) to bring this suit before us. This we need not belabor. But it still behooves us to
determine, at the very inception of our discourse, whether the issue raised by petitioner is
one that is justiciable rather than a political question. By itself, the threshold requirement
of justiciability, which is to say the appropriateness of a subject matter for judicial
consideration, is trumped by the assertion of the political question doctrine, perhaps
rendering certain government conduct immune from judicial review. * ECcaDT
In Tañada v. Cuenco , (103 Phil. 1051) the Court de ned political questions as those
"which, under the Constitution are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government (Id. at p. 1065). ** This formulation evolving from the
separation of powers doctrine has been sharpened by saying that challenges on the
constitutionality of a law should be resolved by the Court while doubts on the wisdom of
law should be debated in the halls of Congress. (Tatad v. Secretary , 281 SCRA 347). More
recently, Francisco, Jr. v. HR , (G.R. No. 160261, decided Nov. 10, 2003), gave us the
opportunity for further distinction. Per Madame Justice Carpio-Morales, "the determination
of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the
question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits."
To that extent, we consider Nixon v. United States , 506 U.S. 224, cited by the OSG,
inappropriate. Instead we nd instructive the ruling in U.S. v. Ballin, Joseph & Co. , 144 U.S.
1, which held that while each House of Congress is empowered by the Constitution to
determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints
or violate fundamental rights.
Procedurally, it must be stressed that the petitioner in an action for mandamus has
the burden to show a clear, certain, and well-de ned right to the relief sought. ( Sales v.
Mathay, G.R. No. L-39537, 31 May 1984, 129 SCRA 180, 183.) Mandamus cannot compel
the performance of a discretionary duty. Further, an action for prohibition, as a rule, lies
only against judicial or ministerial functions, but not legislative functions. (Ruperto v.
Torres, G.R. No. L-8785, 25 Feb. 1957.)
Be that as it may, considering the crucial importance of the matter at hand, not just
for the moment but also for the future of a nation beset by crises after crises, it is our view
that a prompt consideration of the instant petition is called for. As well said in Bondoc v.
Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, "a showing that plenary power is granted [to another branch of the
government] is not an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse
thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy."
Nevertheless, with due respect to a co-equal branch, interference with the adoption
and implementation of internal rules of Congress is furthest from our mind. Indubitably,
per the Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 4, it is Congress and not any other organ of the State
which shall promulgate the rules for the canvassing of the certi cates of votes for the
President and the Vice-President. Indeed we recognize the plenary power of Congress to
enact its own internal rules on the matter. ( Osmeña v. Pendatum , 109 Phil. 863. See also
Arroyo v. De Venecia , 277 SCRA 268). What prompts us today to look into the present
petition is the duty to say what the law is, as a matter of constitutional prerogative by way
of judicial review. * To abdicate that duty is to invite lawlessness and disorder.
If only for edification, let us now focus on petitioner's complaint.

He alleges that "the questioned Rules of Congress call for the creation of a Joint
Committee under Section 13, Rule VIII thereof, which provides that the Joint Committee
shall: (a) be composed of eleven (11) members from the Senate to be appointed by the
Senate President and eleven (11) members from the House of Representatives to be
appointed by the Speaker; (b) sit en banc or, in its discretion, in two (2) divisions of eleven
members each; (c) determine the authenticity and due execution of the certi cates of
canvass; and (d) preliminarily canvass the votes of candidates for the o ces of President
and Vice-President." * HECTaA
Petitioner concludes that the Rules thus "(a) removed from the Congress as one
whole body and transferred to the Joint Committee of Congress the duty and function of
determining the authenticity and due execution of the certi cates of canvass, and (b)
removed from the Congress as one whole body and transferred to the Joint Committee of
Congress the duty and function of canvassing the votes cast for presidential and vice-
presidential candidates." *
"Such removal and transfer of canvassing tasks from the constitutionally mandated
entity to the Joint Committee is directly contrary to the Constitution itself," according to
petitioner. "There is absolutely nothing in the Constitution which allows expressly or by
inference such removal and transfer of canvassing tasks from Congress as one whole
body to another entity," he adds. "Neither is there anything in the constitution which allows
any substitution of the Congress as one whole body in the performance of the
constitutionally mandated canvassing tasks. Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution
cannot be any clearer on the matter."
With the alleged delegation and transfer to a Joint Committee of the task of
canvassing the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates, he contends,
"the canvassing of the votes will be done by and only before the Joint Committee . . .
composed of only 11 members from the Senate and 11 members of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner and all other members of both Houses of Congress who are
not members of the Joint Committee of Congress have thus been unduly deprived of their
rights and prerogatives as incumbent members of Congress to be present at, observe and
participate in the canvassing of votes. . ." *
Respondent House of Representatives, thru its Speaker Jose de Venecia, traverses
petitioner's allegations. Joint Committees, according to De Venecia, are constituted
primarily to facilitate the work of the two houses of Congress. The use of the joint
committee system, he adds, is a well recognized and established practice. Such was the
mode, he says, in canvassing the Presidential and Vice-Presidential votes during elections
held on 1957, 1961, 1965, 1969, 1992, and 1998. ** Even assuming that the principle of
delegata potestas non potest delegari applies, nevertheless he submits that such
delegation by the Congress is a valid delegation of powers beyond cavil, for Congress
retains its control over the canvassing process, and the ultimate decision on the matter is
lodged in Congress itself. On this score, we are in agreement. Equally important, we also
agree with the Speaker that when acting as the National Board of Canvassers, Congress is
not engaged in legislation, hence no issue of undue delegation of legislative power need
arise.
In any event, we are assured by respondent Senate, through its President Franklin M.
Drilon, that contrary to the assertion of the petitioner, he is not deprived of any right or
prerogative by the Joint Committee under its Rules that he now assails. Petitioner's
participation in the canvassing remains guaranteed under the Rules of the Joint Public
Session, thus:
"SEC. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in divisions, shall
decide any question involving the certi cate of canvass by a majority vote of its
Members, each House panel voting separately. Any such decision shall be
subject to approval by the joint session, the Senate and House of
Representatives voting separately . In case the two Houses disagree, the
decision of the President of the Senate, in consultation with the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, shall prevail.
xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 23. The Joint Committee, en banc or divisions, shall meet eight (8)
it by the joint public session shall have been canvassed. The nal report shall
be submitted by the Joint Committee en banc to the joint public session
for its approval, each House voting separately . ScHADI
xxx xxx xxx

certi cates of canvass not yet transmitted would no longer affect the results of
the election. Congress in joint public session, voting separately, shall
immediately act on the final report .
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 27. Upon termination of the canvass and approval of the
Joint Committee report and the accompanying resolution by majority of
all the Members of both Houses voting separately in the joint public
session, Congress through the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives shall forthwith proclaim the President-
elect and Vice-President elect."
By its very nature, either chamber of Congress must act through committees. They
make the business of legislation feasible and practicable. Without working committees,
the tasks of the Senate or the House would be unmanageable. The same is true of both
chambers acting as the National Board of Canvassers. To deprive the Board of the
committee system is tantamount to obstructing its work and consigning it to delay and
failure.
Whether the Joint Committee or Congress as a whole is clothe with ministerial or
discretionary powers in the canvass of votes, including the "determination of the
authenticity and due execution" relative to the canvass of certi cates need not, in my view,
preoccupy us now. Nor should the question of fraud and other matters more appropriate
for an election protest, if any. What is important now is that the canvass be conducted "in
the manner provided by law." *
The OSG calls attention, however, to one factor in this controversy: "the avoidance of
undue delay in the canvass of certi cates to ensure the proclamation of the winning
candidates before June 30, 2004 Constitutional deadline" ** Respondent House thru its
Speaker bewails "an obvious attempt to stop or delay the current canvassing of votes for
both the Presidency and the Vice-Presidency," whereby petitioner, in effect "would cast a
cloud of doubt on the elections for the two highest posts of land," including most if not all
previous elections. To respondent, such doubt would have staggering implications. ***
As the Solicitor General keenly observed:
"In the judgment of the Congress, to require the whole Congress to canvass
the certificates would unduly delay the canvassing of votes. This delay may prove
detrimental to the national interest. Far from undermining the Constitution, the
creation of the joint canvassing committee will ensure that the elected President
and Vice-President shall assume o ce at noon of June 30, 2004, in accordance
with the Constitution. The national interest would be best served by deferring to
this policy decision made by the Congress." *
WHEREFORE , nding no clear and adequate basis to declare that there is a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents, I vote that the instant petition be
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
CARPIO-MORALES , J., concurring :
I join in the Resolution dismissing the instant petition, and in addition, I would like to
make the following observations.
By his Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus (Petition), petitioner Ruy Elias C.
Lopez, incumbent Representative of the 3rd Legislative District of Davao City, seeks: HICEca
(1) a judgment declaring null and void the Rules of the Joint Public Session
of Congress on Canvassing the Votes Cast for the Presidential and
Vice-Presidential Candidates in the May 10, 2004 Elections (Rules on
Canvassing) adopted by both Houses of Congress on May 28, 2004;
(2) the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing all of respondents to cease
and desist from implementing the Rules on Canvassing; and
(3) the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing both Houses of Congress
"to immediately open the certi cates of canvass in the presence of
the Senate and House of Representatives in joint public session, and
the Congress to determine the authenticity and due execution thereof
in the manner provided by law and canvass the votes as expressly
commanded under Section 4 (paragraph 4), Article VII of the
Constitution . . . ." 1
Petitioner advances the following arguments in support of his Petition:
ARGUMENTS
The Aforementioned Rules of Congress Dated May 28, 2004 Constitute an
Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power to a Joint Committee of
Congress.

