INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS

FACING THE PHILIPPINES:

STRATEGIZING NATIONAL SECURITY

Karin Ingrid Castro

Exam:
Security Studies and Strategy
Winter 2014/2015
Karin Ingrid Castro Security Studies & Strategy Exam winter 2014/2015

Table of Contents

1 PREFACE 3

2 METHODS 3
2.1 DEFINING CONCEPTS AND RELATIONS TO THE CURRENT CASE 3
2.1.1 SECURITY 3
2.1.2 NATIONAL SECURITY AND SOVEREIGNTY 4
2.1.3 STRATEGY 4

3 SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION 5

3.1 THE “OTHER” 5
3.1.1 EXTREMIST GROUPS 5
3.1.2 CHINA 6
3.2 GLOBAL POWER POLITICS 7
3.2.1 TERRORISM AND THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY 7
3.2.2 CHINA AND THE REGIONAL SECURITY COMPLEX 8
3.3 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 8

4 RECOMMENDING A STRATEGY FOR ACTION 9

4.1 DISCUSSING POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 9
4.1.1 DO NOTHING 10
4.1.2 DEPLOY MILITARY AGAINST EXTREMIST GROUPS AND DECLARE WAR ON CHINA 10
4.1.3 CONTAIN AND DETER: THE RECOMMENDED SOLUTION 11

5 CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 12

6 LITERATURE 13

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1 Preface
The Republic of the Philippines currently faces a complex security threat. The death of
President Benigno S. Aquino III, and subsequent terrorist activity by Islamic extremist groups,
has resulted in the loss of governing control over Mindanao, Palawan and the Sulu Islands.
Additionally, China has released a statement claiming that it will “use all means necessary to
re-establish order and ensure the safe passage of merchant vessels in the area”. 1

The vice president, Jejomar Binay, now assumes the position of chief of state and head of
government, and therefore chairs the Council Proper of the Philippine National Security
Council 2, which has commissioned this report.
The report is based on empirical research and academic theory, which will be used to
provide a security analysis of the current situation, to establish the context and identify
primary concerns. This will then be used to discuss strategic options, and finally deliver
strategic recommendations for action.

2 Methods
To obtain reading practicality and facilitate clarity in this report, references are placed as
footnotes. Empirical material is primarily sourced from the internet, combined with local
experience, obtained through long-term visits to the Philippines over the past 25 years.

2.1 Defining concepts and Relations to the Current Case

Theoretically, this paper will begin by looking at the conceptualisation of security, national
security, and strategy.

2.1.1 Security
There are numerous theories on what security is and how it should be defined ad it is
therefore, a much debated and contested concept, as can be seen in its conceptual
development in International Security Studies, since the Second World War. 3 This paper will
look at the internal and external threats to the Philippine state, as the referent object, within a
widened sense of the security concept, namely securitization. 4
In relation to the current problem, this conceptualisation will be used to look at the
international subsystem, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); the two main units

1 Chinese government spokespersons, Kristian Knus Larsen

2 (National Security Council 2011)
3 (Buzan and Hansen 2009:8–13)
4 (Buzan and Hansen 2009:10; Buzan et al. 1998:1–5)

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involved in the problem, the Philippines and China (and secondary USA); and the subunits
involved, the Islamic extremist groups. 5
The external security dilemma 6 between the Philippines and China will be explored
alongside the internal security threat from the extremist groups, through a heterogeneous
security complex lens. 7 It will be explored how the political, military, economic and social
sectors are affected by the current problems and can come to be affected by various
strategies.

2.1.2 National Security and Sovereignty

National security can be described as national interest, a shared value of which a nation has
more or less at any given point in time. 8 It describes the absence of (subjective) national fear,
and thus security can be both a means and an end. 9 This argument introduces the notion of
morality and the responsibility of statesmen to make moral choices, as the decision-makers of
security thus make decisions about a nation’s values. 10
The concept of security described above, is linked to the principle of state sovereignty,
which for the intended use in this paper, will be described as the “monopoly of power and/or
authority in a particular territory”. 11 Within this particular territory or political community
are the values that make up national interest. 12 Therefore, if this is threatened either
internally or externally, it will become a matter of national security.

