A Model of Moral Emotional Reactions To Injustice Implications For Psychological Well Being and Prosocial Action PDF

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
Los Angeles
A Model of Moral Emotional Reactions to Injustice:
Implications for Psychological Well-Being and Prosocial Action
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy
in Psychology
by
Sabrina Joy Pagano
2007
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UMI Number: 3295730
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The dissertation o f Sabrina Joy Pagano is approved.
^ AA [ A A A ^ I a a \~I j a /
Peter Bentler
Shelly Gable Nayak
Maia Young
W i Q,$<*•
David Sears, Committee Chair
University of California, Los Angeles
2007
DEDICATION
This dissertation is dedicated to the author’s grandparents, Mr. Vincent and Josephine
Pagano, to her father, Mr. John Pagano, and to her aunt, Ms. Anna Marie Pagano.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction 1
A. Emotions and their Relationship to Prosocial Action 6
B. Origins o f Moral Emotions 9
C. Moral Emotions as Mediators between Focus of Attention
and Prosocial Action 14
1. Guilt and Reparative Action 16
2. Empathy and Humanitarian Action 17
3. Moral Outrage and Preventative/Retributive Action 19
D. Psychological Consequences of Moral Emotions 21
1. Guilt: Directed at the Self 21
2. Empathy and Moral Outrage: Directed at the Other 23
E. Potential Limits of Moral Emotions as Motivators of
Prosocial Action 24
F. Present Research 26
II. Study 1: Does Helping the Victims Harm the Observers? 27
A. Predictions 28
1. Prediction 1 28
2. Prediction 2 28
3. Prediction 3 29
4. Prediction 4 30
B. Method 30
1. Participants 30
2. Materials and Procedure 31
a. Manipulating Focus of Attention 32
b. Measuring Moral Emotional Reactions 34
c. Measuring Psychological Well-Being 35
d. Measuring Support for Prosocial Action 35
iv
e. Manipulation Checks for Responsibility,
Perceived Discrepancy, Identification, and Perceived
Injustice 36
f. Manipulation Check for Focus of Attention 37
C. Results 37
1. Factor Analyses on Emotion Items 38
a. Exploratory factor analysis on emotion items 38
b. Confirmatory factor model for emotions 38
2. Effectiveness of the Focus of Attention Manipulation 39
3. Does Changing One’s Focus of Attention Produce
Different Moral Emotions? 41
4. Moral Emotions and Support for Prosocial Action 42
a. Predicting Humanitarian Action 42
b. Predicting Reparative Action 43
c. Predicting Preventative Action 43
d. Predicting Retributive Action 44
5. Moral Emotions and Observer Psychological Well-
Being 44
a. Predicting State Self-Esteem 47
b. Predicting State Anxiety 47
6. Structural Equation Model of Moral Emotional
Reactions to Injustice 48
a. Factor Model for Prosocial Actions 50
b. Factor Models for Measures of Psychological
Well-Being (Pre- and Post-) 51
7. Modeling Emotions and Prosocial Action 52
a. Do Perceptions of Responsibility (Blame) Predict
People’s Moral Emotional Reactions? 54
b. Predicting Guilt 55
c. Predicting Empathy 56
d. Predicting Moral Outrage 57
D. Discussion 57
III. Study 2: Injustice and Emotions in the Laboratory 63
A. Predictions 64
1. Prediction 1 64
2. Prediction 2 64
B. Method 65
1. Participants 65
2. Materials and Procedure 65
a. Manipulation Check for Comprehension of
Allocations Made for the Cash Prize 68
b. Manipulating Focus of Attention 69
c. Measuring Emotional Reactions 71
d. Island Survival Task and Reactions Questionnaire 72
e. Measuring Support for Prosocial Action 73
f. Manipulation Checks for Perceived Injustice and
Focus of Attention / Demographic Items 74
C. Results 76
1. Perceptions of Injustice for Victim and Self 76
2. Reliability and Means of Moral Emotion Scales 77
3. Effectiveness of the Focus of Attention Manipulation 78
4. Does Changing One’s Focus of Attention Produce
Different Moral Emotions? 79
5. Effects of Emotions on Support for Prosocial Action 80
a. Predicting Humanitarian Action 81
b. Predicting Reparative Action and Preventative
Action 82
c. Predicting Retributive Action 82
6. Perceptions of Injustice and Support for Prosocial
Action 82
D. Discussion 83
vi
IV. General Discussion 85
V. Summary 95
VI. Appendix A 98
VII. Appendix B 109
VIII. Appendix C 117
IX. Appendix D 118
X. Appendix E 123
XI. References 124
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: A Model o f Emotional Reactions to Injustice 6

Figure 2: Conceptual Diagram of the Hypothesized Relationships
between Three Types o f Focus of Attention and Corresponding
Moral Emotions 29
Figure 3: Conceptual Diagram of the Hypothesized Relationships
between Three Types of Moral Emotion and Four Types of
Prosocial Action 29
Figure 4: Conceptual Diagram of Modeled Relationships Between
Moral Emotions and Prosocial Action 54
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Exploratory Factor Analysis on Emotion Items 40

Table 2. Effect of Focus of Attention on Moral Emotion 45
Table 3. Regressions and Zero-Order Correlations Between Moral
Emotions and Prosocial Actions 46
Table 4. Regressions and Zero-Order Correlations Between Moral
Emotions and Psychological Well-Being 49
Table 5: Summary o f Findings from Structural Equation Model of
Moral Emotions and Prosocial Action 56
Table 6: Regressions and Zero-Order Correlations between
Attributions of Blame and Moral Emotions 58
ix
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was supported by the following: Oderberg Dissertation Year Fellowship.
The author would like to thank her advisor, David Sears, as well as the following
individuals for their comments, proofreading, and other input on this project at various
stages: Peter Bentler, Karen Cheng, Shelly Gable Nayak, Matthew Hays, and Maia
Young.
VITA
February 2,1978 Bom, Mount Vemon, New York
2000 B.A., Psychology, highest honors

B.A., Political Science
Graduated with University Distinction
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill, North Carolina
2001-2002 Political Psychology Fellowship

