Summary of current electoral data

June 2019

1. Context

The results of the local elections and European Election were shaped during April when there
was a marked decline in declared support for the two major parties, ending a period of
stability in voting intention which followed the 2017 General Election:

• As recently as two –three months ago, Labour was averaging near to 40% in voter
intention polls
• During the period of the intensification of Brexit parliamentary “chaos”/failure to leave
the EU at the end of March/talks with Govt there was a slower decline, followed by a
swift fall during the European election campaign
• Labour’s Brexit position had retained the bulk of Remain voters up to this point, with a
slower and longer term fall in Leave voters
• The polarised ‘proxy referendum’ of the euro elections led to a large shift of Remain
voters to the Libs/Green and a smaller shift of Labour leave voters to the Brexit Party
• Labour is currently averaging approximately 20-25% (lower in yougov) in Westminster
polls in what is currently an effective four-party split

The local elections held on May 2 appeared to confirm the polls in recording net seat losses
for both Labour and Conservative and a Projected National Share of the Vote of 28%-28. This
was despite there being no candidates standing for Change UK or the Brexit Party.

In the European Elections on 23 May, Labour came third with 14.1%, and the Tories were in
fifth place with 9.1%. The Liberal Democrats’ 20.3% of the vote was their highest in a
European Election, Brexit Party’s 31.6% the highest ever in a national election by any party
other than Labour or Conservative.

2. Interpreting the Recent Polls and Elections

a. Polls post-29 March

The failure to leave the EU on 29 March and the need to hold European Elections as a result
evidently brought about a collapse of confidence, both real and symbolic, in the government
and had a knock-on effect on Labour.

While the vote flows from one party to another are complex and vary considerably from poll
to poll, the two major switches which emerged were from 2017 Conservative voters to the
Brexit Party and from 2017 Labour voters to the Liberal Democrats. The most recent YouGov
poll (6 June) showed for example:

Current Voting Intention Share of 2017 Con vote

Share of 2017 Lab backing
backing
Con 42% 1%
Lab 1% 47%
LD 10% 25%
Nat 1% 1%
Brexit 42% 10%
Grn 3% 13%
Oths 2% 1%

b. Local Elections 2 May

Despite the Tories’ net 1,350 seat and 47 council losses and Labour’s net seat and council
losses, the overall pattern of the results was not dramatic. In large swathes of the country
where comparisons could be made, the parties’ performances were very similar to those in
2018 and 2016. The Tories were always anyway vulnerable to setbacks because of their
relative high point in 2015 when most of these seats were last contested.

It isn’t clear what difference might have been made had the Brexit Party in particular stood
large numbers of candidates, but what is certainly true is that had there been more
independent and minor parties available for people to vote for the Tory losses would
have been much greater. A very high proportion of independent candidates were elected
regardless of their local credentials, while any organised community group and Residents’
Association was almost bound to be successful. Additionally, candidates of the Green Party
attracted support again almost regardless of the type of area they were standing in.

The Liberal Democrats made a net gain of 697 seats, but their Projected National Share
of the vote at 19% remained well below what it had been in most years before 2010.
Their seat gains were clustered, with several councils where they won 20 or more seats
from the Tories but many others where they made little progress. Many of their best
results were in the South of England and in particular in some of the most affluent commuter
towns in counties like Berkshire, Hertfordshire, Surrey and Sussex. There is some
correlation with areas with high percentages of 2016 Remain voting but this is at best a
partial explanation of their performance. Actually the best pointer to a strong Lib Dem
performance in the local elections was their electoral success in the past. Almost all of
the councils where the made most of their gains were places where they had an established
political and organisational presence, especially those parliamentary seats which they used to
or still hold and those councils where they had large numbers of councillors prior to 2010.
Several of these were places which voted Leave in 2016, many of them in former Liberal
Democrat parliamentary seats in the South West of England, and some in Labour-held
constituencies and councils, particularly in the North East and East Midlands.

c. European Election 23 May

In the European Election there was a much clearer Brexit-related pattern to the results
as compared with the local elections.

A comparison of the parties’ shares of the vote and the 2016 Remain vote at a local authority
level shows some very clear patterns:

Liberal Democrat support correlated strongly with Remain voting in 2016,

especially when Scotland (where they were competing with the Scottish National Party
for Remain votes) is not included.