Unconstitutional Amendment of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Unconstitutional Deprivation and Derogation of the Rights and Prerogatives of
Petitioners [sic] as Members [sic] of Congress.
By the Passage of the Aforementioned Rules Dated May 28, 2004,
Congress has Unlawfully Neglected the Performance of an Act which the
Constitution Specifically Enjoins as a Duty Resulting from Office. 2
In ne, the Petition raises two issues for resolution. First, whether the Rules on
Canvassing constitute an unconstitutional delegation of a non-ministerial power vested
exclusively by the Constitution in the Congress as a whole. Second, whether the Rules on
Canvassing deprives petitioner of his alleged rights and prerogatives to be present,
observe and participate in the determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
Certificates of Canvass for President and Vice-President.
As always, in exercising its power of judicial review, 3 this Court does not assert any
superiority over a co-equal branch of the government, but merely acts pursuant to its
mandated duty to determine whether an organ of government has acted within the
restrictions and limitations imposed by the Constitution. 4 Where an act of Congress is
shown to have outstripped the boundaries set by the Constitution, this Court has not
hesitated to declare the same null and void. 5 But, at the same time, where constitutional
infirmity has not been proven, this Court is duty bound to uphold and respect the actions of
the Legislature. 6
Matters of procedure and jurisdiction aside, for the reasons discussed hereunder, I
find that the issues raised in the Petition must be decided in the negative.
The national canvass of votes for President and Vice-President by Congress is
provided for in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, as follows: cSEAHa
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct

vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the
same date six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any
reelection. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for
more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms.

Voluntary renunciation of the o ce for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular elections for President and
Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President,
duly certi ed by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall
be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate.
Upon receipt of the certi cates of canvass, the President of the Senate
shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the
certi cates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be

proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and
highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the
vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately .
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and quali cations of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner maintains that the foregoing solely and exclusively vested three tasks on
Congress, in its capacity as the National Board of Canvassers, to wit:
a) the President of the Senate shall open all the certi cates of canvass in the
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives in joint public
session,
b) Congress shall determine the authenticity and due execution of all certi cates
of canvass in the manner provided by law, and
c) Congress shall canvass the votes for presidential and vice-presidential

candidates. 7
Petitioner then argues that the following portions of the Rules on Canvassing:
Sec. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created composed of eleven (11)
Speaker. The Members of each House panel shall elect among themselves their
respective Chairman in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee may sit en
banc or, in its discretion, in two (2) divisions of eleven members each composed
of a chairman, ve (5) members from the Senate and ve (5) from the House of
Representatives: Provided, That a Member of Congress who is a candidate for
President or Vice-President shall not be eligible for appointment to the Joint
Committee. Each division shall be chaired by a Chairman of the Committee.
The Representative of the province or city whose certi cate of canvass is
being canvassed shall be an ex-officio member of the Joint Committee, without
canvass.
Sec. 14. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions, shall satisfy itself
that each certi cate of canvass was duly executed, signed and thumbmarked by
President and their corresponding votes in words and in figures; and there exists
discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and gures in the same
certificate. . . .
Sec. 19. The Joint Committee, whether en banc or in divisions, shall decide
any question involving the Certi cate of canvass by a majority vote of its
Members, each House panel voting separately. . . . (Rule VIII). 8 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
removed from Congress and transferred to the Joint Committee the functions of (a)
determining the authenticity and due execution of the certi cates of canvass and (b)
canvassing the votes for President and Vice-President, in contravention of the
Constitution.
This argument fails.
First, contrary to petitioner's assertions, the functions of determining the
authenticity and due execution of the certi cates of canvass and the actual canvassing of
votes are both ministerial functions. Thus, in Lopez v. Roxas , 9 this Court, noting that the
function of Congress as the National Board of Canvassers was essentially just like that of
any municipal, city or provincial board of canvassers, held: CSHcDT
Needless to say, the power of Congress to declare who, among

the candidates for President and/or Vice-President, has obtained the
largest number of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not
inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal by Republic Act No. 1793. Congress merely acts as a national
board of canvassers , charged with the ministerial and executive duty to
make said declaration , on the basis of the election returns duly certified
provincial and city boards of canvassers . Upon the other hand, the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal has the judicial power to determine whether or not
said duly certi ed election returns have been irregularly made or tampered with, or
re ect the true result of the elections in the areas covered by each, and, if not, to
recount the ballots cast, and incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each
ballot or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in the a rmative, in
whose favor, which Congress has power to do. 10 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; italics in the original)
Petitioner, however, contends that the foregoing no longer holds since, unlike the
1935 or 1973 Constitutions, the 1987 Constitution vested Congress, as the National Board
of Canvassers, with "more than merely ministerial functions." In particular, petitioner
contends that the determination of the authenticity and due execution of the certi cates of
canvass necessarily "requires the exercise of sound discretion based upon informed
judgement through the use of the faculty of the intellect." 11
Petitioner is mistaken.
A ministerial duty is one which is clear and speci c leaving no room for the
exercise of discretion in its performance. Upon the other hand, a discretionary duty is
that which by its nature requires the exercise of judgment. 12
In general, the duty of a board of canvassers has been held to be purely ministerial in
function, its task being limited to mathematically computing the results of the elections on
the basis of the documents submitted to it. Thus, in Demafiles v. Commission on Elections,
13 this Court held:
First, a canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function —

that of compiling and adding the results as they appear in the returns
transmitted to it. This is the teaching in Nacionalista Party v.
Commission on Elections : "the canvassers are to be satis ed of the
genuineness of the returns — namely, that the papers presented to them
are not forged and spurious, that they are returns, and that they are
signed by the proper o cers. When so satis ed, . . . they may not reject
any returns because of informalities in them or because of illegal and
fraudulent practices in the elections." Thus, they cannot pass upon the
validity of an election return, much less exclude it from the canvass on the ground
that the votes cast in the precinct from whence it came are illegal.
But the exclusion of the return in this case is sought to be justi ed on the
ground that it is "obviously manufactured" because, contrary to the statement
therein that there were 195 registered voters, of whom 188 voted, the certi cate of
the local election registrar states that only 182 voters had registered on October
30, 1967. Lagumbay v. Commission on Elections is cited in support of this view.
I n Lagumbay the returns were palpably false as it was indeed
statistically improbable that "all the eight candidates of one party
garnered all the votes, each of them receiving exactly the same number,
whereas all the eight candidates of the other party got precisely
nothing." In other words, the aid of evidence aliunde was not needed, as
"the fraud [being] so palpable from the return itself ( res ipsa loquitur —
the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and gives it
prima facie value." LLpr
On the other hand, the return in this case shows nothing on its face
from which the canvassers might conclude that it does not speak the
truth . It is only when it is compared with the certi cate of the election registrar
that a discrepancy appears as to the number of registered voters. The return
therefore is by no means "obviously manufactured" so as to justify its
exclusion .
This is not to belittle the respondent's claim that more people than
registered voters were allowed to vote in precinct 7. Perhaps that is true, although
the petitioner claims that after October 30, 1967 eight more voters were allowed to
register (making a total of 190 voters), and on the day of the election 5 voters
erroneously assigned to precinct 6 were allowed to vote in precinct 7 because that
was where they were really assigned. The point is simply that this question
should be threshed out in an election contest . 14 (Emphasis and
The foregoing decisions also clearly illustrate that the duty of a board of canvassers
t o authenticate the documents submitted to it, before tabulating the results is not
something new. Indeed, authentication is necessarily included in the task of canvassing
since only genuine documents which are in due form may be canvassed. This, however,
does not imply that a board of canvassers also exercises adjudicatory powers to assume
jurisdiction over allegations of electoral fraud or irregularity. Such allegations may only be
threshed out through an election contest before the proper adjudicatory body. Thus, in
Dizon v. Tizon, 15 this Court held:
We are of the opinion that the dismissal of the petition below is correct,
and that the remedy now sought against such dismissal should be denied.
1. The election return for precinct No. 18 of Dinalupihan is not "obviously