2003 M.A., Psychology

University of California
Los Angeles, California
2004-2006 PROPS Graduate Mentor

Department of Psychology
2005 Shepherd Ivory Franz Distinguished Teaching Award

2006 Teacher Training Award

2006-2007 Oderberg Dissertation Year Fellowship

2006,2007 Instructor of Record

2007 Collegium of University Teaching Fellowship

PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS
Pagano, S. J. (January, 2007). Moral Emotions and Prosocial Action: Does helping the
victims harm the observers? Poster presented at the annual meeting o f the Society
fo r Personality and Social Psychology. Memphis, TN.
Pagano, S. J. (February, 2003). Guilt and moral outrage: Distinct emotions with distinct
implications for helping behavior. Paper presented at the annual meeting o f the
Society fo r Personality and Social Psychology Justice Pre-Conference. Universal
City, CA.
Pagano, S. J., & Huo, Y. J. (2007). The role of moral emotions in predicting political
attitudes about post-war Iraq. Political Psychology, 28 (2), 227-255.
Pagano, S. J., & Huo, Y. J. (January, 2007). The role of moral emotions in predicting
political attitudes about post-war Iraq. Paper presented at the annual meeting o f
the Society fo r Personality and Social Psychology Justice Pre-Conference.
Memphis, TN.
Pagano, S. J., & Huo, Y. J. (January, 2005). The role of moral emotions in predicting
policy attitudes about post-war Iraq. Poster presented at the annual meeting o f
the Society fo r Personality and Social Psychology. New Orleans, LA.
Pagano, S. J., & Huo, Y. J. (January, 2004). Moral outrage and guilt as predictors of
differential helping behavior on behalf of the disadvantaged. Poster presented at
the annual meeting o f the Society fo r Personality and Social Psychology. Austin,
TX.
Pagano, S. J., & Montoya, R. M. (January, 2006). Emotional aspects of dignity: Toward a
preliminary understanding of self-worth. Poster presented at the annual meeting
o f the Society fo r Personality and Social Psychology Emotion Pre-Conference.
Palm Springs, CA.
Sears, D. O., Molina, L. E., & Pagano, S. J. (July, 2004). External attacks and internal
cohesion: Impact of September 11 on domestic interethnic relations. Paper
presented at the International Society o f Political Psychology. Lund, Sweden.
Sears, D. O., Molina, L. E, & Pagano, S. J. (April, 2003). External attacks and internal
cohesion: The effects of September 11 on domestic interethnic relations. Paper
presented at the annual meeting o f the Midwestern Political Science Association.
Chicago, IL.
xii
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
A Model of Moral Emotional Reactions to Injustice:
Implications for Psychological Well-Being and Prosocial Action
by
Sabrina Joy Pagano
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology
University of California, Los Angeles, 2007
Professor David Sears, Chair
Two studies tested a model of moral emotional reactions to injustice. Three types of
focus of attention (self, victim, perpetrator) were examined as elicitors of guilt, empathy,
and moral outrage, respectively. These emotions were posited to give rise to support for
distinct forms of prosocial action (e.g., humanitarian and preventative action) and to have
distinct implications for observers’ psychological well-being (i.e., state anxiety and state
self-esteem). Results across both studies indicated weak support for the role of focus of
attention in eliciting distinct moral emotions. In Study 1, participants’ moral emotional
reactions to a written scenario about the working poor were shown to predict their
xiii
support for different types of prosocial action and to have unique patterns of association
with psychological well-being, supporting several hypothesized relationships. Among
these were positive associations between guilt and reparative action, between empathy
and preventative action, and between moral outrage and both preventative action and
retributive action. Unexpected relationships included a positive association between guilt
and humanitarian action, a positive relationship between empathy and retributive action,
and positive associations between moral outrage and both humanitarian action and
reparative action. As hypothesized, participants who felt guilt reported lower state self
esteem prior to, but not after, endorsement of prosocial action. Interestingly, participants
feeling moral outrage (but not guilt, as hypothesized) reported higher state anxiety both
before and after endorsement o f prosocial action. Study 2 was a laboratory study that
tested the effects of focus of attention on moral emotions and in turn the effects of moral
emotions on support for prosocial action. Study 2 did not produce support for these
relationships; the focus o f attention manipulation was unsuccessful. Although Study 2
participants perceived injustice in the experimental situation, this perception did not
result in moral emotional reactions. Nevertheless, some of the overall results suggest that
distinguishing among different types of moral emotional reactions to injustice may be
important in predicting what kind of prosocial actions people will support. Moreover,
observers’ psychological well-being may be impacted in different ways when people
experience different emotional reactions to injustice.
xiv
Introduction
“Whenever they’s a fight so hungry people can eat, I’ll be there. Whenever they’s a cop
heatin’ up a guy, I’ll be there. . . . I’ll be in the way guys yell when they’re mad an’—I’ll
be in the way kids laugh when they’re hungry an’ they know supper’s ready. An’ when
our folks eat the stuff they raise an’ live in the houses they build—why, I’ll be there.”
Tom Joad, Chapter 28, Grapes o f Wrath
As the experience o f Tom Joad suggests, the recognition of injustice can promote
a powerful desire to “be there” and help—a desire so powerful that Tom believes it will
extend beyond his mortal life. Powerful reactions to injustice are not limited to the
characters in novels, however, but may occur in “real life” whenever injustice strikes a
chord in its observers. What chord is being struck? Imagine the anger you might feel, for
example, toward a boss unfairly chastising and humiliating his hardworking employee.
Or the guilt you may experience when confronted with someone who is starving as you
walk from the grocery store with your arms full of bags. While not everyone will live a
life like Tom Joad’s, few among us are unfamiliar with the emotions so often resulting
when we confront injustice.
What our experience tells us also finds support in psychological research.
Emotional reactions to suffering and injustice (often in the form of empathy) are a driving
force behind willingness to enact prosocial action aimed at assisting victims (for reviews,
see Batson, 1998, and Eisenberg & Fabes, 1991). Emotions such as guilt and moral
outrage (i.e., anger on behalf of victims directed at perpetrators) also have come under
examination. O f course, emotional reactions to injustice are not limited to these. When
injustice takes the form of inequality, emotions like pride, disdain, pity, and moral
indignation (e.g., in response to “reverse discrimination”) all are potential reactions
(Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002).
In part because guilt, empathy, and moral outrage motivate support for actions
aimed at protecting the welfare and interest of other individuals or of society as a whole,
they fall into a special class called moral emotions (Haidt, 2003). Haidt presents a
preliminary definition of moral emotions as those that are “linked to the interests or
welfare either o f society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent”
(p. 853). Moral emotions have two defining features. First, they have disinterested
elicitors, meaning that they can be triggered even when the self (or those who are close
to, similar to, or otherwise valued by the self) has no involvement with the eliciting event.
Haidt proposes that the more an emotion can be prompted by a disinterested elicitor, the
more prototypical of a moral emotion it is. Second, moral emotions have associated
prosocial action tendencies, meaning that they motivate one to perform some goal-related
action in response to the eliciting event. Although the action may not in fact be taken,
experiencing a moral emotion should place one into a cognitive and motivational state
that readies one to perform actions related to the experienced emotion; these potentiated
actions can be described as prosocial action tendencies.
A set of examples may be instructive in clarifying what a moral emotion is and
what a moral emotion is not. Anger often is felt in response to direct insults or threats to
the self. This anger may in turn prompt actions designed to correct any wrongs that have
been done. On other occasions, we may feel anger at someone because of the harm she
has brought to another. This anger may in turn motivate us to take action on the wronged
person’s behalf that also is intended at righting the wrong that has been done. Only in the
second example can we consider the anger being experienced to be moral. In part for
heuristic purposes, Haidt (2003) goes on to provide an alternative definition of moral
emotions as capturing “the difference between the emotional life of Homo Sapiens and
the emotional life o f Homo Economicus ”—a fictitious and purely self-interested creature
largely resembling a psychopath (pg. 855).
Weiner (2006) instead defines moral emotions as a subset of social emotions
(whose antecedents are found at the social level— outside the individual) that “involve a
consideration of right or wrong, good and bad, and ought and should” (p. 87). In
Weiner’s view, controllability, volition, and responsibility are central features of whether
an experienced emotion is moral. Hence, an emotion such as sympathy may most likely
be experienced in response to someone if he could not control his situation, did not aim
for it to happen, and was not responsible for the situation coming about. Weiner identifies
an exhaustive list o f 12 emotions that he considers to be moral emotions. Among these
are emotions such as Schadenfreude (joy at the suffering of others). The inclusion of such
an emotion on a list of moral emotions seems in opposition to Haidt’s (2003) definition;
even if the disinterested elicitor criterion were met, it is difficult to imagine that
Schadenfreude would prompt emotions that truly serve the interests of another individual
or of society (although Weiner argues that Schadenfreude may serve as a signal to others
to discontinue what they are doing—an action that may not always serve others).
Both Haidt’s (2003) and Weiner’s (2006) definitions appear to have intuitive
appeal; the study of moral emotions remains at a nascent enough stage that only time will
tell which of these definitions will hold in terms of their explanatory value and overall
utility. For two reasons, Haidt’s definition is preferred for the purposes of the present
paper. First, the present work aims to examine emotions in response to injustice that are
likely to prompt action intended to help the victim of this injustice in one of several
possible ways. This aim seems to resonate most closely with Haidt’s approach. Second,
although Haidt’s definition is not free of complications, its greater flexibility (e.g., for the
same emotion to be understood as moral or not depending on its specific instantiation) is
a desirable characteristic, given the labile nature of human interactions and emotional
experience in response to injustice.
The set o f moral emotions composed of guilt, empathy, and moral outrage have
the benefit of addressing the main actors in situations where injustice occurs: the
observer, victim, and perpetrator. Other emotions that lead observers to celebrate the self
(e.g., pride) or denigrate the victim (e.g., disdain) in the face of injustice are not
considered to be moral emotions; they are less likely than are guilt, empathy, or moral
outrage to give rise to a willingness to help the disadvantaged. The moral emotions of
guilt, empathy, and moral outrage perhaps can be understood best if we consider first the
more general relationship between emotion and prosocial action and then move on to
consider the potential elicitors of these specific emotions. The present paper then will
give a more detailed description of these emotions and their proposed consequences,
wherein formal definitions will be given.
Among moral emotions, differences in the nature and experience of these
emotions may distinguish them from one another. For example, while prompting actions
that improve victims’ welfare, some emotions may come with costs to the well-being of
those witnessing the injustice. Emotional reactions to injustice characterized by a focus
on the self may be associated with powerful feelings of dysphoria. Imagine once again
our grocery store scene. If you recognize the discrepancy between your own welfare and
that of the other, and feel that the situation is unjust, chances are that you will not only
feel guilty, but that your self-directed attention will lead you to feel uncomfortable in
other ways. Other emotional reactions that direct attention away from the self also may
be aversive to experience. Nonetheless, while you may be upset, the negativity of your
experience likely will be directed not at yourself but instead outward (e.g., your anger
toward the patronizing boss). In sum, emotions that direct attention outward and away
from the observer—emotions that focus instead on the victims or the perpetrators of
injustice—may be associated with less detrimental outcomes for observer well-being.
The goal o f the present work is to examine these potential relationships by
presenting and testing a model of moral emotional reactions to injustice (see Figure 1
below). In doing so, this paper will examine both the elicitors of distinct moral emotions
and their consequences both for observers and victims of injustice. The present paper will
begin with a brief discussion of the historical and current view of emotions and a succinct
overview of emotions and prosocial action. Next, the paper will move on to detail the
various parts o f the proposed model. After presenting two studies designed to test this
model, results will be detailed and the implications of these findings for the model, future
work, and possible applications will be discussed.
Figure 1: A Model of Emotional Reactions to Injustice
Prosocial
Actions
Focus Of
Emotions
Attention
Psychological
Well-Being
Emotions and their Relationship to Prosocial Action
Philosophers and other scholars have long debated the merits and pitfalls of
emotions. Early analyses of emotion appear to date back at least to Platonic times and
later received much attention from Plato’s student, Aristotle, in the context of ethics.
Emotions or “passions” often were thought to arise from illogical and biological
precursors to thought and action—a view that finds continued representation in
psychological scholarship (for a discussion, see Zajonc, 1998). Bom from illogic,
emotions were seen as giving rise to bias and misjudgment, and thereby were controlled
best by reason and intellect. Emotions, then, were thought to play little role in prosocial
or moral behavior, which was instead engendered by rational processes (Kant,
1788/1949).
In stark contrast to this view, David Hume famously claimed that, “reason is, and
ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than
to serve and obey them” (1739/1969, p.462). He later argued that emotional responses
such as sympathy and benevolence are in fact primary motives underlying prosocial
action (Hume, 1777/1966). Although it is the less historically popular position, this view
finds contemporary support in the work of scholars in both social and political
psychology (e.g., Batson, 1998; Haidt, 2003; Marcus, 2003).
Emotions gain force as impetuses for prosocial action in part because abstract
moral principles resulting only from cool cognitive reasoning lack the motivational force
necessary to promote action (De Rivera, Gerstmann, & Maisels, 2002; Hoffman, 2000).
Recent evidence from studies in neuroscience provides compelling support for this view.
In these studies, patients suffering from bilateral damage to their amygdala suffer an
impairment o f their ability to experience emotional responses but retain complete
cognitive functioning. O f interest is the finding that these patients, lacking an emotional
impetus, are substantially less inclined to enact the behaviors that their reasoning tells
them are appropriate and desired (Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Bechara
etal., 1995).
If emotion is in fact necessary for the promotion of prosocial action, then it should
form a core component of models that examine reactions to injustice. This premise gains
some support from the following: when allowed to report their open-ended reactions to
injustice, people often describe these reactions as being “hot” and emotionally laden (e.g.,
Bies & Tripp, 2002). Some authors have even argued that justice itself can be thought of
as an affective event (Weiss & Cropanzano, 1996). A large portion of the justice
literature nonetheless has emphasized attitudinal and behavioral, instead of emotional,
reactions to injustice.
Nonetheless, when examining the vast literature on prosocial behavior and the
more recent justice literature, it is clear that emotion can and does promote prosocial
action aimed at alleviating injustice or other disadvantage. Emotion has been shown to
generate helping behavior for those in need (Dovidio, Allen, & Schroeder, 1990; for a
review, see Batson, 1998), is an important mediator of support for political actions
helping the disadvantaged (e.g., Montada & Schneider, 1989; Pagano & Huo, 2007), and
can even prompt reallocation of goods from the advantaged to the disadvantaged (e.g.,
Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2001). Emotion appears to be associated not only with
action, but also with the recognition of injustice and attitude change toward the person or
group in question that often precedes this prosocial action. Both early (e.g., Homans,
1961) and recent (e.g., Barclay, Skarlicki, & Pugh, 2005; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano,
1999) work indicates that emotions are powerfully associated with perceptions of
injustice and can help generate more positive attitudes toward the stigmatized (e.g.,
Batson, Polycarpou, et al., 1997; Dovidio et al.).
As Haidt (2003) argues, distinct moral emotions should have distinct
psychological bases and should prompt distinct action tendencies (i.e., motivations).
Rather than producing a diffuse willingness to help in any possible way, some emotions
may be more strongly associated with certain forms of prosocial action than with others.
Because o f the specificity o f these relationships, an emphasis on discrete emotions (rather
than overall affective valence) may increase the likelihood of predicting specific
behaviors (Weiss et al., 1999). Recently, attempts have been made to specify how these
distinct emotional responses to injustice may determine in what way people will choose
to assist disadvantaged others (e.g., Gault & Sabini, 2000; Haidt; Iyer, Leach, &
Pedersen, 2004; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Pagano & Huo, 2007). At the grocery store,
you may divert your eyes, rush away, or even distract yourself with other thoughts. But
perhaps you will give some money or food to the starving individual. Compare this
response with the one you may have when witnessing the employee being unfairly
castigated. Will you confront the boss? Report him to his own supervisor? Write the
company in charge, asking that they change the way their employees are treated?
The strength of an emphasis on studying discrete emotions is that it allows for
clear predictions both about the types of outcomes expected and about the specific
elicitors of each emotion. Below, I present the proposed components of a model of moral
emotional reactions to injustice, identifying several hypotheses regarding the elicitors and
outcomes of three moral emotions: guilt, empathy, and moral outrage.
Origins o f Moral Emotions
What might prompt these moral emotions? A preliminary suggestion is offered in
work by Stotland (1969). He was perhaps the first to discover that two different forms of
perspective-taking, one focused on imagining another person’s experience with suffering
and one focused on imagining how the self would experience the other’s situation,
produce distinct physiological reactions and self-reported emotion.
Batson and his colleagues (e.g., Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997) furthered
Stotland’s insight by distinguishing the emotion produced by an other-focused
perspective (i.e., thinking of how another person feels) as empathy and the emotion
produced by a self-focused perspective (i.e., thinking of how one might feel if one were
in the other’s situation) as personal distress. There is now much evidence that these
different emotions, following from different focuses of attention, motivate an observer to
perform different types o f prosocial action. For example, while empathy leads to a
motivation to relieve the suffering o f the other (i.e., an altruistic motivation), personal
distress leads to a motivation to relieve one’s own distress (i.e., egoistic motivation; for a
review, see Batson, 1991). Personal distress therefore motivates and ultimately results in
helping only when situational escape is not possible. Outside of Batson and his
colleagues’ line o f work, however, the role of perspective-taking as a causal determinant
o f distinct moral emotions and subsequent prosocial behavior has been underexplored.
Varying people’s focus of attention may differ somewhat from varying the type of
perspective-taking they use. In both cases, it appears that the kind of information made
most salient changes as a function of the type of perspective or type of focus taken. For
example, both self-focused perspective-taking and self-focused attention should increase
availability o f information relevant to the self. The precise nature of the difference
between focus o f attention and perspective-taking has not yet been specified; nonetheless,
10
both perspective-taking and focusing people’s attention may increase people’s likelihood
o f helping (Batson, 1998).
When another person’s suffering is brought about by injustice (i.e., when the
victim’s treatment or outcome are unfair), moral emotions may be elicited as a function
of one’s focus of attention. One can direct attention to the self as observer, to the victim,
or to the third-party perpetrator (i.e., the actor harming the victim). People that attend to
the same situation but focus on these different targets may experience distinct emotional
responses (Leach et al., 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989). Some researchers (e.g.,
Haidt, 2003) even use focus o f attention to distinguish among moral emotion families
(i.e., variations on a common emotional theme). Based on Haidt’s (2003)
conceptualization, the emotions selected for the present studies fall into the following
categories: self-conscious family (guilt), other-suffering family (empathy), and other-
condemning family (moral outrage).
Work by Iyer, Leach, and Crosby (2003) provides a preliminary experimental
demonstration of the relationship between moral emotions and focus of attention. In two
studies that examined support for different forms of affirmative action policy, Iyer et al.
found that guilt was elicited by a self-focused orientation to the problem of racial
inequality, while sympathy was elicited by an other-focused orientation toward racial
inequality. Work by Pagano and Huo (2007) corroborates this finding by demonstrating
that guilt, empathy, and moral outrage were associated with self-focused, other (or
victim)-focused, and perpetrator-focused attention, respectively.
11
The general conception that consideration of different types of information (as
when focus o f attention is varied) may result in different emotional reactions is supported
by cognitive appraisal theories of emotion. Cognitive appraisal theories hold that it is
secondary appraisals of context, such as attributions of agency (self versus others) that
form the basis o f differentiation among different emotions (Smith & Pope, 1992, as cited
in Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). The idea that emotions can be elicited by
considering situation-relevant information also is consistent with the cognition-affect
sequence posited in Weiner’s model of attribution (Weiner, 1986).
Based on these findings, some arguments about the relationships between
different focuses of attention and the emotions of guilt, empathy, and moral outrage can
be made. First, a focus on the role played by oneself or one’s ingroup regarding harm
done to the victim should elicit guilt. As discussed in the present paper, guilt can be
understood as a dysphoric feeling arising from a consideration of one’s real or imagined
social or moral transgression. Interestingly, although guilt involves a belief that one has
caused harm, loss, or distress to another (Hoffman, 1982), its defining feature of self
focus ultimately directs attention inward (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Salovey &
Rosenhan, 1989; Tangney, 2003; Weiner, 1982). In other words, guilt’s self-focus leads
those experiencing it to attend less to the other who has been wronged and more to their
own feelings about the transgression (Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 1995). This internal
focus brings about a state in which the self is seen as the object of experience, thereby
making environmental effects on the self of primary importance and consideration, and
12
making self-preservation concerns most salient (Cohen, Dowling, Bishop, & Maney,
1985; Hoffman, 1998; Iyer et al., 2003; Tobey-Klass, 1978; for a discussion relating self
focus to personal distress, see Batson, Early, et al., 1997).
Although feelings o f guilt typically arise in recognition of personal responsibility
for a wrongdoing or inequity, they also can arise in the absence of responsibility, based
on association with an ingroup (for a discussion of guilt by association, see Doosje,
Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998), or even through virtual or “existential” means
(Montada & Schneider, 1989; for a discussion, see Hoffman, 2000). Hoffman, for
example, details how guilt may arise over achievement, affluence, or even relative
advantage. A unifying element among different experiences of guilt is the recognition
that the victim has been unjustly underbenefited, persecuted, or otherwise harmed,
particularly when compared to the status enjoyed by those experiencing guilt.
Focusing attention instead on the victims’ suffering should elicit empathy (e.g.,
Hoffman, 2000; Batson, 1991). The word empathy was first coined by Titchener in 1909
as a translation of the German “Einfuhlung,” which was used in perceptual contexts in
reference to the process whereby an event is seen from the inside (Batson). Hence, the
term empathy itself implies taking on the victim’s perspective when considering his or
her plight. This link has been well established in prior research, primarily by Batson and
his colleagues (e.g., Batson, Early, et al., 1997). The link between empathy and other-
focus also is suggested by evidence outside the context of the laboratory. For example,
13
rescuers in Nazi Germany, for whom empathy was a principal motive, reported taking
others, rather than themselves, as their primary focus (Oliner & Oliner, 1988).
Finally, focusing one’s attention on the role of a third-party perpetrator should
elicit moral outrage. While moral outrage is similar to guilt in its recognition of and
attributions o f blame for injustice, it differs from guilt in its assignment of blame to an
external or third-party perpetrator responsible for the victim’s harm (Iyer et al., 2004).
The perpetrator can be identified as a person or regime or can be symbolically
represented by the political or other system as a whole in which the perpetrator is acting.
Moral outrage shares with empathy an outward-directed focus that moves the focus of
attention away from the self. Consistent with this conceptualization, Hoffman (2000)
notes that, if someone else is the cause of the victim’s plight, attention may be directed
away from the victim and toward the perpetrator. There also is some indication that Nazi
rescuers motivated by moral outrage reserved their strong emotions for those violating
justice and were less focused on victims, having relatively impersonal relationships with
them (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Although no experimental tests of the link between
perpetrator focus and moral outrage have been made to date, survey data provide some
preliminary support for the link between them (Pagano & Huo, 2007).
Moral Emotions as Mediators between Focus o f Attention and Prosocial Action
Guilt, empathy, and moral outrage are not solely the outcome of different types of
focus, but may also serve as important mediators between focus of attention and support
for different forms o f prosocial action.
14
The focus of the present work is upon four distinct types of prosocial action aimed
at assisting victims in several possible ways: humanitarian action, reparative action,
preventative action, and retributive action. While not intended to be an exhaustive list,
this selection appears to provide a sufficiently wide array o f possible ways to help. Some
of these strategies assist victims directly by providing necessities or correcting harm,
while others assist victims by dismantling the structural basis for injustice or by
punishing their perpetrators.
Specifically, humanitarian actions are those designed to meet the basic needs of
victims for items such as food, shelter, and water, thereby providing immediate relief of
the victims’ suffering. The outpouring of support from organizations such as the Red
Cross and private donors for victims of the December 2005 tsunami in southeast Asia and
of Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast of the United States provides an example of this
kind of prosocial action. Reparative actions, in turn, are those designed specifically to
make reparation or compensate for wrongs done. Material compensation to Japanese
Americans for their internment during World War II or the monetary compensation that
has been proposed for African Americans, whose ancestors endured slavery, are prime
examples o f this kind o f prosocial action. Preventative action instead involves a
reformation of the political or other system with the goal of preventing future abuse.
Some would argue that the installation of a new government in Iraq was designed to
provide this kind of help by prohibiting future abuse of the Iraqi people. Finally,
retributive actions are those that are designed to punish those who caused harm. The
15
Nuremberg Trials are one famous example of bringing retribution to those that
perpetrated injustice. Despite the unique importance of each of these four forms of
prosocial action, the distinctions between and among them and their predictors have been
largely unexamined (for one exception, see Pagano & Huo, 2007).
Guilt and Reparative Action
Guilt can be defined as the dysphoric feeling resulting from the recognition that
one has violated a moral or social standard that is personally relevant (Kugler & Jones,
1992). Characteristic o f guilt is an inward-focus, which incorporates internal attributions
of responsibility (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). These attributions of responsibility can be
directed at the self or at a group to which one belongs when this group is responsible for
an immoral act against another group (Iyer et al., 2004; Leach et al., 2002). This so-called
guilt by association (Doosje et al., 1998) can be contrasted with the guilt over relative
advantage often felt when one’s advantage over another seems unjustified or arbitrary
(Hoffman, 2000). Returning once again to our grocery store example: we might feel guilt
by association if a close relative or friend mocked the starving individual. We instead
might feel guilt over relative advantage simply thinking of the discrepancy between our
own situation and the situation of the other. What ties the two forms of guilt together is
their common focus on the self and on acknowledged transgression.
Because guilt arises from the acknowledgement of wrongdoing, it may assist in
the regulation o f positive social relations between the self and others (e.g., De Rivera,
1984). Guilt thereby helps ensure that one “fits in” and does not draw the enmity of
16
others. In part because of the potential damage to one’s social standing that feelings of
guilt over one’s real or imagined transgression imply, it is highly uncomfortable to view
oneself as responsible for an immoral act (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994).
A motivation to engage in prosocial action may arise as one means of relieving
the aversive state associated with feelings of guilt. Because guilt is posited to follow from
a self focus and to produce a desire to eliminate negative feelings quickly, the prosocial
motivation is likely to involve action that specifically makes reparation for one's real or
virtual transgression (Doosje et al., 1998; Haidt, 2003; Hoffman, 2000; Iyer et al., 2004;
Pagano & Huo, 2007). Prosocial actions prompted by guilt therefore are designed to
restore the moral value of both the victim and the person in whom guilt has been
generated through the use of apology, confession, or other forms of compensation (Iyer et
al.; Minow, 1998). For example, Doosje et al. found that Dutch students in whom guilt
was induced when they were reminded of their nation’s past colonial behavior were most
willing to support national compensation (i.e., reparative action) for the formerly
colonized country. Similar findings were obtained by Iyer et al. (2003) in a study
examining the role o f White guilt in promoting support for compensatory affirmative
action programs for African Americans. They also found that guilt did not predict support
for non-compensatory forms of affirmative action—even low-cost programs aimed solely
at providing equal opportunity.
Empathy and Humanitarian Action
17
Empathy can be defined as an emotional response congruent with the perceived
welfare of another person (but not necessarily congruent with how the other person feels).
The category o f potential emotional responses therefore is quite broad, changing based on
the other person’s situation. An empathic response to another’s suffering, for example,
may be characterized by feelings such as sympathy, compassion, and tenderness (Batson,
1991). Empathy (as an emotion) is distinct from the cognitive process of perspective-
taking that frequently gives rise to this congruent emotional response (Batson, 1991).
Although the sensitivity to others’ suffering that follows from empathy has been called a
basic feature of human nature (e.g., Smith, 1759/1956; Hume, 1739/1969; Piaget,
1932/1965, as cited in Haidt, 2003), feelings of empathy may be strongest when a
victim’s disadvantage is seen as illegitimate, stable, and uncontrollable (Leach et al.,
2002 ).
Because o f these feelings of compassion and tenderness, empathy prompts an
altruistic motivation that has as its ultimate goal the relief of the other’s distress and the
provision o f comfort (for a review, see Batson, 1991). However, while empathy has been
associated with a wide array of prosocial actions aimed at accomplishing this broad goal
(Batson, 1998), it may be particularly effective at motivating helping behaviors aimed at
relieving the specific need for which it is felt (Blader & Tyler, 2002; Dovidio et al.,
1990). For example, empathy’s focus on the victim’s plight is likely to prompt actions
designed to provide immediate and effective relief of this suffering, such as humanitarian
action (Pagano & Huo, 2007).
18
Empathy may be less strongly associated with other forms of prosocial action,
such as support for the implementation of political and other reforms aimed at longer-
term and therefore less direct assistance (Pagano and Huo, 2007). Indeed, in both survey
(Montada & Schneider, 1989) and experimental (De Rivera et al., 2002) studies, empathy
was unassociated with support for political action aimed at aiding victims of injustice.
Empathy’s focus on the victim also should reduce the likelihood of support for retributive
actions, which instead are directed at external forces contributing to a victim’s plight
(e.g., third-party perpetrators) (e.g., Pagano & Huo, 2007; for a review of empathy’s role
in aggression, see Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). Despite its limitations, empathy’s strength
nonetheless lies in its other-directed focus, which frees it o f the accompanying personal
distress associated with a self-focused perspective of the victim’s situation (Batson,
Early, et al., 1997).
Moral Outrage and Preventative/Retributive Action
Moral outrage can be defined as anger directed at a third-party perpetrator that is
felt on behalf of a victim who has experienced illegitimate harm or insult (Haidt, 2003;
Hoffman, 2000; Leach et al., 2002; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Vidmar, 2000). For
example, moral outrage may be felt when a greedy CEO takes advantage of his or her
employees or a political tyrant brings about the suffering of his or her people (Pagano &
Huo, 2007). The insult or violation also can be an affront to community values (Miller,
2001). In situations that prompt people to experience moral outrage, attributions of
responsibility for injustice are made to an individual other than the self (Tangney &
19
Dearing, 2002). For example, swastika graffiti left by neo-nazi groups may result in
moral outrage when its symbolism conflicts with a community’s belief in tolerance.
Moral outrage is perhaps the least understood of the moral emotions, as it often may be
linked incorrectly with more destructive and egoistically motivated forms of anger, such
as those resulting from frustration and goal blockage (Haidt, 2003). As Aristotle first
noted, moral outrage instead arises as an emotional response to a “conspicuous slight
directed without justification''’ and can be felt either for oneself or on behalf of others
(Haidt, 2003).
Moral outrage is not simply a response to wounded pride, but instead is a specific
response to injustice that results in a desire to punish the third-party perpetrator (Haidt,
2003; Vidmar 2000). When a perpetrator violates moral codes of conduct, prosocial
actions such as victim compensation may be insufficient to restore a sense of justice;
additional punishment may be necessary in order to re-establish shared social norms and
values (Averill, 1982; Montada & Schneider, 1989; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo,
1997; Weiner, 1985). Retributive action therefore may be sought in order to rectify
injustice and to uphold desired social norms (Gault & Sabini, 2000; Pagano & Huo, 2007;
Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003). It is perhaps for this reason that philosopher John Stuart
Mill described moral outrage as “the guardian of justice” (as cited in Hoffman, 2000, p.
96).
Moral outrage also may be associated with support for actions designed to prevent
perpetrator’s possible future offenses. Because moral outrage does not involve a focus on
20
the self s role in the injustice, those experiencing moral outrage can more easily call for a
change in the existing societal or political structure causing harm (Iyer et al., 2004). One
way of calling for change is through support for preventative action or politic or societal
reformation. Findings from at least three separate studies (Montada & Schneider, 1989;
Pagano & Huo, 2007; Pedersen, Iyer, & Leach, 2002) provide support for the association
between moral outrage and political action.
Given their lack o f focus on righting moral wrongs perpetrated by a third-party,
humanitarian and reparative actions aimed at direct assistance to the victims should be
unrelated to moral outrage (Pagano & Huo, 2007). It should also be noted that moral
outrage is conceptually different from other forms of anger (e.g., self-reproachful anger)
that are based on assuming personal responsibility for injustice, which would arguably
have different consequences for prosocial action.
Psychological Consequences o f Moral Emotions
Guilt: Directed at the S elf
Despite the considerable benefits to those disadvantaged by injustice, some moral
emotional reactions to injustice may come with consequences for the psychological well
being of the person experiencing the moral emotion. For example, a rich research
tradition in self-awareness (which can be conceptualized as self-focused attention)
supports the idea that attentional focus on the self can be aversive, particularly when the
self is subject to negative evaluation. This discomfort may be increased further when
one’s attention is directed at the self not as a relatively benign actor, but instead as a party
21
responsible for an immoral act, thereby resulting in guilt (Baumeister, Stillwell, &
Heatherton, 1994). Like other states characterized by self-awareness, feelings of guilt
(and the concomitant cognition that one has caused injustice to befall another) can in
some cases create a painful sense of dysphoria or unease. This dysphoria has been
described as a “sinking feeling” (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Roseman, Wiest, &
Schwartz, 1994). Dysphoria, which is in fact considered by some researchers to be a core
component of guilt, has been described as a subclinical form o f psychological distress;
feelings of dysphoria ultimately may become manifest in high scores on depression and
anxiety measures (Bibb, 1996).
Other work also supports the idea that guilt should be associated with decrements
in psychological well-being. For example, Derakshan and Eysenck (2001) found that
self-focused attention (a large component of guilt) led to increased feelings of anxiety,
which is widely considered to be detrimental to psychological well-being in the long
term. Guilt also has been associated more directly with decreased well-being in a number
of different contexts (e.g., Atkins, Martin, & Poon, 1996; Joseph, Hodgkinson, Yule, &
Williams, 1993; O'Connor, Berry, & Weiss, 1999; Saravanan, 2002). In other work,
subjectively negative states such as regret, concern about misdeeds, and even
dissatisfaction with one's self also have been associated with feelings of guilt (Institute
for Personality & Ability Testing, 1974, as cited in Atkins, Martin, & Poon, 1996). It
seems clear, then, that guilt is associated with a wide range of arguably undesirable
psychological outcomes.
22
This discussion of the possible effects of guilt on psychological well-being is
limited to two different measures of well-being: state anxiety (on which the effects of
guilt are more general) and state self-esteem (on which the effects of guilt are more
specific). First, state anxiety is predicated on an appraisal of threatening demands or
dangers, such as the threats to self-worth inherent in guilt’s attributions of personal
responsibility (Lazarus, 1991). At the most general level, guilt should be associated with
unpleasant emotional arousal, such as that experienced in state anxiety. While frequently
examined as dependent variables in the same study, however, the direct relationship
between state anxiety and guilt has been surprisingly unexplored.
The other measure of well-being that should be negatively influenced (at a more
specific level) by guilt is state self-esteem; the self-focused attention associated with guilt
may intensify attributions of personal responsibility for harm committed (Federoff &
Harvey, 1976). Findings from a recent study provide support for this claim,
demonstrating that self-focused attention affected multiple indicators of state self-esteem
(Jimenez, 2001), although the direct relationship between state self-esteem and guilt in
response to injustice has not been examined.
Empathy and Moral Outrage: Directed at the Other
Empathy, which results in feelings of warmth and tenderness toward another (and
directs attention away from the self; e.g., Worthington & Scherer, 2004), may in some
cases and in some ways even be pleasant to experience. Even if the actual experience of
empathy is unpleasant, however, people nonetheless may be pleased that they are
23
experiencing it (Batson, 1991). Moral outrage also is considered an outward-focused
emotion (Barclay et al., 2005). Moral outrage, like other forms of anger, typically may be
aversive to experience. In contrast to guilt’s focus on the self, the outward-directed (i.e.,
on the victim or third-party perpetrator) focus of other emotions, such as empathy and
moral outrage, should insulate the observer from dysphoria. In the case of empathy, this
insulation may be complete. Moral outrage instead may be associated with levels of
psychological well-being intermediate between guilt and empathy.
Potential Limits o f Moral Emotions as Motivators o f Prosocial Action
O f course, the ultimate judgments about when and how to act do not exist in a
vacuum. The potential costs associated with the experience of moral emotions may
inhibit prosocial action. For example, aware of the costs that sometimes result from
feeling empathy for others, people may try to avoid situations (and a focus on the victim)
that would elicit this emotion even before encountering appeals for helping and explicit
considerations o f cost (Batson, 1998; Hodges & Wegner, 1997). The pedestrian averting
her eyes from a homeless person on the street or the woman who looks at her newspaper
rather than attend to the suffering of the employee being berated by his boss both may be
demonstrating an implicit understanding that the experience o f empathy comes with the
cost of prosocial acts such as humanitarian action. People may (not infrequently) expose
themselves to empathy-eliciting information (e.g., immersing themselves in news
broadcasts after an atrocity), enjoying the experience of this emotion. Eventually,
24
however, when the costs o f their empathy (e.g., a compunction to act) become clearer,
they may discontinue their viewing.
As a form o f anger, moral outrage should be associated with a high degree of
arousal (e.g., Ramirez & Andreu, 2006), and is theorized to prompt seemingly high-cost
forms of helping (e.g., preventative action). People aware of the association between their
feelings of moral outrage and their resulting desire to provide high-cost help also may
limit their exposure to situations or people eliciting this emotion. Despite these limits,
however, the outward-focused nature of both empathy and moral outrage should insulate
those experiencing these emotions from the more direct costs to self that are incurred by
self-focused emotions such as guilt.
Because of the inherent aversiveness in the experience of guilt, the effectiveness
of appeals based on guilt may be limited even without considerations of cost.
Experiencing guilt or other self-focused emotions often may be avoided (for reviews, see
Carver & Scheier, 1981, and Wicklund, 1975) and feelings of guilt therefore are rare
(Iyer et al., 2004). One way in which guilt can be evaded is through cognitive
justification (e.g., “he’s probably not really starving anyway”). Another form of cognitive
justification is victim derogation, whereby victims are dehumanized (Baumeister et al.,
1994) or blamed for their plight (Branscombe, Owen, Garstka, & Coleman, 1996). People
of course also may avoid guilt by distancing themselves physically or psychologically
from the victims (Batson, 1998). For example, in a study by Iyer et al., participants in a
self-focus (i.e., guilt-inducing) condition were more likely than those in an other-focus
25
(i.e., empathy-inducing) condition to refuse responsibility for and deny the presence of
racial discrimination, thereby avoiding guilt.
When feelings o f guilt cannot be avoided, people will be motivated to provide
help in the form of reparative action to those harmed as a way of alleviating guilt-related
distress (e.g., Salovey, Mayer, & Rosenhan, 1991; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow,
1996). When this negative state or dysphoria can otherwise be relieved, helping should
no longer occur (Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973). Hence, even guilt’s limited effects in
the promotion of reparative action also may dissipate in the face of easier and more
attractive alternatives to making one feel better.
Present Research
Two studies sought to add to our knowledge of the elicitors of three moral
emotional reactions to injustice (guilt, empathy, and moral outrage) and of their
consequences for prosocial action and observer psychological well-being by testing a
model o f moral emotional reactions to injustice. The first study, a web-based experiment,
examined the effects o f a focus-of-attention manipulation on moral emotional reactions to
a member of a disadvantaged group. Study 1 also examined the relationships between
different moral emotional reactions and two forms of psychological well-being, both
before and after participants’ endorsement of several forms of prosocial action. The
second study was intended to be a high-impact laboratory experiment designed to
examine more directly the causal mechanisms behind these moral emotions through the
use of an alternative manipulation of focus of attention. Study 2 also aimed to provide a
26
conceptual replication of the relationships examined in Study 1 between each moral
emotion and associated forms of prosocial action.
Study 1: Does Helping the Victims Harm the Observers?
Study 1 examined the elicitors and consequences of three moral emotions by
focusing upon a disadvantaged group—in this case, the working poor in America. The
plight o f the working poor was selected as a stimulus situation for several reasons. First,
the victims’ participation in the workforce would decrease the likelihood that they would
be blamed for their poverty, which might otherwise mitigate people’s perception of
injustice and subsequent moral emotional reactions. Second, using the working poor as
the disadvantaged group made it easy to provide information that focused participants’
attention on distinct actors. Third, the plight of the working poor presents a domestic
situation that has not received the major media exposure that other emotion-eliciting
events have obtained (e.g., Hurricane Katrina). Study participants therefore were unlikely
to have developed pre-existing emotional responses to the working poor. Finally, policy
makers, political activists, and others interested in fostering helping behavior are most
likely to encounter targets with similar amounts of information as the present
participants.
The first study goal was to examine whether distinct emotions would result from
varying the type of information on which participants were focused (i.e., information
relevant to the self, victim, or third-party perpetrator). The second study goal was to
examine the unique pattern of relationships between each of three moral emotional
27
reactions to the working poor and several distinct types of prosocial action (e.g.,
humanitarian aid) aimed at assisting this group. The third study goal was to offer a
preliminary examination o f the relationship between these moral emotions and the
psychological well-being of observers both before and after ratings of support for various
forms of prosocial action. The final study goal was to examine whether participants
feeling guilt will report decreases in psychological well-being before, but not after,
endorsement o f prosocial action. The relationship between specific focuses of attention
and specific moral emotions, and in turn between specific moral emotions and specific
prosocial action are represented in the conceptual diagrams below.
Predictions
Prediction 1
The first prediction for this study was that varying the type o f information on
which participants were focused would produce different moral emotional reactions to
injustice. Specifically, a self-focus would produce guilt, a victim-focus would produce
empathy, and a perpetrator-focus would produce moral outrage.
Prediction 2
The second prediction concerned the relationship between each o f the moral
emotions and support for four distinct types of prosocial action. Specifically, guilt would
be associated with support for prosocial action aimed only at reparative action. Moreover,
empathy would be associated with support for humanitarian, reparative, and preventative
28
Figure 2: Conceptual Diagram of the Hypothesized Relationships between Three
Types of Focus of Attention and Corresponding Moral Emotions
Self-Focus Guilt
Victim-Focus Empathy
Perpetrator- Moral
Focus Outrage
Figure 3: Conceptual Diagram of the Hypothesized Relationships between Three

