FLORES V.
DRILON Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an ordinance
The constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of RA 7227 was
challenged as it violates the constitutional proscription
against appointment or designation of elective official to
other government posts. The said provision appointed
Mayor Gordon of Olongapo City as Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.
Sec. 7 (1) Art. IX-B of the Constitution:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or
position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall
hold any other office or employment in the Government
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Held: The first paragraph uses the word “elective” while
the second paragraph uses the word “appointive”. The
exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second
paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who
are governed by the second paragraph.
Exception:
when the other office is held by the public official in an
ex officio capacity.
- There is no violation because such other office does
not comprise “any other position”. The ex officio
position is actually and, in legal contemplation, part
of the principal office. But the official concerned is
not entitled to receive additional compensation for
his services in the said position because his services
are already paid for and covered by the
compensation attached to his principal office.
(National Amnesty Commission v. COA p. 449
Nachura)
DACANAY V. ASSISTIO
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exclusively for residential purposes whereas the zoning as
designating certain city and municipal streets as sites for flea
markets and issued licenses to vendors for them to conduct
vending activities therein.
Held: The disputed areas are public streets. A public
street is property for public use hence outside the
commerce of man. Being outside the commerce of man,
it may not be the subject of lease or other contract.
The leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to
law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be
bargained away through contract. The interests of a few
should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the
community whose health, peace, safety, good order and
general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal
obligation to protect.
HEIRS OF ARDONA V. REYES
The constitutionality of PD 564 and Proclamation No. 2052
are challenged, the said laws declared the some barangays in
Cebu as tourist zones.
Petitioners alleged that the constitution does not provide for
expropriation of private property for tourism purposes and
that the taking was not for public use in comtemplation of
the eminent domain law.
Held: The constitutional restraints are public use and just
compensation. The meaning of “public use” has been
broadened to cover uses which, while not directly
available to the public, redound to their indirect
advantage or benefit.
The petitioner’s contention that the promotion of tourism is
not “public use” because private concessioners would be
allowed to maintain various facilities is impressed with less
merit. At present, whatever may be beneficially employed
for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public
use.
ORTIGAS V. FEATI
The deed of sale contained restrictions on the use of the
subject parcels of land which were then annotated in the
TCTs. The restriction states that the lot should be used
per resolution of the city declares it to be for commercial.
Issues:
1. whether the resolution is a valid exercise of police
power
2. whether the said Resolution can nullify or supersede the
contractual obligations assumed by defendant-appellee.
Held:
In this particular case, the validity of the resolution was
admitted at least impliedly, in the stipulation of facts when
plaintiff-appellant did not dispute the same.
But, assuming arguendo that it is not yet too late in the day
for plaintiff-appellant to raise the issue of the invalidity of
the municipal resolution in question, We are of the opinion
that its posture is unsustainable. Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264,
otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act," empowers a
Municipal Council "to adopt zoning and subdivision
ordinances or regulations"; for the municipality. Clearly,
the law does not restrict the exercise of the power
through an ordinance. Therefore, granting that
Resolution No. 27 is not an ordinance, it certainly is a
regulatory measure within the intendment or ambit of
the word "regulation" under the provision.
With regard to the contention that said resolution cannot
nullify the contractual obligations assumed by the
defendant-appellee – referring to the restrictions
incorporated in the deeds of sale and later in the
corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title issued to
defendant-appellee – it should be stressed, that while non-
impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed,
the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with
the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., "the power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people. Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent,
and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the greatest and
most powerful attribute of government, the exercise of the
power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if
it is capricious, 'whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there
having been a denial of due process or a violation of any
other applicable constitutional guarantee.
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Resolution No. 27, s-1960 declaring the western part of
highway as an industrial and commercial zone, was
obviously passed by the Municipal Council of
Mandaluyong, Rizal in the exercise of police power to
safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order
and general welfare of the people in the locality, Judicial
notice may be taken of the conditions prevailing in the area.
Having been expressly granted the power to adopt zoning
and subdivision ordinances or regulations, the municipality
of Mandaluyong, through its Municipal 'council, was
reasonably, if not perfectly, justified under the
circumstances, in passing the subject resolution.
TORIO V. FONTANILLA
The municipal council passed a resolution resolving to
manage its town fiesta and another resolution creating an
executive committee to organize the said fiesta. The
committee constructed a stage for the “zarzuela”, however
on the night of the performance, the stage collapsed and
pinning Fontanilla (one of the performers) underneath it.
Fontanilla died the following day. His heirs filed a complaint
to recover damages.
Defendant municipality interposed the defense that as a
legally and duly organized public corporation it performs
sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an
exercise of its governmental functions from which no
liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its
agents.
Issue: Whether or not the celebration of a town fiesta
authorized by a municipal council under the
Municipal Law is a governmental or a corporate or
a proprietary function of the municipality.
Held: Holding of a town fiesta is a proprietary
function. The municipality is liable for the death of
Fontanilla under the principle of respondeat superior.
There can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of
determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of
a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular
case are to be considered and will be decisive. The basic
element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking
may be, is that it is governmental in essence, otherwise the
function becomes private or proprietary in nature.
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The distinction of powers becomes important for purposes Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore
of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of be established by proof that there has already been a
its agents which result in injury to third persons. If the injury conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at
is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental the time of flight. Not being a "fugitive from justice" under
function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be. had from the this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon
municipality unless there is an existing statute on the Province gubernatorial post.
matter, nor from its officers, so long as they performed their
duties honestly and in good faith or that they did not act
wantonly and maliciously. With respect to proprietary RECALL
functions, the settled rule is that a municipal corporation
can be held liable to third persons ex contract or ex Exercised by: the registered voters of a local government
delicto. unit to which the local elective official
subject to such recall belongs
Ground: loss of confidence
Process/Rules:
FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE
1. commenced by a petition of a registered voter in the
(case: Rodriguez v. Marquez) LGU concerned and supported by the registered voters
during the election in which the local official sought to
Rodriguez and Marquez ran for governor of Quezon be recalled was elected subject to the percentage
Province and it was Rodriguez who won in the May 1992 requirements provided by law.
elections. Marquez challenged it before the COMELEC
revealing that Rodriguez left the US were a charge filed on 2. The petition shall contain:
November 1985 was pending against him for fraudulent
insurance claims and theft. Rodriguez is therefore a “fugitive i. the name and addresses of the petitioners
from justice” which is a ground for disqualification / ii. the LGU to which the petitioners belong
ineligibility. COMELEC dismissed and the dismissal was
challenged by Marquez before the SC. The SC did not iii. the name of the official sought to be recalled
passed upon whether or not Rodriquez was a fugitive from
justice was this task was upon COMELEC. iv. brief narration of the reasons and
justifications
During the next election, both parties once again became
rivals for the same position. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ 3. COMELEC shall, within 15 days from the filing of the
candidacy on the same ground. petition, certify to the sufficiency of the required number
of signatures.
(long story! Kapoy summarize!)
If sufficient, COMELEC shall cause its
Held: publication.
To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground If not sufficient, COMELEC may dismiss motu
for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to proprio.
run for any elective local position under Section 40(e) of the
4. COMELEC shall set the date of the election or recall.
Local Government Code, should be understood according to
the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision, to wit: 5. The recall of an elective official shall be effective only
upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the
"A 'fugitive from justice' includes not only those who person of the candidate receiving the highest number of
votes cast during the election on recall.
flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise
those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution."
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6. The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not - Refers to an act by which the National Government Abolition of LGU how done:
be allowed to resign while the recall process is in confers power and authority upon various local
progress. government units to perform specific functions and 1. When its income, population or land area is below
responsibilities. the minimum standards
7. Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall
2. Through a law or ordinance
election only once during his term of office. - It shall include the transfer to LGUs of the records,
3. The law or odinance shall specify the province,
equipment, and other assets and personnel of national
No recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved city or municipality with which LGU sought to be
assumption to office or 1 year immediately preceding a powers, functions and responsibilities. abolished will be incorporated
regular local election. 4. Plebiscite requirements
8. All expenses incident to recall shall be borne by the
COMELEC. Eminent Domain
Plebiscite requirements:
1. There must be a valid and definite offer made to the
owner which was refused by him 1. Approved by a majority of the votes cast in
SUSPENSION OF AN ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICIAL
2. Through the chief executive acting pursuant to an 2. The plebiscite called for the purpose in the
☼ Grounds: (for discipline, suspension, removal) ordinance political units directly affected
See SECTION 60 3. For public use or purpose 3. Conducted by COMELEC within 120 days from
4. Payment of just compensation the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance
☼ Preventive suspension may be imposed by:
a. By the president, if the respondent is an elective The LGU may immediately take possession of the
official of a province, a highly urbanized or an property upon:
independent component city Beginning of corporate existence:
1. Filing of the expropriation proceedings
b. By the governor – elective official of a 2. Making a deposit with the proper court of 15% of the - Upon the election and qualification of its chief
component city or municipality FMV at the time of the taking executive and a majority of the members of the
sanggunian
c. By the mayor – elective official of the barangay
Creation, division, merger, abolishment, alteration of Dual nature of LGUs:
boundaries how done:
☼ Preventive suspension is imposed when the evidence of Political subdivision Corporate entity
guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, a) By law enacted by Congress Local governance Proprietary functions
there is great probability that the continuance in office - For province,city, municipality Exercise does not make it Vulnerable to liabilities on
of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose b) By ordinance passed by the sangguniang liable for damages contracts it enters into
a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and panlalawigan or panlungsod concerned EXC: Art. 2189 NCC for
other evidence. maintenance of road safety
- For barangay located within its territorial
☼ The official preventively suspended shall receive no jurisdiction
salary or compensation during such suspension but
upon subsequent exoneration and reinstatement he shall Reclassification of lands:
be paid such.
Verifiable indicators of viability for creation of a LGU: 1. City or municipality makes an ordinance
2. After public hearing
1. Income 3. In the following cases:
OTHER POSSIBLE TOPICS 2. Population a. Land ceases to be economically feasible
Devolution 3. Land area b. Land has a substantially greater economica
value in another purpose
4. Limitation shall be followed under Section 20.