Brexit Party support was even more strongly correlated with Leave voting, and
(positively) with 2014 UKIP support

Turnout was also correlated with Remain support i.e. the higher the 2016 Remain
vote the higher turnout tended to be, although the relationship is much less strong for
changes in turnout compared with 2014. Leave areas tend across the piece for
demographic reasons to have lower turnout in most elections.

Liberal Democrats

While the “core” Liberal Democrat vote would be expected to have correlations with Remain
voting anyway, there is little doubt from this that views for or against Brexit were the
primary driver of their support in the European Election. The pattern for the Greens (not
shown) is similar but not as strong. The relationship between the proportion of 2016 Leave
voters and support for the Brexit Party is even stronger.

The top 50 local authority shares of the vote for the Liberal Democrats were:
LD Share Share Region Remain Leave
-1 1 2 3
Gibraltar 77.4% SW 95.0% 5.0%
Richmond-upon-Thames 52.3% GL 69.3% 30.7%
Kingston-upon-Thames 47.2% GL 61.6% 38.4%
St Albans 45.0% Ea 62.7% 37.3%
Cambridge 43.5% Ea 73.8% 26.2%
City of London 40.5% GL 75.3% 24.7%
Winchester 40.4% SE 58.9% 41.1%
Vale of White Horse 40.3% SE 56.7% 43.3%
Oxford 40.3% SE 70.3% 29.7%
Elmbridge 38.9% SE 59.5% 40.5%
South Cambridgeshire 38.1% Ea 60.2% 39.8%
Wandsworth 36.7% GL 75.0% 25.0%
Mole Valley 36.5% SE 53.1% 46.9%
Cheltenham 36.5% SW 56.2% 43.8%
Woking 36.1% SE 56.2% 43.8%
Guildford 36.0% SE 56.2% 43.8%
Kensington and Chelsea 36.0% GL 68.7% 31.3%
Camden 35.9% GL 74.9% 25.1%
South Lakeland 35.6% NW 52.9% 47.1%
Waverley 35.1% SE 58.4% 41.6%
Bath and North East Somerset 35.0% SW 57.9% 42.1%
Watford 34.3% Ea 49.7% 50.3%
Wokingham 34.3% SE 56.7% 43.3%
Hammersmith and Fulham 34.3% GL 70.0% 30.0%
South Oxfordshire 33.8% SE 55.0% 45.0%
Westminster 33.5% GL 69.0% 31.0%
Orkney Islands 33.5% Sc 63.2% 36.8%
Sutton 32.8% GL 46.3% 53.7%
Merton 32.7% GL 62.9% 37.1%
Lambeth 32.6% GL 78.6% 21.4%
Southwark 32.5% GL 72.8% 27.2%
Epsom and Ewell 32.4% SE 52.1% 47.9%
Chiltern 31.9% SE 55.0% 45.0%
Tunbridge Wells 31.6% SE 54.9% 45.1%
West Oxfordshire 31.6% SE 53.7% 46.3%
North Hertfordshire 31.5% Ea 54.4% 45.6%
Haringey 31.4% GL 75.6% 24.4%
Windsor and Maidenhead 31.2% SE 53.9% 46.1%
Dacorum 31.1% Ea 49.3% 50.7%
Eastleigh 30.8% SE 47.5% 52.5%
Hart 30.8% SE 52.4% 47.6%
Three Rivers 30.8% Ea 48.7% 51.3%
Mid Sussex 30.4% SE 53.1% 46.9%
Cotswold 30.2% SW 51.1% 48.9%
West Berkshire 30.0% SE 51.8% 48.2%
Islington 29.8% GL 75.2% 24.8%
Warwick 29.8% WM 58.8% 41.2%
Shetland Islands 29.6% Sc 56.5% 43.5%
East Cambridgeshire 29.4% Ea 49.1% 50.9%
Stockport 29.1% NW 52.3% 47.7%

As can be seen, most of the Lib Dems’ best performances were in the south eastern quarter of
the country and included several of the affluent commuter councils referred to above where
they made big gains in the local elections e.g. St Albans, Winchester, Vale of White Horse,
South Cambridgeshire, Mole Valley, Guildford, Waverley, South Oxfordshire, as well as several
London Boroughs. The average Remain vote in these councils was 60% and only six of the 50
voted Leave, none by more than 53.7%.

