Professional Documents
Culture Documents
To cite this article: Thung-hong Lin, Yi-ling Lin & Wei-lin Tseng (2016) Manufacturing Suicide:
The Politics of a World Factory, Chinese Sociological Review, 48:1, 1-32
a World Factory
Thung-hong Lin, Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
Yi-ling Lin, Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
Wei-lin Tseng, Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
Abstract: This article examines how global value chains (GVCs) have shaped
a world factory regime, based on the case study of the Foxconn group in
Shenzhen, China. We identify three features that characterize a world factory
regime: the GVCs’ impacts, the fragmented structure of corporate governance,
and workplace despotism, and propose a concept of “global fragmented despot-
ism” to explain changing labor conditions, workers’ suicides and resistance
uncovered in Foxconn since 2010.
In May 2010, the Chinese public was shocked by the official media reports
of a series of “jumping suicide incidents” involving migrant workers in the
Foxconn factories in Shenzhen, owned by the Taiwanese business group
Hon-Hai,1 the largest original equipment manufacturer (OEM) in the world
(in terms of employment) and also the major producer of the iPhone and
iPad for Apple. According to the domestic and foreign media, there were
at least twenty-five suicide cases committed in the Foxconn factories
until the end of 2010. Reports of the suicides subsequently triggered more
workers’ suicides and widespread criticism on factory management, as well
as labor rights violations in China.
The jumping incidents stimulated scholarly investigations. However,
there exists a large theoretical gap between microlevel explanation of
workers’ social psychology, and macrolevel discussion on “working class
formation.” In this paper, we fill this void with a mesolevel analysis of
1
2 CHINESE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
factory regime based on the case study of Foxconn. How did the operation
of Foxconn lead worker riots and suicides? In contrast to previous studies
on the “localistic despotism” in Southern China (Lee 1995), we focused
on the interactions among the global value chains (GVCs), factory regimes,
and the responses of workers. We argue that the politics of the world factory
at Foxconn is a missing link between the macrolevel and microlevel theoreti-
cal account for the labor issues in Foxconn.
According to the organizational features of the Foxconn Technology
Group, we term a world factory regime as “global fragmented despotism.”
“Global” means that the regime largely depends on the production cycles
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Foxconn Studies
More broadly, the Foxconn jumping incidents are just the tip of the
iceberg of the increasing number of labor protests throughout China. The
Honda strikes, which also occurred in June 2010, for instance, have been
used as another case to illustrate the labor politics under authoritarianism
(e.g., Chan and Pun 2009; Chan 2010; Chan and Hui 2012; Chan 2012).
Moreover, attention had also been given to the roles of intellectuals
and nongovernmental organizations’ (NGOs’) participation in investigating
the incidents and subsequent labor protests (Cairns and Elfstrom 2014; Hao
2014; He and Huang 2015). These studies show the growing labor movement
and civic engagement in China.
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Whereas prior studies have shed light on the poor labor conditions and
changing resistance of Chinese migrant workers, there obviously exist
analytical gaps between the microlevel psychological account and the
macrolevel process of class formation. In this paper, we propose that a
mesolevel analysis of organization of factory, which we believe is responsible
for the labor conditions, workers’ jumping incidents and other resistance.
More in alignment with the Marxian perspective, we extend Burawoy’s
(1985) analysis of the production regime to dissect the organizational
structure in Foxconn. First, we will review Burawoy’s studies to see how
he defines “manufacturing consent” and “hegemonic despotism.” Second,
we will parse Lee’s and Zhang’s research to see the changes of factory
regimes in China. Finally, we will point out how Foxconn is a hybrid factory
regime that consists of hegemonic and despotic elements, as well as
globalized and fragmented ones. We hope that our analysis will
fill the gap between description on workers’ social psychological
conditions and the narratives on the working class formation under global
capitalism.
the company and created an almost laissez-faire labor market for female
migrant workers. Enforced by the competitive labor market and substituted
by divisions of female workers’ local networks, the arbitrary management
power formed a despotic factory regime in Southern China. Lee further
pointed out that the interaction of gender roles, social networks, and labor
market conditions shaped the “localistic despotism” (Lee 1995, 1998).