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Closure and reopening of roads:

1. Through an ordinance Disqualifications of elective officials:

2. If permanent closure:
2.1. Ordinance must be approved by at least 2/3
of all members of the sanggunian
2.2. Adequate substitute for the closed facility is
provided
Qualifications of elective officials
1. Must be a citizen of the Philippines.
2. Registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city or province or in the district where he intends
to be electedfor at least 1 year immediately
preceding the day of the election
3. Able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect
4. (additional requirements:)
a. Sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude OR for an offense
punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment,
within 2 years after serving sentence
b. Removed from office asa result of an
administrative case
c. Convicted by final judgment for violating the oath
of allegiance to the republic
d. With dual citizenship
e. Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical
cases here or abroad
f. Permanent residents in a foreign country or
thosewho acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right

For governor, vice-governor, member of the

sangguniang panlalawigan
For mayor, vice-mayor or member of the
sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized
cities

- Must be 23 years of age on election day

Mayor, vice-mayor of independent component

cities, component cities or municipalities

- Must be at least 21 on election day

Sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan

- Must be at least 18 on election day

Punong barangay or member of sangguniang

barangay

- Must be at least 18 on election day

Sangguniang kabataan

- Must be at least 15 but not more than 21

on election day

JAC | 2016 Final exam pointers for Atty. Lapid’s Pub. Corp. class 4