Types of Moral Emotion and Four Types of Prosocial Action
Guilt Reparative Action
Humanitarian Action
Reparative Action
Empathy + + + and —
Preventative Action
Retributive Action
Moral
Moral Outrage
Outrage
forms o f prosocial action, and with opposition to retributive action (i.e., punishment).
Finally, moral outrage would be associated with support for both preventative and
retributive action.
Prediction 3
29
The third prediction for this study was that different moral emotional reactions to
injustice would have different effects on observer psychological well-being. Compared
with empathy and moral outrage, guilt would result in greater detriment to observers’
psychological well-being. Specifically, guilt would produce increased scores on state-
anxiety and decreased scores on state self-esteem. In contrast, empathy would not
produce changes in people’s scores on either state anxiety or state self-esteem. Finally,
moral outrage (an emotion more aversive than empathy but less aversive than guilt)
would result in scores on the two measures of psychological well-being that would be
located somewhere in between the effects produced by experiences of empathy and guilt.
Prediction 4
The fourth and final prediction for this study was that participants experiencing
guilt as a result of induced self-focus would be motivated to alleviate any associated
reductions in their psychological well-being by endorsing a prosocial action. Once they
had the opportunity to endorse prosocial action, they would no longer experience reduced
psychological well-being. Participants experiencing guilt would not report increased
scores on state-anxiety and decreased scores on state self-esteem after they had the
opportunity to endorse prosocial action.
Method
Participants
Participants were 200 introductory psychology students at the University of
California, Los Angeles (125 women, 74 men; 1 did not report) who received partial
30
credit toward the fulfillment of an optional course requirement. Participants were
recruited via email based on their responses to a family income question during mass
testing at the beginning o f the academic term. Participants indicating a family income of
$80,000 or higher were selected for the study in order to increase the likelihood that the
discrepancy between the student’s own situation and the situation of the disadvantaged
person about whom they read was a salient one. The sample of participants reflected the
ethnic diversity o f the general student body, with 1.5% African Americans, 35% Asians,
4.5% Latinos, 48.5% Whites, and 10% who indicated their ethnicity as “other.” The
sample tended to be liberal, with a mean of 3.08 (SD =1.33) on a 7-point scale of
ideology, with lower scores representing greater liberalism. Using a randomized block
procedure, participants were assigned to a control condition or one of three experimental
conditions: self-focus, victim-focus, or perpetrator-focus.
Materials and Procedure
Participants completed the study online, which helped ensure participant
anonymity and reduce social desirability concerns and on average did not appear to
negatively impact participants’ conscientiousness (e.g., in terms of number of items or
response consistency). After reading an informed consent that presented this study as “a
study concerned with people’s emotional reactions to a group of people presented in a
written passage and with their opinions about several ways of assisting the people
described,” and with “how people’s self-perceptions may relate to these emotional
31
reactions and opinions on assistance,” participants read the study introduction (modified
from Batson’s work; e.g., Batson, Sager, et al., 1997):
Today, you will read one of several test articles written for a new column
called News from the Personal Side, which is designed to capture human-
interest stories.
The goal of this series of articles is to go beyond the facts of news events
to report how these events affect the lives of the individuals involved,
thereby taking a more personal approach to news reporting. In today’s
article, you will read about a group of people called the working poor. By
“working poor,” we mean that these people are regularly employed, but
are nonetheless living below the poverty line.
Prior research has shown that an important factor affecting people’s

reactions to news media is the way in which they approach this media.
Along those lines, we ask that you give your complete attention to reading
the news article, really immersing yourself in the story presented to you.
This will help us to understand better your reactions to it and to the people
being described —in this case, the working poor. When you are ready to
read the article, move on to the next page.
Manipulating focus o f attention. In fact, all participants read a similar fictitious
article on the plight o f the working poor in the United States that differed only on the
manipulation of focus of attention. Each version of the article (see Appendix A)
contained general information about the working poor and about the plight of one
woman, Lynn Townsend, in particular. This basic information comprised the victim-
focus condition, and thereby contributed to feelings of empathy.
The other two conditions additionally included information designed to focus
participants’ attention on information relevant to the self (self-focus) or to a third-party
perpetrator (perpetrator-focus). Specifically, the self-focus condition contained
32
information about how the relatively well-off (with whom the participants ostensibly
would identify) had contributed to the plight of the working poor. For example,
participants were provided with information about the percentage of income typically
taken up by rent among the working poor, thereby allowing participants to make a
comparison with their own situation and in turn to experience guilt. A manipulation
check verified the accuracy o f the assumption that participants would perceive a
discrepancy between their own situation and the situation of the working poor.
Finally, information regarding the role of corporate abusers was included in the
perpetrator-focus condition in order to provide an identifiable third-party perpetrator of
the victims’ suffering, thereby contributing to feelings of moral outrage. For example,
participants read about “indignities imposed on the working poor by the corporations that
employ them. ..including constant surveillance, random searches of personal belongings
and random drug tests possibly including protocols requiring workers to strip down to
their undergarments and void their bladders in front of aides or technicians.”
The control condition was designed to disperse participants’ attention across the
various types o f information and thereby result in a more diffuse emotional response to
which the other conditions could be compared. This objective was accomplished by
adding to the basic information all of the additional information provided in the guilt and
moral outrage versions o f the article.
The different types of information (self, victim, third-party perpetrator) presented
in the different versions o f the stimulus article thereby established the basis for the
33
varying moral emotional reactions of guilt, empathy, and moral outrage. The primary
emotional response presumably would differ across conditions because of the information
made salient to participants. Results of each type of focus manipulation first could be
compared to one another to ascertain whether they produced the greatest effect for the
hypothesized emotion. A comparison to the control then would assist in demonstrating
that each focus manipulation produces higher levels of its corresponding emotion than the
control condition.
Measuring moral emotional reactions. After reading the stimulus article,
participants answered questions about the emotions they experienced while reading the
article. Participants rated the degree to which they experienced each of several emotions
specifying different emotional states, including guilt, empathy, and moral outrage (1 =
not at all, 7 = extremely). Five emotion adjectives were used to assess guilt: accountable,
responsible, guilty, blameworthy, and ashamed. Six emotion adjectives designed to
measure empathy were taken from prior research (for a review, see Batson, 1991): tender,
softhearted, compassionate, moved, warm, and sympathetic. Eight emotion adjectives
were used to assess moral outrage: furious, outraged, infuriated, angry, mad, enraged,
disgusted, and contempt. Emotion items measuring these three constructs then were
interleaved with 14 additional emotion items in order to preserve participant naivete.
Each set of moral emotion adjectives was aggregated to form its associated self-reported
emotion scale: guilt (a = .89), empathy (a = .81), and moral outrage (a = .94). (For a list
of emotion items, see Appendix B.)
34
Measuring psychological well-being. At two points during the study (both before
and after the measure o f support for prosocial action), participants rated the degree to
which they agreed with several statements assessing their state psychological well-being.
This was one of two major dependent measures. A modified version of the state anxiety
subscale of the well-validated State and Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger,
Gorsuch, & Luschene, 1983) was used to measure state anxiety. Participants were asked
to indicate the extent to which 20 different emotional states described how they are
feeling “right now” on a four-point scale (1 = not at all, 4 = very much). Self-esteem was
measured on a 6-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree) with ten items
from the well-validated Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1979). This scale was
adapted to reflect state self-esteem by asking participants to think about their responses to
each of the statements “right now.” Both scales were split into subscales comprising
equal numbers of items, which then were used in analyses as pre- and post-measures of
each construct (for a list of pre- and post- items, see Appendix B). The full-scale alpha
for state self-esteem was .90, while the alpha for the pre-measure was .82, and the alpha
for the post-measure was .84. The full-scale alpha for state anxiety was .93, while the
alpha for the pre-measure was .89 and the alpha for the post-measure was .88.
Measuring support fo r prosocial action. Next, participants read, “We are
interested in your honest opinions about the experiences of the working poor about whom
you have just read, and your views about the appropriateness of different types of actions
aimed at helping to improve their situation. Please share your opinion by selecting for
35
each question a number based on the scale given below.” Participants then completed
items assessing their willingness to endorse each o f four types of prosocial action (all
measured on a 9-point labeled scale with anchors at 1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly
agree). This scale, which was modeled on work by Pagano and Huo (2007), comprised
the second major dependent measure. Humanitarian action (5 items) assessed
participants’ willingness to provide basic support (e.g., “we should offer basic aid when
possible to alleviate the immediate suffering of the working poor”), while reparative
action (7 items) assessed participants’ willingness to compensate the working poor (e.g.,
“the well-off should support the replenishment of programs aimed at helping the working
poor”). Preventative action (7 items) assessed participants’ willingness to support system
change (e.g., “Laws against unfair labor practices should be developed in order to help
the working poor”), while the six items on retributive action assessed participants’
willingness to punish the victims’ third-party perpetrator (e.g., “We should ‘blow the
whistle’ on corporate leaders placing monetary gain over human welfare"). Alphas were
computed for each prosocial action: a) humanitarian action (a = .86); b) reparative action
(a =.84); c) preventative action (a = .83), and d) retributive action (a = .86). (For a list of
prosocial action items, see Appendix B.)
Manipulation checks fo r responsibility, perceived discrepancy, identification, and
perceived injustice. After completing the dependent measures, participants completed
several manipulation checks before being debriefed and thanked for their participation.
The first of the dependent measures was a question assessing the degree to which
36
participants thought distinct actors (the well-off, the working poor, and corporations)
were responsible for the plight of the working poor. Participants also completed questions
assessing the salience of the discrepancy between their situation and that of the working
poor, their degree o f identification with the well-off and with corporations, and their
perception o f injustice.
Manipulation checkfo r focus o f attention. Finally, four items were designed to
assess the degree to which participants took each of three focuses of attention or
concentrated about equally on all possible actors. Participants were asked to indicate the
extent to which they concentrated on themselves, corporations, the working poor, or
about equally on all actors when reading the passage about the working poor.
Results
Prior to computing any of the internal or substantive analyses, frequency analyses
first were computed on several items in order to determine whether data from some
participants should be excluded from analysis. Participants were excluded under the
following conditions: 1) they did not perceive the situation of the working poor to be
unfair (9 participants); 2) they did not identify with the well-off (5 participants); 3) they
identified strongly with corporations (2 participants), or 4) they felt that they were
disadvantaged compared to the working poor (1 participant). It is noteworthy that over
50% of the sample believed that the working poor were at least partially to blame for
their situation. In light o f this finding, no participants were excluded based on their
37
perceptions o f victim responsibility. In total, data from 17 participants were excluded,
reducing the total sample size to 183 from 200.
Means and standard deviations for the study’s primary variables are presented in
Appendix C.
Factor Analyses on Emotion Items
Exploratory factor analysis on emotion items. Although there were clear
expectations that the each conceptually distinct set of emotion items (for guilt, empathy,
and moral outrage) would load on factors of the same name, an exploratory approach first
was taken in order to ensure that divisions among the emotions—which are arguably the
most important study variables—were not artificially imposed. Accordingly, a two-step
approach to factor analyzing the emotion items was taken; both exploratory and
confirmatory factor analyses were performed. First, an exploratory factor analysis using
principal axis factoring and direct oblimin rotation assessed whether the conceptual
distinctions among the three emotions of interest would hold empirically. This internal
analysis revealed a simple structure, with items assessing guilt, empathy, and moral
outrage loading on three separate factors accounting for 66.51% of the variance (see
Table 1 below for factor loadings). An investigation of the scree plot additionally
suggested that these three emotions, while correlated (values of r between .38 and .51),
were distinct factors.
Confirmatory factor model fo r emotions. Next, a confirmatory factor analysis was
run testing a three-factor model with items assessing guilt, empathy, and moral outrage
38
used as indicators o f latent variables of the same names. The conceptually and
empirically related emotion factors were allowed to correlate since they should all
motivate prosocial action. The results were consistent with the EFA, demonstrating that
the three emotions represent three distinct constructs. Although the Chi-square value was
significant,^2 (167, N = 171) = 283.64,p < .00, the fit indices taken together suggested a
good model fit to the data: CFI = .95, RMSEA = .06, standardized RMR = .08. All path
coefficients were significant. The factor loadings ranged from .53 to .87 for guilt, from
.53 to .72 for empathy, and from .66 to .91 for moral outrage. The factor correlation
between empathy and guilt was estimated at .44, between empathy and moral outrage at
.55, and between guilt and moral outrage at .56. Although the three factors were
correlated, the results corroborate the conclusion that the items should be separated into
three theoretically meaningful factors. Subsequent analysis therefore treated these three
factors as separate variables.
Effectiveness o f the Focus o f Attention Manipulation
The effectiveness o f the focus of attention manipulation was assessed as follows.
Participants responded to four questions by indicating the degree to which they focused
on themselves, corporations, the working poor, or about equally on all actors when
reading the passage about the working poor. A priori predictions for these and subsequent
analyses then were tested with planned comparisons using a pooled error term. Results
revealed that mean scores for reported focus of attention on self-focus were not
39
Table 1. Exploratory Factor Analysis on Emotion Items
Item Moral Outrage Guilt Empathy
Furious .88
Outraged .87
Mad .87
Infuriated .86
Angry .85
Enraged .83
Disgusted .66
Contempt .56
Accountable .90
Guilty .88
Responsible .87
Blameworthy .72
Ashamed .58
Softhearted .78
Tender .78
Compassionate .64
Moved .57
Warm .52
Sympathetic .41
Eigenvalue 8.48 2.14 2.02