Over the past two decades, some small-medium enterprises (SMEs) Lee
studied have grown tremendously to become largest-scaled ones in the
world, which can hardly be explained by the concept of “localistic despot-
ism” she originally developed. In contrast to SMEs, Zhang (2008) analyzed
some large factories in China’s automobile industry and found that, under
the dual-capital structure of a joint venture (i.e., Sino-Japanese) restricted
by state industrial policy, management adopted employment dualism by
using both formal contract workers and permanent workers side-by-side
on production lines, leading to a “hybrid” factory regime that combined
both hegemonic and despotic elements.
Such a concept of hybrid factory regimes may not be sufficient to capture
the key features of industrial organizations like Foxconn. In contrast
to local SMEs in the mid-1990s Shenzhen and the semi-state-owned auto-
mobile industry, the factory regime of Foxconn, owned by foreign private
investors, is much more globalized and fragmented, and has remained
despotic for most employees. Refining the labor process theories, we
conceptualize the specific industrial organization of Foxconn as a “global
fragmented despotism,” to be elaborated below.
Sturgeon 2005), but have largely neglected political contexts, class struggles,
and exploitation in GVCs.
In consumer electronics GVCs, the power relationship is unbalanced
among the global brands, OEMs, and workers, resulting in the brands’
control of technology, uneven distribution of value, sweatshop-style
exploitation, and class struggles. These GVCs are the “buyer-driven” chains,
controlled by the brands, such as Apple, HP, Dell, Nokia, and Google,
rather than the OEM (Yang 2011). The changing demands of brands
typically disarrange the corporate governance and labor processes of world
factories (Lüthje 2004).
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Table 1
Role of the state Laissez-faire Welfare states Retrenchment from Laissez-faire at local Low standard
welfare states level and complicate
multinational,
national and local
regulations
Capitalist development Competitive Monopoly capital Globalization of Competitive Global Value Chains
monopoly capital (globalization at (e.g., Apple &
periphery) Foxconn)
Consent of workers Weak Strong Decline Weak Weak
Type of resistance Shop-floor conflict, Institutionalized, Disorganized Shop-floor conflict, Ethnic conflict,
wildcat strike internal labor (voice and exit) wildcat strike, exit wildcat strike, riot,
(voice) market and suicide, exit, and
collective occasional
bargaining informal
(loyalty) negotiation
Case study Roy’s factories Chicago (Burawoy Burawoy (1985) Shenzhen Shenzhen, 2010–
in Chicago 1979) (Lee 1995) 2014 (our study)
(Burawoy 1979)
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8 CHINESE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
Before moving on to the next section, we would like to illustrate the research
method first. In July 2010, faculties and students from twenty universities in
China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan organized a research group to investigate
the labor abuse at Foxconn (Chan, Pun, and Selden 2013). The three
Taiwanese authors of this paper were involved in this research program.
Despite the general concern of the research group about labor conditions
(Pun and Chan 2012), the authors also used their unique advantage of being
Taiwanese to approach the management at Foxconn and gain an insider’s
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perspective.
From 2010 to 2014, we purposively sampled and interviewed more
than forty workers and managers from high and low levels of the company
hierarchy, including Chinese, Taiwanese, and American citizens, particularly
those who worked at plants located in Shenzhen and Chengdu. Most of
the interviews were conducted during summertime. We interviewed as wide
a range as possible of the Foxconn managerial hierarchy and strove to
balance the gender ratio. All of the interviewees agreed to be interviewed
and consented to the content being anonymously used in academic research,
and at least one-third of them were interviewed more than twice in different
years (Table 2). Through the longitudinal interviews, we followed the
changes in the industrial relationship in their workplace and analyzed the
associations among the global brands, politics of production, and resistance,
and worker suicides.
Table 2
List of Interviewees
(Continued )
10 CHINESE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
Table 2 Continued
No. Sex Position Ranks BGs Nationality Site
stated that Apple handles the core products and only allows Hon Hai to be
the OEM: “We are responsible for only some software and for checking
censors to make sure the delicate buttons are able to work” (Field notes, C3).