2.1.3 Strategy
Strategy has been described as a plan (intended), pattern (realised), position, perspective and
ploy. 13 It has also been described as an act, as “doing – dealing with the situation at hand”. 14
There are countless definitions and meanings of the concept, which can be traced back to
classical antiquity, but for this purpose, strategy will be defined as a “comprehensive way to
pursue political ends, including the threat or actual use of force, in a dialectic of wills – there has
to be at least two sides to a conflict”. 15

5 (Buzan et al. 1998:6)

6 (Jervis 1978)
7 (Buzan et al. 1998:10–20)
8 (Wolfers 1952:481-485)
9 (Wolfers 1952:492–493)
10 (Wolfers 1952:498–501)
11 (Walker 1990:8–9)
12 (Walker 1990:6–7)
13 (Mintzberg et al. 2009:9–15)
14 (Rasmussen 2014)
15 (Heuser 2010:27–28)

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Throughout time, there has been a debate on whether strategy is a science or art of war;
Clausewitz rejected both when he claimed that it was commerce on a large scale and thus
close to politics. 16 Following this in conjunction with the above, strategy in this sense
connects ends (the political objective/ problem), ways (concepts) and means
(military/political/economic resources for action).
In the current context, the strategic analysis will be based on the security analysis of the
problem, and empirical analysis of the actors involved.

3 Security Analysis of the Current Situation

The current situation threatening Philippine national security, as defined in the methods
section, takes form of a dual complex threat. Therefore it is crucial to first analyse the
threatening “other”; secondly it is important to analyse the nation under threat, to uncover
and prioritise areas of vulnerability; and thirdly, to review other actors that might be involved
or affected, through looking at global power politics.

3.1 The “Other”

The current threat comes from two sides, one internal – the Islamic extremist groups, that
have launched a series of terrorist attacks across the nation, and now control the southwest
part of the country; the second threat is external, and is posed by China who threaten to take
(unspecified) action, in order to secure safe passage of merchant vessels in the area. This
presents the Philippines with an urgent complex threat situation that needs to be resolved.

3.1.1 Extremist Groups

For more than 500 years the southern, mostly Islamic population (Bangsamoros) of the
Philippines have been fighting for independence from the Christian majority rule in Manila;
first the Spaniards, then the Americans, and since national independence in 1946, the
Philippine government. 17 This movement was formalised by the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF), the originator of several Islamic non-state armed groups (INSAGs), which
today continue to perform violent activities in the name of independence and/or Islam. 18
Some of these groups have also been linked to international terrorist groups e.g. Abu Sayyaf to
al Qaeda. 19

16 (Heuser 2010:5–6)
17 (Boot et al. 2009; MNLF n.d.; BBC 2009)
18 (Banlaoi 2012a:163–164; BBC 2009; Boot et al. 2009)
19 (BBC 2009; Boot et al. 2009)

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The difference in objectives and means of obtaining them, of these INSAGs also define the
support received from the wider population, as well as, the acknowledgement of the
Philippine government. The smaller, more extremely violent groups do not receive as much
support as the larger, more organised groups that are willing to negotiate their objectives
with the government. 20 The US has also worked with the Philippine government to assist with
countering the armed attacks. 21
Currently the MNFL and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 22 have signed a peace
agreement with the government, 23 which has given them greater level of autonomy. One must
therefore consider that it is in their interest to continue this peaceful recent development.
Some of the smaller groups like Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) and Moro Army
Committee (MAC) have to some extent formed relations with each other in an attempt to create a
stronger front against the government, including trying to disrupt and prevent peace talks with
MNFL/MILF. 24
Following the history of- and the relationships involved, in this conflict it is argued that the
national security of the sovereign state, the Philippines is being threatened from within.
Therefore, it is important to uncover, which constellation of INSAGs are involved in the recent
attacks; this will enable the government to pursue the most effective strategic action against this
development. 25 It is also crucial to consider the values within the various objectives the INSAGs
have – if the government is successful in uncovering these, the security interests of all can be
weighed and manipulated, to lower the security threat to the nation. 26

3.1.2 China
With regards to the external threat posed by China, it is imminent to first consider what is
meant by “all means necessary”. Is this a threat of armed force? Will they enter Philippine
sovereign territory? If so, what are the consequences?
Furthermore, following the dispute over contested territory in the South China Sea, 27 one
must also consider if this is a ploy from China’s side to solidify its claim. Thus the main
motivation may be territorial expansion, and securing the safe passage of merchant vessels, a
secondary motive acting as a profitable excuse. Why else should China assume the role of
policing the passage? Although piracy is known to be one of the INSAGs revenue generating

