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Luzon Stevedoring Co vs WCC 10 SCRA 207

Facts
Stevedore Rosano had a heated verbal argument with Valdez, another stevedore
engaged by petitioner corporation, over the possession of a platform used in the loading
and unloading of cargoes taken into or out of the watercraft. Later, informed that the
barge they were waiting for definitely was not arriving, Rosano, with two companions,
boarded a passenger jeep bound for Tondo. When he got off from the jeep near his
house, he was met by Valdez, who whipped out a knife and stabbed him. Rosano died on
the same day after being brought to the hospital.

Issue
Whether or not the death of Rosano is compensable considering that it came after he
was outside the company premises and not at work.

Ruling
it is evident that the cause of his fatal stabbing by Benjamin Valdez (who was thereafter
accused and convicted) can be traced to their disagreement over the possession of a
platform that was to be used in their work for petitioner that although the altercation
started in the morning the same was resumed when they returned in the afternoon and
carried on when Valdez left, lay in wait near Rosario's house, and there met and stabbed
the latter when he alighted from the jeep. Neither can it be said that the employer is
exempt from liability under the Workmen's Compensation law because the cause of
death arose outside of the company premises, whereas the quarrel happened at the
waterfront at Pier 9.

For an injury to be compensable, it is not necessary that the cause therefor shall
take place within the place of employment. If a workman is acting within the
scope of his employment, his protection "in the course of" the employment
usually continues, regard of the place of injury.

the ultimate test was whether "the quarrel from origin to ending must be taken to be
one" it should make no difference how widely separated the assault was from the
employment in time and space if it remained an inherent part of an employment
incident.

2. Lopez vs ECC 228 SCRA 657

Facts:

Petitioner's late husband, Pedro Lopez, was employed as a public school teacher at the
Urdaneta National High School. A memorandum was issued to Pedro Lopez by the head
of the school's Science Department designated to prepare the MODEL DAM. Lopez
complied with his superior's instruction and constructed an improvised electric micro-
dam, which he took home to enable him to finish it before the deadline.

Around 6:30 A.M., while he was engrossed in his project, he in contact with a live wire
was electrocuted. He was immediately brought to a clinic for emergency treatment but
was pronounced dead on arrival. The death certificate showed that he died of cardiac
arrest due to accidental electrocution.

Petitioner then filed a claim for death benefits with the GSIS, which was denied on the
ground that her husband's death did not arise out and in the course of employment.

Issue:

Respondent ECC argued that based on the certification issued by the school principal,
Lopez at the time of the accident was supposed to report for duty to help in the
enrollment of the 4th year class, but he opted to remain at his house to finish the
project. Hence, respondent ECC contends, that the claim for death benefits failed to
satisfy the conditions set forth under Sec. 1 (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation.

Said rule states:


For an injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be
the result of an employment accident, satisfying all the following conditions:

1. The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to
be;
2. The employee must have been performing his official functions; and
3. If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order
from its superior.

Held:

While the death of Pedro Lopez took place in his house and not in his official work
station, which is the school, he was still discharging his function as the one in-charge of
the project. He was constrained to finish the project within a specific period of time and
he could only do so if he worked overtime in his house.

The death of petitioner's husband is service-connected even if it happened during the


summer vacation. He was still under the employ of the government and there still
existed an employer-employee relationship although teachers do not report for duty
during that period (Pepito v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 78 SCRA 35
[1977] ).
It can even be said that the conditions set forth under sec. 1, par. (a), Rule III of the
amended Rules on Employees Compensation, have been complied with.

The said rule requires that the injury must have been sustained by the employee at "the
place where his work requires him to be" and if the injury is sustained elsewhere the
employees "must have been executing an order from his superior." Inasmuch as Lopez
had to finish the project on the time for the contest scheduled on October 5 and 9, 1987,
it can be implied that Lopez was given permission, if not direction, to perform his work
at his house.