To continually receive orders from Apple, Foxconn has to play by
Apple’s rules. For instance, at Foxconn, the workplace security and techno-
logical confidentiality are strictly maintained by the Central Security
Department (CSD). In the Foxconn factory located at Longhua, Shenzhen,
there are three access control systems leading to each entrance gate, and no
data storage devices or camera installations are allowed in the production
plants, among which the Apple’s Bus have the strictest regulations. Sun
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Fragmented Management
notes, C1). A notable case is that a mainland manager, after being promoted
to vice president, was attacked by allied Taiwanese managers and therefore
quit. Seeing the “glass ceiling” effect, local employees were less loyal to their
companies. They stayed only for the higher wages from overtime payment
and would not usually leave unless they received a better offer from another
company, thus employment turnout rates were very high at Foxconn.
Given the fact that high-level management positions were mostly
occupied by Taiwanese expatriates, Foxconn established the CSD, consisted
of mainland employees, to prevent Taiwanese managers from collusion and
corruption, as well as power struggles. Several high-level managers, for
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How did managers and workers in the world factory organize the shop
floor? Foxconn workers were paid a base salary per month, with
increments over time. The rate of remuneration usually was determined
by industrial engineers, many of whom were hired by the brand owners.
Some interviewees (C21 and C22) talked about the tension between indus-
trial engineers and workers, which was similar to that in Roy’s factory
described by Burawoy ([1979] 2005). If the brands’ engineers did not trust
engineers at Foxconn, they would intervene and change the division of
labor on the line to facilitate production, often instigating workers’ strong
resistance.
Whereas mistreatment of line leaders and security guards has received
public attention, direct violence is rarely applied to foremen and forewomen.
CHINESE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 15
Manufacturing Suicide
The suicide rate among workers in recent years may be linked to the
despotism on the shop floor. Whereas the media and public tend to perceive
Foxconn as a sweatshop that wields military-style management, we argue
16 CHINESE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
that the intervention from the global brand owners, together with Foxconn’s
fragmented governance, is an important institutional factor that causes
suicides. We use the story of a suicide survivor to illustrate this point in
the following.
Tian Yu, from a village in Hubei province, was one of the few suicide
survivors at Foxconn. Being paralyzed from the waist down and bound
to a wheelchair now, the young girl was optimistic and willing to share
her feelings to help us understand more comprehensively the contour of
suicides. Tian Yu was interviewed in Guanlan, another Foxconn plant in
Shenzhen, and had worked in Longhua for one month. Because of the
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grueling workload, she decided to quit this job. To receive her final payment
for the wage, Tian Yu was forced to produce her salary slip because the shift
leaders in both Longhua and Guanlan denied to pay her. On March 17, 2010,
Yu spent an entire day traveling back and forth between the two plants. To
make matters worse, she ran out of money and her cell phone service was
cut off. Walking 15 kilometers back to Longhua, Tian Yu was desperate,
jumping from her fourth floor dormitory (Chan, Pun, and Selden 2013).
As we argue, such tragedies are deeply rooted in the fragmented
and chaotic structure of the Foxconn group. In response to the harsh
competition in the market, BGs constantly adjusted the internal structure
and personnel allocation, sometime arbitrarily. As a result, there is no
coherent information and close collaboration within Foxconn. Moreover,
workers from the same provinces are often assigned to different dormitories
and workplaces to prevent them from forming social circles. Therefore,
depressed workers with emotional problems would be able to find a close
friend or acquaintance to talk to. Such a chaotic and individualistic system
of employment has resulted in a weak social network in the workplace. With
little support from social networks, many workers had difficulty dealing
with their mental health problems arising from either workplace or personal
life, culminating in suicide in some cases.
We analyzed thirty-nine suicide cases in 2007, which are listed in Table 3.
Similar to Tian Yu, most victims were younger than 25 years old, cross-
provincial migrants who left their hometown for the first time to work in
Foxconn (only one was from Guangdong). Some reports claimed that these
young migrant men and women, via a randomly assigned dormitory system,
were living in an atomized environment, and socially isolated. Even worse,
some suicide cases were due to bullies in the dormitory, in addition to those
bullies by forepersons and security on the shop floor.