manufactured" within the meaning of our decision in Lagumbay vs. Commission
on Elections, G.R. No. L-25444, January 21, 1966. The said return, as found by the
lower court, is regular and complete on its face. In fact, when it was canvassed by
the provincial board of canvassers on December 7, 1967, the petitioner did not
raise any objection to it or point to any defect or in rmity in its contents. The
discrepancy on which the petition was based is not one which appears
on the face of the return , but between the statement therein that 279
ballots had been cast and an entirely different document, namely the
certi cation of the election registrar that only 80 voters actually voted.
This certi cation, as correctly explained by the trial court, was not
material insofar as the board of canvassers was concerned, since its
ministerial duty was to read and canvass the results of the election on
the basis of the returns , once satisfied that the same were genuine . aADSIc
xxx xxx xxx
If there was any fraud or irregularity committed in the election in said

precinct; if, for example, some ballots were lled and cast by persons other than
the registered voters themselves, the election return could not, for that reason, be
considered as obviously manufactured. It would still re ect the actual number of
ballots found and counted, and the remedy to correct the anomaly would be an
election contest, not a petition to exclude the return in question from the canvass
and thus virtually annul the election in that precinct. 16 (Emphasis and
And in Abella v. Commission on Elections, 17 this Court stated:

. . . The issue is the refusal of the COMELEC to consider
objections to 24 election returns on which the board of canvassers had
not made a written ruling. But it would seem that, strictly speaking, no
ruling was necessary, or even proper . By the petitioners' own contention "in
all those 24 returns, the Christian name, nickname or maternal surname of private
respondent's husband was used with her Christian name or nickname which, as
we will show at length infra, did not constitute a valid vote for private respondent.
If so, the total 1,912 votes in these returns credited for private respondent should
be discounted." This matter was obviously beyond the competence of the
board of canvassers to resolve . Neither was it cognizable in a pre-
proclamation controversy before the COMELEC as de ned in Section 243 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
This provision reads as follows:

Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. — The
following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation
controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material
defects, appear to be tampered with or falsi ed, or contain discrepancies in the
same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233,
234, 235 and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or
intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places

were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the
aggrieved candidate or candidates.
The inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of certain election

returns where votes allegedly cast for Emeterio Larrazabal were
counted for his wife is an issue appropriate in an election contest and
not in a pre-proclamation controversy . And it is also immaterial that, as also
contended, the inclusion of such votes would affect the over-all results of the
election and swing it in his favor. The accepted rule is that as long as the
returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished , the board of
canvassers cannot look beyond them to verify allegations of
irregularities in the casting or the counting of the votes. These issues
cannot be resolved by the board of canvassers. A long line of decisions has
established the doctrine that the board of canvassers has only the
ministerial task of tallying the votes as reported in the election returns
and cannot exercise the judicial power of deciding an election contest .
18 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) ACIDTE
It does not appear from the text of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the
phrase "upon determination of authenticity and due execution [of the certi cates of
canvass] in the manner provided by law" was intended to confer anything more than a
ministerial duty on Congress and the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, when this very
point was raised during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner
Maambong, the author of the amendment expressly clari ed that the duty of the National
Board of Canvassers was ministerial in nature, to wit:
MR. NOLLEDO:
I am referring to the use of the words " upon determination of the
authenticity and the execution thereof " on lines 7 and 8, page 2,
referring to the certi cates of canvass of the President and Vice-
(page 391) President. Am I right if I say that because of the use
of these words, the duty of the legislature to canvass is no longer
ministerial?
MR. MAAMBONG:
Madam President, the word "ministerial" has always been interpreted
by the Supreme Court as applicable to the canvass made by the
national Assembly, and the reason why we did not put the word
"ministerial" in the Article is, it has been understood in the case of
Roxas v. Lopez and in other cases . When we used the words
"authenticity" and "genuineness," the question refers to the problem of
whether or not the ministerial function is already nonministerial. The
answer is , it is still ministerial , but when we say "authenticity and
due execution," what it really means is that the national Assembly
will look at the certificates of canvass and find out from the face
of the document whether there are flaws in the execution and
authenticity of the document . That is what it means.
MR. NOLLEDO:
MR. MAAMBONG:
The answer to that is the phrase "in the manner provided by law." The
Committee had to insert the phrase "in the manner provided by
law" so that the legislature itself will nd out and will make it
very specific as to what flaws or deficiencies in the certificates of
canvass can be taken cognizance of by the canvassing board of
tellers , because as of now the guiding regulations that govern the
National Assembly, as I mentioned in the Committee, are: the rules and
regulations of the COMELEC, the Omnibus Election Code, the jurisprudence
from the decisions of the Supreme Court. All these things taken together,
the legislature is given a notice by using the phrase "in the
manner provided by law," so that it will make a determination now
of what are the points which the board of tellers can take
cognizance of , because it is not very clear right now under the laws and
regulations, and as a matter of fact, that was one of the controversies
which arose during the canvassing of the votes of President Aquino and
former President Marcos in the last Batasan. 19 (Emphasis and
Indeed a contrary interpretation is not possible because the last paragraph of the
very same constitutional provision vests the power to adjudicate electoral controversies
concerning the positions of President and Vice-President exclusively with the Supreme
Court, viz.: EcTCAD
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and quali cations of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose
An examination of Section 30 of Republic Act 7166, the implementing law referred

to in the above-cited constitutional provision, removes all doubt as to the ministerial
character of the duties and functions of the Congress as the National Board of
Canvassers:
Sec. 30. Congress as the National Board of Canvassers for the Election of
President and Vice-President: Determination of Authenticity and Due Execution of
Certi cates of Canvass. — Congress shall determine the authenticity and
due execution of the certi cate of canvass for President and Vice-
President as accomplished and transmitted to it by the local boards of
canvassers, on a showing that: (1) each certi cate of canvass was
executed, signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and members of
the board of canvassers and transmitted or caused to be transmitted to
Congress by them; (2) each certi cate of canvass contains the names
of all of the candidates for President and Vice-President and their
corresponding votes in words and in gures; and (3) there exists no
discrepancy in other authentic copies of the certi cate of canvass or
discrepancy in the votes of any candidate in words and gures in the
certificate .
When the certi cate of canvass, duly certi ed by the board of canvassers
of each province, city or district, appears to be incomplete, the Senate President
shall require the board of canvassers concerned to transmit by personal delivery,
the election returns from polling places that were not included in the certi cate of
canvass and supporting statements. Said election returns shall be submitted by
personal delivery within two (2) days from receipt of notice. AISHcD
When it appears that any certi cate of canvass or supporting statement of

votes by precinct bears erasures or alterations which may cast doubt as to the
veracity of the number of votes stated therein and may affect the result of the
election, upon request of the Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate concerned
or his party, Congress shall, for the sole purpose of verifying the actual number of
votes cast for President and Vice-President, count the votes as they appear in the
copies of the election returns submitted to it. (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing clearly limits the authentication of the certi cates of canvass to (1) a
physical examination of the certi cates themselves to determine whether: (a) each
certi cate was executed, signed and thumbmarked by the chairman and members of the
board of canvassers and transmitted to Congress by them, (b) each certi cate of canvass
contains the names of all of the candidates for President and Vice-President and their
corresponding votes in words and in gures, and (c) there is a discrepancy between the
words and gures in the votes of any of the candidates; and (2) a physical comparison to
determine any discrepancies between the certi cates transmitted to the Congress and the
other authentic copies of the certificate of canvass.
These tasks are purely mechanical and therefore clearly ministerial in nature and do
not require "the exercise of sound discretion based upon informed judgment through the
use of the faculty of the intellect."
Second, a reading of the questioned Rules on Canvassing shows that there has been
no delegation by Congress of its duties as the National Board of Canvassers to an entity
separate and distinct from Congress itself. To delegate means to transfer authority from
one person to another; to empower one to perform a task in behalf of another; 20 to
transfer authority by one branch of government in which such authority is vested to some
other branch or administrative agency. 21
By promulgating the questioned Rules on Canvassing, all Congress has done is refer
to the Joint Committee the mechanical and ministerial tasks of (1) physically examining
the certificates of canvass for irregularities or discrepancies, as provided for in Section 30
of Republic Act 7166, and (2) tabulating the votes of the respective candidates:
SEC. 14. The Joint Committee, en banc or in divisions, shall satisfy itself
that each certi cate of canvass was duly executed, signed and thumb marked by
President and their corresponding votes in words and in gures; and there exists
discrepancy in the votes or any candidate in words and gures in the same
certificate.
xxx xxx xxx