3. Floresca vs Philex Mining Corp 136 SCRA 141

FACTS:

On June 28, 1967, some employees of Philex Mining Corporation died asa result of the
cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the copper mine (Tuba,Benguet) during
underground operations. Allegedly, Philex was in violation of government rules and
regulations for negligently and deliberately failing to takethe required precautions for
the protection of the lives of its men working underground.The Petitioners (Floresca et
al) are the heirs of the deceased employees of PhilexMining Corporation. Petitioners
moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’sCompensation Act before the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also petitionedbefore the regular courts
and sued Philex for additional damages.Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued
because the petitioners havealready claimed benefits under the WCA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Floresca et al can claim benefits and at the same time sue.

HELD:

Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one . If they filedfor benefits under the
WCA then they will be prohibited from proceeding with a civil casebefore the regular
courts. On the contrary, if they sued before the civil courts then theywould also be
prohibited from claiming benefits under the WCA.

The SC however ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to
ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of
such a remedy. The SC ruled that the dismissal of the case in the lower court be
reversed and case is remanded for further proceedings.
However, if in case the petitioners win in the lower court, whatever award may be
granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC
emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of
the law may be defeated.

(Refer to excerpt below) “WHEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT’S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS


HEREBY REVERSED ANDSET ASIDE AND THE CASE IS REMANDED TO IT FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. SHOULD AGREATER AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BE DECREED IN
FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONERS, THEPAYMENTS ALREADY MADE TO THEM
PURSUANT TO THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT SHALL BE DEDUCTED. NO
COSTS.”

Justice Gutierrez dissenting


No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers are
already liable to pay benefits under the WCA they should not be compelled to bear the
cost of damage suits or get insurance for that purpose. The exclusion provided by the
WCA can only be properly removed by the legislature NOT the SC.

4. Ysmael Maritime Corp vs Avelino 151 SCRA 333

FACTS

1. On December 22, 1971, Rolando Lim, a licensed second mate, died when the
vessel 
he was on board ran aground and sank near Sabtan, Batanes. 


2. The vessel was owned by petitioner Ysmael Maritime Corporation. 


3. The parents of the deceased claiming that the untimely death of their son was
due to 
the negligence of the petitioner, sued the petitioner in the CFI for
damages. 


4. By way of affirmative defense, petitioner claimed that the private respondents


had 
already been compensated by the Workman’s Compensation Commission
(WCC) for the same incident, for which reason they are now precluded from
seeking other remedies against the same employer under the Civil Code. 


ISSUE

Whether the compensation remedy under the Workmen’s Compensation Act (WCA),
and now under the Labor Code, for work-connected death or injuries sustained by an
employee, is exclusive of the other remedies under the Civil Code.
HELD

In the recent case of Floresca v. Philex Mining Company, the Court was confronted with
three divergent opinion on the exclusivity rule.

One view is that the injured employee or his heirs, in case of death, may initiate an
action to recover damages (not compensation under the Workman’s Compensation Act)
with the regular courts on the basis of negligence of the employer pursuant to the Civil
Code.

Another view, is that the remedy of an employee for work-connected injury or accident
is exclusive in accordance with Section 5 of WCA.

The third view is that the action is selective and the employee or his heirs have a choice
of availing themselves of the benefits under the WCA or of suing in the regular courts
under the Code for higher damages from the employer by reason of his negligence. But
once the election has been exercised, the employee or his heirs are no longer free to opt
for the other remedy.

This latter view was adopted by the Court in Floresca v. Philex Mining Company. In
doing so, the Court rejected the doctrine of exclusivity of the rights and remedies
granted by the WCA.

As thus applied to the case at bar, respondent Lim spouses cannot be allowed to
maintain their present action to recover additional damages against petitioner under
the Civil Code. In open court, respondent admitted that they had previously filed a claim
for death benefits with the WCC and had received the compensation payable to them
under the WCA. It is therefore clear that thew respondents had not only opted to
recover under the Act but they had also been duly paid. At the very least, a sense of fair
play would demand that if a person entitled to a choice of remedies made a first election
and accepted the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allowed to exercise the
second option. Having staked his fortunes on a particular remedy, he is precluded from
pursuing the alternate course, at least until the prior claim is rejected by the
Compensation Commission.

