G.R. No.

187061, October 08, 2014 Celerina's parents in Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their
daughter's whereabouts.10 He also inquired about her from other relatives and
CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent. friends, but no one gave him any information.11chanrobleslaw
DECISION
Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional Trial
LEONEN, J.: Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed
away.12chanrobleslaw
The proper remedy for a judicial declaration of presumptive death obtained by
extrinsic fraud is an action to annul the judgment. An affidavit of reappearance
Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in
is not the proper remedy when the person declared presumptively dead has
October 2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal,
never been absent.
petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.13chanrobleslaw

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Celerina J. Santos, assailing the
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of
Court of Appeals' resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. The
judgment14 before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial court's
lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in court when
judgment declaring her presumptively dead.
Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the
court that she was a resident of Tarlac City.15 According to Celerina, her true
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner
residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue, Quezon City.16 This
Celerina J. Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent
residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989 until Ricardo
Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or
left in May 2008.17 As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007.1 Ricardo
of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her
remarried on September 17, 2008.2chanrobleslaw
presumptively dead.18chanrobleslaw

In his petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death, Ricardo alleged

Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac. She also never left and
that he and Celerina rented an apartment somewhere in San Juan, Metro
worked as a domestic helper abroad.20 Neither did she go to an employment
Manila; after they had gotten married on June 18, 1980.3 After a year, they
agency in February 1995.21 She also claimed that it was not true that she had
moved to Tarlac City. They were engaged in the buy and sell
been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal
business.4chanrobleslaw
dwelling in Quezon City.22 It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008
to cohabit with another woman.23 Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed
Ricardo claimed that their business did not prosper.5 As a result, Celerina
by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false allegations
convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic helper in Hong Kong.6 Ricardo
in his petition.24chanrobleslaw
initially refused but because of Celerina's insistence, he allowed her to work
abroad.7 She allegedly applied in an employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in
Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's
February 1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never heard from
petition because it had never been published in a newspaper.25 She added that
again.8chanrobleslaw
the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were
not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.26chanrobleslaw
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina.9 He went to
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008,
dismissing Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong
mode of remedy.27 According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to
file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in
accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.28chanrobleslaw
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals' resolution
dated November 28, 2008.29 The Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration in the resolution dated March 5, 2009.30chanrobleslaw
Hence, this petition was filed.
The issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing
Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong remedy for a
fraudulently obtained judgment declaring presumptive death.
Celerina argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the
Family Code is appropriate only when the spouse is actually absent and the
spouse seeking the declaration of presumptive death actually has a well-
founded belief of the spouse's death.31 She added that it would be
inappropriate to file an affidavit of reappearance if she did not disappear in the
first place.32 She insisted that an action for annulment of judgment is proper
when the declaration of presumptive death is obtained
fraudulently.33chanrobleslaw
Celerina further argued that filing an affidavit of reappearance under Article 42
of the Family Code would not be a sufficient remedy because it would not nullify
the legal effects of the judgment declaring her presumptive
death.34chanrobleslaw
In Ricardo's comment,35 he argued that a petition for annulment of judgment is
not the proper remedy because it cannot be availed when there are other
remedies available. Celerina could always file an affidavit of reappearance to
terminate the subsequent marriage. Ricardo iterated the Court of Appeals'
ruling that the remedy afforded to Celerina under Article 42 of the Family Code
is the appropriate remedy.
The petition is meritorious.
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's
judgment, order, or resolution has become final, and the "remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer
available through no fault of the petitioner."36chanrobleslaw
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.37 This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of
Legaspi:38chanrobleslaw
For fraud to become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or
actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the
original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been
litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the
trial which prevents a parly from having a real contest, or from presenting all of
his case, such that there is no fair submission of the controversy.39 (Emphasis
supplied)
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of judgment that there was fraud
when Ricardo deliberately made false allegations in the court with respect to
her residence.40 Ricardo also falsely claimed that she was absent for 12 years.
There was also no publication of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's petition in a
newspaper of general circulation.41 Celerina claimed that because of these, she
was deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose Ricardo's petition to declare
her presumptively dead.42chanrobleslaw
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting Ricardo's petition for declaration of
presumptive death were false.43 Celerina further claimed that the court did not
acquire jurisdiction because the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of Ricardo's petition.44chanrobleslaw
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Celerina alleged
in her petition with the Court of Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of
judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment45 on November 17, 2008.
This was less than two years from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her
presumptively dead and about a month from her discovery of the decision in
October 2008. The petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year period
allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and before the action is barred by
laches, which is the period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.46chanrobleslaw
There was also no other sufficient remedy available to Celerina at the time of
her discovery of the fraud perpetrated on her.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain
admissions, presumptions, and conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse
that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a
second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage.47chanrobleslaw
The Family Code also provides that the second marriage is in danger of being
terminated by the presumptively dead spouse when he or she reappears.
Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be
automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of
the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage
or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be
recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent
marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact
of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed.
(Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the Family Code provides the presumptively dead spouse with
the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the part of the first
spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he
or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination
of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1)
the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it
void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to
the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the
fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be
undisputed or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always
immediately cause the subsequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of
the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the termination of the
subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family
Code are present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or
presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already
been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the
reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses'
residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of
reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet
rendered confirming, such fact of reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of
presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead
and that the second marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the
continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse.48 The second
marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid.49 The burden of proof to
show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person
assailing the validity of the second marriage.50chanrobleslaw
This court recognized the conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for
terminating the subsequent marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de
Bailon.51 This court noted52 that mere reappearance will not terminate the
subsequent marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were
notified if there was "no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent marriage,
either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]"53 "Since the
second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former
spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse's physical
reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded as legally
an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by
law."54chanrobleslaw
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining
the status of the second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad
faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous
subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are
present:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) The prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years;
2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead;
3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse; and
4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.55
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a
court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-
founded belief56 that the spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be
considered as. validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid
termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and
void.57 Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith is
also not immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for
being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of
another marriage still applies.58chanrobleslaw
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith when he filed his petition to
declare her presumptively dead and when he contracted the subsequent
marriage, such marriage would be considered void for being bigamous under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. This is because the circumstances lack the
element of "well-founded belief under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is
essential for the exception to the rule against bigamous marriages to
apply.59chanrobleslaw
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the
termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was
declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This
court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be
terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage."60chanrobleslaw
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also seeks not merely the
termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its effects.
She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only
terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration
of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42
of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall
be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such
marriage will be the same as in valid marriages."61 If it is terminated by mere
reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the
termination shall still be considered legitimate.62 Moreover, a judgment
declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for
bigamy.63chanrobleslaw
It is true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent
marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in
relation to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent
for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may
be filed solely by the husband or wife."64 This means that even if Celerina is a
real party in interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of
an action to nullify the second marriage,65 this remedy is not available to her.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but
also of nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not
suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will,
therefore, lie.

WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for determination

of the existence of extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity/annulment of the first
marriage, and the merits of the petition.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Perlas-Bernabe,* JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 184621 | 2013-12-10
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari1 before us assails the decision2 dated
August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01558-MIN
which affirmed the order3 dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, in SP Proc. Case No. 313-25,
declaring Jerry F. Cantor, respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor’s husband,
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Factual Antecedents
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived
together as husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes,
Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a
violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to reach “sexual
climax” whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s
expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time
that the respondent ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated
nor heard anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s
disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a petition4 for her
husband’s declaration of presumptive death, docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-
25. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was already dead.
She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law,
her sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbours and friends, but to no avail. In the
hopes of finding Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients’
directory whenever she went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the
respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.
The Ruling of the RTC
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondent’s
petition and declaring Jerry presumptively dead. It concluded that the
respondent had a well-founded belief that her husband was already dead since
more than four (4) years had passed without the former receiving any news
about the latter or his whereabouts. The dispositive portion of the order dated
December 15, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that respondent
Jerry F. Cantor is presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code
of the Philippines without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the
absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor.5
The Ruling of the CA
The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6 filed by the petitioner,
Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In
its August 27, 2008 decision, the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition, finding
no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part, and, accordingly, fully affirmed
the latter’s order, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
and the assailed Order dated December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor
presumptively dead is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.7
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court.
The Petition

The petitioner contends that certiorari lies to challenge the decisions,
judgments or final orders of trial courts in petitions for declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Rule 41 of the Family Code. It
maintains that although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial
proceedings, including presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final
and executory (hence, not appealable under Article 247 of the Family Code), this
rule does not mean that they are not subject to review on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded
belief to justify the declaration of her husband’s presumptive death. It claims
that the respondent failed to conduct the requisite diligent search for her
missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner invites this Court’s attention to the
attendant circumstances surrounding the case, particularly, the degree of
search conducted and the respondent’s resultant failure to meet the strict
standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Issues
The petition poses to us the following issues:
(1) Whether certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders
of trial courts in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code; and
(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already
dead.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition.
a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy
Court’s Judgment in the Judicial Proceedings for Declaration of Presumptive
Death Is Final and Executory, Hence, Unappealable
The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary proceedings,
such as the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article
41 of the Family Code, shall be immediately final and executory.
Article 41, in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
[underscores ours]
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject
to an appeal, the dispositions and conclusions therein having become
immutable and unalterable not only as against the parties but even as against
the courts.8 Modification of the court’s ruling, no matter how erroneous is no
longer permissible. The final and executory nature of this summary proceeding
thus prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained in Republic of the Phils. v.
Bermudez-Lorino,9 the right to appeal is not granted to parties because of the
express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of [Article] 247, Family
Code, supra, are “immediately final and executory.” It was erroneous, therefore,
on the part of the RTC to give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the
transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by
express provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in
Veloria vs. Comelec, “the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of
due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege.” Since, by express mandate of
Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial
proceedings in Family Law are “immediately final and executory,” the right to
appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the
Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death,
should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of
November 7, 2001. [emphasis ours; italics supplied]
Certiorari Lies to Challenge the Decisions, Judgments or Final Orders of Trial
Courts in a Summary Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under the Family Code
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy.
While jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court's
judgment, an aggrieved party may, nevertheless, file a petition forcertiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.
As held in De los Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a decision has
become final does not automatically negate the original action of the CA to
issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in connection with orders or
processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of where a court
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
and where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not available. Such a procedure
finds support in the case of Republic v. Tango,11 wherein we held that:
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of
judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and
accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary
court proceedings in the Family Code:
“ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this
Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules.”
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in
chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
“ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217,
insofar as they are applicable.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:

“ART. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.”
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that
no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of
the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may
file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance
with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court
of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis ours]
Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner’s resort to certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court to question the RTC’s order declaring Jerry
presumptively dead was proper.
b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief
The Essential Requisites for the Declaration of Presumptive Death Under Article
41 of the Family Code
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be
shown that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
present spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already
dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites
for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is
dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.12
The Present Spouse Has the Burden of Proof to Show that All the Requisites
Under Article 41 of the Family Code Are Present
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites
under Article 41 of the Family Code are present. Since it is the present spouse
who, for purposes of declaration of presumptive death, substantially asserts the
affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the burden of proof lies with
him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation
is not evidence.13
Declaration of Presumptive Death Under Article 41 of the Family Code Imposes a
Stricter Standard
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil
Code which it superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a “well-
founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for
declaration of presumptive death can be granted. We have had occasion to
make the same observation in Republic v. Nolasco,14 where we noted the crucial
differences between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of the Civil
Code, to wit:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been
shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death to enable the spouse present to remarry. Also, Article 41 of
the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the
Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is
still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be
so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code. The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded
belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted.
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law),
lack of any news that such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or
general presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. This
conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family Code places
upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more
stringent requirement of “well-founded belief” which can only be discharged
upon a showing of proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to
ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but, more importantly, that
the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.15
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by “well-founded belief.” It depends upon
the circumstances of each particular case. Its determination, so to speak,
remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with this requirement, the
present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on
these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere
passive one).
To illustrate this degree of “diligent and reasonable search” required by the law,
an analysis of the following relevant cases is warranted:
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),17 the Court ruled
that the present spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that
his absent spouse was already dead before he filed his petition. His efforts to
locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the following:
(1) He went to his in-laws’ house to look for her;
(2) He sought the barangay captain’s aid to locate her;
(3) He went to her friends’ houses to find her and inquired about her
whereabouts among his friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in
malls during his free time;
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.
Despite these alleged “earnest efforts,” the Court still ruled against the present
spouse. The Court found that he failed to present the persons from whom he
allegedly made inquiries and only reported his wife’s absence after the OSG
filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a
"well-founded belief" under Article 41 of the Family Code: iii. Republic v. Nolasco21

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive
death of his wife, who had been missing for more than four years. He testified
spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether
or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent that his efforts to find her consisted of:
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent (1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the] present
spouse.18 (2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and

(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved
ii. Republic v. Granada19 fruitless.

Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her
"well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing
of the petition. In this case, the present spouse alleged that her brother had
made inquiries from their relatives regarding the absent spouse’s whereabouts.
The present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the aid of the mass
media. Applying the standards in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
(Tenth Div.),20 the Court ruled against the present spouse, as follows:
The Court ruled that the present spouse’s investigations were too sketchy to
form a basis that his wife was already dead and ruled that the pieces of
evidence only proved that his wife had chosen not to communicate with their
common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
iv. The present case

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent In the case at bar, the respondent’s “well-founded belief” was anchored on her
husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about alleged “earnest efforts” to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:
the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not
presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was
(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws,
allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she
neighbours and friends; and
were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office
or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the
could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she
patients’ directory, hoping to find Jerry.
failed to explain these omissions.
These efforts, however, fell short of the “stringent standard” and degree of
diligence required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be
inferred from the records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking
of the patients’ directory therein were unintentional. She did not purposely
undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital visits were not
planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these
attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid
of the authorities to look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies
with the nature of the situation in which the present spouse is placed, under
present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present spouse, whose
spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least,
report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbours and
friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons,
from whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named. As held in
Nolasco, the present spouse’s bare assertion that he inquired from his friends
about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the
friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor
presented as witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s
claim that she conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting
evidence proving that she had a well-founded belief other than her bare claims
that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her husband’s
whereabouts.
In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a
“passive search” where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws,
neighbours and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her
alleged efforts are insufficient to form a well-founded belief that her husband
was already dead. As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals
(Tenth Div.),22 “[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded
belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn
from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance
of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by [the]
present spouse.”
Strict Standard Approach Is Consistent with the State’s Policy to Protect and
Strengthen Marriage
In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of
spouses in nullifying their marriage, has consistently applied the “strict
standard” approach. This is to ensure that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to
conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural
shortcuts and should ensure that the stricter standard required by the Family
Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),23 we
emphasized that:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of
due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the above-mentioned cases in
locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied with.
There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to
by parties wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing
spouses are alive and well. It is even possible that those who cannot have their
marriages xxx declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code resort
to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the xxx summary nature of
its proceedings.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we
consider the State’s policy to protect and strengthen the institution of
marriage.24 Since marriage serves as the family’s foundation25 and since it is the
state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution,26 marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of
the parties. In interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying
rationale – to uphold the sanctity of marriage. Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals27 reflected this sentiment when we stressed:
[The] protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the
preservation of which the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here
involved is of the most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in
case of remarriage is effectively negated.[28] Thus, for purposes of remarriage,
it is necessary to strictly comply with the stringent standard and have the absent
spouse judicially declared presumptively dead.
Final Word
As a final word, it has not escaped this Court’s attention that the strict standard
required in petitions for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully
observed by the lower courts. We need only to cite the instances when this
Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage and
reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a
denial. To rectify this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of
the strict standard this Court requires in cases under Article 41 of the Family
Code.

The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27,
Strict Standard Prescribed Under Article 41 of the Family Code Is for the Present 2008 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the order dated December 15,
Spouse’s Benefit 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato,
declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse
(and consequently, the application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is
also for the present spouse’s benefit. It is intended to protect him/her from a SO ORDERED.
criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
which might come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry sans the
court’s declaration.

Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse

presumptively dead, the present spouse’s good faith in contracting a second
marriage is effectively established. The decision of the competent court
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 187512 | 2012-06-13
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23
January 2009[1] and 3 April 2009[2] issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed the grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent.
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus
Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics
company in Paranaque where both were then working. The two eventually got
married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the
birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus
went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she
had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts
to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus
regarding the latter’s whereabouts, to no avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead. The Petition was raffled to Presiding Judge Avelino
Demetria of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City, and was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 2002-
0530.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as
presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this
Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to
locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was
already dead. However, in an Order dated 29 June 2007, the RTC denied the
motion.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably
under Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. Yolanda filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She
argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article
41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding,
in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not
appealable.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-
Lorino,[3]the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive death under
Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated 3 April 2009.[4]
Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.
Issues
1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the
ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon
notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family
Code based on the evidence that respondent presented
Our Ruling
1. On whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the
ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is immediately final and executory upon
notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal
In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the Petition
assailing the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of
the absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing Republic v.
Bermudez-Lorino,[5] the appellate court noted that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage is a summary judicial
proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties, by express provision
of Article 247 of the same Code. The decision is therefore not subject to
ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question it through a Notice of Appeal is
unavailing.
We affirm the CA ruling.
Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a
previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided
in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Underscoring
supplied.)
Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for
the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family
Code is a summary proceeding “as provided for” under the Family Code.
Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled “Summary Judicial Proceedings in
the Family Law.” Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238 and 247, which provide:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title
shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.
Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise
govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and
217, insofar as they are applicable.
Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that
since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding,
the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,[6] the Republic likewise appealed the CA’s
affirmation of the RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. The Court therein held that it was an
error for the Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated the
matter to the CA, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family
Code, supra, are “immediately final and executory.”
xxx xxx xxx
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench ordinary appeal as a vehicle for questioning the trial court’s Decision in a
and the bar, let it be stated that the RTC’s decision dated November 7, 2001, summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of
was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was the Family Code was intended “to set the records straight and for the future
erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due guidance of the bench and the bar.”
course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and
should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground. At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding appeal
of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code when it
Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result ruled inRepublic v. Tango:[9]
reached by the Court in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that
what the OSG should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of
judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and
petition for review under Rule 45.
accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been
superseded by the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v.
Jomoc,[7] issued a few months later. Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary
Death of her absent husband for the purpose of remarriage. Petitioner Republic court proceedings in the Family Code:
appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court
disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that, under
the Rules of Court,[8] a record on appeal is required to be filed when appealing ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this
special proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA, Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
this Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or absence proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
under Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls under the category of special regard to technical rules.
proceedings, a petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of
the Family Code is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the
same Code. Since its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in
marriage, petitioner’s action was a summary proceeding based on Article 41 of chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
the Family Code, rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of
Court. Considering that this action was not a special proceeding, petitioner
was not required to file a record on appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise
the CA.
govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and
We do not agree with the Republic’s argument that Republic v. 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
Jomoc superseded our ruling in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino. As observed by
the CA, the Supreme Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a
summary proceeding under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
in Bermudez-Lorino expressly stated that its ruling on the impropriety of an
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding
shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that
no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of
the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may
file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance
with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court
of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted
freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals,
the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the
court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment
which are the proper subject of an appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for
certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the
matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republic’s
Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondent’s spouse was immediately final
and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.
2. On whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the
Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family
Code based on the evidence that respondent had presented
Petitioner also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she
had not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that
her absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the
Family Code. Petitioner cites Republic v. Nolasco,[10] United States v.
Biasbas[11] and Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro[12] as authorities on the
subject.
In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CA’s affirmation of the
RTC’s grant of respondent’s Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of his
absent spouse, a British subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after
giving birth to their son while respondent was on board a vessel working as a
seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the ruling on the ground
that respondent was not able to establish
his “well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead,” as required by
Article 41 of the Family Code. In ruling thereon, this Court recognized that this
provision imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil
Code.[13] The Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news
that the absentee is still alive; or that the absentee is generally considered to be
dead and is believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under
Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision
prescribes a “well-founded belief” that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. As noted by the
Court in that case, the four requisites for the declaration of presumptive death
under the Family Code are as follows:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence
of a “well-founded belief” that the absent spouse is already dead, the Court
in Nolasco citedUnited States v. Biasbas,[14] which it found to be instructive as to
the diligence required in searching for a missing spouse.
In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due
diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife, considering his
admission that that he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only
basis of that suspicion was the fact of her absence.
Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic sought
the reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTC’s grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the
respondent therein had not been able to prove a “well-founded belief” that his
spouse was already dead. The Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and
provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a “well-founded
belief” under Article 41 of the Family Code:
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent
and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead
before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does
not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es
menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales.”
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It
may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend,
even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination
probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character,
habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually
control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as
it tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their
intentions, competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent
spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether
or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
(Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that
respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent
husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about
the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives were not
presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was
allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she
were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office
or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She
could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she
failed to explain these omissions.
The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to
deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her “well-
founded belief” that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of
the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no
longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law than
that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law.”[15]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Associate Justice
Appeals dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165
areAFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Senior Associate Justice

Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
OSCAR P. MALLION, Petitioner, versus EDITHA ALCANTARA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 141528 | 2006-10-31
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising a question of law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent
petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?
The facts are not disputed:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition[1] with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of
Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the Family Code,
citing respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition
in a decision[2] dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner
"failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is
seeking."[3] The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in
a resolution[4] dated June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the docket
and other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed
on July 12, 1999 another petition[5] for declaration of nullity of marriage with
the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent
was null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss[6]
dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of
res judicata and forum shopping.
In an order[7] dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent's motion to
dismiss, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits, the Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order[9] dated
January 21, 2000.
Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:
A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF HIS
MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE
MARRIAGE LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF AN EARLIER PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF HIS
WIFE'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE,
THE TRIAL COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH HAS
PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN DETERMINED SQUARELY AND DEFINITIVELY
BY THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW.
B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE TRIAL
COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND MISAPPLIED THE FUNDAMENTAL
RULES AND CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
AND FORUM SHOPPING.[10]
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same,
that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of
action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of action in
the present case because the operative facts upon which they were based as
well as the evidence required to sustain either were different. Because there is
no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not
lie to bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there
was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes
the splitting of a cause of action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000, counters
that while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the
same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner
and respondent's marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is, the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contends that
petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts
that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in
this petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
The petition lacks merit.
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the
invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed
by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding where the
marriage is being impugned on the ground of a party's psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code?
Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of absence of marriage license constitute
separate causes of action, the present case would not fall under the prohibition
against splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the principle
of res judicata.
The contention is untenable.
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a
final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points
and matters determined in the former suit."[11]
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common law,
namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary doctrine
would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals
and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to
the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.[12]
In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b) and
(c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to
the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person,
or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular
person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or
relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters
of administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator
or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter
directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in
relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest
by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;
and,
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or
final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.[13] Section 47 (b)
pertains to it in its concept as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict,"
which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On the other hand,
Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept as "conclusiveness of
judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendant which
ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again
be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different
cause of action.[14] Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior judgment
obtains in the present case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the
merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.[15]
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in
issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to determine
whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same
evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts
essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence
would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in
the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.[16]
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by
him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate
causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition which
was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is different
from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored
on the purported absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the
same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another.[17] In both petitions, petitioner has
the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What
differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These
grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal
issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual
status of petitioner and respondent's marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null
and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged
lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner
impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in
accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged
absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been
presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound
not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their
claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged
in that case.[18]
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res
judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method
of presenting his case. [19] As this Court stated in Perez v. Court of Appeals:[20]
x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of
action, provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress
for the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action
simply because the theory of the second would not have been open under the
pleadings in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action
after the loss of the first merely by having circumscribed and limited theories of
recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.
It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff
is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit
began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in
his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which
he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in
successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court,
either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect
a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands, and
prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which a
special relief is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit if
the first fails. There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation
is allowed. (Citations omitted.)
In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in
order to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed
in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The
losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be
needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred
by law from litigating the same controversy all over again.[21]
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their
marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects
therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the
decision dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in
Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-
SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision
introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated
17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos
("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him.
Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel
persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with
herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a
nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in
the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful
day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows
before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed,
shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's
parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave
birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy,
however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of
the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family
affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of
other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently
from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's
spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a
nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her
contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the
United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he
desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his
efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional
trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage
Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons
was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros
Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed
the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the
petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their
marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to
the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been
set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation,
stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the
trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with
Circular 28-91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its
lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly
show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his
own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia
Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner.
A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a
period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The
deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which
has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the
provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.)
Reyes suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo)
Caguioa preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand,
Justice Reyes proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice
Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in
judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack
of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy
remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of
judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the
former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be
modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of
reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to
defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in
subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental
incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for
declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there
is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable
marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very
essence of marital obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally"
be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers
to retain the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological
impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-)
Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting
the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language
which describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice
Caguioa added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the
Canon Law, there are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is
precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be
cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for
void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is
curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or
incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not
apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase
"psychological or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of
consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and
if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the
marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a
ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really
understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make
excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the
obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for
divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by
reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a
defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for
voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable
of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there
are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological
incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with
consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do
not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are
really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that,
ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it
is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected
to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the
obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each
other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age,
for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that
psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be
classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should
be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as
the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and
if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for
annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be
raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically
incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has
no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense?
In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and
cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser
degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the
expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological
incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the
consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in
insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of
the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the
ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted
at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the
grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances
the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only
with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it
is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different
meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity"
can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological
incapacity" is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to
show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was
psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the
essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa
explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the
marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of
marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and
later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after
the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is
cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is
to allow him to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the
other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity
becomes manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage
one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of
abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities,
which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa
explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while
psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their
February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase "psychological or
mental impotence" is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code
of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity"
refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have
decided not to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because
there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they
classified it as a special case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments
of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile
with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and
in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect
that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of
psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other
members replied negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or
prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to
the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the
Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned
about the avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee
approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio
were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years
within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed
in court. The Committee approved the suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately
deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact,
so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice
Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr.
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June
1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear
that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to
interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given
persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila
matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for
having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law
prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be
dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or
construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the
third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the
legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was
proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a
grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are
unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychicam) . . . (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope
(cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the
term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to
draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of
psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to
assume the ordinary obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise
definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius
Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to
the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of
personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in
legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render
what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a
farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly
reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations
of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; (c) the inability must
be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming
these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not
constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder
which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to
R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under
this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a
psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the
moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or,
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and
most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of
the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely
low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in
Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder
by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity"
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must
exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently
envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual
relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family
Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of
nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,
they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the
possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the
degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to
be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and
even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal
and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.

Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the

family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).

The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our
laws on marriage and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on
to.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to
the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and
understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the
specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

CYNTHIA E. YAMBAO v REPUBLIC OF Likewise, respondent went into several business ventures, which all failed. In
THE PHILIPPINES and PATRICIO E. YAMBAO addition, respondent loved to gamble and would gamble away whatever money
would come his way.
G.R. No. 184063

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is yet another tale of marital woe.
Petitioner Cynthia E. Yambao (petitioner) is assailing the Decision[1] dated April
16, 2008 and the Resolution[2] dated August 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262. The CA affirmed the decision[3] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City, which denied petitioners Petition[4] for the
annulment of her marriage to respondent Patricio E. Yambao (respondent) on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner and respondent were married on December 21, 1968 at
the Philamlife Church in Quezon City.[5] On July 11, 2003, after 35 years of
marriage, petitioner filed a Petition[6] before the RTC, Makati City, praying that
the marriage be declared null and void by reason of respondents psychological
incapacity, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.[7]
Petitioner also claimed that, when their children were babies, respondent did
not even help to change their diapers or feed them, even while petitioner was
recovering from her caesarean operation, proffering the excuse that he knew
nothing about children.[9] Later, respondent became insecure and jealous and
would get mad every time he would see petitioner talking to other people, even
to her relatives. When respondent started threatening to kill petitioner, she
decided to leave the conjugal abode and live separately from him.[10] She then
consulted a psychiatrist who concluded that respondent was indeed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.[11]
In his Answer, respondent denied that he has refused to work. He claimed that
he had been trying to find a decent job, but was always unable to because of his
old age and lack of qualifications. He also claimed that he did not stay long in
the jobs he had because the same could not support the needs of his family, and
yielded benefits that were not commensurate to the efforts he exerted. He had
ventured into small businesses but they failed due to various economic crises.
Respondent further claimed that he was not, in fact, contented with living with
petitioners relatives since his every move was being watched with eagle eyes.[12]

In her petition before the RTC, petitioner narrated that, since the beginning, her
Respondent denied that he gambled, positing that since he had no income, he
and respondents married life had been marred by bickering, quarrels, and
would not have the funds for such activity. He alleged that even without a
recrimination due to the latters inability to comply with the essential obligations
steady source of income, he still shared in the payment of the amortization of
of married life.[8]
their house in BF Homes, Paraaque City.

Petitioner averred that through all the years of their married life, she was the
As to the care of their children, respondent countered that no fault should be
only one who earned a living and took care of the children. Respondent, she
attributed to him because that is the duty of the household help.[13]
alleged, did nothing but eat and sleep all day, and spend time with friends.
When respondent would find a job, he would not be able to stay in it for long.
Respondent also denied that he threatened to kill petitioner, considering that
there was never any evidence that he had ever harmed or inflicted physical
injury on petitioner to justify the latter having a nervous breakdown.[14]
He further alleged that he never consulted any psychiatrist, and denied that he
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.[15]
On February 9, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision[16] dismissing the petition for
lack of merit. The RTC held that petitioners evidence failed to support her
argument that respondent was totally unaware of and incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations such that the marriage was void from the beginning. The
court said that, even as petitioner claimed to be unhappy in the marriage, it is
incontrovertible that the union lasted for over thirty years and the parties were
able to raise three children into adulthood without suffering any major
parenting problems. The court also noted that respondent was faithful to
petitioner and never physically abused her. Likewise, when the parties lived
with petitioners parents, respondent got along well enough with her family.[17]
The RTC recognized that respondent did indeed have many faults, such as his
indolence and utter irresponsibility. However, the RTC said, respondents failure
to find decent work was due to his not having obtained a college degree and his
lack of other qualifications. Likewise, respondents failure in business could not
be entirely attributed to him, since petitioner was a business partner in some of
these ventures.[18]
The RTC also rejected the supposed negative effect of respondents Dependent
Personality Disorder. The RTC said that, although the evidence tended to show
that respondent would unduly rely upon petitioner to earn a living for the
family, there was no evidence to show that the latter resented such imposition
or suffered with the additional financial burdens passed to her by her husband.
On the contrary, the RTC averred that, despite a supposedly horrible married
life, petitioner was able to rise in the ranks in her company and buy properties
with hardly any help from respondent.[19]
The RTC concluded that while respondent might have been deficient in
providing financial support, his presence, companionship, and love allowed
petitioner to accomplish many things. Thus, respondent could be relied on for
love, fidelity, and moral support, which are obligations expected of a spouse
under Article 68 of the Family Code.[20]
Lastly, the RTC rejected petitioners claim that she suffered through respondents
overbearing jealousy. It found that respondent only became jealous when he
thought that petitioner was cheating on him. The RTC determined that jealousy
was not a character trait that contributed to respondents psychological
dysfunction; much less did it amount to psychological or mental torture on
petitioner.[21] Thus, the RTC concluded that the parties might have indeed
entered into a bad marriage, but this did not in itself prove that the marriage
did not exist, given the 30 years they remained together through the various ups
and downs of their volatile relationship.[22]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on May 21,
2007.[23] Petitioner subsequently filed a Notice of Appeal,[24] which was given
due course by the RTC in an Order dated June 8, 2007.[25] She then appealed to
the CA.
In a Decision[26] dated April 16, 2008, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The CA
held that petitioner failed to show that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. It pointed
out that respondent exerted efforts to find a source of income to support his
family. However, his failure to find a suitable job and the failure of his business
ventures were not mental but physical defects and, hence, could not be
considered psychological incapacity as contemplated under the law.
 Petitioner is now before this Court in a last ditch effort to gain freedom from her
marriage to respondent. In her petition for review, petitioner submits the
The CA also found that petitioners claims that she lived in misery during the following assignment of errors:
marriage and that respondent failed to keep his promises to her were not duly
established. The CA held that the fact that the parties lived together for 35 years
and raised three children well, and the fact that respondent never physically
abused petitioner belied the formers psychological incapacity. The CA also held I
that respondents refusal to care for the children was not psychological
incapacity but merely constituted refusal to perform the task, which is not
equivalent to an incapacity or inability.[27] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
FAILED TO SHOW THAT RESPONDENT WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED
TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE
The appellate court also rejected petitioners allegation of respondents
unbearable jealousy. It said that the same must be shown as a manifestation of
a disordered personality which would make respondent completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.[28] The CA averred that a
II
jealous attitude simply evinced respondents love for his wife, whom he could
not bear to lose to another man. Meanwhile, the CA construed the purported
threats to kill petitioner as emotional immaturity and not psychological
incapacity.[29] THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT
WAS MERELY REFUSING TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
MARRIAGE AND NOT DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITATED OR UNABLE
Lastly, the CA found the report of expert witness Dr. Edgardo Juan Tolentino (Dr.
Tolentino) to be unsupported by sufficient evidence since the findings therein
were not corroborated by any other witness. Moreover, the CA said, neither the
report nor petitioners testimony established that respondents psychological
III
condition was grave enough to bring about the inability of the latter to assume
the essential obligations of marriage, so that the same was medically permanent
or incurable.[30]
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RESPONDENTS UNBEARABLE JEALOUSY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A CHARACTER
TRAIT CONTRIBUTING TO PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
Petitioners subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution
dated August 4, 2008.[31]

IV

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITION OF
RESPONDENT WAS GRAVE ENOUGH, INCURABLE AND HAD NO ANTECEDENCE
(sic)[32]
Petitioner argues that respondents Dependent Personality Disorder was
sufficiently established by her testimony and that of her sister, which
testimonies were both credible considering that they have personal knowledge
of the circumstances prior to and during the parties marriage. On the other
hand, respondents evidence consisted merely of his sole testimony, which were
self-serving and full of inconsistencies.[33] Petitioner points out that what the CA
characterized as respondents efforts in finding jobs were merely the result of
short-lived bursts of industry, failing to note that the jobs were few and very far
between.[34] The rest of the time, respondent did nothing but eat, sleep, and
party with his friends.[35] Petitioner also alleges that respondent was given the
opportunity to finish his studies, first by his parents, and then by petitioner
herself, but he never took up these offers.[36]
Petitioner also highlighted respondents failure to earn his keep, participate in
household chores, or take care of their children. She argues that respondent
had the obligation to help and contribute to all the needs of the family, whether
the same be in the form of material or physical support.[37]
Petitioner also refutes the CAs conclusion that respondent was merely
refusing to attend to his familys needs. She insists that respondents inability is
due to a psychological affliction, i.e., Dependent Personality Disorder, as
attested to by the expert witness she presented during trial.[38] Part of this same
disorder, according to petitioner, is respondents jealous tendencies, which the
CA belittled and attributed to emotional immaturity.[39]
Finally, petitioner argues against the CAs finding that respondents laziness and
dependence could not be characterized as inability but just plain refusal.
Petitioner contends that she has complied with the guidelines laid down by the
Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina. She further contends that the
framers of the Family Code never intended to give such a suppressed definition
of psychological incapacity, and, in fact, declared that a restrictive definition
would limit the applicability of the provision.[40]Moreover, she asserts that she
has proven that respondents unbearable jealousy and Dependent Personality
Disorder manifested themselves even before the marriage of the parties,
although not in the same degree as when they were already married.[41]
The petition has no merit and, perforce, must be denied.
Article 36 of the Family Code states:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
Preliminarily, the Court reiterates its recent pronouncement that each case for
declaration of nullity under the foregoing provision must be judged, not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections, or generalizations, but according to
its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.[42] Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed
by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current
trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience.[43]
While the Court has not abandoned the standard set in Molina,[44] the Court has
reiterated the tenet that the factual milieu of each case must be treated as
distinct and, as such, each case must be decided based on its own set of facts.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[45] the Court held that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. These guidelines do not require that a physician examine the
person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may
be medically or clinically identified.[46]What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. If the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to.[47]
Hence, the issue in this case can be summed up, thus: Does the totality of
petitioners evidence establish respondents psychological incapacity to perform
the essential obligations of marriage?
The Court holds that it does not.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.[48] Thus, for a marriage to be annulled under Article 36 of the Family
Code, the psychologically incapacitated spouse must be shown to suffer no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes him or her to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants.[49] It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[50]
In this case, there is no showing that respondent was suffering from a
psychological condition so severe that he was unaware of his obligations to his
wife and family. On the contrary, respondents efforts, though few and far
between they may be, showed an understanding of his duty to provide for his
family, albeit he did not meet with much success. Whether his failure was
brought about by his own indolence or irresponsibility, or by some other
external factors, is not relevant. What is clear is that respondent, in showing an
awareness to provide for his family, even with his many failings, does not suffer
from psychological incapacity.
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in
the performance of marital obligations or ill will.[51] This incapacity consists of
the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage;
(b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.[52] It is not enough to prove
that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological illness.[53]
That respondent, according to petitioner, lack[ed] effective sense of rational
judgment and responsibility[54] does not mean he is incapable to meet his
marital obligations. His refusal to help care for the children, his neglect for his
business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate some
emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount to
a psychological abnormality.

