8 TOP FAQ ON NEW DECISION OF PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT ALLOWING FOR RECOGNITION OF DIVORCE

OBTAINED BY FILIPINOD MARRIED TO FOREIGNERS.

1) Q: I am a Filipino citizen married to a foreigner. I obtained a divorce abroad from my husband. Can I have
this recognized in the Philippines even if there is no divorce in the Philippines? My husband had already remarried,
why can’t I?
A: The Supreme Court answered “yes” to both these questions. In Republic vs. Manalo (G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018),
the Court held that a foreign divorce secured by a Filipino against a foreign spouse is also considered valid in the Philippines,
even if it is the Filipino spouse who initiated the divorce proceedings abroad. To put this issue in the right context, we quote
the exact words of the Supreme Court decision as written by Justice Peralta:
“Par. 2 of Article 26 speaks of ‘a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.’
Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The
letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word “obtained” should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding
must actually be initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court , will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would
depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of
the act.
The purpose of par. 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address the anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.”
Petitioner Marelyn Tanedo Manalo in this landmark case is also a Filipina married to a Japanese national. She initiated the
divorce proceedings against her husband, which was granted by the foreign court. However, her petition for judicial
recognition of the divorce obtained abroad was denied by Regional Trial Court in Dagupan. It ruled that the kind of divorce
recognized here in the Philippines are those validly obtained by the alien spouse abroad, and not by the Filipino spouse.
This is because, prior to this landmark case, if the one who obtained the divorce was the Filipino spouse, the State will not
recognize the divorce because of the absence of absolute divorce in the country and the application of the nationality
principle where laws on marriage follow the Filipino national wherever he or she may be. With this ruling, the State now
recognizes the divorce obtained by the Filipino, and couples of the same circumstances of mixed-marriages will now be
considered not married to each other even under Philippine law.
Manalo can now go to the Dagupan Trial Court and present to them this SC ruling, and the divorce will now be recognized.
This ruling opens up the gate for Filipinos married to foreigners to get divorce in a predominantly Catholic country that is
still ambivalent towards divorce. It also cures the “injustice” as the Court noted of the Filipino citizen not being able to remarry
while the foreign spouse had already been freed from the shackles of a failed marriage.
What are the consequences of this ruling on the following situations?
2) Q: We are both Filipino citizens living and working abroad, can one or both of us now get a divorce and
have that recognized in the Philippines?
A: No. In the Philippines, a married couple cannot divorce by law. Regardless of where they live, this law follows them
throughout the entire world. Article 15 of the New Civil Code states that:
“The laws pertaining to familial rights and responsibilities, or to the standing, form and legal capability of persons is
compulsory upon inhabitants of the Philippines even though they are residing overseas.”
This is more commonly known as the nationality principle. Therefore, Filipinos are still under the rule of their land even if
they are in another location.
3) Q: What if my spouse and I were both Filipino citizens, but he became naturalized in another country while
we were married, what can we do to get a divorce under this new ruling of the Supreme Court?
A: According to the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines:
“Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.”
The literal interpretation of the aforementioned provision suggests that the parties to the marriage must only be between a
Filipino and a foreigner; it does not cover scenarios where the marriage is between Filipino citizens, but later on one of them
became a citizen of another country and obtained a divorce decree. But in the case of Republic of the Philippines vs.
Cipriano Orbecido III (G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005), the High Court said:
“Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute, according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended
to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
To wit, to be under the operation of this provision, there must be a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at
the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.”
Based on the above mentioned decision, when both spouses are Filipino citizens, and one of them subsequently became
a naturalized citizen of a foreign country, and a divorce decree was later obtained, to the effect of dissolving the marriage
between them, the divorce shall likewise be recognized in the Philippines.
 4) Q: I am a Filipino citizen married to a foreigner. I filed a petition for divorce abroad, and it was granted. Is it
possible for me to remarry in the Philippines?
A: Yes, but in order for the divorce obtained abroad to be legally binding under our Philippine laws, the divorce must first be
recognized or acknowledged here in the Philippines. This can be done by filing a petition for judicial recognition of divorce
before the Regional Trial Courts.
In other words, if the divorce proceedings overseas have been granted, this does not automatically mean that the Filipino
has the right to enter into another marriage. There must be an acknowledgment of the divorce from the Filipino courts for
remarriage to be possible. After the Filipino courts have acknowledged the dissolution of marriage, only then can a Filipino
citizen remarry.
5) Q: What evidence should be presented before the Philippine Courts to prove foreign divorce?
A: Petitioner must prove that the spouse is a foreign citizen. He must prove the foreign divorce as a fact and demonstrate
its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. That foreign law must also be proved before our courts. Like any other fact, such
laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, the Petitioner must also show that the divorce decree allows his former
spouse to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that the
Petitioner is capacitated to enter into another marriage. (Republic vs. Obrecido, G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005)
6) Q: The ruling of the Supreme Court is dated April 24, 2018, if I am a Filipino citizen married to a foreigner
and my divorce was obtained prior to this date, can I still use it to justify the recognition of my divorce in the
Philippines?
A: As a general rule, laws and decisions of courts which are part of the law of the land, have only prospective effect. In this
strict sense, it can be interpreted to mean that you cannot use the divorce obtained prior to the decision. However, as an
exception to the general rule, laws or decisions of the Supreme Court which are remedial in nature or which corrects an
interpretation of the law, should be given retroractive effect.
7) Q: If I am able to have my divorce from my foreign husband recognized in the Philippines under this new
ruling, how would the custody and support of my children be resolved? Would the custody ordered by the foreign
court in the divorce decree be binding on me or could I file separate custody proceedings in the Philippines under
the Nationality Principle?
A: There is a conflict here as to which law should apply when it comes to custody and support, and a lot will depend on the
court where the petition for custody or support is filed. Under the principle of comity under international law which allows
Philippine courts to recognize the decisions of foreign courts or tribunals, it can be argued that you are bound by whatever
the foreign court has ruled on the issues of custody and support. However, it can likewise be argued under Philippine law
that you have the right to sue separately for custody or support in the Philippine.
8) Q: How would property issues between me and my foreign husband be disposed of under this ruling,
assuming we have properties in the Philippines? Am I bound by whatever disposition on properties were made in
the foreign divorce decree or could I sue in the Philippines to protect my interests?
A: Again, this is a situation where there is potentially a conflict between a foreign law and Philippine law. It can be argued
that you are bound by the property dispositions made under the foreign divorce. But it can also be argued that under the
nationality principle and the fact that the properties are in the Philippines that you have a right to file separate actions in
court to protect your interests insofar as those properties are concerned.

Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.

Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.

Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.

The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. The
court, however, approved it.

The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:

(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lana of the deceased's
business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the
failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the
receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph G. Brimo's will
which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation or article 10
of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:

Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.

But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch
as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws,
they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)

It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he desires to be given an
opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the court in not having deferred the approval
of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.

The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is discretionary with the trial
court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, we find no
abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is, therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the
testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must
be complied with and executed. lawphil.net

Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee, inasmuch as he is one of
the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such exclusion is based on the last part of the second
clause of the will, which says:

Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred upon me
by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a considerable length of
time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now possess, it is my wish that the
distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made and disposed of in accordance with the
laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the person or persons who fail to comply with this request.

The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the testator's will to
distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with the laws of the Philippines.

If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein oppositor who, by his
attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is prevented from receiving his legacy.

The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides the following:

Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice
the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.

And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to article 10 of the civil
Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions.

Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will
is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.

It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition imposed upon the
legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.

All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it not appearing that
said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to
include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is
approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April
30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 therein.1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E.
Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in
infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him,
he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate
children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations,
and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied,
the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A.
Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1äwphï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to
probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective
legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed
the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account,
Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E.
Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria
Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition,
the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the residuary estate
into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition
on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt
submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued
an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and project of
partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law,
which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants
appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law.
 In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar
v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of
one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas
and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine
law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties
here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should
not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they
never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e)
the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy
and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the
phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the
old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific
provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national
law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress
has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia,
the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas estate and the other his
Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such
was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled
in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of
Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to
the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

April 24, 2018

G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
RESOLUTION

peralta, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and set aside the September 18,
2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of
the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional Trial Court
of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the
case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive
weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting
of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27,
2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the Philippines authorizing the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or
caption of the petition considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended Petition, which captioned that if it
is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as
shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die proceedings, a divorce
decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;

4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband are no
longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said Japanese former
husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila
cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously registered, in order
that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her
husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the marriage between
the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage
was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage, that
she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment. Among the documents that
were offered and admitted were:
 1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form and in
substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12,
2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Notification of
Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should
not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to
file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated
their marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country,
Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties, together with the determination of their
condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable
even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no
longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling
that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it
would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For
the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van
Dorn v. Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by the latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 10

