Before the MCTC, respondent heirs presented evidence that they
inherited a bigger parcel of land from their mother, Maxima Sin, who
March 26, 2014
G.R. No. 157485
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by AKLAN
NATIONAL COLLEGE OF FISHERIES (ANCF) and DR. ELENITA R.
ANDRADE, in her capacity as ANCF Superintendent, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMA LACHICA SIN, namely: SALVACION L. SIN,
ROSARIO S. ENRIQUEZ, FRANCISCO L. SIN, MARIA S.
YUCHINTAT, MANUEL L. SIN, JAIME CARDINAL SIN, RAMON L.
SIN, and CEFERINA S. VITA,Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review assailing the Decision of the Court of
1 heirs herein] the owner and possessor of the land in question in this
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 65244 dated February 24, 2003, which
upheld the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan
in Civil Case No. 6130 and the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of New Washington and Batan, Aklan in Civil Case No. 1181,
segregating from the Aklan National College of Fisheries (ANCF)
reservation the portion of land being claimed by respondents.
Petitioner in this case is the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
ANCF and Dr. Elenita R. Andrade, in her capacity as Superintendent of
ANCF. Respondents claim that they are the lawful heirs of the late
Maxima Lachica Sin who was the owner of a parcel of land situated at
Barangay Tambac, New Washington, Aklan, and more particularly
described as follows:
A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay
Tambac, New Washington, Aklan, containing an approximate area of
FIFTY[-]EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIX (58,606) square
meters, more or less, as per survey by Geodetic Engineer Reynaldo L.
Lopez. Bounded on the North by Dumlog Creek; on the East by
Adriano Melocoton; on the South by Mabilo Creek; and on the West by
Amado Cayetano and declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Maxima L. Sin (deceased) under Tax Declaration No. 10701 (1985)
with an assessed value of Php1,320.00. 2
On August 26, 1991, respondent heirs instituted in the RTC of Kalibo,
Aklan a complaint against Lucio Arquisola, in his capacity as
Superintendent of ANCF (hereinafter ANCF Superintendent), for
recovery of possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership
with damages. Respondent heirs claim that a 41,231-square meter-
portion of the property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF,
creating a cloud of doubt with respect to their ownership over the
parcel of land they wish to remove from the ANCF reservation.
The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being
claimed by respondents was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of
land within the area, which included said portion of private
respondents’ alleged property, as civil reservation for educational
purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred
that the subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not
susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include ANCF as a party
defendant and Lucio Arquisola, who retired from the service during the
pendency of the case, was substituted by Ricardo Andres, then the
designated Officer-in-Charge of ANCF.
The RTC remanded the case to the MCTC of New Washington and
Batan, Aklan, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659 which
expanded the jurisdiction of first-level courts. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 1181 (4390).
died in the year 1945 in New Washington, Capiz (now Aklan). Maxima
Sin acquired said bigger parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale
(Exhibit "B"), and then developed the same by planting coconut trees,
banana plants, mango trees and nipa palms and usufructing the
produce of said land until her death in 1945.
In the year 1988, a portion of said land respondents inherited from
Maxima Sin was occupied by ANCF and converted into a fishpond for
educational purpose. Respondent heirs of Maxima Sin asserted that
they were previously in possession of the disputed land in the concept
of an owner. The disputed area was a swampy land until it was
converted into a fishpond by the ANCF. To prove possession,
respondents presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which
was in the year 1945.
On June 19, 2000, the MCTC rendered its Decision in favor of
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring plaintiffs [respondent
case and for the defendants to cause the segregation of the same from
the Civil Reservation of the Aklan National College of Fisheries,
granted under Proclamation No. 2074 dated March 31, 1981.
It is further ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the
plaintiffs actual damages for the unearned yearly income from nipa
plants uprooted by the defendants [on] the land in question when the
same has been converted by the defendants into a fishpond, in the
amount of Php3,500.00 yearly beginning the year 1988 until plaintiffs
are fully restored to the possession of the land in question.
It is finally ordered, that defendants jointly and severally pay the
plaintiffs the sum of Php10,000.00 for attorney’s fees and costs of this
suit.
3
According to the MCTC, the sketch made by the Court Commissioner
in his report (Exh. "LL") shows that the disputed property is an
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. Furthermore, the
land covered by Civil Reservation under Proclamation No. 2074 was
classified as timberland only on December 22, 1960 (Exh. "4-D"). The
MCTC observed that the phrase "Block II Alien or Disp. LC 2415" was
printed on the Map of the Civil Reservation for ANCF established under
Proclamation No. 2074 (Exh. "6"), indicating that the disputed land is
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
The MCTC likewise cited a decision of this Court in the 1976 case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals where it was pronounced that:
4
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful
settlement on them can be acquired. The claims of persons who have
settled on, occupied, and improved a parcel of public land which is
later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and
are usually respected, but where the President, as authorized by law,
issues a proclamation reserving certain lands, and warning all persons
to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously acquired in
such lands by a person who has settled thereon in order to obtain a
preferential right of purchase. And patents for lands which have been
previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriated are void.
(Underscoring from the MCTC, citations omitted.)
Noting that there was no warning in Proclamation No. 2074 requiring
all persons to depart from the reservation, the MCTC concluded that
the reservation was subject to private rights if there are any.
The MCTC thus ruled that the claim of respondent heirs over the
disputed land by virtue of their and their predecessors’ open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession amounts to an
imperfect title, which should be respected and protected.
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 6130.
On May 2, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision affirming the MCTC
judgment with modification:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is modified
absolving Appellant Ricardo Andres from the payment of damages and
attorney’s fees. All other details of the appealed decision are affirmed
in toto.
5
The RTC stressed that Proclamation No. 2074 recognizes vested
rights acquired by private individuals prior to its issuance on March 31,
1981.
The RTC added that the findings of facts of the MCTC may not be
disturbed on appeal unless the court below has overlooked some facts
of substance that may alter the results of its findings. The RTC,
however, absolved the Superintendent of the ANCF from liability as
there was no showing on record that he acted with malice or in bad
faith in the implementation of Proclamation No. 2074. 6
Petitioner Republic, represented by the ANCF and Dr. Elenita R.
Andrade, in her capacity as the new Superintendent of the ANCF,
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a Petition for
Review. The petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 65244.
On February 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
dismissing the petition for lack of merit. In addition to the findings of the
MCTC and the RTC, the Court of Appeals held:
Moreover, petitioner had not shown by competent evidence that the
subject land was likewise declared a timberland before its formal
classification as such in 1960. Considering that lands adjoining to that
of the private respondents, which are also within the reservation area,
have been issued original certificates of title, the same affirms the
conclusion that the area of the subject land was agricultural, and
therefore disposable, before its declaration as a timberland in 1960.
It should be noted that Maxima Lachica Sin acquired, through
purchase and sale, the subject property from its previous owners
spouses Sotera Melocoton and Victor Garcia on January 15, 1932, or
28 years before the said landholding was declared a timberland on
December 22, 1960. Tacking, therefore, the possession of the previous
owners and that of Maxima Lachica Sin over the disputed property, it
does not tax ones imagination to conclude that the subject property
had been privately possessed for more than 30 years before it was
declared a timberland. This being the case, the said possession has
ripened into an ownership against the State, albeit an imperfect one.
Nonetheless, it is our considered opinion that this should come under
the meaning of "private rights" under Proclamation No. 2074 which are
deemed segregated from the mass of civil reservation granted to
petitioner. (Citation omitted.)
7
Hence, this Petition for Review, anchored on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAW IN UPHOLDING RESPONDENTS’ CLAIM TO SUPPOSED
"PRIVATE RIGHTS" OVER SUBJECT LAND DESPITE THE DENR
CERTIFICATION THAT IT IS CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF
LAW IN AFFIRMING THE DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT AND THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
RELEASING THE SUBJECT LAND BEING CLAIMED BY
RESPONDENTS FROM THE MASS OF PUBLIC DOMAIN AND
AWARDING DAMAGES TO THEM. 8
The central dispute in the case at bar is the interpretation of the first
paragraph of Proclamation No. 2074:
Upon recommendation of the Director of Forest Development,
approved by the Minister of Natural Resources and by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of
the Philippines, do hereby set aside as Civil Reservation for Aklan
National College of Fisheries, subject to private rights, if any there be,
parcels of land, containing an aggregate area of 24.0551 hectares,
situated in the Municipality of New Washington, Province of Aklan,
Philippines, designated Parcels I and II on the attached BFD Map CR-
203, x x x [.]
9
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held that
respondents retain private rights to the disputed property, thus
preventing the application of the above proclamation thereon. The
private right referred to is an alleged imperfect title, which respondents
supposedly acquired by possession of the subject property, through
their predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years before it was declared as a
timberland on December 22, 1960.
At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public
Land Act or the Property Registration Decree. Nevertheless, the courts
a quo apparently treated respondents’ complaint for recovery of
possession, quieting of title and declaration of ownership as such an
application and proceeded to determine if respondents complied with
the requirements therefor.
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073, as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
An equivalent provision is found in Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, which provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply.— The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
This Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-
in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial
or from June 12, 1945; and
(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. 10
With respect to the second requisite, the courts a quo held that the
disputed property was alienable and disposable before 1960, citing
petitioner’s failure to show competent evidence that the subject land
was declared a timberland before its formal classification as such on
said year. Petitioner emphatically objects, alleging that under the
11
Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State
and that lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State.
After a thorough review of the records, we agree with petitioner. As this
Court held in the fairly recent case of Valiao v. Republic :
12
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of
any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person
by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public
land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or disposable to a
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public
domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man
and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no matter how
long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. The
burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of
the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration
(or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of
the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
1âwphi1
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable. (Citations
omitted.)
This Court reached the same conclusion in Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap, which 13
presents a similar issue with respect to another area of the same
province of Aklan. On November 10, 1978, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island, among other islands,
caves and peninsulas of the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine
reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority
(PTA). On September 3, 1982, PTA Circular 3-82 was issued to
implement Proclamation No. 1801. The respondents-claimants in said
case filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan,
claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3-82 precluded
them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
or survey of land for titling purposes. The respondents claim that
through their predecessors-in-interest, they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of their
lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945 or earlier since time immemorial.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the petition for review of the
above case with this Court, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred
(400) hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six
hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land
(alienable and disposable). Petitioner-claimants and other landowners
in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,
mandamus and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064, alleging that it
infringed on their "prior vested right" over portions of Boracay which
they allege to have possessed since time immemorial. This petition
was consolidated with the petition for review concerning Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular 3- 82.
This Court, discussing the Regalian Doctrine vis-à-vis the right of the
claimants to lands they claim to have possessed since time
immemorial, held:
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time
and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In
fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only
to those lands which have been "officially delimited and classified."
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership
of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the
land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to
the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to
2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court
cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants
were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
proof. (Emphases in the original; citations omitted.)
14
Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to
show competent evidence that the subject land was declared a
timberland before its formal classification as such in 1960 does not
lead to the presumption that said land was alienable and disposable
prior to said date. On the contrary, the presumption is that unclassified
lands are inalienable public lands. Such was the conclusion of this
Court in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea
Rafols v. Republic, wherein we held:
15
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically
state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were
unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified
land until released and rendered open to disposition. x x x. (Emphasis
supplied, citation deleted.)
The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title in Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, and the equivalent provision
in Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was furthermore
painstakingly debated upon by the members of this Court in
Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic. In Malabanan, the members of
16
this Court were in disagreement as to whether lands declared alienable
or disposable after June 12, 1945 may be subject to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. There was, however, no disagreement
that there must be a declaration to that effect.
In the case at bar, it is therefore the respondents which have the
burden to identify a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land
for agricultural or other purposes. Since respondents failed to do so,
the alleged possession by them and by their predecessors-in-interest is
inconsequential and could never ripen into ownership. Accordingly,
respondents cannot be considered to have private rights within the
purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the application of said
proclamation to the subject property. We are thus constrained to
reverse the rulings of the courts a quo and grant the prayer of
petitioner Republic to dismiss Civil Case No. 1181 (4390) for lack of
merit.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
65244 dated February 24, 2003, which upheld the Decisions of the
Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 6130 and the
First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and Batan, Aklan
in Civil Case No. 1181 (4390), segregating from the Aklan National
College of Fisheries reservation the portion of land being claimed by
respondents is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 1181
(4390) of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of New Washington and
Batan, Aklan is hereby DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 199310 February 19, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC., represented by RONNIE P.
INOCENCIO, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
1
the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the Decision dated 2
November 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
90503. The CA affirmed the Decision dated May 16, 2007 of the
3 executed by Salvador and Mijares in favor of the respondent; (2)
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 69, in Land
Registration Case No. N-11465.
The Facts
On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed
an application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two
4
parcels of land situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila,
identified as Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastre,
with an area of 29,945 square meters and 20,357 sq m, respectively.
On December 13, 2001, the RTC issued the Order finding the
5 4850 (R.A. No. 4850), lands, surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located
respondent’s application for registration sufficient in form and
substance and setting it for initial hearing on February 21, 2002. The
scheduled initial hearing was later reset to May 30, 2002. The Notice
6 testifying for the oppositor LLDA, claimed that, upon preliminary
of Initial Hearing was published in the Official Gazette, April 1, 2002
issue, Volume 98, No. 13, pages 1631-1633 and in the March 21,
7 Taguig, which was prepared using an aerial survey conducted by the
2002 issue of People’s Balita, a newspaper of general circulation in
8 then Department of National Defense-Bureau of Coast in April 1966,
the Philippines. The Notice of Initial Hearing was likewise posted in a
conspicuous place on Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077, as well as in a
conspicuous place on the bulletin board of the City hall of Taguig,
Metro Manila. 9
On May 30, 2002, when the RTC called the case for initial hearing,
only the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as
oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued an order of general default except
LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its comment/opposition to
the respondent’s application for registration. 10
On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition to the respondent’s
11
application for registration, asserting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are
not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. On
the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16,
2002, likewise filed its Opposition, alleging that the respondent failed
12
to prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject parcels
of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Trial on the merits of the respondent’s application ensued thereafter.
The respondent presented four witnesses: Teresita Villaroya, the
respondent’s corporate secretary; Ronnie Inocencio, an employee of
the respondent and the one authorized by it to file the application for
registration with the RTC; Cenon Cerquena (Cerquena), the caretaker
of the subject properties since 1957; and Engineer Mariano Flotildes
(Engr. Flotildes), a geodetic engineer hired by the respondent to
conduct a topographic survey of the subject properties.
For its part, the LLDA presented the testimonies of Engineers Ramon
Magalonga (Engr. Magalonga) and Christopher A. Pedrezuela (Engr.
Pedrezuela), who are both geodetic engineers employed by the LLDA.
Essentially, the testimonies of the respondent’s witnesses showed that
the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said parcels of
land long before June 12, 1945. The respondent purchased Lot Nos.
3068 and 3077 from Conrado Salvador (Salvador) and Bella Mijares
(Mijares), respectively, in 1989. The subject properties were originally
owned and possessed by Veronica Jaime (Jaime), who cultivated and
planted different kinds of crops in the said lots, through her caretaker
and hired farmers, since 1943. Sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the said
parcels of land to Salvador and Mijares, who continued to cultivate the
lots until the same were purchased by the respondent in 1989.
The respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced
by the certifications issued by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR).