Moreover, even assuming that respondents faults amount to psychological
incapacity, it has not been established that the same existed at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
In his psychological report,[55] Dr. Tolentino merely said, [b]ecause ones
personality or character is formed early in life, it has a clear ANTECEDENT and it
has an enduring pattern of inner experience that deviates from the expectations
of the individuals culture,[56] without explaining this antecedent. Even petitioner,
in her allegations, never explained how the alleged psychological incapacity
manifested itself prior to or at the time of the celebration of their marriage.
incapacitated to discharge his marital obligations, as to give the Court a reason
to declare the marriage null and void.
Certainly, the marriage was beset by difficulties, or as petitioner puts it, marred
by bickerings, quarrels, and recrimination. It is a fact, however, that all
marriages suffer through the same trials at one point or another, with some
going through more rough patches than others. The Court concedes that
petitioner and respondents marriage, as characterized by the former, may
indeed be problematic, even tumultuous. However, that they had gone through
35 years together as husband and wife is an indication that the parties can,
should they choose to do so, work through their problems.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The

Likewise militating against petitioners cause is the finding of the trial court, and Decision dated April 16, 2008 and the Resolution dated August 4, 2008 of the
the same was affirmed by the CA, that respondent never committed infidelity or Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89262 are AFFIRMED.
physically abused petitioner or their children. In fact, considering that the
children lived with both parents, it is safe to assume that both made an impact
in the childrens upbringing. And still, as found by the RTC and the CA, the parties
were able to raise three children into adulthood without any major parenting SO ORDERED.
problems.[57] Such fact could hardly support a proposition that the parties
marriage is a nullity.

Respondent may not have turned out to be the ideal husband, or may have
failed to meet petitioners exacting standards. Yet this Court finds it impossible
to believe that, as petitioner alleges, there was nothing but heartache and strife
in their over 35 years (prior to filing the petition for declaration of nullity) of
marriage.

To be sure, respondent, perhaps with a little more effort on his part, could have
been more helpful and could have made life that much easier for his wife. The
fact that he did not, however, does not mean that he is psychologically
LESTER BENJAMIN S. HALILI v CHONA M. SANTOS-HALILI and THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165424
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of
this Court denying petitioners petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set aside the January 26,
2004 decision[1] and September 24, 2004 resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to
respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After
the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained
the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which
point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other
women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop
dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making
an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not fake.
Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality
disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as
diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that
petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected
his capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to respondent. It
thus declared the marriage null and void.[3]
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the
ground that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish petitioners
psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was denied.
The case was elevated to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We
affirmed the CAs decision and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.
Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument
that his marriage to respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis
of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he presented,
especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain
the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is
psychologically incapable of complying with the essential obligations of
marriage.
We grant the motion for reconsideration.
In the recent case of Te v. Yu-Te and the Republic of the Philippines,[4] this Court
reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity
(as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
Accordingly, we emphasized that, by the very nature of Article 36, courts,
despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must consider
as essential the expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of
the parties.[5]
In this case, the testimony[6] of petitioners expert witness revealed that
petitioner was suffering from dependent personality disorder. Thus:
Q. Dr. Dayan, going back to the examinations and interviews which you
conducted, can you briefly tell this court your findings [and] conclusions?
A. Well, the petitioner is suffering from a personality disorder. It is a mixed
personality disorder from self-defeating personality disorder to [dependent]
personality disorder and this is brought about by [a] dysfunctional family that
petitioner had. He also suffered from partner relational problem during his
marriage with Chona. There were lots of fights and it was not truly a marriage,
sir.
Q. Now, what made you conclude that Lester is suffering from psychological
incapacity to handle the essential obligations of marriage?
A. Sir, for the reason that his motivation for marriage was very questionable. It
was a very impulsive decision. I dont think he understood what it meant to
really be married and after the marriage, there was no consummation, there
was no sexual intercourse, he never lived with the respondent. And after three
months he refused to see or talk with the respondent and afterwards, I guess
the relationship died a natural death, and he never thought it was a really
serious matter at all.
xx xx xx
Q. Likewise, you stated here in your evaluation that Lester Halili and respondent
suffered from a grave lack of discretionary judgment. Can you expound on this?
A. xx xx I dont think they truly appreciate the civil [rites which] they had
undergone. [It was] just a spur of the moment decision that they should get
married xx xx I dont think they truly considered themselves married.
xx xx xx
Q. Now [from] what particular portion of their marriage were you able to
conclude xx xx that petitioner and respondent are suffering from psychological
incapacity?
A. xx xx they never lived together[.] [T]hey never had a residence, they never
consummated the marriage. During the very short relationship they had, there
were frequent quarrels and so there might be a problem also of lack of respect
[for] each other and afterwards there was abandonment.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder[7] as
[a] personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive
behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times
they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.
Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals
who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without
advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their
important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even
when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing
things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are
often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.
In her psychological report,[8] Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent
personality disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much
attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions.[9] Petitioners
mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt
confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent
was for real.[10]
Dr. Dayan further observed that, as expected of persons suffering from a
dependent personality disorder, petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating
manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive attitude
encouraged other people to take advantage of him.[11] This could be seen in the
way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his father who treated
his family like robots[12] and, later, by respondent who was as domineering as his
father.[13] When petitioner could no longer take respondents domineering ways,
he preferred to hide from her rather than confront her and tell her outright that
he wanted to end their marriage.[14]
Dr. Dayan traced petitioners personality disorder to his dysfunctional family life,
to wit:[15]
Q. And what might be the root cause of such psychological incapacity?
A. Sir, I mentioned awhile ago that Lesters family is dysfunctional. The father
was very abusive, very domineering. The mother has been very unhappy and
the children never had affirmation. They might [have been] x x x given financial
support because the father was [a] very affluent person but it was never an
intact family. x x x The wife and the children were practically robots. And so, I
would say Lester grew up, not having self-confidence, very immature and
somehow not truly understand[ing] what [it] meant to be a husband, what [it]
meant to have a real family life.
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave
and incurable and already existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage
to respondent.[16]
It has been sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition
that was grave and incurable and had a deeply rooted cause. This Court, in the
same Tecase, recognized that individuals with diagnosable personality disorders
usually have long-term concerns, and thus therapy may be long-
term.[17] Particularly, personality disorders are long-standing, inflexible ways of
behaving that are not so much severe mental disorders as dysfunctional styles
of living. These disorders affect all areas of functioning and, beginning in
childhood or adolescence, create problems for those who display them and for
others.[18]
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from
psychological incapacity that effectively renders him unable to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is declared null and void.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The April 16,
2008 resolution of this Court and the January 26, 2004 decision and September
24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010 are SET
ASIDE.
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17,
1998 is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may
be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement,
however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a
psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the
parties is hereby declared valid."[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying
her Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and
respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is
declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The
conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and
129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the
delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In the best interest and welfare
of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the
visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census
and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for
their appropriate action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on
September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the
Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized
by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security
Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage,
five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in
1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in
Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other
hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in
1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the
military service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential
Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they
became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy
Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the
Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and
then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a
wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see
him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his
failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex
with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their
children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised
them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their
house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and
chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early
in the morning before going to Malacaang.When she was discharged from the
military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and
construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development
Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when
they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not
want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in
their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent,
inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her
aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house
and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions
(Exh. G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went
to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child,
Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their
unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her
driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a
house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in
Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children
described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records,
pp. 85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for
psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on
the other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to
perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to
support his family and his violent attitude towardsappellee and their children, x
x x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the
spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically
identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the
decision. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68
to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital
obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and
explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or
psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by
psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with
the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists
is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was
mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or
she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In
fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically
incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the
petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or
sufficiently proven by an expert.Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would
show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was]
psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have
known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d]
preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the
following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings
by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a
Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did
not subject himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all
the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the
Petition."[7]
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological
examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration
of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she
presented does not show such incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that
were submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform
the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of
Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests
himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the
circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in
order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused
to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the
interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family
Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees
marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the
state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration'
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her
own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by
the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity(b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The
foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be
"medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in
the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common
children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a
finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not
lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely
no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost
his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It
was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give
material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to
the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing
that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a
taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are
those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.

Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid
down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner,
however, has not faithfully observed them.

In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the
guidelines outlined in Molina.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except

that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non
to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 22,
1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage of
Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan
Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija.2 The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on
January 16, 1978; and Eden M. Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982.3 Their birth
certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at
the back of the house of their in-laws.4 A week after the wedding, Avelino
started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months,
suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times
when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and
would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her.5
On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from
him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to
support herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was
imprisoned for some crime,6 and that he escaped from jail on October 22,
1985.7 A certification therefor dated February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail
Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a
petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.8 Since Avelino
could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo
News, a newspaper of general circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17,
1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish jurisdictional facts.
Thereafter, on December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence,
only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her
sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness.
Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her
husband live in Olongapo City but they spend their vacations at the house of
Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino
always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the couple's house.
She knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied
Erlinda and the children.10
Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the
investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing whether or
not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to
file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision.
In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an
investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.
However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of
evidence.11
On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's
manifestation dated December 5, 1990, the trial court rendered a
decision12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of
the Family Code, disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby
declares the marriage celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between Erlinda
Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to be null and void.
The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into
his Book of Marriage this declaration after this decision shall have become final
and executory .
SO ORDERED."
On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside
Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he
was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting
controverting evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence
and the law. After requiring Erlinda to comment, the trial court denied the
Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21, 1991 as follows:13
"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable
Court dated December 27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The observation
of the movant is to the effect that 'Mere alcoholism and abusiveness are not
enough to show psychological incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are
common in marriage. There must be showing that these traits, stemmed from
psychological incapacity existing at the time of celebration of the marriage.’
In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife
and children since 1983. The defendant, while in jail escaped and whose present
whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support his family for the same period
of time, actuations clearly indicative of the failure of the husband to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage defined and enumerated
under Article 68 of the Family Code. These findings of facts are
uncontroverted. 1âwphi1.nêt
Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and
became manifest only after the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits are
manifestations of lack of marital responsibility and appear now to be incurable.
Nothing can be graver since the family members are now left to fend for
themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-General, these are not
common in marriage.
Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to
assuage the sensibilities of the more numerous church, is a substitute for
divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in order to dissolve marriages
that exist only in name.
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration
aforecited is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED"
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole
assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A VELINO
DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF
THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW
NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.14
On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision15 affirming the
decision of the trial court, disposing thus:
"Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to
perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.
Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial
declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is continously
(sic) destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff.
(Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)."16
Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of
Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family
Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase "psychological incapacity" and an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case. Respondent, in her Comment, insists
that the facts constituting psychological incapacity were proven by
preponderance of evidence during trial.
At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly
declared the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on
the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is
emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive
from justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides -
"A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization."
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The
trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate
court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of
the trial court.18
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid down the following
GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code:
"(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code20 as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles
220, 221 and 225 of the same Code21 in regard to parents and their children.
Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378
given great respect by our courts. x x x is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor No pronouncement as to costs.
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the SO ORDERED.
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."22

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to

comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to
comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by
experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged
psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the
husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime
for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor
was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since
the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered.

In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed the dismissal of the

trial court and Court of Appeals of the petition for annulment on the ground of
dearth of the evidence presented. We further explained therein that -

"Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the

precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to
show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of
the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals, supra. )"24
ROWENA PADILLA-RUMBAUA v EDWARD
RUMBAUA
G.R. No. 166738
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Petitioner Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua (petitioner) challenges, through her petition
for review on certiorari,[1] the decision dated June 25, 2004[2] and the resolution
dated January 18, 2005[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.
The challenged decision reversed the decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
declaring the marriage of the petitioner and respondent Edward Rumbaua
(respondent) null and void on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
The assailed resolution, on the other hand, denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
The present petition traces its roots to the petitioner’s complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage against the respondent before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 767. The petitioner alleged that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as
shown by the following circumstances: the respondent reneged on his promise
to live with her under one roof after finding work; he failed to extend financial
support to her; he blamed her for his mother’s death; he represented himself as
single in his transactions; and he pretended to be working in Davao, although he
was cohabiting with another woman in Novaliches, Quezon City.
Summons was served on the respondent through substituted service, as
personal service proved futile.[5] The RTC ordered the provincial prosecutor to
investigate if collusion existed between the parties and to ensure that no
fabrication or suppression of evidence would take place.[6] Prosecutor Melvin P.
Tiongson’s report negated the presence of collusion between the parties.[7]
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the petition.[8] The OSG entered its appearance and
deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Vizcaya to assist in all hearings of
the case.[9]
The petitioner presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate
her charges.
The petitioner related that she and the respondent were childhood neighbors in
Dupax del Norte, Nueva Vizcaya. Sometime in 1987, they met again and
became sweethearts but the respondent’s family did not approve of their
relationship. After graduation from college in 1991, the respondent promised
to marry the petitioner as soon as he found a job. The job came in 1993, when
the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) accepted the respondent as a computer
engineer. The respondent proposed to the petitioner that they first have a
“secret marriage” in order not to antagonize his parents. The petitioner agreed;
they were married in Manila on February 23, 1993. The petitioner and the
respondent, however, never lived together; the petitioner stayed with her sister
in Fairview, Quezon City, while the respondent lived with his parents in
Novaliches.
The petitioner and respondent saw each other every day during the first
six months of their marriage. At that point, the respondent refused to live with
the petitioner for fear that public knowledge of their marriage would affect his
application for a PAL scholarship. Seven months into their marriage, the
couple’s daily meetings became occasional visits to the petitioner’s house
in Fairview; they would have sexual trysts in motels. Later that year, the
respondent enrolled at FEATI University after he lost his employment with
PAL.[10]
In 1994, the parties’ respective families discovered their secret
marriage. The respondent’s mother tried to convince him to go to the United
States, but he refused. To appease his mother, he continued living separately
from the petitioner. The respondent forgot to greet the petitioner during her
birthday in 1992 and likewise failed to send her greeting cards on special
occasions. The respondent indicated as well in his visa application that he was
single.
In April 1995, the respondent’s mother died. The respondent blamed the
petitioner, associating his mother’s death to the pain that the discovery of his
secret marriage brought. Pained by the respondent’s action, the petitioner
severed her relationship with the respondent. They eventually reconciled
through the help of the petitioner’s father, although they still lived separately.
In 1997, the respondent informed the petitioner that he had found a job
in Davao. A year later, the petitioner and her mother went to the respondent’s
house in Novaliches and found him cohabiting with one Cynthia Villanueva
(Cynthia). When she confronted the respondent about it, he denied having an
affair with Cynthia.[11] The petitioner apparently did not believe the
respondents and moved to to Nueva Vizcaya to recover from the pain and
anguish that her discovery brought.[12]
The petitioner disclosed during her cross-examination that communication
between her and respondent had ceased. Aside from her oral testimony, the
petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage contract;[13] and
the testimony, curriculum vitae,[14] and psychological report[15] of clinical
psychologist Dr. Nedy Lorenzo Tayag (Dr. Tayag).
Dr. Tayag declared on the witness stand that she administered the following
tests on the petitioner: a Revised Beta Examination; a Bender Visual Motor
Gestalt Test; a Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test; a Draw a Person Test; a Sach’s
Sentence Completion Test; and MMPI.[16] She thereafter prepared a
psychological report with the following findings:
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION
Psychometric tests data reveal petitioner to operate in an average intellectual
level. Logic and reasoning remained intact. She is seen to be the type of woman
who adjusts fairly well into most situations especially if it is within her interests.
She is pictured to be faithful to her commitments and had reservations from
negative criticisms such that she normally adheres to social norms, behavior-
wise. Her age speaks of maturity, both intellectually and emotionally. Her one
fault lies in her compliant attitude which makes her a subject for manipulation
and deception such that of respondent. In all the years of their relationship, she
opted to endure his irresponsibility largely because of the mere belief that
someday things will be much better for them. But upon the advent of her
husband’s infidelity, she gradually lost hope as well as the sense of self-respect,
that she has finally taken her tool to be assertive to the point of being
aggressive and very cautious at times – so as to fight with the frustration and
insecurity she had especially regarding her failed marriage.
Respondent in this case, is revealed to operate in a very self-centered manner
as he believes that the world revolves around him. His egocentrism made it so
easy for him to deceitfully use others for his own advancement with an extreme
air of confidence and dominance. He would do actions without any remorse or
guilt feelings towards others especially to that of petitioner.
REMARKS
Love happens to everyone. It is dubbed to be boundless as it goes beyond the
expectations people tagged with it. In love, “age does matter.” People love in
order to be secure that one will share his/her life with another and that he/she
will not die alone. Individuals who are in love had the power to let love grow or
let love die – it is a choice one had to face when love is not the love he/she
expected.
In the case presented by petitioner, it is very apparent that love really happened
for her towards the young respondent – who used “love” as a disguise or
deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence she extended towards him. He
made her believe that he is responsible, true, caring and thoughtful – only to
reveal himself contrary to what was mentioned. He lacked the commitment,
faithfulness, and remorse that he was able to engage himself to promiscuous
acts that made petitioner look like an innocent fool. His character traits reveal
him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder - declared to be grave, severe and
incurable.[17] [Emphasis supplied.]
The RTC Ruling
The RTC nullified the parties’ marriage in its decision of April 19, 2002. The
trial court saw merit in the testimonies of the petitioner and Dr. Tayag, and
concluded as follows:
xxxx
Respondent was never solicitous of the welfare and wishes of his wife.
Respondent imposed limited or block [sic] out communication with his wife,
forgetting special occasions, like petitioner’s birthdays and Valentine’s Day;
going out only on occasions despite their living separately and to go to a motel
to have sexual intercourse.
It would appear that the foregoing narration are the attendant facts in this case
which show the psychological incapacity of respondent, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of the parties, to enter into lawful marriage and to
discharge his marital responsibilities (See Articles 68 to 71, Family Code). This
incapacity is “declared grave, severe and incurable.”
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the marriage between petitioner Rowena
Padilla Rumbaua and respondent Edwin Rumbaua is hereby declared annulled.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The CA Decision
The Republic, through the OSG, appealed the RTC decision to the
[19]
CA. The CA decision of June 25, 2004 reversed and set aside the RTC decision,
and denied the nullification of the parties’ marriage.[20]
In its ruling, the CA observed that Dr. Tayag’s psychiatric report did not
mention the cause of the respondent’s so-called “narcissistic personality
disorder;” it did not discuss the respondent’s childhood and thus failed to give
the court an insight into the respondent’s developmental years. Dr. Tayag
likewise failed to explain why she came to the conclusion that the respondent’s
incapacity was “deep-seated” and “incurable.”
The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code requires the incapacity to
be psychological, although its manifestations may be physical. Moreover, the
evidence presented must show that the incapacitated party was mentally or
physically ill so that he or she could not have known the marital obligations
assumed, knowing them, could not have assumed them. In other words, the
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect,
or difficulty to perform the essential obligations of marriage. In the present
case, the petitioner suffered because the respondent adamantly refused to live
with her because of his parents’ objection to their marriage.
The petitioner moved to reconsider the decision, but the CA denied her
motion in its resolution of January 18, 2005. [21]
The Petition and the Issues
The petitioner argues in the present petition that –
1. the OSG certification requirement under Republic v.
Molina[22] (the Molina case) cannot be dispensed with because A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, which relaxed the requirement, took effect only on March 15, 2003;
2. vacating the decision of the courts a quo and remanding the case to the
RTC to recall her expert witness and cure the defects in her testimony, as well as
to present additional evidence, would temper justice with mercy; and
3. Dr. Tayag’s testimony in court cured the deficiencies in her psychiatric
report.
The petitioner prays that the RTC’s and the CA’s decisions be reversed and set
aside, and the case be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; in the
event we cannot grant this prayer, that the CA’s decision be set aside and the
RTC’s decision be reinstated.
The Republic maintained in its comment that: (a) A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC was
applicable although it took effect after the promulgation of Molina; (b)
invalidating the trial court’s decision and remanding the case for further
proceedings were not proper; and (c) the petitioner failed to establish
respondent’s psychological incapacity.[23]
The parties simply reiterated their arguments in the memoranda they filed.
THE COURT’S RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is applicable
In Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the OSG; they are to appear as counsel for the State in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Emphasis supplied.]

A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC[24] -- which this Court promulgated on March 15, 2003 and
duly published -- is geared towards the relaxation of the OSG certification
that Molina required. Section 18 of this remedial regulation provides:
SEC. 18. Memoranda. – The court may require the parties and the public
prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their
respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the
date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to
file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No
other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the
lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for
decision, with or without the memoranda.
The petitioner argues that the RTC decision of April 19, 2002 should be vacated
for prematurity, as it was rendered despite the absence of the required OSG
certification specified in Molina. According to the petitioner, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, which took effect only on March 15, 2003, cannot overturn the
requirements of Molina that was promulgated as early as February 13, 1997.
The petitioner’s argument lacks merit.
The amendment introduced under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is procedural or
remedial in character; it does not create or remove any vested right, but only
operates as a remedy in aid of or confirmation of already existing rights. The
settled rule is that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect,[25] as we
held in De Los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat:[26]
Procedural Laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law,
or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statues - they may be
given retroactive effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage and this will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he
is adversely affected, insomuch as there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as a remedial measure, removed the mandatory nature
of an OSG certification and may be applied retroactively to pending matters. In
effect, the measure cures in any pending matter any procedural lapse on the
certification prior to its promulgation. Our rulings in Antonio v.
Reyes[27] and Navales v. Navales[28] have since confirmed and clarified that A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC has dispensed with the Molina guideline on the matter of
certification, although Article 48 mandates the appearance of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal to ensure that no collusion between the parties would take
place. Thus, what is important is the presence of the prosecutor in the case, not
the remedial requirement that he be certified to be present. From this
perspective, the petitioner’s objection regarding the Molina guideline on
certification lacks merit.
A Remand of the Case to the RTC is Improper
The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts’ decisions and the
remand of the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence are
procedurally permissible. She argues that the inadequacy of her evidence
during the trial was the fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and
asserts that remanding the case to the RTC would allow her to cure the
evidentiary insufficiencies. She posits in this regard that while mistakes of
counsel bind a party, the rule should be liberally construed in her favor to serve
the ends of justice.
We do not find her arguments convincing.

A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the
grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of
Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a
judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the
period for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only
on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that
could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of
which the aggrieved party’s rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly
discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could
not have discovered and produced at the trial, and that would probably alter
the result if presented.
In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence
presented by her former counsel as basis for a remand. She did not, however,
specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of
nullity prima facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel had not been negligent in
handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioner’s counsel had been
negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be
excusable, i.e. one that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded
against. The negligence that the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited
in Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:[29]
Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a
result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify
as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-
opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new
counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not
been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on
the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to
securing new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the
instant case.
Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioner’s requested remand.
Petitioner failed to establish the
respondent’s psychological incapacity
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on
Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that “a marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of its celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.” In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court first declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to “no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage.” It must be confined to “the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.”
We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic v. Court of Appeals where we said:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees
marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not
to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration”
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their “I do's.” The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts…
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established
in Santos. To reiterate, psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a)
gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.[31] These requisites must
be strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for nullity of marriage based
on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Furthermore, since the Family
Code does not define “psychological incapacity,” fleshing out its terms is left to
us to do so on a case-to-case basis through jurisprudence.[32] We emphasized
this approach in the recent case of Ting v. Velez-Ting[33] when we explained:
 It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo
Te that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated
distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.
In the present case and using the above standards and approach, we find
the totality of the petitioner’s evidence insufficient to prove that the
respondent is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband.
a. Petitioner’s testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability
of respondent’s condition
The petitioner’s evidence merely showed that the respondent: (a) reneged
on his promise to cohabit with her; (b) visited her occasionally from 1993 to
1997; (c) forgot her birthday in 1992, and did not send her greeting cards during
special occasions; (d) represented himself as single in his visa application; (e)
blamed her for the death of his mother; and (f) told her he was working in
Davao when in fact he was cohabiting with another woman in 1997.
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of the “psychological incapacity”
that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the “difficulty,” if not
outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations
that characterize some marriages. In Bier v. Bier,[34] we ruled that it was not
enough that respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse
integral element in the respondent's personality structure that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations – had to
be shown and was not shown in this cited case.
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the
petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted in
some psychological illness. As the petitioner’s testimony
reveals, respondent merely refused to cohabit with her for fear of jeopardizing
his application for a scholarship, and later due to his fear of antagonizing his
family. The respondent’s failure to greet the petitioner on her birthday and to
send her cards during special occasions, as well as his acts of blaming petitioner
for his mother’s death and of representing himself as single in his visa
application, could only at best amount to forgetfulness, insensitivity or
emotional immaturity, not necessarily psychological incapacity. Likewise, the
respondent’s act of living with another woman four years into the marriage
cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when
no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at
the inception of marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent
was caring and faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their
marriage; their problems only came in later.
To be sure, the respondent was far from perfect and had some character
flaws. The presence of these imperfections, however, does not necessarily
warrant a conclusion that he had a psychological malady at the time of the
marriage that rendered him incapable of fulfilling his duties and obligations. To
use the words of Navales v. Navales:[35]
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere “difficulty,”
“refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of marital obligations or “ill will” on
the part of the spouse is different from “incapacity” rooted on some debilitating
psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like,
do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article
36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological
illness that is contemplated by said rule.
b. Dr. Tayag’s psychological report and court testimony
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s
psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one
side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted.
While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist for reasons
of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more
rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above.[36] For,
effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism of a third
party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and
how he would have reacted and responded to the doctor’s probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s narrations,
and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric,
and unremorseful person who “believes that the world revolves around him”;
and who “used love as a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence
[petitioner] extended towards him.” Dr. Tayag then incorporated her own idea
of “love”; made a generalization that respondent was a person who “lacked
commitment, faithfulness, and remorse,” and who engaged “in promiscuous
acts that made the petitioner look like a fool”; and finally concluded that the
respondent’s character traits reveal “him to suffer Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and
incurable.”
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed
that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the respondent's narcissistic
personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the
marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged
disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we
cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in her Report – i.e., that
the respondent suffered “Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of
Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and incurable” – is an
unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous
characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests
administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess
her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with
respect to the respondent’s condition. To make conclusions and generalizations
on the respondent’s psychological condition based on the information fed by
only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as
proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
Petitioner nonetheless contends that Dr. Tayag’s subsequent testimony in
court cured whatever deficiencies attended her psychological report.
We do not share this view.
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to
establish the fact that at the time the parties were married, respondent was
already suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to
assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she
adequately explain how she came to the conclusion that respondent’s condition
was grave and incurable. To directly quote from the records:
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO:

Q: I would like to call your attention to the Report already
marked as Exh. “E-7”, there is a statement to the effect that his character traits
begin to suffer narcissistic personality disorder with traces of antisocial
personality disorder. What do you mean? Can you please explain in layman’s
word, Madam Witness?
DR. NEDY LORENZO TAYAG:
A: Actually, in a layman’s term, narcissistic personality disorder
cannot accept that there is something wrong with his own behavioral
manifestation. [sic] They feel that they can rule the world; they are eccentric;
they are exemplary, demanding financial and emotional support, and this is
clearly manifested by the fact that respondent abused and used petitioner’s
love. Along the line, a narcissistic person cannot give empathy; cannot give love
simply because they love themselves more than anybody else; and thirdly,
narcissistic person cannot support his own personal need and gratification
without the help of others and this is where the petitioner set in.
Q: Can you please describe the personal [sic] disorder?
A: Clinically, considering that label, the respondent behavioral
manifestation under personality disorder [sic] this is already considered grave,
serious, and treatment will be impossible [sic]. As I say this, a kind of
developmental disorder wherein it all started during the early formative years
and brought about by one familiar relationship the way he was reared and cared
by the family. Environmental exposure is also part and parcel of the child
disorder. [sic]
Q: You mean to say, from the formative [years] up to the
present?
A: Actually, the respondent behavioral manner was [present]
long before he entered marriage. [Un]fortunately, on the part of the petitioner,
she never realized that such behavioral manifestation of the respondent
connotes pathology. [sic]
xxxx
Q: So in the representation of the petitioner that the
respondent is now lying [sic] with somebody else, how will you describe the
character of this respondent who is living with somebody else?
A: This is where the antisocial personality trait of the
respondent [sic] because an antisocial person is one who indulge in philandering
activities, who do not have any feeling of guilt at the expense of another person,
and this [is] again a buy-product of deep seated psychological incapacity.
Q: And this psychological incapacity based on this particular
deep seated [sic], how would you describe the psychological incapacity? [sic]
A: As I said there is a deep seated psychological dilemma, so I
would say incurable in nature and at this time and again [sic] the psychological
pathology of the respondent. One plays a major factor of not being able to give
meaning to a relationship in terms of sincerity and endurance.
 Q: And if this psychological disorder exists before the marriage
of the respondent and the petitioner, Madam Witness?
A: Efforts were made by the psychologist but unfortunately,
the respondent never appeared at my clinic.

A: Clinically, any disorder are usually rooted from the early

formative years and so if it takes enough that such psychological incapacity of
respondent already existed long before he entered marriage, because if you Q: On the basis of those examinations conducted with the
petitioning wife to annul their marriage with her husband in general, what can
analyze how he was reared by her parents particularly by the mother, there is
already an unhealthy symbiosis developed between the two, and this creates a you say about the respondent?
major emotional havoc when he reached adult age.