% of Variance 44.6 11.28 10.63
Note: The exploratory factor analysis used principal axis factoring with oblique rotation
(viz., oblimin with Kaiser normalization). Loadings under .30 are omitted. Emotion items
are keyed such that a higher score reflects feeling more of that emotion.
significantly higher in the self-focus condition (M= 2.16) than in the other conditions
(Ms =1.71,2.15, and 2.25 for the perpetrator-focus, victim-focus, and control conditions,
40
respectively), t(\19) = 1.05, ns. It is worth noting, however, that a contrast comparing the
victim-focus condition to the remaining conditions was significant, with those in the
victim-focus condition least likely to report being self-focused, t(179) = -3.93, p < .001.
Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance indicated that the four categories formed by
the independent variable did not have equal variances on the dependent variable, reported
victim-focus (F(3, 179) = 3.84,p < .01). Although cell sizes were not of vastly unequal
size, the results o f planned comparisons that do not assume equal variances nonetheless
are reported for this analysis. Mean scores for reported focus of attention on victim-focus
did not vary as a function of condition (Ms = 3.39, 3.48, 3.37, and 3.34 for self-focus,
victim-focus, perpetrator-focus, and control conditions, respectively), /(80.05) = ns.
Finally, for reported focus of attention on perpetrator-focus, the mean for perpetrator-
focus was significantly higher in the perpetrator-focus condition ( M - 2.74) compared to
the other conditions (Ms - 2.55,2.50, and 2.14 for self-focus, victim-focus, and control
conditions, respectively), /(179) = 2.21,/? < .05.
Does Changing O ne’s Focus o f Attention Produce Different Moral Emotions?
To assess the effectiveness of the focus of attention manipulation in inducing
distinct emotions, participants’ self-reported emotions were examined. An effective focus
of attention manipulation would result in the highest mean levels of each theoretically
proposed emotion in its associated condition (e.g., the most guilt in the self-focused
condition). Planned contrasts, with weighting consistent with study hypotheses, were
again used to test specific predictions (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985). As predicted,
41
participants experienced more guilt in the self-focus condition than in the other
conditions (M = 2.80 vs. Ms = 2.19,2.30, and 2.57 for the victim-focus, perpetrator-
focus, and control conditions, respectively; /(179) = 2.20, p < .05). However, participants
did not experience more empathy in the victim-focus condition than in the other
conditions {M= 4.05 vs. Ms = 4.00,3.84, and 3.77 for the self-focus, perpetrator-focus,
and control conditions, respectively; /(179) = 1.01, ns), or more moral outrage in the
perpetrator-focus condition than in the other conditions ( M - 3.18 vs. My = 3.06,2.97,
and 2.48 for the self-focus, victim-focus, and control conditions, respectively; /(179) =
1.59, ns). Table 2 below presents a summary of this information. Given the mixed results
of this and the above analysis, it appears that the focus of attention manipulation was not
sufficiently strong to produce the desired moral emotions. Of course, it also is possible
that, even with a stronger manipulation, varying people’s focus of attention might not in
fact have produced different emotional responses.
Moral Emotions and Support fo r Prosocial Action
Accordingly, subsequent analyses were executed instead with participants’ self-
reported emotions. The first o f these analyses was a set of simultaneous regressions with
each of the four prosocial actions regressed on guilt, empathy, and moral outrage. See
Table 3 for zero-order correlations and a summary of the regressions.
Predicting humanitarian action. When the emotions were entered into a
simultaneous multiple regression, they accounted for 21% of the variance in humanitarian
action (p < .001). Only empathy had been hypothesized to be a predictor of humanitarian
42
action. Surprisingly, empathy did not emerge as a significant predictor of humanitarian
action (fi = .10, ns). Also contrary to predictions, increases in guilt were associated with
corresponding increases in support for humanitarian action (ft= .18, p < .05). Finally,
moral outrage surprisingly also was the strongest predictor of humanitarian action (fi =
.30,/? < .001), such that increases in feelings of moral outrage were associated with
greater support of humanitarian action.
Predicting reparative action. The three moral emotions together predicted 28% of
the variance in support for reparative action (p < .001). Both guilt and empathy were
hypothesized to be predictors of reparative action. As predicted, increased guilt was a
significant and positive predictor of greater support for reparative action (J3 = .32,/? <
.001). However, empathy failed to emerge as a significant predictor of reparative action
(P = .07, ns). Also unexpectedly, moral outrage was positively associated with increases
in support for reparative action (fi = .24,/? < .001).
Predicting preventative action. The three moral emotions predicted 16% of the
variance in support for preventative action (p < .001). Only empathy and moral outrage
were hypothesized to be predictors of preventative action. Results emerged as predicted
for all three emotions and support for preventative action. Guilt was not a significant
predictor o f preventative action ifi = .02, ns). Empathy was a significant predictor of
preventative action (fi = .20,/? <.01), with increases in empathy associated with greater
support for preventative action. Finally, moral outrage was a significant positive
43
predictor, with increases in moral outrage associated with increases in support for
preventative action ifi = .27, p < .01 ).
Predicting retributive action. Guilt, empathy, and moral outrage predicted 12% of
the variance in support for retributive action (p < .001). Only empathy and moral outrage
were hypothesized to be predictors of retributive action, with increases in empathy
associated with increased opposition to retributive action, and increases in moral outrage
associated with increased support for retributive action. As predicted, guilt did not predict
support for retributive action (fi = -.11, ns). Notably, empathy was a significant and
positive predictor o f retributive action (fi = .25, p < .01). In the present context, increases
in empathy were associated with greater support for punishment of perpetrators. Finally,
consistent with hypotheses, moral outrage was a significant positive predictor of
retributive action {fi = .23,/? < .001). Increases in feelings of moral outrage were
associated with increased support for punishing perpetrators.
Moral Emotions and Observer Psychological Well-Being
Next, to examine the relationship between the moral emotions and two forms of
psychological well-being, a second set o f simultaneous regressions was run. These
analyses were conducted with measures of psychological well-being collected both
before and after participants indicated their degree of support for four forms of prosocial
action. Guilt, empathy, and moral outrage were entered as predictors of: 1) state self
esteem, and 2) state anxiety. See Table 4 for zero-order correlations and summary of
regressions.
44
Table 2. Effect of Focus of Attention on Moral Emotion
Self-Focus Victim-Focus Perpetrator-Focus Control

M (SD) t M (SD) t M (SD) t M (SD)
Guilt 2.80(1.25) 2.20* 2.19(1.24) 2.30(1.10) 2.57(1.30)
Empathy 4.00 (.86 ) 4.05 (.97) 1.01 3.84(1.12) 3.77(1.01)
Moral Outrage 3.06(1.13) 2.97(1.43) 3.18(1.18) 1.59 2.48(1.25)
Note: For all comparisons, total N = 183. Bolded numbers represent means hypothesized
to be highest in each condition
*p < .05
Table 3. Regressions and Zero-Order Correlations Between Moral Emotions and Prosocial Actions
Humanitarian Action Reparative Action Preventative Action Retributive Action

r_________ £_________ r_________£________ R________ /?________r 0
Predictors
Emotions
Guilt 3 7 *** .18* 4g*** 32*** .23** .02 .10 -.11
Empathy .10 31*** .07 3 4 *** .2 0 ** 31*** .25**
Moral Outrage 4 3 *** 3Q*** 2 9 *** 2 4 *** 3 7 *** .27** 29*** 2 3 ***
Adjusted R2 = 2 i*** .28*** 16*** 12 ***

N= 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183
* p < .05. **/? < .01. * * * p < .001

Predicting state self-esteem. Guilt, empathy, and moral outrage together only
predicted a non-significant 1-2% of the variance in state self-esteem measured before and
after endorsement o f prosocial action. For this reason, the relationships among the
predictor and dependent variables cannot be interpreted directly. It is notable, however,
that the overall pattern of results patterned similarly to the zero-order correlations. As
predicted, guilt was associated with lower reported state self-esteem (fi = - A7 , p < .05)
measured before endorsement of prosocial action but was unassociated with self-esteem
reported after endorsement o f prosocial action (fi = -.14, ns). Also as predicted, neither
empathy nor moral outrage significantly predicted participants’ reported self-esteem,
either before (fis = -.06, ns and .02, ns) or after ifis - -.03, ns and -.00, ns) indicating their
support for various forms o f prosocial action.
Predicting state anxiety. Guilt, empathy, and moral outrage explained 7-11% of
the variance in state anxiety measured both before and after endorsement of prosocial
action (ps < .001). Unexpectedly, guilt did not emerge as a significant predictor of
anxiety, either before (fi = .04, ns) or after (fi = .10, ns) endorsement of prosocial action.
As predicted, empathy also was not associated with state anxiety either before (fi = .03,
ns) or after (fi = .03, ns) endorsement of prosocial action. Although stronger than
predicted, an interesting relationship emerged between moral outrage and state anxiety,
such that, as participants experienced greater degrees of more moral outrage, they
experienced corresponding higher state anxiety both before (fi = .32, p < .001) and, to a
47
seemingly lesser extent, after (fi = .21 ,P < .05) indicating their support for four forms of
prosocial action.
Structural Equation Model o f Moral Emotional Reactions to Injustice
It should be emphasized that structural equation modeling is a confirmatory
approach, which can be used to test the fit of proposed theoretical models to the data.
However, given the combined results of the planned contrasts and regressions just above,
the originally proposed model in fact cannot be tested. Instead, a modified and truncated
version of the model examining the relationships between the moral emotions and their
consequences was run, with the proposed system of relationships based upon the results
of the earlier regression analysis. This analysis is performed with the caveat and
understanding that future work must seek to test this and/or the proposed model in an
independent sample.
In order to examine the full system of relationships suggested by the results
above, structural equation modeling was employed using EQS 6 .1 (Bentler, 2003).
However, before testing the structural model, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was
conducted to test the latent factor structures of the different prosocial actions and
measures of psychological well-being (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993). The results of the
earlier CFA on emotions also were considered. For all CFAs performed, factors were
allowed to correlate, as they were theoretically and empirically related. For all analyses,
the data appeared to be multivariate non-normal; therefore, the robust statistics were
interpreted and reported. For all CFAs, one path from each factor was fixed to one, for
48
Table 4. Regressions and Zero-Order Correlations Between Moral Emotions and Psychological Well-Being
Self-Esteem (Pre) Self-Esteem (Post) Anxiety (Pre) Anxiety (Post)

fi fi r fi fi
Predictors
Emotions
Guilt -.18* -.17* -.15* -.14 .2 1 ** .04 .2 2 ** .10
Empathy -.11 -.06 -.09 -.03 .2 0 ** .03 .17* .03
Moral Outrage -.09 .02 -.09 -.00 3 5 *** 32*** 28*** .2 1 *
Adjusted R2 = .02 .01 1 j*** 07***

N= 183 183 183 183 183 183 183 183
* p < .05. * * p < . 01. * * * p < . 001

identification purposes. Since the sample size used for this analysis is less than 200, fit
indices such as RMSEA and CFI (which are less sensitive to problems introduced by
small sample size in SEM; Hu & Bentler, 1995; Fan, Thompson, & Wang, 1999) are
among those chosen for examination.
Factor model fo r prosocial actions. A one-factor model for prosocial actions first
was run to examine whether the prosocial actions represented one overarching construct.
The one-factor model provided a very poor model fit to the data, as indicated by the
combined results from the Chi-square and the fit indices, /2 (252, N = 171) = 780.03, p
< .00, CFI = .67, RMSEA = .11, standardized RMR = .11. Clearly, these results indicate
that the single factor model does not fit the data.
Subsequent analysis instead offers a test of the proposed four-factor model for
prosocial action. Items assessing support for humanitarian, reparative, preventative, and
retributive actions were used as indicators of their correspondent latent factors. These
factors were allowed to correlate, as they are conceptually and empirically related (zero-
order correlations ranging from .35 to .68 ). The Chi-square value was significant,
(246, N =171) = 416.75,p < .00, and mixed results of the alternative indices suggest that
the model fit to the data was adequate at best, CFI = .89, RMSEA = .06, standardized
RMR = .07. All path coefficients were significant, although caution should be used in
their interpretation. For humanitarian action, the factor loadings for the humanitarian
action items ranged from .66 to .76, while the factor loadings for the reparative action
items ranged from .79 to .85 for reparative action. For preventative action, the factor
50
loadings ranged from .41 to .75 for the preventative action items, while the factor
loadings for the retributive action items ranged from .61 to .75 for retributive action. The
estimated factor correlations were a) humanitarian action and reparative action—.77; b)
humanitarian action and preventative action— .81; c) humanitarian action and retributive
action— .56; d) reparative and preventative action— .61; e) reparative and retributive
action—.44; and f) preventative and retributive action—.83. The overall pattern of results
provides tentative support for the division of the items into four theoretically meaningful
factors.
Factor models fo r measures ofpsychological well-being (pre- and post-). Items
assessing support for self-esteem and anxiety were used as indicators of their
correspondent latent factors. For both CFAs (i.e., for measures of psychological well
being administered both before and after endorsement o f prosocial action), the factors
were allowed to correlate as they are conceptually and empirically related (zero-order
correlations ranging from -.35 (for a CFA on the pre- measures) to .75 (for a CFA on the
post- measures). For the measures of psychological well-being administered before
endorsement o f prosocial action: The Chi-square value was significant,^ (89, N =178) =
250.03,p < .00 and the descriptive measures of fit indicate a relatively poor model fit to
the data, CFI = .85, RMSEA = .10, standardized RMR = .08. Similarly, for the measures
of psychological well-being administered after endorsement of prosocial action: The Chi-
square value was significant,^ (89, N =178) = 300.85,/? < .00 and the descriptive
measures o f fit indicate a poor model fit to the data, CFI = .80, RMSEA = .12,
51
standardized RMR = .09. To ensure that these results were not simply a product of the
division made between the items from the original scales, a third CFA was run on the full
scale (i.e., both pre- and post- items) both for self-esteem and for anxiety. This model
also provided a poor fit to the data: £ (404, N =173) = 970.34,/? < .00; CFI = .76,
RMSEA = .09, standardized RMR = .09.
Modeling Emotions and Prosocial Action
Because the measurement models for the psychological well-being factors were
not upheld, an examination of a model incorporating psychological well-being was
inappropriate. Instead, a truncated version of the model was examined, in order to
provide an evaluation o f the structural relationships between the moral emotions and
prosocial actions. A partial disaggregation model (Bagozzi & Heatherton, 1994; Bandalos
& Finney, 2001) was used to reduce problems introduced by highly complex models (e.g.
increased measurement error, inflated standard errors). This kind of model utilizes
aggregates of items (i.e., item parceling) to create two or more indicators per latent
construct.
The model included the following originally hypothesized paths from each
emotion to its correspondent action tendency: guilt to reparative action, empathy to
preventative action and retributive action, and moral outrage to preventative action and
retributive action. Paths from empathy to humanitarian action and to reparative action
were not included in this model. The following additional paths suggested by the results
of the regression analysis were included in this model: moral outrage to humanitarian
52
action and reparative action, and guilt to humanitarian action. Correlations among the
empathy, guilt, and moral outrage variables were allowed.1 (for a visual representation of
the relationships modeled, see Figure 4.)
Despite the modifications made to the original model, the revised model
nonetheless provided a relatively poor fit to the data: scaled (339, N = 175) = 672.56,/?
< .00; CFI = .88, RMSEA = .08, standardized RMR = .13. For the purposes of
examination, path coefficients are presented. Perhaps unsurprisingly, with only one
exception, the pattern of significant relationships (p < .05) found mimicked that of the
individual regressions. Latent constructs explained a substantial amount of variance in
observed variables (R ranged from .39 to .87). Guilt was a significant predictor of
reparative action (fi - .38) but also of humanitarian action (fi - .22). Empathy predicted
preventative action (fi - .26), and retributive action (fi = .29). Moral outrage predicted
humanitarian action (P = .46), reparative action (P = .36), and preventative action (P =
.38), but was not a significant predictor of retributive action (P = .19). The model
explained 37% of the variance in support for humanitarian actions, 41% of the variance
in reparative actions, 33% of the variance in preventative actions, and 18% of the
variance in retributive actions. The Lagrangian Multiplier test (for adding parameters)
was examined to determine whether the addition of any structural paths (i.e., between
1 In this partial disaggregation model, all factors had four indicators. Factor correlations
ranged from .46 to .58. Factor loadings ranged from .67 to .92 for the emotion factors and
from .62 to .93 for the prosocial action factors.
53
factors) would produce a significant reduction in the Chi-square value for this model.
Results from this test did not strongly suggest the addition of any paths. A summary of
these findings is presented in Table 5 below.
Figure 4: Conceptual Diagram of Modeled Relationships Between Moral Emotions

and Prosocial Action
Humanitarian
Action
Guilt
Reparative
Action
Empathy
Preventative
Action
Moral
Outrage
Retributive
Action
Do perceptions o f responsibility (blame) predict people’s moral emotional
reactions? Variations in focus of attention were not sufficient to produce distinct moral
emotions. A body of work suggests that attributions can play a role in the type of
emotions people experience (for instructive examples, see Roseman, 2004 and Weiner,
2006). Attributions o f blame to the self and to the perpetrator have been shown in prior
54
work to predict distinct moral emotions such as guilt and moral outrage, respectively
(e.g., Pagano & Huo, 2007). In the present study, perceptions of responsibility (otherwise
referred to as blame) may succeed where focus of attention failed: in predicting
differentiated moral emotional reactions to injustice. In order to examine this possibility,
a set of simultaneous regressions with each of the three moral emotions regressed on
blame attributed to the self (as identified with the well-off), the victim, or a third-party
perpetrator (i.e., corporations). Consistent with the Pagano and Huo research and with the
present conceptualization, we would expect that blame attributed to the self (i.e., to a
group with which one identifies—the well-off) would be associated with feelings of guilt,
whereas blame attributed to a third-party perpetrator would be associated with feelings of
moral outrage. Blame attributed to the victims should mitigate feelings of empathy for
them (e.g., Weiner, 2006) but may not preclude empathy if empathy was experienced
prior to making the blame attribution (e.g., Batson, Polycarpou, et al., 1997). See Table 6
below for zero-order correlations and summary of regressions.
Predicting guilt. When attributions of blame were entered into a simultaneous
multiple regression, they accounted for 17% of the variance in guilt (p < .001). As would
be expected, blame attributed to the self (i.e., the well-off) was a strong and significant
predictor of participants’ feelings of guilt (fi = 31, p < .001). An increase in blame
attributed to the victims was associated with a decreased likelihood of experiencing guilt
(fi = -.15, p < .05). Unsurprisingly, attributions of blame to the third-party perpetrator
were not associated with feelings of guilt (fi = .09, ns).
55
Table 5: Summary of Findings from Structural Equation Model of Moral Emotions
and Prosocial Action
Humanitarian Reparative Preventative Retributive

Action Action Action Action
P P P P
Predictors
Emotions
Guilt .2 2 * .38*
Empathy — -- .26* .29*
Moral Outrage .46* .36* .38* .19
r 2= .37* .41* .33* .18*
Note: X2 (339, N = 1 7 5 )= 672.56, p < .00; CFI = .88 , RMSEA

= .08, standardized RMR = .13.
Predicting empathy. When attributions of blame were entered into a simultaneous
multiple regression, they accounted for 9% of the variance in empathy (p < .001). The
expected pattern of results here is somewhat less clear than those either for guilt or moral
outrage when considering (for example) both the findings from Weiner (2006) and
Batson, Polycarpou, et al. (1997). This analysis revealed that blame attributed to the self
(i.e., the well-off) was a weak but significant predictor o f participants’ feelings of
empathy (fi = .16, p < .05). Blame attributed to the victims was unassociated with
56
empathy {fi = -.07, ns). Blame attributed to the third-party perpetrator was significantly
associated with feelings of empathy {fi = .23, p < .01).
Predicting moral outrage. When attributions of blame were entered into a
simultaneous multiple regression, they accounted for 16% of the variance in moral
outrage (p < .001). As would be expected, blame attributed to the third-party perpetrator
(i.e., corporations) was a significant predictor of participants’ feelings of moral outrage {fi
= .25, p < .001). Interestingly, similar to the results for guilt, an increase in blame
attributed to the victims was associated with a decreased likelihood of experiencing moral
outrage {fi = -.19, p < .01). Attributions of blame to the self (i.e., the well-off)
surprisingly were associated with feelings of moral outrage (fi = 2 \ , p < .01 ); however,
given the way in which anger was measured in this study, the emotional response
resulting from attributions o f blame to the self may more accurately reflect general
feelings o f anger rather than moral outrage directed at a perpetrator bringing harm.
Discussion
Study 1 was designed to provide an initial test of a model of moral emotional
reactions to injustice. This model posited that people’s emotional reactions to injustice
might vary as a function o f their focus of attention. Experiencing different emotions in
turn may lead people to endorse different forms of prosocial action in response to the
injustice. The type of emotion experienced also may influence the observer’s own
psychological well-being. For people experiencing self-focused emotions (e.g., guilt),
endorsing prosocial action may be one way of alleviating the negative effects of emotion
57
Table 6: Regressions and Zero-Order Correlations between Attributions of Blame and Moral Emotions
Guilt Empathy Moral Outrage

r_________ r________ H________ r________ §_
Predictors
Attributions o f Blame
Blame the Self (Well-Off) 40*** 2 7 *** 2 3 *** 16* 30*** 21**
Blame the Working Poor -.15* -.15* -.07 -.07 -.19* -.19**
Blame Third-Party .22** .09 .28*** 23** 33*** 2 5 ***