After the certi cates of canvass and the statement of votes have been
tabulated, any Member of Congress may request in writing for copies thereof
from the Secretariat prior to the consideration of any interim or nal report to the
joint session.
However, the same Rules on Canvassing clearly provides that Congress, as a

whole, retains control over the canvassing process . Thus, any determination made
by the Joint Committee as well as the preliminary canvass itself is subject to the nal
approval of both House of Congress, voting separately , thus: IHCSTE

subject to approval by the joint session, the Senate and the House of
xxx xxx xxx
for its approval , each House voting separately .
Congress: Provided, That objections raised and rulings made thereon shall no
sign the nal report of the Joint Committee. Every Member shall be provided with
a copy of the nal report and shall be given twenty-four (24) hours within which
to submit his concurring or dissenting opinion.
elect. The Member designated by those against the report shall also speak for not
more than one hour. Subsequent speakers for or against the resolution shall be
allowed to speak for not more than three hours: Provided, That one (1) speaker for
each candidate shall be given the opportunity to speak for not more than twenty
minutes.
RULE X
PROCLAMATION
elect and the Vice-President-elect . (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing provisions also make it abundantly clear that it is Congress, as a

whole and meeting in joint session, and not the Joint Committee, which has the ultimate
authority to proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President.
Petitioner nonetheless insists that even such a referral by Congress to its own Joint
Committee is proscribed since the Constitution allegedly requires that the functions of the
National Board of Canvassers should be performed by all the members of both Houses of
Congress acting together. Thus, so he argues, there is nothing in the Constitution which
allows Congress to refer the physical inspection and comparison of the certi cates of
canvass and the mechanical tabulation of the votes cast for each candidate to the Joint
Committee. 22 TCacIA
Petitioner's argument stands a basic principle of Constitutional law on its head. It is

axiomatic that the presumption is in favor of constitutionality. 23 To strike down a law or
rule as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the
fundamental law prohibits, the law or rule permits. 24
While there is nothing to prevent Congress from undertaking the authentication and
canvassing of the certi cates through a committee of the whole, if it so chooses, there is
also nothing in the text of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that prohibits Congress
from referring the authentication and tabulation of the certi cates of canvass to a
bicameral committee. Indeed, the only task expressly required by the Constitution to be
done in the presence of the all the Senators and representatives is the opening by the
Senate President of all the certi cates of canvass at the start of the joint session of
Congress.
Petitioner's attempt to draw parallels between the canvassing procedure provided
for in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and the impeachment procedures provided
for in Sections 1 to 3 of Article XI 25 does not persuade. A reading of the provisions of
Article XI readily demonstrates the detailed manner by which the Constitution sets forth
the procedures for impeachment, even to the extent of specifying the number of session
days between each phase of the impeachment process. In contrast, aside from specifying
the manner by which the certi cates of canvass are transmitted to Congress, the date for
the opening of the certi cates by the Senate President, and that the person with the
highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, 26 Section 4 of Article VII gives wide
latitude to Congress to determine the manner by which to undertake the canvass of votes.
HcACTE
To be sure, there is nothing irregular or sinister in the referral by Congress of the

authentication and tabulation functions to the Joint Committee. As a matter of
convenience and expediency, both Houses of Congress regularly refer matters to their
respective Committees for study and recommendation. In Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, 27 where the validity of amendments introduced by a bicameral conference
committee of both Houses of Congress in a tax bill was put into question, this Court,
speaking through Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, held:
Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference committee to insert
new provisions as long as these are germane to the subject of the conference. As
this Court held in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado , 227 SCRA 703 (1993),
in an opinion written by then Justice Cruz, the jurisdiction of the conference
committee is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate and the
House. It may propose an entirely new provision. What is important is that its
report is subsequently approved by the respective houses of Congress .
This Court ruled that it would not entertain allegations that, because new
provisions had been added by the conference committee, there was thereby a
violation of the constitutional injunction that "upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed."
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the

petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading
of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in
its nal form were not distributed among the members of each House.
Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure
was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2), of the
Constitution. We are bound by such o cial assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy. (Id., at 710. [Emphasis added]) CSDAIa
It is interesting to note the following description of conference committees

in the Philippines in a 1979 study:
Conference committees may be of two types: free or instructed.

These committees may be given instructions by their parent bodies or they
may be left without instructions. Normally the conference committees are
without instructions, and this is why they are often critically referred to as
"the little legislatures." Once bills have been sent to them, the conferees
have almost unlimited authority to change the clauses of the bills and in
fact sometimes introduce new measures that were not in the original
legislation. No minutes are kept, and members' activities on conference
committees are di cult to determine. One congressman known for his
idealism put it this way: "I killed a bill on export incentives for my interest
group [copra] in the conference committee but I could not have done so
anywhere else." The conference committee submits a report to both
houses, and usually it is accepted. If the report is not accepted, then the
committee is discharged and new members are appointed. (R. Jackson,
Committees in the Philippine Congress, in COMMITTEES AND
LEGISLATURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 163 (J.D. LEES AND M.
SHAW, eds.))
In citing this study, we pass no judgment on the methods of conference
committees. We cite it only to say that conference committees here are no
different from their counterparts in the United States whose vast powers we noted
in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado , supra. At all events, under Art. VI,
§16(3) each house has the power "to determine the rules of its proceedings,"
including those of its committees. Any meaningful change in the method and
procedures of Congress or its committees must therefore be sought in that body
itself. 28 DSETcC
If parts of the legislative process, which are unquestionably both sovereign and
discretionary in character, may be referred to a bicameral committee in the interest of
e ciency and expediency, there is no reason why the ministerial tasks of authentication
and tabulation of certi cates of canvass cannot similarly be referred to the Joint
Committee created by the Rules on Canvassing.
As a second line of argument, petitioner claims that the Rules on Canvassing unduly
deprives him of his rights and prerogatives to be present at, observe and participate in the
determination of the authenticity and due execution of all certificates of canvass. 29
Petitioner's claim is without constitutional basis. The rights he asserts are not to be
found within the four corners of the Constitution. In fact the only individual member of
Congress on whom the Constitution imposes speci c duties with regard to the canvass is
the Senate President, who is responsible for the reception and opening of the certi cates
of canvass.
More importantly, and contrary to petitioner's assertions, the Rules on Canvassing
adequately provides each member of Congress with an opportunity to observe the
canvassing and to make known his views on the Report of Joint Committee:
Sec. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created composed of eleven (11)
Speaker. The Members of each House panel shall elect among themselves their
respective Chairman in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee may sit en
banc or, in its discretion, in two (2) divisions of eleven members each composed
of a chairman, ve (5) members from the Senate and ve (5) from the House of
Representatives: Provided, That a Member of Congress who is a candidate for
President or Vice-President shall not be eligible for appointment to the Joint
Committee. Each division shall be chaired by a Chairman of the Committee.
The Representative of the province or city whose certi cate of
canvass is being canvassed shall be an ex-officio member of the Joint
Committee, without voting rights, for the duration of the canvassing of
the aforesaid certificate of canvass.
subject to approval by the joint session, the Senate and the House of
xxx xxx xxx
After the certi cates of canvass and the statement of votes have
been tabulated, any Member of Congress may request in writing for
copies thereof from the Secretariat prior to the consideration of any
interim or final report to the joint session.
for its approval, each House voting separately . CAacTH
Congress: Provided, That objections raised and rulings made thereon shall no
sign the nal report of the Joint Committee. Every Member shall be provided
with a copy of the nal report and shall be given twenty-four (24) hours
within which to submit his concurring or dissenting opinion .
elect. The Member designated by those against the report shall also
speak for not more than one hour. Subsequent speakers for or against
the resolution shall be allowed to speak for not more than three hours:
Provided , That one (1) speaker for each candidate shall be given the
opportunity to speak for not more than twenty minutes.
RULE X
PROCLAMATION
elect and the Vice-President-elect . (Emphasis supplied) IacHAE
The Rules on Canvassing likewise provides for mechanisms by which the