A: That from the very start respondent has no emotional intent

Q: How about the gravity? to give meaning to their relationship. If you analyze their marital relationship
they never lived under one room. From the very start of the [marriage], the
respondent to have petitioner to engage in secret marriage until that time their
family knew of their marriage [sic]. Respondent completely refused, completely
A: This is already grave simply because from the very start
relinquished his marital obligation to the petitioner.
respondent never had an inkling that his behavioral manifestation connotes
pathology and second ground [sic], respondent will never admit again that such
behavior of his connotes again pathology simply because the disorder of the
respondent is not detrimental to himself but, more often than not, it is xxxx
detrimental to other party involved.

xxxx COURT:

PROSECUTOR MELVIN TIONGSON: Q: Because you have interviewed or you have questioned the
petitioner, can you really enumerate the specific traits of the respondent?

Q: You were not able to personally examine the respondent

here? DR. NEDY TAYAG:

DR. NEDY TAYAG: A: One is the happy-go-lucky attitude of the respondent and
the dependent attitude of the respondent.
 Q: Even if he is already eligible for employment?
A: He remains to be at the mercy of his mother. He is a happy-
go-lucky simply because he never had a set of responsibility. I think that he
finished his education but he never had a stable job because he completely
relied on the support of his mother.
Q: You give a more thorough interview so I am asking you
something specific?
A: The happy-go-lucky attitude; the overly dependent attitude
on the part of the mother merely because respondent happened to be the only
son. I said that there is a unhealthy symbiosis relationship [sic] developed
between the son and the mother simply because the mother always pampered
completely, pampered to the point that respondent failed to develop his own
sense of assertion or responsibility particularly during that stage and there is
also presence of the simple lying act particularly his responsibility in terms of
handling emotional imbalance and it is clearly manifested by the fact that
respondent refused to build a home together with the petitioner when in fact
they are legally married. Thirdly, respondent never felt or completely ignored
the feelings of the petitioner; he never felt guilty hurting the petitioner because
on the part of the petitioner, knowing that respondent indulge with another
woman it is very, very traumatic on her part yet respondent never had the guts
to feel guilty or to atone said act he committed in their relationship, and
clinically this falls under antisocial personality. [37]
In terms of incurability, Dr. Tayag’s answer was very vague and inconclusive,
thus:
xxxx
ATTY. RICHARD TABAGO
Q: Can this personally be cured, madam witness?
DR. NEDY TAYAG
A: Clinically, if persons suffering from personality disorder
curable, up to this very moment, no scientific could be upheld to alleviate their
kind of personality disorder; Secondly, again respondent or other person
suffering from any kind of disorder particularly narcissistic personality will never
admit that they are suffering from this kind of disorder, and then
again curability will always be a question. [sic][38]
This testimony shows that while Dr. Tayag initially described the general
characteristics of a person suffering from a narcissistic personality disorder, she
did not really show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited these
traits. She mentioned the buzz words that jurisprudence requires for the nullity
of a marriage – namely, gravity, incurability, existence at the time of the
marriage, psychological incapacity relating to marriage – and in her own limited
way, related these to the medical condition she generally described. The
testimony, together with her report, however, suffers from very basic flaws.
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her
testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on
particulars, most notably on how the respondent can be said to be suffering
from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is
grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the
marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s awareness of and
his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All these Thus, on the whole, we do not blame the petitioner for the move to secure
are critical to the success of the petitioner’s case. a remand of this case to the trial courts for the introduction of additional
evidence; the petitioner’s evidence in its present state is woefully insufficient to
support the conclusion that the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent should
be nullified on the ground of the respondent’s psychological incapacity.
Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because
it was wholly based on what the petitioner related to her. As the doctor
admitted to the prosecutor, she did not at all examine the respondent, only the
petitioner. Neither the law nor jurisprudence requires, of course, that the The Court commiserates with the petitioner’s marital predicament. The
person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally respondent may indeed be unwilling to discharge his marital obligations,
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at particularly the obligation to live with one’s spouse. Nonetheless, we cannot
such declaration.[39] If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent presume psychological defect from the mere fact that respondent refuses to
means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and comply with his marital duties. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove
that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
given credit.[40] No such independent evidence, however, appears on record to
have been gathered in this case, particularly about the respondent’s early life essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
and associations, and about events on or about the time of the marriage and psychological illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the
immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appear to us to be no inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meager facts that deprive the party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion that a the matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.[41]
ground exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this because
only the baser qualities of the respondent’s life were examined and given focus;
none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the better qualities, WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we DENY the petition
such as his focus on having a job, his determination to improve himself through and AFFIRM the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated June 25,
studies, his care and attention in the first six months of the marriage, among 2004 and January 18, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 75095.
others. The evidence fails to mention also what character and qualities the
petitioner brought into her marriage, for example, why the respondent’s family
opposed the marriage and what events led the respondent to blame the SO ORDERED.
petitioner for the death of his mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be
sure, these are important because not a few marriages have failed, not because
of psychological incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic
incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to psychological
incapacity. The continued separation of the spouses likewise never appeared to
have been factored in. Not a few married couples have likewise permanently
separated simply because they have “fallen out of love,” or have outgrown the
attraction that drew them together in their younger years.
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its
journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much
reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created
all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring
husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed
the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of
Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration
in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and
reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly
established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila
Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh.
"A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa,
Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night
of their married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual
intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side
thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There was no sexual
intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy
together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City.
But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew.
They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City
for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse
between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during
siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They
slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until
March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her
husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr.
Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20,
1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and
still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to
this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed
medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment
was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he
never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he
did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an
eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that,
according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or
maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the
appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be
annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for
several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on
his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the
relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of
them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them
has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He
further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of
medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their
separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But,
the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to
have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims,
that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue
because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed
this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced
to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the
defendant, will consummate their marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are
still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was
examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is
impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report.
(Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"),
and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether
or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2)
inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1)
inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft
erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of
further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of
having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion
between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage
entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila
Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before
the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision
be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual
intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion
with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally
absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of
both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the
lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between
them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private
respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that
since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus
between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion
except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to
validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the
conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the
parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could
have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage,
the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an
issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's
pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such
pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the
material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said
provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed
decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private
respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined
by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she
thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was
presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He
admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the
petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall
be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts.
88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial
(Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their
marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the
parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent)
have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling
the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial
lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on
a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is
psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was
resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on
record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife
after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder
which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of
Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019,
January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the
alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex
with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as
error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the
alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such
refusal which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because
there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches,
pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have
sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10
months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court
made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to
have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has
never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the
marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes
immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that
any of the parties is suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also
claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for
private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as
stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with
private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids
him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At
least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or
discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in
evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his
impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the
reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private
respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant,
Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than
to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual
intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-
fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the
wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he
was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during
the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the
same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to
be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins
vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it
were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that
defendant did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his
claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her
marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate
modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her
private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it
were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is
the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not
phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper
motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the
husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom
he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable
resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of
a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to
discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family
Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the
sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between
husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another.
Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I
could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled
self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy
which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a
participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope
of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private
respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between husband and wife must
be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive
interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long
way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children
but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit
amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise,
conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated
marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of
respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of

Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,
vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has
unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception
between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the
depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the
modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to
fulfill the marital obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the
Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of
Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F.
Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and
affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old
and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they
got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through
a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog,
Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born
on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent
declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the
Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that
respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and
still subsists up to the present.8
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner
claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her,
her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to
wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate
son,10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her
family. She only confessed the truth about the boy’s parentage when petitioner
learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to
rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo
Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in
psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with
Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her
family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same
vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village
Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect14 but
petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that
no such occasion had taken place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those
names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and
touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry
worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the
one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one
of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were
only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or
connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her
payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set
from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous
furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up
borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up
his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her
unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a
reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good
in November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr.
Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they
conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and
conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that
respondent’s persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship
that should be based on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that
respondent’s extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of
paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was
having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential
marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital
obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there
was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented
personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was
afraid of losing her husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she
surmised such intent from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from
head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching
psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of
Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for
the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank.
She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not
under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after
office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at
the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the
writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan
was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with
Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred
that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking
for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband’s
whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten
people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to
their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly
hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence
presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a
psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr.
Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,33 together
with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological
Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent
was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic
tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to
the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation
conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and
interpreted respondent’s psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only
one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake
the results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that
respondent’s propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of
health, singing abilities and her income, among others−had been duly
established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic ability to invent
and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-
believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her
incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court
thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of
the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the
ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the
pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan
Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by
a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic
tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While
conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with
petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the
evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological
incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated
the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively
establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the
credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a
settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court
regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the
appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor
or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of
Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner.
Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to
establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the
operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of
facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These
standards were definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v.
Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of
Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at
bar.46 Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely
affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one
case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively
concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the
remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the
Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did
ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the
petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of
nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a
decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party
who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of
psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body
of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for
the dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons
"who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting
marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same
class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among
others. A party’s mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the
Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound
mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under
the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouse’s incurable
insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage
contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the
Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the
marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab
initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2)
of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just
like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential
requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a
specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of
the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that
psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse
may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless
incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated
in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this
"psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does
not affect the consent to the marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as
phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically
incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage,
which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x
x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At
the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological
incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this
would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though
were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court,
through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand
the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them,
was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then
Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to
establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or
one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized
that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one
is about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity
deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading
"psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has
been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code
committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application,
by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision
under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision
committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis,
guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken
from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for
annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law,
on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori
assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In
regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as
intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics.
Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving
standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in
psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the
auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has
developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since
1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework
that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the
clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation,
and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36.
There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of
this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then
in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation
of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family
Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological
incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted
as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic
Church but still existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard
the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent
understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local
Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole
source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept
may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code
and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression.
Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive
on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological
incapacity are binding on lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide
utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the
kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which
respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the
constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection
to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains
the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and
prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-
political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification
that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation
the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been
accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which
defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes
the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it
may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is
reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact
merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally
ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections
1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be
taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an
implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State
interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn
serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the
State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab
initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State
concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who,
for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case
As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the
judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has
consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines
therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological–not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children
as an essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law on evidence—
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General
issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the
petition.78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the
implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article
48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the
consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of
nullity. In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial
court is extant from the records of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this
Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of
facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these
facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied
about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her
psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally,
the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he
presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior,
and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel
Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing
career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology
who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to
psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered
petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court
acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under
Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of
evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public
matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family
Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between
the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus,
even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of
respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the
parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by
experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. The initiatory
complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and
abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories,
and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using
fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational
attainment, and family background, among others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to
medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology.
Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a
psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2)
major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can
say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the
standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and
over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated
lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal
behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the
respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her
marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another.
The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something
that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on
communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are
our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their
feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie,
what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned.
Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love,
trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent
in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing
the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third
witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the
petitioner’s officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and
ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page
six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr.
witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which
means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is
having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is
pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we
also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is
abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the
husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes
that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is
pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered
psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Ma’am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the
psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of
petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she
continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the
case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well
as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not
personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v.
Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not
required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We
deem the methodology utilized by petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for
their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez’s common
conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts. However, since the
trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there is
no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom
by petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court
explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It
has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity
for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health,
her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and
fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make
believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance
to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner,
respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that
is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented
by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to
psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly
existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She
fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she
married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural
child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the
truth after their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to
prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is
immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of
cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such
circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise
supports the belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the
record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as
false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly,
they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from
fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court
were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the
pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of
respondent’s inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality
would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond,
much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to
marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be
expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried
her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to
perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her
psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly
banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential marital
obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly
disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her
commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which
states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances
constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity
shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations
made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46.
The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to,
and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the
misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her
marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital
obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in
particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it
is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to
the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into
consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the
Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally
inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed
decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such
deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that
interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila
decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30
March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such
decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s
psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause93 was
appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting
another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is
considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when
elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary
judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical
understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct
appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that
based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the
testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the
marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly
antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage
Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial
consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a
discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on
account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was
impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no
sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of
due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by
the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper
import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway
since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity
of petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s
version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings
of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value.
After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the
canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such
psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment
of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that
respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such
effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he
returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s
aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate
stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the
conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that
respondent’s condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s
psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it
would have been easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized
respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether
the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity
on this point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court
rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well
before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that
the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36
or any other provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995,
began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code
committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its
formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did
refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding
judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that
psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule
on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to
incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court
came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent’s
psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly
mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in
an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity
at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial
court’s decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite
arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate
review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument
that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the
courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in
enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical
considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot
be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical
averment from the expert witnesses that respondent’s psychological incapacity
was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to
elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly
propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be
undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molinaor Santos, especially those
presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and
their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of
incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at
the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of
Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to
reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of
incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present
evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten
(10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced
that the incurability of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been
established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the
fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as
an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that
respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that
annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for
declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly
ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the
marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that
respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as
exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the
appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed commitment
to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons
and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the
legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August
1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and
VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE v ROWENA ONG GUTIERREZ YU-TE and REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 161793
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Far from novel is the issue involved in this petition. Psychological incapacity,
since its incorporation in our laws, has become a clichd subject of discussion in
our jurisprudence. The Court treats this case, however, with much ado, it having
realized that current jurisprudential doctrine has unnecessarily imposed a
perspective by which psychological incapacity should be viewed, totally
inconsistent with the way the concept was formulatedfree in form and devoid
of any definition.
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the August 5, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867. The petition further assails the January
19, 2004 Resolution[2] denying the motion for the reconsideration of the
challenged decision.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena
Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association
in their college. Edward was then initially attracted to Rowenas close friend; but,
as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court
Rowena. That was in January 1996, when petitioner was a sophomore student
and respondent, a freshman.[3]
Sharing similar angst towards their families, the two understood one another
and developed a certain degree of closeness towards each other. In March
1996, or around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked Edward
that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and
jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and
sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money and she, purchasing
the boat ticket.[4]
However, Edwards P80,000.00 lasted for only a month. Their pension house
accommodation and daily sustenance fast depleted it. And they could not find a
job. In April 1996, they decided to go back to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her
uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was abroad, and
Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit
suicide, Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncles place.[5]
On April 23, 1996, Rowenas uncle brought the two to a court to get married. He
was then 25 years old, and she, 20.[6] The two then continued to stay at her
uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisonerhe was not allowed to go
out unaccompanied. Her uncle also showed Edward his guns and warned the
latter not to leave Rowena.[7] At one point, Edward was able to call home and
talk to his brother who suggested that they should stay at their parents home
and live with them. Edward relayed this to Rowena who, however, suggested
that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward
talked to his father about this, but the patriarch got mad, told Edward that he
would be disinherited, and insisted that Edward must go home.[8]
After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowenas uncle, and stayed
with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena and her family whenever
they telephoned to ask for him.[9]
In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence
that they should live with his parents, she said that it was better for them to live
separate lives. They then parted ways.[10]
After almost four years, or on January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106, for the annulment of
his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity. This
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-39720.[11]
As Rowena did not file an answer, the trial court, on July 11, 2000, ordered the
Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City to investigate whether there
was collusion between the parties.[12] In the meantime, on July 27, 2000, the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance and deputized the
OCP to appear on its behalf and assist it in the scheduled hearings.[13]
On August 23, 2000, the OCP submitted an investigation report stating that it
could not determine if there was collusion between the parties; thus, it
recommended trial on the merits.[14]
The clinical psychologist who examined petitioner found both parties
psychologically incapacitated, and made the following findings and conclusions:
BACKGROUND DATA & BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY:
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE is a [29-year-old] Filipino male adult born and
baptized Born Again Christian at Manila. He finished two years in college
at AMA Computer College last 1994 and is currently unemployed. He is married
to and separated from ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE. He presented himself at my
office for a psychological evaluation in relation to his petition for Nullification of
Marriage against the latter by the grounds of psychological incapacity. He is now
residing at 181 P. Tuazon Street, Quezon City.
Petitioner got himself three siblings who are now in business and one deceased
sister. Both his parents are also in the business world by whom he [considers] as
generous, hospitable, and patient. This said virtues are said to be handed to
each of the family member. He generally considers himself to be quiet and
simple. He clearly remembers himself to be afraid of meeting people. After
1994, he tried his luck in being a Sales Executive of Mansfield International
Incorporated. And because of job incompetence, as well as being quiet and
loner, he did not stay long in the job until 1996. His interest lie[s] on becoming a
full servant of God by being a priest or a pastor. He [is] said to isolate himself
from his friends even during his childhood days as he only loves to read the
Bible and hear its message.
Respondent is said to come from a fine family despite having a lazy father and a
disobedient wife. She is said to have not finish[ed] her collegiate degree and
shared intimate sexual moments with her boyfriend prior to that with
petitioner.
In January of 1996, respondent showed her kindness to petitioner and this
became the foundation of their intimate relationship. After a month of dating,
petitioner mentioned to respondent that he is having problems with his
family. Respondent surprisingly retorted that she also hates her family and that
she actually wanted to get out of their lives. From that [time on], respondent
had insisted to petitioner that they should elope and live together. Petitioner
hesitated because he is not prepared as they are both young and inexperienced,
but she insisted that they would somehow manage because petitioner is rich. In
the last week of March 1996, respondent seriously brought the idea of eloping
and she already bought tickets for the boat going to Cebu. Petitioner reluctantly
agreed to the idea and so they eloped to Cebu. The parties are supposed to stay
at the house of a friend of respondent, but they were not able to locate her, so
petitioner was compelled to rent an apartment. The parties tried to look for a
job but could not find any so it was suggested by respondent that they should
go back and seek help from petitioners parents.When the parties arrived at the
house of petitioner, all of his whole family was all out of the country so
respondent decided to go back to her home for the meantime while petitioner
stayed behind at their home. After a few days of separation, respondent called
petitioner by phone and said she wanted to talk to him. Petitioner responded
immediately and when he arrived at their house, respondent confronted
petitioner as to why he appeared to be cold, respondent acted irrationally and
even threatened to commit suicide. Petitioner got scared so he went home
again.Respondent would call by phone every now and then and became angry
as petitioner does not know what to do. Respondent went to the extent of
threatening to file a case against petitioner and scandalize his family in the
newspaper. Petitioner asked her how he would be able to make amends and at
this point in time[,] respondent brought the idea of marriage. Petitioner[,] out of
frustration in life[,] agreed to her to pacify her. And so on April 23, 1996,
respondents uncle brought the parties to Valenzuela[,] and on that very same
day[,] petitioner was made to sign the Marriage Contract before the
Judge. Petitioner actually never applied for any Marriage License.
already get his share of whatever he would inherit from his parents so they can
start a new life. Respondent demanded these not knowing [that] the petitioner
already settled his differences with his own family. When respondent refused to
live with petitioner where he chose for them to stay, petitioner decided to tell
her to stop harassing the home of his parents. He told her already that he was
disinherited and since he also does not have a job, he would not be able to
support her. After knowing that petitioner does not have any money anymore,
respondent stopped tormenting petitioner and informed petitioner that they
should live separate lives.
The said relationship between Edward and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in
the wreck and weakly-founded. The break-up was caused by both parties[]
unreadiness to commitment and their young age. He was still in the state of
finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved
with herself.

TESTS ADMINISTERED:

Respondent decided that they should stay first at their house until after arrival
of the parents of petitioner. But when the parents of petitioner arrived,
Revised Beta Examination
respondent refused to allow petitioner to go home. Petitioner was threatened
in so many ways with her uncle showing to him many guns. Respondent even Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
threatened that if he should persist in going home, they will commission their
military friends to harm his family. Respondent even made petitioner sign a Draw A Person Test
declaration that if he should perish, the authorities should look for him at his
Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test
parents[‫ ]ۥ‬and relatives[‫ ]ۥ‬houses.Sometime in June of 1996, petitioner was able
to escape and he went home. He told his parents about his predicament and Sachs Sentence Completion Test
they forgave him and supported him by giving him military escort.Petitioner,
however, did not inform them that he signed a marriage contract with MMPI
respondent. When they knew about it[,] petitioner was referred for
counseling. Petitioner[,] after the counseling[,] tried to contact
respondent. Petitioner offered her to live instead to[sic] the home of petitioners TEST RESULTS & EVALUATION:
parents while they are still studying. Respondent refused the idea and claimed
that she would only live with him if they will have a separate home of their own
and be away from his parents. She also intimated to petitioner that he should
Both petitioner and respondent are dubbed to be emotionally immature and
recklessly impulsive upon swearing to their marital vows as each of them was
motivated by different notions on marriage.
Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, the petitioner in this case[,] is said to be still unsure
and unready so as to commit himself to marriage. He is still founded to be on
the search of what he wants in life.He is absconded as an introvert as he is not
really sociable and displays a lack of interest in social interactions and mingling
with other individuals. He is seen too akin to this kind of lifestyle that he finds it
boring and uninteresting to commit himself to a relationship especially to that
of respondent, as aggravated by her dangerously aggressive moves. As he is
more of the reserved and timid type of person, as he prefer to be religiously
attached and spend a solemn time alone.
ROWENA GUTIERREZ YU-TE, the respondent, is said to be of the aggressive-
rebellious type of woman. She is seen to be somewhat exploitative in her
[plight] for a life of wealth and glamour. She is seen to take move on marriage
as she thought that her marriage with petitioner will bring her good fortune
because he is part of a rich family. In order to have her dreams realized, she
used force and threats knowing that [her] husband is somehow weak-
willed. Upon the realization that there is really no chance for wealth, she gladly
finds her way out of the relationship.
REMARKS:
Before going to marriage, one should really get to know himself and marry
himself before submitting to marital vows. Marriage should not be taken out of
intuition as it is profoundly a serious institution solemnized by religious and law.
In the case presented by petitioner and respondent[,] (sic) it is evidently clear
that both parties have impulsively taken marriage for granted as they are still
unaware of their own selves. He is extremely introvert to the point of
weakening their relationship by his weak behavioral disposition. She, on the
other hand[,] is extremely exploitative and aggressive so as to be unlawful,
insincere and undoubtedly uncaring in her strides toward convenience. It is
apparent that she is suffering the grave, severe, and incurable presence of
Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder that started since childhood and
only manifested during marriage. Both parties display psychological incapacities
that made marriage a big mistake for them to take.[15]
The trial court, on July 30, 2001, rendered its Decision[16] declaring the marriage
of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.[17] The Republic,
represented by the OSG, timely filed its notice of appeal.[18]
On review, the appellate court, in the assailed August 5, 2003 Decision[19] in CA-
G.R. CV No. 71867, reversed and set aside the trial courts ruling.[20] It ruled that
petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent. The
clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on
the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity
was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.
In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in Republic
v. Court of Appeals and Molina[21] needed for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.[22] The CA faulted the lower court
for rendering the decision without the required certification of the OSG briefly
stating therein the OSGs reasons for its agreement with or opposition to, as the
case may be, the petition.[23] The CA later denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration in the likewise assailed January 19, 2004 Resolution.[24]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed before this Court the instant petition for review
on certiorari. On June 15, 2005, the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[25]
In his memorandum,[26] petitioner argues that the CA erred in substituting its
own judgment for that of the trial court. He posits that the RTC declared the
marriage void, not only because of respondents psychological incapacity, but
rather due to both parties psychological incapacity. Petitioner also points out
that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine
respondent. Further, he avers that the OSG is bound by the actions of the OCP
because the latter represented it during the trial; and it had been furnished
copies of all the pleadings, the trial court orders and notices.[27]
For its part, the OSG contends in its memorandum,[28] that the annulment
petition filed before the RTC contains no statement of the essential marital
obligations that the parties failed to comply with. The root cause of the
psychological incapacity was likewise not alleged in the petition; neither was it
medically or clinically identified. The purported incapacity of both parties was
not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. And the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine the respondent. Thus, the OSG
concludes that the requirements in Molina[29] were not satisfied.[30]
The Court now resolves the singular issue of whether, based on Article 36 of the
Family Code, the marriage between the parties is null and void.[31]
I.
We begin by examining the provision, tracing its origin and charting the
development of jurisprudence interpreting it.
Article 36 of the Family Code[32] provides:
Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
As borne out by the deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee that
drafted the Family Code, Article 36 was based on grounds available in the Canon
Law. Thus, Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero elucidated in her separate opinion
in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[33]
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Commission of the
UP Law Center, I wish to add some observations. The letter dated April 15, 1985
of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of the Family Law and Civil
Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the
Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a
chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil
Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In
fact, some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce
between the spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de facto.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for
dissolution of marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five
continuous years of separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial
decree of legal separation, and (b) whenever a married person would have
obtained a decree of absolute divorce in another country. Actually, such a
proposal is one for absolute divorce but called by another name. Later, even the
Civil Code Revision Committee took time to discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes
on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family
Law Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of
the New Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as
a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within
the limits provided by law.
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of
marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social
institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the
strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from
the Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great
majority of our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did
not pursue the idea of absolute divorce and, instead, opted for an action for
judicial declaration of invalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the
Canon Law. It was thought that such an action would not only be an acceptable
alternative to divorce but would also solve the nagging problem of church
annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized by the civil law of the
State. Justice Reyes was, thus, requested to again prepare a draft of provisions
on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to avoid the
overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil Code
and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now
working as a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided
to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of
Justice Reyes. The result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage
in the enumeration of void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
(7) those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
as well as the following implementing provisions:
Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or pleaded only on
the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, without prejudice to
the provision of Article 34.
Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage shall not prescribe.
xxxxxxxxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may
already be dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint
Committee on declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus
rendering an absolute divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference
with Father Gerald Healy of the Ateneo University, as well as another meeting
with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint
Committee was informed that since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has been
declaring marriages null and void on the ground of lack of due discretion for
causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds for divorce, like teen-
age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because of some
personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage
to a woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have
children. Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in
tribunal work that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of
their sociopathic personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their
wives, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and
psychosexual anomaly.[34]
In her separate opinion in Molina,[35] she expounded:
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the
essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to
discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is
made manifest after the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the
following revised provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even
if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any
reference to wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand
the essential nature of marriage and to mentally incapacitated. It was explained
that these phrases refer to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent,
which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation.
There being a defect in consent, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable
marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of
convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are
cases when the insanity is curable . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to
mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations
attendant to marriage.
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological
incapacity is, in a sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term psychological or mental
impotence, Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in the earlier February 9, 1984
session that this term is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but
not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code
of Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . . Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be
psychologically impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation
and application of Art. 36 is: Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
everyone of the same sex.
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the
phrase and is incurable but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would
give rise to the question of how they will determine curability and Justice
Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet, the possibility that one
may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice
Caguioa suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to
remarry.

For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages,
viz.:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under special cases and
special situations, hence, its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as
finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding
or annulling marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the
marriage, such marriage which stands valid until annulled is capable of
ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites,
some marriages are void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on
Marriage, the drafters, now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the
more permissive mores and practices of the time, took a leaf from the relatively
liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of
contracting marriage: 3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological
nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage provided the
model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types
of marriages with respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however,
recognizes an intermediate state, the voidable or annullable marriages. When
the Ecclesiastical Tribunal annuls a marriage, it actually declares the marriage
null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid sacramental
marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and
consummated marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be
nullified by the formal annulment process which entails a full tribunal procedure
with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church annulments are not recognized by Civil Law as severing
the marriage ties as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another
marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil marriage, not being congruent with
those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict, quite a number of
married couples have found themselves in limbofreed from the marriage bonds
in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil
marriage under state laws. Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons
contract new marriages or enter into live-in relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations
that the Civil Law Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law
concept of psychological incapacity into the Family Codeand classified the same
as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally inexistent from the
beginning.

