3.

Writ of Habeas Data
THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is
a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party.
The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere
in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees
shall be required from an indigent petitioner. The petition
of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon
immediately, without prejudice to subsequent
submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen
(15) days from the filing of the petition.
SEC. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ
of habeas data should contain:

SEC. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner
petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of and the respondent;
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the
petition may be filed by:
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life,
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children
and parents; or
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the
petitioner to secure the data or information;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral
relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth
(d) The location of the files, registers or
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default
databases, the government office, and the
of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
person in charge, in possession or in control of
or
the data or information, if known;

SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the
the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or
updating, rectification, suppression or
respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over
destruction of the database or information or
the place where the data or information is gathered, files kept by the respondent.
collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner.
In case of threats, the relief may include a
The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or
prayer for an order enjoining the act complained
the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the
of; and
action concerns public data files of government offices.
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and
SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the
equitable.
writ is issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge
thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge.
SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the
petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately
When issued by the Court of Appeals or the
order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to
Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be
issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the
returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to
seal of the court and cause it to be served within three
any Regional Trial Court of the place where the
(3) days from the issuance; or, in case of urgent
petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under
jurisdiction over the place where the data or information his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or
is gathered, collected or stored.
person serve it.

When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices,

it may be returnable before such Court or any justice
thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the
Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any Regional
Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or
respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over
the place where the data or information is gathered,
collected or stored.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary
hearing of the petition which shall not be later than ten
(10) work days from the date of its issuance.
SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the
Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after
its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to

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serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice the data or information cannot be divulged to the public
or judge for contempt without prejudice to other due to its nature or privileged character.
disciplinary actions.
Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The
SEC. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be following pleadings and motions are prohibited:
served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or by a
person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall (a) Motion to dismiss;
retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In
case the writ cannot be served personally on the
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return,
respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.
opposition, affidavit, position paper and other
pleadings;
SEC. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file
a verified written return together with supporting (c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
affidavits within five (5) working days from service of the
writ, which period may be reasonably extended by the
Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among (d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
other things, contain the following:
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(a) The lawful defenses such as national
security, state secrets, privileged (f) Third-party complaint;
communications, confidentiality of the source of
information of media and others; (g) Reply;

(b) In case of respondent in charge, in (h) Motion to declare respondent in default;

possession or in control of the data or
information subject of the petition; (i) Intervention;

(i) a disclosure of the data or information (j) Memorandum;

about the petitioner, the nature of such
data or information, and the purpose for
its collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the
respondent to ensure the security and
confidentiality of the data or information;
and,
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the
data or information held; and,
(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of
the proceeding.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall
not be allowed.
SEC. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may
punish with imprisonment or fine a respondent who
commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing
to make a return; or any person who otherwise disobeys
or resist a lawful process or order of the court.
SEC. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in
Chambers. - A hearing in chambers may be conducted
where the respondent invokes the defense that the
release of the data or information in question shall
compromise national security or state secrets, or when
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory
orders or interim relief orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or
prohibition against any interlocutory order.
SEC. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails
to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to
hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such
relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its
discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence.
SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the
petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or
judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify
the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining
stipulations and admissions from the parties.
SEC. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment
within ten (10) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition
are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin
the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction,
or rectification of the erroneous data or information and
grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable;
otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied.