candidates, through their representatives, may participate in the canvassing process:
Section 8. Each candidate shall be entitled to two watchers from a
team of ve watchers who shall have access to an unimpeded view of
the entire canvassing proceedings . They shall register their attendance
before the Joint Committee and shall keep vigilant watch over the ballot boxes
from the time the same are received in the House of Representatives until the
canvassing proceedings are terminated.
Each candidate shall likewise be entitled to attorneys who shall
serve during the entire canvassing proceedings . The attorneys shall register
their appearances before the Joint Committee: Provided, That only one attorney
for every candidate may argue and question any certificate of
canvassconsidered by the Joint Committee for not more than ve (5)
minutes which may be extended for a similar period by the chairman when the
need arises without prejudice to the right to submit a written
memorandum not later than twenty-four (24) hours from the time the
objection was raised . No extension of the period to submit shall be allowed,
and if no memorandum is submitted with the said period, the right shall be
considered waived. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

as well as remedies in case patent irregularities and discrepancies are discovered in
the certificates of canvass: AaDSEC
Section 17. When it appears that any certificate of canvass or

supporting statement of votes by precinct bears erasures or alterations
which may cast doubt as to the veracity of the number of votes stated
therein and may affect the result of the election, upon request of the
Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate concerned or his party ,
Congress shall , for the sole purpose of verifying the actual number of votes cast
for President and Vice-President, count the votes as they appear in the
copies of the election returns submitted to it. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
The procedure adopted by Congress is not without rational basis. The procedure
embodied in the questioned Rules on Canvassing is evidently intended to accomplish both
a speedy and accurate canvass. On the other hand, while there appears to be little to be
gained in the way of accuracy if the authentication and canvass of the certi cates were
undertaken by both Houses of Congress as a whole, much time may be lost by such a
procedure.
It may not be amiss to point out that the timeliness of the canvassing and the
proclamation of the President-elect and Vice-President-elect is also of concern. It is a
general policy of our elections laws that controversies arising before the proclamation of
winning candidates should be dealt with in a summary manner so that the canvass and
proclamation be delayed as little as possible. Hence, questions involving the appreciation
of votes and the conduct of the election campaign and the voting itself, which require more
deliberate and necessarily longer consideration, are properly the subject matter of election
protests before the appropriate adjudicatory body. 30 In the recent case of Sandoval v.
Commission on Elections, 31 this Court had occasion to state:
On the rst issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over the
petitions led by private respondent. As a general rule, candidates and registered
political parties involved in an election are allowed to le pre-proclamation cases
before the COMELEC. Pre-proclamation cases refer to any question pertaining to
or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by
any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties
before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under
Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission,
receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns. The COMELEC has exclusive
jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies. As an exception, however,
to the general rule, Section 15 of Republic Act (RA) 7166 prohibits
candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and
congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases . It states: AacSTE
"SECTION 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for

President, Vice-President, senator, and Members of the House of
Representatives. — For purposes of the elections for President, Vice-
President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-
proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the
certi cates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not
preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or
upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in
the certificate of canvass or election returns before it."
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the
winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these
sensitive posts . . . . 32 (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, the will of the people is no less frustrated by undue delays in the canvass and
proclamation of the winning candidates as by other forms of electoral fraud.
Finally, it may be observed that, because there can only be one winner, elections
naturally provoke intense competition among the candidates vying for elective o ce. And
in a close race for the highest executive position, erce partisan political activity is but to
be expected. But once the electoral process has moved beyond election day itself and all
that is left to be done is to ascertain the will of the people as expressed through the ballot,
it is to be hoped that the members of both Houses of Congress, politicians though they
may be, will remember the words of Manuel Luis Quezon, rst President of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, and realize that loyalty to their party ends where loyalty
to their country begins.
WHEREFORE , I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
CALLEJO, SR. , J., concurring :
I concur with the encompassing separate opinion of my esteemed colleague, Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno.
I am convinced that Congress, when it acts as the National Board of Canvassers in
the presidential and vice-presidential elections conformably with Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution, does not merely perform a ministerial function, but exercises quasi-
judicial powers when it determines the authenticity and due execution of the certi cates of
canvass. In fact, this is one of the substantial changes introduced in the 1987 Constitution.
In his sponsorship speech, Commissioner Lorenzo M. Sumulong, Chairman of the
Committee of the 1986 Constitutional Commission which drafted the Article on the
Executive Department, explained:
The rst constitutional change that I will mention is the canvassing of
votes for President and Vice-President. In the 1973 Constitution, the provision on
canvassing of votes for President and Vice-President is as follows:
The returns of every election for President, duly certi ed by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa, who shall, not later than thirty days
after the day of the election, and in the presence of the Batasang
Pambansa, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted.
It will be remembered that many of the certi cates of canvass received
from each province and city by the Batasang Pambasa were objected to by the
supporters of Aquino and Laurel. But based on this provision of the 1973
Constitution, after the certi cates of canvass had been opened, the Speaker
immediately announced the results of the canvass and proclaimed President
Marcos and Mr. Tolentino as elected President and Vice-President, respectively. aSADIC
In the Article on the Executive that is submitted for consideration, it is now

provided that after the certi cates of canvass had been opened, the counting and
canvassing of votes for the President and Vice-President shall not immediately be
made because, rst, there should be a determination of the authenticity and due
execution of the certi cates of canvass before the votes may be canvassed. That
appears in Section 4 of the Article. . . . 1
The discussion between Messrs. Regalado E. Maambong and Jose N. Nolledo, both
members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, on this point is, likewise, particularly
instructive:
MR. NOLLEDO:
I am referring to the use of the words "upon determination of the authenticity and
due execution thereof" on lines 7 and 8, page 2, referring to the certi cates
of canvass of the President and Vice-President. Am I right if I say that
because of the use of these words, the duty of the legislature to canvass is
no longer ministerial?
MR. MAAMBONG:
Madam President, the word "ministerial" has always been interpreted by the
Supreme Court as applicable to the canvass made by the National
Assembly, and the reason why we did not put the word "ministerial" in the
Article is, it has been understood in Roxas v. Lopez and in other cases.
When we used the words "authenticity" and "genuineness," the question
refers to the problem of whether or not the ministerial function is already
non-ministerial. The answer is, it is still ministerial but when we say
"authenticity and due execution," what it really means is that the National
Assembly will look at the certificates of canvass and find out from the face
of the document whether there are aws in the execution and authenticity
of the document. That is what it means. HDTSCc
MR. NOLLEDO:
MR. MAAMBONG:
The answer to that is in the phrase "in the manner provided by law." The
Committee had to insert the phrase "in the manner provided by law" so that
the legislature itself will nd out and will make it very speci c as to what
aws or de ciencies in the certi cates of canvass can be taken
cognizance of by the canvassing board of tellers, because as of now, the
guiding regulations that govern the National Assembly, as I mentioned in
the Committee, are: the rules and regulations of the COMELEC, the
Omnibus Election Code, the jurisprudence from the decisions of the
Supreme Court. All these things taken together, the legislature is given a
notice by using the phrase "in the manner provided by law," so that it will
make a determination now of what are the points which the board of tellers
can take cognizance of, because it is not very clear right now under the
laws and regulations, and as a matter of fact, that was one of the
controversies which arose during the canvassing of the votes of President
Aquino and former President Marcos in the last Batasan. 2
A purely ministerial act or duty is one in which an o cer or tribunal performs in a