A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did
not provide directly for psychological incapacity, in effect, recognized the same
indirectly from a combination of three old canons: Canon #1081 required
persons to be capable according to law in order to give valid consent; Canon
#1082 required that persons be at least not ignorant of the major elements
required in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required
that internal and external freedom be present in order for consent to be valid.
This line of interpretation produced two distinct but related grounds for
annulment called lack of due discretion and lack of due competence. Lack of due
discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at
the time of the wedding and, therefore, the union is invalid. Lack of due
competence means that the person was incapable of carrying out the
obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding ceremony.
Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s
involving sexual disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the
foundation for a broader approach to the kind of proof necessary for
psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the first time
in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage
was probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly
after the marriage. The nature of this change was nothing short of
revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a cautious willingness to
use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after
1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological
problems that manifested themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an
inability to give valid consent at the time of the ceremony.[36]
Interestingly, the Committee did not give any examples of psychological
incapacity for fear that by so doing, it might limit the applicability of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. The Committee desired that
the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil
courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision itself was taken from
the Canon Law.[37] The law is then so designed as to allow some resiliency in its
application.[38]
Yet, as held in Santos,[39] the phrase psychological incapacity is not meant to
comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It refers to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly noncognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as expressed by Article 68[40] of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity; and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to
confine it to the most serious of cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.[41] This interpretation is, in fact, consistent with
that in Canon Law, thus:
3.5.3.1. The Meaning of Incapacity to Assume. A sharp conceptual distinction
must be made between the second and third paragraphs of C.1095, namely
between the grave lack of discretionary judgment and the incapacity to assume
the essential obligation. Mario Pompedda, a rotal judge, explains the difference
by an ordinary, if somewhat banal, example. Jose wishes to sell a house to
Carmela, and on the assumption that they are capable according to positive law
to enter such contract, there remains the object of the contract, viz, the
house. The house is located in a different locality, and prior to the conclusion of
the contract, the house was gutted down by fire unbeknown to both of
them. This is the hypothesis contemplated by the third paragraph of the
canon. The third paragraph does not deal with the psychological process of
giving consent because it has been established a priori that both have such a
capacity to give consent, and they both know well the object of their consent
[the house and its particulars]. Rather, C.1095.3 deals with the object of the
consent/contract which does not exist. The contract is invalid because it lacks its
formal object. The consent as a psychological act is both valid and sufficient. The
psychological act, however, is directed towards an object which is not
available. Urbano Navarrete summarizes this distinction: the third paragraph
deals not with the positing of consent but with positing the object of
consent. The person may be capable of positing a free act of consent, but he is
not capable of fulfilling the responsibilities he assumes as a result of the consent
he elicits.
Since the address of Pius XII to the auditors of the Roman Rota in 1941
regarding psychic incapacity with respect to marriage arising from pathological
conditions, there has been an increasing trend to understand as ground of
nullity different from others, the incapacity to assume the essential obligations
of marriage, especially the incapacity which arises from sexual
anomalies.Nymphomania is a sample which ecclesiastical jurisprudence has
studied under this rubric.
The problem as treated can be summarized, thus: do sexual anomalies always
and in every case imply a grave psychopathological condition which affects the
higher faculties of intellect, discernment, and freedom; or are there sexual
anomalies that are purely so that is to say, they arise from certain physiological
dysfunction of the hormonal system, and they affect the sexual condition,
leaving intact the higher faculties however, so that these persons are still
capable of free human acts. The evidence from the empirical sciences is
abundant that there are certain anomalies of a sexual nature which may impel a
person towards sexual activities which are not normal, either with respect to its
frequency [nymphomania, satyriasis] or to the nature of the activity itself
[sadism, masochism, homosexuality]. However, these anomalies
notwithstanding, it is altogether possible that the higher faculties remain intact
such that a person so afflicted continues to have an adequate understanding of
what marriage is and of the gravity of its responsibilities. In fact, he can choose
marriage freely. The question though is whether such a person can assume
those responsibilities which he cannot fulfill, although he may be able to
understand them. In this latter hypothesis, the incapacity to assume the
essential obligations of marriage issues from the incapacity to posit the object of
consent, rather than the incapacity to posit consent itself.
Ecclesiastical jurisprudence has been hesitant, if not actually confused, in this
regard. The initial steps taken by church courts were not too clear whether this
incapacity is incapacity to posit consent or incapacity to posit the object of
consent. A case c. Pinna, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the intellect,
under such an irresistible impulse, is prevented from properly deliberating and
its judgment lacks freedom. This line of reasoning supposes that the intellect, at
the moment of consent, is under the influence of this irresistible compulsion,
with the inevitable conclusion that such a decision, made as it was under these
circumstances, lacks the necessary freedom. It would be incontrovertible that a
decision made under duress, such as this irresistible impulse, would not be a
free act. But this is precisely the question: is it, as a matter of fact, true that the
intellect is always and continuously under such an irresistible compulsion? It
would seem entirely possible, and certainly more reasonable, to think that there
are certain cases in which one who is sexually hyperaesthetic can understand
perfectly and evaluate quite maturely what marriage is and what it implies; his
consent would be juridically ineffective for this one reason that he cannot posit
the object of consent, the exclusive jus in corpus to be exercised in a normal
way and with usually regularity. It would seem more correct to say that the
consent may indeed be free, but is juridically ineffective because the party is
consenting to an object that he cannot deliver. The house he is selling was
gutted down by fire.
3.5.3.2. Incapacity as an Autonomous Ground. Sabattani seems to have seen his
way more clearly through this tangled mess, proposing as he did a clear
conceptual distinction between the inability to give consent on the one hand,
and the inability to fulfill the object of consent, on the other. It is his opinion
that nymphomaniacs usually understand the meaning of marriage, and they are
usually able to evaluate its implications. They would have no difficulty with
positing a free and intelligent consent. However, such persons, capable as they
are of eliciting an intelligent and free consent, experience difficulty in another
sphere: delivering the object of the consent. Anne, another rotal judge, had
likewise treated the difference between the act of consenting and the act of
positing the object of consent from the point of view of a person afflicted with
nymphomania. According to him, such an affliction usually leaves the process of
knowing and understanding and evaluating intact. What it affects is the object
of consent: the delivering of the goods.
3.5.3.3 Incapacity as Incapacity to Posit the Object of Consent. From the
selected rotal jurisprudence cited, supra, it is possible to see a certain progress
towards a consensus doctrine that the incapacity to assume the essential
obligations of marriage (that is to say, the formal object of consent) can coexist
in the same person with the ability to make a free decision, an intelligent
judgment, and a mature evaluation and weighing of things. The decision coram
Sabattani concerning a nymphomaniac affirmed that such a spouse can have
difficulty not only with regard to the moment of consent but also, and
especially, with regard to the matrimonium in facto esse. The decision concludes
that a person in such a condition is incapable of assuming the conjugal
obligation of fidelity, although she may have no difficulty in understanding what
the obligations of marriage are, nor in the weighing and evaluating of those
same obligations.
Prior to the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1983, it was not unusual
to refer to this ground as moral impotence or psychic impotence, or similar
expressions to express a specific incapacity rooted in some anomalies and
disorders in the personality. These anomalies leave intact the faculties of the
will and the intellect. It is qualified as moral or psychic, obviously to distinguish
it from the impotence that constitutes the impediment dealt with by
C.1084. Nonetheless, the anomalies render the subject incapable of binding
himself in a valid matrimonial pact, to the extent that the anomaly renders that
person incapable of fulfilling the essential obligations. According to the principle
affirmed by the long tradition of moral theology: nemo ad impossibile tenetur.
xxxx
3.5.3.5 Indications of Incapacity. There is incapacity when either or both of the
contractants are not capable of initiating or maintaining this consortium. One
immediately thinks of those cases where one of the parties is so self-centered
[e.g., a narcissistic personality] that he does not even know how to begin a
union with the other, let alone how to maintain and sustain such a
relationship. A second incapacity could be due to the fact that the spouses are
incapable of beginning or maintaining a heterosexual consortium, which goes to
the very substance of matrimony.Another incapacity could arise when a spouse
is unable to concretize the good of himself or of the other party. The canon
speaks, not of the bonum partium, but of the bonum conjugum. A spouse who is
capable only of realizing or contributing to the good of the other party qua
persona rather than qua conjunx would be deemed incapable of contracting
marriage. Such would be the case of a person who may be quite capable of
procuring the economic good and the financial security of the other, but not
capable of realizing the bonum conjugale of the other. These are general strokes
and this is not the place for detained and individual description.
A rotal decision c. Pinto resolved a petition where the concrete circumstances of
the case concerns a person diagnosed to be suffering from serious
sociopathy. He concluded that while the respondent may have understood, on
the level of the intellect, the essential obligations of marriage, he was not
capable of assuming them because of his constitutional immorality.
Stankiewicz clarifies that the maturity and capacity of the person as regards the
fulfillment of responsibilities is determined not only at the moment of decision
but also and especially during the moment of execution of decision. And when
this is applied to constitution of the marital consent, it means that the actual
fulfillment of the essential obligations of marriage is a pertinent consideration
that must be factored into the question of whether a person was in a position to
assume the obligations of marriage in the first place. When one speaks of the
inability of the party to assume and fulfill the obligations, one is not looking
at matrimonium in fieri, but also and especially at matrimonium in facto esse. In
[the] decision of 19 Dec. 1985, Stankiewicz collocated the incapacity of the
respondent to assume the essential obligations of marriage in the psychic
constitution of the person, precisely on the basis of his irresponsibility as
regards money and his apathy as regards the rights of others that he had
violated. Interpersonal relationships are invariably disturbed in the presence of
this personality disorder. A lack of empathy (inability to recognize and
experience how others feel) is common. A sense of entitlement, unreasonable
expectation, especially favorable treatment, is usually present. Likewise
common is interpersonal exploitativeness, in which others are taken advantage
of in order to achieve ones ends.
Authors have made listings of obligations considered as essential matrimonial
obligations. One of them is the right to the communio vitae. This and their
corresponding obligations are basically centered around the good of the
spouses and of the children. Serious psychic anomalies, which do not have to be
necessarily incurable, may give rise to the incapacity to assume any, or several,
or even all of these rights. There are some cases in which interpersonal
relationship is impossible. Some characteristic features of inability for
interpersonal relationships in marriage include affective immaturity, narcissism,
and antisocial traits.
Marriage and Homosexuality. Until 1967, it was not very clear under what rubric
homosexuality was understood to be invalidating of marriage that is to say, is
homosexuality invalidating because of the inability to evaluate the
responsibilities of marriage, or because of the inability to fulfill its
obligations. Progressively, however, rotal jurisprudence began to understand it
as incapacity to assume the obligations of marriage so that by 1978, Parisella
was able to consider, with charity, homosexuality as an autonomous ground of
nullity. This is to say that a person so afflicted is said to be unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. In this same rotal decision, the object of
matrimonial consent is understood to refer not only to the jus in corpus but also
the consortium totius vitae. The third paragraph of C.1095 [incapacity to assume
the essential obligations of marriage] certainly seems to be the more adequate
juridical structure to account for the complex phenomenon that homosexuality
is. The homosexual is not necessarily impotent because, except in very few
exceptional cases, such a person is usually capable of full sexual relations with
the spouse. Neither is it a mental infirmity, and a person so afflicted does not
necessarily suffer from a grave lack of due discretion because this sexual
anomaly does not by itself affect the critical, volitive, and intellectual
faculties. Rather, the homosexual person is unable to assume the
responsibilities of marriage because he is unable to fulfill this object of the
matrimonial contract. In other words, the invalidity lies, not so much in the
defect of consent, as in the defect of the object of consent.
3.5.3.6 Causes of Incapacity. A last point that needs to be addressed is the
source of incapacity specified by the canon: causes of a psychological
nature. Pompedda proffers the opinion that the clause is a reference to the
personality of the contractant. In other words, there must be a reference to the
psychic part of the person. It is only when there is something in the psyche or in
the psychic constitution of the person which impedes his capacity that one can
then affirm that the person is incapable according to the hypothesis
contemplated by C.1095.3. A person is judged incapable in this juridical sense
only to the extent that he is found to have something rooted in his psychic
constitution which impedes the assumption of these obligations. A bad habit
deeply engrained in ones consciousness would not seem to qualify to be a
source of this invalidating incapacity. The difference being that there seems to
be some freedom, however remote, in the development of the habit, while one
accepts as given ones psychic constitution. It would seem then that the law
insists that the source of the incapacity must be one which is not the fruit of
some degree of freedom.[42]
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that
should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically
incapacitated, the Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment
in Tuason v. Court of Appeals,[43] ruled that the findings of the trial court are
final and binding on the appellate courts.[44]
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was not
a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,[45] explained
that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and
was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in
the form of testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of
Catholic marriage tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case
basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its
framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of
strict standards in Molina,[46] thus:
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characterological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidencewhat
is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Churchwhile remaining independent,
separate and apart from each othershall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[47]
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Courts membership
concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio
V. Panganiban, three justices concurred in the result and another
threeincluding, as aforesaid, Justice Romerotook pains to compose their
individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized
that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predelictions or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say
that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.[48]
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases,[49] the Court has applied
the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the laws clear intention
that each case is to be treated differently, as courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set
of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological
incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of
petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs
exaggeration of Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the
world.[50] The unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll
on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the
very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit
into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert
the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on
account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.[51]
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by
Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among
which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard
against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.[52] The
Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital
abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either partys psychological incapacity,
the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually
protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted
with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the essential
marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that
the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug
dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are manifestations of a
sociopathic personality anomaly.[53] Let it be noted that in Article 36, there is no
marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning.[54] To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36
will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
The prospect of a possible remarriage by the freed spouses should not pose too
much of a concern for the Court. First and foremost, because it is none of its
business. And second, because the judicial declaration of psychological
incapacity operates as a warning or a lesson learned. On one hand, the normal
spouse would have become vigilant, and never again marry a person with a
personality disorder. On the other hand, a would-be spouse of the
psychologically incapacitated runs the risk of the latters disorder recurring in
their marriage.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in
this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga
in Antonio v. Reyes,[55] there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle
that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat
for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis;
guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
II.
We now examine the instant case.
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They met
in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted
ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both
parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under
the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of
the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.[56]
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.[57]
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological
expert became increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's
entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts
and they were asked to give professional opinions about a party's mental
capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and
tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not
amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an
accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the
past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-important
connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of
a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no
longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually
understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid consent to
marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature,
lifelong commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid
matrimonial consent.
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological
incapacity, not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders
that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the
essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or
the right of the spouses to each other's body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a
developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the
meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the
development of an adult personality; as meaning the capacity of the spouses to
give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that
the spouses must be other oriented since the obligations of marriage are rooted
in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for
interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality
but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The fulfillment of the
obligations of marriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength
of this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing
and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to
fulfill the essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not
considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental relationship to the
other spouse.
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the
mature marital relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment:
(1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness
to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial
responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of
marriage, etc.

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that
might lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion
even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly
giving rise to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1)
antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of
moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses
consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts
whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation
that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily
into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in
their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to
exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion),
recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to assume or
carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised (lack of due
competence). An advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is
that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of the
family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into.[58]
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals[59] emphasizes the importance of presenting
expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological
incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And
as Marcos v. Marcos[60] asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be
declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity.[61] Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological
disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the
presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment
of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.[62] Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest
the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[63] an option for the trial judge to refer
the case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent
assessment and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will
assist the courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an
intelligent and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not
dispense with the parties prerogative to present their own expert witnesses.
Going back, in the case at bench, the psychological assessment, which we
consider as adequate, produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with
personality disordersto repeat, dependent personality disorder for petitioner,
and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. We note
that The Encyclopedia of Mental Health discusses personality disorders as
follows
A group of disorders involving behaviors or traits that are characteristic of a
persons recent and long-term functioning. Patterns of perceiving and thinking
are not usually limited to isolated episodes but are deeply ingrained, inflexible,
maladaptive and severe enough to cause the individual mental stress or
anxieties or to interfere with interpersonal relationships and normal
functioning. Personality disorders are often recognizable by adolescence or
earlier, continue through adulthood and become less obvious in middle or old
age. An individual may have more than one personality disorder at a time.
The common factor among individuals who have personality disorders, despite a
variety of character traits, is the way in which the disorder leads to pervasive
problems in social and occupational adjustment. Some individuals with
personality disorders are perceived by others as overdramatic, paranoid,
obnoxious or even criminal, without an awareness of their behaviors.Such
qualities may lead to trouble getting along with other people, as well as
difficulties in other areas of life and often a tendency to blame others for their
problems. Other individuals with personality disorders are not unpleasant or
difficult to work with but tend to be lonely, isolated or dependent. Such traits
can lead to interpersonal difficulties, reduced self-esteem and dissatisfaction
with life.
Causes of Personality Disorders Different mental health viewpoints propose a
variety of causes of personality disorders. These include Freudian, genetic
factors, neurobiologic theories and brain wave activity.
Freudian Sigmund Freud believed that fixation at certain stages of development
led to certain personality types. Thus, some disorders as described in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.) are
derived from his oral, anal and phallic character types. Demanding and
dependent behavior (dependent and passive-aggressive) was thought to derive
from fixation at the oral stage. Characteristics of obsessionality, rigidity and
emotional aloofness were thought to derive from fixation at the anal stage;
fixation at the phallic stage was thought to lead to shallowness and an inability
to engage in intimate relationships. However, later researchers have found little
evidence that early childhood events or fixation at certain stages of
development lead to specific personality patterns.
adoption and twin studies suggest that schizotypal personality may be related
to genetic factors.
Neurobiologic Theories In individuals who have borderline personality,
researchers have found that low cerebrospinal fluid 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid
(5-HIAA) negatively correlated with measures of aggression and a past history of
suicide attempts. Schizotypal personality has been associated with low platelet
monoamine oxidase (MAO) activity and impaired smooth pursuit eye
movement.
Brain Wave Activity Abnormalities in electroencephalograph (EEG) have been
reported in antisocial personality for many years; slow wave is the most widely
reported abnormality. A study of borderline patients reported that 38 percent
had at least marginal EEG abnormalities, compared with 19 percent in a control
group.
Types of Disorders According to the American Psychiatric
Associations Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev.,
1987), or DSM-III-R, personality disorders are categorized into three major
clusters:
Cluster A: Paranoid, schizoid and schizotypal personality disorders. Individuals
who have these disorders often appear to have odd or eccentric habits and
traits.
Cluster B: Antisocial, borderline, histrionic and narcissistic personality
disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear overly emotional,
erratic and dramatic.

Genetic Factors Researchers have found that there may be a genetic factor
involved in the etiology of antisocial and borderline personality disorders; there
is less evidence of inheritance of other personality disorders. Some family,
Cluster C: Avoidant, dependent, obsessive-compulsive and passive-aggressive
personality disorders. Individuals who have these disorders often appear
anxious or fearful.
and antisocial personality disorder described, as follows

The DSM-III-R also lists another category, personality disorder not otherwise
specified, that can be used for other specific personality disorders or for mixed
conditions that do not qualify as any of the specific personality disorders.
Characteristics include a consistent pattern of behavior that is intolerant of the
conventional behavioral limitations imposed by a society, an inability to sustain
a job over a period of years, disregard for the rights of others (either through
Individuals with diagnosable personality disorders usually have long-term
exploitiveness or criminal behavior), frequent physical fights and, quite
concerns, and thus therapy may be long-term.[64]
commonly, child or spouse abuse without remorse and a tendency to blame
others. There is often a faade of charm and even sophistication that masks
disregard, lack of remorse for mistreatment of others and the need to control
others.
Dependent personality disorder is characterized in the following manner

A personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive
behavior. Such individuals usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their
capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others comments. At times
they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.
Although characteristics of this disorder describe criminals, they also may befit
some individuals who are prominent in business or politics whose habits of self-
centeredness and disregard for the rights of others may be hidden prior to a
public scandal.
During the 19th century, this type of personality disorder was referred to as
moral insanity. The term described immoral, guiltless behavior that was not
accompanied by impairments in reasoning.

Dependent personality disorder usually begins in early adulthood. Individuals

who have this disorder may be unable to make everyday decisions without According to the classification system used in the Diagnostic and Statistical
advice or reassurance from others, may allow others to make most of their Manual of Mental Disorders (3d ed., rev. 1987), anti-social personality disorder
important decisions (such as where to live), tend to agree with people even is one of the four dramatic personality disorders, the others being borderline,
when they believe they are wrong, have difficulty starting projects or doing histrionic and narcissistic.[66]
things on their own, volunteer to do things that are demeaning in order to get
approval from other people, feel uncomfortable or helpless when alone and are
often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned.[65]
The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the
Court, in this case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the
expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null and void
on ground of both parties psychological incapacity. We further consider that the
trial court, which had a first-hand view of the witnesses deportment, arrived at
the same conclusion.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The August 5, 2003 Decision and the January 19, 2004
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71867
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Decision, dated July 30,
2001, REINSTATED.

Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot

assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, SO ORDERED.
respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make
everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of
his important decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even
when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own,
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other
people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied
with fears of being abandoned.[67] As clearly shown in this case, petitioner
followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure,
weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self
to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

Although on a different plane, the same may also be said of the respondent. Her
being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume
the essential marital obligations. This finding takes into account her disregard
for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without
remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional
behavioral limitations imposed by society.[68] Moreover, as shown in this case,
respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
incapacity, the precipitous marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is
thus, declared null and void.
MA. SOCORRO CAMACHO-REYES v RAMON REYES
G.R. No. 185286
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This case is, again, an instance of the all-too-familiar tale of a marriage in
disarray.
In this regard, we air the caveat that courts should be extra careful before
making a finding of psychological incapacity or vicariously diagnosing
personality disorders in spouses where there are none. On the other hand, blind
adherence by the courts to the exhortation in the
Constitution[1] and in our statutes that marriage is an inviolable social
institution, and validating a marriage that is null and void despite convincing
proof of psychological incapacity, trenches on the very reason why a marriage
that is doomed from its inception should not be forcibly inflicted upon its
hapless partners for life.
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA -G.R. CV No. 89761[2] which reversed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854.[3]
First, we unfurl the facts.
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the
University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both
nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates then in one university
subject when respondent cross-enrolled from the UP Los Baos campus. The
casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend
relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she thought
was free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and
traditions.[4] Since both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every
day and drove home together from the university.
Easily impressed, petitioner enjoyed respondents style of courtship which
included dining out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a
university students budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family
business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioners good impression of the
respondent was not diminished by the latters habit of cutting classes, not even
by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana.
Not surprisingly, only petitioner finished university studies, obtaining a degree
in AB Sociology from the UP. By 1974, respondent had dropped out of school on
his third year, and just continued to work for the Aristocrat Restaurant.
On December 5, 1976, the year following petitioners graduation and her fathers
death, petitioner and respondent got married. At that time, petitioner was
already five (5) months pregnant and employed at the Population Center
Foundation.
Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondents family
in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by respondents
parents, and the couples respective salaries were spent solely for their personal
needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00
from his salary.
When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started.
Rearing a child entailed expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly
allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no
longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough
courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he had
resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondents
game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels
and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new
business took respondent away from his young family for days on end without
any communication. Petitioner simply endured the set up, hoping that the
situation will change.
To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested
that they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement
engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends
meet as the single-income earner of the household, respondents business
floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro,
was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically.
Compounding the familys financial woes and further straining the parties
relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That
his business took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent;
he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in
Mindoro.
After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this
time, moved in with petitioners mother. But the new set up did not end their
marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner
continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but in
most aspects as well.
In 1985, petitioner, who had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to
their third son. At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even
inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A week later,
respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby,
with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled.
In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondents fishpond business stopped
operations. Although without any means to support his family, respondent
refused to go back to work for the family business. Respondent came up with
another business venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton trading. As with
all of respondents business ventures, this did not succeed and added to the trail
of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not
surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated.
Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-
marital affair. She overheard respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former
secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter liked respondents gift to her.
Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to provide
financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his
obligation to remain faithful to her and their family.
One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties marriage was a
surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was
about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive;
and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested
that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the
operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondents lack of
concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room.
Still, petitioner made a string of final attempts to salvage what was left of their
marriage. Petitioner approached respondents siblings and asked them to
intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even
respondents siblings waved the white flag on respondent.
Adolfo Reyes, respondents elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members
of a marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the
group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and
respondent, but these did not improve the parties relationship as respondent
remained uncooperative.
In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a
psychological assessment to determine benchmarks of current psychological
functioning. As with all other attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did
not continue with the clinical psychologists recommendation to undergo
psychotherapy.
At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondents siblings, told
respondent to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to
petitioner.
With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did
respondents relationship with his children.
Finally, in 2001,[5] petitioner filed (before the RTC) a petition for the declaration
of nullity of her marriage with the respondent, alleging the latters psychological
incapacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was
psychologically incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in
performing his obligations to his familyboth as a spouse to petitioner and father
to their children.
After trial (where the testimonies of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and
Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were presented in
evidence), the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the
parties null and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity. The trial
court ruled, thus:
Wherefore, on the ground of psychological incapacity of both parties, the
petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the marriage between petitioner MA.
SOCORRO PERPETUA CAMACHO and respondent RAMON REYES contracted on
December 4, 1976 at the Archbishops Chapel Villa San Miguel Mandaluyong,
Rizal, is declared null and void under Art. 36 of the Family Code, as amended.
Henceforth, their property relation is dissolved.
Parties are restored to their single or unmarried status.
Their children JESUS TEODORO CAMACHO REYES and JOSEPH MICHAEL
CAMACHO REYES, who are already of age and have the full civil capacity and
legal rights to decide for themselves having finished their studies, are free to
decide for themselves.
The Decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen (15) days from notice
to the parties. Entry of Judgment shall be made if no Motion for
Reconsideration or New Trial or Appeal is filed by any of the parties, the Public
Prosecutor or the Solicitor General.
Upon finality of this Decision, the Court shall forthwith issue the corresponding
Decree if the parties have no properties[.] [O]therwise, the Court shall observe
the procedure prescribed in Section 21 of AM 02-11-10 SC.
The Decree of Nullity quoting the dispositive portion of the Decision (Sec. 22 AM
02-11-10 SC) shall be issued by the Court only after compliance with Articles 50
& 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rules on Liquidation,
Partition and Distribution of Property (Sections 19 & 21, AM 02-11-10 SC) in a
situation where the parties have properties.
The Entry of Judgment of this Decision shall be registered in the Local Civil Undaunted by the setback, petitioner now appeals to this Court positing the
Registry of Mandaluyong and Quezon City. following issues:

Let [a] copy of this Decision be furnished the parties, their counsel, the Office of I
the Solicitor General, the Public Prosecutor, the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar, Mandaluyong City, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, Quezon City
and the Civil Registrar General at their respective office addresses. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
SO ORDERED.[6]

II

Finding no cogent reason to reverse its prior ruling, the trial court, on motion for
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT PETITIONER IS LIKEWISE
reconsideration of the respondent, affirmed the declaration of nullity of the
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
parties marriage.
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

Taking exception to the trial courts rulings, respondent appealed to

the Court of Appeals, adamant on the validity of his marriage to petitioner. The
appellate court, agreeing with the respondent, reversed the RTC and declared
the parties marriage as valid and subsisting. Significantly, a special division of
five (two members dissenting from the majority decision and voting to affirm
the decision of the RTC) ruled, thus:
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE TESTIMONIES OF
THE EXPERT WITNESSES PRESENTED BY PETITIONER.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated IV

May 23, 2007 and Order dated July 13, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 89 in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Amended Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE FINDINGS OF THE
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.[7] TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING ON IT.
V Essentially, petitioner raises the singular issue of whether the marriage between
the parties is void ab initio on the ground of both parties psychological
incapacity, as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TOTALITY OF THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED DULY ESTABLISHED THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITIES
OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE. In declaring the marriage null and void, the RTC relied heavily on the oral and
documentary evidence obtained from the three (3) experts i.e., Doctors Magno,
Dayan and Villegas. The RTC ratiocinated, thus:

VI After a careful evaluation of the entire evidence presented, the Court finds
merit in the petition.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL

INCAPACITIES OF THE PARTIES TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS
OF MARRIAGE WERE ESTABLISHED, NOT MERELY BY A TOTALITY, BUT BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.

VII

Article 36 of the Family Code reads:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PARTIES MARRIAGE,
WHICH IS UNDOUBTEDLY VOID AB INITIO UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE, DOES NOT FURTHER THE INITIATIVES OF THE STATE CONCERNING A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY AND THEREFORE, NOT COVERED BY THE MANTLE OF
THE CONSTITUTION ON THE PROTECTION OF MARRIAGE. marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after solemnization.

VIII
and Art. 68 of the same Code provides:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE AMENDED

PETITION WAS VALIDLY AMENDED TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE.[8] The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

Similarly, Articles 69-71 further define the mutual obligations of a marital
partner towards each other and Articles 220, 225 and 271 of the Family Code
express the duties of parents toward their children.
Article 36 does not define what psychological incapacity means. It left the
determination of the same solely to the Court on a case to case basis.
xxxx
Taking into consideration the explicit guidelines in the determination of
psychological incapacity in conjunction to the totality of the evidence
presented, with emphasis on the pervasive pattern of behaviors of the
respondent and outcome of the assessment/diagnos[is] of expert witnesses,
Dra. Dayan, Dra. Mango and Dra. Villegas on the psychological condition of the
respondent, the Court finds that the marriage between the parties from its
inception has a congenital infirmity termed psychological incapacity which
pertains to the inability of the parties to effectively function emotionally,
intellectually and socially towards each other in relation to their essential duties
to mutually observe love, fidelity and respect as well as to mutually render help
and support, (Art. 68 Family Code). In short, there was already a fixed niche in
the psychological constellation of respondent which created the death of his
marriage. There is no reason to entertain any slightest doubt on the truthfulness
of the personality disorder of the respondent.
The three expert witnesses have spoken. They were unanimous in their findings
that respondent is suffering from personality disorder which psychologically
incapacitated him to fulfill his basic duties to the marriage. Being professionals
and hav[ing] solemn duties to their profession, the Court considered their
assessment/diagnos[is] as credible or a product of an honest evaluation on the
psychological status of the respondent. This psychological incapacity of the
respondent, in the uniform words of said three (3) expert witnesses, is serious,
incurable and exists before his marriage and renders him a helpless victim of his
structural constellation. It is beyond the respondents impulse control. In short,
he is weaponless or powerless to restrain himself from his consistent behaviors
simply because he did not consider the same as wrongful. This is clearly
manifested from his assertion that nothing was wrong in his marriage with the
petitioner and considered their relationship as a normal one. In fact, with this
belief, he lent deaf ears to counseling and efforts extended to them by his
original family members to save his marriage. In short, he was blind and too
insensitive to the reality of his marital atmosphere. He totally disregarded the
feelings of petitioner who appeared to have been saturated already that she
finally revealed her misfortunes to her sister-in-law and willingly submitted to
counseling to save their marriage. However, the hard position of the respondent
finally constrained her to ask respondent to leave the conjugal dwelling. Even
the siblings of the respondent were unanimous that separation is the remedy to
the seriously ailing marriage of the parties. Respondent confirmed this stand of
his siblings.
xxxx
The process of an ideal atmosphere demands a give and take relationship and
not a one sided one. It also requires surrender to the fulfillment of the essential
duties to the marriage which must naturally be observed by the parties as a
consequence of their marriage. Unfortunately, the more than 21 years of
marriage between the parties did not create a monument of marital integrity,
simply because the personality disorder of the respondent which renders him
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his basic duties to his marriage, is deeply
entombed in his structural system and cure is not possible due to his belief that
there is nothing wrong with them.
The checkered life of the parties is not solely attributable to the respondent.
Petitioner, too, is to be blamed. Dra. Villegas was firm that she, too, is afflicted
with psychological incapacity as her personality cannot be harmonized with the
personality of the respondent. They are poles apart. Petitioner is a well-
organized person or a perfectionist while respondent is a free spirited or
carefree person. Thus, the weakness of the respondent cannot be catered by
the petitioner and vice-versa.
Resultantly, the psychological incapacities of both parties constitute the thunder
bolt or principal culprit on their inability to nurture and reward their marital life
with meaning and significance. So much so that it is a pity that though their
marriage is intact for 21 years, still it is an empty kingdom due to their
psychological incapacity which is grave, incurable and has origin from unhealthy
event in their growing years.
Both parties to the marriage are protected by the law. As human beings, they
are entitled to live in a peaceful and orderly environment conducive to a healthy
life. In fact, Article 72 of the Family Code provides remedy to any party
aggrieved by their marital reality. The case of the parties is already a settled
matter due to their psychological incapacity. In the words of Dra. Magno, their
marriage, at the very inception, was already at the funeral parlor. Stated
differently, there was no life at all in their marriage for it never existed at all.
The Court finds that with this reality, both parties suffer in agony by
continuously sustaining a marriage that exists in paper only. Hence, it could no
longer chain or jail the parties whose marriage remains in its crib with its boots
and diaper due to factors beyond the physical, emotional, intellectual and social
ability of the parties to sustain.[9]
In a complete turnaround, albeit disposing of the case through a divided
decision, the appellate court diverged from the findings of the RTC in this wise:
On the basis of the guidelines [in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina] vis--
vis the totality of evidence presented by herein [petitioner], we find that the
latter failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her
husband, as well as of herself. There is thus no basis for declaring the nullity of
their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is
psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed
[respondent] as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid
Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist
Magno found [respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality
Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed
[respondent] to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type,
associated with strong sense of Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings
and narcissistic features.
Generally, expert opinions are regarded, not as conclusive, but as purely
advisory in character. A court may place whatever weight it chooses upon such
testimonies. It may even reject them, if it finds that they are inconsistent with
the facts of the case or are otherwise unreasonable. In the instant case, neither
clinical psychologist Magno nor psychiatrist Dr. Villegas conducted a
psychological examination on the [respondent].
Undoubtedly, the assessment and conclusion made by Magno and Dr. Villegas
are hearsay. They are unscientific and unreliable as they have no personal
knowledge of the psychological condition of the [respondent] as they never
personally examined the [respondent] himself.
xxxx
[I]t can be gleaned from the recommendation of Dayan that the purported
psychological incapacity of [respondent] is not incurable as the [petitioner]
would like this Court to think. It bears stressing that [respondent] was referred
to Dayan for psychological evaluation to determine benchmarks of current
psychological functioning. The undeniable fact is that based on Dayans personal
examination of the [respondent], the assessment procedures used, behavioral
observations made, background information gathered and interpretation of
psychological data, the conclusion arrived at is that there is a way to help the
[respondent] through individual therapy and counseling sessions.
Even granting arguendo that the charges cast by the [petitioner] on
[respondent], such as his failure to give regular support, substance abuse,
infidelity and come and go attitude are true, the totality of the evidence
presented still falls short of establishing that [respondent] is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations within the
contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.
xxxx
In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quos findings regarding the
[respondents] alleged mixed personality disorder, his come and go attitude,
failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to his family,
sexual infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioners] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to
consult [petitioner] on his business pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay
debts in connection with his failed business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are
not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but on serious marital
difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. [Respondents] defects were not present at the
inception of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the first few
years of their marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner]
admitted in her Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably and
[respondent] would give his salary in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino
households, but the situation changed when [respondent] resigned from the
family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his
business ventures. It appears, however, that [respondent] has been gainfully
employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since 1998, which fact was stipulated
upon by the [petitioner].
xxxx
As regards the purported psychological incapacity of [petitioner], Dr. Villegas
Psychiatric Report states that [petitioner] manifested inadequacies along her
affective sphere, that made her less responsive to the emotional needs of her
husband, who needed a great amount of it, rendering her relatively
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage.
However, a perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically
allege the complete facts showing that petitioner was psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage
at the time of celebration [thereof] even if such incapacity became manifest
only after its celebration xxx. In fact, what was merely prayed for in the said
Amended Petition is that judgment be rendered declaring the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent solemnized on 04 December 1976
to be void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the
respondent at the time of the celebration of marriage x x x.
xxxx
What is evident is that [petitioner] really encountered a lot of difficulties in their
marriage. However, it is jurisprudentially settled that psychological incapacity
must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of
some marital obligations, it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time
of the celebration of the marriage.
While [petitioners] marriage with [respondent] failed and appears to be without
hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared
void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory
marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it
decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the
State.
Thus, in determining the import of psychological incapacity under Article 36, it
must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles
35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the
marriage void ab initio, or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely
voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care
must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. Article 36 should
not be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. x x x
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage
rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.[10]
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we cannot subscribe to the
appellate courts ruling that the psychological incapacity of respondent was not
sufficiently established. We disagree with its decision declaring the marriage
between the parties as valid and subsisting. Accordingly, we grant the petition.
Santos v. Court of Appeals[11] solidified the jurisprudential foundation of the
principle that the factors characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the
essential marital obligations are: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, and (3)
incurability. We explained:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.[12]
As previously adverted to, the three experts were one in diagnosing respondent
with a personality disorder, to wit:
1. Dra. Cecilia C. Villegas
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE
[Petitioner] is the second among 6 siblings of educated parents. Belonging to an
average social status, intellectual achievement is quite important to the family
values (sic). All children were equipped with high intellectual potentials (sic)
which made their parents proud of them. Father was disabled, but despite his
handicap, he was able to assume his financial and emotional responsibilities to
his family and to a limited extent, his social functions (sic). Despite this, he has
been described as the unseen strength in the family.
Mother [of petitioner] was [actively involved] in activities outside the home.
Doing volunteer and community services, she was not the demonstrative,
affectionate and the emotional mother (sic). Her love and concern came in the
form of positive attitudes, advices (sic) and encouragements (sic), but not the
caressing, sensitive and soothing touches of an emotional reaction (sic).
Psychological home environment did not permit one to nurture a hurt feeling or
depression, but one has to stand up and to help himself (sic). This trained her to
subjugate (sic) emotions to reasons.
Because of her high intellectual endowment, she has easy facilities for any
undertakings (sic). She is organized, planned (sic), reliable, dependable,
systematic, prudent, loyal, competent and has a strong sense of duty (sic). But
emotionally, she is not as sensitive. Her analytical resources and strong sense of
objectivity predisposed her to a superficial adjustments (sic). She acts on the
dictates of her mind and reason, and less of how she feels (sic). The above
qualities are perfect for a leader, but less effective in a heterosexual
relationship, especially to her husband, who has deep seated sense of
inadequacy, insecurity, low self esteem and self-worth despite his intellectual
assets (sic). Despite this, [petitioner] remained in her marriage for more than 20
years, trying to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and
relationship (sic). She was hoping for the time when others, like her husband
would make decision for her (sic), instead of being depended upon. But the
more [petitioner] tried to compensate for [respondents] shortcomings, the
bigger was the discrepancy in their coping mechanisms (sic). At the end,
[petitioner] felt unloved, unappreciated, uncared for and she characterized their
marriage as very much lacking in relationship (sic).
On the other hand, [respondent] is the 9th of 11 siblings and belonged to the
second set of brood (sic), where there were less bounds (sic) and limitations
during his growing up stage. Additionally, he was acknowledged as the favorite
of his mother, and was described to have a close relationship with her. At an
early age, he manifested clinical behavior of conduct disorder and was on
marijuana regularly. Despite his apparent high intellectual potentials (sic), he
felt that he needed a push to keep him going. His being a free spirit, attracted
[petitioner], who adored him for being able to do what he wanted, without
being bothered by untraditional, unacceptable norms and differing ideas from
other people. He presented no guilt feelings, no remorse, no anxiety for
whatever wrongdoings he has committed. His studies proved too much of a
pressure for him, and quit at the middle of his course, despite his apparent high
intellectual resources (sic).
His marriage to [petitioner] became a bigger pressure. Trying to prove his
worth, he quit work from his family employment and ventured on his own. With
no much planning and project study, his businesses failed. This became the
sources (sic) of their marital conflicts, the lack of relationships (sic) and
consultations (sic) with each other, his negativistic attitudes (sic) and sarcasm,
stubbornness and insults, his spitting at her face which impliedly meant you are
nothing as compared to me were in reality, his defenses for a strong sense of
inadequacy (sic).
As described by [petitioner], he is intelligent and has bright ides. However, this
seemed not coupled with emotional attributes such as perseverance, patience,
maturity, direction, focus, adequacy, stability and confidence to make it work.
He complained that he did not feel the support of his wife regarding his decision
to go into his own business. But when he failed, the more he became
negativistic and closed to suggestions especially from [petitioner]. He was too
careful not to let go or make known his strong sense of inadequacy,
ambivalence, doubts, lack of drive and motivation or even feelings of inferiority,
for fear of rejection or loss of pride. When things did not work out according to
his plans, he suppressed his hostilities in negative ways, such as stubbornness,
sarcasm or drug intake.
His decision making is characterized by poor impulse control, lack of insight and
primitive drives. He seemed to feel more comfortable in being untraditional and
different from others. Preoccupation is centered on himself, (sic) an
unconscious wish for the continuance of the gratification of his dependency
needs, (sic) in his mother-son relationship. From this stems his difficulties in
heterosexual relationship with his wife, as pressures, stresses, (sic) demands
and expectations filled up in (sic) up in their marital relationship. Strong
masculine strivings is projected.
For an intelligent person like [respondent], he may sincerely want to be able to
assume his duties and responsibilities as a husband and father, but because of a
severe psychological deficit, he was unable to do so.
Based on the clinical data presented, it is the opinion of the examiner, that
[petitioner] manifested inadequacies along her affective sphere, that made her
less responsive to the emotional needs of her husband, who needed a great
amount of it, rendering her relatively psychologically incapacitated to perform
the duties and responsibilities of marriage. [Respondent], on the other hand,
has manifested strong clinical evidences (sic), that he is suffering from a
Personality Disorder, of the antisocial type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy along masculine strivings and narcissistic features that renders him
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage. This is characterized by his inability to conform to the social norms
that ordinarily govern many aspects of adolescent and adult behavior. His being
a free spirit associated with no remorse, no guilt feelings and no anxiety, is
distinctive of this clinical condition. His prolonged drug intake [marijuana] and
maybe stronger drugs lately, are external factors to boost his ego.
The root cause of the above clinical conditions is due to his underlying defense
mechanisms, or the unconscious mental processes, that the ego uses to resolve
conflicts. His prolonged and closed attachments to his mother encouraged cross
identification and developed a severe sense of inadequacy specifically along
masculine strivings. He therefore has to camouflage his weakness, in terms of
authority, assertiveness, unilateral and forceful decision making, aloofness and
indifference, even if it resulted to antisocial acts. His narcissistic supplies
rendered by his mother was not resolved (sic).
It existed before marriage, but became manifest only after the celebration, due
to marital demands and stresses. It is considered as permanent in nature
because it started early in his psychological development, and therefore became
so engrained into his personality structures (sic). It is considered as severe in
degree, because it hampered, interrupted and interfered with his normal
functioning related to heterosexual adjustments. (emphasis supplied)[13]
2. Dr. Natividad A. Dayan
Adolfo and Mandy[, respondent]s brothers, referred [respondent] to the clinic.
According to them, respondent has not really taken care of his wife and
children. He does not seem to have any direction in life. He seems to be full of
bright ideas and good at starting things but he never gets to accomplish
anything. His brothers are suspecting (sic) that until now [respondent] is still
taking drugs. There are times when they see that [respondent] is not himself. He
likes to bum around and just spends the day at home doing nothing. They wish
that hed be more responsible and try to give priority to his family. [Petitioner,]
his wife[,] is the breadwinner of the family because she has a stable job.
[Respondent]s brothers learned from friends that [petitioner] is really
disappointed with him. She has discussed things with him but he always refused
to listen. She does not know what to do with him anymore. She has grown tired
of him.
When [respondent] was asked about his drug problem, he mentioned that he
stopped taking it in 1993. His brothers think that he is not telling the truth. It is
so hard for [respondent] to stop taking drugs when he had been hooked to it for
the past 22 years. When [respondent] was also asked what his problems are at
the moment, he mentioned that he feels lonely and distressed. He does not
have anyone to talk to. He feels that he and his wife [have] drifted apart. He
wants to be close to somebody and discuss things with this person but he is not
given the chance. He also mentioned that one of his weak points is that he is
very tolerant of people[,] that is why he is taken advantage of most of the time.
He wants to avoid conflict so hed rather be submissive and compliant. He does
not want to hurt anyone [or] to cause anymore pain. He wants to make other increases his preoccupation with himself and accentuates his tendency to
people happy. withdraw from interpersonal contact. [Respondent] is also apt to be the less
dominant partner. He feels better when he has to follow than when he has to
take the lead. A self-contained person[,] he does not really need to interact with
xxxx others in order to enjoy life and to be able to move on. He has a small need of
companionship and is most comfortable alone. He, too[,] feels uncomfortable in
expressing his more tender feelings for fear of being hurt. Likewise, he maybe
very angry within but he may choose to repress this feeling. [Respondents]
Interpretation of Psychological Data
strong need for social approval, which could have stemmed from some deep
seated insecurities makes him submissive and over [compliant]. He tends to
make extra effort to please people. Although at times[, he] already feels
A. Intellectual / Cognitive Functioning victimized and taken advantage of, he still tolerates abusive behavior for fear of
interpersonal conflicts. Despite