The jumping incidents were exposed to the public in mid-May, 2010; Apple,
Foxconn, and the Chinese government were all involved in the management
of the crisis. The Chinese government and Apple directly intervened in the
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Table 3
1 2007-06-18 N/A F N/A Zhejiang Hou Hanged himself in his Foxconn dormitory room.
2 2007-09-01 N/A M 21 N/A Liu, Bing N/A
3 2008-03-16 Yantai N/A 28 N/A Li N/A
4 2009-07-15 Guanlan M 25 Yunnan Sun,Dan-yong Without any evidence, the CSD (namely,
Environment, Health, and Safety department)
suspected that Sun stole one of sixteen
iPhone samples. During the investigation,
Sun was violently attacked, held in custody,
and unlawfully searched.
5 2009-11-04 Longhua M 23 Guangdong Tan, Guo-xi Tan’s director verbally abused him before Tan
was off duty. Humiliated, Tan jumped to his
death from the fifth floor of the plant.
6 2010-01-08 Langfang M 19 Hebei Rong, Bo Rong’s father speculated whether Rong was
bullied in the plant before his suicide.
7 2010-01-23 Guanlan M 19 Henan Ma, Xiang-qian Ma’s sister did not believe that her brother
committed suicide. She found a scar on Ma’s
forehead and chest and bloodstains on his
nose. Moreover, Ma once informed his family
that he was bullied at the plant. The police
stated that Ma’s death was an accident.
(Continued )
17
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18
Table 3 Continued
No Date Suicide site Sex Age Birthplace Name Note of event
8 2010-02-22 Langfang F 16 Hebei Wang, Ling-yan Suspected suicide or “karoshi” (i.e., death from
overwork). A doctor diagnosed her death as a
sudden cardiac death. Wang’s mother
recalled Ling-Yan’s last phone call, reporting
that her daughter complained about the
gloomy life in the factory, particularly her
inability to chat with others in the dormitory.
9 2010-03-11 Longhua M 20þ Henan Li One of the series of suicide jumpers.
10 2010-03-17 Longhua F 17 Hubei Tian, Yu After working for a month, everyone received
their wages except Tian. Exhausted and
desperate, she jumped from the fourth floor of
her dormitory building. Tian was one of the
few survivors of the Foxconn jumpers.
11 2010-03-23 Langfang M 23 Hebei Li, Zhuan One of the series of suicide jumpers.
12 2010-03-29 Longhua M 23 Hunan Liu, Zhi-jun One of the series of suicide jumpers.
13 2010-04-06 Guanlan F 18 Jiangxi Rao, Shu-qin One of the series of suicide jumpers.
14 2010-04-07 Guanlan F 18 Yunnan Ning One of the series of suicide jumpers.
15 2010-04-07 Guanlan M 22 N/A N/A One of the series of suicide jumpers.
16 2010-05-06 Longhua M 24 Hunan Lu, Xin One of the series of suicide jumpers. Southern
Weekly stated that this was the seventh
incident since January 2010. Lu’s friend,
Tseng, told a reporter that Lu repeatedly
stated that he was being followed and
threatened.
(Continued )
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Table 3 Continued
No Date Suicide site Sex Age Birthplace Name Note of event
17 2010-05-11 Longhua F 24 Henan Zhu, Chen-ming One of the series of suicide jumpers.
18 2010-05-14 Longhua M 21 Anhui Liang, Chao One of the series of suicide jumpers.
19 2010-05-21 Longhua M 21 Hubei Na, Gang One of the series of suicide jumpers.
20 2010-05-25 Guanlan M 19 Hunan Li, Hai One of the series of suicide jumpers.
21 2010-05-26 Longhua M 23 Gansu He One of the series of suicide jumpers.
22 2010-05-27 Longhua M 25 Hunan Chen One of the series of suicide jumpers.
23 2010-07-20 Nanhai M 18 Hebei Liu One of the series of suicide jumpers.
24 2010-08-04 Kunshan F 23 Jiangsu Liu One of the series of suicide jumpers.