given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. 3
As my esteemed colleague, Justice Jose C. Vitug, in his separate opinion in Romualdez-
Marcos v. Commission on Elections , 4 succinctly put it, "a ministerial duty is an obligation
the performance of which, being adequately de ned, does not allow the use of further
judgment or discretion." Congress, as the sole body tasked to canvass the votes for the
President and Vice-President, is mandated to make a "determination of the authenticity
and due execution" of the certi cates of canvass before it proceeds to canvass the same.
As such, it cannot be said to perform a purely ministerial function but it exercises a quasi-
judicial function as well. It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or
discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of
function of a judge, or is conferred upon an o cer other than a judicial o cer, it is deemed
quasi-judicial. 5
In this sense, the function of Congress, as the National Board of Canvassers in the
presidential and vice-presidential elections, is akin to that of the municipal, provincial or
city boards of canvassers. These boards of canvassers are said to exercise quasi-judicial
powers as they are tasked to determine the due execution and authenticity of the
certificates of canvass or the election returns as the case may be before them:
. . . We do not discern in the law a purpose to throw the burden on courts
where it is patent — as in the case here — that tampering of the returns occurred
after they have left the hands of the election inspectors, just to pave the way for
the proclamation of a candidate in whose favor falsi cation was resorted to. To
tie up the hands of the board of canvassers in the situation here presented is to
wink at a brazen form of wrong-doing to subvert the people's will, and in mockery
crown the loser with victory. Correctly then, canvassers are given quasi-judicial
powers to determine whether the return is genuine and to disregard one which is
obviously a forgery. Along parallel lines, this Court, in Nacionalista Party v.
Commission on Elections . . ., declared that the canvassing board could accept as
correct those returns transmitted to it "which are in due form;" that they must "be
satis ed of the genuineness of the returns — namely, that the papers presented to
them are not forged and spurious;" and that "where the returns are obviously
manufactured, . . . the board will not be compelled to canvass them. 6
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

TINGA , J.:
The tradition of judicial review is as old as the essences of the democratic system
of government we practice today. 1 This Court has consistently a rmed the doctrine,
dating as far back as the Commonwealth era. 2 Judicial review arises from the inherent
judicial power, and has traditionally relied on no statutory grant other than the source law
that created the judicial system. 3 DTaAHS
At the same time, the notion of separation of powers is a linchpin of our

constitutional order. Coordinate political departments are accorded their respective
spheres over which they exercise discretion to manage. It is a rule that promotes e cient
governance, and, perhaps more importantly, institutionalizes the system of checks and
balances within the government.
These two doctrines are hardly antithetical. Judicial review ensures that the other
branches of government obey the Constitution. 4 It also shields one branch from undue
interference by another. On the other hand, the Court should restrain itself from unduly
interfering in the affairs of co-equal branches of government. Indeed, the unwarranted
exercise of the judicial power would be judicial activism at its most egregious.
Cognizant that unwarranted judicial review may breach both the traditional
deference accorded by the judiciary to the coordinate political departments and the
presumption of validity accorded to their actions, jurisprudence has fostered the evolution
of the "political question" doctrine as a form of autolimitation of the judicial power. The
traditional stance of the Court has been to desist from deciding issues that may properly
be classi ed as political questions. A political question refers to a question of policy or to
issues which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. 5
In our country, the "political question" doctrine has undergone some rethinking,
particularly in light of the misuse of the doctrine during the martial law era. The
incorporation of Article VIII, Section 1 6 in the 1987 Constitution has especially affected
this Court's thinking on the political question doctrine. 7
Yet while nobody pretends that Section 1, Article VIII invented judicial review in the
Philippines, I likewise submit that the same article did not render the "political question"
inconsequential. Section 1, Article VIII has crystallized into a constitutional command
decades of jurisprudence a rming this Court's exercise of judicial review, as balanced by
the political question doctrine. Neither have the contours of judicial review been altered by
the new provision. Its effect is simply this: with judicial duty cast not only as a power but
also as a duty, no longer can this Court refuse to correct a coordinate branch's act of grave
abuse of discretion simply on the premise that it constitutes a political question, as it had
done in the past. 8
The petition is unable to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Congress in promulgating the canvassing rules. Shorn of this essential element, the Court
is left with nothing to review but an act of a coordinate branch of government which is
textually committed to Congress by Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution. 9 This is a
political question, and the Court should not extend due course to the petition.
This leads to an important point which the Court should not overlook. The mere
incantation by a petitioner of "grave abuse of discretion" is not a passport to this Court's
jurisdiction. If upon initial review, it appears that no grave abuse of discretion attends the
questioned political act, the Court should say so, and say nothing more.
Moreover, an express rejection of jurisdiction over political questions bereft of grave
abuse of discretion serves not only as an act of courtesy to the co-equal branch, but also
as an act of deference to the Constitution. While the Court should not hesitate to compel
an errant branch into obeying the Constitution, it should also acknowledge when the other
branches are obeying the Constitution, and that the Court itself is observing its own
constitutional mandate by reusing to interfere. HcTSDa
The present petition serves as a perfect opportunity to desist and reject.

The basic issue proposed by petitioner is whether the rules of canvass ("Rules")
promulgated relative to the 10 May 2004 elections are constitutional. 10 In support of his
thesis that the Rules are unconstitutional, petitioner makes four arguments; that the Rules
are an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to a joint committee of Congress;
that the Rules amend Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; that the Rules deprive
petitioner of his rights and prerogatives as a member of congress; and by enforcement of
the Rules, Congress neglects performing its constitutionally enjoined duty. 11

On the arguments raised by the petitioner, the result is clear-cut. The petition is
palpably without merit.
First, the Rules does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. The power to canvass votes is not inherently legislative, as it does not pertain to
the enactment of legislation. 12 By traditional concept, the non-delegation rule means that
Congress may not constitutionally delegate its legislative power to another branch
of government. 13
At the same time, pursuing this point is ultimately needless, as despite petitioner's
claim, there really is no delegation made by Congress. A clear examination of the Rules
reveals that therein, Congress retains the right to open the certi cates of canvass and
canvass the votes. cACDaH
Second, the Rules does not amend Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution by
providing for an unconstitutional method for canvassing the votes.
Congress is expressly granted the power to promulgate rules for the canvassing of
the certificates. 14 By virtue of this express right, the Rules were promulgated by Congress.
The Joint Committee does not have any authority or power except that granted to it under
the questioned Rules. Even then, its power is limited only to functioning as a preparatory or
preliminary body to speed up and make more e cient the canvassing of the votes. 15 The
Joint Committee's acts and determinations do not have any force and effect unless
approved by the whole of Congress. 16
The canvassing of the votes under the questioned Rules is still the act of Congress
as one whole body. The ndings of the Joint Committee do not bind Congress unless
approved in a joint public session. 17 Accordingly, Congress may choose to overrule the
findings and determinations made by the Joint Committee.
The assailed Rules, and the procedure laid therein, are but an offshoot of legislative
practice. 18 Congress, as a matter of legislative practice, functions by way of delegation
towards committees. The formation of congressional committees arises from plenary
power possessed by the legislative body for all purposes of civil government. 19 The entire
House or Senate is too large to conduct basic functions, such as to conduct investigations
in aid of legislation, and thus must always use a committee. 20 A bill that is led in
Congress is always referred for preliminary consideration to the particular congressional
committee which would have specialized competence to examine the merits of the
proposed law. Yet, while the nal report of the congressional committee as to the
proposed bill may have persuasive effect on the body as a whole, it is by no means
binding. In fact, Congress as a whole has the power to revive a bill that has been tabled due
to unfavorable action by the congressional committee. 21 HDCTAc
The assailed Rules is premised on realistic considerations that also govern the daily
legislative grind: that owing to the sheer volume of work and the number of legislators, it
would be counter-productive to have every and any preliminary matter to be voted upon by
every member of the House or Senate.
The procedure outlined in the questioned Rules does not in any way contravene Sec.
4, Article VII of the Constitution. In fact, it strictly adheres to the provision. Under the Rules,
the Senate President opens the certi cates of canvass in the presence of the Senate and
the House of Representatives in joint public session. 22 Upon approval by Congress in joint
public session of the Joint Committee report, Congress as one whole body is deemed to
have determined the authenticity and due execution of the certi cates and canvassed the
certificate of votes.
Third, the questionedRules does not emasculate the representatives who are not
members of the Joint Committee since the Rules speci cally provides avenues for each
member of Congress to voice out any dissent to the opinions and conclusions of the Joint
Committee. Petitioner will be entitled to avail of all his legislative privileges and exert his
persuasive powers during that time certain when the Congress as a whole would
deliberate on and approve the Joint Committee's resolution of any question involving a
certi cate of canvass, 23 the nal report of the Joint Committee, 24 and the resolution
proclaiming the President and Vice-President-elect. 25
In light of my earlier discussion, petitioner's fourth argument hardly bears
discussion. Contrary to his claim, Congress did not abdicate from its constitutional duties
to canvass the presidential and vice-presidential elections. The Joint Committee canvass
is merely a preliminary canvass, with the nal canvass results subject to approval by the
entire Congress.
These are the only issues for resolution before the Court, and they can be concisely
dispensed with. Given the scope and limitations of these issues presented before us, it
would be improvident of this Court to discuss issues which are not raised, or to
engage in a "preemptive strike" based on speculative musings that in its
wisdom, Congress will be misguided by erroneous principles in the future
conduct of its canvass . By doing so, this Court will act in excess of its jurisdiction, by
ruling upon matters which have not been duly raised before us. The Court does not
issue advisory opinions . 26 This holds true, especially in the face of temptation to
dictate to a co-equal branch how it should act, despite the absence of any justiciable
question that would warrant such intrusion.
In ne, it is not the business of the Court to dictate on Congress as to how it should
perform its task as the national canvassing board, as its mandate was derived from no
less than the fundamental law. Should it fail to ful ll its mandate, it is accountable not to
this Court, but to the sovereign people.
Of course, there are laws which governs the conduct of the national canvass.
Republic Act No. 7166, passed in 1991, is one such law. Section 15 thereof provides:
Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator, and Members of the House of Representatives. — For
purposes of the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of
the House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of election returns or the certi cates of canvass, as the case may be.
However, this does not preclude the authority of the appropriate canvassing body
motu propio or upon written complaint of an interested person to correct manifest
errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before it.
SIaHDA
It is clear that Section 15 of Republic Act No. 7166 prohibits pre-proclamation