Absent from the list are the Lib Dems’ South West strongholds where they also made
gains in the local elections, councils such as South Somerset, Somerset West & Taunton,
Teignbridge and North Devon all of which voted Leave. Their share was even worse in
Leave-voting Labour areas where they had done well in the local elections such as
Sheffield (18.1% of the vote across the whole city) Kingston-upon-Hull (13.4%) or Redcar and
Cleveland (13.7%). It’s obviously impossible to know how much the Lib Dems would have
been inhibited in these areas had there been Brexit Party candidates in the local elections.

All of this confirms that this was a very different, much more politically coherent vote
than that in the local elections.

These 50 local authorities wholly or partly contain 22 parliamentary constituencies which

Labour won in 2017:

Cambridge, Oxford East, Battersea, Tooting, Kensington, Hampstead & Kilburn,

Holborn & St Pancras, Hammersmith, Westminster North, Mitcham & Morden, Dulwich
& West Norwood, Streatham, Vauxhall, Bermondsey & Old Southwark, Camberwell &
Peckham, Hornsey & Wood Green, Tottenham, Islington North, Islington South &
Finsbury, Warwick & Leamington, Denton & Reddish, Stockport

There also include four marginal seats which Labour needs to win:

Cities of London & Westminster, Putney, Watford, Wimbledon

In respect of the Green Party, there is considerable overlap with the areas with the
highest Lib Dem vote and a higher proportion of Labour-held Parliamentary seats and
marginals. The correlation with Remain voting is however weaker, with several council areas
included which voted Leave, notably some such as Hastings, Cornwall, Adur and the Isle of
Wight where Labour performed very strongly in 2017. Of course it is quite possible, indeed
probable that the Green voters in these areas were mainly Remain in 2016.
Grn Share Share Region Remain Leave
-4 1 2 3
Brighton and Hove 35.7% SE 68.6% 31.4%
Bristol 35.1% SW 61.7% 38.3%
Stroud 28.3% SW 54.6% 45.4%
Exeter 27.2% SW 55.3% 44.7%
Norwich 26.0% Ea 56.2% 43.8%
Sheffield 24.8% YH 49.0% 51.0%
Isles of Scilly 24.8% SW 56.4% 43.6%
Cambridge 23.6% Ea 73.8% 26.2%
Hackney 23.1% GL 78.5% 21.5%
Mendip 22.8% SW 51.1% 48.9%
Oxford 22.7% SE 70.3% 29.7%
South Hams 21.7% SW 52.9% 47.1%
Lambeth 20.6% GL 78.6% 21.4%
Bath and North East Somerset 20.6% SW 57.9% 42.1%
Lancaster 20.5% NW 48.9% 51.1%
Lewes 20.4% SE 52.1% 47.9%
Lewisham 20.1% GL 69.9% 30.1%
York 19.9% YH 58.0% 42.0%
Islington 19.6% GL 75.2% 24.8%
Mid Devon 19.1% SW 46.7% 53.3%
West Devon 19.0% SW 46.8% 53.2%
Warwick 18.7% WM 58.8% 41.2%
Manchester 18.5% NW 60.4% 39.6%
Haringey 18.4% GL 75.6% 24.4%
Southwark 18.3% GL 72.8% 27.2%
Hastings 18.3% SE 45.1% 54.9%
Mid Suffolk 18.2% Ea 44.8% 55.2%
Cornwall 18.1% SW 43.5% 56.5%
East Devon 18.0% SW 45.9% 54.1%
Forest of Dean 17.8% SW 41.4% 58.6%
North Somerset 17.5% SW 47.8% 52.2%
Reading 17.3% SE 58.0% 42.0%
Adur 17.3% SE 45.4% 54.6%
Trafford 17.0% NW 57.7% 42.3%
Teignbridge 17.0% SW 46.1% 53.9%
Cheltenham 16.9% SW 56.2% 43.8%
Worcester 16.9% WM 46.3% 53.7%
Craven 16.9% YH 47.2% 52.8%
Waltham Forest 16.7% GL 59.1% 40.9%
Wirral 16.5% NW 51.7% 48.3%
Isle of Wight 16.5% SE 38.1% 61.9%
High Peak 16.4% EM 49.5% 50.5%
Babergh 16.3% Ea 45.8% 54.2%
Wiltshire 16.3% SW 47.5% 52.5%
South Norfolk 16.2% Ea 48.3% 51.7%
Eden 16.1% NW 46.7% 53.3%
East Suffolk 16.0% Ea 41.8% 58.2%
Leeds 16.0% YH 50.3% 49.7%
Camden 15.9% GL 74.9% 25.1%
Herefordshire 15.9% WM 40.8% 59.2%

