3.

Writ of Habeas Data
THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is
a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy
in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee,
or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party.
The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere
in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees
shall be required from an indigent petitioner. The petition
of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon
immediately, without prejudice to subsequent
submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen
(15) days from the filing of the petition.
SEC. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ
of habeas data should contain:

SEC. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a (a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner
petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of and the respondent;
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the
petition may be filed by:
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or
threatened and how it affects the right to life,
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children
and parents; or
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the
petitioner to secure the data or information;
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral
relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth
(d) The location of the files, registers or
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default
databases, the government office, and the
of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
person in charge, in possession or in control of
or
the data or information, if known;

SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the
the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or
updating, rectification, suppression or
respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over
destruction of the database or information or
the place where the data or information is gathered, files kept by the respondent.
collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner.
In case of threats, the relief may include a
The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or
prayer for an order enjoining the act complained
the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan when the
of; and
action concerns public data files of government offices.
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and
SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the
equitable.
writ is issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge
thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge.
SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the
petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately
When issued by the Court of Appeals or the
order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to
Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be
issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the
returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to
seal of the court and cause it to be served within three
any Regional Trial Court of the place where the
(3) days from the issuance; or, in case of urgent
petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under
jurisdiction over the place where the data or information his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or
is gathered, collected or stored.
person serve it.

When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices,

it may be returnable before such Court or any justice
thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the
Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any Regional
Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or
respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over
the place where the data or information is gathered,
collected or stored.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary
hearing of the petition which shall not be later than ten
(10) work days from the date of its issuance.
SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the
Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ after
its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to

1
serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice the data or information cannot be divulged to the public
or judge for contempt without prejudice to other due to its nature or privileged character.
disciplinary actions.
Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The
SEC. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be following pleadings and motions are prohibited:
served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or by a
person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall (a) Motion to dismiss;
retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In
case the writ cannot be served personally on the
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return,
respondent, the rules on substituted service shall apply.
opposition, affidavit, position paper and other
pleadings;
SEC. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file
a verified written return together with supporting (c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
affidavits within five (5) working days from service of the
writ, which period may be reasonably extended by the
Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among (d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
other things, contain the following:
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(a) The lawful defenses such as national
security, state secrets, privileged (f) Third-party complaint;
communications, confidentiality of the source of
information of media and others; (g) Reply;

(b) In case of respondent in charge, in (h) Motion to declare respondent in default;

possession or in control of the data or
information subject of the petition; (i) Intervention;

(i) a disclosure of the data or information (j) Memorandum;

about the petitioner, the nature of such
data or information, and the purpose for
its collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the
respondent to ensure the security and
confidentiality of the data or information;
and,
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the
data or information held; and,
(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of
the proceeding.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall
not be allowed.
SEC. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may
punish with imprisonment or fine a respondent who
commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing
to make a return; or any person who otherwise disobeys
or resist a lawful process or order of the court.
SEC. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in
Chambers. - A hearing in chambers may be conducted
where the respondent invokes the defense that the
release of the data or information in question shall
compromise national security or state secrets, or when
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory
orders or interim relief orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or
prohibition against any interlocutory order.
SEC. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails
to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall proceed to
hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such
relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its
discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence.
SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the
petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or
judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify
the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining
stipulations and admissions from the parties.
SEC. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment
within ten (10) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition
are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin
the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction,
or rectification of the erroneous data or information and
grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable;
otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied.