2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos
cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad. 13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a subsequent
marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry.15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise
known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988. 16Shortly thereafter , E.O. No.
227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second
paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee
(Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209. 19 As
modified, Article 26 now states:
 Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the where country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. 20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. 21Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained
by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations
of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.23

According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a
Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had
obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national law. 24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino
women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly
divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already married again.25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding,
and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as
in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced
by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains
divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x
x

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the
instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but their
citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under Philippine
law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated
to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and
for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear anymore that she is still married
to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be
remarried, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation,respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor daughter. Later on, the
husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole
custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree
is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce
decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to
enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction
or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to
support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign
divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino
is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for
accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce
(obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen,
against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right
to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment
in the divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the divorce
decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that
the acts and declaration of a foreign court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect
of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is
not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794,799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is
unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall
not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond of the
former marriage."

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 31

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be recognized and given legal effects
in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings inFujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family
court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy.
In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as
married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the
 entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in
the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of
his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in
limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation
of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage included the right to be supported
"in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife")
of the Family Code. x x x34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which was
granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity
to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et
al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the
case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual
issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that
was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it
should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right
to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and
ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital
bond.

The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to Philippine law, which prohibits
absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute,
a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of
the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition
until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The
letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree
was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouth of lawmakers. 37 The legislature is presumed
to know the meaning of the words to have used words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found
in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be departure."38

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the divorce proceeding must be
actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true
intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. 39 Law have ends to
achieve, and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. 40 As held in League of Cities
of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched.
Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to
inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the
intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to
the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her countr. 42 Whether the Filipino
spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her
alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who
initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an
alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means
to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by
operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute
and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception
thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws
of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.43

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision is accorded recognition and
respect by the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to judicial review. 44 The deference stops where the classification
violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. 45 When these violations arise, this
Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence
to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates
to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden
is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest.47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are those basic liberties explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right to free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the
right to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights
and powers arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history. 50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some
individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or the general welfare. 51 It essentially involves
a public right or interest that, because of its primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the
latter.52

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to the acts of the President which
have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates
one of the essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce
decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real,
material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly, while
a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against
his her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner. 55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino
who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are
considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were
it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to
make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not
is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment because a foreign divorce decree that
was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds
similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. 56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be
accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she
chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her
martial ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For
the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these "mechanism" are and
how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration
of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides,
such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the
floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien
spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support what he intends to prove. Second, We
adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if
uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong, 57 that a person takes ordinary care of
his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a
man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage, 61 and that the law has
been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or
she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into out of genuine love
and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more
forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not
for Us to prejudge the motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:

Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictated on the kind
of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to
privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no
children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the
legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid
cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage. 63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C.
Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was
categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer specifically to
the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a general law on divorce? His
intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to encourage
the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of
divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce law?

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine courts could grant an absolute
divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial
Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission
promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and provided eleven ground for absolute divorce,
such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross
insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's incurable
insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect
and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an
absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized. 70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-institute absolute divorce. As
a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17thCongress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of
representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage
in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and
2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a
child of the petitioner;
 b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;

c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a petitioner,
to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if
pardoned;

e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or

abroad;

h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse during
the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to them by in
vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;

i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a petitioner;
and

j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or both spouses can petition the proper
court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years of age
or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents
guradian or personl having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after
attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together
as husband and wife;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with
the other as husband and wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full knowledge
of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;

d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same
having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and
wife;

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such
incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and

f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or appears to be
incurable.

Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or supervening after the marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition for absolute
divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;

2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or not the
incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;
 3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to another, the
other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-
versa;

4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the marriage
beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any attempt to enact a law on absolute
divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and
their nature of permanence,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits
what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines
as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms,
would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion. 76

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand
that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they are good for country. 77 While marriage is considered a
sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family Code. 78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical
overtone, that the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the
solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend,
among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of
Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children
are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable legislation passed in
order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A.
No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and
R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2012").Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose
sight of the constitutional mandate to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and
obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing
"mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered
as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being branded
as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to
hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article
XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without denying
State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs. 82

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of communication and information
technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world,
mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that
imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the
attainment of the individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is
hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten
quality.

Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of
any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating
that the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis
v. San Luis85 quoted:

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is
a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
 Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same,
in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the sord and the will, that
justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy
that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one
of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought
to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we
interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with,
that the law be dispensed with justice.86

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene
the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the
letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within
its spirit or intent.88

The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce
the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must
still first be proven.90Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. 91

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be
written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the seal of his office. 92

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court allowing
the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificateissued by the Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of
the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court, these documents
sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We are constrained to recognize the Japanese
Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible a a written act of the foreign
court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court
impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an
opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material defendants
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
 It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts,
they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. 96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former husband's
capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino
judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDEDto the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a
petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29,
2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition
for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. 5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed
Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. 6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with
the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to
the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was
prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar
prayer to Gerbert’s.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be
able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."11
THE PETITION

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly
asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien
spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the
Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might
be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be
on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, 14 both support
Gerbert’s position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right
to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURT’S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes
is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the
judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the
exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of
the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion
of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign
divorce had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to
a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially,
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to
the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or
as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce
as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for
the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in
this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens
– with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence
of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that
the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien
himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section
requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. 31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss
the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s
(Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations,
the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it
not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on
Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. 34We consider the recording to be legally
improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in
the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded.
In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:

(a) births;

(b) deaths;

(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;

(g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall,
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves
do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition
of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law
when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign
decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4,
series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed
the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not,
by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules
of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the
civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding
civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. 40As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one
filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of
a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which
the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent
marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does
not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband
or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a
copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a
foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign
service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office. 50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the
parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the
public prosecutor,53the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the
case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 The
interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58this Court explained that "[i]f every
judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the
effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine
State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case
as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign
citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a
fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules
of Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can
only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as
respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence. 64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary
trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained
a divorce decree abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108
creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, 66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by
the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made
in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he
has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry
on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted
and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of
the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances 68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. 69 These property interests in marriage include the right to
be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, 72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. 74 In any
case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the
wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are
neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because
any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. 77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a
subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in
the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that
such judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. 81 Thus, the
"validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing
the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage.
A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for
the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage
by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign
judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity
of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26
which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a
Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse
being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that
the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served." 91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void
on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse,
after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment
is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse
cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino
spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option
to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy
available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided
under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a
foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country,
Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of
the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy
in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the
comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a
right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise,
there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the
Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contents
and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23145 November 29, 1968

TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D. TAYAG, ancillary administrator-appellee,
vs.
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., oppositor-appellant.

Cirilo F. Asperillo, Jr., for ancillary administrator-appellee.

Ross, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for oppositor-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:

Confronted by an obstinate and adamant refusal of the domiciliary administrator, the County Trust Company of New York, United
States of America, of the estate of the deceased Idonah Slade Perkins, who died in New York City on March 27, 1960, to surrender
to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines the stock certificates owned by her in a Philippine corporation, Benguet Consolidated,
Inc., to satisfy the legitimate claims of local creditors, the lower court, then presided by the Honorable Arsenio Santos, now retired,
issued on May 18, 1964, an order of this tenor: "After considering the motion of the ancillary administrator, dated February 11, 1964,
as well as the opposition filed by the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., the Court hereby (1) considers as lost for all purposes in connection
with the administration and liquidation of the Philippine estate of Idonah Slade Perkins the stock certificates covering the 33,002
shares of stock standing in her name in the books of the Benguet Consolidated, Inc., (2) orders said certificates cancelled, and (3)
directs said corporation to issue new certificates in lieu thereof, the same to be delivered by said corporation to either the incumbent
ancillary administrator or to the Probate Division of this Court."1

From such an order, an appeal was taken to this Court not by the domiciliary administrator, the County Trust Company of New York,
but by the Philippine corporation, the Benguet Consolidated, Inc. The appeal cannot possibly prosper. The challenged order represents
a response and expresses a policy, to paraphrase Frankfurter, arising out of a specific problem, addressed to the attainment of specific
ends by the use of specific remedies, with full and ample support from legal doctrines of weight and significance.