The top 50 council shares of the vote for the Brexit Party include all or part of 14 seats won by
Labour in 2017:

Hartlepool, Great Grimsby, Ashfield, Redcar, Bolsover, Barnsley Central, Barnsley East,
Penistone & Stocksbridge, Wentworth & Dearne, Dudley North, Bassetlaw, Scunthorpe,
Stoke-on-Trent Central, Stoke-on-Trent North.

There are also a number of marginal seats which Labour needs to win to form a majority
including three which were lost in 2017:
 Mansfield, Middlesbrough South & East Cleveland and Stoke-on-Trent South.

Brexit Share Share Region Remain Leave

-6 1 2 3
Castle Point 58.7% Ea 27.3% 72.7%
Boston 56.1% EM 24.4% 75.6%
South Holland 55.2% EM 26.4% 73.6%
Tendring 54.3% Ea 30.5% 69.5%
East Lindsey 53.8% EM 29.3% 70.7%
Great Yarmouth 53.0% Ea 28.5% 71.5%
Rochford 52.8% Ea 33.4% 66.6%
Hartlepool 52.7% NE 30.4% 69.6%
Fenland 51.9% Ea 28.6% 71.4%
North East Lincolnshire 51.9% YH 30.1% 69.9%
Thurrock 51.7% Ea 27.7% 72.3%
Torbay 51.6% SW 36.8% 63.2%
Basildon 50.5% Ea 31.4% 68.6%
Gosport 50.4% SE 36.1% 63.9%
Cannock Chase 50.3% WM 31.1% 68.9%
Mansfield 50.2% EM 29.1% 70.9%
South Staffordshire 50.1% WM 35.2% 64.8%
North Warwickshire 49.7% WM 33.1% 66.9%
Swale 49.6% SE 37.5% 62.5%
Ashfield 49.4% EM 30.2% 69.8%
Thanet 49.2% SE 36.2% 63.8%
Redcar and Cleveland 48.7% NE 33.8% 66.2%
Arun 48.7% SE 37.5% 62.5%
Torridge 48.7% SW 39.2% 60.8%
Bolsover 48.5% EM 29.2% 70.8%
Folkestone and Hythe 48.4% SE 37.8% 62.2%
Medway 48.3% SE 35.9% 64.1%
Havering 47.6% GL 30.3% 69.7%
Barnsley 47.6% YH 31.7% 68.3%
Dudley 47.4% WM 32.4% 67.6%
King's Lynn and West Norfolk
47.4% Ea 33.6% 66.4%
Rother 47.3% SE 41.5% 58.5%
Staffordshire Moorlands 47.3% WM 35.3% 64.7%
Maldon 47.2% Ea 37.4% 62.6%
Havant 47.2% SE 37.6% 62.4%
Tamworth 47.2% WM 32.5% 67.5%
Bassetlaw 47.1% EM 32.2% 67.8%
North Kesteven 47.0% EM 37.7% 62.3%
North Lincolnshire 47.0% YH 33.7% 66.3%
Dover 47.0% SE 37.8% 62.2%
Isle of Wight 46.7% SE 38.1% 61.9%
Dartford 46.2% SE 35.8% 64.2%
Wyre Forest 46.0% WM 36.9% 63.1%
Maidstone 46.0% SE 41.2% 58.8%
Breckland 45.8% Ea 35.8% 64.2%
Nuneaton and Bedworth 45.6% WM 34.0% 66.0%
Ashford 45.5% SE 40.6% 59.4%
Stoke-on-Trent 45.5% WM 30.6% 69.4%
Gravesham 45.4% SE 34.6% 65.4%
West Lindsey 45.4% EM 38.2% 61.8%
3. Labour’s Performance in both sets of Elections

Labour’s overall performance in the local elections resulted in the loss of 10 councils with
five gained.

