Professional Documents
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Facts:
While was Fuentes was detained, he alleged that he was "mauled and tied
up by the security officers of [Protective]." To preserve proof of these claims,
Fuentes had pictures taken of his injuries while in custody and acquired a
medical certificate detailing his injuries. But On August 15, 2001, the OPP of
dismissed due to lack of Probable cause.
Hence, On March 14, 2002, Fuentes filed the Complaint "for illegal dismissal,
non-payment of salaries, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest
day, 13th month pay, service incentive leave and damages against
Protective.
On their part petitioner alleged that Fuentes abandoned his work and that
he only filed for illegal dismissal after 6 mos.
Issue:
Held:
However, respondent reported for work after August 15, 2001, when the
criminal Complaint against him was dropped but petitioner refused to allow
respondent to resume his employment because petitioner believed that
respondent was a member of the New People’s Army and had already hired
a replacement.
Respondent’s act of reporting for work after being cleared of the charges
against him showed that he had no intention to sever ties with his employer.
In Arriola v. Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc., this court made the distinction
between money claims under Article 291 and the claims for backwages under
Article 1146 of the Civil Code:
Art. 291. MONEY CLAIMS. All money claims arising from employer-employee
relations accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three
(3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be
forever barred.
Article 291 covers claims for overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive
leave pay, bonuses, salary differentials, and illegal deductions by an
employer. It also covers money claims arising from seafarer contracts.
Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:
Petitioner admits that respondent filed the Complaint for illegal dismissal six
(6) months after the first time petitioner had refused to allow respondent to
work. This is well within the four-year prescriptive period provided by Article
1146 of the Labor Code, as mentioned in Arriola.
In this case, the six-month period from the date of dismissal to the filing of
the Complaint was well within reason and cannot be considered "inexcusable
delay." The cases filed before the courts and administrative tribunals
originate from human experience. Thus, this court will give due consideration
to the established facts which would justify the gap of six (6) months prior
to the filing of the complaint.
The SC applied the case of Standard Electric wherein respondent was not
entitled to the entirety of the backwages during the time of his detention
Hence, respondent is not entitled to backwages from August 15, 2001, the
date of the Resolution dismissing the Complaint against respondent. Absent
proof of the actual date that respondent first reported for work and was
refused by petitioner, the date of the filing of the Complaint should serve as
the basis from which the computation of backwages should begin. Thus, this
court finds that respondent is entitled to full backwages starting only on
March 14, 2002 until actual reinstatement.
The two-notice requirement was not followed. There was no attempt from
petitioner to serve the proper notice on respondent at the address
contained in its employment records. Respondent was replaced without
being given an 'opportunity to explain his absence.
G.R. No. 190303 July 9, 2014
Facts:
Hence, she was found guilty of Dishonesty and serious misconduct and
meted out a penalty of suspension for one semester.
Issue:
HELD:
The Court recognizes the right of the employers to discipline its employees
for serious violations of company rules after affording the latter due
process and if the evidence warrants.23 Such right, however, should be
exercised in consonance with sound discretion putting into mind the basic
elements of justice and fair play.
3. G.R. No. 209499 January 28, 2015
Facts:
In this case, records reveal that Sykes Asia adequately informed petitioners
of their employment status at the time of their engagement, as evidenced
by the latter’s employment contracts which similarly provide that they were
hired in connection with the Alltel Project, and that their positions were
"project-based and as such is co-terminus to the project."
In this light, the CA correctly ruled that petitioners were indeed project-based
employees, considering that: (a) they were hired to carry out a specific
undertaking, i.e., the Alltel Project; and (b) the duration and scope of such
project were made known to them at the time of their engagement, i.e., "co-
terminus with the project."
When the Alltel Project was terminated, petitioners no longer had any project
to work on, and hence, Sykes Asia may validly terminate them from
employment.
4. G.R. No. L-48494 February 5, 1990
Facts:
Doroteo R. Alegre was the athletic director by Brent School, Inc. with a
contract fixed at a specific term for its existence for five (5) years from the
date of execution of the agreement.
Three months before the expiration of the stipulated period Alegre was
informed of his termination of service. The stated ground for the termination
was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of
employment." Hence, Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed
a receipt therefor containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the
period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of contract."
Issues: won the provision for fix term was valid making the dismissal of
Alegre valid.
Held:
The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July
18, 1971, at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet
been promulgated. At that time, the validity of term employment was impliedly
recognized by the Termination Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787.
Prior, thereto, it was the Code of Commerce (Article 302) which governed
employment without a fixed period, and also implicitly acknowledged the propriety
of employment with a fixed period. The Civil Code of the Philippines, which was
approved on June 18, 1949 and became effective on August 30,1950, itself deals
with obligations with a period. No prohibition against term-or fixed-period
employment is contained in any of its articles or is otherwise deducible therefrom.
It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School and
Alegre, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration
thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court.
Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding employment with “a definite period” and
“regular” employment were amended by Presidential Decree No. 850, effective December
16, 1975.
Article 320, dealing with “Probationary and fixed period employment,” was altered by
eliminating the reference to persons “employed with a fixed period,” and was renumbered
(becoming Article 271).
As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal
interpretation, not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the
lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without
reasonable distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the
duration of his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be
eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude
absurdity in its application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and
subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer’s
using it as a means to prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like
cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping
off the head.