25 2010-11-05 Guanlan M 23 Hunan He The “final” incident in the series of suicide
jumpers mentioned by mass media.
26 2011-01-07 Longhua F 25 Hebei Wang, Ling N/A
27 2011-05-26 Chengdu M 20 N/A Hou N/A
28 2011-07-18 Longhua M 21 N/A N/A N/A
29 2011-11-23 Taiyuan F 21 Shanxi Li, Rong-ying N/A
30 2012-01-01 Yantai M N/A N/A Jia, Peng-ran Working in CCPBG-CNP.
31 2012-09-12 Guanlan N/A 22 Heilong-jiang Yang N/A
32 2013-04-24 Zhengzhou M 24 Henan Yao The Foxconn labor union stated that Yao was
not an employee of Foxconn. Some union
members stated that Yao had not signed a
contract because he had been in the plant for
only three days.
19
(Continued )
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20
Table 3 Continued
No Date Suicide site Sex Age Birthplace Name Note of event
increase in pay except for year-end bonuses. In a certain sense, suicides have
led to the increase in operators’ legal minimum wage, which is at the expense
of the salaries of Chinese managers at low levels and forepersons on the
shop floor. From the fieldwork interviews, we learned that more “wildcat
strikes” occurred because Chinese managers, engineers, and foremen and
forewomen were dissatisfied with their decreasing incomes. They led strikes,
followed by their line operators.
Not until the exposure of the jumping incidents had the public noticed
that there was no labor union in Foxconn for years, which should be
established as stipulated by the Chinese Labor Law. Foxconn established
a union in March 2007, but it was seen as a “yellow dog.” The chairman
of the union was also Terry Gou’s executive assistant (Pun and Chan
2012). Most interviewees doubted the effectiveness of the union in protecting
labor rights.
After the jumping incidents, the union set up a hotline for workers to
voice their discontent. According to our interviewees, if the discontent is
on the dormitory conditions, the problems will be addressed immediately.
However, if workers complained about line management, they were often
fired afterwards (C21, C22). A Taiwanese manager (T7) expressed
his personal problems, but received a reply from the union that “we are
responsible for Chinese workers only” (Field notes, T7). In Chengdu,
as a gesture to show their concern with labor conditions, with the help from
local government, the union established some models of “youth apartments”
with gyms, swimming pools, and Internet bars. However, some workers
complained that, after the long work hours, they had little time to enjoy
the facilities. Hence, these observations, contradictory to each other, making
it difficult to evaluate whether labor conditions have improved after suicide
incidents were exposed to the public in Foxconn.
Workers’ Resistance
from 2010 to 2014 (Appendix Table 1). As we have seen, most disputes were
due to the decrease in income without overtime pay, the reallocation of
migrant workers to provinces where the minimum wage was set lower, or
the conflicts with local security in which the CSD was in charge. For
instance, in Hubei in January 2012, there were 300 local workers, one of
whom was an interviewee we met in Shenzhen (C11), but was transferred
back to Hubei, threatened to commit suicide after the denial of pay increase.
Similar protests occurred elsewhere, such as Chengdu (Apple Daily Hong
Kong 2012a), Taiyuan (Apple Daily Hong Kong 2012b), Chongching
(MyDrivers.com), Shenzhen (NetEase 2013a, 2013b), and Yantai (NetEase
2013c).
The features of these collective resistances, as scholars on the Chinese
“insurgency trap” (Friedman 2014; Gallagher 2014) have argued, departed
from institutionalized labor movements. Since official unions do little to
relieve worker’ plight, various forms of wildcat strikes and perturbations
occur. Most labor disputes in Foxconn occurred because of the long-
distance reallocation of workers for rush orders of brands, typically led by
forepersons and low-rank engineers, whose income was affected by the
restriction of overtime work and pay, whereas operators’ base salaries were
increased. In many cases, the variant compensation and promotion rules
between managers and workers among different BGs and BUs within
Foxconn have created employees’ discontent with regard to regarding
inequality, discrimination, and unfairness. All of which would not occur in a
transparent and well-organized company. In sum, the chaotic and fragmented
management, associated with the global market demand, particularly from
Apple, has instigated the resistance from workers in Foxconn.