20 (Banlaoi 2012a)
21 (Boot et al. 2009; Shankar 2014)
22 (MNLF n.d.)
23 (BBC n.d.)
24 (Banlaoi 2012a:172–179)
25 (Sun Tzu 1994:134–135)
26 (Wolfers 1952:497–498)
27 (Banlaoi 2012b; Banlaoi 2012c; Thayer 2013; Tiezzi 2014a; Panda 2014)

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activities, 28 this issue has not previously been a concern for China, nor on a significantly large
scale to warrant any foreign state intervention.
If then, we assume that the motive is connected with the territorial dispute; it introduces
the larger picture of Philippine-China bilateral relations. As such, it also places the sovereignty
of the Philippines, and herein its nations values, under threat, making it a question of national
security. 29
Considering China’s size and military capability, they far outmatch the arms capabilities of
the Philippines. This leads one to assume that China is not made vulnerable or insecure by the
Philippine’s defensive arms capability, and as such there is no security dilemma in the classic
bi-polar sense on the unit level. 30 However, this will not stop China from armed invasion of
territory, as this is the assumed motive, and thus there is an urgent need to consider either
allies with armed capability that meet China’s, or non-military strategic deterrence. 31

3.2 Global Power Politics

In todays world, global power politics and international relations has replaced the bi-polarity
of the cold war. 32 As such, armed conflict between two nations or within a nation, might be of
interest to a certain global power nation, in this case the US, or an entire region, in this case
the ASEAN region. Therefore, in considering the concept of securitization, one must study the
power politics of the concept. 33

3.2.1 Terrorism and the Global Community

As mentioned previously, some of the INSAGs are linked to international terrorist groups,
and/or are listed on terror watch-lists internationally.
The US has recently signed a military access agreement with the Philippine government,
permitting US military presence and activity; 34 so despite the recent US decision to roll back
its involvement in fighting INSAGs, 35 one could assume that it would be in their interest to
assist in combating the current uprising.

28 (Banlaoi 2012a:164)
29 (Wolfers 1952)
30 (Jervis 1978:199; Buzan et al. 1998:6)
31 (Freedman 2004a:59)
32 (Krause and Williams 1996; Buzan et al. 1998)
33 (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde 1998:32)
34 (Capozzola 2014; Keck 2014; Press 2014)
35 (Boot et al. 2009; Shankar 2014)

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3.2.2 China and the Regional Security Complex

Concerning China, it may also be possible for the Philippines to acquire armed support from
another unit actor, such as the US due to their presence in the country. 36 One could also
speculate that the US is apprehensive about the growing power of China and therefore has a
political interest in containing this event. 37 It is possible that this could be enough to deter
China from armed action. 38
Alternatively, one could look to the international subsystem, and request support from
the other ASEAN nations. Considering regional security complex theory, China holds the
principle power among the units of ASEAN. 39 Over recent years there has been an internal
transformation, as China’s aggressive behaviour regarding the contested waters dispute, has
increased the affected countries’ enmity toward China. 40 In this sense, the security complex is
best viewed as a heterogeneous complex as the dispute touches military, political, economic
and social sectors 41.

3.3 Republic of the Philippines

To fully understand the threats to national security, it is necessary to analyse the state itself,
as it has been written that victory comes from knowing yourself as well as your enemy. 42
Empirical statistical data has been reviewed 43 and taken into consideration, when
investigating the societal disposition towards the level of national security, both from the
broader population, but also from the decision-makers. 44 Having been under colonial rule and
experienced rebellious freedom movements, as well as, martial law within recent decades, the
Philippine people and government value democracy and freedom. In the National Security
Policy, the former president states that the government’s first priority is to secure the safety
and well being of the Philippine people. 45
Following the analysis of the dual problem, it is clear that both ‘others’ threaten the
national security from different angles. None of these threats are new, and the government
have been working on both threats for decades. Within the last year progress has been made
by successfully signing a peace treaty with MNLF/MILF as mentioned above, and defending its

36 (Press 2014; Keck 2014)

37 (US-China Relations n.d.)
38 (Jervis 1978:168–173)
39 (Buzan et al. 1998:10–15)
40 (Heijmans 2014)
41 (Buzan et al. 1998:16–17)
42 (Sun Tzu 1994:135)
43 (UN Data: Philippines 2015; CIA Library 2014; BBC n.d.)
44 (Wolfers 1952; Jervis 1978:174–176)
45 (National Security Council 2011:i–ii)