cases in elections for President and Vice-President. This would extend to questions
pertaining to the appreciation of election returns or certi cates of canvass. The only
exception would be to correct manifest errors in the certi cate of canvass. The Court in
Chavez v. COMELEC 2 7 de ned "manifest errors" as those that must appear on the face of
the certi cates of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected, and an objection
thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and speci cally noted in the
minutes of their respective proceedings. For the purpose of the presidential/vice-
presidential canvass, the Court's de nition in Chavez must be quali ed, since Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution mandates that Congress inspect only the certi cates of
canvass. Verily, I submit that such manifest errors which may be corrected only pertain to
the certificates of canvass in the case of presidential and vice-presidential elections.
The Court, through Justice Puno, explained the reason for Section 15 in Sandoval v.
COMELEC:
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the
winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these
sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception.
The second sentence of Section 15 allows the ling of petitions for correction of
manifest errors in the certi cate of canvass or election returns even in elections
for president, vice-president and members of the House of Representatives for
the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong
the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in
the election . This rule is consistent with and complements the authority of the
COMELEC under the Constitution to, "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an, election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall" and its power to "decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
questions affecting elections. 28 (emphasis supplied)
The limitations imposed on the national board of canvassers are thus clear. The
question which must be resolved by the canvassers is whether there is prima
facie basis for the proclamation of the president and the vice-president . Matters
which may be inquired into through a pre-proclamation protest, as laid down in Section
243 of the Omnibus Election Code, are not justiciable by Congress acting as the Board of
Canvassers. 29
Populist arguments aside, there are fundamental policy considerations why
Congress is proscribed by law from entertaining pre-proclamation controversies, or
inquiring into the intrinsic validity of the certi cates of canvass. First, there is the
abhorrence of vacuum in the "sensitive posts" 30 of President and Vice-President. The
Constitution provides that the term of o ce of the president shall begin on the thirtieth
day of June. 31 While the Constitution provides for contingencies should no president be
proclaimed before that date, all efforts should be exerted to avoid these "emergency
provisions" from coming into play, as they would necessarily affect political stability. In
fact, the June 30th "deadline" should be appreciated by Congress as an imperative that
should guide the body in the formulation of the rules for canvassing.
There is also the fact that the Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution as the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns , and quali cations of the
President or Vice-President. 32 As the eminent constitutionalist Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza has explained:
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation
cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the
House of Representatives. The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges" under the constitution of the election, returns and quali cations of
members of Congress of the President and Vice President, as the case may be.
(citations omitted) 33 IcESaA

It is clear that such questions in the province of the Supreme Court to decide in its
capacity as the sole judge of election contests for the presidency and vice-presidency are
distinct from those within the mandate of Congress as the canvassing body. They include
the appreciation of election returns and questions pertaining to the intrinsic validity of the
certi cates of canvass. The power to be the "judge of contests relating to the election,
returns, and quali cations" of any public o cer is essentially judicial, and as such, under
the principle of separation of powers, it belongs exclusively to the judicial department,
except only insofar as the Constitution provides otherwise. 3 4
I VOTE to DISMISS the petition.
Footnotes
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
1. Petition, p. 2 [emphasis supplied].
2. 103 Phil. 1051, 1068 [1957].

3. Javellana v. Executive Secretary , L-35154, 31 March 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 84, citing In re
McConaughy, 119, N.W. 408, 417.
4. Petition, p. 12, citing 2 Records of the Constitutional Commission 419 [hereinafter RECORDS].
5. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed., 1979.
6. People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 112-113 [1937].

7. Sec. 1., Article II, 1987 Constitution.
8. U.S. v. Hampton, 276 US 394 [1928]. See also Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
13260, 12 October 1998, 297 SCRA 754; People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 [1939].
9. Throughout the Constitution are examples of such encroachment, such as in the House of
Representatives, Senate, or Presidential Electoral Tribunals, with members from their
respective Houses as well as from the Supreme Court, or else when the President
exercises the veto power regarding legislation.
10. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed shall not exceed sixty days. [Emphasis
supplied]
11. Discussing the authority of Congress to provide its rules of proceedings, Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza in Arroyo v. De Venecia, (G.R. No. 127255, 14 August 1997, 277 SCRA 268),
cites Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 64 Fla. 41; 59 So. 963, 968 [1912], where it was held: "The
provision that each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict
the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the
body in ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and
when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a
determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it
proceeds in the exercise of any power, in the transaction of any business, or in the
performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution." [Emphasis supplied]. See
also United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 79 Conn. 141, 64 Atl. 5, 9-10 [1906]: "The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. . . .The power
to make rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
12. RECORDS at 433.
13. 2 RECORDS at 391.
14. Republic Act No. 7166, An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and
For Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and Other Purposes, 26
November 1991.
15. See Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 25 August 1995, 235 SCRA, 666-672
where it was held that amendments to bills proposed by conference committees held in
executive session that were not found in the original bills approved by the House of
Representatives or the Senate, were deemed valid because they were "[o]ften the only
way to reach agreement an conflicting provisions. . . with only the conferees present.
Otherwise, no compromise is likely to be made." Regardless, such amendments were deemed
valid as they could only be passed with the approval of Congress.
16. Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863, 871, citing 67 Corpus Juris Secundum 870.
17. Citing Sanson v. Barrios, 63 Phil. 198.
18. 2 RECORDS at 433.
19. 124 Phil. 168.

20. Id. at p. 182.
21. Record and Journal of the Joint Session of Congress as National Board of Canvassers,
Tenth Congress of the Philippines.
22. Id., 1.
23. Id., 1 & 2.

PUNO, J.:
1. A delegated power cannot be delegated.
2. 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
3. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 80 (2000).
4. Gonzales v. COMELEC, 129 Phil. 7 (1967).
5. 281 SCRA 330, 348 (1997).

6. 277 SCRA 268 (1997).
7. 144 U.S. 5, 36 L ed., 324-325.
8. G.R. No. 160261. See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, J. Puno.
9. Ibid.
10. Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001.
11. The New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language, 1995 International Edition, p. 790.
12. Section 14.

13. 40 Phil. 246, 251 (1919).
14. Aquino v. COMELEC, 22 SCRA 288, 293 (1968).
QUISUMBING, J.:
* Annex "A" to the petition.
* Arguments, p. 10 of petition.
* A member of the Joint Committee, Hon. Ma. Blanca Kim Bernardo-Lokin, also filed a motion
for leave to file attached Comment, which we granted and noted on 8 June 2004.
** Comment, House of Representatives, p. 12.
*** Comment, Senate of the Philippines, p. 40.
* See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186.
** See also Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452.
* See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), and Gore v. Bush, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
* Petition, p. 13.
* Note from the Publisher: Missing footnote text.
* Petition, p. 22.
** Citing Congressional Records for these years.
* See Records, Constitutional Com., pp. 391, 401.
** Comment of the OSG, p. 15.
*** Comment, House of Representatives, p. 10.