The facts will explain why. As set forth in the brief of appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc., Idonah Slade Perkins, who died on March
27, 1960 in New York City, left among others, two stock certificates covering 33,002 shares of appellant, the certificates being in the
possession of the County Trust Company of New York, which as noted, is the domiciliary administrator of the estate of the
deceased.2Then came this portion of the appellant's brief: "On August 12, 1960, Prospero Sanidad instituted ancillary administration
proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila; Lazaro A. Marquez was appointed ancillary administrator, and on January 22,
1963, he was substituted by the appellee Renato D. Tayag. A dispute arose between the domiciary administrator in New York and
the ancillary administrator in the Philippines as to which of them was entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in question.
On January 27, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the domiciliary administrator, County Trust Company, to "produce
and deposit" them with the ancillary administrator or with the Clerk of Court. The domiciliary administrator did not comply with the
order, and on February 11, 1964, the ancillary administrator petitioned the court to "issue an order declaring the certificate or
certificates of stocks covering the 33,002 shares issued in the name of Idonah Slade Perkins by Benguet Consolidated, Inc., be
declared [or] considered as lost."3

It is to be noted further that appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. admits that "it is immaterial" as far as it is concerned as to "who is
entitled to the possession of the stock certificates in question; appellant opposed the petition of the ancillary administrator because
the said stock certificates are in existence, they are today in the possession of the domiciliary administrator, the County Trust
Company, in New York, U.S.A...."4

It is its view, therefore, that under the circumstances, the stock certificates cannot be declared or considered as lost. Moreover, it
would allege that there was a failure to observe certain requirements of its by-laws before new stock certificates could be issued.
Hence, its appeal.
As was made clear at the outset of this opinion, the appeal lacks merit. The challenged order constitutes an emphatic affirmation of
judicial authority sought to be emasculated by the wilful conduct of the domiciliary administrator in refusing to accord obedience to a
court decree. How, then, can this order be stigmatized as illegal?

As is true of many problems confronting the judiciary, such a response was called for by the realities of the situation. What cannot be
ignored is that conduct bordering on wilful defiance, if it had not actually reached it, cannot without undue loss of judicial prestige, be
condoned or tolerated. For the law is not so lacking in flexibility and resourcefulness as to preclude such a solution, the more so as
deeper reflection would make clear its being buttressed by indisputable principles and supported by the strongest policy
considerations.

It can truly be said then that the result arrived at upheld and vindicated the honor of the judiciary no less than that of the country.
Through this challenged order, there is thus dispelled the atmosphere of contingent frustration brought about by the persistence of
the domiciliary administrator to hold on to the stock certificates after it had, as admitted, voluntarily submitted itself to the jurisdiction
of the lower court by entering its appearance through counsel on June 27, 1963, and filing a petition for relief from a previous order of
March 15, 1963.

Thus did the lower court, in the order now on appeal, impart vitality and effectiveness to what was decreed. For without it, what it had
been decided would be set at naught and nullified. Unless such a blatant disregard by the domiciliary administrator, with residence
abroad, of what was previously ordained by a court order could be thus remedied, it would have entailed, insofar as this matter was
concerned, not a partial but a well-nigh complete paralysis of judicial authority.

1. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. did not dispute the power of the appellee ancillary administrator to gain control and possession
of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines. Nor could it. Such a power is inherent in his duty to settle her
estate and satisfy the claims of local creditors.5 As Justice Tuason speaking for this Court made clear, it is a "general rule universally
recognized" that administration, whether principal or ancillary, certainly "extends to the assets of a decedent found within the state or
country where it was granted," the corollary being "that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property
in another state or country."6

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an earlier case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus:
"It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country
of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of
decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration.
The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the
country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary
administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered
in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs." 7

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering
the 33,002 shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond
question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its
shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.

Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue8 finds application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of
the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above undeniable proposition, not
even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.