In support of its application, the respondent, inter alia, presented the
following documents: (1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 28, 1989
13
survey plans of the subject properties; (3) technical descriptions of the
14
subject properties; (4) Geodetic Engineer’s Certificate; (5) tax
15 16
declarations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 for 2002; and (6) certifications
17
dated December 17, 2002, issued by Corazon D. Calamno (Calamno),
Senior Forest Management Specialist of the DENR, attesting that Lot
Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain.18
On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent’s application
for registration should be denied since the subject parcels of land are
not part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it
pointed out that pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No.
19
at and below the reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters are public
lands which form part of the bed of the said lake. Engr. Magalonga,
evaluation of the subject properties, based on the topographic map of
he found out that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below
12.50 m. That upon actual area verification of the subject properties on
September 25, 2002, Engr. Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of
the subject properties range from 11.33 m to 11.77 m.
On rebuttal, the respondent presented Engr. Flotildes, who claimed
that, based on the actual topographic survey of the subject properties
he conducted upon the request of the respondent, the elevations of the
subject properties, contrary to LLDA’s claim, are above 12.50 m.
Particularly, Engr. Flotildes claimed that Lot No. 3068 has an elevation
ranging from 12.60 m to 15 m while the elevation of Lot No. 3077
ranges from 12.60 m to 14.80 m.
The RTC Ruling
On May 16, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, which granted the
20
respondent’s application for registration of title to the subject
properties, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is rendered confirming
the title of the applicant Remman Enterprises Incorporated over a
parcels of land [sic] consisting of 29,945 square meters (Lot 3068) and
20,357 (Lot 3077) both situated in Brgy. Napindan, Taguig, Taguig,
Metro Manila more particularly described in the Technical Descriptions
Ap-04-003103 and Swo-00-001769 respectively and ordering their
registration under the Property Registration Decree in the name of
Remman Enterprises Incorporated.
SO ORDERED. 21
The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove that the subject
properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. The RTC opined that the elevations of the subject properties
are very much higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and,
thus, not part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC pointed out that
LLDA’s claim that the elevation of the subject properties is below 12.50
m is hearsay since the same was merely based on the topographic
map that was prepared using an aerial survey on March 2, 1966; that
nobody was presented to prove that an aerial survey was indeed
conducted on March 2, 1966 for purposes of gathering data for the
preparation of the topographic map.
Further, the RTC posited that the elevation of a parcel of land does not
always remain the same; that the elevations of the subject properties
may have already changed since 1966 when the supposed aerial
survey, from which the topographic map used by LLDA was based,
was conducted. The RTC likewise faulted the method used by Engr.
Magalonga in measuring the elevations of the subject properties,
pointing out that:
Further, in finding that the elevation of the subject lots are below 12.5
meters, oppositor’s witness merely compared their elevation to the
elevation of the particular portion of the lake dike which he used as his
[benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the
subject lots. Also, the elevation of the said portion of the lake dike that
was then under the construction by FF Cruz was allegedly 12.79
meters and after finding that the elevation of the subject lots are lower
than the said [benchmark] or reference point, said witness suddenly
jumped to a conclusion that the elevation was below 12.5 meters. x x x.
Moreover, the finding of LLDA’s witness was based on hearsay as said
witness admitted that it was DPWH or the FF Cruz who determined the
elevation of the portion of the lake dike which he used as the
[benchmark] or reference point in determining the elevation of the
subject lots and that he has no personal knowledge as to how the
DPWH and FF Cruz determined the elevation of the said [benchmark]
or reference point and he only learn[ed] that its elevation is 12.79
meters from the information he got from FF Cruz. 22
Even supposing that the elevations of the subject properties are indeed
below 12.50 m, the RTC opined that the same could not be considered
part of the bed of Laguna Lake. The RTC held that, under Section
41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake extends only to those areas that
can be covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual
maximum lake level of 12.50 m. Hence, the RTC averred, only those
parcels of land that are adjacent to and near the shoreline of Laguna
Lake form part of its bed and not those that are already far from it,
which could not be reached by the lake water. The RTC pointed out
that the subject properties are more than a kilometer away from the
shoreline of Laguna Lake; that they are dry and waterless even when
the waters of Laguna Lake is at its maximum level. The RTC likewise
found that the respondent was able to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.
The petitioner appealed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007 to the
CA.
The CA Ruling
On November 10, 2011, the CA, by way of the assailed
Decision, affirmed the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007. The CA
23
found that the respondent was able to establish that the subject
properties are part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain; that the same are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake, as
claimed by the petitioner. Thus:
The evidence submitted by the appellee is sufficient to warrant
registration of the subject lands in its name. Appellee’s witness Engr.
Mariano Flotildes, who conducted an actual area verification of the
subject lots, ably proved that the elevation of the lowest portion of Lot
No. 3068 is 12.6 meters and the elevation of its highest portion is 15
meters. As to the other lot, it was found [out] that the elevation of the
lowest portion of Lot No. 3077 is also 12.6 meters and the elevation of
its highest portion is 15 meters. Said elevations are higher than the
reglementary elevation of 12.5 meters as provided for under paragraph
11, Section 41 of R.A. No. 4850, as amended.
In opposing the instant application for registration, appellant relies
merely on the Topographic Map dated March 2, 1966, prepared by
Commodore Pathfinder, which allegedly shows that the subject parcels
of land are so situated in the submerge[d] [lake water] of Laguna Lake.
The said data was gathered through aerial photography over the area
of Taguig conducted on March 2, 1966. However, nobody testified on
the due execution and authenticity of the said document. As regards
the testimony of the witness for LLDA, Engr. Ramon Magalonga, that
the subject parcels of land are below the 12.5 meter elevation, the
same can be considered inaccurate aside from being hearsay
considering his admission that his findings were based merely on the
evaluation conducted by DPWH and FF Cruz. x x x. (Citations
24
omitted)
The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present
certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that the subject properties
form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
which was not disputed by the petitioner. The CA further ruled that the
respondent was able to prove, through the testimonies of its witnesses,
that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject properties prior to
June 12, 1945.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in
affirming the RTC Decision dated May 16, 2007, which granted the
application for registration filed by the respondent.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The petitioner maintains that the lower courts erred in granting the
respondent’s application for registration since the subject properties do
not form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain. The petitioner insists that the elevations of the subject
properties are below the reglementary level of 12.50 m and, pursuant
to Section 41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, are considered part of the bed of
Laguna Lake.
That the elevations of the subject properties are above the
reglementary level of 12.50 m is a finding of fact by the lower courts,
which this Court, generally may not disregard. It is a long-standing
policy of this Court that the findings of facts of the RTC which were
adopted and affirmed by the CA are generally deemed conclusive and
binding. This Court is not a trier of facts and will not disturb the factual
findings of the lower courts unless there are substantial reasons for
doing so.25
That the subject properties are not part of the bed of Laguna Lake,
however, does not necessarily mean that they already form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is still
incumbent upon the respondent to prove, with well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence, that the subject properties are indeed part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. While
deference is due to the lower courts’ finding that the elevations of the
subject properties are above the reglementary level of 12.50 m and,
hence, no longer part of the bed of Laguna Lake pursuant to Section
41(11) of R.A. No. 4850, the Court nevertheless finds that the
respondent failed to substantiate its entitlement to registration of title to
the subject properties.
"Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution,
all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source
of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person
by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden
of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who
must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence
must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application
is alienable or disposable." 26
The respondent filed its application for registration of title to the subject
properties under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529 , which provides that:
27
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles to public land acquired under Section
48(b) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073. Under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529,
28
applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish: first, that
the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain; second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. 29
The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the
subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, the respondent presented two certifications issued by
30
Calamno, attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain "under Project No.
27-B of Taguig, Metro Manila as per LC Map 2623, approved on
January 3, 1968."
However, the said certifications presented by the respondent are
insufficient to prove that the subject properties are alienable and
disposable. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc., the Court clarified that, in addition to the certification issued by
31
the proper government agency that a parcel of land is alienable and
disposable, applicants for land registration must prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of
public domain as alienable and disposable. They must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the records. Thus:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a
land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration
must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to
do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable. (Emphasis ours)
32
In Republic v. Roche, the Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the
33
ruling in T.A.N. Properties, viz:
Respecting the third requirement, the applicant bears the burden of
proving the status of the land. In this connection, the Court has held
that he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)
of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and
disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification
through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. These facts must be established by the applicant to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Here, Roche did not present evidence that the land she applied for has
been classified as alienable or disposable land of the public domain.
She submitted only the survey map and technical description of the
land which bears no information regarding the land’s classification. She
did not bother to establish the status of the land by any certification
from the appropriate government agency. Thus, it cannot be said that
she complied with all requisites for registration of title under Section
14(1) of P.D. 1529. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
34
The DENR certifications that were presented by the respondent in
support of its application for registration are thus not sufficient to prove
that the subject properties are indeed classified by the DENR
Secretary as alienable and disposable. It is still imperative for the
respondent to present a copy of the original classification approved by
the DENR Secretary, which must be certified by the legal custodian
thereof as a true copy. Accordingly, the lower courts erred in granting
the application for registration in spite of the failure of the respondent to
prove by well-nigh incontrovertible evidence that the subject properties
are alienable and disposable.
Nevertheless, the respondent claims that the Court’s ruling in T.A.N.
Properties, which was promulgated on June 26, 2008, must be applied
prospectively, asserting that decisions of this Court form part of the law
of the land and, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, laws shall have
no retroactive effect. The respondent points out that its application for
registration of title to the subject properties was filed and was granted
by the RTC prior to the Court’s promulgation of its ruling in T.A.N.
Properties. Accordingly, that it failed to present a copy of the original
classification covering the subject properties approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy,
the respondent claims, would not warrant the denial of its application
for registration.
The Court does not agree.
Notwithstanding that the respondent’s application for registration was
filed and granted by RTC prior to the Court’s ruling in T.A.N.
Properties, the pronouncements in that case may be applied to the
present case; it is not antithetical to the rule of non-retroactivity of laws
pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code. It is elementary that the
interpretation of a law by this Court constitutes part of that law from the
date it was originally passed, since this Court’s construction merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted
law carried into effect. "Such judicial doctrine does not amount to the
35
passage of a new law, but consists merely of a construction or
interpretation of a pre-existing one."36
Verily, the ruling in T.A.N. Properties was applied by the Court in
subsequent cases notwithstanding that the applications for registration
were filed and granted by the lower courts prior to the promulgation of
T.A.N. Properties.
In Republic v. Medida, the application for registration of the subject
37
properties therein was filed on October 22, 2004 and was granted by
the trial court on June 21, 2006. Similarly, in Republic v. Jaralve, the
38
application for registration of the subject property therein was filed on
October 22, 1996 and was granted by the trial court on November 15,
2002. In the foregoing cases, notwithstanding that the applications for
registration were filed and granted by the trial courts prior to the
promulgation of T.A.N. Properties, this Court applied the
pronouncements in T.A.N. Properties and denied the applications for
registration on the ground, inter alia, that the applicants therein failed to
present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified by the legal custodian thereof as a true copy.
Anent the second and third requirements, the Court finds that the
respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
To prove that it and its predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession and occupation of the subject properties since 1943, the
respondent presented the testimony of Cerquena. Cerquena testified
that the subject properties were originally owned by Jaime who
supposedly possessed and cultivated the same since 1943; that
sometime in 1975, Jaime sold the subject properties to Salvador and
Mijares who, in turn, sold the same to the respondent in 1989.
The foregoing are but unsubstantiated and self-serving assertions of
the possession and occupation of the subject properties by the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest; they do not constitute the
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence of possession and occupation of the
subject properties required by Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Indeed,
other than the testimony of Cerquena, the respondent failed to present
any other evidence to prove the character of the possession and
occupation by it and its predecessors-in-interest of the subject
properties.
For purposes of land registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529,
proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate
the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land subject of the application. Applicants for land
registration cannot just offer general statements which are mere
conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession. Actual
possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of
such a nature as a party would actually exercise over his own
property.39
Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its predecessors-
in-interest cultivated the subject properties, by planting different crops
thereon, his testimony is bereft of any specificity as to the nature of
such cultivation as to warrant the conclusion that they have been
indeed in possession and occupation of the subject properties in the
manner required by law. There was no showing as to the number of
crops that are planted in the subject properties or to the volume of the
produce harvested from the crops supposedly planted thereon.
Further, assuming ex gratia argumenti that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest have indeed planted crops on the subject
properties, it does not necessarily follow that the subject properties
have been possessed and occupied by them in the manner
contemplated by law. The supposed planting of crops in the subject
properties may only have amounted to mere casual cultivation, which
is not the possession and occupation required by law.
"A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does
not constitute possession under claim of ownership. For him,
possession is not exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the state. The possession of public land,
however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with
regard to public land does not operate against the state, unless the
occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under
claim of ownership for the required number of years." 40
Further, the Court notes that the tax declarations over the subject
properties presented by the respondent were only for 2002. The
respondent failed to explain why, despite its claim that it acquired the
subject properties as early as 1989, and that its predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession of the subject property since 1943, it
was only in 2002 that it started to declare the same for purposes of
taxation. "While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership." That the
41
subject properties were declared for taxation purposes only in 2002
gives rise to the presumption that the respondent claimed ownership or
possession of the subject properties starting that year. Likewise, no
improvement or plantings were declared or noted in the said tax
declarations. This fact belies the claim that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest, contrary to Cerquena's testimony, have been
in possession and occupation of the subject properties in the manner
required by law.
Having failed to prove that the subject properties form part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and that it and its
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same since June 12, 1945,
or earlier, the respondent's application for registration should be
denied.
1âw phi 1
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the
instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 10, 2011
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90503, which affirmed the
Decision dated May 16, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 69, in Land Registration Case No. N-11465 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of
Remman Enterprises, Inc. in Land Registration Case No. N-11465 is
DENIED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 179155 April 2, 2014
NICOMEDES J. LOZADA, Petitioner,
vs.
EULALIA BRACEWELL, EDDIE BRACEWELL, ESTELLITA
BRACEWELL, JAMES BRACEWELL, JOHN BRACEWELL, EDWIN
BRACEWELL, ERIC BRACEWELL, and HEIRS OF GEORGE
BRACEWELL,Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision dated
1 2
May 23, 2007 and the Resolution dated August 14, 2007 of the Court
3
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 81075, which affirmed the
Decision dated July 31, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las
4
Pifias City, Branch 275 in Civil Case No. LP 98-0025, directing the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) to set aside Decree of Registration
No. N-217036 (Decree No. N-217036) and Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 0-78 in the name of petitioner Nicomedes J. Lozada
(petitioner), and ordering the latter to cause the amendment of Plan
PSU-129514 as well as segregate therefrom Lot 5 of Plan PSU-
180598.
The Facts
On December 10, 1976, petitioner filed an application for registration
and confirmation of title over a parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-
129514, which was granted on February 23, 1989 by the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 134, acting as a land registration
court. Consequently, on July 10, 1997, the LRA issued Decree No. N-
5
217036 in the name of petitioner, who later obtained OCT No. 0-78
covering the said parcel of land.6
On February 6, 1998, within a year from the issuance of the The Las Piñas City-RTC Ruling
aforementioned decree, James Bracewell, Jr. (Bracewell) filed a
petition for review of a decree of registration under Section 32 of
Finding that petitioner obtained Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known as the "Property
7