Perpetrator (Corporations)
Adjusted R2= iy*** 09*** ig***

N= 182-183 182 182-183 182 182-183 182
on psychological well-being. Once prosocial action is endorsed, this discomfort should be
alleviated.
Study 1 produced only weak support for the link between focus of attention and
distinct moral emotions. A manipulation check on the focus of attention manipulation
indicated that participants reported a focus of attention consistent with their assigned
condition in only one planned contrast. Specifically, participants reported a greater focus
on corporations in the perpetrator-focus condition. A test of the hypothesis that focus of
attention would lead to moral emotion also revealed only one significant planned
contrast: participants reported greater guilt in the self-focus condition. Because the results
of these two analyses presented different pictures of the effectiveness of the focus of
attention manipulation, it is important to consider that focus of attention did not in fact
have any meaningful effects on emotions.
Why might this manipulation have failed in Study 1? As part of the study design,
participants were assigned to read one of four versions (three experimental and one
control) o f an article about the working poor that varied their focus of attention by
including and emphasizing information relevant to the self, the victim, a third-party
perpetrator, or about equally on all actors. Compared to the article designed to evoke
empathy, which included information only about the victim, the other versions of the
article included information about the victim but also about the potential actors bringing
harm to the victim. This design was purposeful; without information about the victim, it
would have been difficult to generate either guilt or moral outrage on her behalf.
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Nonetheless, for both the self-focus and perpetrator-focus versions of the article, the
proportion o f victim-focused information was relatively large in comparison with the
information directing attention to another actor (the well-off or corporations).
As a function of this design, participants may have felt primarily empathy across
all conditions. An examination of the means for empathy revealed that participants
experienced similar levels of empathy in each condition. Collapsing across condition,
participants did appear to experience more empathy (M= 3.92) than either guilt (M=
2.48) or moral outrage ( M - 2.93). It is of note that the mean levels of all three emotions
nonetheless were low, with only the mean for empathy higher than the midpoint for the
scale. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given their common designation as moral emotions, the
correlations among these emotions were high. The high degree o f correlation may have
arisen in part because empathic affects have been argued by some researchers to provide
a basis for other moral emotions (e.g., Hoffman, 2000).
Nonetheless, the discrete moral emotions of guilt, empathy, and moral outrage
appeared to produce unique patterns of association with support for the four prosocial
actions (i.e., humanitarian action, reparative action, preventative action, and retributive
action) in regressions controlling for the effects of each other emotion. The low means
and high correlations suggest that these results should be interpreted with caution.
However, a demonstration that these emotions are associated with support for different
types o f action in other work (e.g., Iyer et al., 2004; Pagano & Huo, 2007) in turn
suggests that these results are not spurious.
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As predicted, guilt emerged as a significant positive predictor of reparative action.
The more guilt that participants felt, the more likely they were to support actions that
were aimed at making reparation for the transgressions brought about by the relatively
well-off—a group with which they identified. Hypothesized positive associations also
emerged between moral outrage and both preventative action and retributive action.
Moral outrage was associated with support for actions aimed at preventing the perpetrator
from bringing future harm and at punishing the perpetrator for wrongs already
committed. While empathy indeed did predict support for preventative action (as
hypothesized), it was surprisingly unassociated with support either for humanitarian
action or for reparative action. Particularly surprising was the finding that empathy was
positively associated with support for retributive action. In prior work (e.g., Pagano &
Huo, 2007), empathy was associated with decreased support for punishment of
perpetrators. In the present study, empathy instead seemed to best promote actions that
were aimed at assisting the victims more directly. Furthermore, empathy generally has
been shown to decrease aggression toward others (for a review o f empathy’s effects on
aggression and antisocial behavior, see Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). Also noteworthy was
the finding that moral outrage predicted support both for humanitarian action and for
reparative action. In the present study, moral outrage appeared to be associated with the
broad support for multiple forms of prosocial action that was hypothesized for empathy.
These findings differ somewhat from the Pagano and Huo (2007) study that
examined the same moral emotional reactions to injustice and support for prosocial
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actions aimed at assisting Iraqi citizens in the context of the War in Iraq. It may be the
case that context and/or degree of media exposure may affect the way in which moral
emotions influence support for prosocial action. While the Pagano and Huo study
examined a well-publicized international event, the present work instead examined a
domestic situation that has received little to no media attention. Before any conclusions
can be drawn from the present findings, however, these results should be replicated in
another sample.
Significant relationships also emerged between moral emotions and psychological
well-being. These relationships changed as a function of whether the measures of
psychological well-being were administered before or after participants had an
opportunity to endorse prosocial action. As predicted, participants who felt guilt reported
lower state self-esteem prior to, but not after, endorsement of prosocial action.
Interestingly, participants who felt moral outrage (but not those who felt guilt, as
hypothesized) reported higher state anxiety both before and after endorsement of
prosocial action. An examination of the anxiety scales, which included items such as “I
feel tense” (pre-) and “I feel relaxed” (post-; reversed) reveals that their content was not
inconsistent with the feelings one is likely to experience when feeling moral outrage.
These findings suggest that the association between guilt and psychological well-being
may be quite specific—limited to forms of psychological well-being that have a high
degree o f self relevance—and that this association also may be quite short-lived. In
contrast, moral outrage may have more general and enduring effects on psychological
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well-being; this supposition is consistent with the conceptualization of moral outrage as a
high-impact emotion (Leach et al., 2002).
Study 2: Injustice and Emotions in the Laboratory
Study 2 was intended as a conceptual replication of Study 1, which would provide
a “hard test” o f the relationships between and among focus of attention, emotional
reactions to injustice, and each of four prosocial actions. Portions of the Study 2
methodology were adapted from a study by Batson et al. (2003: Study 2) investigating
morality and perspective-taking. The basic scenario presented to participants was one in
which they would perform a main study task, receiving rewards in the form of chances
toward a cash prize for each correct answer on the exercise. Participants were led to
believe that they would complete this task as one of three group members participating at
different times, and would have different study roles (i.e., the person allocating chances
toward the cash prize or one of two observers). All participants in fact would be assigned
the role of observer, although they would believe that this assignment had been random.
The method in which chances toward the cash prize were assigned presented a zero-sum
conflict between the participant’s and allocator’s interests and the interest of the
remaining observer. Use of this set-up was aimed at ensuring that participants would
recognize the disadvantage faced by the other observer, and at allowing the independent
variable—focus of attention—to be varied with relative ease. Since the conflict was
presumably real, and not imagined, this study set-up also enabled actual behavior to be
observed.
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A change that was made from Study 1 to Study 2 was to eliminate the condition in
which participants’ focus of attention was dispersed across all three actors (self, victim,
and third-party perpetrator). In Study 1, this condition was intended to function as a
control condition, which could be used to reflect participants’ baseline levels of each
emotion. However, in the present instantiation of the study variables, having participants
focus about equally on all actors when thinking about the cash prize allocation does not
appear to provide a meaningful basis for comparison. Results of each focus manipulation
instead will be compared to one another to ascertain whether the predicted focus-emotion
relationship is the strongest of all the focus-emotion relationships for each condition.
With the elimination of the condition that dispersed participants’ focus of
attention across several actors, Study 2 therefore examined the impact of self, victim, and
third-party perpetrator focuses of attention on participants’ feelings of guilt, empathy, and
moral outrage. Participants’ support for four types of prosocial action (humanitarian,
reparative, preventative, and retributive) then was measured.
Predictions
Similar to Study 1, the following predictions were made.
Prediction 1
While guilt will result from a self-focused perspective, empathy will result from a
victim-focused perspective, and moral outrage will result from a perpetrator-focused
perspective.
Prediction 2
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Guilt will be associated with support for prosocial action aimed only at reparative
action. Empathy instead will be associated with support for humanitarian, reparative, and
preventative forms o f prosocial action, and with opposition to retributive action (i.e.,
punishment). Finally, moral outrage will be associated with support both for preventative
and retributive action.
Method
Participants
A total of 62 introductory psychology students (49 women, 13 men) were
recruited at the University o f California, Los Angeles, and received one hour of credit for
their participation. The sample of participants once again reflected the ethnic diversity of
the general student body, with 3.2% African Americans, 53.2% Asians, 12.9% Latinos,
27.4% Whites, and 3.2% who indicated their ethnicity as “other.” The sample, on
average, tended to be politically moderate, with a mean of 3.45 (SD = 1.52) on a 7-point
scale o f ideology, with lower scores representing greater liberalism. Using a randomized
block procedure, participants were assigned to one of three experimental conditions: self
focus, victim-focus, or perpetrator-focus.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were run individually and they completed the study in a small, private
room. All study materials other than the informed consent sheets were contained within
spiral ring binders, separated into sections based on content. Each section was set apart
by a page with a picture of a stop sign and a note to please speak with the experimenter
65
before moving on. After reading the informed consent form and indicating their desire to
take part in the study, participants then were asked to open their study binders and read a
written introduction, which described the study as:
.. .part of an ongoing research project investigating how a variety of task

characteristics affects people’s feelings and reactions about performing a
given task. In the present study, we are primarily interested in how
positive task consequences—where correct responses are rewarded, and
there are no consequences for incorrect responses—affect people’s
feelings and reactions to the main task you will perform today—the Island
Survival Task.
Participants also read in the study introduction that their correct answers on the Island
Survival Task would be rewarded with chances toward a $150 cash prize. To ensure that
participants cared about the consequences, they were later informed by the experimenter
that only participants in the study would be eligible for the cash prize; they would
therefore have a good chance of winning.
Participants, who were told that they were part of a three-person group whose
members would be participating at different times, also read information about their
study roles:
As a participant in today’s study, you are assigned a study role. The first
of three consecutive participants signed up for this study will always be
the allocator—i.e., the person who chooses how chances toward the $150
cash prize will be assigned (in other words, s/he assigns the task
consequences with which we’re concerned). We’re suggesting a guideline
o f equality, so that everyone gets the same outcome, although the allocator
gets to choose how she or he would like to assign consequences. The
second and third participants will be observers—that is, they will
“observe” how chances toward the $150 cash prize have been allocated
and may receive chances toward this prize but will not play an active role
in assigning how these chances will be allocated. All participants’
66
identities will remain anonymous throughout the study.
The experimenter then told participants that she would take a moment to briefly
review the information from the introduction, as well as go over a few additional study
details. In addition to summarizing the main points from the study introduction, the
experimenter also told participants that their other two group members already had taken
part in the study. Further, because the allocator role had already been assigned in their
group, the method o f allocation had been determined. All participants were told that their
group’s (in reality, fictional) allocator had chosen to allocate chances toward the cash
prize in the following way: while the allocator him or herself and the third member of the
group (the actual participant) each would receive two chances toward the cash prize for
each correct answer on the Island Survival Task, the second participant would receive no
chances at all, regardless of his or her outcome on the Island Survival Task.
The experimenter then added, “so, it looks like you’ve got the good end of this
deal and the other observer lost out.” This verbal aside was intended to indicate explicitly
to the participant that s/he was unjustly overbenefited, thereby establishing the
participant’s relative advantage and presumably increasing the participant’s perception
that unfairness had transpired. There is evidence suggesting that when injustice is
reported directly by the experimenter—as opposed to being reported by the person
experiencing the injustice—participants’ judgments of unfairness increase (van den Bos
& Lind, 2001). Further, the work by van den Bos and Lind indicates that participants may
be sensitive to the unfairness implicit in unequal treatment. Given this general sensitivity
67
to injustice, the unfair treatment of others can be as powerful a consideration of justice
judgments as participants’ own unfair treatment. A manipulation check was included in
order to ascertain participants’ actual perceptions of unfairness.
Before moving on to the first set of questionnaires, participants were told by the
experimenter that they would have an opportunity to read their group allocator’s
explanation for why he or she had allocated chances toward the cash prize in the way
chosen. All participants read the following, which was written in block letters on a sheet
of paper whose formatting resembled a questionnaire that the participants themselves
later would fill out:
Well, I figured I’d have a better chance at winning the money if I could
totally eliminate one o f the other people from the game. I don’t really need
the money but its a hundred and fifty bucks—that would be awesome.
Since I knew I was being kinda unfair, I didn’t want to get rid of both
people, you know? But I figured “no big deal” if I get rid of one. Also,
there was no rule against this.. .so I decided that I’d give no tickets at all to
the second person. I don’t really know what they’re like, but I don’t really
care— I figured it doesn’t really matter, especially if I have a better chance
of getting the money.
Participants were given an opportunity at this time to ask any questions about what they
had read or been told.
Manipulation checkfo r comprehension o f allocations made fo r the cash prize.
Next, participants were told that, in order to ensure careful understanding of the positive
task consequences and allocation method, they would be asked to complete a brief
questionnaire reviewing this information. This questionnaire was designed with the broad
goals o f deciphering whether the experimental instructions had been adequate and
68
whether any participants had misunderstood the implications of these instructions. This
questionnaire presumably also helped reinforce the cover story. (For a list of items, see
Appendix D.)
The instructions on this questionnaire indicated to participants that they should
complete only those items that applied to their study role (allocator or observer). All
participants o f course should have responded only to those items designed for observers
to answer. Specifically, observers were asked: a) “How will the chances toward the $150
cash prize be allocated today?” (six labeled response options); b) “Is your selection above
the type o f allocation that the experimenter suggested for allocating chances toward the
$150 cash prize?” (yes/no response format); and c) “If the allocation is different from
what the experimenter suggested, then what suggestion did the experimenter have?” (five
labeled response options).
After completing this questionnaire, participants came to a page that instructed
them to stop before moving on in order to speak with the experimenter. The experimenter
once again offered participants the opportunity to ask any questions they might have had
about the method of allocation or the items designed to assess how they thought chances
would be allocated. After comprehension was ensured, participants then were asked to
move on to the next questionnaire, which contained the manipulation o f the independent
variable— focus o f attention.
Manipulating focus o f attention. The instructions explained that, in addition to
studying the effects that rewards have on people’s reactions to a study task, the
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experimenters also were interested in studying how the allocation decision that was made
by the allocator would affect people’s reactions to the task and to the people involved.
Participants then were asked to think about the assignment of chances toward the $150
cash prize in a particular way, in order to help the experimenters understand how the
assignment was perceived. At this point, participants received one of three sets of
instructions designed to manipulate their focus of attention.
For participants in the self-focus condition, the instructions read as follows:
“Think about the way chances toward the $150 cash prize were assigned to you and what
that means for the other observer’s outcomes.” For participants in the victim-focus
condition, the instructions read as follows: “Think about the way chances toward the
$150 cash prize were assigned to the other observer and what that means for his/her
outcomes.” For participants in the perpetrator-focus condition, participants read: “Think
about the way chances toward the $150 cash prize were assigned by the allocator and
what that means for the other observer’s outcomes.” The experimenter was unaware of
which focus o f attention instructions a given participant received. All participants were
then asked, “Since the success of the study depends on how well you carry out these
instructions, please re-read them and be sure you have them clearly in mind. Once you
have the instructions clearly in mind and have done what they asked, please turn to the
next page.” On the next page, participants were instructed to take two minutes to write
about their reactions to the way in which chances toward the $150 cash prize were
allocated. All participants were asked to think about the way chances were assigned in a
70
way that was consistent with the condition to which they had been assigned. A sample set
of instructions (in this case, for the self-focus condition) read as follows:
In the spaces below, you will have about two minutes to write about your
reactions to the way in which chances toward the $150 cash prize were
assigned, thinking about the way chances were assigned to you and what
that means for the other observer’s outcomes. Thank you!
At the bottom of this page, participants were asked to “please continue.”
Measuring emotional reactions. After writing about their reactions to the way that
chances toward the cash prize were assigned, participants completed a questionnaire on
their emotional reactions, which allowed for a test o f the hypothesis that different
emotions would follow from different focuses of attention. This questionnaire contained
28 statements designed to capture several possible emotional reactions to the way in
which chances toward the cash prize were allocated. For each statement, participants
were asked to report how much they had experienced that emotion in reaction to the
allocation (1 = very strongly disagree, 5 = neither disagree nor agree, 9 = very strongly
agree). Three items were used to assess participants’ feelings of guilt over the allocation
method (e.g., “I feel guilty thinking about the way I benefited from the way in which
chances toward the $150 cash prize were assigned”). Similarly, three items were used to
assess participants’ feelings of empathy toward the (in reality, fictional) other participant
regarding the allocation method (e.g., “I feel sympathy for the other participant for the
way in which the chances toward the $150 cash prize were allocated”). Three items also
were used to assess participants’ feelings of moral outrage toward the allocator based on
71
the allocation method (e.g., “I feel mad at the allocator for harming the other observer
with his or her method of distributing chances toward the $150 cash prize”). (For a list of
items, see Appendix D.)
These items were interleaved with distractor items that assessed other emotions
and/or would not apply to the participant in his or her role as observer. Items that were
inapplicable to participants’ situation were included in order to help maintain the cover
story that participants were told at the initiation of the study and to prevent hypothesis
guessing. Participants were told that they should answer only those items that applied to
their study role and to their specific circumstance (i.e., items that made sense based on
their group allocator’s ostensible method of allocation).
Island Survival Task and reactions questionnaire. After completing the emotional
reactions questionnaire, participants were asked to move on to what they thought was the
main study task—the Island Survival Task—on which they believed they would earn two
chances for each correct answer. Participants first read a brief task introduction that asked
them to imagine themselves on a deserted island with only 13 items available for their
use (e.g., stone flint, sails from their ship, etc.). Next, participants were asked to detail
uses for each of the items and to think about ways in which the items could be combined.
After participants completed this task, the experimenter collected participants’ answer
sheets in order to “score” them. In reality, participants’ performance on this task was not
assessed. To keep consistency with the cover story, participants then completed an eight-
item questionnaire aimed at assessing their reactions to the Island Survival Task (e.g.,
72
“How interesting was the Island Survival Task” and “How much would you like to play
similar games?”).
Measuring support fo r prosocial action. Participants then encountered a set of
three brief questionnaires that appeared to be directed either at the allocator or at the
observers. Participants were told to complete only the questionnaires appropriate for their
role and only to complete those items that they felt were applicable to their situation. The
first of these three questionnaires was directed at the allocator. The primary dependent
variable—support for prosocial action—was found on one of two observer questionnaires
that participants were told to complete if they believed the other observer had been
underbenefited. Participants were told to complete the other observer questionnaire if
they felt that they themselves had been underbenefited (in actuality, no participants
should have completed this questionnaire). These questionnaires were included to keep
consistency with the cover story and contained items parallel to the items on the primary
dependent variable. Participants should not in actuality have completed more than one
questionnaire, instead writing “not applicable” at the top of the additional forms. The
questionnaire measuring the primary dependent variable began with the following:
Although we recommend a rule of equality to those choosing the allocator