2. In the face of such incontrovertible doctrines that argue in a rather conclusive fashion for the legality of the challenged order, how
does appellant, Benguet Consolidated, Inc. propose to carry the extremely heavy burden of persuasion of precisely demonstrating
the contrary? It would assign as the basic error allegedly committed by the lower court its "considering as lost the stock certificates
covering 33,002 shares of Benguet belonging to the deceased Idonah Slade Perkins, ..." 9 More specifically, appellant would stress
that the "lower court could not "consider as lost" the stock certificates in question when, as a matter of fact, his Honor the trial Judge
knew, and does know, and it is admitted by the appellee, that the said stock certificates are in existence and are today in the possession
of the domiciliary administrator in New York."10

There may be an element of fiction in the above view of the lower court. That certainly does not suffice to call for the reversal of the
appealed order. Since there is a refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary administrator in New York, to deliver the shares of
stocks of appellant corporation owned by the decedent to the ancillary administrator in the Philippines, there was nothing unreasonable
or arbitrary in considering them as lost and requiring the appellant to issue new certificates in lieu thereof. Thereby, the task incumbent
under the law on the ancillary administrator could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled.

Any other view would result in the compliance to a valid judicial order being made to depend on the uncontrolled discretion of the party
or entity, in this case domiciled abroad, which thus far has shown the utmost persistence in refusing to yield obedience. Certainly,
appellant would not be heard to contend in all seriousness that a judicial decree could be treated as a mere scrap of paper, the court
issuing it being powerless to remedy its flagrant disregard.
It may be admitted of course that such alleged loss as found by the lower court did not correspond exactly with the facts. To be more
blunt, the quality of truth may be lacking in such a conclusion arrived at. It is to be remembered however, again to borrow from
Frankfurter, "that fictions which the law may rely upon in the pursuit of legitimate ends have played an important part in its
development."11

Speaking of the common law in its earlier period, Cardozo could state fictions "were devices to advance the ends of justice, [even if]
clumsy and at times offensive."12 Some of them have persisted even to the present, that eminent jurist, noting "the quasi contract, the
adopted child, the constructive trust, all of flourishing vitality, to attest the empire of "as if" today."13 He likewise noted "a class of
fictions of another order, the fiction which is a working tool of thought, but which at times hides itself from view till reflection and
analysis have brought it to the light."14

What cannot be disputed, therefore, is the at times indispensable role that fictions as such played in the law. There should be then on
the part of the appellant a further refinement in the catholicity of its condemnation of such judicial technique. If ever an occasion did
call for the employment of a legal fiction to put an end to the anomalous situation of a valid judicial order being disregarded with
apparent impunity, this is it. What is thus most obvious is that this particular alleged error does not carry persuasion.

3. Appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. would seek to bolster the above contention by its invoking one of the provisions of its by-laws
which would set forth the procedure to be followed in case of a lost, stolen or destroyed stock certificate; it would stress that in the
event of a contest or the pendency of an action regarding ownership of such certificate or certificates of stock allegedly lost, stolen or
destroyed, the issuance of a new certificate or certificates would await the "final decision by [a] court regarding the ownership
[thereof]."15

Such reliance is misplaced. In the first place, there is no such occasion to apply such by-law. It is admitted that the foreign domiciliary
administrator did not appeal from the order now in question. Moreover, there is likewise the express admission of appellant that as far
as it is concerned, "it is immaterial ... who is entitled to the possession of the stock certificates ..." Even if such were not the case, it
would be a legal absurdity to impart to such a provision conclusiveness and finality. Assuming that a contrariety exists between the
above by-law and the command of a court decree, the latter is to be followed.

It is understandable, as Cardozo pointed out, that the Constitution overrides a statute, to which, however, the judiciary must yield
deference, when appropriately invoked and deemed applicable. It would be most highly unorthodox, however, if a corporate by-law
would be accorded such a high estate in the jural order that a court must not only take note of it but yield to its alleged controlling
force.

The fear of appellant of a contingent liability with which it could be saddled unless the appealed order be set aside for its inconsistency
with one of its by-laws does not impress us. Its obedience to a lawful court order certainly constitutes a valid defense, assuming that
such apprehension of a possible court action against it could possibly materialize. Thus far, nothing in the circumstances as they have
developed gives substance to such a fear. Gossamer possibilities of a future prejudice to appellant do not suffice to nullify the lawful
exercise of judicial authority.

4. What is more the view adopted by appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc. is fraught with implications at war with the basic postulates
of corporate theory.