5. Crystal Shipping Inc vs Natividad GR 154798 10-20-05

FACTS:

Petitioner Crystal Shipping, Inc., employed respondent Deo P. Natividad as Chief Mate of
M/V Steinfighter for a period of ten months. Within the contract period, respondent
complained of coughing and hoarseness and was brought to shore for examination. He
was diagnosed with swelling neck and declared unfit for duty, and advised to see an
ear-nose-throat specialist. He was repatriated to Manila.

Respondent was referred to ClinicoMed Inc., the company-designated clinic, for check-
up. His attending physician diagnosed him permanently disabled with a grade 9
impediment. A second opinion likewise concurred that respondent was disabled with a
grade 9 impediment. While his treatment was ongoing, respondent sought another
opinion who opined that he was totally and permanently disabled for labor. All
expenses incurred in respondents examination and treatments were shouldered by the
petitioners.

Petitioners offered US$13,060 as disability benefits which respondent rejected.


Respondent claimed that he deserves to be paid US$60,000 for a grade 1 impediment.
Failing to reach an agreement, respondent filed, with the Regional Arbitration Branch
(RAB), a complaint for disability benefits. Labor Arbiter ruled for respondent.

On appeal, the NLRC initially reversed the ruling of the RAB on the ground that findings
of the company-designated doctors were binding. However, upon respondents motion
for reconsideration, citing jurisprudence that findings of company-designated doctors
are self-serving, the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the RAB with respect only to the award
of disability benefits.

HELD:

Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than 120
days, regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body. Respondent
was unable to work from August 18, 1998 to February 22, 1999, at the least, or more
than 120 days, due to his medical treatment. This clearly shows that his disability was
permanent.

Total disability, on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee to earn
wages in the same kind of work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed
to perform, or any kind of work which a person of his mentality and attainments could
do. It does not mean absolute helplessness. In disability compensation, it is not the
injury which is compensated, but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the
impairment of ones earning capacity.

Although the company-designated doctors and respondents physician differ in their


assessments of the degree of respondents disability, both found that respondent was
unfit for sea-duty due to respondents need for regular medical check-ups and treatment
which would not be available if he were at sea. There is no question in our mind that
respondents disability was total.
Petitioners tried to contest the above findings by showing that respondent was able to
work again as a chief mate. Nonetheless, this information does not alter the fact that as
a result of his illness, respondent was unable to work as a chief mate for almost three
years. It is of no consequence that respondent was cured after a couple of years. The
law does not require that the illness should be incurable. What is important is that he
was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes
permanent total disability. An award of a total and permanent disability benefit would
be germane to the purpose of the benefit, which is to help the employee in making ends
meet at the time when he is unable to work.

6. Vergara vs Hammonia Maritime Services Inc GR 172993 10-6-2008, 551 SCRA 611

FACTS:

Petitioner was hired by respondent Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc. Petitioner left
the Philippines to rendezvous with his ship and to carry out his work as a pumpman.

While attending to a defective hydraulic valve, he felt he was losing his vision. He
complained to the Ship Captain that he was seeing black dots and hairy figures floating
in front of his right eye. His condition developed into a gradual visual loss. The ships
medical log entered his condition as internal bleeding in the eye or glaucoma. He was
given eye drops to treat his condition.

The seafarer was repatriated due to eye problem. After undergoing the required
treatment, the COMPANY DOCTOR declared the seafarer fit to resume further sea duty.
The SEAFARER’S PRIVATE DOCTORS disagreed and gave the opinion that seafarer was
not fit to work as a pump man because the job could precipitate the resurgence of his
former condition.