his [dis]illusion with people, he seeks to minimize dangers of indifference and

xxxx
disapproval [of] others. Resentments are suppressed. This is likely to result in
anger and frustrations which is likewise apt to be repressed.

B. Vocational Preference

There are indications that [respondent] is[,] at the moment[,] experiencing

considerable tension and anxiety. He is prone to fits of apprehension and
xxxx nervousness. Likewise, he is also entertaining feelings of hopelessness and is
preoccupied with negative thought. He feels that he is up in the air but with no
sound foundation. He is striving [for] goals which he knows he will never be able
C. Socio Emotional Functioning to attain. Feeling discouraged and distressed, he has difficulty concentrating and
focusing on things which he needs to prioritize. He has many plans but he cant
accomplish anything because he is unable to see which path to take. This feeling
of hopelessness is further aggravated by the lack of support from significant
xxxx
others.

In his relationships with people, [respondent] is apt to project a reserved, aloof

Diagnostic Impression
and detached attitude. [Respondent] exhibits withdrawal patterns. He has deep
feelings of inadequacy. Due to a low self-esteem, he tends to feel inferior and to
exclude himself from association with others. He feels that he is different and as
a result is prone to anticipate rejections. Because of the discomfort produced by Axis I : Drug Dependence
these feelings, he is apt to avoid personal and social involvement, which
Axis II : Mixed Personality Disorder this regard are praiseworthy. But she is emotionally immature and her
comprehension of human situations is very shallow for a woman of her
[Schizoid, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder] academic and professional competence. And this explains why she married RRR
even when she knew he was a pothead, then despite the abuse, took so long to
do something about her situation.
Axis III : None

Axis IV : Psychosocial and Environmental Problems:

Diagnosis for [petitioner]:
Severe

He seems to be very good at planning and starting things but is unable to

accomplish anything; unable to give priority to the needs of his family; in social Axis I Partner Relational Problem
relationships.

Axis II Obsessive Compulsive Personality Style with Self-Defeating features

Axis V : Global Assessment of Functioning Fair (Emphasis supplied)[14]

3. Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno Axis III No diagnosis

Summary and Conclusion Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (spouses immaturity,
drug abuse, and infidelity)

From the evidence available from [petitioners] case history and from her Severity: 4-severe
psychological assessment, and despite the non-cooperation of the respondent,
it is possible to infer with certainty the nullity of this marriage. Based on the
information available about the respondent, he suffers from [an] antisocial Diagnosis for [respondent]
personality disorder with narcissistic and dependent features that renders him
too immature and irresponsible to assume the normal obligations of a
marriage. As for the petitioner, she is a good, sincere, and conscientious person Axis I Partner Relational Problem
and she has tried her best to provide for the needs of her children. Her
achievements in

Axis II Antisocial Personality Disorder with marked narcissistic, aggressive

sadistic and dependent features

Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors-Pervasive Family Discord (successful wife)
Severity: 4 (severe)
xxxx
One has to go back to [respondents] early childhood in order to understand
the root cause of his antisocial personality disorder. [Respondent] grew up the
ninth child in a brood of 11. His elder siblings were taken cared of by his
grandmother. [Respondents] father was kind, quiet and blind and [respondent]
was [reared] by his mother. Unfortunately, [respondents] mother grew up
believing that she was not her mothers favorite child, so she felt api, treated like
poor relations. [Respondents] mothers reaction to her perceived rejection was
to act outwith poor impulse control and poor mood regulation (spent money
like water, had terrible temper tantrums, etc.). Unwittingly, his mother became
[respondents] role model.
However, because [respondent] had to get on with the business of living, he
learned to use his good looks and his charms, and learned to size up the
weaknesses of others, to lie convincingly and to say what people wanted to hear
(esp. his deprived mother who liked admiration and attention, his siblings from
whom he borrowed money, etc.). In the process, his ability to love and to
empathize with others was impaired so that he cannot sustain a relationship
with one person for a long time, which is devastating in a marriage.
[Respondents] narcissistic personality features were manifested by his self-
centeredness (e.g. moved to Mindoro and lived there for 10 years, leaving his
family in Manila); his grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g. he would just
come and go, without telling his wife his whereabouts, etc.); his sense of
entitlement (e.g. felt entitled to a mistress because [petitioner] deprived him of
his marital rights, etc.); interpersonally exploitative (e.g. let his wife spend for all
the maintenance needs of the family, etc.); and lack of empathy (e.g. when
asked to choose between his mistress and his wife, he said he would think about
it, etc.) The aggressive sadistic personality features were manifested whom he
has physically, emotionally and verbally abusive [of] his wife when high on
drugs; and his dependent personality features were manifested by his need for
others to assume responsibility for most major areas of his life, and in his
difficulty in doing things on his own.
[Respondent], diagnosed with an antisocial personality disorder with marked
narcissistic features and aggressive sadistic and dependent features, is
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage: to
love, respect and render support for his spouse and children. A personality
disorder is not curable as it is permanent and stable over time.
From a psychological viewpoint, therefore, there is evidence that the marriage
of [petitioner] and [respondent is] null and void from the very
beginning. (emphasis supplied)[15]
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the
testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never
personally examined and interviewed the respondent.
We do not agree with the CA.
The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other
person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the
testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.
(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and
events)
(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, liability, and appropriateness of
emotional response)

For one, marriage, by its very definition,[16] necessarily involves only two
persons. The totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and
marriage is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, (3) interpersonal functioning
the experts testified on their individual assessment of the present state of the (4) impulse control
parties marriage from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner.
Certainly, petitioner, during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and
experience, respondents pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay
B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of
to the clinical psychologists and the psychiatrist.
personal and social situations.

C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in

For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not
based solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other
informants such as respondents own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law
(sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondents
behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew
him.[17] These were also used as the basis of the doctors assessments.
social, occupational or other important areas of functioning.
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back
at least to adolescence or early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a
consequence of another mental disorder.

F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a

substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition
The recent case of Lim v. Sta. Cruz-Lim,[18] citing The Diagnostic and Statistical
(e.g., head trauma).
Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM IV),[19] instructs us on
the general diagnostic criteria for personality disorders:

Specifically, the DSM IV outlines the diagnostic criteria for Antisocial Personality
Disorder:
A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly
from the expectations of the individual's culture. This pattern is manifested in
two (2) or more of the following areas:
A. There is a pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of the rights of
others occurring since age 15 years, as indicated by three (or more) of the
following:

(1) failure to conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as
indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for arrest
(2) deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning
others for personal profit or pleasure
(3) impulsivity or failure to plan ahead
(4) irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or
assaults
(5) reckless disregard for safety of self or others
(6) consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by repeated failure to sustain
consistent work behavior or honor financial obligations
(7) lack of remorse as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having
hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another
B. The individual is at least 18 years.
C. There is evidence of conduct disorder with onset before age 15 years.
D. The occurrence of antisocial behavior is not exclusively during the course of
schizophrenia or a manic episode.[20]
Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the
psychological make up of a person based on a number of factors culled from
various sources. A person afflicted with a personality disorder will not
necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a
personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the
respondent consisting only in his bare denial of the doctors separate diagnoses,
does not necessarily evoke credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of
experts.
The CA declared that, based on Dr. Dayans findings and recommendation, the
psychological incapacity of respondent is not incurable.
The appellate court is mistaken.
A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In
general, recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or
even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddocks textbook
entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry,[21] treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to
pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of personality disorders are
recommended. In short, Dr. Dayans recommendation that respondent should
undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondents
psychological incapacity is incurable.
Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations.[22] As aptly stated by Justice Romero in her separate opinion in the
ubiquitously cited case of Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina:[23]
[T]he professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly
important in such cases. Data about the persons entire life, both before and
after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to
give professional opinions about a partys mental capacity at the time of the
wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be accepted as
decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
[Because] of advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was
now the expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a
marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the
respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1)
respondent does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic
irresponsibility; inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of
his family; several failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of
unpaid money obligations.
It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has
personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of
declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologists or
psychiatrists finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a
marriage is valid and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties or both
parties psychological incapacity.
On more than one occasion, we have rejected an experts opinion concerning
the supposed psychological incapacity of a party.[24] In Lim v. Sta. Cruz-
Lim,[25] we ruled that, even without delving into the non-exclusive list found
in Republic v. Court of Appeals & Molina,[26] the stringent requisites provided
in Santos v. Court of Appeals[27] must be independently met by the party alleging
the nullity of the marriage grounded on Article 36 of the Family Code. We
declared, thus:
It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr.
Villegas with nary a link drawn between the "psychodynamics of the case" and
the factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas' sparse
testimony does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
Even on questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas' testimony did not
illuminate on the parties' alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating
effect on their marriage x x x.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas' global conclusion of both parties' personality disorders
was not supported by psychological tests properly administered by clinical
psychologists specifically trained in the tests' use and interpretation. The
supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses
were made, could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological
tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of people's intelligence,
thinking, or personality.
xxxx
The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7)
hours of interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie
the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding
on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an
expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in
the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as
a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is
founded.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual
antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during
trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
In this connection, it is well to note that persons with antisocial personality
disorder exhibit the following clinical features:
Patients with antisocial personality disorder can often seem to be normal and
even charming and ingratiating. Their histories, however, reveal many areas of
disordered life functioning. Lying, truancy, running away from home, thefts,
fights, substance abuse, and illegal activities are typical experiences that
patients report as beginning in childhood. x x x Their own explanations of their
antisocial behavior make it seem mindless, but their mental content reveals the
complete absence of delusions and other signs of irrational thinking. In fact,
they frequently have a heightened sense of reality testing and often impress
observers as having good verbal intelligence.
x x x Those with this disorder do not tell the truth and cannot be trusted to carry
out any task or adhere to any conventional standard of morality. x x x A notable
finding is a lack of remorse for these actions; that is, they appear to lack a
conscience.[28]
In the instant case, respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay,
a psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown
by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance
abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to
keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal
charges of estafa.
On the issue of the petitioners purported psychological incapacity, we agree
with the CAs ruling thereon:
A perusal of the Amended Petition shows that it failed to specifically allege the
complete facts showing that petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity became manifest only after its celebration x x x. In fact,
what was merely prayed for in the said Amended Petition is that judgment be
rendered declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent
solemnized on 04 December 1976 to be void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent at the time of the
celebration of the marriage x x x
At any rate, even assuming arguendo that [petitioners] Amended Petition was
indeed amended to conform to the evidence, as provided under Section 5, Rule
10 of the Rules of Court, Dr. Villegas finding that [petitioner] is supposedly
suffering from an Inadequate Personality [Disorder] along the affectional area
does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Such alleged condition of [petitioner] is not a debilitating psychological
condition that incapacitates her from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriage. In fact, in the Psychological Evaluation Report of clinical
psychologist Magno, [petitioner] was given a glowing evaluation as she was
found to be a good, sincere, and conscientious person and she has tried her best
to provide for the needs of her children. Her achievements in this regard are
praiseworthy. Even in Dr. Villegas psychiatric report, it was stated that
[petitioner] was able to remain in their marriage for more than 20 years trying
to reach out and lending a hand for better understanding and relationship. With
the foregoing evaluation made by no less than [petitioners] own expert
witnesses, we find it hard to believe that she is psychologically incapacitated
within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code.[29]

All told, it is wise to be reminded of the caveat articulated by Justice Teodoro R.

Padilla in his separate statement in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina:[30]

x x x Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,

predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say
that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing
disquisition, we find ample basis to conclude that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations at the
time of his marriage to the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in

CA -G.R. CV No. 89761 is REVERSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 89, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-01-44854 declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the
Family Code is REINSTATED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 143376. November 26, 2002]
LENI O. CHOA, petitioner, vs. ALFONSO C. CHOA, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Though interlocutory in character, an order denying a demurrer to evidence
may be the subject of a certiorari proceeding, provided the petitioner can show
that it was issued with grave abuse of discretion; and that appeal in due course
is not plain, adequate or speedy under the circumstances. Indeed, when the
plaintiffs evidence is utterly and patently insufficient to prove the complaint, it
would be capricious for a trial judge to deny the demurrer and to require the
defendant to present evidence to controvert a nonexisting case. Verily, the
denial constitutes an unwelcome imposition on the courts docket and an assault
on the defendants resources and peace of mind. In short, such denial needlessly
delays and, thus, effectively denies justice.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the March 16, 2000 Decision[1] and the May 22, 2000
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53100. The decretal
portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.[3]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[4]
The Facts
Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of this union,
two children were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On October 27, 1993,
respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental,
Branch 51, a Complaint[5] for the annulment of his marriage to petitioner. The
Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-8098.Afterwards he filed an
Amended Complaint[6] dated November 8, 1993 for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage to petitioner based on her alleged psychological incapacity.
The case went to trial with respondent presenting his evidence in chief. After his
last witness testified, he submitted his Formal Offer of Exhibits[7] dated February
20, 1998. Instead of offering any objection to it, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence)[8] dated May 11, 1998. The lower court
then allowed a number of pleadings to be filed thereafter.
Finally, the RTC issued its December 2, 1998 Order[9] denying petitioners
Demurrer to Evidence. It held that [respondent] established a quantum of
evidence that the [petitioner] must controvert.[10] After her Motion for
Reconsideration[11] was denied in the March 22, 1999 Order,[12] petitioner
elevated the case to the CA by way of a Petition for Certiorari,[13] docketed as
CA-GR No. 53100.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA held that the denial of the demurrer was merely interlocutory; hence,
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not available. The proper
remedy was for the defense to present evidence; and if an unfavorable decision
was handed down later, to take an appeal therefrom.[14] In any event, no grave
abuse of discretion was committed by respondent judge in issuing the assailed
Orders.[15]
The CA also ruled that the propriety of granting or denying a demurrer to
evidence rests on the sound exercise of the [trial] courts discretion.[16] Further,
the [p]etitioner failed to show that the issues in the court below [had] been
resolved arbitrarily or without basis.[17]
Hence, this Petition.[18]
The Issues
In her Memorandum,[19] petitioner submits the following issues for our
consideration:
1) Upon the denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is she under obligation, as a matter of inflexible
rule, as what the Court of Appeals required of her, to present her evidence, and
when an unfavorable [verdict] is handed down, appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law, despite the palpably and patently weak and grossly
insufficient or so inadequate evidence of the private respondent as plaintiff in
the annulment of marriage case, grounded on psychological incapacity under
Art. 36 of The Family Code? Or under such circumstances, can the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari be directly and immediately resorted to by the petitioner;
and
2) In upholding the lower courts denial of petitioners demurrer to evidence, did
the Court of Appeals wantonly violate, ignore or disregard in a whimsical
manner the doctrinal pronouncements of this Court in Molina (G.R. No. 108763,
February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198) and Santos (G.R. No. 112019, January 14,
1995, 58 SCRA 17)?[20]
Simply stated, the issues are: (1) is certiorari available to correct an order
denying a demurrer to evidence? and (2) in its denial, did the RTC commit grave
abuse of discretion by violating or ignoring the applicable law and
jurisprudence?
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Resort to Certiorari
Petitioner argues that the RTC denied her Demurrer to Evidence despite the
patent weakness and gross insufficiency of respondents evidence. Thus, she was
entitled to the immediate recourse of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari. Echoing the CA, respondent counters that appeal in due course, not
certiorari, is the proper remedy.
We clarify. In general, interlocutory orders are neither appealable nor subject to
certiorari proceedings.
[21]
However, this rule is not absolute. In Tadeo v. People, this Court declared that
appeal -- not certiorari -- in due time was indeed the proper remedy, provided
there was no grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction or oppressive
exercise of judicial authority.
In fact, Rules 41 and 65 of the Rules of Court expressly recognize this exception
and allow certiorari when the lower court acts with grave abuse of discretion in
the issuance of an interlocutory order. Rule 41 provides:
No appeal may be taken from:
xxxxxxxxx
(c) An interlocutory order;
xxxxxxxxx
In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable,
the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65. [22]
In turn, Section 1 of Rule 65 reads as follows:
SEC. 1. Petition for certiorari -- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal,
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.[23]
Thus, a denial of a demurrer that is tainted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction may be assailed through a petition
for certiorari.[24] In Cruz v. People, this exception was stressed by the Court in
this wise:
Admittedly, the general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not
available to challenge interlocutory orders of the trial court may be subject to
exceptions. When the assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or
issued with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies.[25]
Second Issue:
Denial of Demurrer to Evidence
Having established that a writ of certiorari may be issued in exceptional
circumstances, this Court is now tasked to determine whether the present case
falls under the exception; that is, whether the RTC indeed committed a patent
error or grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection or exception by one of the
parties in an action at law, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or not) to make out his
case or sustain the issue.[26] The demurrer challenges the sufficiency of the
plaintiffs evidence to sustain a verdict.[27] In passing upon the sufficiency of the
evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether
there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a
verdict of guilt.[28]
We have thoroughly reviewed the records of the present case, and we are
convinced that the evidence against respondent (herein petitioner) is grossly
insufficient to support any finding of psychological incapacity that would
warrant a declaration of nullity of the parties marriage.
First. Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges
against him are proof of the latters psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. These charges included Complaints for
perjury,[29] false testimony,[30] concubinage[31] and deportation.[32] According to
him, the filing and the prosecution of these cases clearly showed that his wife
(herein petitioner) wanted not only to put him behind bars, but also to banish
him from the country. He contends that this is very abnormal for a wife who,
instead of protecting the name and integrity of her husband as the father of her
children, had acted to the contrary.[33]
We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during the trial do
not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife. It is the
height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her as psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations, simply because she filed cases
against him. The evidence presented, even if taken as true, merely establishes
the prosecution of the cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to
establish her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also
grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.
Second. Neither is the testimony of respondent, taken by itself or in conjunction
with his documentary offerings, sufficient to prove petitioners alleged
psychological incapacity. He testified in these words:
Q Will you please tell us or explain to the Court what do you mean by
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. What do you mean by that?
A Because before our marriage she was already on the family way, so at that
time she even want it aborted by taking pills. She was even immature, carefree,
and she lacked the intention of procreative sexuality.[34]
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. CHUA:
And you consider her that she was carefree, she is psychologically
incapacitated? Will you please elaborate on this what you mean by carefree
approximating psychologically incapacitated?
ATTY. MIRANO:
I think we better ask the witness what he means by carefree.
ATTY. CHUA:
Okay.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
She does not help in the household chores, she does not take care of the child,
she wants me to hire an attendant in order to take care of the child. Even when
the children were sick she does not bother to let the children see a doctor.[35]
xxxxxxxxx
STENOGRAPHER (reads back the question of Atty. Chua):
ATTY. CHUA:
Now. From the time of courtship up to the time of your marriage to the
defendant, did you notice any characteristic or traits which you consider as
psychological incapacity?
WITNESS:
Sometimes when I cannot visit at her house she gets mad at me, and she wont
talk to me when I call her up by telephone. So, all she wanted for me to visit her
everytime and even at the time when I am busy with some other things. So, I
think that is all.[36]
Even if taken as true, the testimony of respondent basically complains about
three aspects of petitioners personality; namely, her alleged (1) lack of attention
to their children, (2) immaturity and (3) lack of an intention of procreative
sexuality. None of these three, singly or collectively, constitutes psychological
incapacity. Far from it.
In Santos v. CA,[37] this Court clearly explained that psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability.[38] Said the Court:
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and
most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
itself, that the use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses
as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low
intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's
Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon
Law, quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's Handbook II for Marriage
Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our
law on marriage. Thus correlated, psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated.[39]
Furthermore, in Republic v. Molina,[40] we ruled that the psychological incapacity
must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of
some marital obligations. We stressed that a mere showing of irreconcilable
differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely shows that he
and his wife could not get along with each other. There was absolutely no
showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or incurability of the problems
besetting their marital union.
Sorely lacking in respondents evidence is proof that the psychological incapacity
was grave enough to bring about the disability of a party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. In Molina, we affirmed that mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes of psychological incapacity.The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there should be a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.[41]
Respondents pious peroration that petitioner lacked the intention of
procreative sexuality is easily belied by the fact that two children were born
during their union. Moreover, there is absolutely no showing that the alleged
defect was already existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Third. Most telling is the insufficiency, if not incompetency, of the supposed
expert testimony presented by respondent. His witness, Dr. Antonio M. Gauzon,
utterly failed to identify and prove the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. Specifically, his testimony did not show that the incapacity, if true,
was medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Neither did he testify that it
was grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. The pertinent portions of his testimony are
quoted thus:
ATTY. CHUA:
And then finally and ultimately you reached the conclusion that both parties,
meaning the husband and the wife in the present case have a personality which
is normal. That is your conclusion?
WITNESS:
They are normal, but they cannot mix together.
Q. So as a general proposition, both of them are of normal personality, only that
they are not compatible with each other?
A. Yes.
Q. And by normal personality, you mean that neither of them suffer from any
personality disorder, bordering on abnormality?
A. Yes.
Q. But Doctor, is not a fact or a fact of life, that no couple could be or are
perfectly match?
A. Precisely, if there is a problem, marital problem, there should be somebody
who knows how to handle marriage, that should try to intervene.
Q. You mean expert advise or services should be needed by the couple?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, if the couple are mature enough and each of them practises what we
call maximum tolerance and give and take, will that serve the purpose?
A. That would served the purpose of getting well.
Q. Yes?
A. Yes.
Q. Meaning to say that the incompatibility could be harmonized?
A. Yes, because they are supposedly normal, but both of them are personally
disordered. It cannot be harmonized. So this case, if only they have tried
professional help to take care of their marital problem, it could have been
solved.
Q. Or the situation could have been remedied?
A. Yes. But I would like to say that it must be somebody who is an expert. Not
just any from Tom, Dick and Harry could handle this. That means from the very
beginning they have personalities which they were incompatible. So if anybody
would handle that, they will not mix, they will be always quarreling with each
other. They should not have got married.[42]
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Yes. So in this present case, your expert opinion was sought by the plaintiff,
and you found out that both are normal?
A. With different personalities. So that they were incompatible.
Q. Normal, simply incompatible.
A. Yes, with personalities different from each other, which I mentioned there in
my last page. That they are like oil and water, immiscible. Like oil and water,
they will not mix.
Q. You also mentioned that the plaintiff. Meaning to say the husband told you
about the frequent quarrels had with the wife. Did he ever tell you that was a
serious or major quarrel?
A. Actually there was no major quarrel. It was all petty quarrels.[43]
xxxxxxxxx
Q. So the problem of this couple is fundamentally a conflicting personalities?
A. Yes.[44]
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Now, you mentioned that you maybe able to make them reconcile?
A. Yes.
Q. You mean that given the time and opportunity, things could be worked out?
A. Yes.
Q. You mean reconciliation at this stage with expert services, and the advise of
those who possess the necessary [expertise] could be worked out?
A. Yes, as I said it can be done by therapy. Family therapy.[45]
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Doctor, you draw your conclusion that there is psychological inc[a]pacity
existing in this case?
A. Yes.
Q. Because of the
A. The incompatibility.
Q. Incompatibility.
A. Yes.[46]
His testimony established merely that the spouses had an incompatibility, a
defect that could possibly be treated or alleviated through psychotherapy. We
need not expound further on the patent insufficiency of the expert testimony to
establish the psychological incapacity of petitioner.
Furthermore, the assessment of petitioner by Dr. Gauzon was based merely on
descriptions communicated to him by respondent. The doctor never conducted
any psychological examination of her. Neither did he ever claim to have done
so. In fact, his Professional Opinion[47] began with the statement [I]f what
Alfonso Choa said about his wife Leni is true, x x x.[48]The expert witness testified
thus:
ATTY. CHUA
Q Doctor, in this professional opinion of yours, you gathered most of your
material data from the plaintiff who is the husband?
WITNESS
A Yes. By the way, I requested the husband Alfonso, if it was possible for me to
interview Leni, and he said, he doesnt know.
ATTY. CHUA
Q He doesnt know. Now, Doctor if we were to request you to conduct the same
personal interview and written psychological examination on the part of the
wife, [w]ould you be willing to do that?
WITNESS
A Sure for a fee. I maybe able to make them reconcile.[49]
Obviously, Dr. Gauzon had no personal knowledge of the facts he testified to, as
these had merely been relayed to him by respondent. The former was working
on pure suppositions and secondhand information fed to him by one
side. Consequently, his testimony can be dismissed as unscientific and
unreliable.
Dr. Gauzon tried to save his credibility by asserting that he was able to assess
petitioners character, not only through the descriptions given by respondent,
but also through the formers at least fifteen hours[50] of study of the voluminous
transcript of records of this case. Even if it took the good doctor a whole day or
a whole week to examine the records of this case, we still find his assessment of
petitioners psychological state sorely insufficient and methodologically flawed.
As to respondents argument -- that because Dr. Gauzons testimony had never
been objected to, the objection raised thereafter was deemed waived -- the
Supreme Court has already ruled on the matter. It held that although the
question of admissibility of evidence could not be raised for the first time on
appeal, hearsay or unreliable evidence should be disregarded whether objected
to or not, because it has no probative value.[51]
We are, of course, mindful of the ruling that a medical examination is not
a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, so long as the
totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the incapacity
adequately.[52] Here, however, the totality of evidence presented by respondent
was completely insufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity --
more so without any medical, psychiatric or psychological examination.

The trial court should have carefully studied and assessed the evidence
presented by respondent and taken into account the prevailing jurisprudence
on the matter. It could then have easily concluded, as we conclude now, that it
was useless to proceed further with the tedious process of hearing contravening
proof. His evidence was obviously, grossly and clearly insufficient to support a
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Withal, it
was grave abuse of discretion for the RTC to deny the Demurrer and to violate
or ignore this Courts rulings in point. Indeed, continuing the process of litigation
would have been a total waste of time and money for the parties and an
unwelcome imposition on the trial courts docket.

We have already ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower
court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence.[53] Any decision, order or resolution of a lower court tantamount
to overruling a judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably a
very grave abuse of discretion.[54]

There is no reason to believe that an appeal would prove to be a plain, speedy

or adequate remedy in the case at bar. An appeal would not promptly relieve
petitioner from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken Orders
maintaining the baseless action of respondent. It would only compel her to go
needlessly through a protracted trial, which would further clog the court
dockets with another futile case.[55]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA

Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Demurrer to Evidence
is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the
alleged psychological incapacity of petitioner is DISMISSED. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Puno, (Chairman), J., abroad on official leave.

[G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004]
DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZ-
DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was
working in the advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to
courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows
before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966.[1] The civil marriage was
ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.[2]
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18,
1968;[3] Stephanie Janice born on September 9, 1969;[4] Kenneth David born on
April 24, 1971;[5] and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.[6] The conjugal
partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an
irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with
several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in
the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr.
Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the
treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian
national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had
two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned
to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her
back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter,
on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan
with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on
special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on
April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code,
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was
effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general
circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not
be found in the Philippines.[7]
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a
psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious,
hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects
completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-
Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she
committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing
with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such
immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts
of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social
Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage.[8]
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages
between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28,
1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the essential
obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is
dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of property
between the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent
provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously acquired by
creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property
registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed
alleging that
I to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE
OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A
CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED
IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and
ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.[10]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January
8, 2002.[11] Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and
manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not suffering
from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2)
psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical
antecedence and permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence
submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity suffered
by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of
respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term psychological
incapacity?
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled:
x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the
law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The
law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse
to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article
54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial
declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the
state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage
contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage,
they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family
Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of
these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent and other
conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and
evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily
decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and
persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even
desirable.[13]
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder
is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and
definition. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the
obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid
assumption thereof.[14] It appears that respondents promiscuity did not SO ORDERED.
exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by
the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
rites, and which produced four children. Azcuna, J., on official leave.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by
themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be
equated with psychological incapacity.[15] It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity[16] or sexual promiscuity.