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sovereignty towards China in the contested waters dispute, taking the matter to the UN. 46
This problem should therefore be seen as new developments of already existing threats.
It is also important to consider the support of the population for the government. Since
the President is the chief of state and head of government, he has the final responsibility for
the nation. Reviewing the history of presidential elections, rule, and Philippine politics in
general, it is clear that corruption is a transcending problem; moreover, it is evident that
personal popularity with the population is key. 47 Since the vice president is elected separately
from the president, political convictions and objectives do not necessarily match. However, to
sustain popularity and thus support, it is crucial that Jejomar Binay takes public opinion into
account and works for the interest of the nation. Sensitivity towards personal interest and
corruption is at a high, which could be seen when the former president Arroyo’s was indicted
on fraud and corruption charges. 48 In addition, public opinion on China seems increasingly
negative, 49 something that needs to be considered when making strategic choices with
regards to the current problem.
Lastly, it is also important to consider that the Philippines is still a economic developing
country that is regularly exposed to extreme weather conditions such as typhoons,
earthquakes and landslides. 50 This makes it important to consider the allocation of resources
when selecting strategies for action. 51

4 Recommending a Strategy for Action

The current problem has been described, and analysis has found that it is a complex and
dynamic situation where two separate adversaries threaten the national security; one from
inside the sovereign territory and one from the outside. The situation requires the
government to be flexible and be open to adaption regardless of which action is prescribed. 52

4.1 Discussing Possible Solutions

It has been said that war is an interaction where you cannot predict everything. 53 However, it
is crucial to know your own political objective for the outcome of the conflict, as well as,
consider the possible ways to get there, and the means at your disposal, before acting. 54

46 (Tiezzi 2014a)
47 (Personality-Driven 2013; New Philippine President Sworn in 2010; BBC n.d.)
48 (Hunt 2012; Palatino 2013)
49 (Tiezzi 2014b; Press 2014; Whitehead 2013)
50 (UN Data: Philippines 2015; CIA Library 2014; BBC n.d.)
51 (Baldwin 1997:16)
52 (Sun Tzu 1994:111,146–148,177–179)

53 (Clausewitz 1989:I, 84–85)

54 (Clausewitz 1989:I, 80–81; 86–87)

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4.1.1 Do nothing
One option is to simply accept the security threat posed by the INSAGs and China on grounds
that the cost of taking action outweighs the benefit. 55 However this is problematic in several
ways.
First, regarding the extremist groups, this solution needs to be ruled out, as there would
then be nothing but blind faith, stopping them from expanding their territorial take-over. It is
not clear which INSAGs are involved, or what their ends, ways and means are. The unknowns
are too numerous for this situation to be acceptable. Secondly, if one assumes that the
objective is to gain territory in the name of Islam, and considers the extreme violence used
against ordinary civilians, this would endanger the (Catholic) majority of the population.
With regards to China’s threat, one could choose to assume that they only mean to guard
their own part of the South China Sea and will not interfere with Philippine sovereignty.
Following the analysis, this however is doubtful. Even if they “only” take over the contested
territory, Philippine public opinion will turn against the government, which in the end could
mean an attempted overthrow. Furthermore, what would then stop China from claiming even
more territory as theirs and where would it end?
Both of these scenarios would be going directly against the National Security Policy of the
Philippines about protecting the interest of the nation. 56

4.1.2 Deploy Military Against Extremist Groups and Declare War on China
Another option at the other end of the scale could be to respond with immediate armed force.
This would be raising the issue to an urgent security threat, and would thus be to perform an
act of securitization that in this case would need to be accepted (approved) by the president. 57
The military could then be deployed to fight the INSAGs, and would most likely win; but at
what cost? Since there are too many unanswered questions regarding whom, what and why
these groups have taken action, jumping into an armed conflict could be a costly mistake. First
of all, they are on well-known territory, which may not be the case for the national military; it
is imperative for victory that one knows the battleground well. 58 Secondly, engaging in
internal warfare without careful consideration may cause negative public opinion, since a
signed peace-agreement exists, and it is not clear who is involved in the armed attacks. 59

55 (Baldwin 1997:19–21)
56 (National Security Council 2011)
57 (Buzan et al. 1998:23–26)
58 (Clausewitz 1989; Sun Tzu 1994:140–142)
59 (Freedman 2004b:126)