There were features to both elections which date back to 2017 and before, indeed over
several elections. These are complementary trends which together have the effect over a
long period of shifting the distribution of Labour Party support.

The consolidation and strengthening of Labour support in what urban/city area

and their professional commuter hinterlands

The instability and fragmentation of Labour’s vote in non-metropolitan Britain,

including the industrial communities which comprised Labour’s heartland at
least until the 1980s

It is possible to identify these trends emerging at least as far back as the 1987 General
Election when Labour’s best performances and most of its seat gains were in the first category
and in 1992 when Labour made several gains in London, Birmingham and the North West. In
the last three general elections, differential swings have been exacerbated, particularly with
the collapse of the Lib Dems in the 2015 election. In 2017 while there was a net swing of
2.2.% from Conservative to Labour, there were 186 constituencies with a net swing to the
Tories, and six seats which Labour lost.

The Regional Shares of the vote in the European Election were

The concentration of Labour’s European Election vote in London and the North West was also
a feature of the 2010 and 2015 General Elections while the above average fall in the North
East reflected the result in 2017 when this was the only region of England with a net swing to
the Tories. In the local elections four of Labour’s council losses were in the North East while
there were major losses of seats in most of the others.

The trend against Labour in non-metropolitan areas is not however properly described at a
regional level. In addition to large parts of the North East region the seats with a swing to the
Conservatives in 2017 were partly in clusters, most notably in South Yorkshire and the North
Midlands, the Black Country, the Thames Estuary and even in the North West around the
Lancashire coalfield. In most of these non-metropolitan seats, in addition to a net swing to
the Tories they also achieved their largest ever number of votes. Against that there were big
swings to Labour in much of London, in mainly professional and multi-ethnic seats in the
large regional cities as well as the North West commuter belt.

These trends also explained the broad pattern of the local elections results in 2019
where the Labour council gains included commuter areas such as High Peak, Calderdale and
Trafford, but the losses included North East Derbyshire (to the Tories), Cannock Chase,
Darlington and Stockton-on-Tees. In the parliamentary seats which they gained from Labour
in 2017 the Tories made numerous seat gains. In the European Election the councils
where Labour was ahead were mainly in London or the North West:

Luton, Leicester, Nottingham, Barking & Dagenham, Brent, Croydon, Ealing, Enfield,
Greenwich, Hackney, Harrow, Hounslow, Newham, Redbridge, Tower Hamlets,
Waltham Forest, Blackburn with Darwen, Knowsley, Liverpool, Manchester, Oldham,
Preston, Slough, Birmingham
These were the first European Elections since the Scottish Referendum and therefore the
Scottish National Party were bound to increase their support. The extent to which Brexit
positioning in Scotland contributed to this is very difficult to assess as the differentials
in Remain voting by local authority were not as marked as in England and Wales.

In Wales it is again not possible to analyse Plaid Cymru support in respect of Brexit
positioning because of the small number of very varied local authorities. Labour’s long-
term performance in the industrial areas of South Wales vis a vis Cardiff and Swansea fits the
trends described above, but in Wales the Tories remain much weaker than in demographically
comparable parts of England, despite in many seats reaching their highest ever share of the
vote in the 2017 General Election.

4. Since the Elections

As is always the case the Liberal Democrats were boosted in the polls by the local elections,
partly because of the recent memory of large numbers of voters who only ever vote for them
in local elections.

In the May local elections in Peterborough Labour had been just 200 votes ahead of the
Tories, many of whose supporters vote independent in city council elections. Had the by-
election been held on local election day and there been no Brexit candidate the Tories would
probably have won by 1000 or more. In the European Election the Brexit Party was ahead by
across the whole city and almost certainly in the constituency.

Labour’s victory in the by-election was partly thanks to an increased turnout, with 10,000
additional voters compared with the European election. Overall however some of the
European Election switchers must have switched back to the two major parties, a
tentative indication that the European Election should not be taken as a precursor of
potential general election behaviour.

5. Brexit and its Significance for Party Support

a. Labour Voters and the Referendum

Polls at the time of the Referendum indicated that roughly 25-30% of Labour’s 2015
voters voted Leave. While the proportion would have varied quite significantly from area to
area, with perhaps 90% of Labour voters being Remain in parts of London and a handful of
places with a large Labour vote (Thurrock, Mansfield, Ashfield, Bolsover) where the Leave vote
was so high it is quite possible it included a majority of Labour voters, in the vast majority,
Labour voters would have voted Remain by 60-40% or more.