At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal
separation under Article 55[17] of the Family Code. However, we pointed out
in Marcos v. Marcos[18] that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation
in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on
physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence
presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.

We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The
authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the
Roman Catholic Church.

All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate
court. We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner
in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in this case,
where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every
individual problem.[19] While we sympathize with petitioners marital
predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how
harsh it may be.[20]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
G.R. NO. 158896 October 27, 2004
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge
Manuel Siayngco ("respondent Manuel").
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent
Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic
Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they could not have a child of
their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named
Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together,
respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout
their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude
towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose
nature; that she incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone
connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything
not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in
his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at
all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial
Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the
house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his
professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and
encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted
in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as
lack of love and appreciation from her own parents since childhood and that
such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could be
attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical
capacity of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent
and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living
with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious
stories against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a
loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his
marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his
endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family
and had a happy childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint.
In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following:
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness
stand and elaborated on the allegations in his petition. He testified that his
parents never approved of his marriage as they still harbored hope that he
would return to the seminary.4 The early years of their marriage were difficult
years as they had a hard time being accepted as husband and wife by his
parents and it was at this period that his wife started exhibiting signs of being
irritable and temperamental5 to him and his parents.6 She was also obsessive
about cleanliness which became the common source of their quarrels.7 He,
however, characterized their union as happy during that period of time in 1979
when they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new
house.8 In 1981, when he became busy with law school and with various
community organizations, it was then that he felt that he and his wife started to
drift apart.9 He then narrated incidents during their marriage that were greatly
embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with an
elderly neighbor;10 when she would visit him in his office and remark that the
curtains were already dirty or when she kicked a trash can across the room or
when she threw a ballpen from his table;11 when she caused his office drawer to
be forcibly opened while he was away;12 when she confronted a female tenant
of theirs and accused the tenant of having an affair with him;13 and other
incidents reported to him which would show her jealous nature. Money matters
continued to be a source of bitter quarrels.14Respondent Manuel could not
forget that he was not able to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his
wife did not approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very generous
when it came to celebrations of their parish priest.15 Respondent Manuel then
denied that he was a womanizer16 or that he had a mistress.17 Lastly,
respondent Manuel testified as to their conjugal properties and obligations.18
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel’s Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner
Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuel’s office.19 But when she was there,
she would call witness to complain about the curtains and the cleanliness of the
office.20 One time, witness remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging through
respondent Manuel’s drawer looking for his address book while the latter was in
Subic attending a conference.21 When petitioner Juanita could not open a
locked drawer she called witness, telling the latter that she was looking for the
telephone number of respondent’s hotel room in Subic. A process server was
requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper. When
the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked
drawer. On another occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified
that she heard petitioner Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino bang
batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa labas?"22
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA
whose professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner
Juanita.23 From her psychiatric evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco
contributed to the marital collapse. There is a partner relational problem which
affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond with love, support and
understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to
the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged
themselves in a defective communication pattern which is characteristically
negative and deformed. This affected their competence to maintain the love
and respect that they should give to each other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who are
expected to use healthy strategies to solve their disputes and differences.
Whereas Juanita would be derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive and
obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance and suppression. In his
effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego to cover up for his felt or
imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the detrimental effects of his
unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the marriage. Both spouses, who
display narcissistic psychological repertoire (along with their other maladaptive
traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to
each other’s needs and feelings. The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a
healthy and a progressive marriage. Manuel and Juanita have shown their
psychologically [sic] incapacity to satisfactorily comply with the fundamental
duties of marriage. The clashing of their patterns of maladaptive traits, which
warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS,
with code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will bring about more emotional
mishaps and psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits which were in existence
before the marriage will tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery.25
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuel’s allegations. She
insisted that they were a normal couple who had their own share of fights; that
they were happily married until respondent Manuel started having extra-marital
affairs26 which he had admitted to her.27 Petitioner Juanita professed that she
would wish to preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her
husband.28 She stated further that she has continuously supported respondent
Manuel, waiting up for him while he was in law school to serve him food and
drinks. Even when he already filed the present case, she would still attend to his
needs.29 She remembered that after the pre-trial, while they were in the
hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new
family.30
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by
respondent Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on
petitioner Juanita, the results of which were embodied in his report. Said report
stated in part:
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests,
respondent Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature,
conservative, religious and highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more
than enough psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long term
heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is respectful of traditional
institutions of society like the institution of marriage. She was also found to be a
loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is capable of enduring severe
environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is reality-oriented and
therefore capable of rendering fair and sound decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be
psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of
marriage.32
CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the
Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each other.33 The couple would
religiously attend prayer meetings in the community.34 Both were likewise
leaders in their community.35 Witness then stated that she would often go to
the house of the couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent
Manuel there.36
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuel’s petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita holding in part that:
The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not preponderantly
supported in evidence. The couple [was] happily married and after four years of
marital bliss [was] blest with a son. Their life together continued years
thereafter in peace and prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and
obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties’ relationship sometime in the early
90’s when the defendant-wife started receiving letters that the plaintiff is
playing footsy.
xxx xxx xxx
The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk responses to
slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A wife, as in the
instant case, may have succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery
of irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as our laws now stand, the
dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in such cases. In contrast to some
countries, our laws do not look at a marital partner as a mere refrigerator in the
Kitchen even if he or she sometimes may sound like a firetruck.37
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04 May
2001.38
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly
on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita
psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of
Appeals.39 Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that there is
empathy between plaintiff and defendant. That is – a shared feeling which
between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital
union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other’s feelings at a
time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital
relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults
who view the relationship with love "amore gignit amorem", sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties
found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated
marital obligations, can do no less, but reverse and set aside the decision of the
lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity
on the ground of psychological incapacity, not only of defendant but also of
himself.40
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred –
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SEPARATED
ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS
HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE
PRESENT
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT
NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE
36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
The Court’s Ruling
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we held that
whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the
declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the
case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged according to its own facts
as there can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court of
Appeals did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a
clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the
couple involved therein, despite sharing the same bed from the time of their
wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation on 15 March 1989, never
had coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity
of her marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We
sustained the wife for the reason that an essential marital obligation under the
Family Code is procreation such that "the senseless and protracted refusal of
one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity."
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather,
we have here a case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wife’s
outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wife’s obsession with cleanliness
and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of
support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book,
however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel
to file a case against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.43 In Republic v. Court of
Appeals44 we expounded:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of
the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family
Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or
clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts
and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.45
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of
whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent
Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage
rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.46 With this
cardinal state policy in mind, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals47 that the
burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff
(respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that
respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of
Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuel’s own evidence, contains candid
admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to gauge
whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of
marriage:
She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool,
intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what he has
done to me, I take care of him whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital
affairs because he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest problem is
not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his girl now. He started
his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them together in the car. I think
that it was the girl who encouraged him to file the petition." She feels that the
problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-ulit," but, that she still is willing to
pursue it.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really
psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy should
give me a chance to have a new family." She answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan
mo akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin."48
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital
obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the
obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.50 It must
be shown that respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a
disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state51 and not merely due to his ardent wish
to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel
has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child
at that particular point."52
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack of respect for him, her jealousies and the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might
with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are
grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer
essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor
"defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.61
incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01
by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.54 Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
The psychological report of respondent Manuel’s witness, Dr. Garcia, on the Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and effect. No costs.
other hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in there supports the doctor’s SO ORDERED.
conclusion that petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. On the
contrary, the report clearly shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanita’s Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
behavior is traceable – not from the inception of their marriage as required by
law – but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws’
disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood,55 her
husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him,56 and her inability to
conceive.57 Dr. Garcia’s report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew
professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the
hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and
togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself
during his direct examination.58

Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been
allowed a window into the Siayngcos’s life and have perceived therefrom a
simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each
other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.

An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere

showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.59 As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:60

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests
themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the
Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage
contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her
husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a
Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter,
Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16,
1987, she gave birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia
of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio
was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which
incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their
marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for
two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several
times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her
friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and
their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer
residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed
an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The
trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons,
accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general
circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file
a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent
filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for
investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding
that no collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence
submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted
respondent’s motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on
how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary
evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion
of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M.
Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered
to make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to
this judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED.4
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshio’s psychological
incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill
his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter.
Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and
welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear
manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which
characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced
to respondent’s mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.5
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of
the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a
decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby
rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo
is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.6
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a
month after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the
promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens.
But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated
with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines
but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all
efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant
to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court
rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the
cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should
petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not around
and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life and
assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of
the Family Code?7
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated
with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina8and Santos vs. Court of
Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a
"mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of
error:
I marriage and unity of the family. x x x
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the
psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations,
despite respondent’s failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in
the Molina case.10
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his
insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity.
His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse
falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe
and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the
guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling
of the courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage
as the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage.12
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied)
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by
the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines
do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or
clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can
adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to.15
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved
Toshio’s psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and
support his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to
respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He made
a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated
was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor
proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent SO ORDERED.
testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as
a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have
greatly helped respondent’s case had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert
witness. This respondent did not do.

We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal

separation.16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance
of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume
psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family
immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is
not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a
married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing
so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element
in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage.18

According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not
apply here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband
being a Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we
find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be
lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and
clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the
basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for
determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of
nationality.

In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social
institution that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with
respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be
the fitting denouement.
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition
to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage,
namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have
been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this
ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological
incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges
and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In
the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but
nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal
divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the
present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the
January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858
affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano
Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent
Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage
to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo
were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son,
Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs
of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he
preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he
squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance,
and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in
frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo
was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole
breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense
quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March
1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and
had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was
psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and
was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest
to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel
could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their
misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange
behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their
marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as
cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their
finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church
of St. Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was
born on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;
6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of
her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G.
Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the
Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents
marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage
void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which
affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an
erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity'
(as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect
application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision
tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily
on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up
because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown
opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as
Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal
and family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a
broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal
relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul
for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct
because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason
to leave the spouses to their individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in
analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of
Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such
ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their
responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which
renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose
C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge
of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the
psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a
"difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and
"conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is
not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband
could nor get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity
of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert
testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings
that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit
for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits
were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage
celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to
fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's
part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such
failure of expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If
at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of
the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the
facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty
of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts
interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae,
namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code
Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the
Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument
on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following
guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are
hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at
the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by
the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family
and emphasizes the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical. although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological
illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given
qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to
the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the
Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence —
what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining
independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage
and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down
unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant
the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the
foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and
remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and
Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
BENJAMIN G. TING v CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
November 17, 2003 Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its
December 13, 2004 Resolution[2] in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court,
in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision[3] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage
between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code.[4]
The facts follow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting
(Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school.[5] They
fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent
was already pregnant with their first child.
At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in
Maguikay, Mandaue City.[6] When their second child was born, the couple
decided to move to Carmens family home in Cebu City.[7] In September 1975,
Benjamin passed the medical board examinations[8] and thereafter proceeded to
take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology
after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship program for
the said field[9] and, in 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by
Carmens family, as member of its active staff,[10] while Carmen worked as the
hospitals Treasurer.[11]
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975;
James Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981;
Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988;
and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.[12]
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner
and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified
petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of
their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that
Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest
thereafter. [13]
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already
aware that Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his
friends.[14] But after they were married, petitioner continued to drink regularly
and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the
morning drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically
assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were also instances when
Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their house.[15]Because of his
drinking habit, Benjamins job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that
he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the
task to other anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his
services because they perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to
talk to her husband about the latters drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to
acknowledge the same.[16]
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial
support to their family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for
money for their children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend
his money on drinking and gambling and would even buy expensive equipment
for his hobby.[17] He rarely stayed home[18] and even neglected his obligation to
his children.[19]

Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.[20] He would
gamble two or three times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers,
or from loan sharks whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would
pawn his wifes own jewelry to finance his gambling.[21] There was also an
instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and even a portion of the
lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling
debts.[22] Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he was
banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely
committed so that he would be banned from the gambling establishments.[23]
In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of
the following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family
relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular
drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found
it necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his
father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the
same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure
and refusal to give regular financial support to his family.[24]
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He
maintained that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said
that he is an active member of social and athletic clubs and would drink and
gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being a violent
person, except when provoked by circumstances.[25] As for his alleged failure to
support his family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who
would collect his professional fees from VelezHospital when he was still serving
there as practicing anesthesiologist.[26] In his testimony, Benjamin also insisted
that he gave his family financial support within his means whenever he could
and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his hard-earned
money on unnecessary things.[27] He also pointed out that it was he who often
comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with
her friends twice a week.[28]
During the trial, Carmens testimony regarding Benjamins drinking and gambling
habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served
as nanny to the spouses children from 1987 to 1992.[29] Wasawas stated that
she personally witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in
front of their children.[30]
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oate, a
psychiatrist.[31] Instead of the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oates
evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of stenographic notes taken
during Benjamins deposition because the latter had already gone to work as an
anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of
stenographic notes, Dr. Oate concluded that Benjamins compulsive drinking,
compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear indications that
petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.[32]
To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a
psychiatrist and a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry
in Don Vicente Sotto MemorialMedical Center, as his expert witness.[33] Dr. Obra
evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior based on the transcript of
stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr.
A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his
(Dr. Obras) interview with Benjamins brothers.[34] Contrary to Dr. Oates findings,
Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality,
considering the latters good relationship with his fellow doctors and his good
track record as anesthesiologist.[35]
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision[36] declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave
credence to Dr. Oates findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the
course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court
found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who
prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent
tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect existing even
before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab
initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x
xxxx
SO ORDERED.[37]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered
a Decision[38] reversing the trial courts ruling. It faulted the trial courts finding,
stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was
psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oates
conclusion was based only on theories and not on established fact,[39] contrary
to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals[40] and in Rep. of the
Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[41]
Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case since
the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or more than
five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.[42] She claimed that
the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run
counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent
thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the prescriptive
period but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari[43] with this Court. In a
Resolution[44] dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and directed
the CA to resolve Carmens motion for reconsideration.[45]On review, the CA
decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued
an Amended Decision[46] reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial courts
decision.[47]
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was
denied by the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.[48]
Hence, this petition.
For our resolution are the following issues:
I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to
follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;
II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of
psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based
on Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized; and
III. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
We find merit in the petition.
I. On the issue of stare decisis.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal
rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle
that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be
deemed settled and closed to further argument.[49] Basically, it is a bar to any
attempt to relitigate the same issues,[50] necessary for two simple reasons:
economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8
of the Civil Code.[51]
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the
English courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice
(now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Punos discussion on the historical development
of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on
Elections[52] is enlightening:
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means stand by the thing
and do not disturb the calm. The doctrine started with the English Courts.
Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the 18th century, it is an
established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come
again in litigation. As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were
recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were plainly unreasonable; (2)
where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and, (3) the
binding force of the decision was the actual principle or principles necessary for
the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of
the U.S. Constitution. According to Hamilton, strict rules and precedents are
necessary to prevent arbitrary discretion in the courts. Madison agreed but
stressed that x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering or
repealing the law, it should be rejected. Prof. Consovoy well noted that
Hamilton and Madison disagree about the countervailing policy considerations
that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent. He added that their ideas
reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule of
law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict
that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries.
Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's
observation although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States.
Two strains of stare decisishave been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known
as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the
decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second,
known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high courts must follow its own
precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical stare decisis has
been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed as
a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of
the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare
decisis constitutional stare decisis and statutory stare
decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the
Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes.
The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to
apply stare decisisin constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the
binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today.
In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and
inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall
be followed or departed from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the
court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided. In the
same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: the ultimate touchstone of
constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it. In
contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is
more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: after a statute has been construed,
either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges
and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss
had been drafted by the Congress itself. This stance reflects both respect for
Congress' role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.:
(1) it legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it
allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare
decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and
unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and
political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional
law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges can dictate the policy
for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with
them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare
decisis rule and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these
reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which junked Plessy
v. Ferguson's separate but equal doctrine. Plessy upheld as constitutional a state
law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown,
the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that separate . . . is inherently
unequal. Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S.
Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the
Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by
the stare decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan
Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our original ruling that certain
provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of
Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for
reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that
courts are agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning
prior rulings. These are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the
law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the following
determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule
in constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-
pronged test. The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be
intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule
is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3)
determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have
the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out
whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.[53]
To be forthright, respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed
in Santos and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to
the principle of stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also
raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,[54] and again in Antonio v.
Reyes.[55] In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of
a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is
enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different
view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in
favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good
faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non
respicit.
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,[56] we declared that,
in hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set
of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity.
We said that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a
straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and
be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but
unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can
be considered as on all fours with another.[57]
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical
and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by
psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to
determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage.[58] At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not
indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.[59] The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the expert
opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in
the course of the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that
each case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the
stringent requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by
the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an
accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the
parties. They adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact
that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the
Committee deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated
in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a
psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts
shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.[60]
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present
professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity
and incurability of a partys alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert
opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in
deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.
III. On petitioners psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by
respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to
discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that
he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage
eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts and the
appellate courts rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[61] The
psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she
is about to assume.[62]
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects were present at
the time of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their
marriage, she already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble
with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-
existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
evidence adduced prove such defects to be incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence
in determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and
void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these
experts strengthened respondents allegation of psychological incapacity. The
two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr.
Oate testified that petitioners behavior is a positive indication of a personality
disorder,[63] while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with
petitioners personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr.
Obras opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamins
deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration
the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South
Africawho personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal
interview with Benjamins brothers.[64] Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in
favor of Dr. Obras findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and
gambling problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid
excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes love,
respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him.
Unfortunately, this court finds respondents testimony, as well as the totality of
evidence presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him
psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity
of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.[65] In this case, the
presumption has not been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the
December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903
are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
JORDAN CHAN PAZ v JEANICE PAVON PAZ
G.R. No. 166579
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the 9 August 2004[2] and 26 November
2004[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80473. In its 9
August 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner Jordan Chan
Pazs (Jordan) appeal of the 13 May 2003 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City, Branch 69 (trial court), which granted respondent Jeanice Pavon
Pazs (Jeanice) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. In its 26 November
2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Jordans motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
Jordan and Jeanice met sometime in November 1996. Jeanice was only 19 years
old while Jordan was 27 years old. In January 1997, they became a couple and,
on 10 May 1997, they were formally engaged. They had their civil wedding on 3
July 1997, and their church wedding on 21 September 1997. They have one son,
Evan Gaubert, who was born on 12 February 1998. After a big fight, Jeanice left
their conjugal home on 23 February 1999.
On 15 September 1999, Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage against Jordan. Jeanice alleged that Jordan was psychologically
incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage. According to
Jeanice, Jordans psychological incapacity was manifested by his uncontrollable
tendency to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his predisposition
to become violent and abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not
satisfied.
Jeanice alleged that Jordan had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts and
had the habit of hanging out and spending a great deal of time with his
friends. Since Jordan worked in their family business, Jordan would allegedly
just stay home, tinker with the Play Station, and ask Jeanice to lie to his brothers
about his whereabouts. Jeanice further alleged that Jordan was heavily
dependent on and attached to his mother. After giving birth to their son,
Jeanice noticed that Jordan resented their son and spent more time with his
friends rather than help her take care of their son. Jordan also demanded from
his mother a steady supply of milk and diapers for their son.
At the early stage of their marriage, Jeanice said they had petty fights but that
the quarrels turned for the worse and Jordan became increasingly violent
toward her. At one point, Jordan threatened to hurt her with a pair of
scissors. Jeanice also alleged that on 22 February 1999, Jordan subjected her to
verbal lashing and insults and threatened to hit her with a golf club. Jeanice
added that Jordan has not provided any financial support or visited their son
since she left their conjugal home.
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted with
Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his impulsive behavior,
delinquency and instability.[5] Gates concluded that Jordans psychological
maladies antedate their marriage and are rooted in his family background.
Gates added that with no indication of reformation, Jordans personality
disorder appears to be grave and incorrigible.
JORDAN DENIED JEANICES ALLEGATIONS. JORDAN ASSERTED THAT JEANICE
EXAGGERATED HER STATEMENTS AGAINST HIM. JORDAN SAID THAT JEANICE
HAS HER OWN PERSONAL INSECURITIES AND THAT HER ACTIONS SHOWED HER
LACK OF MATURITY, CHILDISHNESS AND EMOTIONAL INABILITY TO COPE WITH
THE STRUGGLES AND CHALLENGES OF MAINTAINING A MARRIED LIFE.

JORDAN ALSO OBJECTED TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORT OFFERED BY
JEANICE. JORDAN POINTED OUT THAT HE WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO ANY
INTERVIEW OR PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS BY GATES. JORDAN ARGUED THAT GATES
CONCLUSIONS WERE MERE SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND SUPPOSITIONS
FROM THE INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY JEANICE. JORDAN ALLEGED THAT IT
WAS PATENTLY ONE-SIDED AND IS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AS IT WAS
BASED ON HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF JEANICE WHICH WERE OBVIOUSLY SELF-
SERVING. JORDAN SAID HE WANTS JEANICE BACK AND PRAYED FOR THE
DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION.
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
ON 13 MAY 2003, THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED JEANICES PETITION. THE TRIAL
COURT DECLARED THAT JORDANS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, WHICH WAS
SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED AS BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER, DEPRIVED
HIM OF THE CAPACITY TO FULLY UNDERSTAND HIS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER
THE MARITAL BOND. THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT JORDAN WAS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL
OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE, PARTICULARLY ARTICLES 68[6] AND 70[7] OF THE
FAMILY CODE. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO DECLARED THAT JORDANS
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, BEING ROOTED IN HIS FAMILY BACKGROUND,
ANTEDATES THE MARRIAGE AND THAT WITHOUT ANY SIGN OF REFORMATION,
FOUND THE SAME TO BE GRAVE AND INCURABLE.
THE DISPOSITVE PORTION OF THE TRIAL COURTS 13 MAY 2003 DECISION
READS:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JEANICE PAVON PAZ AND RESPONDENT
JORDAN CHAN PAZ CELEBRATED ON JULY 3, 1997 AND SEPTEMBER 21, 1997 AS
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
WITH ALL THE EFFECTS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE COUPLES ABSOLUTE
COMMUNITY OF PROPERTIES [SIC] SHALL BE DISSOLVED IN THE MANNER
HEREIN PROVIDED. AND THE CUSTODY OVER EVAN SHALL REMAIN WITH THE
PETITIONER, WITHOUT REGARD TO VISITATION RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENT AS
THE FATHER OF THE CHILD. FURTHERMORE, THE PARTIES ARE JOINTLY
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUPPORT OF THEIR MINOR CHILD EVAN GUABERT
PAVON PAZ.
LET COPIES OF THIS DECISION BE FURNISHED THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRARS OF
QUEZON CITY AND PASIG CITY RESPECTIVELY AS WELL AS THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO, CRP, LEGAL DEPARTMENT) EDSA, QUEZON CITY.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On 6 June 2003, Jordan filed a Notice of Appeal.[9] The trial court promptly
approved Jordans appeal.
ON 10 FEBRUARY 2004, JEANICE FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL WITH
THE COURT OF APPEALS.[10] IN HER MOTION, JEANICE SOUGHT THE IMMEDIATE
DISMISSAL OF JORDANS APPEAL ON THE GROUND THAT JORDAN FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH SECTION 20 OF A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC[11] WHICH PROVIDES:
SEC. 20. APPEAL.
(1) Pre-condition. No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless the
appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial within fifteen days
from notice of judgment.
ON 9 AUGUST 2004, THE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSED JORDANS
APPEAL. ACCORDING TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE RULES STATE IN
MANDATORY AND CATEGORICAL TERMS THAT THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OR NEW TRIAL IS A PRE-CONDITION BEFORE AN APPEAL
FROM THE DECISION IS ALLOWED. THE COURT OF APPEALS ADDED THAT WHEN
THE LAW IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, IT ADMITS NO ROOM FOR
INTERPRETATION BUT MERELY FOR APPLICATION.
JEANICE FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION
DATED 5 JUNE 2006, WE DENIED JEANICES MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
FOR LACK OF MERIT.[15]

JORDAN FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. IN ITS 26 NOVEMBER 2004

RESOLUTION, THE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSED THE MOTION. ON 7 AUGUST 2006, JEANICE FILED A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 2006, WE DENIED JEANICES

HENCE, THIS PETITION.
SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR LACK OF MERIT AND REMINDED
JEANICE THAT A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A PROHIBITED
PLEADING.[16]
IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 22 JUNE 2005, WE DENIED JORDANS
PETITION FOR FAILURE TO SUFFICIENTLY SHOW THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED ANY REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTIONS AS TO
WARRANT THE EXERCISE BY THIS COURT OF ITS DISCRETIONARY APPELLATE
JURISDICTION.[12]

On 18 August 2005, Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration. While Jordan THE ISSUE
admits that he failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts 13
May 2003 Decision, Jordan submits that Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
should not have been strictly applied against him because it took effect only on
THE ONLY ISSUE LEFT TO BE RESOLVED IS WHETHER JORDAN IS
15 March 2003, or less than two months prior to the rendition of the trial courts
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
13 May 2003 Decision. Moreover, Jordan enjoins the Court to decide the case
OBLIGATIONS.
on the merits so as to preserve the sanctity of marriage as enshrined in the
Constitution.

JEANICE ALSO FILED AN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION THE RULING OF THIS COURT
ON 1 SEPTEMBER 2005.[13]

THE PETITION HAS MERIT.

IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 2005, WE GRANTED JORDANS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REINSTATED THE PETITION.[14]
JEANICE FAILED TO PROVE JORDANS
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
JEANICES PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS ANCHORED
ON ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE WHICH PROVIDES:
A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED BY ANY PARTY WHO, AT THE TIME OF THE
CELEBRATION, WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE, SHALL LIKEWISE BE VOID
EVEN IF SUCH INCAPACITY BECOMES MANIFEST ONLY AFTER ITS
SOLEMNIZATION.
IN SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS,[17] THE COURT FIRST DECLARED THAT
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY MUST BE CHARACTERIZED BY (A) GRAVITY; (B)
JUDICIAL ANTECEDENCE; AND (C) INCURABILITY. IT MUST BE CONFINED TO THE
MOST SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATIVE
OF AN UTTER INSENSITIVITY OR INABILITY TO GIVE MEANING AND
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE MARRIAGE.[18]
IN DIMAYUGA-LAURENA V. COURT OF APPEALS,[19] THE COURT EXPLAINED:
(A) GRAVITY IT MUST BE GRAVE AND SERIOUS SUCH THAT THE PARTY WOULD
BE INCAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT THE ORDINARY DUTIES REQUIRED IN A
MARRIAGE;
(B) JUDICIAL ANTECEDENCE IT MUST BE ROOTED IN THE HISTORY OF THE PARTY
ANTEDATING THE MARRIAGE, ALTHOUGH THE OVERT MANIFESTATIONS MAY
EMERGE ONLY AFTER THE MARRIAGE; AND
(C) INCURABILITY IT MUST BE INCURABLE, OR EVEN IF IT WERE OTHERWISE, THE
CURE WOULD BE BEYOND THE MEANS OF THE PARTY INVOLVED.[20]
IN GRANTING JEANICES PETITION, THE TRIAL COURT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF GATES TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION THAT JORDAN WAS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS. GATES DECLARED THAT JORDAN WAS SUFFERING FROM
BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER AS MANIFESTED BY HIS BEING A MAMAS
BOY AND THAT SUCH WAS GRAVE AND INCURABLE, ROOTED IN HIS FAMILY
BACKGROUND, [AND] ANTEDATES THE MARRIAGE.
ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT A PARTY TO BE DECLARED
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED SHOULD BE PERSONALLY EXAMINED BY A
PHYSICIAN OR A PSYCHOLOGIST, THERE IS NEVERTHELESS A NEED TO PROVE
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY THROUGH INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY THE PERSON ALLEGING SAID DISORDER.[21]
CORRESPONDINGLY, THE PRESENTATION OF EXPERT PROOF PRESUPPOSES A
THOROUGH AND IN-DEPTH ASSESSMENT OF THE PARTIES BY THE
PSYCHOLOGIST OR EXPERT, FOR A CONCLUSIVE DIAGNOSIS OF A GRAVE, SEVERE
AND INCURABLE PRESENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.[22]
IN THIS CASE, THE COURT NOTES THAT THE REPORT AND TESTIMONY OF GATES
ON JORDANS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WERE BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON HER
INTERVIEWS WITH JEANICE AND THE TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF
JEANICES TESTIMONY BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.[23] GATES ONLY DIAGNOSED
JORDAN FROM THE STATEMENTS OF JEANICE, WHOSE BIAS IN FAVOR OF HER
CAUSE CANNOT BE DOUBTED. GATES DID NOT ACTUALLY HEAR, SEE AND
EVALUATE JORDAN. GATES TESTIFIED:
Q- AS A LAST QUESTION MADAM WITNESS. SO ALL IN ALL YOUR
CONCLUSIONS HERE ON PAGE 1 TO PAGE 5 OF YOUR REPORT ARE ALL BASED
ON THE STATEMENT AND PERCEPTION OF THE PETITIONER (JEANICE) ON
THE RESPONDENT (JORDAN)?
A- YES MAM.[24]
Consequently, Gates report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she had
no personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying
on.[25] Gates testimony should have thus been dismissed for being unscientific
and unreliable.[26]
MOREOVER, CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT, JORDANS
ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE SO GRAVE AND
SO PERMANENT AS TO DEPRIVE HIM OF THE AWARENESS OF THE DUTIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MATRIMONIAL BOND. AT BEST, JEANICES
ALLEGATIONS SHOWED THAT JORDAN WAS IRRESPONSIBLE, INSENSITIVE, OR
EMOTIONALLY IMMATURE. THE INCIDENTS CITED BY JEANICE DO NOT SHOW
THAT JORDAN SUFFERED FROM GRAVE PSYCHOLOGICAL MALADIES THAT
PARALYZED JORDAN FROM COMPLYING WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF
MARRIAGE.
WHAT THE LAW REQUIRES TO RENDER A MARRIAGE VOID ON THE GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITY, NOT REFUSAL OR
NEGLECT OR DIFFICULTY, MUCH LESS ILL WILL.[27] THE MERE SHOWING OF
IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES AND CONFLICTING PERSONALITIES DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.[28]
IN PEREZ-FERRARIS V. FERRARIS,[29] WE SAID:
AS ALL PEOPLE MAY HAVE CERTAIN QUIRKS AND IDIOSYNCRASIES, OR ISOLATED
CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN PERSONALITY DISORDERS, THERE
IS HARDLY A DOUBT THAT THE INTENDMENT OF THE LAW HAS BEEN TO
CONFINE THE MEANING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY TO THE MOST
SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATIVE OF AN
UTTER INSENSITIVITY OR INABILITY TO GIVE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE TO
MARRIAGE.[30]
Furthermore, Gates did not particularly describe the pattern of behavior which
showed that Jordan indeed suffers from Borderline Personality Disorder. Gates
also failed to explain how such a personality disorder made Jordan
psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband.
LIKEWISE, JEANICE WAS NOT ABLE TO ESTABLISH WITH CERTAINTY THAT
JORDANS ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WAS MEDICALLY OR
CLINICALLY PERMANENT OR INCURABLE. GATES TESTIMONY ON THE MATTER
WAS VAGUE AND INCONCLUSIVE. GATES TESTIFIED:
Q - NOW IS THIS DISORDER CURABLE?
A - IF ITS CONTINUING TO THE PRESENT THEREFORE ITS
PERSEVERERATIVE BEHAVIOR. THEN THE POSSIBILITY OF COUNTERING THE
SAME MIGHT BE NIL.[31]
GATES DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN HOW SHE CAME TO THE CONCLUSION
THAT JORDANS CONDITION WAS INCURABLE.
IN SUM, THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY JEANICE FAILED TO
SHOW THAT JORDAN WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY
WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS AND THAT SUCH INCAPACITY WAS
GRAVE, INCURABLE, AND EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE SOLEMNIZATION OF
THEIR MARRIAGE.