role, allocators do not always in fact decide to distribute chances toward
the $150 cash prize in this way. If this is currently the case, and you feel
that the other observer has been underbenefited and would like to help the
other observer in some way, now is your opportunity to do so. If this does
not apply to your situation, please write “not applicable” at the top of this
form.
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Participants were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very
much) how much they wanted to take each of four actions, then circling the one they
would most like to do. Each of four items was designed to capture conceptually the four
prosocial actions o f interest. Humanitarian action was assessed with the following item:
“Send a nice note to the other participant observer in order to make him/her feel better
about the allotment o f chances toward the $150 cash prize that s/he received.” Reparative
action was measured with the following item: “Send a note containing some of your
chances toward the $150 cash prize, to make up for having received more than the other
observer.” Preventative action was measured with the following item: “Write a note to
the study supervisor asking that the system of allocation for chances toward the $150
cash prize be changed in the future so that the assignment is always fair.” Finally,
retributive action was assessed with the following item: “Write a note to the study
supervisor requesting that some of the allocator’s chances toward the $150 cash prize be
given to the observer, to make up for having distributed the chances unfairly.”
Participants also read that they would have an opportunity later in the study to actually
take this action, but that their identity would remain unknown. (For a list of items, see
Appendix D.)
Manipulation checks fo r perceived injustice andfocus o f attention/demographic
items. Every participant’s final task was to complete a “background questionnaire,”
which contained a number o f questions designed as manipulation checks. First of these
was a manipulation check aimed at assessing whether participants perceived the
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experimental situation as unjust. As before, participants were instructed to answer only
those items that pertained to their study role (in all cases, an observer). Since participants
presumably could judge both the procedure and/or the outcome as being unfair for the
other participant observer, two sets of questions assessing both procedural justice (i.e.,
fair procedures) and distributive justice (i.e., fair outcomes) were used. Drawing on work
by van den Bos and Lind (2001), participants’ procedural judgments were solicited by
asking them how fairly (1= not at all, 7 = very much), and how justly (1= not at all, 7 =
very much) they felt the other participant observer had been treated. These items together
formed the procedural justice scale. Participants also were asked how fair and how just
they felt the allocation of chances toward the cash prize (or outcomes) was for the other
participant observer. These items composed the distributive justice scale. To maintain
parallel structure, similar questions also were asked of participants regarding their own
treatment and about the allotment of chances they received for the cash prize. (For a list
of items, see Appendix D.)
Next was a manipulation check for the focus of attention manipulation.
Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they thought about the allocation
of chances toward the cash prize in each of three ways that emphasized (i.e., focused
upon) the role o f different actors. For example, to what degree did participants think
about “the way the allocator distributed chances toward the $150 cash prize to the other
observer” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much). (For a list of items, see Appendix D.)
75
The survey concluded with a number of basic demographic questions, such as
age, sex, ethnicity, party identification, and family income.
After completing the study, participants were carefully debriefed in order to probe
for suspicion and to ensure that they left the study feeling positive about their experience.
Since participants were presented with the possibility o f earning chances toward the cash
prize, participants were informed prior to leaving that they in fact would receive 10
chances in a raffle to be held for a $100 prize, following the completion o f data
collection.
Results
Analyses designed to assess the efficacy of the various manipulations and other
study elements (e.g., perceptions of injustice and focus of attention) first were conducted,
followed by tests o f primary study hypotheses.
Two exclusion criteria were used for these analyses: a) during the debriefing
period, participants were asked a number of questions that allowed the experimenter to
determine their level of suspicion. Participants with a suspicion score greater than 6 on a
10 point scale were eliminated from the analysis (11 participants), and b) participants
who did not respond appropriately to the manipulation checks designed to check
comprehension of the cash prize allocation were eliminated from the data analysis (10
participants), reducing the total sample size to 41 from 62.
Perceptions o f Injustice fo r Victim and Self
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To examine participants’ perception of the (ostensible) victim’s situation as unjust
and whether they viewed themselves as comparatively advantaged, participants’ mean
ratings of procedural and distributive justice for self and other were computed. Paired
sample t-tests were computed in order to examine differences in these ratings. A
significant difference emerged in a comparison of participants’ ratings of the degree to
which the victim was treated fairly with the degree to which they themselves were treated
fairly (i.e., procedural justice scores for victim and self), MViCtim= 1-97 versus Mseif =
4.74, t(34) = -10.09, SD = 1.73,/? < .001. A significant difference also emerged in a
comparison of participants’ ratings of the degree to which the allocation of chances
toward the cash prize was fair with the degree to which they themselves received a fair
allocation of chances (i.e., distributive justice scores for victim and self), = 1.80
versus A/seif = 4.66, t (34) = -9.49, SD - 1.78,/? < .001. The manipulation o f injustice
clearly was successful. With the assumption of injustice verified, further analyses could
be performed.
Reliability and Means o f Moral Emotion Scales
A Cronbach’s reliability analysis was run on each set o f moral emotion items. The
alpha for the guilt scale was below the standard cutoff of .70 (a = .50) but could be
improved with the removal of one item (to a = .69). Although this item (a reverse-coded
item assessing guilt over relative advantage) at face value did not merit exclusion, the
item was deleted in order to reduce error that would likely be introduced in later analyses
if an unreliable scale were used. The reliability analysis for the moral outrage scale also
77
produced an initial reliability below the standard cutoff of .70 (a = .57) but could be
improved with the removal of one item (to a = .75). Upon inspection, this item (which
assessed irritation) appears to connote a weaker intensity emotional response than do its
counterparts (which assessed the degree to which participants were mad or angry).
Finally, the full set of empathy items demonstrated good reliability (a = .76). Each set of
items then was aggregated to form the relevant moral emotion scales. Based on these
aggregated scales: Mgujit = 4.38, SD = 1.58: M e m p a t h y = 5.72, SD = 1.48: A / m o r a l o u tr a g e =
3.56, SD = 1.61. It is important to note that the midpoint on these 9-point scales
represented a neutral point (“neither disagree nor agree”), so that positive or negative
deviations from a score o f 5 represent the relative presence or absence of each emotion,
respectively.
Effectiveness o f the Focus o f Attention Manipulation
The effectiveness o f the focus of attention manipulation was assessed as follows.
Participants indicated on three questions the degree to which they thought about the
allocation of chances toward the cash prize in each o f three ways—which reflected
different actors on which the participant could have focused. A priori predictions for
these and subsequent analyses were tested with planned comparisons using a pooled error
term.
Results revealed that, for reported focus of attention on self-focus, the mean for
self-focus was not significantly higher in the self-focus condition (M = 4.92) than in the
other conditions (Ms = 5.29 and 5.00 for the victim-focus and third-party perpetrator-
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focus conditions, respectively), t(38) = -.43, ns. For reported focus of attention on victim-
focus, the means for victim-focus also did not vary as a function of condition (M = 4.00
for victim-focus vs. Ms = 3.38 and 3.50 for self-focus and third-party perpetrator-focus,
respectively), /(38) = 1.00, ns. Finally, for reported focus of attention on third-party
perpetrator-focus, the mean for third-party perpetrator-focus also was not significantly
higher in the third-party perpetrator-focus condition (M = 3.64) compared to the other
conditions (Ms = 3.77 and 4.00 for self-focus and victim-focus, respectively), t(38) = -
.47, ns. The results of this analysis clearly indicate that the focus of attention
manipulation was unsuccessful.
Does Changing O ne’s Focus o f Attention Produce Different Moral Emotions?
To assess the effectiveness of the focus of attention manipulation in inducing
distinct emotions, participants’ self-reported emotions were examined. An effective focus
of attention manipulation would result in the highest mean levels of each theoretically
proposed emotion in its associated condition (e.g., the most guilt in the self-focused
condition). Planned contrasts, with weighting consistent with study hypotheses, were
again used to test specific predictions (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985). Levene’s test for
homogeneity o f variance indicated that the three categories formed by the independent
variable did not have equal variances on the dependent variable, reported guilt (F(2, 37)
= 4.49, p < .05). Cell sizes were approximately equal; nonetheless, the results of planned
comparisons that do not assume equal variances are reported for this analysis.
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Participants did not experience more guilt in the self-focus condition than in the
other conditions (M = 4.54 vs. Ms - 4.36 and 4.23 for the victim-focus and perpetrator-
focus conditions, respectively; /(16.96) = -.35, ns). Participants also did not experience
more empathy in the victim-focus condition than in the other conditions (M = 5.32 vs. Ms
= 6.00 and 5.86 for the self-focus and perpetrator-focus conditions, respectively; t(38) =
.40, ns), or more moral outrage in the perpetrator-focus condition than in the other
conditions (M= 3.50 vs. Ms = 3.77 and 3.50 for the self-focus and victim-focus
conditions, respectively; /(38) = -.25, ns). The results of these analyses indicate that the
focus of attention manipulation was not successful in inducing different emotions; this
finding is unsurprising given the results of the manipulation check on focus of attention.
Effects ofEmotions on Support fo r Prosocial Action
Based on the results of these manipulation checks, no further analyses using the
focus o f attention variable were conducted. Instead, regression analysis was used to
examine the associations between each moral emotion and each prosocial action. An
operation was performed prior to conducting the regression analyses. The midpoint of the
emotion scale responses was recoded in order to make the regression coefficients
interpretable. Specifically, a score of “5”—indicating neither disagreement nor agreement
with the emotion statements—was recoded to a score of “0,” whereas the remaining scale
scores were left the same. Based on this recoding, increases in the independent variables
could be meaningfully associated with increased or decreased scores on the dependent
variable.
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Second, regression diagnostics were examined in order to determine whether any
cases exerted a disproportionate influence on the regression coefficients. Cases for which
the dfBeta (a statistic that assesses the specific impact of an observation on the regression
coefficients) was greater than .32 (i.e., 2 / a/4T) for any of the moral emotions were
eliminated from the analysis, thereby reducing the sample size for these analyses to 35
participants.
For the purposes o f comparison, the zero-order correlations among these variables
first were computed. The only significant relationship to emerge between a moral
emotion and a type of prosocial action was that between guilt and humanitarian action (r
= .65, p < .05).
Regression analysis typically is a large-sample technique; a guideline of
approximately 10 participants per predictor variable is considered the absolute minimum
acceptable. The following analyses are executed with 35 participants and three predictors.
Nonetheless, the small sample size of the present sample strongly suggests that any
results obtained here should be reexamined in an independent and larger sample, since
the estimates are likely to be unstable.
Predicting humanitarian action. When the moral emotions were entered into a
simultaneous multiple regression, they accounted for 46% of the variance in participants’
willingness to write a nice note to the other observer as a gesture of comfort and an
attempt to provide immediate relief to his or her suffering (i.e., humanitarian action),/? <
.001. Both guilt {fi = .70,/? < .001) and empathy (fi = .32,/? < .05) emerged as significant
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predictors of humanitarian action, with increases in guilt and empathy associated with
increased desire to leave a nice note for the other observer (rs = .33 and . 18,
respectively). Moral outrage was not a significant predictor of humanitarian action (fi = -
.04, although r = .46).
Predicting reparative action and preventative action. The three moral emotions
together did not predict a significant amount of the variance in support for reparative
action or preventative action. As such, the relationships between each of the moral
emotions and these prosocial actions (which nonetheless all were non-significant) cannot
be interpreted.
Predicting retributive action. When the moral emotions were entered into a
simultaneous multiple regression, they did not account for a significant proportion of
variance in participants’ willingness to punish the allocator (by writing a note requesting
that some of his/her chances toward the cash prize be taken away; i.e., retributive action),
R2= .11, ns. Therefore, although the regression coefficients were marginally significant
both for guilt (fi = .35,p - .06) and for moral outrage (J3 - -36, p = .06), these results
cannot be interpreted.
Perceptions o f Injustice and Support fo r Prosocial Action
The present results did not provide a strong case for moral emotions as predictors
of prosocial action. Perhaps a more general perception of injustice may have influenced
participants in this study. In order to examine this proposition, another set of regressions
was run. Although participants did indeed perceive differences in fairness ratings for their
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own outcomes and treatment compared to the outcomes and treatment of the victims,
these perceptions of distributive and procedural injustice did not predict a willingness to
assist the victims.
Discussion
Study 2 was a laboratory study that tested the effects of focus of attention on
moral emotions and, in turn, the effects of moral emotions on support for prosocial
action. Participants were told that they were part of a three-person group that consisted of
the following actors: one member who was assigned the role of an allocator and therefore
had the power to decide how chances toward a cash prize would be allocated, and two
members who were assigned the role of observers and therefore would simply observe
how chances toward the cash prize were allocated. In reality, all participants were
assigned the role o f an observer and were granted by the (ostensible) allocator some fixed
number o f chances toward the cash prize (equal to the allocator’s own), while the other
observer received no chances at all. This set-up created an unjust situation in which
participants’ attention furthermore could be varied—through the manipulation of the
independent variable, focus o f attention—on one of three actors: the self, the victim (i.e.,
the other observer), or the third-party perpetrator (i.e., the allocator).
Out of 62 initial participants, a sizeable proportion of participants indicated either
that they were suspicious o f the study (e.g., about the existence of other group members)
or that they had some confusion about the study set-up (e.g., the method of allocation
recommended by the experimenter or the way in which chances in fact would be
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assigned). Data from these participants were eliminated from the substantive analyses.
Interestingly but not surprisingly, the number of participants reporting suspicion during
debriefing increased dramatically toward the end of the academic term, with many
students noting that they had recently learned about the use o f deception in psychological
studies and so were differentially more vigilant. The presence of non-trivial amounts of
participant suspicion and/or confusion suggests that the study methodology was flawed.
While the overall study methodology requires improvement, the study indeed was
successful at establishing one of the requirements necessary in order to execute the study
and to examine study hypotheses: the creation of a situation that would be perceived as
unjust. Among the remaining 41 participants, there was a significant difference in
perceived procedural and distributive justice in their own situation versus the situation of
the victim (i.e., other observer). In other words, the participants felt that the other
observer had received unfair treatment and outcomes when compared with the self.
Moreover, this unjust situation was created by a third party other than the experimenter
and was perceived as directed toward another person, and not toward the participants
themselves. All o f these elements were necessary prerequisites in order to vary
participants’ focus o f attention on different actors. From this information, we can derive
that a lack of perceived injustice was not the cause for the study’s failure to produce
support for the proposed components of the model of moral emotional reactions to
injustice.
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An examination of the first hypothesis for this study revealed that Study 2 did not
produce support for the relationship between focus of attention and moral emotion. The
focus of attention manipulation was unsuccessful in producing self-reported focuses of
attention that were consistent with the assigned conditions. As an unsurprising result,
variations in focus of attention also did not affect people’s experience of different moral
emotions (contrary to study hypotheses).
Regressions were run with the three moral emotions as predictors of each of the
four prosocial actions. The only significant and interpretable relationships were a very
strong positive association between self-reported guilt and support for humanitarian
action and a strong association between empathy and support for humanitarian action.
Given the small sample size used for this analysis, it is wise to interpret these findings
with caution. Moreover, it is important to note that the mean levels of each emotion were
low to moderate.
Although Study 2 participants perceived injustice in the experimental situation,
this perception did not appear to produce strong moral emotional reactions. This
perception o f injustice also appeared insufficient to produce strong support for any of the
prosocial actions. This conclusion follows not only from the results of regression
analyses examining these relationships but also are indicated by the mean levels of
support collapsing across condition, which were all below the scale midpoints (for table
of means for Study 2 variables, see Appendix E).
General Discussion
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Two studies tested a model of moral emotional reactions to injustice. Three types
o f focus o f attention (self, victim, third-party perpetrator) were hypothesized to elicit
guilt, empathy, and moral outrage, respectively. These moral emotions in turn were
posited to give rise to support for distinct forms of prosocial action (humanitarian action,
reparative action, preventative action, and retributive action) and to have distinct
implications for observers’ psychological well-being (i.e., state anxiety and state self
esteem).
Results across both studies indicated that overall, participants did not report
focuses o f attention consistent with the conditions to which they had been assigned. What
this set o f findings suggests is that the failure of the focus of attention manipulation to
produce distinct moral emotions may be traced primarily to methodological, and not
necessarily theoretical, problems with the present research. It therefore was not possible
to provide an adequate test o f whether variations in focus of attention can in fact elicit
distinct moral emotions.
What might have caused the focus o f attention manipulations to fail? The
relatively subtle manipulations of attentional focus in both Study 1 and Study 2 may not
have been sufficient to focus and direct participants’ attention to the degree that would be
necessary to permit the type o f strong reaction characteristic of moral emotions. The
Study 1 manipulation attempted to direct participants’ attention by varying the proportion
of information that they read about the victim relative to amount of information they read
about other actors. That is, in the third-party perpetrator-focus condition, participants read
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the same amount of information about the victim as did participants in the other
conditions—but they also read about the role of corporations and did not receive
information about the role of the well-off in perpetrating harm against the working poor
(which instead would have been the self-focus condition). A better approach may be to
frame each version of the article solely in terms of the actor upon whom the participants’
attention is to be focused. For example, the third-party perpetrator-focus version of the
article might describe (only) how American corporations are negatively affecting a core
segment o f our society: the working poor.
The approach to manipulating focus of attention in Study 2 was different. In
Study 2, participants were asked to think about the way in which chances toward the cash
prize were allocated in one of three ways designed to focus their attention either on the
self, the victim, or the third-party perpetrator. As an attempt to ensure that participants
gave these instructions more than cursory thought, they were asked to write for two
minutes on their reactions in a focus-consistent way. Although the situation established in
the laboratory did permit focus of attention to be varied onto three different actors, the
instructions themselves may have been too abstract or general to ensure that participants
indeed were thinking about these distinct actors in the way that they were asked. An
examination of participants’ written reactions reveals that the manner in which
participants thought about “the way chances toward the $150 cash prize were assigned by
the allocator and what that means for the other observer’s outcomes” was not always the
same (i.e., those were the instructions in the perpetrator-focus condition). This variation
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in the way people reacted to the instructions within a given condition likely introduced
noise into the focus o f attention manipulation.
O f course, it also may be the case that focus of attention is insufficient by itself to
produce distinct moral emotions. Focus of attention instead may interact with other
variables to jointly produce moral emotions. This tentative proposition is not unlike the
reasoning behind work by Gendolla, Abele, Andrei, Spurk, and Richter (2005), who
propose a joint impact hypothesis, wherein negative affect promotes somatic symptoms
(e.g., cold hands, increased heart rate) only when combined with a simultaneous focus of
attention on the self. For example, previous work (e.g., Weiner, 2006) and the results of
the present Study 1 suggest that processes of appraisal (e.g., attributions of blame) also
may be potent predictors of the type of moral emotional reaction felt. Levenson (1999)
suggests that different families of emotion each in fact may require different emotion
theories in order to understand better their intrapersonal functions. Different emotion
theories also may provide a better approach to understanding the unique or joint elicitors
of distinct families o f emotion.
Another possibility (not necessarily at odds with the interaction speculation
above) is that the elicitation of moral emotions is susceptible to what Hoffman (2000)
calls the here-and-now bias—which holds that we are most likely to experience emotions
in response to victims who are in the immediate situation. While sometimes “simply
reading about an injustice ... can trigger anger or sympathy” (Haidt, 2003, p. 4), in other
cases this may not be enough to produce a strong emotional or other response. Our
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tendency to empathize and to feel other moral emotions may be moderated by our
similarity to and the frequency with which we interact with the victim or the victim’s
defining group (e.g., Hoffman, 2000). The absence of a victim that the participants could
hear or see in the present studies may have been particularly harmful in terms of
producing moral emotional reactions, given that participants were largely unfamiliar with
the situation o f the working poor (Study 1) and had never met the ostensible other
observer (Study 2). Therefore, participants could not draw upon existing mental
representations of these victims, which has been suggested as a way by which people
may experience moral emotional reactions to others (Hoffman, 2000). Having a clear
mental representation o f victims may be one feature of other studies in which strong
moral emotional reactions were elicited (e.g., Iyer et al., 2004; Pagano & Huo, 2007),
where the victims were members of well-known groups. If we are reading about an
injustice against someone who is similar to us, and his or her similarity to us is made
salient, we may respond more easily with moral emotions. In other circumstances, being
prompted to feel moral emotional responses to injustice may require considerably more
work.
While basic emotions such as joy and fear may be more easily elicited in the
laboratory than moral emotions, the “methodological impediments to the study of self-
conscious emotions [and arguably other moral emotions] are not intractable” (Tracy &
Robins, 2004). Future work should seek to calibrate better the strength of the focus of
attention manipulation with the strength of the emotional effects that the study is
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attempting to produce. More impactful manipulations may be needed to capture subtle
effects; at the same time, weak manipulations should not be used in order to produce
strong emotional responses.
Hoffman’s (2000) discussion of a “media-enhanced here-and-now bias” (pp. 212-
213) suggests that, by virtue o f visual media, we tend to empathize with the “victim of
the moment.” One implication of this tendency is that anyone can come to be thought of
as a victim if they are portrayed as such. Hoffman argues that this mercurial portrayal of
victims creates a problem wherein moral emotional reactions may be elicited on behalf of
people who in fact previously were the culprits behind a given problem. Future work may
be able to produce more effectively these emotional reactions by harnessing this bias
(e.g., using potent visual stimuli or otherwise making the victim more salient). The
degree to which focus o f attention is a necessary component for eliciting moral emotional
reactions to injustice is still a question open to examination. What we can conclude for
now is that, without a sufficiently potent stimulus, a proper test of the relationship
between focus o f attention and moral emotional reactions to injustice may not be
possible.
Because the focus o f attention manipulation did not work, participants’ reported
individual differences in moral emotional responses (independent of focus of attention
condition) instead were examined. While the mean levels of self-reported moral emotion
in general were low, moral emotions in Study 1 did appear to predict support for a
number of prosocial actions. This finding is particularly noteworthy given the finding that
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over 50% of the sample blamed the working poor at least somewhat for their plight; in
general, people are less likely to feel empathy and other emotions toward victims who are
perceived as responsible for their situation (e.g., Weiner, 2006). The working poor, by
very definition, should have been less likely than other groups to be blamed for their
plight because their behavior corresponds with the American work ethic (i.e., “work hard
and you will reap rewards”). In Study 1 of the present work, attributions of blame to the
victim (while not eliminating willingness to support prosocial action entirely) in fact were
associated with decreased likelihood of feeling either guilt or moral outrage. However,
attributions o f blame to the victim were unassociated with empathy. Batson et al. (1997)
demonstrated that people can be induced to feel empathy for a target (e.g., a homeless
person), as long as the empathy-inducing information comes before they have received
attributional information about that target’s degree of responsibility for his or her
situation. Study 1 did not allow for any direct tests of when participants came to make
attributions o f blame for the victims’ plight, and so it is difficult to draw any conclusions
regarding the interaction between participants’ attributions of blame to the victims and
their subsequent moral emotional responses (or lack thereof). Results nonetheless
tentatively suggest that—in contrast to the time-sensitive effects present for attributions
o f victim responsibility on feelings of empathy—emotions directed at the self (such as
guilt) or at a third-party perpetrator (such as moral outrage) may be less likely to occur.
To the extent that moral emotions prompt prosocial action, increased blame for
victims also should mitigate degree of support for prosocial action. Victim derogation in
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fact may be the more likely outcome (for a recent example, see Napier, Mandisodza,
Anderson, & Jost, 2006). In the present study, blame for victims may have been a result
of a backward attributional process in which the working poor were thought to be
responsible because of their plight. In Study 1, while blame attributed to the poor led to
decreased feelings o f guilt and moral outrage, general (though weak) associations
between distinct moral emotions and support for prosocial action remained. If people can
experience some degree or kinds of moral emotional responses even when victims are to
blame for their situation, one might guess that an even clearer example of injustice
brought upon by a third party and not the victim himself or herself (such as in Study 2)
might facilitate moral emotional reactions to the victim or more directly predict support
for prosocial action. Interestingly, quite the opposite was found. Even though participants
recognized that the other observer’s situation was unjust when compared to their own,
this recognition was unassociated with prosocial action.
Why did participants not help in the face of injustice? This finding perhaps can be
understood in the context o f Batson’s work on moral hypocrisy (e.g., Batson,
Kobrynowicz, Dinnerstein, Kampf, & Wilson, 1997). Moral hypocrisy describes a motive
to appear moral (to oneself and to others), while when possible avoiding the actual costs
of being moral. Batson, Kobrynowicz, et al. note further that this moral hypocrisy may
not be conscious, but instead may be in some cases the product o f self-deception. That is,
the desire to appear moral is an implicit desire, and moral hypocrisy is the inadvertent
result of this desire combined with a guilt-relieving alternative (e.g., rationalization or
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giving the appearance o f actually helping). Although participants reported that they
perceived injustice in Study 2, their written comments helped paint a more elaborate
picture. Many participants, for example, acknowledged that the situation was unfair but
then appeared to rationalize the situation in one way or another. A typical example of this
reasoning (edited for style but not content to help preserve participant anonymity) read:
“.. .1 felt bad for the other person since s/he did not get any chances for the cash prize.
Nonetheless, this is life and I will take this opportunity... I am guilt-free because it
wasn’t my decision to leave the second person out.” Thus, while participants tended to
acknowledge the injustice (perhaps as a way of establishing—even to themselves—their
own moral virtuousness), this injustice was not sufficient to produce action in the light of
less expensive actions (such as rationalization). In another study on moral hypocrisy
(Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999), findings revealed that
when moral standards were not salient prior to acting, factors such as self-awareness
increased alignment o f one’s moral standards with one’s behavior (instead of the other
way around). Similarly, participants in Study 2 may have aligned their moral standards
(e.g., “I am guilt-free because it wasn’t my decision to leave the second person out”) with
their behavior (e.g., “I will take this opportunity”).
An alternative explanation for participants’ unwillingness to help despite
recognizing the presence o f injustice refers back to Hoffman’s (2000) here-and-now bias
(explained above). Specifically, participants’ acknowledgement of injustice, in the
absence o f a physically present and thereby compelling victim, may have produced a
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response just below the critical threshold necessary to produce a moral emotional
response. If emotions indeed provide the critical impetus for action (De Rivera et al.,
2002), then a cognitive assessment of injustice by itself may be insufficient to provoke
action.
Yet another potential explanation for participants’ lack of action follows from
their implicit understanding that injustice itself may be a stressor—especially for those
who are highly sensitive to injustice (Francis, 2003). People who are likely to respond
emotionally to injustice against others also may be more likely to suffer decreased
psychological well-being in response to these stressors. As a result, people may avoid
immersing themselves fully in a consideration of injustice as a way of avoiding the
negative consequences that such a consideration may provide. To date, the relative
implications for psychological well-being—particularly for those who are not themselves
targets o f injustice—that result from different moral emotional reactions to injustice have
been largely unexplored either in the justice or in the moral emotion literature. In Study
1, participants who felt guilt reported lower state self-esteem prior to, but not after,
endorsement o f prosocial action. Moreover, participants who felt moral outrage reported
higher state anxiety both before and after endorsement of prosocial action. If this
relationship between moral emotions and psychological well-being holds more generally,
it is possible that in Study 2 participants may have had an implicit understanding of the
potential costs of reacting emotionally to the situation; participants instead may have
sought less costly ways to react.
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A related explanation of participants’ lack o f action involving the increased
potential costs o f reacting emotionally (including decreased psychological well-being and
knowledge that one may be motivated to perform costly actions) can be derived from
Hoffman’s (2000) notion o f egoistic drift. This process involves a drifting of attention
away from the victim’s need to the participant’s own need; this tendency may provide yet
another factor inhibiting people’s moral emotional reactions to injustice, and in turn their
willingness to perform prosocial action.
Whether participants’ moral emotional reactions in the two present studies were
weak because o f an ineffective focus-of-attention manipulation, the perceived costs of
helping, or still other factors, the conclusions that can be drawn from the data gathered
unfortunately are limited.
Summary
Although the two present studies failed to permit a test of the proposed model of
moral emotional reactions to injustice, they nevertheless shed important light on the
relationships between and among moral emotion, prosocial action, and psychological
well-being. From these studies, we can begin to speculate about the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the elicitation of discrete moral emotional reactions to injustice.
A strong and potent stimulus, such as the presence or implied presence of a victim may
be necessary in order to elicit moral emotions. Considering the present work in
conjunction with Pagano and Huo (2007), which found a slightly different pattern of
relationships between the moral emotions and support for prosocial action, we can
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tentatively infer some ideas about the potential moderators o f moral emotional reactions
to injustice and subsequent support for prosocial action—such as context or media
exposure. Moreover, findings from the present studies hint at the potential limits of
reactions to injustice; we should be aware of our potential as human beings for moral
hypocrisy. At the same time, however, people can and often do help—examples of this
tendency to respond to others’ suffering and injustice abound not only in the
psychological literature, but also in everyday life.
Despite the limits of the present set of studies, this general line of research has the
potential to make a number of useful contributions to basic scientific knowledge about
the nature of moral emotions both in terms of their elicitors and in terms of their
consequences. Taken together, these and future studies should assist in an understanding
of the elements involved in motivating important social behaviors while also highlighting
the potential psychological costs to would-be helpers. Future work should draw upon the
findings here to decipher how to effectively test of the role o f focus of attention as an
elicitor of emotion. A proper test of the proposed model of moral emotional reactions to
injustice then can be made, which will examine the unique relationship of guilt, empathy,
and moral outrage to different forms of prosocial action and psychological well-being.
An emphasis both on specific emotions and on distinct prosocial actions should provide a
relatively comprehensive approach toward motivating support for distinct behaviors
aimed at addressing the various possible needs of the suffering and unjustly
disadvantaged.
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Models of moral emotional reactions to injustice can assist people making appeals
for help by helping them tailor their approach to the kind of prosocial action they would
like to obtain. It is through this focused approach that successful appeals can be made on
behalf o f the disadvantaged, the stigmatized, and other victims of injustice in our society.
Armed in turn with knowledge about the impact of various emotions on psychological
well-being, policy-makers may also assist in preserving the welfare of those providing
help. Under the right conditions, we all may be capable of acting like Tom Joad; the next
time we face an opportunity to provide prosocial action, perhaps we too will say, “I’ll be
there.”
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Appendix A
ARTICLE VERSIONS
Article Used in Self-Focus Condition
Continued Struggles for the Working Poor in 2005
September 27,2005
By FRANCES CLEMETSON
Lynn Townsend*, 43, does not complain about her work-weary back or about her
seemingly unacceptable housing situation. A note of sorrow creeps into her voice,
however, when I ask if she has any children. She has a young daughter with whom she’d
like to spend more time but cannot because of the two jobs she must hold to try and make
ends meet. Her primary job, involving heavy labor with a high risk of repetitive-stress
injury, is as a cleaning woman for several families in a more affluent area a few towns
over from where she lives. Despite her hope of working “mother’s hours” —from 9 a.m.
to 3 p.m.~ so she can spend some time with her daughter before going to her second job
at a national grocery store chain at 6 p.m., the state of many of the homes in which she
works precludes her from returning home until well after 5 p.m. .Despite working two
jobs for a combined wage of $425 a week after taxes, Ms. Townsend can barely afford
the $250 a week rent at the dilapidated residential motel where she lives with her
daughter in Minneapolis, particularly after considering expenses such as food, gas, and
toiletries. Despite boasting “the cheapest rent in town,” the motel’s conditions include
exposed electrical wires, no air conditioning or fan, and holes in room doors. Moreover,
if housing analysts’ estimates of “affordable housing” as 30 percent or less of one’s
income are correct, then Ms. Townsend is way behind many other Americans.
Lynn Townsend is a member of what has come to be known as the “working poor.” More
importantly, her situation is not an exceptional one. A 2004 report by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics indicates that over 25 percent of full-time workers can be classified as the
working poor, despite the number of persons holding two or more jobs averaging 7.8
million, or 6.2 percent of the workforce. Indeed, a 2000 report by the National Coalition
for the Homeless indicates that nearly one-fifth of all homeless people (in 29 cities across
the nation) are employed in full- or part-time jobs. Economists and others champion the
wage increases seen in recent years, but they neglect to examine what these wages mean
in 2005 terms. To put these gains in perspective: they are insufficient to bring low-wage
workers up to the amounts they were earning 27 years ago, in 1978. Moreover, the
situation seems to be getting worse. As one example, the percentage of Wisconsin food-
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stamp families in “extreme poverty”—defined as less than 50 percent of the federal
poverty line—has tripled in the last decade to more than 30 percent. Indeed, basic needs
often cannot be met. According to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, 67 percent o f the
adults requesting emergency food aid are people with jobs.
Journalist Deborah Tandy recently went undercover in a quest to determine whether even
a person privileged by years o f schooling and adequate nutrition could get by on
prevailing unskilled wages for a month’s period o f time. Her investigation revealed that
current unskilled wages are too paltry to ensure even a minimum standard of living.
“Minimum standard o f living” does not mean the ownership of such “luxuries” as a
telephone or childcare, let alone restaurant meals or video rentals. It goes without saying,
then, that today’s wages are woefully inadequate. Despite their meager conditions, Ms.
Tandy noted that, “I was amazed and saddened by the pride people took in the jobs that
rewarded them so meagerly in wages and in recognition.”
The well-off play a major role in contributing to the plight of the working poor, as they
have done little to help remedy the seeming unfairness inherent in working people’s
poverty. Some might argue that it isn’t the responsibility of the well-off to help. But does
inaction in the face o f injustice not in some way contribute to suffering? Students of
history need only think to examples such as the Holocaust or the internment of Japanese-
American citizens during World War II to understand that inaction and lack o f protest can
often enable injustice. Who are the well-off? They include me, and if you’re reading this,
they likely include you as well. We may not feel like our dinners out, our computers, our
cell phones, our cars, healthy food, or even a clean, safe place to sleep at night are
luxuries. We have become accustomed to this standard of living —a standard of living
that is unavailable, in some cases, even to those who believe strongly and participate in
hard work. As Ms. Tandy notes, “despite any desire to believe otherwise, the working
poor are largely similar to you and I - they have similar values, similar goals and dreams,
and believe that their hard work will pay off.” Despite their hopefulness, however, the
hard evidence indicates otherwise. Housing costs continue to skyrocket, health care and
other basic needs go unmet, and prior programs devised to provide relief have been
retracted or are now severely underfunded. For example, while housing subsidies
continue to be quite generous for the well-off, public housing expenditures for the poor
have fallen drastically since the 1980s.
Despite the fact that 94 percent o f Americans agree that, “people who work full time
should be able to earn enough to keep their families out o f poverty” those with greater
resources and opportunities rarely see the poor, who have become, as journalist James
Fallows notes, “invisible.” The well-off continue to ignore the situation, and do little or
nothing to acknowledge or fight for remedies to this situation. Heads turn, eyes are
diverted, and news channels are changed - it can be so much easier to ignore a situation
99
than do something about it. Perhaps because of this, despite any similarities the well-off
might share with the working poor, the well-off are in fact increasingly less likely to
share spaces and services with the poor. As public schools and other public services
deteriorate, the well-off often spend their free time in private spaces—health clubs, for
example, instead o f the local park. They avoid public buses and subways. They withdraw
from mixed socioeconomic neighborhoods into suburbs, gated communities, or guarded
apartment towers.
Among those who are well-off compared to the working poor, it is common to think of
poverty as a sustainable condition - austere, perhaps, but they get by somehow, don’t
they? What is harder for the well-off to see is poverty as acute distress: The lunch that
consists of Doritos or hot dog rolls, leading to faintness before the end of a work shift.
The “home” that is also a car or a van. The illness or injury that must be “worked
through,” with gritted teeth, such as the excruciating pain of a tom tendon Lynn
Townsend endured months ago, as there’s no sick pay or health insurance and the loss of
one day’s pay will mean no groceries for the next. The working poor may in fact be the
major philanthropists o f our society. The well-off function in part based on their
underpaid labor, a situation receiving shockingly little complaint from the workers
themselves or from the well-off. The working poor’s experiences are not part of a
sustainable lifestyle, however, even one of chronic deprivation and relentless punishment.
They are, by almost any standard of subsistence, emergency situations. And that is how
we should see the poverty of so many millions of low-wage Americans—as a state of
emergency.
* In order to maintain their confidentiality, some people’s names have been changed.
Reportingfo r this article was contributed by Barbara Ehrenreich, from Minneapolis,