It is unlikely that the percentage of Remain voting would have been much different
among Labour’s 2017 voters. The four million additional Labour voters included perhaps
20% of UKIP’s 2015 support but these would have been balanced by switchers from the
Greens and others and first time voters.
There is a long-standing and unresolvable debate about the proportion of ex-Labour voters
included in UKIP’s 2015 support. The polls prior to the election showed it was overwhelmingly
comprised of ex-Tories and previous non-voters with only 10% or so having voted Labour in
2010. Attitudinally UKIP’s pre-2015 vote was very anti-Labour, choosing the Tories over
Labour as preferable on every policy area. While undoubtedly there were some voters
who voted Labour in 2010 and switched to UKIP and in some areas possibly a more
significant number, they were not an identifiably coherent group.

What is much more plausible is that UKIP’s 2015 vote included large numbers of 2005
Labour voters, many of whom may have voted Conservative or not voted in 2010. Other
than in 1997 when Labour won among almost every social and demographic group, the
2005 election was the major blip in the otherwise steady trends as described above. In
that election the major swing was from Labour to Liberal Democrat, it was exaggerated in
student and academic areas and in parts of affluent London, resulted in a number of Lib Dem
gains from Labour and facilitated Tory gains elsewhere. The swing to the Lib Dems was lower,
and therefore Labour retained many of its marginal seats across what later became the main
Leave heartlands of Eastern England, the ex-coalfields of the Midlands, most seaside towns
and the Thames Estuary. In 2010 the swing against Labour in these areas was higher than
average and it was compounded in 2015 when Labour’s failed to regain any of them.

b. Current Position

The Brexit Party and Liberal Democrats, and to a lesser extent the Greens and Scottish
National Party were undoubtedly attracting support in the European Election partly as
proxies for positions on aspects of Brexit policy, and that included switching from
Labour and Conservative much as the polls suggested. That is the extent of the hard
evidence we have for how Brexit may shape party support in the future.

No hypothetical polling can fully replicate the actual circumstances of those choices, the fact
that unlike a European Election, a General Election has a real effect, electing a government
and Prime Minister. It cannot reliably anticipate the expectations of that election, who would
be expected to win it and therefore the scope for tactical voting. It cannot truly measure the
salience of Brexit issues as against other policy and political choices set out in the parties’
messages and manifestos.

Logically it is obviously possible that adopting a position deemed as “pro-“ or “anti-“ Brexit
would by itself be sufficient to switch votes. Quantifying that in terms of seats or votes could
only be speculative. The context is that Labour’s current supporters are anti-Brexit. We do
not know for how many of them this such a defining issue that support for Labour is
determined by it. We also know that the long-term trend is for Labour support to become
more concentrated in metropolitan communities and areas which voted Remain.

Against this, in 2015 and especially in 2017 with the decline of UKIP, the non-Labour
vote in some non-metropolitan areas became organised behind the Tories on a scale
that it has not before. It led to the loss of seats, and swings which have made many others
vulnerable. So while Labour switchers to the Brexit Party, or indeed the Tories, may not be
numerous as a result, Labour’s definition as an avowedly anti-Brexit party could accelerate
that trend. Again, quantifying this, and isolating Brexit from the wider social, demographic
and political ingredients of these trends could only be speculative.

5. Summary

National polling in the past two to three months shows Labour losing Remain votes to the
LibDems, and the Tories losing Leave votes to the Brexit Party.

The support which Labour has lost since March has broken roughly 2:1:1 to Liberal
Democrats:Greens:Brexit. Switching between Labour and Conservative in either direction is
currently virtually non-existent.

Very few Remain voters are supporting the Brexit Party and very few Leave voter the Lib
Dems. In the current phase of the Brexit crisis, each is attracting the plurality of supporters of
those positions. The European Election voting patterns for both were similarly matched with
Referendum voting patterns.

However, in the local elections, when the Brexit Party did not stand, the pattern of Lib Dem
support was related to their profile and organisation rather than their Brexit positioning,
which is traditionally the dynamic in local elections. They made gains almost wherever they
have any representational history including many councils which voted Leave

Therefore, it is not obvious, from the evidence of local elections and Peterborough, that a
more “pro Remain” position from Labour would in itself win back voters currently lost to the
Liberal Democrats, or in a numerical enough way that would offset Leave voters in many of
the key marginals, that have lost both recently and over the last few general elections.