2
Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the
sheriff or any lawful officers as may be designated by the
court, justice or judge within five (5) working days.
SEC. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed
the final judgment shall, within three (3) days from its
enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The
return shall contain a full statement of the proceedings
under the writ and a complete inventory of the database
or information, or documents and articles inspected,
updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the
petitioner and the respondent.
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment
was enforced and complied with by the respondent, as
well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner
and regularity of the service of the writ.
SEC. 18. Hearing on Officer’s Return. - The court shall
set the return for hearing with due notice to the parties
and act accordingly.
SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final
judgment or order to the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from
the date of notice of the judgment or final order.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas
corpus and amparo cases.
SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of
a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not preclude
the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative
actions.
SEC. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is
filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ, the
latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are
filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of habeas data,
the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall
continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in the
petition.
SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When
a criminal action has been commenced, no separate
petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ
shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the
criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the
disposition of the reliefs available under the writ
of habeas data.
SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of
Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily
insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.
SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on
February 2, 2008, following its publication in three (3)
newspapers of general circulation.
a.) Nature and Purpose
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual,
and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy. (Manila Electric Co. v. Lim,
G.R. No. 184769, 5 October 2010)
It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information
regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in
order to achieve unlawful ends. (Roxas v. Arroyo, G.R.
No. 189155, 7 September 2010)
It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of
the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between
the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other. (Gamboa v. Chan, G.R.
No. 193636, 24 July 2012)
Essentially, habeas data allows families of victims of
enforced disappearance to petition the courts to compel
government and security officials to allow access to
documents about the missing person
b.) Coverage/ Grounds
Issuance of writ of habeas data; requirements
1. The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy
2. An actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim (proven by at least
substantial evidence)
Note that the writ will not issue on the basis merely of an
alleged unauthorized access to information about a
person.
c.) Proceedings under AM No. 08-1-16-SC
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Vivares v. St. Theresa's College
(G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014)
A group of graduating high school students of St. Theresa's
College (STC) while changing into their swimsuits during a
beach outing took digital pictures of themselves clad only in
their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded on
one of the students Facebook profile.
Back at the school, a computer teacher at STC’s high school
department, learned from her students that some seniors at
STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the
waist up, dressed only in brassieres. The teacher then asked
her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In
turn, they readily identified them.
Using STC’s computers, the teachers students logged in to
their respective personal Facebook accounts and showed her
photos of the identified students, which include them: (a)
Drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and
(b) Along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that
show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is
more, the teachers students claimed that there were times
when access to or the availability of the identified students’
photos was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends, but
were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.
Upon discovery, the teacher reported the matter and, through
one of her student’s Facebook page, showed the photos to
STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter,
following an investigation, STC found the identified students to
have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the
school’s Student Handbook.
As punishment, STC enjoined the group of graduating students
from joining the commencement exercises.
The parents of the group of students filed an action for violation
of the right to privacy and the issuance of a writ of habeas
data.
ISSUE:
whether or not a writ of habeas data should be issued given
the factual milieu.
whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of
the minors involved in this case.
HELD:
(a) THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA IS NOT ONLY CONFINED
TO CASES OF EXTRALEGAL KILLINGS AND ENFORCED
DISAPPEARANCE- Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age." As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact,
the annotations to the Rule prepared by the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of
Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out
that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an
independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more
specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating,
rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or
information or files in possession or in control of respondents.
Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also
be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances.
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(b) MEANING OF "ENGAGED" IN THE GATHERING,
COLLECTING OR STORING OF DATA OR INFORMATION -
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole,
irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection
against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of
private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting,
or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or
entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a
business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do or take part in
something." It does not necessarily mean that the activity must
be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the
person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said
data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her
family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of
regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the
nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even
for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the
writ from getting to said person or entity.
(c) PRIVACY ON FACEBOOK - To address concerns about
privacy, but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was
armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the
accessibility of a user’s profile as well as information uploaded
by the user. In H v. W, the South Gauteng High Court
recognized this ability of the users to "customize their privacy
settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its
policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s
information, these privacy settings are not foolproof."
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her
OSN activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the
children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain
posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent
access thereto or to limit its visibility. And this intention can
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s
privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is
the manifestation, in cyberworld, of the user’s invocation of his
or her right to informational privacy.
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy
tool to grant or deny access to his or her post or profile detail
should not be denied the informational privacy right which
necessarily accompanies said choice. Otherwise, using these
privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for
instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to
his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only
Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can
view it, said photo would still be deemed public by the courts
as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and
accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these
privacy tools of their function but it would also disregard the
very intention of the user to keep said photo or information
within the confines of his or her private space.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts
is"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The
ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most