IN REPUBLIC V. CABANTUG-BAGUIO,[32] WE SAID:

THE CONSTITUTION SETS OUT A POLICY OF PROTECTING AND STRENGTHENING

THE FAMILY AS THE BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION AND MARRIAGE AS THE
FOUNDATION OF THE FAMILY. MARRIAGE, AS AN INVIOLABLE INSTITUTION
PROTECTED BY THE STATE, CANNOT BE DISSOLVED AT THE WHIM OF THE
PARTIES. IN PETITIONS FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, THE
BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE LIES ON THE
PLAINTIFF. ANY DOUBT SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE EXISTENCE
AND CONTINUATION OF THE MARRIAGE AND AGAINST ITS DISSOLUTION AND
NULLITY.[33]

WHEREFORE, WE GRANT THE PETITION. WE SET ASIDE THE 9 AUGUST 2004 AND
26 NOVEMBER 2004 RESOLUTIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS.
WE REVERSE THE 13 MAY 2003 DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
PASIG, BRANCH 69. THE MARRIAGE OF JEANICE PAVON PAZ TO JORDAN CHAN
PAZ SUBSISTS AND REMAINS VALID.

SO ORDERED.
EDWARD N. LIM v. MA. CHERYL STA. CRUZ-LIM,
G.R. No. 176464
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition raises a far-from-novel issue, i.e., the invalidity of a marriage on the
ground of either or both of the parties psychological incapacity. However,
similar petitions continue to hound the lower courts, even with the stringent
requirements for the grant of declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, given the facility with which married persons are
diagnosed with personality disorders.
The instant petition for review on certiorari assails the decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74822, which reversed the decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 140, Makati City, in Civil Case No. 99-1852.
First, the all too familiar antecedents of man-meets-woman; they get married
after a whirlwind relationship; and, not surprisingly, the marriage goes awry.
Petitioner Edward N. Lim and respondent Maria Cheryl Sta. Cruz-Lim met in
1978 in Cebu, where petitioner, who resides in Makati City, spent a semestral
break from college; and respondent, who resides in Gingoog City, Cagayan de
Oro, was a boarder in petitioners uncles house. At that time, petitioner was
twenty-six (26) years old, a college student, and working in the family business,
while respondent was a secretarial student.
After less than a year of courtship via long distance phone calls, petitioner and
respondent became sweethearts in early 1979. Within that year, or on
December 8, 1979, the two were wed at the Don Bosco Church in Makati City,
with a reception at Midtown Ramada Hotel.
As is customary among those of Chinese descent, petitioner and respondent
took up residence with the formers grandparents and parents
in Forbes Park, Makati City. The couple was blessed with three (3) children:
Lester Edward,[3] Candice Grace,[4] and Mariano III.[5]
During their stay in Forbes Park, all living, household and medical expenses were
paid and provided by petitioners grandparents. Petitioners salary of P6,000.00
for working in the family distillery went straight to respondent. Despite all these
amenities, the setup and living arrangement rankled respondent, who
continued to insist that they live separately and independently from petitioners
family.
October 14, 1990 proved to be a black-letter day for the union of petitioner and
respondent. That morning, respondent registered a complaint, which was
recorded in the police blotter of the Makati City police, about a prior incident
where she caught petitioner in their house in a compromising situation with the
stay-in caregiver of petitioners grandmother. This incident landed on the pages
of a tabloid newspaper, Abante, where petitioner, his grandparents house and
the family business were all named and identified. Naturally, this caused
embarrassment and humiliation to petitioner and to the rest of his family and
relatives.
Also, on that same day, respondent finally left petitioner and brought with her
their three (3) children. Respondent forcibly opened their cabinet and cleaned
out the contents thereof, which included petitioners passport, jewelry, and a
land title in petitioners name.
Respondent likewise filed a criminal complaint for Concubinage and Physical
Injuries against petitioner which was eventually dismissed by the investigating
prosecutor for lack of merit.
Subsequently, respondent filed with the RTC of Makati City an action for
support against petitioner and petitioners parents. Thereafter, the trial court
directed petitioner to give a monthly support of P6,000.00 and, in case of his
inability to do so, petitioners parents were also decreed to give a monthly
support for the three minor children in the amount of P34,000.00.[6]
On October 29, 1999, petitioner filed a petition and sought the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent on the ground of the latters psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Three years thereafter, on July
22, 2002, petitioner filed an amended petition including an allegation of his own
psychological incapacity, as both he and respondent were diagnosed with
personality disordersdependent personality disorder and histrionic personality
disorder, respectively.
Following the exchange of pleadings between the parties, petitioner presented
evidence, which consisted of the testimonies of Dr. Cecilia C. Villegas, a
psychiatrist; and Maxima Adato, petitioners co-employee in the distillery. In
addition, petitioner offered in evidence Dr. Villegas Psychiatric Report, which
concluded that the parties were suffering from personality disorders.
Respondent, despite filing an Answer to the petition denying the allegations
therein, waived her right to present evidence.
Based on the foregoing, primarily on the Psychiatric Report, the RTC declared
the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void as the two were
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The RTC disposed of the case, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby DECLARES the marriage of
EDWARD N. LIM and MA. CHERYL STA. CRUZ on December 8, 1979 in Makati
City VOID AB INITIO on ground of psychological incapacity of both parties
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code with all the effects and consequences
of all the existing provisions of law.
As regards the custody of the children, considering that all of them are over
seven (7) years of age, the Court shall take into account the choice of each of
the child, unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Let copies thereof be sent to the Office of Local Civil Registrar of Makati City and
the National Statistics Office, Quezon City who are directed to CANCEL from
their respective Civil Registries the marriage of EDWARD N. LIM and CHERYL
STA. CRUZ on December 8, 1979 in Makati City.
The Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses shall be liquidated, partitioned, and
distributed in accordance with the provisions of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code.[7]
Disagreeing completely with the RTCs disposition, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) appealed to the CA, questioning the RTCs finding that the parties
were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The appellate court granted the OSGs appeal and reversed the trial
court. It ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly,
the assailed Decision dated March 25, 2002 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage between herein parties is hereby declared subsisting and valid.[8]
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari positing the singular issue of
whether the marriage between petitioner and respondent is null and void on
the ground of the parties psychological incapacity.
We deny the petition.
The seminal ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] cites three (3) factors
characterizing psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations: (1) gravity, (2) juridical antecedence, (3) incurability. We expounded
on the foregoing, to wit:
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Given the foregoing stringent requisites and without going into the non-
exclusive list found in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[10] petitioner, as the party
alleging his own psychological incapacity and that of his spouse, had the special
albatross to prove that he and his wife were suffering from the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[11]
Instead, petitioner presented the Psychiatric Report of Dr. Villegas, the
conclusions drawn are reprinted in full:
PSYCHODYNAMICS OF THE CASE:
Edward is of Chinese descent, born and grew up in a Philippine environment. He
was raised and educated in Philippine school. However, despite his prominent
Filipino exposure, his immediate family still practice a strong cultural Chinese
tradition within his home. Very clannish, all family members has to stay in one
roof, in a communal style of living, with the elders in this case, the grandparents
are recognized as the authority. Most of the family members tend to rebel, but
at the end, tendency to be submissive and passive were developed. But despite
physical closeness, Edward did not build close attachments to his parents. The
father was exceptionally temperamental and moody, while the mother was
extremely asocial, isolated, withdrawn and seclusive, that repelled him from
both of them.
Surrogate parenting from his grandparents satisfied his dependency needs. He
developed into a kind, obedient, submissive and passive adult, which became
the center of jealousy and rivalry among the siblings. Under stressful situation,
he became depressed and had suicidal intentions. He felt so secure with his
grandparents, that he subordinated his needs to them. He allowed them to
assume responsibilities for major areas of his life, as in his family decision and
independence. He has difficulty expressing disagreements with others,
especially with his wife, because of fear of loss of support or approval. So that
even an abusive spouse may be tolerated for long periods, in order not to
disturb the sense of attachments. A persevering worker, he had difficulties
initiating change due to lack of self-confidence in judgment or abilities, rather
than lack of motivation or energy. Within 10 years in marriage, he tried hard to
grant his wifes wishes, but to no avail. His wife left him in October, 1990
together with their three children, whom he missed very much. The death of his
grandfather in 1994 was a big blow to him, but he finds solace and security in
visiting his grave every Sunday since then.
On the other hand, Cheryl was initially congenial, which lasted only for a short
period of time. Later, her immaturity interfered with her behavioral pattern and
adjustment. Apparently, she could not recognize realities in their family set-up
and will insist on her fantasized wishes. When not granted, shell go into
tantrums, moodiness, anger, hostilities, exhibitions and dramatizations, just to
get attention and to emphasize her wants. Her attention-getting devices will be
endless and her suggestibility to the influence of others is very fertile.
Based on the family background, pattern of behavior, and outcome of their
marriage, clinical evidence showed that Mr. Edward Lim is suffering from a
Dependent Personality Disorder, while Cheryl is suffering from Histrionic
Personality Disorder associated with immaturity, that render both of them
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of Q- And were you able to actually conduct an examination for the
marriage. purposes that you have stated?

A- Yes, maam.

The root cause of the above clinical condition on the part of Edward was due to
overindulgence and overprotection of his surrogate parents, that left no room
for him to develop his own abilities, encouraging too much dependence, lack of Q- How many times were you able to examine or meet the petitioner?
self-confidence, self-doubt, passivity, pessimism, and depression. How much of A- I met him three (3x) times, maam. That was on January 10, January
the Dependent Disorder was due to developmental defect and how much was 14 and January 17, year 2000.
due to strong Chinese culture and traditions, will be difficult to assess.

On the part of Cheryl, the root cause was due to unsatisfied dependency needs
that finds gratification in adult stage, in the form of attention-seeking devices,
manifested in her clinical symptoms. Both existed prior to marriage, but became
obviously manifested only after the celebration, due to marital stresses and
demands. Both disorders are considered permanent and incurable, because
they started early in their developmental stage and therefore became so
engrained in their personality structure. Both are severe and grave in degree,
because they hampered their normal functioning, specifically related to a
difficult heterosexual adjustment.[12]
Q- And is there any other witness or person that you have met for the
purpose of evaluating the behavior and personality of petitioner?
A- Yes, maam. I was able to interview a long time employee that they
have in their company in the person of Mrs. Emmy Adato who herself know the
petitioner since he was eight (8) years old, maam.
xxxx

Q- Do you affirm before this Honorable Court the conclusions that you
have arrived at to be correct?
In addition, Dr. Villegas testified in the lower court as to the findings contained A- Yes, maam.
in the Psychiatric Report. Thus, on direct examination, Dr. Villegas testimony
consisted of the following:

Q- And what was the conclusion after you conducted the evaluation of
the character of petitioner, as well as that of the respondent?
Q- Can you tell the Court how you happened to know the petitioner?
A- After my intensive interview about the circumstances of their
A- He was referred to me by his counsel for psychological and marriage, family background of the petitioner and also the family background of
psychiatric evaluation related to his application for nullity of marriage in this the respondent, it is the opinion of the examiner that the petitioner Mr. Edward
Honorable Court, maam. Lim is suffering from DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER that renders him
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage, maam. On the other hand, based on the informations and clinical data Q- And the other person whom you have interviewed was the employee of the
gathered from the petitioner and my other informant, Ms. Emmy Adato, it is the petitioner?
opinion of the examiner that the respondent is suffering from HISTRIONIC
PERSONALITY DISORDER associated with an immaturity that renders her A- Yes, maam.
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and responsibilities of
marriage.
Q- No other person whom you have interviewed?

A- None, maam.
Q- In your capacity as expert, a psychiatrist of forty (40) years, can you
conclude that this deficiencies or defects that you found are sufficient ground to
nullify the marriage under Article 36?
Q- You did not interview the surrogate parents of petitioner?
A- Yes, maam.
A- No, maam.

Q- Do you conclude also these deficiencies are continuous and permanent?

Q- Did you attempt to communicate with the respondent of this case for the
A- Yes, maam. purpose of interviewing her?

A- Yes, maam. [A]nd I have made this through the petitioner who has contacted
his children in Cagayan De Oro, maam.
Q- Would you conclude therefore would you consider it as valid ground for the
annulment of the marriage?

A- Yes, maam.[13] Q- So you are telling us, Doctor, that the respondent is in Cagayan De Oro?

A- Yes, maam.

On cross examination by the prosecutor, Dr. Villegas testified as Q- And despite your invitation, she did not appear to you?

follows: A- Yes, maam.

Q- Doctor, you have testified that it was only the petitioner whom you have
examined and evaluated with (sic)?
Q- So based from your Report on the circumstances of marriage, the
A- Yes, maam. information regarding the marriage of parties in this case came from the
petitioner?

A- Yes, sir.
Q- And the family background you have made on Cheryl, the respondent also
came from the petitioner?
A- Yes, maam.
Q- And the interview you have made on Adato, the employee of petitioner, she
gave you some background of the respondent here?
A- Yes, maam.
Q- But most of the informations you have gathered from her were pertaining to
the petitioner?
A- Yes, maam.
Q- So practically, the evaluation you have made were based on the interview
only on both the employee and the petitioner himself?
A- Yes, maam.
Q- You did not conduct a series of tests to determine or evaluate further?
A- No, maam.
Q- You have not collaborated with any psychologists so as to get some
psychological evaluation on petitioner?
A- No, maam. But the clearer picture of the case presented to me is a very clear
picture already of the psychiatric disorder which did not necessitated (sic) the
assistance of a psychologist because it is obvious, the signs and symptoms are
obviously manifested by the parties.
Q- How many times did you meet the petitioner?
A- Three (3) times maam.
Q- And the duration of interview or examination on petitioner is how long?
A- It lasted for about one and a half hours to two and a half hours.
Q- For each session?
A- For each session.
Q- So you were able to examine him for a duration of six (6) hours, more or less.
In the six (6) or seven (7) hours, you were able to make the conclusions which
you have made in your report?
A- Yes, maam. A psychiatric interview is a very structured interview
Q- When did you find out that you dont have to resort to psychological
evaluation?
A- Even on my interview, I already kn[e]w that I will not be referring this case to
a psychological evaluation because the signs and symptoms are already very
clear.
Q- What are these signs and symptoms?
A- The family background, for example, which gave the rootcause, of this case
are very, very typical ground that can bring about

Q- Did you not have any suspicion that the petitioner might be giving you some
informations which would given (sic) some presumption to nullifying his
marriage?
A- I have no basis to doubt that kind of information that he might be lying.
During the one and a half to two hours of interview based on his reactions, the
way he answers me, the way he grimaces and also, his statements that he has
been giving me are very sincere on his part, that he even, despite the fact that
that happened already about eleven years ago, I could still appreciate how
much he feels, so devastated, so frustrated and disappointed about family life.
Q- You made a conclusion about the personality of both the petitioner and the
respondent. Would you say that even if petitioner would marry again, the same
manifestations would exist in the second marriage?
A- It would depend again on the personality profile of the would be partner that
he will be having. So it is not really absolute in his case, in a personality profile,
but it would again depend on the personality profile of the would-be partner
that he will be having, maam.[14]
It was folly for the trial court to accept the findings and conclusions of Dr.
Villegas with nary a link drawn between the psychodynamics of the case and the
factors characterizing the psychological incapacity. Dr. Villegas sparse testimony
does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the parties were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. Even on
questioning from the trial court, Dr. Villegas testimony did not illuminate on the
parties alleged personality disorders and their incapacitating effect on their
marriage:
Q- Doctora, you gave a conclusion that the respondent is suffering from
Histrionic Personality Disorder associated with immaturity. Did you discover the
antecedents of this disorder?
A- Yes, your honor.
Q- What did you find out?
A- I found out from her family background that the parents were separated. She
lived with a stepfather and therefore their family relationship were only
preoccupied by earning a living and no attention were given to the children.
When the children were growing up, specifically Cheryl (interrupted).
Q- By the way, who supplied you this information?
A- The petitioner.
Q- You never discussed the matter with the respondent or any of her relatives,
except the husband?
A- None, maam.
Q- Now, you have interviewed Mr. Lim three (3) times. What tests did you give
to him aside from the interview?
A- I did not give him any test because a psychological examination is given by a
psychologist who acts as a laboratory aide to a psychiatrist and therefore, if
there are some doubts in our clinical interviews, that is the time we refer the
case to a psychologist for a sort of clarification in our clinical interviews.
Q- As far as the gravity of the disorder of petitioner is concerned do you have
any suggestions as to the cure of the same?
A- Because the psychological/psychiatric incapacity has been formed or
developed during his early years of development, I would say that it is ingrained
in his personality and therefore, no amount of psychiatric assistance or
medicines can help him improve his personality, your honor.[15]
D. The pattern is stable and of long duration, and its onset can be traced back at
least to adolescence or early adulthood.
E. The enduring pattern is not better accounted for as a manifestation or a
consequence of another mental disorder.

F. The enduring pattern is not due to the direct physiological effects of a

The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM substance (i.e., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition
IV),[16] provides general diagnostic criteria for personality disorders: (e.g., head trauma).

A. An enduring pattern of inner experience and behavior that deviates markedly

from the expectations of the individuals culture. This pattern is manifested in
The alleged personality disorders of the parties have the following specified
two (2) or more of the following areas:
diagnostic criteria:

301.6 DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER

(1) cognition (i.e., ways of perceiving and interpreting self, other people, and
events)

(2) affectivity (i.e., the range, intensity, lability, and appropriateness of A pervasive and excessive need to be taken care of that leads to submissive and
clinging behavior and fears of separation, beginning by early adulthood and
emotional response)
present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:
(3) interpersonal functioning

(4) impulse control

(1) has difficulty making everyday decisions without an excessive amount of
advice and reassurance from others;

B. The enduring pattern is inflexible and pervasive across a broad range of

personal and social situations.
(2) needs others to assume responsibility for most major areas of his or her life;

C. The enduring pattern leads to clinically significant distress or impairment in

social, occupational or other important areas of functioning. (3) has difficulty expressing disagreement with others because of fear of loss of
support or approval. Note: do not include realistic fears of retribution;

(4) has difficulty intiating projects or doing things on his or her own (because of
a lack of self-confidence in judgment or abilities rather than a lack of motivation
or energy);
(5) goes to excessive lengths to obtain nurturance and support from others, to
the point of volunteering to do things that are unpleasant;
(6) feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone because of exaggerated fears of
being unable to care for himself or herself;
(7) urgently seeks another relationship as a source of care and support when a
close relationship ends;
(8) is unrealistically preoccupied with fears of being left to take care of himself
or herself.
301.5 HISTRIONIC PERSONALITY DISORDER
A pervasive pattern of excessive emotionality and attention seeking, beginning
by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or
more) of the following:
(1) is uncomfortable in situations in which he or she is not the center of
attention;
(2) interaction with others is often characterized by inappropriate sexually
seductive or provocative behavior;
(3) displays rapidly shifting and shallow expressing of emotions;
(4) consistently uses physical appearance to draw attention to self;
(5) has a style of speech that is excessively impressionistic and lacking in detail;
(6) shows self-dramatization, theatricality, and exaggerated expression of
emotion;
(7) is suggestible, i.e., easily influenced by others or circumstances; and
(8) considers relationships to be more intimate than they actually are.
Significantly, nowhere in Dr. Villegas Psychiatric Report and in her testimony
does she link particular acts of the parties to the DSM IVs list of criteria for the
specific personality disorders.
Curiously, Dr. Villegas global conclusion of both parties personality disorders
was not supported by psychological tests properly administered by clinical
psychologists specifically trained in the tests use and interpretation. The
supposed personality disorders of the parties, considering that such diagnoses
were made, could have been fully established by psychometric and neurological
tests which are designed to measure specific aspects of peoples intelligence,
thinking, or personality.[17]
Concededly, a copy of DSM IV, or any of the psychology textbooks, does not
transform a lawyer or a judge into a professional psychologist. A judge should
not substitute his own psychological assessment of the parties for that of the
psychologist or the psychiatrist. However, a judge has the bounden duty to rule
on what the law is, as applied to a certain set of facts. Certainly, as in all other
litigations involving technical or special knowledge, a judge must first and
foremost resolve the legal question based on law and jurisprudence.

The expert opinion of a psychiatrist arrived at after a maximum of seven (7)

hours of interview, and unsupported by separate psychological tests, cannot tie
the hands of the trial court and prevent it from making its own factual finding
on what happened in this case. The probative force of the testimony of an
expert does not lie in a mere statement of his theory or opinion, but rather in
the assistance that he can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as
a basis for his criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of his conclusion is
founded.[18]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74822 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
SILVINO A. LIGERALDE v. MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG and the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. NO. 168796
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition seeks to set aside the November 30, 2004 Decision[1] of the Court
of Appeals (CA) which reversed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of
Dagupan City (RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner Silvino A.
Ligeralde (Silvino) and private respondent May Ascension A.
Patalinghug (May) null and void.
Silvino and May got married on October 3, 1984. They were blessed with four
children. Silvino claimed that, during their marriage, he observed that May had
several manifestations of a negative marital behavior. He described her as
immature, irresponsible and carefree. Her infidelity, negligence and nocturnal
activities, he claimed, characterized their marital relations.
Sometime in September 1995, May arrived home at 4:00 oclock in the morning.
Her excuse was that she had watched a video program in a neighboring town,
but admitted later to have slept with her Palestinian boyfriend in a hotel. Silvino
tried to persuade her to be conscientious of her duties as wife and mother. His
pleas were ignored. His persuasions would often lead to altercations or physical
violence.
In the midst of these, Silvinos deep love for her, the thought of saving their
marriage for the sake of their children, and the commitment of May to reform
dissuaded him from separating from her. He still wanted to reconcile with her.
The couple started a new life. A few months after, however, he realized that
their marriage was hopeless. May was back again to her old ways. This was
demonstrated when Silvino arrived home one day and learned that she was
nowhere to be found. He searched for her and found her in a nearby apartment
drinking beer with a male lover.
Later, May confessed that she had no more love for him. They then lived
separately.
With Mays irresponsible, immature and immoral behavior, Silvino came to
believe that she is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.
Prior to the filing of the complaint, Silvino referred the matter to Dr. Tina
Nicdao-Basilio for psychological evaluation. The psychologist certified that May
was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations;
that the incapacity started when she was still young and became manifest after
marriage; and that the same was serious and incurable.[3]
On October 22, 1999, the RTC declared the marriage of Silvino and May null and
void. Its findings were based on the Psychological Evaluation Report of Dr. Tina
Nicdao-Basilio.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision. It ruled that private
respondents alleged sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
do not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code and that the psychologist failed to identify and prove the root
cause thereof or that the incapacity was medically or clinically permanent or
incurable.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
The core issue raised by petitioner Silvino Ligeralde is that the assailed order of
the CA is based on conjecture and, therefore, issued without jurisdiction, in
excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.[4]
The Court required the private respondent to comment but she failed to do so.
Efforts were exerted to locate her but to no avail.
Nevertheless, the petition is technically and substantially flawed. On procedural
grounds, the Court agrees with the public respondent that the petitioner should
have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 instead of this
petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For having availed of the wrong remedy,
this petition deserves outright dismissal.
Substantially, the petition has no merit. In order to avail of the special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court,[5] the petitioner
must clearly show that the public respondent acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction. By grave
abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility. In sum, for the extraordinary writ of certiorari to lie, there must be
capricious, arbitrary or whimsical exercise of power.[6]
In this case at bench, the Court finds no commission of a grave abuse of
discretion in the rendition of the assailed CA decision dismissing petitioners
complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Upon close scrutiny of the records, we find nothing whimsical, arbitrary or
capricious in its findings.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the
Family Code which provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.[7] The Court likewise laid
down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of
Appeals.[8]Relevant to this petition are the following:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff; (2) the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be medically or
clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts and
clearly explained in the decision; (3) the incapacity must be proven to be
existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4) such incapacity
must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; and (5)
such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. SO ORDERED.

Guided by these pronouncements, it is the Courts considered view that

petitioners evidence failed to establish respondent Mays psychological
incapacity.

Petitioner's testimony did not prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of
private respondents condition. Even Dr. Nicdao-Basilio failed to show the root
cause of her psychological incapacity. The root cause of the psychological
incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature
fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during
trial.[9]

More importantly, the acts of private respondent do not even rise to the level of
the psychological incapacity that the law requires. Private respondent's act of
living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological
disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was
a trait already existing at the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to
establish that respondent's unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality, which makes her completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state.[10]

Doubtless, the private respondent was far from being a perfect wife and a good
mother. She certainly had some character flaws. But these imperfections do not
warrant a conclusion that she had a psychological malady at the time of the
marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital and family duties
and obligations.[11]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

RICARDO P. TORING v. TERESITA M. TORING and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165321
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Ricardo P. Toring from the May 31,
2004 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. The CA
reversed the August 10, 2001 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
106 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-36662,[2] nullifying Ricardo's marriage
with respondent Teresita M. Toring on the ground of psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
Ricardo was introduced to Teresita in 1978 at his aunts house in Cebu. Teresita
was then his cousins teacher in Hawaiian dance and was conducting lessons at
his aunts house. Despite their slight difference in age (of five years), the younger
Ricardo found the dance teacher attractive and fell in love with her. He pursued
Teresita and they became sweethearts after three months of courtship. They
eloped soon after, hastened by the bid of another girlfriend, already pregnant,
to get Ricardo to marry her.
Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978 before Hon. Remigio
Zari of the City Court of Quezon City. They begot three children: Richardson,
Rachel Anne, and Ric Jayson.
On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed
a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their
marriage. He asked the court to declare his marriage to Teresita null and void.
At the trial, Ricardo offered in evidence their marriage contract; the
psychological evaluation and signature of his expert witness, psychiatrist Dr.
Cecilia R. Albaran, and his and Dr. Albarans respective testimonies. Teresita did
not file any answer or opposition to the petition, nor did she testify to refute the
allegations against her.[3]
Ricardo alleged in his petition and in his testimony at the trial that Teresita was
an adulteress and a squanderer. He was an overseas seaman, and he regularly
sent money to his wife to cover the familys living expenses and their childrens
tuition. Teresita, however, was not adept in managing the funds he sent and
their finances. Many times, Ricardo would come home and be welcomed by
debts incurred by his wife; he had to settle these to avoid embarrassment.
Aside from neglect in paying debts she incurred from other people, Teresita
likewise failed to remit amounts she collected as sales agent of a plasticware
and cosmetics company. She left the familys utility bills and their childrens
tuition fees unpaid. She also missed paying the rent and the amortization for the
house that Ricardo acquired for the family, so their children had to live in a
small rented room and eventually had to be taken in by Ricardos parents. When
confronted by Ricardo, Teresita would simply offer the excuse that she spent
the funds Ricardo sent to buy things for the house and for their children.
Ricardo likewise accused Teresita of infidelity and suspected that she was
pregnant with another mans child. During one of his visits to the country, he
noticed that Teresitas stomach was slightly bigger. He tried to convince her to
have a medical examination but she refused. Her miscarriage five months into
her pregnancy confirmed his worst suspicions. Ricardo alleged that the child
could not have been his, as his three instances of sexual contact with Teresita
were characterized by withdrawals; other than these, no other sexual contacts
with his wife transpired, as he transferred and lived with his relatives after a
month of living with Teresita in Cebu. Ricardo reported, too, of rumors that his
wife represented herself to others as single, and went out on dates with other
men when he was not around.
Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling
and demanding person, who mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for
the nightlife and was very averse to the duties of a housewife; was stubborn
and independent, also most unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was
unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their family; and was most
painfully unmindful of him.[4] He believed that their marriage had broken down
beyond repair and that they both have lost their mutual trust and love for one
another.[5]
Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise
of the marriage was Teresitas Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations. To quote
Dr. Albaran:
Teresita, the respondent[,] has [sic] shown to manifest the following pervasive
pattern of behaviors: a sense of entitlement as she expected favorable
treatment and automatic compliance to her wishes, being interpersonally
exploitative as on several occasions she took advantage of him to achieve her
own ends, lack of empathy as she was unwilling to recognize her partners [sic]
feelings and needs[,] taking into consideration her own feelings and needs only,
her haughty and arrogant behavior and attitude and her proneness to blame
others for her failures and shortcomings. These patterns of behavior speaks [sic]
of a Narcissistic Personality Disorder, which started to manifest in early
adulthood. The disorder is considered to be grave and incurable based on the
fact that individuals do not recognize the symptoms as it is ego syntonic and
they feel there is nothing wrong in them. Because of that[,] they remain
unmotivated for treatment and impervious to recovery.[6]
She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her psychological
evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresitas eldest son). She
admitted, though, that she did not personally observe and examine Teresita;
she sent Teresita a personally-delivered notice for the conduct of a psychiatric
evaluation, but the notice remained unanswered.
In opposing the petition for annulment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contended that there was no basis to declare Teresita psychologically
incapacitated. It asserted that the psychological evaluation conducted on
Ricardo (and his son Richardson) only revealed a vague and general conclusion
on these parties personality traits but not on Teresitas psychological makeup.
The OSG also argued that the evidence adduced did not clinically identify and
sufficiently prove the medical cause of the alleged psychological
incapacity. Neither did the evidence indicate that the alleged psychological
incapacity existed prior to or at the time of marriage, nor that the incapacity
was grave and incurable.
The RTC agreed with Ricardo, and annulled his marriage to Teresita. In short, the
RTC believed Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation and testimony and, on the
totality of Ricardos evidence, found Teresita to be psychologically incapacitated
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. The OSG appealed the decision
to the CA.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and held that the trial courts findings did not
satisfy the rules and guidelines set by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina.[7] The RTC failed to specifically point out the root illness or defect
that caused Teresitas psychological incapacity, and likewise failed to show that
the incapacity already existed at the time of celebration of marriage.

The CA found that the conclusions from Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation
do not appear to have been drawn from well-rounded and fair sources, and
dwelt mostly on hearsay statements and rumors. Likewise, the CA found that
Ricardos allegations on Teresitas overspending and infidelity do not constitute
adequate grounds for declaring the marriage null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code. These allegations, even if true, could only effectively serve as
grounds for legal separation or a criminal charge for adultery.
THE PETITION AND THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS
Ricardo faults the CA for disregarding the factual findings of the trial court,
particularly the expert testimony of Dr. Albaran, and submits that the trial court
in declaring the nullity of the marriage fully complied with Molina.
In its Comment,[8] the OSG argued that the CA correctly reversed the RTCs
decision, particularly in its conclusion that Ricardo failed to comply with this
Courts guidelines for the proper interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code. Reiterating its earlier arguments below, the OSG asserts that
the evidence adduced before the trial court failed to show the gravity, juridical
antecedence, or incurability of the psychological incapacity of Teresita, and
failed as well to identify and discuss its root cause. The psychiatrist, likewise,
failed to show that Teresita was completely unable to discharge her marital
obligations due to her alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
Ricardos Reply[9] reiterated that the RTC decision thoroughly discussed the root
cause of Teresitas psychological incapacity and identified it as Narcissistic
Personality Disorder.He claimed that sufficient proof had been adduced by the
psychiatrist whose expertise on the subject cannot be doubted. Interestingly,
Ricardo further argued that alleging the root cause in a petition for annulment
under Article 36 of the Family Code is no longer necessary, citing Barcelona v.
Court of Appeals.[10]
These positions were collated and reiterated in the memoranda the parties
filed.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition unmeritorious, as the CA committed no reversible error
when it set aside the RTCs decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
In the leading case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[11] we held that
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability, to be
sufficient basis to annul a marriage. The psychological incapacity should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage.[12]
We further expounded on Article 36 of the Family Code in Molina and laid down
definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of this article. These
guidelines incorporate the basic requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability established in the Santos case, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not
to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration"
of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the
parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such
moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard
to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.[13]
Subsequent jurisprudence on psychological incapacity applied these basic
guidelines to varying factual situations, thus confirming the continuing doctrinal
validity of Santos. In so far as the present factual situation is concerned, what
should not be lost in reading and applying our established rulings is the intent of
the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most
serious cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in the
utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning and
significance to the marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the
psychological illness and its root cause must have been there from the inception
of the marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of
the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes
that there never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction
already then existing was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted
party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he
or she was to assume or had assumed.[14]
In the present case and guided by these standards, we find the totality of the
petitioners evidence to be insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically
incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. As already mentioned, the
evidence presented consisted of the testimonies of Ricardo and Dr. Albaran, and
the latters psychological evaluation of Ricardo and Richardson from where she
derived a psychological evaluation of Teresita.
a. Dr. Albarans psychological evaluation and testimony
Dr. Albaran concluded in her psychological evaluation that Teresita suffers from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated
to assume essential marital obligations. To support her findings and conclusion,
she banked on the statements told to her by Ricardo and Richardson, which she
narrated in her evaluation. Apparently relying on the same basis, Dr. Albaran
added that Teresitas disorder manifested during her early adulthood and is
grave and incurable.
To say the least, we are greatly disturbed by the kind of testimony and
evaluation that, in this case, became the basis for the conclusion that no
marriage really took place because of the psychological incapacity of one of the
parties at the time of marriage.
We are in no way convinced that a mere narration of the statements of Ricardo
and Richardson, coupled with the results of the psychological tests administered
only on Ricardo, without more, already constitutes sufficient basis for the
conclusion that Teresita suffered from Narcissistic Personality Disorder. This
Court has long been negatively critical in considering psychological evaluations,
presented in evidence, derived solely from one-sided sources, particularly from
the spouse seeking the nullity of the marriage.
In So v. Valera,[15] the Court considered the psychologists testimony and
conclusions to be insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the
finding of respondents psychological incapacity because the facts, on which the
conclusions were based, were all derived from the petitioners statements
whose bias in favor of his cause cannot be discounted. In another case, Padilla-
Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,[16] the Court declared that while the various tests
administered on the petitioner-wife could have been used as a fair gauge to
assess her own psychological condition, this same statement could not be made
with respect to the respondent-husbands psychological condition. To our mind,
conclusions and generalizations about Teresitas psychological condition,
based solely on information fed by Ricardo, are not any different in kind from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.[17]
To be sure, we have recognized that the law does not require that the allegedly
incapacitated spouse be personally examined by a physician or by a psychologist
as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.[18] This recognition, however, does not signify that
the evidence, we shall favorably appreciate, should be any less than the
evidence that an Article 36 case, by its nature, requires.