We do not and cannot know how 2017 Labour voters would repeat their European Election
voting in a General Election to choose a government. The pro-Remain balance of Labour
support is partly the product of much wider long-term electoral and demographic trends of
which arguably Brexit is an expression, a significant part of which voted Labour for the first
time in 2017 after the Referendum.

Potential losses from adopting an anti-Brexit position are equally difficult to assess. Some of
Labour’s most serious electoral setbacks have been in areas which also voted heavily to
Leave. Once again however these are mainly the product of long-term trends of which Leave-
voting was a symptom, and not necessarily Labour’s Brexit positioning.

It remains the case that there are more target and defensive seats in the Midlands and North
of England which voted leave. The recent elections don’t suggest any change to this basic
arithmetic, given the geographical distribution of Leave and Remain voters. There is an
evident risk that shifting to a more explicitly pro-Remain position would leave us vulnerable in
seats we need to hold or win without enough potential seat gains in winnable Remain
majority areas.
Appendix

1. Table of UK marginal seats

 2. Breakdown of Scottish European election results

National vote share change vs. 2014

Result, and standing, by Local Authority

Local Authority Brex Con Lab LDem UKIP Grn SNP ChUK Ind(s) Brex + UKIP Lab position 2019 Lab position 2014 Turnout (%) 2019 Remain (%) 2016
Aberdeen 15.6 12.8 8.5 16.9 1.8 6.9 34.6 2.4 0.5 17.4 5th 2nd 38.9 61.1
Aberdeenshire 19.8 18.0 3.0 16.9 2.2 6.2 31.4 2.1 0.5 22.0 6th 5th 38.6 55.0
Angus 18.7 17.2 4.3 10.5 1.8 6.0 38.8 1.9 0.7 20.6 6th 3rd 38.8 55.3
Argyll & Bute 17.9 13.1 3.9 16.4 1.9 7.4 37.2 1.7 0.6 19.7 6th 4th 46.8 60.6
Clackmannanshire 16.2 11.9 11.3 9.7 2.0 6.9 39.6 1.6 0.4 18.2 4th 2nd 37.0 57.8
Dumfries & Galloway 21.9 21.1 7.0 10.0 2.7 6.9 27.8 2.0 0.7 24.6 5th 2nd 40.6 53.1
Dundee 14.0 8.1 11.4 9.3 1.7 7.3 46.1 1.5 0.5 15.7 3rd 2nd 35.7 59.8
East Ayrshire 18.8 11.1 12.7 7.7 2.1 5.4 40.3 2.0 0.4 21.0 3rd 2nd 33.2 58.6
East Dunbartonshire 12.3 10.1 6.7 24.8 1.2 8.0 34.5 1.8 0.5 13.5 6th 2nd 47.1 71.4
East Lothian 13.3 13.8 11.9 15.1 1.6 9.2 32.7 2.0 0.4 14.9 5th 1st 42.9 64.6
East Renfrewshire 11.9 17.4 8.4 16.2 1.2 7.6 33.6 2.9 0.7 13.1 5th 2nd 48.4 74.3
Edinburgh 9.4 10.0 7.1 23.0 1.1 13.9 33.4 1.9 0.3 10.5 6th 1st 50.2 74.4
Falkirk 17.0 9.3 9.8 9.1 2.2 6.4 43.0 2.5 0.7 19.2 3rd 2nd 35.6 56.8
Fife 15.9 9.4 9.7 16.4 1.9 6.7 37.5 1.7 0.8 17.8 4th 1st 38.9 58.6
Glasgow 9.8 6.2 15.1 9.2 1.6 12.1 43.9 1.6 0.4 11.4 2nd 1st 35.8 66.6
Highland 18.0 9.9 4.0 17.4 2.1 9.2 37.3 1.6 0.5 20.1 6th 3rd 43.2 56.0
Inverclyde 14.6 9.3 14.7 10.1 1.7 5.2 41.9 1.9 0.6 16.3 2nd 1st 37.4 63.8
Midlothian 14.1 9.1 12.4 13.2 2.1 9.0 37.2 2.3 0.6 16.2 4th 1st 38.2 62.1
Moray 21.8 17.5 3.6 10.1 2.5 7.2 34.0 2.2 1.2 24.3 6th 4th 38.0 50.1
North Ayrshire 17.5 12.5 10.1 7.9 2.2 5.6 41.6 2.0 0.6 19.7 4th 2nd 33.6 56.9
North Lanarkshire 14.0 7.8 16.4 6.9 2.1 5.1 45.4 1.8 0.5 16.1 2nd 1st 33.6 61.7
Orkney 16.2 7.8 3.2 33.5 2.5 11.3 24.2 1.2 0.3 18.6 6th 5th 38.3 63.2
Perth & Kinross 16.0 19.5 3.0 14.5 1.5 7.3 35.8 1.8 0.5 17.5 6th 3rd 45.9 61.1
Renfrewshire 13.7 9.4 13.3 10.8 1.9 6.7 41.6 2.1 0.6 15.6 3rd 1st 40.3 64.8
Scottish Borders 19.0 18.9 2.8 18.2 1.8 7.9 28.4 1.9 1.1 20.8 6th 5th 43.0 58.5
Shetland 19.7 5.1 4.5 29.6 2.2 11.2 25.9 1.2 0.5 21.9 6th 4th 39.6 56.5
South Ayrshire 17.3 20.4 7.3 10.5 1.9 5.8 34.2 2.0 0.7 19.2 5th 3rd 40.8 59.0
South Lanarkshire 15.0 10.7 12.5 10.6 1.8 6.3 40.7 2.0 0.5 16.8 3rd 1st 37.6 63.1
Stirling 12.3 15.1 6.2 15.1 1.3 9.6 38.3 1.8 0.3 13.6 6th 2nd 46.7 67.7
West Dunbartonshire 13.8 6.3 16.0 7.3 2.1 6.6 45.5 1.8 0.6 15.9 2nd 1st 35.7 62.0
West Lothian 16.4 9.1 11.6 10.9 2.3 7.0 39.9 2.2 0.6 18.7 3rd 2nd 38.5 58.3
Western Isles 20.0 7.4 9.9 7.4 2.3 7.1 43.9 1.6 0.3 22.3 3rd 2nd 39.3 55.2