Mn„ and Mark Achbar, Jennifer Abbot, and Joel Bakan from the District o f Columbia.
Article Used in Victim-Focus Condition
September 27, 2005

ends meet. Her primary job, involves heavy labor with a high risk of repetitive-stress
100
injury. Her primary job supposedly provides “mother’s hours,” which should be from 9
a.m. to 3 p.m., However, Ms. Townsend often does not arrive home until after 5 p.m.,
after which she goes to her second job. Despite working two jobs for a combined wage of
$425 a week after taxes, Ms. Townsend can barely afford the $250 a week rent at the
dilapidated residential motel where she lives with her daughter in Minneapolis,
particularly after considering expenses such as food, gas, and toiletries. Despite boasting
“the cheapest rent in town,” the motel’s conditions include exposed electrical wires, no
air conditioning or fan, and holes in room doors. Moreover, if housing analysts’ estimates
of “affordable housing” as 30 percent or less of one’s income are correct, then Ms.
Townsend is way behind many other Americans.
often cannot be met. According to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, 67 percent of the
a person privileged by years o f schooling and adequate nutrition could get by on
rewarded them so meagerly in wages and in recognition.” As Ms. Tandy notes, “the
working poor have values, goals, and dreams, and believe that their hard work will pay
off.” Despite their hopefulness, however, the hard evidence indicates otherwise. Housing
costs continue to skyrocket, health care and other basic needs go unmet, and prior
programs devised to provide relief have been retracted or are now severely underfunded.
101
For example, while housing subsidies continue to be quite generous for the well-off,
public housing expenditures for the poor have fallen drastically since the 1980s.
The indignities suffered by the working poor are many, including constant surveillance,
random searches o f personal belongings and random drug tests possibly including
protocols requiring workers to strip down to their undergarments and void their bladders
in front o f aides or technicians. Being “reamed out” by their employers in the public and
private sector for so-called infractions, or fired from non-union jobs without explanation
also may call into question their very humanity. Eventually, after being treated as
untrustworthy people - slackers, drug addicts, or thieves —people may come to view
themselves as untrustworthy as well. The working poor then may come to think that what
they are paid, however little, is what they are worth.
Among corporations and those who are well-off compared to the working poor, it is
common to think o f poverty as a sustainable condition - austere, perhaps, but they get by
somehow, don’t they? What is harder for the well-off to see is poverty as acute distress:
The lunch that consists of Doritos or hot dog rolls, leading to faintness before the end o f a
work shift. The “home” that is also a car or a van. The illness or injury that must be
“worked through,” with gritted teeth, such as the excruciating pain o f a tom tendon Lynn
major philanthropists o f our society. Society functions in part based on their underpaid
labor, a situation receiving shockingly little complaint from the workers themselves or
from society as a whole. The working poor’s experiences are not part o f a sustainable
lifestyle, however, even one of chronic deprivation and relentless punishment. They are,
by almost any standard o f subsistence, emergency situations. And that is how we should
see the poverty o f so many millions of low-wage Americans—as a state of emergency.
Reporting fo r this article was contributed by Barbara Ehrenreich, from Minneapolis,

Article Used in Third-Party Perpetrator-Focus Condition

September 27, 2005
102
ends meet. Her primary job, involving heavy labor with a high risk of repetitive-stress
injury, is at a national cleaning chain, the Made to Maid Corporation. Despite Made to
Maid’s “mother’s hours,” which are supposedly from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m., Ms. Townsend
often does not arrive home until after 5 p.m., after which she goes to her second job at a
national grocery store chain. Despite working two jobs for a combined wage of $425 a
week after taxes, Ms. Townsend can barely afford the $250 a week rent at the dilapidated
residential motel where she lives with her daughter in Minneapolis, particularly after
considering expenses such as food, gas, and toiletries. Despite boasting “the cheapest rent
in town,” the motel’s conditions include exposed electrical wires, no air conditioning or
fan, and holes in room doors. Moreover, if housing analysts’ estimates of “affordable
housing” as 30 percent or less of one’s income are correct, then Ms. Townsend is way
behind many other Americans.
a person privileged by years of schooling and adequate nutrition could get by on
current unskilled wages are too paltry to ensure even a minimum standard o f living.
103
The corporations employing these individuals, such as the Made to Maid Corporation
play a major role in contributing to the plight of the working poor, as many of their
actions contribute to the unfairness and suffering inherent in working people’s poverty.
Some might argue that it isn’t the responsibility of corporations to help. But do actions
that create injustice not in some way imply responsibility? Students of history need only
think to examples such as the Holocaust or the internment of Japanese-American citizens
during World War II to understand that actions creating injustice should be both
recognized and remedied. Who or what are these corporations? In the mid-1800s, the
corporation emerged as a legal "person" with a motive of economic self-interest, thereby
creating unprecedented wealth. But at what cost? Given that the main role of corporations
is to create wealth, even world disasters are often viewed as profit. Carlton Alford*, a
commodities trader, recounts with unabashed honesty the first thing that came to the
mind of gold traders while the twin towers crushed their occupants: "How much is gold
up?" This unwavering quest to uphold the monetary “bottom line” often results in
remorseless denial o f responsibility for countless cases of illness, poverty, exploitation,
and even death. Rather than dealing with substantive concerns, such as inordinately low
wages or poor work conditions, corporations often do whatever is necessary to avoid
humanitarian but economically disadvantageous changes.
For example, while the Made to Maid Corporation obtains $25 for each person hour
worked, they only pay their workers $5.15 for each hour they work - a ratio of corporate
to worker profit that is excessively low. Moreover, the 30 minute lunch break they
promise their workers often turns out to be a five-minute pit stop at a convenience store,
if any, as Ms. Townsend relates. Perhaps most offensive is that one of Made to Maid
Corporation’s selling points is that they clean floors the “old-fashioned way - on our
hands and knees.” Floors indeed are washed this way, despite the harm incurred by the
human body and the existence of equally effective hand-held sponge mops. Indeed, the
indignities imposed on the working poor by the corporations that employ them are many,
including constant surveillance, random searches of personal belongings and random
drug tests possibly including protocols requiring workers to strip down to their
undergarments and void their bladders in front of aides or technicians. In recent years,
when some o f these activities have come to light, these companies have routinely used a
policy of denial. Being “reamed out” by managers for so-called infractions or fired from
non-union jobs without explanation also may call into question the very humanity of the
working poor. Eventually, after being treated as untrustworthy people - slackers, drug
addicts, or thieves —people may come to view themselves as untrustworthy as well. The
working poor then may come to think that what they are paid, however little, is what they
are worth.
Among corporations, it is common to think of poverty as a sustainable condition -

austere, perhaps, but they get by somehow, don’t they? What is harder for the well-off to
104
see is poverty as acute distress: The lunch that consists of Doritos or hot dog rolls,
leading to faintness before the end of a work shift. The “home” that is also a car or a van.
The illness or injury that must be “worked through,” with gritted teeth, such as the
excruciating pain of a tom tendon Lynn Townsend endured months ago, as there’s no
sick pay or health insurance and the loss of one day’s pay will mean no groceries for the
next. The working poor may in fact be the major philanthropists of our society.
Corporations function in part based on their underpaid labor, a situation receiving
shockingly little complaint from the workers themselves or from any of the corporations.
The working poor’s experiences are not part of a sustainable lifestyle, however, even one
of chronic deprivation and relentless punishment. They are, by almost any standard of
subsistence, emergency situations. And that is how we should see the poverty of so many
millions of low-wage Americans—as a state of emergency.
Reporting fo r this article was contributed by Barbara Ehrenreich, from Minneapolis,