Our recognition simply means that the requirements for nullity outlined
in Santos and Molina need not necessarily come from the allegedly
incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still essential although from sources
other than the respondent spouse to show his or her personality profile, or its
approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause of the inability to
appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence
and incurability of the condition.
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from persons intimately
related to them, such as relatives, close friends or even family doctors or
lawyers who could testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouses condition at or
about the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that trace their
roots to the incapacity already present at the time of marriage.
In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever
asked to give statements for purposes of Teresitas psychological evaluation was
Richardson, the spouses eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a
witness in an Article 36 case because he could not have been there when the
spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was
happening between his parents until long after his birth.
We confirm the validity of this observation from a reading of the summary of
Richardsons interview with the pyschologist: Richardsons statement occupied a
mere one paragraph (comprising eleven sentences) in the psychological
evaluation and merely recited isolated instances of his parents fighting over the
foreclosure of their house, his fathers alleged womanizing, and their differences
in religion (Ricardo is a Catholic, while Teresita is a Mormon).[19]
We find nothing unusual in these recited marital incidents to indicate that
Teresita suffered from some psychological disorder as far back as the time of
her marriage to Ricardo, nor do we find these fights to be indicative of problems
traceable to any basic psychological disorder existing at the time of
marriage. For one, these points of dispute are not uncommon in a marriage and
relate essentially to the usual roots of marital problems finances, fidelity and
religion. The psychologist, too, never delved into the relationship between
mother and son except to observe their estranged relationship due to a
previous argument a money problem involving Ricardos financial remittances to
the family. To state the obvious, the psychologists evaluation never explained
how the recited incidents, made by one who was not even born at the time of
the spouses marriage, showed a debilitating psychological incapacity already
existing at that time.
Of more serious consequence, fatal to Ricardos cause, is the failure of Dr.
Albarans psychological evaluation to fully explain the details i.e., the what, how,
when, where and since when of Teresitas alleged Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. It seems to us that, with hardly any supporting evidence to fall back
on, Dr. Albaran simply stated out of the blue that Teresitas personality disorder
manifested itself in early adulthood, presuming thereby that the incapacity
should have been there when the marriage was celebrated. Dr. Albaran never
explained, too, the incapacitating nature of Teresitas alleged personality
disorder, and how it related to the essential marital obligations that she failed
to assume. Neither did the good doctor adequately explain in her psychological
evaluation how grave and incurable was Teresitas psychological disorder.
Dr. Albarans testimony at the trial did not improve the evidentiary situation for
Ricardo, as it still failed to provide the required insights that would have
remedied the evidentiary gaps in her written psychological evaluation. In fact,
Dr. Albarans cross-examination only made the evidentiary situation worse when
she admitted that she had difficulty pinpointing the root cause of Teresitas
personality disorder, due to the limited information she gathered from Ricardo
and Richardson regarding Teresitas personal and family history. To directly
quote from the records, Dr. Albaran confessed this limitation when she said
that [t]he only data that I have is that, the respondent seem [sic] to have grown
from a tumultuous family and this could be perhaps the [sic] contributory to the
development of the personality disorder.[20] Dr. Albarans obvious uncertainty in
her assessment only proves our point that a complete personality profile of the
spouse, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, could not be determined
from meager information coming only from a biased source.
b. Ricardos testimony
Ricardo testified in court that Teresita was a squanderer and an adulteress. We
do not, however, find Ricardos characterizations of his wife sufficient to
constitute psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Article
36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume basic marital obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is
different from incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or
illness.[21]
Ricardos testimony merely established that Teresita was irresponsible in
managing the familys finances by not paying their rent, utility bills and other
financial obligations. Teresitas spendthrift attitude, according to Ricardo, even
resulted in the loss of the house and lot intended to be their family
residence. This kind of irresponsibility, however, does not rise to the level of a
psychological incapacity required under Article 36 of the Family Code. At most,
Teresitas mismanagement of the familys finances merely constituted difficulty,
refusal or neglect, during the marriage, in the handling of funds intended for the
familys financial support.
Teresitas alleged infidelity, even if true, likewise does not constitute
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In order for sexual
infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondents
unfaithfulness must be established as a manifestation of a disordered
personality, completely preventing the respondent from discharging the
essential obligations of the marital state;[22] there must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor that effectively incapacitated her from complying
with the obligation to be faithful to her spouse.[23]
In our view, Ricardo utterly failed in his testimony to prove that Teresita
suffered from a disordered personality of this kind. Even Ricardos added
testimony, relating to rumors of Teresitas dates with other men and her
pregnancy by another man, would not fill in the deficiencies we have observed,
given the absence of an adverse integral element and link to Teresitas allegedly
disordered personality.
Moreover, Ricardo failed to prove that Teresitas alleged character traits already
existed at the inception of their marriage. Article 36 of the Family Code requires
that the psychological incapacity must exist at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.[24] In the absence of this element, a marriage cannot be annulled
under Article 36.
Root cause of the psychological incapacity needs to be alleged in a petition for
annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code
Citing Barcelona,[25] Ricardo defended the RTC decision, alleging that the root
cause in a petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code is no
longer necessary. We find this argument completely at variance with Ricardos
main argument against the assailed CA decision i.e., that the RTC, in its decision,
discussed thoroughly the root cause of Teresitas psychological incapacity as
Narcissistic Personality Disorder. These conflicting positions, notwithstanding,
we see the need to address this issue to further clarify our statement
in Barcelona, which Ricardo misquoted and misinterpreted to support his
present petition that since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege
expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no
need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity.[26]
 incapacity. The Court further held that the Rules, being procedural in nature,
apply only to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption.
In Barcelona, the petitioner assailed the bid for annulment for its failure to state
the root cause of the respondents alleged psychological incapacity. The Court
resolved this issue, ruling that the petition sufficiently stated a cause of action
because the petitioner instead of stating a specific root cause clearly described To sum up, Ricardo failed to discharge the burden of proof to show that Teresita
suffered from psychological incapacity; thus, his petition for annulment of
the physical manifestations indicative of the psychological incapacity. This, the
Court found to be sufficiently compliant with the first requirement in the Molina marriage must fail. Ricardo merely established that Teresita had been remiss in
case that the root cause of the psychological incapacity be alleged in an Article her duties as a wife for being irresponsible in taking care of their familys
finances a fault or deficiency that does not amount to the psychological
36 petition.
incapacity that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. We reiterate that
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity
and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
Thus, contrary to Ricardos position, Barcelona does not do away with the root psychological incapacity, as the same may only be due to a persons difficulty,
cause requirement. The ruling simply means that the statement of the root refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in
cause does not need to be in medical terms or be technical in nature, as the
some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.[28]
root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science. It is
enough to merely allege the physical manifestations constituting the root cause
of the psychological incapacity. Section 2, paragraph (d) of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71882. Costs against the
Marriages (Rules)[27] in fact provides:
petitioner.
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

xxxx
SO ORDERED.
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specially
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were
psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital
obligations of marriages at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

As we explained in Barcelona, the requirement alleging the root cause in a

petition for annulment under Article 36 of the Family Code was not dispensed
with by the adoption of the Rules. What the Rules really eliminated was the
need for an expert opinion to prove the root cause of the psychological
ROSALINO L. MARABLE v MYRNA F. MARABLE
G.R. No. 178741
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated February 12, 2007 and Resolution[2] dated July
4, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 which reversed
and set aside the Decision[3] dated January 4, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 72, Antipolo City, in Civil Case No. 01-6302. The RTC had granted
petitioners prayer that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void on
the ground that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner and respondent met in 1967 while studying at Arellano
University. They were classmates but initially, petitioner was not interested in
respondent. He only became attracted to her after they happened to sit beside
each other in a passenger bus. Petitioner courted respondent and they
eventually became sweethearts even though petitioner already had a girl
friend. Later, respondent discovered petitioners other relationship and
demanded more time and attention from petitioner. Petitioner alleged that he
appreciated this gesture like a child longing for love, time and attention.
On December 19, 1970, petitioner and respondent eloped and were married in
civil rites at Tanay, Rizal before Mayor Antonio C. Esguerra. A church wedding
followed on December 30, 1970 at the Chapel of the Muntinlupa Bilibid Prison
and their marriage was blessed with five children.
As the years went by, however, their marriage turned sour. Verbal and physical
quarrels became common occurrences. They fought incessantly and petitioner
became unhappy because of it. The frequency of their quarrels increased when
their eldest daughter transferred from one school to another due to juvenile
misconduct. It became worse still when their daughter had an unwanted
teenage pregnancy. The exceedingly serious attention petitioner gave to his
children also made things worse for them as it not only spoiled some of them,
but it also became another cause for the incessant quarrelling between him and
respondent.
Longing for peace, love and affection, petitioner developed a relationship with
another woman. Respondent learned about the affair, and petitioner promptly
terminated it.But despite the end of the short-lived affair, their quarrels
aggravated. Also, their business ventures failed. Any amount of respect
remaining between them was further eroded by their frequent arguments and
verbal abuses infront of their friends. Petitioner felt that he was unloved,
unwanted and unappreciated and this made him indifferent towards
respondent. When he could not bear his lot any longer, petitioner left the family
home and stayed with his sister in Antipolo City. He gave up all the properties
which he and respondent had accumulated during their marriage in favor of
respondent and their children. Later, he converted to Islam after dating several
women.
On October 8, 2001, petitioner decided to sever his marital bonds. On said date,
he filed a petition[4] for declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent on
the ground of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
responsibilities of marital life.
In his petition, petitioner averred that he came from a poor family and was
already exposed to the hardships of farm life at an early age. His father,
although responsible and supportive, was a compulsive gambler and
womanizer. His father left their family to live with another woman with whom
he had seven other children. This caused petitioners mother and siblings to
suffer immensely. Thus, petitioner became obsessed with attention and worked
hard to excel so he would be noticed.
Petitioner further alleged that he supported himself through college and worked
hard for the company he joined. He rose from the ranks at Advertising and
Marketing Associates, Inc., and became Senior Executive Vice President and
Chief Finance Officer therein. But despite his success at work, he alleged that his
misery and loneliness as a child lingered as he experienced a void in his
relationship with his own family.
In support of his petition, petitioner presented the Psychological Report[5] of Dr.
Nedy L. Tayag, a clinical psychologist from the National Center for Mental
Health. Dr. Tayags report stated that petitioner is suffering from Antisocial
Personality Disorder, characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy,
rebelliousness, impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness and lack of
remorse. The report also revealed that petitioners personality disorder is rooted
in deep feelings of rejection starting from the family to peers, and that his
experiences have made him so self-absorbed for needed attention. It was Dr.
Tayags conclusion that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision annulling petitioners marriage to
respondent on the ground of petitioners psychological incapacity.
Upon appeal by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the CA reversed the
RTC decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed
Decision hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the marriage between
the parties is declared valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The CA held that the circumstances related by petitioner are insufficient to
establish the existence of petitioners psychological incapacity. The CA noted
that Dr. Tayag did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder nor did she
give a concrete explanation as to how she arrived at a conclusion as to its
gravity or permanence. The appellate court emphasized that the root cause of
petitioners psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision.In addition,
the incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It
must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the petitioner to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this appeal.
Essentially, petitioner raises the sole issue of whether the CA erred in reversing
the trial courts decision.
Petitioner claims that his psychological incapacity to perform his essential
marital obligations was clearly proven and correctly appreciated by the trial
court. Petitioner relies heavily on the psychological evaluation conducted by Dr.
Tayag and quotes the latters findings:
Petitioner had always been hungry for love and affection starting from his family
to the present affairs that he [has]. This need had afforded him to find avenues
straight or not, just to fulfill this need. He used charm, deceit, lies, violence,
[and] authority just so to accom[m]odate and justify his acts. Finally, he is using
religions to support his claim for a much better personal and married life which
is really out of context. Rebellious and impulsive as he is, emotional instability is
apparent that it would be difficult for him to harmonize with life in general and
changes. Changes must come from within, it is not purely external.
Clinically, petitioners self-absorbed ideals represent the grave, severe, and
incurable nature of Antisocial Personality Disorder. Such disorder is
characterized by a pervasive pattern of social deviancy, rebelliousness,
impulsivity, self-centeredness, deceitfulness, and lack of remorse.
The psychological incapacity of the petitioner is attributed by jurisdictional
antecedence as it existed even before the said marital union. It is also
profoundly rooted, grave and incurable.The root cause of which is deep feelings
of rejection starting from family to peers. This insecure feelings had made him
so self-absorbed for needed attention. Carrying it until his marital life.Said
psychological incapacity had deeply marred his adjustment and severed the
relationship. Thus, said marriage should be declared null and void by reason of
the psychological incapacity.[7]
According to petitioner, the uncontradicted psychological report of Dr. Tayag
declared that his psychological incapacity is profoundly rooted and has the
characteristics of juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability. Moreover,
petitioner asserts that his psychological incapacity has been medically identified
and sufficiently proven. The State, on the other hand, never presented another
psychologist to rebut Dr. Tayags findings. Also, petitioner maintains that the
psychological evaluation would show that the marriage failed not solely because
of irreconcilable differences between the spouses, but due to petitioners
personality disorder which rendered him unable to comply with his marital
obligations. To the mind of petitioner, the assailed decision compelled the
parties to continue to live under a non-existent marriage.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a Comment[8] maintaining that petitioner
failed to prove his psychological incapacity. The OSG points out that Dr. Tayag
failed to explain specifically how she arrived at the conclusion that petitioner
suffers from an anti-social personality disorder and that it is grave and
incurable. In fact, contrary to his claim, it even appears that petitioner acted
responsibly throughout their marriage. Despite financial difficulties, he and
respondent had blissful moments together. He was a good father and provider
to his children. Thus, the OSG argues that there was no reason to describe
petitioner as a self-centered, remorseless, rebellious, impulsive and socially
deviant person.
Additionally, the OSG contends that since the burden of proof is on petitioner to
establish his psychological incapacity, the State is not required to present an
expert witness where the testimony of petitioners psychologist was insufficient
and inconclusive. The OSG adds that petitioner was not able to substantiate his
claim that his infidelity was due to some psychological disorder, as the real
cause of petitioners alleged incapacity appears to be his general dissatisfaction
with his marriage. At most he was able to prove infidelity on his part and the
existence of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities. These,
however, do not constitute psychological incapacity.
Respondent also filed her Comment[9] and Memorandum[10] stressing that
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage should
contemplate downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the essential marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
The appeal has no merit.
The appellate court did not err when it reversed and set aside the findings of
the RTC for lack of legal and factual bases.
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration,
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.[11] These are the
disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to
give meaning and significance to the marriage he or she has
contracted.[12] Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage.[13]
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,[14] the Court laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36. The Court held,
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration
of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent
or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party
to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up
to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition,
as the case may be, to the petition.
In the instant case, petitioner completely relied on the psychological
examination conducted by Dr. Tayag on him to establish his psychological
incapacity. The result of the examination and the findings of Dr. Tayag however,
are insufficient to establish petitioner's psychological incapacity. In cases of
annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, the
psychological illness and its root cause must be proven to exist from the
inception of the marriage. Here, the appellate court correctly ruled that the
report of Dr. Tayag failed to explain the root cause of petitioners alleged
psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag merely made a general
conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder
but there was no factual basis stated for the finding that petitioner is a socially
deviant person, rebellious, impulsive, self-centered and deceitful.
As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo,[15] the presentation of expert proof in
cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity
presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and
incurable presence of psychological incapacity. Here, the evaluation of Dr. Tayag
falls short of the required proof which the Court can rely on as basis to declare
as void petitioners marriage to respondent. In fact, we are baffled by Dr. Tayags
evaluation which became the trial courts basis for concluding that petitioner
was psychologically incapacitated, for the report did not clearly specify the
actions of petitioner which are indicative of his alleged psychological incapacity.
More importantly, there was no established link between petitioners acts to his
alleged psychological incapacity. It is indispensable that the evidence must show
a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.[16]
For sure, the spouses frequent marital squabbles[17] and differences in handling
finances and managing their business affairs, as well as their conflicts on how to
raise their children, are not manifestations of psychological incapacity which
may be a ground for declaring their marriage void. Petitioner even admitted
that despite their financial difficulties, they had happy moments together. Also,
the records would show that the petitioner acted responsibly during their
marriage and in fact worked hard to provide for the needs of his family, most
especially his children. Their personal differences do not reflect a personality
disorder tantamount to psychological incapacity.
Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer
for a father, was one of the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs
during his marriage. However, it appears more likely that he became unfaithful
as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a
psychological disorder rooted in his personal history.His tendency to womanize,
assuming he had such tendency, was not shown to be due to causes of a
psychological nature that is grave, permanent and incurable. In fact, the records
show that when respondent learned of his affair, he immediately terminated
it. In short, petitioners marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a
grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his
spousal obligations. It has been held in various cases that sexual infidelity, by
itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological
incapacity.[18] It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make
petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
marriage.[19] That not being the case with petitioner, his claim of psychological
incapacity must fail. It bears stressing that psychological incapacity must be
more than just a difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital
obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the intention of the
law is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[21]
All told, we find that the CA did not err in declaring the marriage of petitioner
and respondent as valid and subsisting. The totality of the evidence presented is
insufficient to establish petitioners psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential
marital obligations.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The February 12, 2007
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86111 and its Resolution
dated July 4, 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA v BONA J. ALANO and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 167459
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision[1] dated October 11, 2004 as well as the
Resolution[2]dated March 10, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
65120, which reversed and set aside the Decision[3] dated January 11, 1999 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 140 in Civil Case No. 97-2903. In
the said January 11, 1999 Decision, the trial court granted petitioner Jose
Reynaldo Ochosas (Jose) petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage
between him and private respondent Bona J. Alano (Bona).
The relevant facts of this case, as outlined by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant
in the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college drop-out.
They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual intimacy and
eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S.
Principe in Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they
incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976, however, they
found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby girl whom they later
registered as their daughter, naming her Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts of the Philippine
archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not cohabit with him in his posts,
preferring to stay in her hometown of Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his
areas of assignment, except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for
four (4) days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion Commander of the
Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with Ramona, were given living
quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City where they resided with their military
aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged participation in the
failed coup detat. He was incarcerated in Camp Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset of their
marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the country, she had illicit
relations with other men. Bona apparently did not change her ways when they
lived together at Fort Bonifacio; she entertained male visitors in her bedroom
whenever Jose was out of their living quarters. On one occasion, Bona was
caught by Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with Joses driver,
Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of Bonas sexual infidelity circulated in the military
community. When Jose could no longer bear these rumors, he got a military
pass from his jail warden and confronted Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with Corporal
Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose drove Bona away from
their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona and went to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose who is currently
supporting the needs of Ramona.

Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, docketed as Civil Case
No. 97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 140, seeking to nullify his
marriage to Bona on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity to fulfill
the essential obligations of marriage.
Summons with a copy of the petition and its annexes were duly served upon
Bona who failed to file any responsive pleading during the reglementary period.
Pursuant to the order of the trial court, the Public Prosecutor conducted an
investigation to determine whether there was collusion between the parties.
Said prosecutor submitted a report that she issued a subpoena to both parties
but only Jose appeared; hence, it can not be reasonably determined whether or
not there was collusion between them.
Trial on the merits of the case ensued. Petitioner along with his two military
aides, Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal and Demetrio Bajet y Lita, testified about
respondents marital infidelity during the marriage.
The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a psychiatrist, who
testified that after conducting several tests, she reached the conclusion that
respondent was suffering from histrionic personality disorder which she
described as follows:
Her personality is that she has an excessive emotion and attention seeking
behavior. So therefore they dont develop sympathy in feelings and they have
difficulty in maintaining emotional intimacy. In the case of Mr. Ochosa he has
been a military man. It is his duty to be transferred in different areas in the
Philippines. And while he is being transferred from one place to another
because of his assignments as a military man, Mrs. Bona Alano refused to follow
him in all his assignments. There were only few occasions in which she followed
him. And during those times that they were not living together, because of the
assignments of Mr. Ochosa she developed extra marital affair with other man of
which she denied in the beginning but in the latter part of their relationship she
admitted it to Mr. Ochosa that she had relationship with respondents driver. I
believe with this extra marital affair that is her way of seeking attention and
seeking emotions from other person and not from the husband. And of course,
this is not fulfilling the basic responsibility in a marriage.
According to Rondain, respondents psychological disorder was traceable to her
family history, having for a father a gambler and a womanizer and a mother who
was a battered wife. There was no possibility of a cure since respondent does
not have an insight of what is happening to her and refused to acknowledge the
reality.
With the conclusion of the witnesses testimonies, petitioner formally offered his
evidence and rested his case.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its opposition to the petition
on the ground that the factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at
all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage
(Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 [1995]).
In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court granted the petition and
nullified the parties marriage on the following findings, viz:
xxxx
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides as follows:

A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
Such a ground to be invalidative (sic) of marriage, the degree of incapacity must
exhibit GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that the psychological incapacity
of the respondent exhibited GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
It is grave because the respondent did not carry out the normal and ordinary
duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under
everyday circumstances of life and work. The gravity was manifested in
respondents infidelity as testified to by the petitioner and his witnesses.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent could be traced back to
respondents history as testified to by the expert witness when she said that
respondents bad experience during her childhood resulted in her difficulty in
achieving emotional intimacy, hence, her continuous illicit relations with several
men before and during the marriage.
Considering that persons suffering from this kind of personality disorder have
no insight of their condition, they will not submit to treatment at all. As in the
case at bar, respondents psychological incapacity clinically identified as
Histrionic Personality Disorder will remain incurable.[4] (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial court Decision dated January 11, 1999
read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING
the marriage of JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA and BONA J. ALANO on October 27,
1973 at Basilan City VOID AB INITIO on ground of psychological incapacity of the
respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code as amended with all the effects
and consequences provided for by all applicable provisions of existing pertinent
laws.
After this Decision becomes final, let copies thereof be sent to the Local Civil
Registrar of Basilan City who is directed to cancel the said marriage from its Civil
Registry, and the Local Civil Registrar of Makati City for its information and
guidance.[5]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the said ruling to the Court of
Appeals which sided with the OSGs contention that the trial court erred in
granting the petition despite Joses abject failure to discharge the burden of
proving the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Bona, to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the trial court Decision in its
assailed Decision dated October 11, 2004, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, the appealed Decision dated 11 January
1999 in Civil Case No. 97-2903 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 140, is accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is entered
DISMISSING the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.[6]

Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was denied by the Court of
Appeals for lack of merit in its assailed Resolution dated March 10, 2005.
Hence, this Petition.
The only issue before this Court is whether or not Bona should be deemed
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
The petition is without merit.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which Jose filed in the trial
court hinges on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] we observed that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must
be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.
Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of psychological
incapacity as mandated in Santos, we laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina[8] the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees
marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince
the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.
Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was
existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached
at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only
in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild
characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outburst
cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Article
68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken
by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of
Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature.
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize
our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to
achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what
is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the
Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given
persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other shall walk together in synodal cadence
towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed
down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in
the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition,
as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the
prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[9] (Citations omitted.)
In Marcos v. Marcos,[10] we previously held that the foregoing guidelines do not
require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may
be medically or clinically identified. What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition.For,
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
It is also established in jurisprudence that from these requirements arise the
concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it
simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place because
the affliction already then existing was so grave and permanent as to deprive
the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed.[11]
A little over a decade since the promulgation of the Molina guidelines, we made
a critical assessment of the same in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,[12] to wit:
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set
of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity.
Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGs exaggeration of
Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world. The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live
with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly,
which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families,
our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the
Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be
bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina,
has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists
and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the personality
disorders of the said individuals.[13]
However, our critique did not mean that we had declared an abandonment of
the Molina doctrine. On the contrary, we simply declared and, thus, clarified in
the same Tecase that there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36. Furthermore, we reiterated in the same case the principle that each
case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own facts.And, to repeat for emphasis,
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines,
and by decisions of church tribunals.[14]
In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage on the basis of Dr. Elizabeth Rondains testimony[15] and her
psychiatric evaluation report[16] as well as the individual testimonies of
Jose[17] and his military aides - Mrs. Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal[18] and
Corporal Demetrio Bajet.[19]
We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of the evidence presented
in this case, that Bona had been, on several occasions with several other men,
sexually disloyal to her spouse, Jose. Likewise, we are persuaded that Bona had
indeed abandoned Jose. However, we cannot apply the same conviction to
Joses thesis that the totality of Bonas acts constituted psychological incapacity
as determined by Article 36 of the Family Code. There is inadequate credible
evidence that her defects were already present at the inception of, or prior to,
the marriage. In other words, her alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy
the jurisprudential requisite of juridical antecedence.
With regard to Bonas sexual promiscuity prior to her marriage to Jose, we have
only the uncorroborated testimony of Jose made in open court to support this
allegation. To quote the pertinent portion of the transcript:
Q: So, what was the reason why you have broken with your wife after several
years -
A: Well, I finally broke up with my wife because I can no longer bear the torture
because of the gossips that she had an affair with other men, and finally, when I
have a chance to confront her she admitted that she had an affair with other
men.
Q: With other men. And, of course this her life with other men of course before
the marriage you have already known
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: So, that this gossips because you said that you thought that this affair would
go to end after your marriage?
A: Yes, I was thinking about that.
Q: So, that after several years she will not change so thats why you cant bear it
anymore?
A: Yes, maam.[20]
Dr. Rondains testimony and psychiatric evaluation report do not provide
evidentiary support to cure the doubtful veracity of Joses one-sided
assertion. Even if we take into account the psychiatrists conclusion that Bona
harbors a Histrionic Personality Disorder that existed prior to her marriage with
Jose and this mental condition purportedly made her helplessly prone to
promiscuity and sexual infidelity, the same cannot be taken as credible proof of
antecedence since the method by which such an inference was reached leaves
much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in
determining psychological incapacity.
The psychiatrists findings on Bonas personality profile did not emanate from a
personal interview with the subject herself as admitted by Dr. Rondain in court,
as follows:
Q: How about, you mentioned that the petitioner came for psychological test,
how about the respondent, did she come for interview and test?
A: No, maam.
Q: Did you try to take her for such?
A: Yes, maam.

A: I also interviewed (sic) the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies

of other witnesses, maam.
Q: And what did she tell you, did she come for an interview?

xxxx
A: There was no response, maam.[21]

Q: Was there also a psychological test conducted on the respondent?

As a consequence thereof, Dr. Rondain merely relied on her interview with Jose
and his witness, Mrs. Padernal, as well as the court record of the testimonies of A: Yes, your honor.
other witnesses, to wit:

Q: It was on the basis of the psychological test in which you based your
Q: And you said you did interviews. Who did the interview? evaluation report?

A: I interviewed Mr. Ochosa and their witness Padernal, maam. A: It was based on the psychological test conducted and clinical interview with
the other witnesses, your Honor.[22]

Q: When you say Padernal are you referring to Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal
who testified in this court?

Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated Bonas psychological condition indirectly from the
information gathered solely from Jose and his witnesses. This factual
A: Yes, maam. circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist
is tainted with bias for Joses cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration.

xxxx
Even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the testimonies at issue since the
trial court judge had found them to be credible enough after personally
Q: Other than the interviews what else did you do in order to evaluate members witnessing Jose and the witnesses testify in court, we cannot lower the
of the parties? evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on Bonas pre-marital history
which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in this case because we have only
the word of Jose to rely on. In fact, Bonas dysfunctional family portrait which we need only to look at the testimonial records of Jose and his witnesses to be
brought about her Histrionic Personality Disorder as painted by Dr. Rondain was convinced otherwise, to wit:
based solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of Jose, the spouse who has
the most to gain if his wife is found to be indeed psychologically
incapacitated. No other witness testified to Bonas family history or her behavior JOSE OCHOSAS TESTIMONY:
prior to or at the beginning of the marriage. Both Mrs. Padernal and Corporal
Bajet came to know Bona only during their employment in petitioners
household during the marriage. It is undisputed that Jose and Bona were
married in 1973 while Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet started to live with
petitioners family only in 1980 and 1986, respectively. Q: How long did you stay with your wife?

We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and stringent level of A: We were married in 1973 and we separated in 1988 but in all those years
evidentiary scrutiny to cases like this, we do not suggest that a personal there were only few occasions that we were staying together because most of
examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is the time Im in the field.
mandatory; jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a
mandatory requirement. While such examination is desirable, we recognize that
it may not be practical in all instances given the oftentimes estranged relations
Q: Now, you said most of the time you were in the field, did you not your wife
between the parties. For a determination though of a partys complete
come with you in any of your assignments?
personality profile, information coming from persons with personal knowledge
of the juridical antecedents may be helpful. This is an approach in the
application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time that it avoids, if
not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion A: Never, but sometimes she really visited me and stayed for one (1) day and
based entirely on doubtful sources of information.[23] then

However, we have also ruled in past decisions that to make conclusions and Q: And, where did your wife stayed when she leaves you?
generalizations on a spouses psychological condition based on the information
fed by only one side, similar to what we have pointed out in the case at bar, is,
to the Courts mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of A: She was staying with her mother in Basilan.
the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.[24]

Q: Where were you assigned most of the time?

Anent the accusation that, even at the inception of their marriage, Bona did not
wish to be with Jose as a further manifestation of her psychological incapacity,

A: I was assigned in Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Basilan.

 Q: And you said that you have known the petitioner and the respondent in this
case because in fact, you lived with them together in the same quarters. Does
Q: And, of course she would come to your place every now and then because it the quarters have different rooms?
is not very far

A: Yes, maam.
A: No, maam, once in a while only.

Q: But very near each other?

Q: Did you not go home to your conjugal home?

A: Yes, maam.
A: I have a chanced also to go home because we were allowed to at least three
(3) days every other month.

Q: You know them because of the proximity of the quarters?

Q: So, if you start from the marriage up to 1988 so that is 16 years you were
supposed to have been living together?
A: Yes, maam.

A: No, actually in 19 middle of 1987 because in 1987 I was in x x x.[25]

Q: It was only during this 1980 to 1983, three (3) years that you lived together
that you have a chance to be with the spouses?

GERTRUDES PADERNALS TESTIMONY: xxxx

A: Since 1980 to 1983 we lived together in the same house.

Q: Now, do you know when they lived together as husband and wife?

xxxx

A: 1979.
Q: Now, Madam Witness, after 1983, where did you reside together with your
husband?
A: Fort Bonifacio, maam.

A: In Cagayan de Oro and in 1986 we came back to Manila, in Fort Bonifacio.

Q: What about the wife, where does she stay?

Q: You mean, in the same house where petitioner and the respondent lived
together? A: At Fort Bonifacio, in their house.[26]

A: Yes. Maam.
DR. ELIZABETH E. RONDAINS TESTIMONY:

Q: How long did you live in the house where the petitioner and the respondent
stay?

Q: Now, they got married in 1973, am I correct?

A: Twelve years now since 1983 to 1995.

A: Yes, maam.
Q: Where was the petitioner working at that time, from 1982 to 1995?

Q: But the matter of the work or assignment of the petitioner, he was assigned
A: He is a soldier, a Colonel. in different Provinces or Barangays in the Philippines?

Q: Do you know where he was assigned during this time? A: Yes, maam.

A: Yes, maam, G-3. Q: Now, when the wife or the respondent in this case did not go with the
husband in different places of his assignment did you ask her why what was the
reason why she did not like to go those places?

Q: May we know where this G-3 is?

A: She just did not want to. The wife did not go with him because by transferring
from one place to another, she just dont want to go, she just wanted to stay in
Basilan where her hometown is, maam.
Q: Did the petitioner herein tell you why the respondent dont want to go with
him?
A: Yes, I asked, the answer of the petitioner was she simply did not want to go
with him because she did not want him to be appointed to far away places.
Q: And would it be that since she did not like to go with the husband in some far
away different assignments she also assumed that the assignments were in this
war regions they were always fighting considering the place in Basilan they were
in fighting atmosphere?
A: It is possible but he was transferred to Manila and she also refused to stay in
Manila, maam.
Q: When was that that she refused to come to Manila?
A: I think, sometime in 1983, maam. She did not follow immediately. She stayed
with him only for four (4) months, maam.
Q: Now, do you know if the petitioner and the respondent were living together
as husband and wife for this period of time during the relationship?
A: Yes, maam. After their marriage I believe their relationship was good for a
few months until he was transferred to Julu. I believe during that time when
they were together the husband was giving an attention to her. The husband
was always there and when the husband transferred to Basilan, the attention
was not there anymore, maam.[27]
It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that Bona, contrary to Joses
assertion, had no manifest desire to abandon Jose at the beginning of their
marriage and was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their relationship
from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her away from their conjugal home
in 1988. On the contrary, the record shows that it was Jose who was constantly
away from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later incarceration. A
reasonable explanation for Bonas refusal to accompany Jose in his military
assignments in other parts of Mindanao may be simply that those locations
were known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt as to Bonas desire to live
with Jose would later be erased by the fact that Bona lived with Jose in their
conjugal home in Fort Bonifacio during the following decade.
In view of the foregoing, the badges of Bonas alleged psychological
incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only be convincingly
traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception
of the said marriage.
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so
grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital
obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code.[28]
While we are not insensitive to petitioners suffering in view of the truly
appalling and shocking behavior of his wife, still, we are bound by judicial
precedents regarding the evidentiary requirements in psychological incapacity
cases that must be applied to the present case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.