ISSUE:

W/n the petitioners claim for permanent total disability benefits has a legal basis.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that a temporary total disability onlybecomes permanent
when so declared by the company physicianwithin the periods he is allowed to do so, or
upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without
adeclaration of either fitness to work or the existence of apermanent disability. In the
instant case, the company-designateddoctor duly made a declaration well within the
extended 240-dayperiod that the seafarer was fit to work.
7. Montierro vs Rickmers Marine Agency Phils Inc GR 210634 Jan 14 2015

FACTS:

Noriel Montierro is an ordinary seaman, employed by Rickmers Marine Agency Phils.,


Inc. He was asssigned to work on board the vessel MV CSAV Maresias. Sometime in May
2010, while on board the vessel and going down from crane ladder, Montierro lost his
balance and twisted his legs, thus injuring his right knee. On June 4, 2010, he was
examined and treated by Dr. Alegre II, the company-designated physician.. On
September 3, 2010, the 91st day of Montierro’s treatment, Dr. Alegre issued an interim
disability grade of ten. And on January 3, 2011 Dr. Alegre issued final assessment of
disability grade of 10. One month prior to the issuance of the the final assessment, he
filed before a labor arbiter a complaint for complete recovery of permanent disability
compensation, sickness allowance plus moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s
fees. In support of his complaint he secured a Medical Certificate from a physician of his
own choice.

Labor arbiter held that Montierro is entitled to permanent total disability benefits,
which relied on 120 days rule of inability of seafarers to perform work introduced by
2005 case Crystal Shipping Inc. Vs Natividad. One month sickness allowance and
attorney’s fees was also awarded.

NLRC affirmed the decision of LA. After the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration,
Rickmers elevated the case to CA.

CA partially granted the petition. Downgrading the claim to Grade 10 permanent partial
disability benefits because his disability is not deemed total and permanent under the
240-day rule established by case of Vergara vs. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.
promulgated on October 6, 2008.

Attorney’s fees was deleted.

Issues:
 Whether 120 day rule or the 240 days rule should be applied.
 Whether the opinion of the company doctor or the personal doctor of the
seafarer should prevail.
 Whether Montierro is entitled to attorney’s fees.

Ruling:
 If the maritime compensation complaint was filed prior to 6 October 2008, the
120-day rule applies; if, on the other hand, the complaint was filed from 6
October 2008 onwards, the 240-day rule applies. Considering that the complaint
of Montierro was filed on December 3, 2010, 240-day rule should prevail.
 The procedure for determining the liability for work related death, illness or
injury in the case of overseas Filipino seafarers is as follows: when the seafarer
sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his fitness for
work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. The physician
has 120 days, or 240 days , if validly extended, to make the assessment. If the
physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the
company designated physician, the opinion of a third doctor may be agreed
jointly between the employer and the seafarer, whose decision shall be final and
binding on them. Montierro, however, preempted the procedure when he filed
on December 3, 2010 a complaint based on his chosen physician’s assessment.
Hence, for failure of Montierro to observe the procedure provided by POEA-SEC,
the assessment of the company doctor should prevail.
 The rule on labor law is that withholding of wages need not be coupled with
malice or bad faith to warant the grant of attorney’s fees under Article 111 of the
Labor Code. The premature filing of complaint by Montierro shows that there is
no unlawful withholding of benefits to speak of.

8. Vicente vs ECC GR 85024 Jan 23 1991 193 SCRA 190

FACTS

1. Domingo Vicente was formerly employed as a nursing attendant at the Veterans



Memorial Medical Center. 

2. At the age of 45, after having rendered more than 25 years of government
service, 
he applied for optional retirement under the provisions of Sec. 12(c) of
RA 1616, giving his reason therefore his inability to continue working as a result
of his physical disability. 

3. The petitioner likewise filed with the GSIS an application for “income benefits
claim for payment” under PD 626. 

4. The petitioner submitted a Physician’s Certification wherein his attending doctor
had dignosed him as suffering: Osteoarthritis multiple, Hypertensive
Cardiovascular Disease, Cardiomegaly, and Left Venticular Hypertrophy and
classified him as being under “permanent total disability.” 

5. The GSIS granted the claim but only for permanent partial disability
compensation or for a period of 19 months. The petitioner was granted the
equivalent of an additional 4 months benefits as a consequence of his motion for
reconsideration. 