78 in bad faith, the Las Piñas City-RTC rendered a Decision on July 18

Registration Decree," before the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 275
31, 2003 in favor of Bracewell, who had died during the pendency of
(Las Piñas City-RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. LP 98-
the case and was substituted by Eulalia Bracewell and his heirs
0025, claiming that a portion of Plan PSU-129514, consisting of 3,097
8

(respondents). Accordingly, it directed the LRA to set aside Decree No.

square meters identified as Lot 5 of Plan PSU-180598 (subject lot) – of
N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78, and ordered petitioner (a) to cause the
which he is the absolute owner and possessor – is fraudulently
amendment of Plan PSU-129514 and to segregate therefrom the
included in Decree No. N-217036. He allegedly filed on September 19,
9

subject lot, and (b) to pay respondents the sum of ₱100,000.00 as

1963 an application for registration and confirmation of the subject lot,
attorney's fees, as well as the cost of suit. 19
as well as of Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Plan PSU-180598, situated in Las
Piñas City, which was granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58,
on May 3, 1989. He further averred that petitioner deliberately
10
The Las Piñas City-RTC faulted petitioner for deliberately preventing
concealed the fact that he (Bracewell) is one of the adjoining owners, respondents from participating and objecting to his application for
and left him totally ignorant of the registration proceedings involving the registration when the documentary evidence showed that, as early as
lots covered by Plan PSU-129514. Instead of impleading him,
11
1962, Bracewell had been paying taxes for the subject lot; and that he
petitioner listed Bracewell’s grandmother, Maria Cailles, as an (Bracewell) was recognized as the owner thereof in the records of the
adjoining owner, although she had already died by that time. 12
Bureau of Lands way back in 1965, as well as in the City Assessor's
Office.20

In his answer to the foregoing allegations, petitioner called Bracewell

13

a mere interloper with respect to the subject lot, which the Bureau of Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case on appeal before the CA,
21

Lands had long declared to be part and parcel of Plan PSU-
129514. He argued that his Plan PSU-129514 was approved way
14
back in 1951 whereas Bracewell’s Plan PSU-180598 was surveyed
only in 1960, and stated that the latter plan, in fact, contained a
footnote that a portion known as Lot 5, i.e., the subject lot, is a portion
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 81075, arguing mainly that the Las Piñas
City-RTC had no jurisdiction over a petition for review of a decree of
registration under Section 32 of PD 1529, which should be filed in the
same branch of the court that rendered the decision and ordered the
issuance of the decree. He likewise raised (a) the failure of Bracewell
22

of the parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-129514. 15

to submit to conciliation proceedings, as well as (b) the commission of
23

forum shopping, considering that the decision granting Bracewell’s

application for registration over Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-
The overlapping was confirmed by LRA Director Felino M. Cortez in his
180598 was still pending resolution before the Court at the time he filed
2nd Supplementary Report dated August 5, 1996, which was submitted
Civil Case No. LP 98-0025. 24
to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134. The report, which contains a
16

recommendation that petitioner be ordered to cause the amendment of

Plan PSU-129514 in view of Bracewell’s claims, reads as follows: The CA Ruling

COMES NOW the Land Registration Authority (LRA) and to the In a Decision dated May 23, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the
25

Honorable Court respectfully submits this report:
1. LRA records show that a decision was rendered by the
Honorable Court on February 23, 1989, confirming the title of
the herein applicant [petitioner] over the parcel of land
covered by plan PSU-129514;
assailed judgment of the RTC, finding that respondents were able to
substantiate their claim of actual fraud in the procurement of Decree
No. N-217036, which is the only ground that may be invoked in a
petition for review of a decree of registration under Section 32 of PD
1529. It held that, since the petition for review was filed within one (1)
year from the issuance of the questioned decree, and considering that
the subject lot is located in Las Piñas City, the RTC of said city had
jurisdiction over the case. It further declared that: (a) there was no
26

2. Upon updating of plotting on our Municipal Index Sheet,
thru its tie line, it was found to overlap with plan PSU-
180598, Lot 5, applied in LRC Record No. N-24916, which
was referred to the Lands Management Services, El Bldg.,
Quezon City, for verification and/or correction in our letter
dated January 12, 1996 x x x;
need to submit the case a quo for conciliation proceedings because the
LRA, which is an instrumentality of the government, had been
impleaded; (b) no forum shopping was committed because the petition
for review of the decree of registration before the Las Piñas City-RTC
and the application for land registration then pending before the Court
involved different parties and issues; and (c) the award of attorney’s
fees was well within the sound discretion of the RTC. 27