We start with the undeniable premise that, "a corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law...." 16 It owes its life to the
state, its birth being purely dependent on its will. As Berle so aptly stated: "Classically, a corporation was conceived as an artificial
person, owing its existence through creation by a sovereign power."17 As a matter of fact, the statutory language employed owes much
to Chief Justice Marshall, who in the Dartmouth College decision defined a corporation precisely as "an artificial being, invisible,
intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law."18

The well-known authority Fletcher could summarize the matter thus: "A corporation is not in fact and in reality a person, but the law
treats it as though it were a person by process of fiction, or by regarding it as an artificial person distinct and separate from its individual
stockholders.... It owes its existence to law. It is an artificial person created by law for certain specific purposes, the extent of whose
existence, powers and liberties is fixed by its charter." 19Dean Pound's terse summary, a juristic person, resulting from an association
of human beings granted legal personality by the state, puts the matter neatly. 20

There is thus a rejection of Gierke's genossenchaft theory, the basic theme of which to quote from Friedmann, "is the reality of the
group as a social and legal entity, independent of state recognition and concession." 21 A corporation as known to Philippine
jurisprudence is a creature without any existence until it has received the imprimatur of the state according to law. It is logically
inconceivable therefore that it will have rights and privileges of a higher priority than that of its creator. More than that, it cannot
legitimately refuse to yield obedience to acts of its state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary, whenever called upon to do so.

As a matter of fact, a corporation once it comes into being, following American law still of persuasive authority in our jurisdiction,
comes more often within the ken of the judiciary than the other two coordinate branches. It institutes the appropriate court action to
enforce its right. Correlatively, it is not immune from judicial control in those instances, where a duty under the law as ascertained in
an appropriate legal proceeding is cast upon it.
To assert that it can choose which court order to follow and which to disregard is to confer upon it not autonomy which may be
conceded but license which cannot be tolerated. It is to argue that it may, when so minded, overrule the state, the source of its very
existence; it is to contend that what any of its governmental organs may lawfully require could be ignored at will. So extravagant a
claim cannot possibly merit approval.

5. One last point. In Viloria v. Administrator of Veterans Affairs, 22 it was shown that in a guardianship proceedings then pending in a
lower court, the United States Veterans Administration filed a motion for the refund of a certain sum of money paid to the minor under
guardianship, alleging that the lower court had previously granted its petition to consider the deceased father as not entitled to guerilla
benefits according to a determination arrived at by its main office in the United States. The motion was denied. In seeking a
reconsideration of such order, the Administrator relied on an American federal statute making his decisions "final and conclusive on
all questions of law or fact" precluding any other American official to examine the matter anew, "except a judge or judges of the United
States court."23 Reconsideration was denied, and the Administrator appealed.

In an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, we sustained the lower court. Thus: "We are of the opinion that the appeal should be rejected.
The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the appellant, make the decisions of the U.S. Veterans' Administrator final and conclusive
when made on claims property submitted to him for resolution; but they are not applicable to the present case, where the Administrator
is not acting as a judge but as a litigant. There is a great difference between actions against the Administrator (which must be filed
strictly in accordance with the conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act, including the exclusive review by United States courts),
and those actions where the Veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to their jurisdiction by filing actions
therein. Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty that would make the findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions
where he is a party, conclusive on our courts. That, in effect, would deprive our tribunals of judicial discretion and render them mere
subordinate instrumentalities of the Veterans' Administrator."

It is bad enough as the Viloria decision made patent for our judiciary to accept as final and conclusive, determinations made by foreign
governmental agencies. It is infinitely worse if through the absence of any coercive power by our courts over juridical persons within
our jurisdiction, the force and effectivity of their orders could be made to depend on the whim or caprice of alien entities. It is difficult
to imagine of a situation more offensive to the dignity of the bench or the honor of the country.

Yet that would be the effect, even if unintended, of the proposition to which appellant Benguet Consolidated seems to be firmly
committed as shown by its failure to accept the validity of the order complained of; it seeks its reversal. Certainly we must at all pains
see to it that it does not succeed. The deplorable consequences attendant on appellant prevailing attest to the necessity of negative
response from us. That is what appellant will get.

That is all then that this case presents. It is obvious why the appeal cannot succeed. It is always easy to conjure extreme and even
oppressive possibilities. That is not decisive. It does not settle the issue. What carries weight and conviction is the result arrived at,
the just solution obtained, grounded in the soundest of legal doctrines and distinguished by its correspondence with what a sense of
realism requires. For through the appealed order, the imperative requirement of justice according to law is satisfied and national dignity
and honor maintained.

WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Honorable Arsenio Santos, the Judge of the Court of First Instance, dated May 18, 1964, is
affirmed. With costs against oppositor-appelant Benguet Consolidated, Inc.

Makalintal, Zaldivar and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur in the result.