instructive:
"person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely
intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such
imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where
the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices
that would have controlled access to the Web page or the
photograph itself."
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the
method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably
expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room
or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not
necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or
profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can
no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook
friends with the source of the content. The user’s own
Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own
Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged
by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also,
when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the
respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post
or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of
which was set at "Friends."
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question,
or to be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily
clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately
circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a
conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any
evidence, other than bare assertions that they utilized
Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to
them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the
photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their
protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they
have an expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs
in question.
Had it been proved that the access to the pictures posted were
limited to the original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy
setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit
access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result
may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to
limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted
to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse,
becomes more manifest and palpable.
(d) CYBER RESPONSIBILITY - It has been said that "the best
filter is the one between your children’s ears." This means that
self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet
consumers in general is the best means of avoiding privacy
rights violations. As a cyberspace community member, one
has to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy. It is in
this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail.
Responsible social networking or observance of the
"netiquettes" on the part of teenagers has been the concern of
many due to the widespread notion that teenagers can
sometimes go too far since they generally lack the people skills
or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public
forum.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due
diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be
negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant.
Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that
claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right
which they allege to have been violated. These are
indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they
themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines
of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to
learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to
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keep the information private, and to keep track of changes in
the available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook,
especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these
settings and the site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate
the minors' privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb
the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.
MERALCO vs Lim G.R. No. 184769 Writ of Habeas Data
JULY 5, 2018
FACTS: Respondent Cherry Lim works as an administrative
clerk at MERALCO. The HR directed the transfer of
respondent to MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa due
to reports that there were accusations and threats directed
against her from unknown individuals, which could possibly
compromise her safety and security.
Lim appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she
could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter,
claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a
denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel from her
residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and
violation of the provisions on job security of their CBA,
respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to
her security.
Lim filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against petitioners claiming petitioners’ unlawful act and
omission consisting of the latter failing to inform her of the
cause of her transfer amounting to a violation of her right to
privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data.
Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ
commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the
following:
a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent
in relation to the report purportedly received by petitioners on
the alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such
data and the purpose for its collection;
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the
confidentiality of such data or information; and
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information
obtained.
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO
enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer.
The trial court granted the prayers of respondent including the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners
to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such
time that petitioners comply with the disclosures required.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Writ of Habeas Data is the proper
remedy.
RULING: The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with
MERALCOs Memorandum directing her reassignment to the
Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or
data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within
the province of a writ of habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by
means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is
meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and
to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional
guarantees of a persons right to life, liberty and security
against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas
data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective
and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security as a remedy independently from those provided under
prevailing Rules.
Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down
in Tapuz v. del Rosario that the writs of amparo and habeas
data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment
constitutes a property right under the context of the due
process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that
respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer –
a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of
ones employment – are what prompted her to adopt the
extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such
concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the
Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented
that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation
of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty
or security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the
contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to
respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to
privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes
these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her
earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as highly
suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.
And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of
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work betray[s] the real intent of management] and could be a
punitive move. Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue
is labor-related.
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Second
Generation)
A. Right to Development
Right of the development has been defined as “an
alienable human right by virtue of which every human
person and all peoples are entitled to participate in,
contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and
political development, in which all human rights and
fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.”
It also concerns the integrity of human rights as a legal
order by itself. The goal of the world economies is to
fulfill this human right of their people. Development is not
only economic prosperity but social, political and cultural
empowerment as well.
The Philippines need economic development in areas of
social reform, economic, agriculture, agrarian reform and
natural resources, infrastructure development,
governance and development financing. If people are
empowered, then the economic goals and objective for
growth and economic improvement would be achieved
since participation would be devolved down to the lowest
level of society.
B. Rights of Workers
Article 23 UDHR
(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work
and to protection against unemployment.
(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to
equal pay for equal work.
(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and
favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his
family an existence worthy of human dignity, and
supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social
protection.
(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade
unions for the protection of his interests.
Article 6 ICESCR
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right to work, which includes the right
of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by
work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will
take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.
2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the
present Covenant to achieve the full realization of
this right shall include technical and vocational
guidance and training programmes, policies and
techniques to achieve steady economic, social and
cultural development and full and productive
employment under conditions safeguarding
fundamental political and economic freedoms to the
individual.
Article 7 ICERSR
The States Parties to the present Covenant
recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of
just and favourable conditions of work which
ensure, in particular:
(a) Remuneration which provides all workers, as a
minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of
equal value without distinction of any kind, in
particular women being guaranteed conditions of
work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with
equal pay for equal work;
(ii) A decent living for themselves and their families
in accordance with the provisions of the present
Covenant;
(b) Safe and healthy working conditions;
(c) Equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted
in his employment to an appropriate higher level,
subject to no considerations other than those of
seniority and competence;
(d ) Rest, leisure and reasonable limitation of
working hours and periodic holidays with pay, as
well as remuneration for public holidays
1.) Right to Work under Decent Living Condition
Basic fundamental in securing the economic well-being
of a person in his right to work with fair wages and under
decent working conditions. The covenant on economic,
social and cultural rights obligates states parties “to
recognize the right to work which includes the right of
everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work
which he freely chooses or accepts, and will take
appropriate steps to safeguard tis right. “
This right to work necessarily includes the right tp a
decent living wage, decent working conditions and
freedom of choice of work, freedom from discrimination
and the right to form trade unions. It includes the right to
fair wages, equal pay for equal work, a living wage and
adequate leisure time.
The Philippine Constitution declares that the State shall
afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities
for all.
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2.) Right to Self-Organization
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely
dispose of their natural wealth and resources
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of
international economic co-operation, based upon
the principle of mutual benefit, and international
law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own
means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant,
including those having responsibility for the
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right
of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in
conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the
United Nations.
Elegance v. CIR
Facts:
 Private respondents were employees of
petitioner Elegance, Inc. and members of the
PES Labor Association.
 A certification election was conducted in the
company between PES and Elegance
Employees and Workers Union. The latter won.
 Elegance Employees and Workers Union
entered into a CBA with Elegance Inc containing
a provision for a union-shop agreement:
"SEC. 3. — The COMPANY
agrees to a UNIONSHIP; All present
employees and workers in the
bargaining unit who are not now
members of the Union, must become
members within thirty (30) days after the
signing of this agreement as a condition
of continued employment, with the
exception of supervisors. If any dispute
arises as to whether an employee or
worker is a member of the UNION of
good standing, this dispute shall be
disposed of as grievance in the manner
herein provided."cralaw virtua1aw library
 Subsequently, in a letter dated April 5, 1960, the
contracting union demanded from the
management to dismiss from work the 14
 complainants herein allegedly for failure to
affiliate themselves with the union within the
period provided for in the union-shop provision
of the collective bargaining agreement.
 As a result, on April 7, 1960, a notice signed by
the president of the company was posted on the
bulletin board, wherein it was announced that
effective April 8, 1960 the employees
enumerated therein were considered resigned
from their employment
 Complainants allege that their separation from
the service was illegal because, they were
already members of the PES Labor Association.
Nevertheless they still complied with the union-
shop provision by applying for membership with
the Elegance Employees and Workers Union
within the prescribed period of 30 days, through
a letter dated March 2, 1960, which they sent by
registered mail.
 Elegance Inc found no merit in this claim.
According to them, the end of the thirty-day
period required by the union-shop is April 2,
1960. Considering that this date is so close to
the time when the letter of application was sent
by registered mail by complainants, the
probability is that said application must have
been received by the union beyond the
prescribed period, hence the union decided to
compel the company to dismiss complainants.
Issue:
 WON the dismissal of the 14 employees is valid
pursuant to the Union-Shop agreement in the
CBA between Elegance Inc and the Elegance
Employees and Workers Union
Held:
 No. The important fact which cannot be ignored
is that the private respondents did comply with
the union shop provision by applying for
membership with the union within the prescribed
period of thirty days, by means of a letter dated
March 25, 1960 and sent to the said union by
registered mail.
 It should be noted that they were already in the
service when the said contract was entered into,
and that only a clear and definite showing of
their failure to affiliate with the union within the
8
period fixed for that purpose would justify their
dismissal, assuming that the union shop clause
was applicable to them. Even this point,
however, was not altogether free from doubt at
the time, for it ran counter to the spirit of the
Industrial Peace Act which recognizes the right
of the employees to self-organization and to
form, join or assist labor organizations of their
own choosing.
 As stated in the case of of Freeman Shirt
Manufacturing Co., Inc., Et. Al. v. CIR:
"The closed-shop agreement authorized under
Sec. 4 subsec. a(4) of the Industrial Peace Act
abovequoted should, however, apply only to
persons to be hired or to employees who are not
yet members of any labor organization. It is
inapplicable to those already in the service who
arc members of another union. To hold
otherwise, i.e., that the employees in a company
who are members of a minority union may be
compelled to disaffiliate from their union and join
the majority or contracting union, would render
nugatory the right of all employees to self-
organization and to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing, a right
guaranteed by the Industrial Peace Act (Sec. 3,
Republic Act No. 875) as well as by the
Constitution (Art. III, sec. 1 [6]).
3. Right to Strike
a.) Article 8 (d) ICESCR
The right to strike, provided that it is exercised in
conformity with the laws of the particular country.
b.) Definition of Strike
“Strike” is the temporary stoppage of work by
concerted of action of employees as a result of a
labor dispute. (Gold City Integrated Post Services vs
NLRC 254 scra 647 {1995})
c.) Difference between Strike and Lockout
"Strike" means any temporary stoppage of work by
the concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial dispute. (RA no. 875)
"Lockout" means the temporary refusal of any
employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial
dispute. (RA no. 875)
d.) Requisites for a valid strike
for a strike to be valid, it must comply with Article
26316 of the Labor Code, which requires that: (a) a
notice of strike be filed with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) 30 days before the intended
date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor
practice; (b) a strike vote be approved by a majority of
the total union membership in the bargaining unit
concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting
called for that purpose; and (c) a notice be given to
the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven
days before the intended strike.

These requirements are mandatory, and the union’s

failure to comply renders the strike illegal.17 The 15 to
30-day cooling-off period is designed to afford the
parties the opportunity to amicably resolve the dispute
with the assistance of the NCMB conciliator/mediator,
while the seven-day strike ban is intended to give the
DOLE an opportunity to verify whether the projected
strike really carries the imprimatur of the majority of
the union members.18

e.) Do government workers have the right to strike?

Government workers does not have the right to strike.
According to the SC, since the term and conditions of
government employment are fixed by law,
government employees cannot use the same
mechanisms employed by the workers in private
sector to secure concessions from their employers.
(Social Security System Employee Associates vs CA
175 scra 686 [1989]).