3. In reply, the Regional Technical Director, thru the Chief,

Surveys Division, in his letter dated 20 June 1996, x x x, Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he now
28 29

informed this Authority that after [re-verification] and
research of the plan, they found out that Lot 5, PSU-180598
applied in LRC Record No. N-24916 is a portion of plan
PSU-129514, applied in the instant case;
4. Our records further show that the petition for registration
comes before the Court via the instant petition for review, challenging
primarily the jurisdiction of the Las Piñas City-RTC which set aside and
nullified the judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134
that had not yet become final and was still within its exclusive control
and discretion because the one (1) year period within which the decree
of registration issued by the LRA could be reviewed has not yet
elapsed. 30

of title to real property pertaining to Lot 5, PSU-180598 filed

by the petitioner James Bracewell, Jr. under Land Reg. Case
No. N-4329, LRC Record No. N-24916 has been granted by The Issue Before the Court
the Honorable Court per his decision dated May 3, 1989.
The core issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the
WHEREFORE, the foregoing is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Las Piñas City-RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for review of
Court for its information with the recommendation that the applicant Decree No. N-217036, which was issued as a result of the judgment
[herein petitioner] in the instant case be ordered to cause for the rendered by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134.
amendment of plan PSU-129514, subject of registration, by
segregating therefrom the portion of Lot 5, PSU-180598 also decided
The Court’s Ruling
in Land Reg. Case No. N-4328. The approved amended plan and the
corresponding certified technical descriptions shall forthwith be
submitted to the Honorable Court for its approval to enable us to The petition must fail.
comply with the decision of the Court dated May 3, 1989 in the instant
case. (Emphases supplied)
17
Under Act No. 496 (Act 496), or the "Land Registration Act," as
31
amended, – which was the law in force at the time of the
32
commencement by both parties of their respective registration
proceedings – jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title
was conferred upon the Courts of First Instance (CFIs, now RTCs) of
the respective provinces in which the land sought to be registered is
situated. 33
The land registration laws were updated and codified under PD 1529,
which took effect on January 23, 1979, and under Section 17 thereof,
34
reason of absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely
affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments, subject, however, to the right of any person, including the
government and the branches thereof, deprived of land or of any estate
or interest therein by such adjudication or confirmation of title obtained
by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First Instance a petition for
reopening and review of the decree of registration not later than one
year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of registration,
but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court where an
innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest
35

therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase

jurisdiction over an application for land registration is still vested on the
"innocent purchaser for value" or an equivalent phrase occurs in this
CFI (now, RTC) of the province or city where the land is situated. 36

Decree, it shall be deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee,

or other encumbrancer for value.
Worth noting is the explanation proffered by respondents in their
comment to the instant petition that when petitioner filed his land
Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of
registration case in December 1976, jurisdiction over applications for
registration and the certificate of title issued shall become
registration of property situated in Las Piñas City was vested in the
incontrovertible. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in
RTC of Makati City in view of the fact that there were no RTC branches
any case may pursue his remedy by action for damages against the
yet in the Las Piñas City at that time. Bracewell’s own application over
37

applicant or any other persons responsible for the fraud. (Emphasis

Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of Plan PSU-180598, all situated in Las Piñas
and underscoring supplied)
City, was thus granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58. 38

Since the LRA’s issuance of a decree of registration only proceeds

Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129, otherwise known as 39
from the land registration court’s directive, a petition taken under
"The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," was enacted and took
Section 32 of PD 1529 is effectively a review of the land registration
effect on August 14, 1981, authorizing the creation of RTCs in
40

court’s ruling. As such, case law instructs that for "as long as a final
different judicial regions, including the RTC of Las Piñas City as part of
decree has not been entered by the [LRA] and the period of one (1)
the National Capital Judicial Region. As pointed out by the court a quo
41

year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is
in its Decision dated July 31, 2003, the RTC of Las Piñas City was
not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding
established "in or about 1994." Understandably, in February 1998,
42
continues to be under the control and sound discretion of the court
Bracewell sought the review of Decree No. N-217036 before the Las
rendering it."
49

Piñas City-RTC, considering that the lot subject of this case is situated
in Las Piñas City.
While it is indeed undisputed that it was the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 134 which rendered the decision directing the LRA to issue
Petitioner maintains that the petition for review should have been filed
Decree No. N-217036, and should, applying the general rule as above-
with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134, which rendered the assailed
stated, be the same court before which a petition for the review of
decision and ordered the issuance of Decree No. N-217036, citing the
Decree No. N-217036 is filed, the Court must consider the
1964 case of Amando Joson, et al. v. Busuego (Joson) among others.43
circumstantial milieu in this case that, in the interest of orderly
In said case, Spouses Amando Joson and Victoria Balmeo (Sps.
procedure, warrants the filing of the said petition before the Las Piñas
Joson) filed a petition to set aside the decree of registration issued in
City-RTC.
favor of Teodora Busuego (Busuego) on the ground that the latter
misrepresented herself to be the sole owner of the lot when in truth, the
Sps. Joson were owners of one-half thereof, having purchased the Particularly, the Court refers to the fact that the application for original
same from Busuego’s mother. The court a quo therein dismissed the
44
registration in this case was only filed before the RTC of Makati City,
petition for the reason that since its jurisdiction as a cadastral court Branch 134 because, during that time, i.e., December 1976, Las Piñas
was special and limited, it had no authority to pass upon the issues City had no RTC. Barring this situation, the aforesaid application
raised. Disagreeing, the Court held that, as long as the final decree has should not have been filed before the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134
not been issued and the period of one (1) year within which it may be pursuant to the rules on venue prevailing at that time. Under Section 2,
reviewed has not elapsed, the decision remains under the control and Rule 4 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, which took effect on
sound discretion of the court rendering the decree, which court after January 1, 1964, the proper venue for real actions, such as an
hearing, may even set aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the application for original registration, lies with the CFI of the province
land to another. 45
where the property is situated, viz.:

To be clear, the only issue in Joson was which court should take Sec. 2. Venue in Courts of First Instance.— (a) Real actions. —
cognizance of the nullification of the decree, i.e., the cadastral court Actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition
that had issued the decree, or the competent CFI in the exercise of its or condemnation of, or foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, shall
general jurisdiction. It should be pointed out, however, that with the
46
be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part
passage of PD 1529, the distinction between the general jurisdiction thereof lies.
vested in the RTC and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it as a
cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs now have the power to hear and
As the land subject of this case is undeniably situated in Las Piñas
determine all questions, even contentious and substantial ones, arising
City, the application for its original registration should have been filed
from applications for original registration of titles to lands and petitions
before the Las Piñas City-RTC were it not for the fact that the said
filed after such registration. Accordingly, and considering further that
47

court had yet to be created at the time the application was filed. Be that
the matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its
as it may, and considering further that the complication at hand is
general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only
actually one of venue and not of jurisdiction (given that RTCs do retain
a matter of procedure and has nothing to do with the question of
jurisdiction over review of registration decree cases pursuant to
jurisdiction, petitioner cannot now rely on the Joson pronouncement to
48

Section 32 of PD 1529), the Court, cognizant of the peculiarity of the

advance its theory.
Section 32 of PD 1529 provides that the review of a decree of
registration falls within the jurisdiction of and, hence, should be filed in
the "proper Court of First Instance," viz.:
Section 32. Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for
situation, holds that the Las Piñas City-RTC has the authority over the
petition for the review of Decree No. N-217036 filed in this case.
Indeed, the filing of the petition for review before the Las Piñas City-
RTC was only but a rectificatory implementation of the rules of
procedure then-existing, which was temporarily set back only because
of past exigencies. In light of the circumstances now prevailing, the
Court perceives no compelling reason to deviate from applying the
rightful procedure. After all, venue is only a matter of procedure and,
50