Mn„ and MarkAchbar, Jennifer Abbot, and Joel Bakan from the District o f Columbia.
Article Used in Control Condition
September 27, 2005
ends meet. Her primary job, involves heavy labor with a high risk of repetitive-stress
injury. Her primary job supposedly provides “mother’s hours,” which should be from 9
a.m. to 3 p.m.. However, Ms. Townsend often does not arrive home until after 5 p.m.,
after which she goes to her second job. Despite working two jobs for a combined wage of
$425 a week after taxes, Ms. Townsend can barely afford the $250 a week rent at the
dilapidated residential motel where she lives with her daughter in Minneapolis,
particularly after considering expenses such as food, gas, and toiletries. Despite boasting
“the cheapest rent in town,” the motel’s conditions include exposed electrical wires, no
air conditioning or fan, and holes in room doors. Moreover, if housing analysts’ estimates
of “affordable housing” as 30 percent or less of one’s income are correct, then Ms.
Townsend is way behind many other Americans.
105
Labor Statistics indicates that over 25 percent of lull-time workers can be classified as the
for the Homeless indicates that nearly one-fifth o f all homeless people (in 29 cities across
stamp families in “extreme poverty”—defined as less than 50 percent o f the federal
a person privileged by years of schooling and adequate nutrition could get by on
prevailing unskilled wages for a month’s period of time. Her investigation revealed that
The well-off play a large role in contributing to the plight of the working poor, as they
have done little to help remedy the seeming unfairness inherent in working people’s
poverty. Some might argue that it isn’t the responsibility of the well-off to help. But does
inaction in the face o f injustice not in some way contribute to suffering? Who are the
well-off? They include me, and if you’re reading this, they likely include you as well. We
may not feel like our dinners out, our computers, our cell phones, our cars, healthy food,
or even a clean, safe place to sleep at night are luxuries. We have become accustomed to
this standard of living —a standard of living that is unavailable, in some cases, even to
those who believe strongly and participate in hard work. As Ms. Tandy notes, “despite
any desire to believe otherwise, the working poor are largely similar to you and I - they
have similar values, similar goals and dreams, and believe that their hard work will pay
off.” Despite their hopefulness, however, the hard evidence indicates otherwise. Housing
costs continue to skyrocket, health care and other basic needs go unmet, and prior
programs devised to provide relief have been retracted or are now severely underfunded.
106
For example, while housing subsidies continue to be quite generous for the well-off,
public housing expenditures for the poor have fallen drastically since the 1980s.
Despite the fact that 94 percent of Americans agree that, “people who work full time
should be able to earn enough to keep their families out of poverty” those with greater
resources and opportunities rarely see the poor, who have become, as journalist James
Fallows notes, “invisible.” The well-off continue to ignore the situation, and do little or
nothing to acknowledge or fight for remedies to this situation. Heads turn, eyes are
diverted, and news channels are changed - it can be so much easier to ignore a situation
than do something about it. Perhaps because of this, despite any similarities the well-off
might share with the working poor, the well-off are in fact increasingly less likely to
share spaces and services with the poor. As public schools and other public services
deteriorate, the well-off often spend their free time in private spaces—health clubs, for
example, instead o f the local park. They avoid public buses and subways. They withdraw
from mixed socioeconomic neighborhoods into suburbs, gated communities, or guarded
apartment towers.
The corporations employing these individuals, such as the Made to Maid Corporation
also play a major role in contributing to the plight o f the working poor, as many of their
actions contribute the unfairness and suffering inherent in working people’s poverty.
Some also might argue that it isn’t the responsibility of corporations to help. But just as
inaction may create injustice, actions may also create injustice - does this not imply
responsibility? How do we define these corporations? In the mid-1800s, the corporation
emerged as a legal "person" with a motive of economic self-interest, thereby creating
unprecedented wealth. But at what cost? Given that the main role of corporations is to
create wealth, even world disasters are often viewed as profit. Carlton Alford*, a
commodities trader, recounts with unabashed honesty the first thing that came to the
mind of gold traders while the twin towers crushed their occupants: "How much is gold
up?" This unwavering quest to uphold the monetary “bottom line” often results in
remorseless denial o f responsibility for countless cases of illness, poverty, exploitation,
and even death. Rather than dealing with substantive concerns, such as inordinately low
wages or poor work conditions, corporations often do whatever is necessary to avoid
humanitarian but economically disadvantageous changes.
For example, while the Made to Maid Corporation obtains $25 for each person hour
worked, they only pay their workers $5.15 for each hour they work - a ratio of corporate
to worker profit that is excessively low. Moreover, the 30 minute lunch break they
promise their workers often turns out to be a five-minute pit stop at a convenience store,
if any, as Ms. Townsend relates. Perhaps most offensive is that one of Made to Maid
Corporation’s selling points is that they clean floors the “old-fashioned way - on our
hands and knees.” Floors indeed are washed this way, despite the harm incurred by the
107
human body and the existence of equally effective hand-held sponge mops. The
indignities imposed on the working poor by the corporations that employ them are many,
including constant surveillance, random searches of personal belongings and random
drug tests possibly including protocols requiring workers to strip down to their
undergarments and void their bladders in front of aides or technicians. In recent years,
when some o f these activities have come to light, these companies have routinely used a
policy o f denial. Being “reamed out” by managers for so-called infractions or fired from
non-union jobs without explanation also may call into question their very humanity.
Eventually, after being treated as untrustworthy people - slackers, drug addicts, or
thieves —people may come to view themselves as untrustworthy as well. The working
poor then may come to think that what they are paid, however little, is what they are
worth.
Among corporations and those who are well-off compared to the working poor, it is
common to think o f poverty as a sustainable condition - austere, perhaps, but they get by
somehow, don’t they? What is harder for the well-off to see is poverty as acute distress:
The lunch that consists of Doritos or hot dog rolls, leading to faintness before the end of a
work shift. The “home” that is also a car or a van. The illness or injury that must be
“worked through,” with gritted teeth, such as the excruciating pain o f a tom tendon Lynn
major philanthropists o f our society. Society functions in part based on their underpaid
labor, a situation receiving shockingly little complaint from the workers themselves or
from society as a whole. The working poor’s experiences are not part of a sustainable
lifestyle, however, even one of chronic deprivation and relentless punishment. They are,
by almost any standard o f subsistence, emergency situations. And that is how we should
see the poverty o f so many millions of low-wage Americans—as a state of emergency.
Reportingfo r this article was contributed by Barbara Ehrenreich, from Minneapolis,

108
Appendix B
PRIMARY MEASURES AND MANIPULATION CHECKS FOR STUDY 1
M o ra l E m o tio n a l R ea ctio n s
In order to help us understand your emotional reactions to the passage you just read, we
would like to get your answers to the following questions. Do not worry if you were not
feeling some o f these emotions; only a few may apply to this passage. Moreover, you
may notice that some questions appear very similar. Nonetheless, please just be sure to
select a number that corresponds to the degree to which you experienced each of these
emotional reactions while reading the passage.
1 = not at all, 4 = moderately, 7 = extremely
alarmed
grieved
sympathetic
angry
softhearted
troubled
warm
enraged
distressed
infuriated
regretful
compassionate
upset
blameworthy
tender
worried
moved
responsible
outraged
contempt
furious
guilty
mad
empathetic
ashamed
109
disturbed
annoyed
perturbed
disgusted
gratitude
awe
accountable
irritated
P sych o lo g ica l W ell-B ein g (Pre-)
Prior research has shown that how people are feeling at a given point in time may relate
to the way they react to different kinds of information.
At different points in time during this study, we will ask that you respond to the
following statements that people sometimes use to describe how they’re feeling. This will
help us to understand better your responses to the passage you read.
Do not worry if some o f these items seem similar to others you have answered. Please
just read each statement and then select the number that best describes the extent to
which you have been feeling each one RIGHT NOW. Do not spend too much time on
any one statement.
1 = not at all 2 = somewhat 3 = moderately 4 = very much
RIG H TN O W ...
I feel calm
I feel secure
I feel tense
I feel strained
I feel at ease
I feel upset
I feel worried over possible misfortunes
I feel satisfied
I feel frightened
I feel comfortable
Listed below are 5 brief statements. Indicate your agreement or disagreement with each
statement as you are feeling RIGHT NOW using the following scale:
110
1 = strongly disagree 2 = somewhat disagree 3 = disagree 4 = somewhat agree 5 = agree
6 = strongly agree
RIGHTNOW...
I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.

I feel that I have a number o f good qualities.
I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
I am able to do things as well as most other people.
I feel I do not have much to be proud of.
P ro so c ia l A c tio n S ca les
We are interested in your honest opinions about the experiences of the working poor
about whom you have just read, and your views about the appropriateness of different
types of actions aimed at helping to improve their situation. Please share your opinion by
selecting for each question a number based on the scale given below.
1 = very strongly disagree

2 = strongly disagree
3 = moderately disagree
4 = somewhat disagree
5 = neither disagree nor agree
6 = somewhat agree
7 = moderately agree
8 = strongly agree
9 = very strongly agree
Humanitarian Action Items
We should offer basic aid when possible to alleviate the immediate suffering of the
working poor.
We should ensure that the injured and/or ill among the working poor at least receive
adequate medical attention.
We should pull our resources together to make sure that, at the very least, the
humanitarian needs o f the working poor for food, medical assistance, and shelter are met.
We should help those who are trying to help themselves by providing needed basic
assistance.
Despite the needs o f the working poor, I don’t think it’s of great importance to provide
humanitarian help.
Ill
Reparative Action Items
Americans who arbitrarily have more than the working poor should help equalize the
playing field.
The well-off should support the replenishment of programs aimed at helping the working
poor.
The well-off should make more of an effort to improve the lives of the working poor
because o f the inadequacies in their prior help.
The well-off should support measures aimed at restoring the infrastructure designed to
help the working poor that was previously destroyed.
Even if it means making difficult budget decisions, the well-off should try to find the
funds to help repair the situation of the working poor caused by prior negligence.
Even though some Americans might have more than the working poor, I don’t think they
should have to help fix their situation.
Americans who enjoy privileges compared to the working poor should somehow assist in
repairing their situation.
Preventative Action Items
It’s not that important to implement changes protecting the working poor in the
U.S. from future abuse by corporate leaders.
Laws against unfair labor practices should be developed in order to help the working
poor.
In order to create a more equitable nation, it’s important that the current system of
corporate power be restructured.
Institutional safeguards against corporate exploitation of the working poor should be
developed.
We should support efforts to establish a system of checks and balances that protect the
working poor from indignities on the job.
We should work to provide the working poor with the know-how to resist future
corporate abuse.
We should help the voices of low-wage workers be heard by their work supervisors.
Retributive Action Items
Corporate abusers should be punished for the abuses they perpetrate against the working
poor.
We should “blow the whistle” on corporate leaders placing monetary gain over human
welfare.
Whatever the cost, we need to make sure that corporate leaders abusing their workers are
brought to justice.
112
It’s not o f great importance to establish an effective mechanism for punishing corporate
leaders for worker abuse.
Corporate abusers should pay some price for the things they have done to harm the
working poor.
Legal punishment of corporations for any abuse of low-wage workers should be
undertaken.
P sych o lo g ica l W ell-B ein g (Post-)
Once again, in order to better understand your responses to the passage you read and to
the survey items, we ask that you respond to the following statements that people
sometimes use to describe how they’re feeling.
As before, do not worry if some of these items seem similar to others you have answered.
Please just read each statement and then select the number that best describes the extent
to which you have been feeling each one RIGHT NOW. Do not spend too much time on
any one statement.
RIGHT NOW...
I feel self-confident
I feel nervous
I feel jittery
I feel indecisive
I am relaxed
I feel content
I am worried
I feel confused
I feel steady
I feel pleasant
RIGHTNOW...
I take a positive attitude toward myself.

On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
I wish I could have more respect for myself.
I certainly feel useless.
I think I am no good at all.
113
Manipulation Checkfo r Perceptions o f Responsibility
There are a number of potential actors one can consider when thinking about the working
poor. Each actor, in its own way, may or may not play some role with respect to the
situation of the working poor. In this section, we are interested in your opinions about
each o f three players and the role they played. Please respond to the questions by
selecting the response option that best represents your honest views.
In your view, how responsible is each of the following parties for the suffering of the
working poor?
1 = not at all responsible; 7 = wholly responsible
The well-off:
The working poor themselves:
Corporations:
M an ipu lation C h ecks f o r P e rc eiv ed D iscrepan cy, Iden tification , P e rc eiv ed Injustice,
a n d M an ip u la tio n o f F ocu s o f A tten tio n
We would like to conclude this survey with a few questions that will help us better
understand your reactions to the passage you read earlier.
Manipulation Checkfo r Perceived Discrepancy
Compared to the financial situation of the working poor, I feel that people like me are:
Very disadvantaged
Somewhat disadvantaged
Somewhat advantaged
Very advantaged
Compared to the opportunities the working poor are likely to have, I feel that people like
me are:
Very disadvantaged
Somewhat advantaged
Very advantaged
114
Now, considering everything you can think of, do you feel that, compared to the situation
of the working poor, you are:
Very disadvantaged
Somewhat advantaged
Very advantaged
Manipulation Checkfo r Identification
To what extent do you identify with either of the following parties?
The well-off:
Not at all
Somewhat
Very much
Corporations:
Not at all
Somewhat
Very much
Manipulation Checkfo r Perception o f Injustice
To what extent do you believe the situation of the working poor is unfair?
Not at all
Somewhat
Very much
115
Manipulation Checkfor Focus o f Attention Manipulation
Please indicate using the scale below the extent to which you did each of the following
when reading the passage about the working poor:
Not at all
Somewhat
Moderately
Very much
Concentrated on myself.
Concentrated on the working poor.
Concentrated on corporations.
Concentrated about equally on all possible actors.
116
Appendix C
Means and Standard Deviations of Moral Emotion, Psychological Well-Being,

and Prosocial Action Scales (Study 1)
Standard
Scale Mean Deviation
Guilt 2.48 1.24

Empathy 3.92 1.00
Moral Outrage 2.93 1.26
Self-Esteem (Pre) 5.06 .75
Self-Esteem (Post) 4.86 .89
Anxiety (Pre) 1.95 .61
Anxiety (Post) 1.91 .58
Humanitarian Action 7.37 1.12
Reparative Action 5.64 1.56
Preventative Action 7.24 1.05
Retributive Action 6.68 1.42
117
Appendix D
PRIMARY MEASURES AND MANIPULATION CHECKS FOR STUDY 2
M an ipu lation C h eck f o r C om prehension o f A llo ca tio n s M ade f o r th e Cash P rize
As we are interested in this study with how positive task consequences influence people’s
feelings about and reactions to today’s task, it is important that we know how you think
chances toward the $150 cash prize will be allocated today. Please read the instructions
carefully before answering the questions below. Thank you!
Instructions (Part D:
If you are an allocator, please answer question 1.

If you are an observer, please answer question 2:
How will you be allocating chances toward the $150 cash prize today?
Every participant will receive equal amounts of chances
One observer and I will receive chances, although the second observer will not
Only one observer will receive chances
Only I will receive chances
Only the observers will receive chances.
How will the chances toward the $150 cash prize be allocated today?
All participants will receive equal amounts of chances
The allocator and I will receive equal amounts of chances, although the third person
will not
Only the other observer will receive chances
Only the allocator will receive chances
Only I will receive chances
Only the other observer and the allocator will receive chances
Instructions (Tart ID:
Observers and allocators, please answer question 3:
3. Is your selection above the type of allocation that the experimenter suggested for
allocating chances toward the $150 cash prize? (circle one):
Yes No
118
Instructions (Part IIP:
If you are an allocator, please answer question 4.

If you are an observer, please answer question 5.
If the allocation is different from what the experimenter suggested, then what
suggestion did the experimenter have?
Each person should get an equal number of chances
The two observers should receive chances, but the allocator should not
Only the other observer should receive chances
Only I should receive chances
Only the allocator should receive chances
If the allocation is different from what the experimenter suggested, then what
suggestion did the experimenter have?
Each person should get an equal amount of chances
The allocator and I should receive chances, although the third person should not.
Only one observer should receive chances
Only I should receive chances
Only the allocator should receive chances
E m o tio n a l R e a c tio n s to In ju stice
In order to help us understand your reaction to the way in which chances toward the $150
cash prize were assigned today, we would like you to answer the following questions. Do
not worry if you did not experience some of these emotions; there are no wrong or right
answers when it comes to people’s emotions. Some questions may appear very similar -
that’s okay - please just be sure to select a response for each item, writing your answers
in the box to the left o f each statement.
Please respond using the scale below. You may use “N/A” to indicate that an item does
not apply to your study role or to your circumstance —e.g., if the item is written from the
perspective o f the allocator and you are an observer. Some of these options also may not
apply to the trio o f participants of which you are a part —because we don’t know ahead
of time how chances toward the $150 cash prize will be allocated among each set of
participants, we are attempting to list all possible options. If you can respond to an item
using the scale below, however, please do so.
119
1 = very strongly disagree 2 = strongly disagree 3 = moderately disagree 4 = somewhat
disagree 5 = neither disagree nor agree 6 = somewhat agree 7= moderately agree 8 =
strongly agree 9 = very strongly agree
Guilt Items
I feel guilty thinking about the way I benefited from the way in which chances toward the
$150 cash prize were assigned.
Despite the fact that I benefited more than the other observer, I don’t feel any guilt over
my advantage.
I feel some regret for how the chances toward the $150 cash prize were allocated to me.
Empathy Items
I feel sympathy for the other participant for the way in which the chances toward the
$150 cash prize were allocated.
I feel kind o f softhearted toward the other observer thinking of the way the chances
toward the $150 cash prize were allocated.
I feel compassion for the other participant based on how chances toward the $150 cash
prize were allocated.
Moral Outrage Items
I am angry at the allocator for the way she or he allocated chances toward the $150 cash
prize.
I feel mad at the allocator for harming the other observer with his or her method of
distributing chances toward the $150 cash prize.
I don’t feel that irritated with the allocator for not allocating any chances toward the $150
cash prize to the other observer.
P ro so c ia l A c tio n Ite m s
Allocation of Chances Toward $150 Cash Prize
Although we recommend a rule of equality to those choosing the allocator role, allocators
do not always in fact decide to distribute chances toward the $150 cash prize in this way.
If this is currently the case, and you feel that the other observer has been underbenefited
and would like to help the other observer in some way, now is your opportunity to do so.
If this does not apply to your situation, please write “not applicable” at the top of this
form.
120
Please indicate below how much (or little) you would like to do each o f the following
using the given scale, writing your answers in the box to the left of each statement.
1 = not at all 4 = somewhat 7 = very much
Humanitarian Action
Send a nice note to the other participant observer in order to make him/her feel better
about the allotment of chances toward the $150 cash prize that s/he received.
Reparative Action
Send a note containing some of your chances toward the $150 cash prize, to make up for
having received more than the other observer.
Preventative Action
Write a note to the study supervisor asking that the system of allocation for chances
toward the $150 cash prize be changed in the future so that the assignment is always fair.
Retributive Action
Write a note to the study supervisor requesting that some of the allocator’s chances
toward the $150 cash prize be given to the observer, to make up for having distributed the
chances unfairly.
M an ipu lation C h eck f o r P ercep tio n o f In ju stice
We are asking everyone to complete the following questions so that we can better
understand participants’ responses. Although some of the statements below may appear
similar, please just indicate the extent to which you agree with each statement on the
following scale. Thank you!
If you are an allocator, please answer question 2a.

If you are an observer, please answer questions 2b and 2c:
2a. For the two observers:

How fairly do you feel you treated the two observers?
121
How justly do you feel you treated the two observers?
How fair do you feel the allocation of chances toward the $150 cash prize was to the
two observers?
How ju st do you feel the allocation of chances toward the $150 cash prize was to the
two observers?
2b. For the other observer:

How fairly do you feel the other participant observer has been treated?
How justly do you feel the other participant observer has been treated?
How fair do you feel the allocation of chances toward the $150 cash prize was to the
other participant observer?
How ju st do you feel the allocation o f chances toward the $150 cash prize was to the
other participant observer?
2c. For you:

How fairly do you feel you have been treated?
How justly do you feel you have been treated?
How fa ir do you feel the allocation of chances toward the $150 cash prize was to you?
How ju st do you feel the allocation chances toward the $150 cash prize was to you?
M an ipu lation C h eck f o r F ocu s o f A tten tion
Please indicate the extent to which you thought about each of the following up
until this point on the following scale:
the way the chances toward the $150 cash prize were allocated to you
the way the chances toward the $150 cash prize were allocated to the other observer
the way the allocator distributed chances toward the $150 cash prize to the other observer
the facts of how chances toward the $150 cash prize were allocated
122
Appendix E
Means and Standard Deviations of Moral Emotion

and Prosocial Action Scales (Study 2)
Standard
Scale Mean Deviation
Guilt 4.57 1.41

Empathy 5.72 1.48
Moral Outrage 3.76 1.36
Humanitarian Action 2.77 1.63
Reparative Action 2.64 1.65
Preventative Action 3.26 1.92
Retributive Action 3.08 1.58
Note: The midpoint of the emotion scale responses was recoded such that
a score o f “5”—indicating neither disagreement nor agreement with the
emotion statements—was recoded to a score of “0,” whereas the
remaining scale scores were left the same.
123
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

A Model of Moral Emotional Reactions to Injustice:

Implications for Psychological Well-Being and Prosocial Action

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the

requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy

Sabrina Joy Pagano

ProQuest Information and Learning Company

Shelly Gable Nayak

University of California, Los Angeles

Figure 1: A Model o f Emotional Reactions to Injustice 6

Table 1. Exploratory Factor Analysis on Emotion Items 40

February 2,1978 Bom, Mount Vemon, New York

2000 B.A., Psychology, highest honors

2001-2002 Political Psychology Fellowship

2003 M.A., Psychology

2004-2006 PROPS Graduate Mentor

2005 Shepherd Ivory Franz Distinguished Teaching Award

2006 Teacher Training Award

2006-2007 Oderberg Dissertation Year Fellowship

2006,2007 Instructor of Record

2007 Collegium of University Teaching Fellowship

A Model of Moral Emotional Reactions to Injustice:

Implications for Psychological Well-Being and Prosocial Action

Sabrina Joy Pagano

Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology

University of California, Los Angeles, 2007

Professor David Sears, Chair

attention in eliciting distinct moral emotions. In Study 1, participants’ moral emotional

with psychological well-being, supporting several hypothesized relationships. Among

retributive action. Unexpected relationships included a positive association between guilt

relationships; the focus o f attention manipulation was unsuccessful. Although Study 2

distinguishing among different types of moral emotional reactions to injustice may be

observers’ psychological well-being may be impacted in different ways when people

experience different emotional reactions to injustice.

Tom Joad, Chapter 28, Grapes o f Wrath

when we confront injustice.

What our experience tells us also finds support in psychological research.

indignation (e.g., in response to “reverse discrimination”) all are potential reactions

(Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002).

actions can be described as prosocial action tendencies.

A set of examples may be instructive in clarifying what a moral emotion is and

heuristic purposes, Haidt (2003) goes on to provide an alternative definition of moral

largely resembling a psychopath (pg. 855).

Weiner (2006) instead defines moral emotions as a subset of social emotions

an exhaustive list o f 12 emotions that he considers to be moral emotions. Among these

an emotion on a list of moral emotions seems in opposition to Haidt’s (2003) definition;

same emotion to be understood as moral or not depending on its specific instantiation) is

experience in response to injustice.

wherein formal definitions will be given.

Among moral emotions, differences in the nature and experience of these

those witnessing the injustice. Emotional reactions to injustice characterized by a focus

injustice—may be associated with less detrimental outcomes for observer well-being.

The goal o f the present work is to examine these potential relationships by

work, and possible applications will be discussed.

Figure 1: A Model of Emotional Reactions to Injustice

Emotions and their Relationship to Prosocial Action

precursors to thought and action—a view that finds continued representation in

or moral behavior, which was instead engendered by rational processes (Kant,

psychology (e.g., Batson, 1998; Haidt, 2003; Marcus, 2003).

impairment o f their ability to experience emotional responses but retain complete

literature nonetheless has emphasized attitudinal and behavioral, instead of emotional,

Batson, Polycarpou, et al., 1997; Dovidio et al.).

As Haidt (2003) argues, distinct moral emotions should have distinct