responsible for workers’ suicides and resistance in Foxconn. The clients’ harsh
demands, particularly from Apple, forced Foxconn to constantly reorganize
its corporate governance structure and reallocate assembly lines. As with the
Durkheimian studies, we found that workers, atomized in the world factory
regime would have been left in helpless situations. To avoid the public
concern about workers’ suicide incidents, Apple and Foxconn adjusted
the strategies to reallocate some plants to inland areas, to change the
distribution of salary and benefits between forepersons and line workers,
and to expose more inequality and discrimination within the firm. Ironically,
such changes have created even more discontent and resistance among
workers, as well as mainland managers. In this sense, under the global
fragmented despotism, the management of crisis did not ease the tension
but sparked more collective resistance.
To some extent, the Chinese government shall be held responsible for the
laissez-faire policy in the labor market. The arbitrary management inside the
factory was made possible by the large pool of rural migrant workers who
are socially excluded based on their household registration status (hukou)
(Jieh-min 2010). When the local government attempted to enforce the labor
law in response to the public outcry of the jumping incidents, through
implementing the legal minimum wage, albeit very low, and restricting
overtime work, such changes ironically created more discontent among
workers and stimulated more wildcat strikes and riots, because workers’
total compensations decreased as a result.
Given the saturation of the electronic products market, the world factory
regime is facing its own profit-margin crisis. Without an increase in R&D,
Foxconn cannot effectively upgrade its industrial technology. Its revenue
is gradually shrinking due to Apple’s alliance with other OEMs and the
political pressure from the Chinese government on the protection of labor
rights. Foxconn may also face further challenges of the shortage of migrant
labor and rising labor resistance, intensified by the decentralized structure of
global fragmented despotism, leading to under the diminish of its revenue.
Workers’ suicide and resistance, which have caught much attention from
the public and media, are the result of the practice of global fragmented
despotism, exemplified in Foxconn factories.
24 CHINESE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
Nevertheless, the decline of Foxconn may not end the exploitation under
global capitalism. Many preconditions to foster the model of global
fragmented despotism, namely a competitive global market dominated by a
few powerful brands, the low standard for state regulations and social welfare
under authoritarianism, and the large supply of rural migrant workers con-
tinue to exist in China, especially in inland provinces, perhaps also in many
other developing countries to which global capitalism is expanding, may con-
tinue to exist for a long period of time. Therefore, our concept and study of
Foxconn may contribute to the factory regime analyses of GVCs in the future.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the anonymous interviewees, who may still exist or
work at Foxconn. We benefited from the help and comments from Pun
Ngai, Jenny Chan, May Szeto, YC Chen, Parry Leung, Daniel Yang,
Xiaogang Wu, Huilin Lu, Zhong Hua, Jieh-min Wu, Jay Chen, Szu-chien
Hsu, Mingsho Ho, and Chris Tilly, as well as the participants of the Labor
Movement Session at the 2014 annual meeting of the American Sociological
Association. We thank the anonymous reviewers for their excellent
suggestions. Rico Yang provided valuable research assistance.
Funding
Note
1. Hon Hai Precision Industry Co., Ltd. was founded by its Chairman Terry
Gou near Taipei in 1974 as a manufacturer of electrical components. In 1988, the
Foxconn Technology Group was created as a subcompany in Longhua, Shenzhen,
and moved to the Science and Technology Park in 1996. It has become a major
subcontractor for Dell, Nokia, HP, and other global brands since the beginning of
the 2000 s. As the largest private employer in the world, Foxconn hired almost 1.3
million workers in 2013. In this paper, we use the term “Foxconn” to refer to firms
in which the Hon Hai group invested heavily. Foxconn has been recognized as a typical
world factory in China.
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Appendix Table 1
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30 CHINESE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
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CHINESE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 31
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32 CHINESE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
did.
Note: we collected the news about Foxconn workers’ collective actions from English,
Chinese, and Taiwanese mass media, but discovered all the relevant news uncovered after
the series of “jumping incidents.”