value. The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by

1âw phi 1
hence, should succumb to the greater interests of the orderly
administration of justice.51
Anent the other ancillary issues raised by petitioner on forum shopping,
submission to conciliation proceedings, and award of attorney's fees,
suffice it to say that the same have been adequately discussed by the
appellate court and, hence, need no further elucidation.
Finally, on the matter of petitioner's objections against the trial judge's
"unusual interest" in the case, the Court concurs with the CA in saying
that such tirades are not helpful to his cause. Besides, as pointed out
in the Decision dated July 31, 2003 of the RTC of Las Piñas City,
Branch 275, petitioner already had his chance to disqualify the trial
judge from further hearing the case, but the appellate court dismissed
his petition in CA G.R. SP No. 74187 for lack of merit. 52
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 23,
2007 and the Resolution dated August 14, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81075 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170757 November 28, 2011
PACIFICO M. VALIAO, for himself and in behalf of his co-heirs
LODOVICO, RICARDO, BIENVENIDO, all Surnamed VALIAO and
NEMESIO M. GRANDEA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, MACARIO ZAFRA, and MANUEL
YUSAY, Respondents,
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 54811,
which reversed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land Registration Case
No. 03, granting petitioners' application for registration of title over a
parcel of land located in Ilog, Negros Occidental.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
4
On August 11, 1987, petitioners Pacifico, Lodovico, Ricardo,
Bienvenido, all surnamed Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea filed with the
RTC of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental an application for registration
of a parcel of land with an area of 504,535 square meters, more or
less, situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental.
On June 20, 1988, private oppositors Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay
filed their Motion to Dismiss the application on the following grounds:
(1) the land applied for has not been declared alienable and
disposable; (2) res judicata has set in to bar the application for
registration; and (3) the application has no factual or legal basis.
On August 24, 1988, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic),
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
application for registration on the following grounds, among others: that
neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the land in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the
muniment/s of title and/or the tax declaration/s and tax
payments/receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the
application, do/es not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or of their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation in the
concept of owner, since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; that the parcel
of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the
Republic, which is not subject to private appropriation; and that the
present action is barred by a previous final judgment in a cadastral
case prosecuted between the same parties and involving the same
parcel of land.
On July 3, 1989, the RTC denied private oppositors' Motion to Dismiss.
Trial thereafter ensued.
In support of their application for registration, petitioners alleged that
they acquired the subject property in 1947, upon the death of their
uncle Basilio Millarez (Basilio), who purchased the land from a certain
Fermin Payogao, pursuant to a Deed of Sale5 dated May 19, 1916
entirely handwritten in Spanish language. Basilio possessed the land in
question from May 19, 1916 until his death in 1947. Basilio's
possession was open, continuous, peaceful, adverse, notorious,
uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner. Upon Basilio's death, the
applicants as co-heirs possessed the said land until 1966, when
oppositor Zafra unlawfully and violently dispossessed them of their
property, which compelled them to file complaints of Grave Coercion
and Qualified Theft against Zafra. In support of their claim of
possession over the subject property, petitioners submitted in evidence
Tax Declaration No. 95626dated September 29, 1976 under the names
of the heirs of Basilio Millarez.
The RTC, in its Decision dated December 15, 1995, granted
petitioners' application for registration of the subject property, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby orders and
decrees registration of Lot No. 2372 subject of the present proceedings
and the registration of title thereto, in favor of the applicants, who are
declared the true and lawful owners of said Lot No. 2372, except
applicant Lodovico Valiao, who sold his right to Macario Zafra.
Upon the finality of this decision, let the corresponding decree of
registration and Certificate of Title be issued in the name of the
applicants, Heirs of Basilio Millarez, namely: Pacifico Valiao, Ricardo
Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao and Nemesio Grandea, subject to the rights
of private oppositors, Macario Zafra and Manuel Yusay over said lot
whose fishpond permits are declared VALID and will expire on
December 31, 2003.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the Decision, the private oppositors and the Republic,
through Assistant Prosecutor Josue A. Gatin, filed an appeal with the
CA, which reversed the trial court's findings in its Decision dated June
23, 2005. The CA ruled that the classification of lands of the public
domain is an exclusive prerogative of the executive department of the
government and in the absence of such classification, the lands remain
as unclassified until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition. Further, there exists a prior cadastral case involving the
same parties herein and the same Lot No. 2372, which ruled that Lot
No. 2372 belongs to the Republic. The CA held that such judgment
constitutes res judicata that bars a subsequent action for land
registration. It also ruled that the subject property is part of the
inalienable land of the public domain and petitioners failed to prove that
they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land in question since June
12, 1945 or earlier. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED.
Accordingly, We REVERSE the Decision dated December 15, 1995 of
the Regional Trial Court, DENY the application for registration of title
filed by petitioners-appellees, DECLARE as moot and academic any
and all claims of private oppositors-appellants over Lot No. 2372, and
DECLARE the subject parcel of land to be inalienable and indisposable
land belonging to the public domain.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the
CA in a Resolution dated November 17, 2005. Hence, the present
petition with the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT LOT NO. 2372 OF THE ILOG
CADASTRE IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CLAIM OF PRESCRIPTION BY
THE APPLICANT WILL LIE ON LOT NO. 2372.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CAD. CASE NO. 23, ENTITLED LODOVICO
VALIAO, ET, AL., VS. MACARIO ZAFRA, ET, AL., AC G.R.
NO. CV-68873, CONSTITUTES RES JUDICATA AS FAR
AS THIS APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION IS
CONCERNED.
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED POSSESSION OF
THE APPLICANTS THROUGH THEIR PREDECESSORS-
IN-INTEREST IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THEIR CLAIM
FOR PRESCRIPTION.9
Petitioners claim that Lot No. 2372 is an alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain. The possession of applicants'
predecessors-in interest since 1916 until 1966 had been open,
continuous and uninterrupted; thus, converting the said land into a
private land. The subject lot had already become private in character in
view of the length of time the applicants and their predecessors-in-
interest had possessed the subject lot, which entitles them to the
confirmation of their title. Petitioners further claim that prior dismissal in
a cadastral proceeding does not constitute res judicata in a subsequent
application for registration of a parcel of land.
In its Comment, the OSG submits that the issues to be resolved in the
present petition, i.e., whether Lot No. 2372 is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain and whether petitioners have the right to
have the said property registered in their name through prescription of
time are questions of fact, which were already passed upon by the CA
and no longer reviewable by the Court, since findings of fact of the CA,
when supported by sufficient evidence, are conclusive and binding on
the parties. The OSG further claims that petitioners failed to prove that
the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain and that petitioners' application for land registration is
already barred by a prior decision in a cadastral case. Lastly, the OSG
asserts that petitioners did not present sufficient evidence to prove that
their possession over the subject lot applied for had been open,
peaceful, exclusive, continuous and adverse.
Anent the propriety of filing a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the principle is well-established that this Court is not a
trier of facts and that only questions of law may be raised. The
resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose
findings on these matters are received with respect and are, as a rule,
binding on this Court. This rule, however, is subject to certain
exceptions. One of these is when the findings of the appellate court are
contrary to those of the trial court.10 Due to the divergence of the
findings of the CA and the RTC, the Court will now re-examine the
facts and evidence adduced before the lower courts.
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly-authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, petitioners need to prove that: (1) the land forms
part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2)
they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
from June 12, 1945 or earlier.11 These the petitioners must prove by no
less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.12
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of
any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person
by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain.13 Unless
public land is shown to have been reclassified as alienable or
disposable to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Property of the public domain is beyond the
commerce of man and not susceptible of private appropriation and
acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no
matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a
title.14 The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying
for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the
land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.15
There must be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the
required number of years is alienable and disposable.16
No such evidence was offered by the petitioners to show that the land
in question has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove
that the subject property is already classified as alienable and
disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable public
domain.17 Verily, the rules on the confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply unless and until the land subject thereof is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain. 1âwphi1
With respect to the existence of a prior cadastral case, it appears that
on July 11, 1966, the petitioners filed in Cadastral Case No. 23 of the
then CFI of Negros Occidental a petition to reopen the proceedings
relative to three lots, one of which is Lot No. 2372. The lower court, in
its Order18 dated October 20, 1980, held that Lot No. 2372 belongs to
the Republic. It found that after the subject lot was declared public
land, it was found to be inside the communal forest. On appeal, the
CA, in its Decision19 dated August 7, 1984, found no reversible error
and affirmed the decision of the cadastral court. Thereafter, a petition
elevating the case to this Court was dismissed for lack of merit.20 In the
present case, the CA, in its Decision dated June 23, 2005, ruled that
such judgment constitutes res judicata that will bar a subsequent action
for land registration on the same land.
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court held that a judicial
declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the
same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his
title to the same land, provided he thereafter complies with the
provisions of Section 4822 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended,
and as long as said public lands remain alienable and disposable. In
the case at bar, not only did the petitioners fail to prove that the subject
land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain, they failed to demonstrate that they by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the
subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by the law.
It is settled that the applicant must present proof of specific acts of
ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general
statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of
possession.23 Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would actually exercise
over his own property.24
The testimonies of Nemesio and Pacifico as to their own and their
predecessors-in-interest's possession and ownership over the subject
lot fail to convince Us. Petitioners claim that Basilio was in possession
of the land way back in 1916. Yet no tax declaration covering the
subject property, during the period Basilio allegedly occupied the
subject property, i.e., 1916 to 1947, was presented in evidence. Other
than the bare allegations of Nemesio and Pacifico that Basilio allegedly
introduced improvements on the subject property, there is nothing in
the records which would substantiate petitioners' claim that Basilio was
in possession of Lot No. 2372 since June 12, 1945 or earlier, the
period of possession required by law. Hence, petitioners' assertion that
Basilio possessed the property in question from 1916 to 1947 is, at
best, conjectural and self-serving.
As regards petitioners' possession of the land in question from 1947 to
1966, petitioners could only support the same with a tax declaration
dated September 29, 1976. At best, petitioners can only prove
possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession by petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.25 Petitioners failed to explain why, despite
their claim that their predecessors-in-interest have possessed the
subject properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12,
1945, it was only in 1976 that they started to declare the same for
purposes of taxation. Moreover, tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land when
not supported by any other evidence. The disputed property may have
been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for
registration, or of their predecessors-in-interest, but it does not
necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership.26
Evidently, since the petitioners failed to prove that (1) the subject
property was classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of
the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and registration of
the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 54811, which reversed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, in Land
Registration Case No. 03, is AFFIRMED. The application for
registration of title filed by the petitioners Pacifico Valiao, Lodovico
Valiao, Ricardo Valiao, Bienvenido Valiao, and Nemesio Grandea, over
Lot No. 2372, with a total area of 504,535 square meters, more or less,
situated in Barrio Galicia, Municipality of Ilog, Negros Occidental,
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166748 April 24, 2009
LAUREANO V. HERMOSO, as represented by his Attorney-in-Fact
FLORIDA L. UMANDAP, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF ANTONIO FRANCIA and
PETRA FRANCIA, NAMELY: BENJAMIN P. FRANCIA, CECILIA
FRANCIA, AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., FRANCISCO F. VILLARICA,
DANILO F. VILLARICA, RODRIGO F. VILLARICA, MELCHOR F.
VILLARICA, JESUS F. VILLARICA, BENILDA F. VILLARICA and
ERNESTO F. VILLARICA, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision1dated October 15, 2004 and
the Resolution2 dated January 19, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 77546.
The case involves parcels of land located at Malhacan, Meycauyan,
Bulacan, identified as Lot No. 3257 owned by Petra Francia and Lot
3415 owned by Antonio Francia. The lots comprises an area of 2.5 and
1.5850 hectares, respectively, and forms part of a larger parcel of land
with an area of 32.1324 hectares co-owned by Amos, Jr., Benjamin,
Cecilia, Petra, Antonio and Rufo, all surnamed Francia.3
Since 1978, petitioner and Miguel Banag (Banag) have been
occupying and cultivating Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 as tenants thereof.
They filed a petition for coverage of the said lots under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 27.4 On July 4, 1995, the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) issued an order granting the petition, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing facts and jurisprudence considered, Order is
hereby issued:
1. PLACING the subject two (2) parcels of land being
tenanted by petitioners Laureano Hermoso and Miguel
Banag situated at Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, owned
by Amos Francia, et al. under the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27; and
2. DIRECTING the DAR personnel concerned to process the
issuance of emancipation patents in favor of said Laureano
Hermoso and Miguel Banag after a parcellary mapping have
been undertaken by the Bureau of Lands over the subject
landholdings.
SO ORDERED.5
Respondents filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and
reinvestigation. On December 9, 1995, the DAR affirmed with
modification the earlier order, and disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, ORDER is hereby issued
AFFIRMING the first dispositive portion of the Order, dated July 4,
1995, issued in the instant case, but MODIFYING the second
dispositive portion of the same now to read, as follows:
1. PLACING the subject two (2) parcels of land being
tenanted by petitioners Laureano Hermoso and Miguel
Banag situated at Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, owned
by Amos Francia, et al. under the coverage of Operation
Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. 27; and
2. DIRECTING the DAR personnel concerned to hold in
abeyance the processing of the emancipation patent of
Miguel Banag until the issue of tenancy relationship in
 DARAB Cases Nos. 424-Bul’92 and 425-Bul’92 is finally
resolved and disposed.
No further motion of any and/or the same nature shall be entertained.
SO ORDERED.6
In a separate development, petitioner and Banag filed with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
consolidated Cases Nos. 424-BUL-92 and 425-BUL-92. The cases
delved on whether both petitioner and Banag are tenants of
respondents in the subject landholding. On June 3, 1996, the DARAB
rendered a Decision7upholding the tenancy relationship of petitioner
and Banag with the respondents. Respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. A petition for review on
certiorari was filed before the CA. However, the petition was denied on
technical grounds in a Resolution8 dated October 9, 1996. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, but the same was likewise denied in a
Resolution9 dated December 27, 1996. The case was eventually
elevated to this Court in G.R. No. 127668. On March 12, 1997, the
Court denied the petition for lack of verification,10and subsequently,
also denied the motion for reconsideration in a Resolution11 dated July
14, 1997.
Earlier, on January 20, 1997, Banag filed before the DAR, an urgent
ex-parte motion for the issuance of an emancipation patent. On March
13, 1997, the DAR granted the motion.12 On March 21, 1997,
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. They claimed that the
lands involved have been approved for conversion to urban purposes
in an Order13 dated June 5, 1973 issued by the DAR Secretary. The
conversion order stated that the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 does not cover the subject parcels of
land.14 On March 10, 1998, the DAR issued an Order15 affirming the
March 13, 1997 order granting the motion for issuance of emancipation
patent in favor of Banag. On March 30, 1998, respondents filed a
notice of appeal and correspondingly filed their appeal
memorandum.16 On April 21, 2003, the Office of the President through
the Deputy Executive Secretary rendered a Decision17 denying
respondents’ appeal. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED and the questioned Order dated 10 March 1998 of the
DAR Secretary AFFIRMED in toto.
Parties are required to INFORM this Office, within five (5) days from
notice, of the dates of their receipt of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.18
Respondents then filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court. They maintained that P.D. No. 27 does not cover
the subject parcels of land pursuant to the June 5, 1973 Order of the
DAR Secretary reclassifying the lands and declaring the same as
suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes.
Furthermore, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
reclassified the lands as early as October 14, 1978.
On October 15, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed Decision,19 the
fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the assailed decision of the Office of the President is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new decision is hereby rendered
dismissing the Petition for Coverage under P.D. No. 27 filed by
respondents [now herein petitioner].
SO ORDERED.20
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 19, 2005, the
CA rendered the assailed Resolution21denying the motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
The sole issue in this petition is whether Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 are
covered by P.D. No. 27.
Petitioner avers that the final and executory decision of this Court in
G.R. No. 127668 affirming that he is a tenant of the landholding in
question entitles him to avail of the right granted under PD 27. In other
words, because of the finality of the decision declaring him a tenant of
the landholding in question, in effect, the subject lots are considered as
agricultural lands and are thus covered by P.D. No. 27. Parenthetically,
we take judicial notice of the decision of the Court in G.R. No. 127668,
in which the tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents
was upheld. That decision is already final and executory.
Respondents, for their part, claim that the lands were already declared
suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844 as
early as 1973. Hence, they are no longer subject to P.D. No. 27.
We resolve to deny the petition.
Section 3, Article XII22 of the Constitution mandates that alienable lands
of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e.,
primary classification and secondary classification. The primary
classification comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands,
and national parks. These are lands specifically mentioned in Section
3, Article XII of the Constitution. The same provision of the
Constitution, however, also states that agricultural lands of the public
domain may further be classified by law according to the uses to which
they may be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is
referred to as secondary classification.23
Under existing laws, Congress has granted authority to a number of
government agencies to effect the secondary classification of
agricultural lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other urban
uses.
Thus, Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, which took effect on June 15, 1988,
explicitly provides:
Section 65. Conversion of Lands.— After the lapse of five (5) years
from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and
sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized
and the land will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application of the
beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties,
and subject to existing laws, may authorize the reclassification or
conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided, That the
beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
On the other hand, Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as
the Local Government Code of 199124 states:
SECTION 20. Reclassification of Lands. —
(a) A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed
by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the
purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands
and provide for the manner of their utilization or disposition in
the following cases: (1) when the land ceases to be
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as
determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the
land shall have substantially greater economic value for
residential, commercial, or industrial purposes, as
determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That
such reclassification shall be limited to the following
percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of
the passage of the ordinance:
 (1) For highly urbanized and independent
component cities, fifteen percent (15%);
(2) For component cities and first to the third class
municipalities, ten percent (10%); and
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five
percent (5%): Provided, further, That agricultural
lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries
pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Sixty-six
hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise
known as "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law", shall not be affected by the said
reclassification and the conversion of such lands
into other purposes shall be governed by Section
65 of said Act.
(b) The President may, when public interest so requires and
upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority, authorize a city or municipality to
reclassify lands in excess of the limits set in the next
preceding paragraph.
(c) The local government units shall, in conformity with
existing laws, continue to prepare their respective
comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning
ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases
for the future use of land resources: Provided, That the
requirements for food production, human settlements, and
industrial expansion shall be taken into consideration in the
preparation of such plans.
(d) Where the approval by a national agency is required for
reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably
withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application
for reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of the
same shall be deemed as approval thereof.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing,
amending, or modifying in any manner the provisions of R.A.
No. 6657.
But even long before these two trail-blazing legislative enactments,
there was already R.A. No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform
Code, which was approved on August 8, 1963, Section 36 of which
reads:
SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.—
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender, of
the land, agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his
immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or
will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into
residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful
non-agricultural purposes: Provided, That the agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation
equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition
to his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four,
except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural
lessor, is not more that five hectares, in which case instead
of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to
an advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before
ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided,
further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land
himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such
conversion within one year after the dispossession of the
tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and
the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the
land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him
because of said dispossessions;
(2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with
any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the
provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by
fortuitous event or force majeure;
(3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the
landholding for a purpose other than what had been
previously agreed upon;
(4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm
practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section
twenty-nine;
(5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement
thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has
unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of
the agricultural lessee;
(6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental
when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the
rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five
per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment
shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the
obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not
thereby extinguished; or
(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in
violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty-
seven.
The petitioner in the instant case claims that he is entitled to the
issuance of an emancipation patent under P.D. No. 27. The said
decree promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, on
October 21, 1972, is entitled, "DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF
TENANTS FROM THE BONDAGE OF THE SOIL TRANSFERRING
TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND THEY TILL AND
PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS THEREFOR".
However, the law specifically applied "to tenant-farmers of private
agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of
share tenancy or lease tenancy, whether classified as landed estate or
not."
For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the
coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the land
is agricultural. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural land,
as follows:
(c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to agricultural
activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
and Section 3(b) specifies agricultural activity as:
(b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or Agricultural Activity
means cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of
fruit trees, including the harvesting of such farm products,
and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer
in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons
whether natural or juridical.
On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land cannot be
considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27. This considering that the
subject lots were reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes way before
petitioner filed a petition for emancipation under P.D. No. 27. The
pertinent portions of the June 5, 1973 Order25 read:
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act 3844, as amended, the said
requests of the petitioners were referred to the National Planning
Commission as well as to the Agrarian Reform Team Leader,
Valenzuela, Bulacan for proper investigation.
The National Planning Commission in compliance therewith after due
investigation and physical survey of the subject areas, favorably
recommended the suitability of the same to residential, commercial,
industrial or other urban purposes.
Similarly, the Agrarian Reform Team in Valenzuela, Bulacan after due
investigation thereof found the parcels of land subject hereof highly
suitable for conversion into urban purposes in view of his findings and
verification of the location, facilities necessary for urban development
and also, the low agricultural income thereof (unirrigated), of the said
land. The Team Leader concerned in his recommendation submitted to
this Office made mentioned (sic) that in his declaration of the suitability
of the subject properties for urban purposes, he believes that the
conformity of the tenants consisting of eleven (11) tenants are no
longer needed so long as the petitioners are willing to pay the
disturbance compensation as provided for by law. The petitioners
manifested to the Team Leader concerned their willingness to pay
each and every tenant the disturbance compensation according to law.
To show further their sincerity to comply with the provisions of the law
on disturbance compensation, and to show that their (petitioners)
purpose of the instant request is not to evade the provisions of Decree
27, they stated in their letter-request that they will not eject any tenants
therefrom, nor dispossessed (sic) them of their landholdings until after
they are fully and justly paid the disturbance compensation according
to law.
The subject parcels of land are not included in the land transfer
operation according to the team’s report.
It maybe mentioned in this connection, that from the report of the
National Planning Commission submitted to this Office, it appears that
the subject properties are strategically located in the urban center of
the town of Meycauayan wherein there are already existing developed
and occupied residential subdivisions and even low cost housing
projects subsidized by funds from government financial institution.
Likewise, there are also industrial establishments in its vicinity
according to the National Planning Commission’s report.
In view of the foregoing, and considering the parcels of land subject
hereof to be suited for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes as found and recommended by the National Planning
Commission and the Agrarian Reform Team concerned, and
considering further that the said parcels of land by reason of their
location and the existence of developed and occupied residential
subdivisions and industrial establishments in the immediate vicinity
maybe considered as one of the possible areas to be reserved for
urban development as contemplated in the Letter of Instruction No. 46
of the President, and considering finally, that the right of the agricultural
tenants therein will be fully compensated and there will be no
ejectment of tenants until after full payment thereof, as manifested by
the petitioners, the instant requests of the petitioners should be, as
hereby it is, given due course and the parcels of land subject thereof
are hereby declared suited for residential, commercial, industrial or
other urban purposes in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act
3844, as amended.
It is understood however, that no agricultural tenants and/or lessees
shall be ejected from or dispossessed of their landholdings by virtue of
this Order not until after they are duly and justly paid the disturbance
compensation according to law, the amount of which maybe
determined and fixed by the proper court in the absence of any mutual
agreement thereto by and between the agricultural lessees and the
owner-petitioners.
SO ORDERED.26
The main contention of petitioner for the approval of the emancipation
patent in his favor under P.D. No. 27 is the fact that respondents were
not able to realize the actual conversion of the land into residential
purposes. To bolster his claim, petitioner relies on Section 36 (1) of
R.A. No. 3844, viz.:
SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. —
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender, of
the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family
will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding,
if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or
other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural
lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five
years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections
twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by
the agricultural lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case
instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an
advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment
proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the
landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to
substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad
faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the
land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of
said dispossessions.
xxxx27
However, the provision of R.A. No. 3844 had already been amended
by R.A. No. 6389, as early as September 10, 1971. Section 36 (1) of
R.A. No. 3844, as amended, now reads:
SECTION 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. —
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender, of
the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The landholding is declared by the department head upon
recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be suited for
residential, commercial, industrial or some other urban purposes:
Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance
compensation equivalent to five times the average of the gross
harvests on his landholding during the last five preceding calendar
years;
xxxx28
Under R.A. No. 6389, the condition imposed on the landowner to
implement the conversion of the agricultural land to non-agricultural
purposes within a certain period was deleted. With the enactment of
the amendatory law, the condition imposed on the landowner to
implement the conversion of the agricultural land to a non-agricultural
purpose within a certain period was deleted.29 The remedy left
available to the tenant is to claim disturbance compensation.
In Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian Reform30 , the Court
held that lands not devoted to agricultural activity and those that were
previously converted to non-agricultural uses are outside the coverage
of the CARL, viz.:
We now determine whether such lands are covered by the CARL.
Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that the CARL shall "cover, regardless
of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
agricultural lands." As to what constitutes "agricultural land," it is
referred to as "land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act
and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land." The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission
confirm this limitation. "Agricultural lands" are only those lands which
are "arable and suitable agricultural lands" and "do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands."
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the undeveloped portions of the
Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot in any language be considered as
"agricultural lands." These lots were intended for residential use. They
ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the
Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Even today, the areas in question
continued to be developed as a low-cost housing subdivision, albeit at
a snail's pace. This can readily be gleaned from the fact that SAMBA
members even instituted an action to restrain petitioners from
continuing with such development. The enormity of the resources
needed for developing a subdivision may have delayed its completion
but this does not detract from the fact that these lands are still
residential lands and outside the ambit of the CARL. 31
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. The Decision dated October 15, 2004 and the
Resolution dated January 19, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 77546 are hereby affirmed. The case is remanded to the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator of Bulacan for the proper
computation of the disturbance compensation of petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167707 October 8, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR
LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI
PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, DIRECTOR
OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
TOURISM SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM
AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD,
and ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and in behalf of all those
similarly situated, respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------
x June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their
G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775 October 8, 2008
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE
LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A
LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR
FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI,
PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OFFICER, KALIBO, AKLAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present
occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a
petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1of the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan,
which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-
claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for
titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying
Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery
white sand beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a
premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to
12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped island’s
three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation Survey of
Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by
named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 18018 declaring Boracay Island, among other
islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism
Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA
Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation
No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82
precluded them from filing an application for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-
claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and
Aniceto Yap filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo,
Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure
titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or
through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since
lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its
implementing Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of
man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land
Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed the petition for declaratory relief. The OSG countered that
Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which
was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as
amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants’ reliance on PD No.
1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial
confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705.
Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and
disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into
ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the
following facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession
of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were
planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the
coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were
planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-
claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes. 12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was
purely legal: whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal
hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They
decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution
upon submission of their respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay
Island, more particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the
Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos.
5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were
issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of
respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that
Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal
obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to
their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in
the manner prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and
approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the
approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants’ right to have their occupied
lands titled in their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801
nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were
inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.18 The Circular
itself recognized private ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited
Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for
acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only
those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the forest
reserve.22
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The
Republic then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC
decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and
AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a
declaration that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were
part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly
denied.25 Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying
Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest land
(protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100
(628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The
Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each
side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and
which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection
purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando
Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other landowners29 in Boracay filed with
this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege that the
Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over portions of
Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective
lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions
of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally
renowned first class resorts on their lots.31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a
proclamation reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being
classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act
No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in
the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do
not have a vested right over their occupied portions in the island.
Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of
PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are
inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which
has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable lands. There is a need for a positive government act in
order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two
petitions as they principally involve the same issues on the land
classification of Boracay Island.33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and
PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all
those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied lands in
Boracay Island.34
G.R. No. 173775
Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF
PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR
RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR
AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE
THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS
AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC.
3a, PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED
RIGHT OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR OCCUPIED
PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY
HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN]
INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN
TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006,
VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY,
PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC.
8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW
THE SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR
PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS
OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-
claimants in G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No.
173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied portions in
Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do
not involve their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of
190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or superseded by
Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by
then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine
their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the
executive to reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution
provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial,
residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands,
and such other classes as may be provided by law,41 giving the
government great leeway for classification.42 Then the 1987
Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one
addition: national parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be
alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay
Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under
any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.45 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the
1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State.47Thus, all lands that have not
been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the State as part of the inalienable public
domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the
public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The
government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary
power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored
recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be
granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the
way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts of
ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon
the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands,
territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish
Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the
foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the
Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the
systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory
claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the
Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established
possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of
vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in
said decree.54 Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion
posesoria or possessory information title,55 when duly inscribed in the
Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the
lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be
actual, public, and adverse,56 from the date of its
inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected
one year after the promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17,
1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.58
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only
be founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely:
(1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant;
(3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de
compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or
possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines
under American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By
this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were
classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and
timber or forest lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the
disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system)
and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also provided the definition by
exclusion of "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of
"agricultural lands" under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared
in Mapa v. Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act
No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act
No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The act
established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes
absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the
Torrens system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed
Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced
the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease
of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of
persons owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the
public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next
ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act
No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act. This new,
more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to
Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave
Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title,
possession and occupation en concepto dueño since time immemorial,
or since July 26, 1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act
No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as
amended, remains as the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than
timber and mineral lands,70 and privately owned lands which reverted
to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No.
2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since
time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was
superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for a
simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The provision was last amended by PD No.
1073,73 which now provides for possession and occupation of the land
applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the
use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration
proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants
should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six
(6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976.
Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be governed
by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by
Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No.
1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to
codify the various laws relative to registration of property.78 It governs
registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered
lands, including chattel mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is
required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the
Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive
act of the government, such as an official
proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No.
141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have
been "officially delimited and classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership
of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the
land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or
disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a
certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to
the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to
2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were
subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and
disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court
cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants
were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island,
or portions of it, agricultural lands.Private claimants posit that
Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to the old
cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De
Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).89 These cases were
decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
lands until the contrary is shown."90
Private claimants’ reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced.
These cases did not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay
Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be stressed that
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner
through which land registration courts would classify lands of the public
domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or
agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of
the Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into
mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to
make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested
with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.91 This was the Court’s ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses
Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v.
Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be
formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed
open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioner’s reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by
the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was
no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the
Philippines the power to classify lands of the public domain into
mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to
make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested
with implicit power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the
evidence.93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No.
926, it was then necessary to devise a presumption on land
classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have
a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in
each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is
shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De
Aldecoa to an argument that all lands of the public domain had been
automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable agricultural
lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all
lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926 would have automatically made all lands in the
Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral land,
alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of
State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and
totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land
registration cases brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more
specifically those cases dealing with judicial and administrative
confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an
applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title
under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as
private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail
themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land
remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine,
continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not
absolute. Land classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If
there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural
uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite
the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-
General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question
belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that
a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself
sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral
land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future
value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said,
many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and
"mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it
is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must
show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it
contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is
not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that
it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral
today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be
classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of
the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands
classified as agricultural today may be differently classified
tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that
particular case, having regard for its present or future value for
one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact
that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the
Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to
presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case
the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever
the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry
or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior
value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be
settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is
a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide
whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance
belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in
the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by
reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened
before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private
interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of
said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public
domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land.
(Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra)95(Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification
of lands from the facts of each case, except those that have already
became private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919 and
reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive
Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to
classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral
or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether
express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public
domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were
issued their title in 1933,98 did not present a justiciable case for
determination by the land registration court of the property’s land
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then
to resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were
agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874
in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been
filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts
were no longer authorized to determine the property’s land
classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707
mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of Manila,100 which was
decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole
power to classify lands of the public domain was already in
effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,101 De
Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of
the Philippine Islands.103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally
different issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential
lots were included in the general classification of agricultural lands; and
if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled
that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935
Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which included
residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the
public domain are automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned
in Krivenko relied on the old cases decided prior to the enactment of
Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have
already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were
decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands
as agricultural, timber, or mineral.
Private claimants’ continued possession under Act No. 926 does
not create a presumption that the land is alienable. Private
claimants also contend that their continued possession of portions of
Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No.
926106 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence,
they may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v.
Court of Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the
disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and
conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the
Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native
settlers upon public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale
of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the
cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that
title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung from
the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and
the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the
public domain whose title still remained in the government and are
thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and
disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was
an unclassified land of the public domain prior to Proclamation
No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest
under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and
Resource Information Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an
unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified
lands of the public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705
defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain
which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest
purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified
lands, including those in Boracay Island, are ipso factoconsidered
public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing
prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land
under PD No. 705 may seem to be out of touch with the present
realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its
forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a
premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay
appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million
peso beach resorts on the island;111 that the island has already been
stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation
No. 1064 will destroy the island’s tourism industry, do not negate its
character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the
Constitution112 classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not necessarily
refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense
growths of trees and underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry114 is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.115 (Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary
and "forest or timber land" as a classification of lands of the public
domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for
legal purposes.116 At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine
the legalstatus of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout.
Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts,
restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not been
automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did
not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private
claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President
Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist
zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is
susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the
whole of Boracay into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law
or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The
reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"117 and "areas declared
as alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire
island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not
only to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule
VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority
from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest
reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands
merely recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive
department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5
of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development’s
authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable
when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by
the Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act
needed to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and
disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits
of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was
not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the
rationale behind the declaration of Boracay Island, together with other
islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and
marine reserve to be administered by the PTA – to ensure the
concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the
development of the areas’ tourism potential with due regard for
ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the
proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and
ecological purposes. It does not address the areas’ alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay
Island, but sixty-four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the
Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port
Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol,
Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan,
Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a
few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it
alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the
other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for
private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond,
the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared
part of Boracay as alienable and opened the same to private
ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is only
the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department
head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain
into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
merely exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the
public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights.
Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts
have no authority to do so.122 Absent such classification, the land
remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of
reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The
Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side
of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way
and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection
purposes.
Contrary to private claimants’ argument, there was nothing invalid or
irregular, much less unconstitutional, about the classification of
Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation No. 1064.
It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to
existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law. Private claimants further assert that
Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of
public forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a
public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no longer
convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a)
of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to
or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral
lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this
Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and
equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits
of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705
did not bar the Executive from later converting it into agricultural land.
Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the public domain
despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols
v. Republic,124 the Court stated that unclassified lands are public
forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not
categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that
they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land
remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a
"reclassification" of land. If the land had never been previously
classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of
the Department of Justice126 on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in
Section 4(a) is the word "reclassification." Where there has been no
previous classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass
of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present
system of classification for purposes of determining which are needed
for forest purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest
reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code,
there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the
meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the
reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law
delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply
to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest"
under the Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously
determined, or classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance
with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested
rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There are two
requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under
CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the
land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and
Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert portions of Boracay Island into
an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the
public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State
property.
Private claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying
on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801,
must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable
and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our
present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and
applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the
wording of the law itself.129Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those
lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants
failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for
declaratory relief that private claimants complied with the requisite
period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to
prove the first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the
tax declarations in the name of private claimants were issued in 1993.
Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to
convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation
commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having
been in possession of the island for a long time. They have invested
millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist spot. They say
their continued possession and investments give them a vested right
which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private
claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor
do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land they are
presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide
cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As
the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to
apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in
Boracay even with their continued possession and considerable
investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the
development of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and
international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a number
of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While
the Court commiserates with private claimants’ plight, We are bound to
apply the law strictly and judiciously. This is the law and it should
prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be
eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section
48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote their automatic
ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess
now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their
substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title
does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as
builders of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect
their possession. For another, they may look into other modes of
applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead131 or
sales patent,132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private
claimants to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from
certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one such
bill133 now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill
or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step
necessary to open up the island to private ownership. This gesture
may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view the
classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That
the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the
vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy
balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as
important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nation’s survival. Their
promotion and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and
activists. These are needs that become more urgent as destruction of
our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly
observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry
v. Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to
public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many
have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often,
about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation,
protection, development and reforestation. Not without justification.
For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's natural
resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the
necessary green cover on our lands produces a number of adverse or
ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up;
rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The
fish disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls
cease to function, so will hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile
topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion come
the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property –
crops, livestock, houses, and highways – not to mention precious
human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be written
down in a lumberman’s decalogue.135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the
Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135385 December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN
and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, respondents.
HON. JUAN M .FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI
ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG,
EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO,
LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M.
DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE SATURNO, BAE MLOMO-
BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D.
LUMANDONG, DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES,
DATU EDUAARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU RAMON
BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO,
TIMUAY EDWIN B. ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI,
DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA SAWAY,
BAY INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA
HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY,
DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES
D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S.
ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON, ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO
CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-
VIVAL, LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING
DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIOGRIN, LEOPOLDO ABUGAN,
VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES,
ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C. AGUILAR, MAURO
VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B.
GUINOSAO, WALTER N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR
DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS,
SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A. LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANG-
CAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S.
SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB,
SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO APANG, MADION MALID,
SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO
DIANO, JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO
MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P. SARZA, FELIPE P.
BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA
MAPANSAGONOS, ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA,
RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD M.
GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO
M. MALUDAO, MINORS MARICEL MALID, represented by her
father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by
her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by
her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M. EVANGELISTA, represented by
her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN
BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B'LAAN TRIBAL FARMER'S
ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE'S EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN
FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenors.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION
FOR THE CONSERVATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
INC., intervenor.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A.
8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing
Rules).
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required
respondents to comment. In compliance, respondents Chairperson and
1
Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP), the government agency created under the IPRA to implement
its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition,
in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the
petition be dismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the
Solicitor General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of
the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional on the ground that it
grants ownership over natural resources to indigenous peoples and
prays that the petition be granted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen.
Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Bennagen,
a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and
members of 112 groups of indigenous peoples (Flavier, et. al), filed
their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending
the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the
petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise
filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to Appear as Amicus Curiae. The
CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens
patriae and that the State has the responsibility to protect and
guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be
dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan
Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation for the Conservation of
Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a motion to Intervene
with attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and
Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with the Constitution and pray that
the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations
were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties
and intervenors filed their respective memoranda in which they
reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during
the hearing.
notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior
and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the
jurisdiction of said officials over said area terminates;
"(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions
and practices of indigenous peoples shall be applied first
with respect to property rights, claims of ownership,
hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes, and
that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall
be resolved in favor of the indigenous peoples;