6. Still unsatisfied, the petitioner again sent a letter to the GSIS Disability
Compensation Department Manager insisting that he should be compensated no
less than for “permanent total disability.” 

7. The petitioner’s request was denied. He then elevated the case to the ECC which
however dismissed the petitioner’s appeal. 

ISSUE

Does the petitioner suffer “permanent total disability” as he claims or from “permanent
partial disability” as the respondent Commission would have the Court believe?

HELD


The petitioner is suffering from permanent total disability. Employee’s Disability


under the Labor Code is classified into 3 distinct categories:

a. Temporary total disability if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee is


unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period not exceeding
120 days except as otherwise provided in Rule X of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation. 


b. A disability is total and permanent if a result of the injury or sickness the employee
is unable to perform any gainful occupation for a continuous period exceeding
120 days except as otherwise provided for in Rule X of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation. 


c. A disability is partial permanent if as a result of the injury or sickness the employee


suffers a permanent partial loss of use of any part of his body 


Permanent total disability invariably results in an employee’s loss for work or


inability to perform his usual work. Permanent partial disability, on the other hand,
occurs when an employee loses the use of any particular anatomical part of his body
which disables him to continue with his former work. The test of whether or not an
employee suffers from “permanent total disability” is a showing of the capacity of the
employee to continue performing his work notwithstanding the disability he incurred.
Thus, if by reason of the injury or sickness he sustained, the employee is unable to
perform his customary job for more than 120 days and he does not come within the
coverage of Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensability then the said
employee undoubtedly suffers from “permanent total disability” regardless of whether
or not he loses the use of any part of his body.

In the case at bar, the petitioner’s permanent total disability is established beyond
doubt by several factors and circumstances. Noteworthy is the fact that petitioner’s
application for optional retirement on the basis of his ailment has been approved.
Considering that the petitioner was only 45 years old when he retired and still entitled,
under good behaviour, to 20 more years in service, the approval of his optional
retirement application proves that he was no longer fit to continue his employment.
Further, the petitioner’s physician categorically classified the petitioner under
permanent total disability.
9. Austria vs CA GR 146636 Aug 12 2002
FACTS:

Petitioner Pablo Austria was employed as bag piler at Central Azucarera de Tarlac.
Petitioner began to feel severe back pain and underwent an MRI which revealed a small
disc protrusion. Petitioner underwent Laminectomy. The x-ray photographs taken
revealed osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine.

On account of his osteoarthritis, petitioner filed with the SSS a claim for compensation
benefits under PD 626 as amended. The claim was granted and petitioner was awarded
permanent partial disability benefits for eight (8) months. A second release for seven
(7) months and a third release for fifteen (15) months.

Petitioner thereafter requested the SSS for conversion of his permanent partial
disability benefit to permanent total disability benefit. The SSS denied the request. On
appeal, the ECC affirmed the decision of the SSS. The ECC held that considering the
degree of his disability at the time he was separated from the service, petitioner has
already availed of the maximum benefits to which he is entitled on account of his
osteoarthritis.

Petitioner elevated the case to the CA. It dismissed the petition, ruling that the law does
not allow the conversion of permanent partial disability to permanent total disability.

ISSUE:

W/N CA erred in not allowing the conversion of his (petitioner) permanent partial
disability to permanent total disability.

HELD:

There is nothing in the law that prohibits the conversion of permanent partial disability
benefit to permanent total disability benefit if it is shown that the employees ailment
qualifies as such. The grant of permanent total disability benefit to an employee who
was initially compensated for permanent partial disability but is found to be suffering
from permanent total disability would not be prejudicial to the government to give it
reason to deny the claim.

Petitioner has been employed as bag piler for twenty (20) years at the Central
Azucarera de Tarlac. His duties require him to carry heavy loads of refined sugar and to
perform other manual work. Since his work obviously taxes so much on his back, his
illness which affects his lumbar spine renders him incapable of doing his usual work as
bag piler. Hence, his disability to perform his regular duties may be considered total and
permanent.

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