2
Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the
sheriff or any lawful officers as may be designated by the
court, justice or judge within five (5) working days.
SEC. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed
the final judgment shall, within three (3) days from its
enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The
return shall contain a full statement of the proceedings
under the writ and a complete inventory of the database
or information, or documents and articles inspected,
updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the
petitioner and the respondent.
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment
was enforced and complied with by the respondent, as
well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner
and regularity of the service of the writ.
SEC. 18. Hearing on Officer’s Return. - The court shall
set the return for hearing with due notice to the parties
and act accordingly.
SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final
judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from
the date of notice of the judgment or final order.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas
corpus and amparo cases.
SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of
a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not preclude
the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative
actions.
SEC. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is
filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the
latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are
filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of habeas data,
the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall
continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the
petition.
SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When
a criminal action has been commenced, no separate
petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ
shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the
criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the
disposition of the reliefs available under the writ
of habeas data.
SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of
Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily
insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.
SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on
February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3)
newspapers of general circulation.
a.) Nature and Purpose
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual,
and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy. (Manila Electric Co. v. Lim,
G.R. No. 184769, 5 October 2010)
It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends. (Roxas v. Arroyo, G.R.
No. 189155, 7 September 2010)
It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of
the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between
the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R.
No. 193636, 24 July 2012)
Essentially, habeas data allows families of victims of
enforced disappearance to petition the courts to compel
government and security officials to allow access to
documents about the missing person
b.) Coverage/ Grounds
Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements
1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy
2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim (proven by at least
substantial evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an
alleged unauthorized access to information about a
person.
c.) Proceedings under AM No. 08-1-16-SC
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Vivares v. St. Theresa's College
(G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)
A group of graduating high school students of St.
Theresa's College (STC) while changing into their
swimsuits during a beach outing took digital pictures of
themselves clad only in their undergarments. These
pictures were then uploaded on one of the students
Facebook profile.
Back at the school, a computer teacher at STC’s high
school department, learned from her students that some
seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in
brassieres. The teacher then asked her students if they
knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily
identified them.
Using STC’s computers, the teachers students logged in
to their respective personal Facebook accounts and
showed her photos of the identified students, which
include them: (a) Drinking hard liquor and smoking
cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Along the streets of Cebu
wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the
entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, the
teachers students claimed that there were times when
access to or the availability of the identified students’
photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,
but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
Upon discovery, the teacher reported the matter and,
through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed
the photos to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate
action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found
the identified students to have deported themselves in a
manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook.
As punishment, STC enjoined the group of graduating
students from joining the commencement exercises.
The parents of the group of students filed an action for
violation of the right to privacy and the issuance of a writ
of habeas data.
ISSUE:
whether or not a writ of habeas data should be issued
given the factual milieu.
whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
security of the minors involved in this case.
HELD:
(a) THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IS NOT ONLY
CONFINED TO CASES OF EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS
AND ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCE- Habeas data, to
stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom
from abuse in the information age." As such, it is
erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the
annotations to the Rule prepared by the Committee on
the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that
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the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of
Amparo, pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as
an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy,
more specifically the right to informational privacy. The
remedies against the violation of such right can include
the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of
the database or information or files in possession or in
control of respondents. Clearly then, the privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases
outside of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
(b) MEANING OF "ENGAGED" IN THE GATHERING,
COLLECTING OR STORING OF DATA OR
INFORMATION - The provision, when taken in its proper
context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that
habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or
omissions of public officials and of private individuals or
entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data
about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such
individual or entity need not be in the business of
collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a
business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take
part in something." It does not necessarily mean that the
activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What
matters is that the person or entity must be gathering,
collecting or storing said data or information about the
aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such
undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when
one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a
personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no
reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the
writ from getting to said person or entity.
(c) PRIVACY ON FACEBOOK - To address concerns
about privacy, but without defeating its purpose,
Facebook was armed with different privacy tools
designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile
as well as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,
the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of
the users to "customize their privacy settings," but did so
with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that,
although it makes every effort to protect a user’s
information, these privacy settings are not foolproof."
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or
her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in
this case the children of petitioners, manifest the
intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to
limit its visibility. And this intention can materialize in
cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy
tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is
the manifestation, in cyberworld, of the user’s invocation
of his or her right to informational privacy.
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a
privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post or
profile detail should not be denied the informational
privacy right which necessarily accompanies said
choice. Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a
feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user
uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her
Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or
a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can
view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the
courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s
visibility and accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will
not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it
would also disregard the very intention of the user to
keep said photo or information within the confines of his
or her private space.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts
is"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in
question were viewable to everyone on Facebook,
absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively
limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the
right to informational privacy. The ensuing
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most
instructive:
"person who places a photograph on the Internet
precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy
rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances
such as here, where the Defendant did not employ
protective measures or devices that would have
controlled access to the Web page or the photograph
itself."
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more
open the method of transmission is, the less privacy one
can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at
large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of
privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not
necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s
or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no assurance
that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is
not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The
user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or
tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of
whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook
friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the respective
Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or
who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of
which was set at "Friends."
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in
question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor
students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to
affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the
minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However,
the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare
assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings
to make the photos visible only to them or to a select
few. Without proof that they placed the photographs
subject of this case within the ambit of their protected
zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in
question.
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures
posted were limited to the original uploader, through the
"Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list
has been screened to limit access to a select few,
through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been
different, for in such instances, the intention to limit
access to the particular post, instead of being
broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends
en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
(d) CYBER RESPONSIBILITY - It has been said that
"the best filter is the one between your children’s ears."
This means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users
and internet consumers in general is the best means of
avoiding privacy rights violations. As a cyberspace
community member, one has to be proactive in
protecting his or her own privacy. It is in this regard that
many OSN users, especially minors, fail. Responsible
social networking or observance of the "netiquettes" on
the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due
to the widespread notion that teenagers can sometimes
go too far since they generally lack the people skills or
general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a
public forum.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due
diligence in their online dealings and activities and must
not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves
the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here,
requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in
safeguarding a right which they allege to have been
violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford
protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to
place the matter within the confines of their private zone.
OSN users must be mindful enough to learn the use of
privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the
information private, and to keep track of changes in the
available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook,
especially because Facebook is notorious for changing
these settings and the site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not
violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the
court a quo.