Vote share change in key Westminster seats vs. 2017 GE

Local authority LD/Grn/CHUK/SNP BREXIT/UKIP Lab Con SNP SWING FROM LAB TO REMAIN Turnout (%) 2019 Remain Vote %
Edinburgh South 45.8% 9.6% -46.8% -9.2% 6.6% 46.3% 54.7 77.8%
Edinburgh North and Leith 33.5% 8.7% -24.5% -18.1% 1.3% 29.0% 51.6 78.2%
Ediburgh East 26.9% 10.5% -25.5% -12.2% 3.2% 26.2% 47 72.4%
Glasgow North 25.9% 7.5% -24.5% -10.7% 4.6% 25.2% 42.8 78.4%
Glasgow South 25.5% 10.2% -24.6% -11.9% 1.4% 25.0% 41.7 71.2%
East Lothian 25.3% 14.9% -24.2% -15.8% 2.1% 24.8% 42.9 64.6%
Midlothian 23.5% 16.2% -24.0% -16.3% 2.8% 23.8% 38.2 62.1%
Glasgow North West 22.6% 11.1% -23.5% -11.0% -0.3% 23.0% 39.1 68.5%
Glasgow Central 21.6% 9.2% -21.7% -9.6% 1.3% 21.7% 36.2 71.2%
Glasgow South West 20.6% 13.0% -22.7% -9.1% 4.9% 21.2% 30.9 59.1%
Western Isles 17.7% 22.3% -23.9% -9.1% 3.3% 20.8% 39.3 55.2%
Inverclyde 18.1% 16.3% -22.8% -12.2% 3.4% 20.5% 37.4 63.8%
Glasgow North East 16.4% 12.8% -21.9% -8.0% 2.7% 19.2% 30.8 59.3%
West Dunbartonshire 16.0% 15.9% -21.7% -10.9% 2.6% 18.9% 35.7 62.0%
Glasgow East 16.4% 14.8% -20.5% -10.8% 5.0% 18.5% 29.6 56.2%
 3. Breakdown of Welsh European election results

UK comparison