* Comment of OSG, p. 15.
CARPIO MORALES, J., concurring:
1. Petition at 2-3.
2. Id. at 10.
3. CONST. art. VIII, sec. 1.
4. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156-159 (1936).
5. Vide: In re Prautch, 1 Phil. 132 (1902); U.S. v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil. 1 (1922); Bondoc v.
Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991).
6. Vide: Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997), Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., 298 SCRA 756
(1998).
7. Petition at 18.
8. Id. at 7-9.
9. 17 SCRA 756 (1966).
10. Id. at 769.
11. Petition at 15-16.
12. Mateo v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 280, 284 (1991) citing Symaco v. Aquino, 106 Phil.
1130 (1960).
13. 21 SCRA 1462, 1466 (1967).
14. Id. at 1466-1467.
15. 22 SCRA 1317 (1968).
16. Id. at 1318-1320.
17. 180 SCRA 509 (1989).

18. Id. at 514-515.
19. II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION: PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES 390-
391 (1986).
20. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed. at 426.
21. Ibid.
22. Petition at 14-15.
23. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734 (1970); Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968); Peralta v.
Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30 (1978).
24. David v. Commission on Elections, 271 SCRA 90 (1997); vide: Arroyo v. De Venecia, supra;
Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., supra.
25.
ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed
from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to
affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of
all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment,
and trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When
sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President
of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but
shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section.
26. Unless two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes. In which case, one of
them shall be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of
Congress, voting separately.
27. 249 SCRA 628 (1995).
28. Id. at 649-650.
29. Petition at 21.
30. Abella v. Larrazabal, supra.
31. 323 SCRA 403 (2000).
32. Id. at 417-418.

CALLEJO, SR. , J., concurring:
1. II RECORDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 385.
2. Id. at 390-391.
3. Mateo v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 280 (1991).
4. 248 SCRA 300 (1995).
5. Sandoval v. Commission on Elections, 323 SCRA 403 (2000).
6. Espino v. Zaldivar, 21 SCRA 1204 (1967); Salvacion v. Commission on Elections, 170 SCRA
513 (1989). (Underscoring supplied.)
TINGA, J.:
1. See e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 L. ed [1803].

2. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.
3. "The United States Constitution. . . does not explicitly grant the judicial review power asserted
in Marbury." K. Sullivan & G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 13, 14th ed. (2001). See also L.
Tribe, American Constitutional Law 207, 3rd ed. (2000). "Although the Constitution is
silent as to whether federal courts have [the authority for judicial review], the power has
existed ever since Marbury". E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies
39, 2nd ed.; (2002). U.S. Supreme Court Justice Byron White has been on record in
opining that it was the U.S. Constitution, and not Marbury v. Madison that created
judicial review in the United States.
4. "When [judicial] supremacy is invoked, it compels the errant branches of government to obey
not the Supreme Court, but the Constitution." Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R.
Nos. 160261, etc., 10 November 2003, J. Tinga, concurring.
5. Generally, political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the
legality, of a particular measure Tañada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil. 101 [1957], as cited in
Tatad v. Secretary of Finance, 346 Phil. 321.
The formulation made in Baker v. Carr by the late American Supreme Court Justice William
Brennan as to what constitutes a political question has long gained a foothold both in
the United States and in the Philippines. "Prominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision' already made; or potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
217. (1962)
6. "Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." See Article VIII, Section 1,
Constitution, in relation to Baker v. Carr, supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., Marcos v. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, 15 September 1989, 177 SCRA 668.
8. See e.g., Javellana v. Executive Secretary , 151-A Phil. 35 (1973).
9. "The returns of every election for President and Vice-President . . . . shall be transmitted to the
Congress . . . and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes." See Section 4,
Article VII, Constitution.
10. Petition, p. 9.
11. Id. at 10.
12. The essential of the legislative function is the determination of the legislative policy and its
formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct. Occeña v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. L-2265, 28 January 1980, citing Yakus v. United States 321 US 414,
88 L. ed. 834.
13. See K. Sullivan and G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 351, 14th ed. (2001) "The non-delegation
doctrine forces a politically accountable Congress to make the policy choices, rather
than leave this to unelected administrative officials." E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional
Law: Principles and Policies 2nd ed 319 (2002).
14. "The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates." Par. 6, Sec.
4, Article VII, 1987 Constitution.
15. In fact, the 2nd paragraph of Section 13 of the Rules quite baldly states: "The Joint
Committee shall, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution of the
certificates of canvass, preliminarily canvass the votes of candidates for the offices of
President and Vice-President.
16. See Secs. 19, 23 and 24, Congressional Rules of Canvass.
17. See Section 24, Congressional Rules of Canvass.
18. Congress has the constitutional power to adopt rules for its proceedings, and by legislative
practice it is conceded the power to promulgate such orders as may be necessary to
maintain its prestige and to preserve its dignity. See Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 212.
(1946)
19. See Fernando and Fernando, Jr., Separation of Powers: The Three Departments of the
Philippine Government 205 (1985).
20. See E. Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 2nd ed 303 (2002).
21. See Fernando and Fernando, Jr., Separation of Powers: The Three Departments of the
Philippine Government 205 (1985).
24. See Section 23 and 24, Congressional Rules of Canvass.
26. Guingona v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125532, 10 July 1998, 292 SCRA 402, 413; Tolentino
v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. Nos. 115455, 25 August 1994, 235 SCRA 630, 686; De la
Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883, 12 March 1982, 112 SCRA 294, 385, Plana, J.,
concurring and dissenting.
27. Chavez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 105323, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 315, 322.
28. 380 Phil. 375, 389-390 (2000).
29. Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code states:
243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. The following shall be proper
issues that may be raised in a preproclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be
tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other
authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code;
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they
are obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the
results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or
candidates.
30. Sandoval v. COMELEC, supra note 28.
31. Article VII, Section 1, par. 1, Constitution.
32. See Section 4, Article VII, Constitution.
33. Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, 248 SCRA 300, 397; J. Mendoza,
concurring.
34. Lopez v. Roxas, 124 Phil. 168, 177 (1965).

Petitioner Vs Vs Respondents: en Banc

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 163556. June 8, 2004.]

CONG. RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ , petitioner, vs . SENATE OF THE

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO

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It is petitioner's position that the formation of a Joint Committee, which determines

CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE CANVASS OF THE

Is this accepted by the Committee?

When it appears that any certi cate of canvass or supporting statement of

Contrary to petitioner's argument, therefore, whether Congress deems it t to

Referring, once again, to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission: SHEIDC

On May 2, 2004, petitioner, a member of the House of Representatives representing

Respondent House of Representatives, through the Speaker of the House of

SEC. 13. A Joint Committee shall be created composed of eleven (11)

The Representative of the province or city whose certi cate of canvass is

REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE

Similarly, in Arroyo v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

The recent case of Macalintal v. COMELEC on absentee voting a rmed

xxx xxx xxx

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Seventh. The primary consideration in determining the authenticity and due

Nor is the right of petitioner as lawmaker — canvasser unduly prejudiced by the

In denying the issuance of a temporary restraining order, we were not unmindful of

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xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

The Aforementioned Rules of Congress Dated May 28, 2004 Constitute an

Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be

c) Congress shall canvass the votes for presidential and vice-presidential

Needless to say, the power of Congress to declare who, among

First, a canvassing board performs a purely ministerial function —

1. The election return for precinct No. 18 of Dinalupihan is not "obviously

xxx xxx xxx

If there was any fraud or irregularity committed in the election in said

And in Abella v. Commission on Elections, 17 this Court stated:

This provision reads as follows:

(d) When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places

The inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of certain election

xxx xxx xxx

An examination of Section 30 of Republic Act 7166, the implementing law referred

When it appears that any certi cate of canvass or supporting statement of

xxx xxx xxx

However, the same Rules on Canvassing clearly provides that Congress, as a

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The foregoing provisions also make it abundantly clear that it is Congress, as a

Petitioner's argument stands a basic principle of Constitutional law on its head. It is

To be sure, there is nothing irregular or sinister in the referral by Congress of the

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the

It is interesting to note the following description of conference committees

Conference committees may be of two types: free or instructed.

The Rules on Canvassing likewise provides for mechanisms by which the

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Section 17. When it appears that any certificate of canvass or

"SECTION 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for

In the Article on the Executive that is submitted for consideration, it is now

A purely ministerial act or duty is one in which an o cer or tribunal performs in a

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

At the same time, the notion of separation of powers is a linchpin of our

The present petition serves as a perfect opportunity to desist and reject.