YOU CAN LISTEN TO THE NARRATED VERSION OF THIS 

PRESENTATION @ https://talk.city.ac.uk/p47043247/
A quote from “The Balanced Scorecard – Measures that Drive Performance” by Robert S. Kaplan and
David P. Norton, published in HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW Jan–Feb 1992
 Source: Flicker ‐ Connected Company

INCENTIVES & PENALTIES MAY DRIVE CULTURAL CHANGE

 INCENTIVES & PENALTIES

ENCOURAGE RISK TAKING & DISCOURAGE REPORTING

• FOQA / FDM
• Aircraft / Engine Health 
Monitoring (Real‐time 
accessing data collected 
from systems onboard)
• Thanks to TECHNOLOGY 
but it has its limitations
Engineering a Safety Culture - Prof. James Reason
Source: Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents, 1997
Engineering a Safety Culture - Prof. James Reason
Source: Managing the Risks of Organisational Accidents, 1997
 Risk Thermostat – Prof. John Adams
Source: Risk, 1995

“We are all ambivalent risk managers.

Managing risk involves balancing
potential rewards against potential
losses. No one wants an accident but
everyone wants to be free to take risks ‐
without them life would be unutterably
boring. Safety interventions that do not
acknowledge the perceived rewards of
risk are likely to be met with behaviour
that seeks to frustrate them. We also
resent and resist risks imposed upon us
by others and, generally, support
regulation to contain them.”

Risk management is a balancing act. It involves balancing risks and rewards.

 http://youtu.be/u6XAPnuFjJc

http://www.ted.com/talks/dan_pink_on_motivation.html

“If you look at the science there is a mismatch between what science knows and what
business does. And what's alarming here is that our business operating system, think
of the set of assumptions and protocols beneath our business. How we motivate
people, how we apply our human resources. It's built entirely around these extrinsic
motivators, around carrots and sticks. That's actually fine for many kinds of 20th
century tasks, but for 21st century tasks that meganistic reward and punishment
approach doesn't work, often doesn't work and does harm.“
 processes for setting
performance measures

A Service Level Agreement (SLA) that

includes clear Key Performance Indicators

Technical Availability =
F fleet size on the day
Do length of operating day (defined as 18 hours)
TOOS total time out of service during the day resulting 
from technical delays (see Clause S10.1.2.1) and 
out of service events (see Clause S10.1.2.2).

Monthly Average % of Monthly

Payable To
Availability Achieved Revenue
100.00 11.00% Maintenance Organisation
99.80 9.00% Maintenance Organisation
99.60 7.00% Maintenance Organisation
99.40 5.00% Maintenance Organisation
99.20 3.00% Maintenance Organisation
99.10 2.50% Maintenance Organisation
99.00 1.00% Maintenance Organisation
98.90 1.00% Operator (Airline)
98.80 2.00% Operator (Airline)
98.60 3.00% Operator (Airline)
98.40 5.00% Operator (Airline)
98.20 7.00% Operator (Airline)
98.00 8.00% Operator (Airline)
COMMUNICATING ACTUAL PERFORMANCE THROUGH 
INTRANET & TV SCREENS ACROSS THE ORGANISATION
 CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
What happens if the Operator monitors the contracted organisation’s
performance only by ‘Availability’ and ‘Technical Dispatch Reliability’?

Number of Deferred Defects Amount £ Payable to

0.5 or less 10,000 Maintenance Organisation
0.6 to 1.5 5,000 Maintenance Organisation
1.6 to 2.5 2,000 Maintenance Organisation
2.6 to 3.5 0
3.6 to 4.5 2,000 Operator (Airline)
4.6 to 5.5 5,000 Operator (Airline)
5.6 and more 10,000 Operator (Airline)
Number of Deferred Defects Amount £ Payable to
0.5 or less 10,000 Maintenance Organisation
0.6 to 1.5 5,000 Maintenance Organisation
1.6 to 2.5 2,000 Maintenance Organisation
2.6 to 3.5 0
3.6 to 4.5 2,000 Operator (Airline)
4.6 to 5.5 5,000 Operator (Airline)
5.6 and more 10,000 Operator (Airline)
NEXT TIME YOU ARE GOING TO USE
• Collecting data can be problematic for some
organisations, because the relationship between Just
& Reporting Culture is delicate. So be careful how to
handle punitive action.
• CAUTION: Risk Assessment is a subjective process.
Risk takers can always assess high risk as
acceptable.

• “THREE KINDS OF LIES! LIES, DAMN LIES &

STATISTICS” We need to challenge statistics, should not
always be slave to them and consider the big picture.
• Let’s not get obsessed about performance. Ironically if
we push people too hard to achieve better performance,
they will take more risks. (The financial mess we are in?)

• SMS SHOULD NOT STEAL THE LIMELIGHT FROM

HUMAN FACTORS! WE STILL NEED TO ADDRESS
HUMAN ERROR, RISK TAKING BEHAVIOUR AND
NEGLIGENCE TO ACHIEVE BETTER PERFORMANCE.
• MANAGING HUMAN RISK NOT ONLY IN THE BOARD
ROOM BUT ALSO AT THE SHARP END IS THE KEY.
 I’M A
RISK TAKER
I’M A GENUINE I’M 
ERROR MAKER NEGLIGENT

MANAGING HUMAN RISK IS THE KEY TO ENSURE FLIGHT SAFETY.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you require further 
information or you think we can conduct joint research 
cengiz.turkoglu.1@city.ac.uk