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Regarding the Chinese threat, one could from the analysis, reasonably assume that they
have hostile intentions. 60 In this case securitization would be a logical act; declaring armed
warfare against China however, would not. This rash move would mean going into battle
without knowing yourself, your enemy, and possible gains and losses. 61 It would be entering
blind into a battle that from the beginning is unequal in armed capabilities. Entering into a
war, has been described as, setting off a chain of unpredictable and uncontrollable events at
great domestic cost, 62 doing so blind would not be a morally responsible act of the
government towards its nation. 63
Considering both threats, the Philippines does not have the armed capabilities to engage
in conflict with two different threats at once, and focusing on one would leave the nation
vulnerable to the other, and this would also go against the National Security Policy and the
national interest. 64

4.1.3 Contain and Deter: The Recommended Solution

Having rejected the two options above, it is now time to consider a strategy that falls in
between inaction and reckless action. It has been written that, “security should be seen as
negative, as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics”. 65 In this case, the recommended
approach tries to de-securitise the situation and deal with it politically instead. 66
As was uncovered in the analysis of the INSAGs, the conflict and subsequent terror attacks
has a long history. It also revealed that there are different types of groups with different
objectives, ways and means of obtaining them. For this reason, the nation has over time
become used to INSAGs and their activity. 67 This gives allowance for time spent on containing
the situation, gathering intelligence and formulating a coherent strategic plan of action. 68 It is
recommended that cooperation is sought from the US military present in the Philippines, to
contain the situation, so it does not expand into other parts of the country, whilst resources
are spent on finding answers to the unknown factors.
Turning to the threat from China, it is assumed, based on the analysis that they would
potentially take armed action that would compromise Philippine sovereignty. However, since
China has the offensive advantage and has much greater capability, the Philippines need to

60 (Clausewitz 1989:I,76)
61 (Sun Tzu 1994:135, 167,173, 203)
62 (Jervis 1978:177)
63 (Wolfers 1952:498–501)
64 (Wolfers 1952; National Security Council 2011)
65 (Buzan et al. 1998:29)
66 (ibid.)
67 (Freedman 2004b:124–130)
68 (Sun Tzu 1994:231–233)

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Karin Ingrid Castro Security Studies & Strategy Exam winter 2014/2015

find an alternative deterrence strategy that will raise the cost of conquest for China to an
unacceptable level. 69 Thus, the battlefield should be within politics rather than in a physical,
territorial form. In terms of armed capability, the weaker side should obtain the political goal
preferably without violence, but through deception (strategy). 70
To secure sovereignty, the government should take advantage of, already established
political channels and seek political, as well as, armed support in case politics does not deter
China. Within the heterogeneous regional security complex, the other ASEAN governments
share some values with the Philippines across several sectors. 71 Due to already existing and
continuously growing enmity towards China over contested waters, it can be expected that at
least some of the nations will voice political support on the global scene. Since China has been
attempting to improve its international image, this could be a too high cost. Furthermore,
seeking political support from a global power such as the US, who has an armed presence in
the Philippines already, could have a deterring effect on China.
Selecting this strategy of action towards ISAGs and China, will meet the political objective
of securing national sovereignty with maximal domestic cohesion (support of public opinion)
by taking action without sacrificing too much. 72 This will be obtained through de-
securitisation into politicization, whilst still securing armed support as an emergency plan, by
using available political means such as ASEAN and US bilateral relations.

5 Considerations for the Future

In conclusion it must be highlighted that it is imperative for successful strategy, to know
oneself as well as ones adversary. 73 Furthermore, one must also be prepared to alter and
reformulate ones strategy continuously, as it is an interaction with an adversary. 74 Finally,
costs always matter and each security strategy has its cost that needs to be considered and
prioritised, to find maximum benefit across the sectors of a nation with values. 75

69 (Baldwin 1997:16; Jervis 1978:190; Freedman 2004a:59; Wolfers 1952:497–498)

70 (Sun Tzu 1994:177–178)
71 (Buzan et al. 1998:15–17; Wolfers 1952:498)
72 (Wolfers 1952; Sun Tzu 1994)
73 (Sun Tzu 1994:135)
74 (Clausewitz 1989:I, 80)
75 (Baldwin 1997:16; Wolfers 1952)

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