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the

IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in
violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution:
"(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and
practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and
"(5) Section 66 which vests on the NCIP the jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of the indigenous
peoples." 5

"(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral
domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines ancestral lands;
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of
the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, which provides
"(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral
that "the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the
domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of water, mineral
President is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for
and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but
purposes of policy and program coordination." They contend that said
community property of the indigenous peoples;
Rule infringes upon the President’s power of control over executive
departments under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. 6

"(3) Section 6 in relation to section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the
composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
Petitioners pray for the following:

"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the

"(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[I], 57, 58, 59,
indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional and invalid;
(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the
indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to cease and
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous desist from implementing the assailed provisions of R.A.
peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploration of 8371 and its Implementing Rules;
minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be
their ancestral domains, and the right to enter into agreements with
"(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
nonindigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for
Resources to cease and desist from implementing
not more than 25 years; and
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Circular
No. 2, series of 1998;
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve the ancestral domains and
"(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
portions thereof which are found to be necessary for critical
Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and desist
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected
from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the
areas, forest cover or reforestation." 2
assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and

Petitioners also content that, by providing for an all-encompassing

"(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the
definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources to comply
even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and
with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional
3(b) violate the rights of private landowners.3

mandate to control and supervise the exploration,

development, utilization and conservation of Philippine
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the natural resources." 7

powers and jurisdiction of the NCIP and making customary law

applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted
and ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due
as follows:
process clause of the Constitution. 4

Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an

These provisions are:
"(1) sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of
delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and which
vest on the NCIP the sole authority to delineate ancestral
domains and ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the
NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral domain and upon
opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing,
and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions
of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all
challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II,
Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA
which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-
scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in
conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the
other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the
ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners
do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition.
Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that
Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371
are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of
Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await
the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been
violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and
De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and
Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority
was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate
opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Panganiban JJ., see separate
opinion
Footnotes
1
Rollo, p. 114.
2
Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.
3
Id. at 23-25.
4
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws."
5
Rollo, pp. 25-27.
6
Id. at 27-28.
Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on
7
April 13, 1999, pp. 5-6.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
PRECIS
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by
Friedrich Nietzsche entitled "On the Uses and Disadvantages of
History for Life." Expounding on Nietzsche's essay, Judge Richard
Posner1 wrote:2
"Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-
looking, the most 'past-dependent,' of the professions. It venerates
tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient
texts, archaic terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy,
and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history. It is
suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, 'paradigm shifts,' and the
energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained attitudes are
obstacles to anyone who wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic
direction. But, by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must
come to terms with history."
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),
it introduced radical concepts into the Philippine legal system which
appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state
ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense and
subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated without considering its
distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion
attempts to interpret IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist
of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress not only to
fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural
communities' right to their ancestral land but more importantly, to
correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.
G.R. No. 155394 February 17, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO AGUNOY, SR., et al., SPOUSES EDUARDO and
ARCELITA MARQUEZ and RURAL BANK OF GAPAN, NUEVA
ECIJA, respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Interplaying in this case are two (2) counter-balancing doctrines in the
law of land titles: one, the doctrine of fraus et jus nunquam
cohabitant, which basically means that no one may enjoy the fruits of
fraud, and the other, the doctrine that a fraudulent title may be the root
1
of valid title in the name of an innocent buyer for value and in good
faith.
2
Invoking the first, petitioner Republic of the Philippines in this petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to
nullify and set aside the decision dated September 26, 2002 of the 3
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55732, which reversed an earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court at Cabanatuan City, Branch 25, in
its Civil Case No. 831-AF, an action for cancellation of free patent,
original certificate of title and derivative transfer certificates of title,
thereat filed by the petitioner against, among others, the herein
respondents.
The facts are well laid out in the decision under review:
On May 26, 1958, Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. filed his application for Free
Patent No. 5-1414 covering two parcels of land identified as Lot Nos.
1341 and 1342, Cad 269, Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, containing
an aggregate area of 18.6486 hectares with the Bureau of Lands. On
January 18, 1967, he was issued Free Patent No. 314450 by the
Director of Lands.
On February 6, 1967, the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija registered
Free Patent No. 314450 and issued the corresponding Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-4522 in the name of Gregorio Agunoy,
Sr.
On March 10, 1967, the heirs of Eusebio Perez, represented by
Francisca Perez, caused the annotation on the said OCT of an adverse
claim in their favor over a portion of 15.1593 hectares of the property.
On July 30, 1975, the said heirs of Eusebio Perez filed a formal protest
docketed as B.L. Claim No. 760 (n) with the Bureau of Lands alleging
that Lot 1341 of the Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, covered by
Original Certificate of Title No-P4522 is identical to Lots 1 and 2 of Plan
Psu-47200 which had been adjudicated as private property of said
protestant pursuant to a decision promulgated on October 24, 1960 by
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Land Registration Case
No. 430, LRC Records No. 14876.
On May 3, 1976, the chief of the Legal Division, Bureau of Lands,
conducted a formal investigation and ocular inspection of the premises
and it was ascertained that Free Patent No. 314450 and its
corresponding OCT No. P-4522 were improperly and fraudulently
issued (Records, p.78)
On July 31, 1979, upon the death of the wife of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr.,
the heirs, namely Gregorio Sr., Tomas, Lilian, Angelito and Gregorio,
Jr., executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Sale in favor of
Joaquin Sangabol for and in consideration of the sum of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).
The Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 was cancelled by the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija and Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 166270 was issued in favor of the aforenamed heirs. Said
TCT No. 166270 was again cancelled by reason of the concurrent sale
to Joaquin Sangabol in whose favor TCT No. NT- 166271 was issued.
On August 1, 1979, Joaquin Sangabol sold an undivided portion of
three (3) hectares of the property described as Lot 1341 in TCT No.
NT-166271 to Fortunato Para for and in consideration of the sum of
Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (3,500.00)
The following day, he sold the property described as Lot 1342 in TCT
No. NT-166271 to Virginia P. Jimenez for and in consideration of the
sum of One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) in whose favor
TCT No. N-166287 was issued.
On May 12, 1980, the adverse claim of Francisca Perez, et al.
annotated at the back of the OCT was cancelled by the Register of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija (Exhibit G).
On January 16, 1981, Joaquin Sangabol subdivided the property
described as Lot 1341 in TCT No. NT-166271 into three lots
designated as Lot Nos. 1341-A, 1341-B, and 1341-C of plan Psd-
299875 duly approved by the Land Registration Commission.
l^vvphi1.net
TCT No. NT-166271 was cancelled and TCT No. NT-168972 covering
Lot No. 1341-A was issued to spouses Fortunato Para and Araceli
Sena. TCT Nos. NT-168973 and NT-168974 covering Lot Nos. 1341-B
and 1341-C were issued in favor of Joaquin Sangabol.
On June 15, 1982, Virginia P. Jimenez sold the property covered by
TCT No. NT-166287 in favor of spouses Blandino and Josefina A.
Salva Cruz for Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P11,500.00)
where TCT No. 174634 was issued in favor of said spouses. On June
17, 1982, Josefina A. Salva Cruz effected the subdivision of the
property into thirteen (13) lots designated as Lot Nos. 1342-A t0 1342-
M as per subdivision plan Psd-03-004756 thereby canceling TCT No.
NT-174634 and TCT Nos. NT- 174635 to 174647 were issued in lieu
thereof.
On November 2, 1982, Fortunato Para, through his attorney-in-fact
Gloria Bergonia, mortgaged the property covered by TCT No. NT-
168972 in favor of the Perpetual Finance and Investment, Inc. in the
amount of One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P125,000.00).
The mortgage was foreclosed and the property was sold at public
auction. Thereafter, the corresponding certificate of sale was executed
in favor of Perpetual Finance and Credit, Inc.
On March 3, 1983, the properties covered by TCT Nos. NT-174643
and NT- 174644 were mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Gapan for
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00). On February 25, 1985, the
mortgage was likewise foreclosed and the properties were sold at
public auction in favor of the said bank.
On December 16, 1986, Joaquin Sangabol sold the property covered
by TCT No. NT-168974 to Eduardo R. Dee for and in consideration of
the sum of One Hundred Twenty [Thousand] Pesos (P120,000.00).
Subsequently, TCT No. NT-168974 was cancelled and TCT No.
196579 was issued in the name of Eduardo R. Dee.
On January 5, 1988, the heirs of Ruperto Perez (oldest son of
Eusebio), now represented by Sabina P. Hernandez, filed a
supplemental protest alleging that:
a) Lot Nos. 1341 and 1342, Cad 269 of the Sta. Rosa
Cadatre have been exclusively occupied and cultivated by
them and their immediate predecessors-in-interest who have
introduced permanent improvements thereon consisting of
irrigated ricelands, mango trees, bamboo groves and other
crops;
b) Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. never occupied and cultivated said
parcels of land in the manner and for the period required by
law;
c) Said parcels of land are identical to Lots 1, 3 and a portion
of 87,674 square meters of Lot 4 of the amended plan-47200
Amd. as shown by the relocation survey conducted by
Geodetic Engineer Deogracias L. Javier on July 29, 1977;
d) The patent and title issued to Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. were
obtained through fraud and misrepresentation. (Records pp.
9-10)
The Bureau of Lands conducted anew an investigation and ocular
inspection of Lot 1342, Cad. 269 of Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija,
and came out with the following findings, to wit:
a) Lot 1342, Cad. 269 of Sta Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija is
located at Barangay Imbunia (formerly Marawa), Municipality
of Jaen, Nueva Ecija;
b) Said lot was originally registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Cabanatuan City on May 23, 1914
under OCT No. 125 issued in the name of Valeriano Espiritu,
pursuant to Decree No. 15733 issued on May 20, 1914 in
Land Registration Case No. 9552;
c) On May 13, 1952, said property was conveyed in favor of
Isaias Carlos under TCT No. 11554 and the latter conveyed
the same in favor of the spouses Santiago Mateo and
Leogarda Juliano;
d) TCT No. 11554 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT
No. 17471 was issued in the name of Santiago Mateo.
(Records, pp. 13;78)
On May 10, 1988, the Chief of the Legal Division recommended to the
Director of Lands that court action be instituted for the cancellation of
Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding Original Certificate of
Title No. P-4522 in the name Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., as well as other
subsequent transfer certificates of title issued therefrom based on the
foregoing findings (Underscoring supplied).
It was against the foregoing backdrop of events when, on May 24,
1990, in the Regional Trial Court at Gapan, Nueva Ecija petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
the complaint in this case against several defendants, among whom
4
are the herein respondents Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., his children, the
spouses Eduardo Dee and Arcelita Marquez-Dee and the Rural Bank
of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. In its complaint, docketed as Civil Case No.
831-AF, petitioner Republic alleged, inter alia, as follows:
"30. Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding Original Certificate
of Title No. P-4522 were procured by defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr.,
through fraud, deceit and misrepresentation since the property in
question (Lots 1341 and 1342) at the time the patent and the title were
issued was already adjudicated as private property of the heirs of
Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, respectively. Consequently, the
then Bureau of Lands, now Lands Management Bureau, no longer had
any jurisdiction and control over the same. xxx xxx.
31. The fraudulent acts and misrepresentation of defendant Gregorio
Agunoy, Sr. had misled the then Bureau of Lands in issuing said
patent. Since the property in question was no longer a disposable
public land, Free Patent No. 314450 and its corresponding Original
Certificate of Title No. P-4522 issued to defendant Gregorio Agunoy,
Sr. are null and void and should be cancelled. Moreover, Gregorio
Agunoy, Sr. has not occupied and cultivated the land in the manner
and for the length of time required by law (C.A. 141 as amended; see
also RA 782) (Emphasis supplied),
and accordingly prayed for a judgment -
1. Declaring Free Patent No. 314450 and the
corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 in the
name of Gregorio Agunoy, as well as all other subsequent
transfer certificates of title emanating therefrom, i.e.,
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT-168972, NT-168973,
NT-196579, NT-174635 to NT-174647 (inclusive), including
all liens and encumbrances annotated thereon, null and void;
2. Ordering defendants to surrender their owner’s duplicate
copies of all subsequent transfer certificates of title
emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 to the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija;
3. Directing the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel
the aforesaid certificates of title;
4. Ordering defendants and all those claiming under them to
desist from exercising or representing acts of ownership
and/or possession in the premises (Underscoring supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Eventually, in a decision dated September 9, 1996, the trial court
5
rendered judgment for the Republic, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendants as follows:
1. Declaring as null and void Free Patent No. 314450 and
the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 in
the name of Gregorio Agunoy, as well as all other
subsequent transfer certificates of titles emanating
therefrom (TCT Nos. NT-166270, NT-166271, NT- 168972,
NT-168973, NT-168974, NT-166287 and NT-174634 to NT-
174647, inclusive, of the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Ecija)
including all liens and encumbrances annotated thereon;
2. Ordering defendants to surrender their owner's duplicate
copies of all the said subsequent transfer certificates of titles
emanating from Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 to the
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, and ordering the Register
of Deeds to cancel the aforesaid certificates of titles;
3. Ordering reversion of the pieces of land embraced in Free
Patent No. 314450 and OCT No. P-4522 of the Registry of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija, to the mass of public domain except
the pieces of land which were already the subject of land
registration proceedings;
4. Ordering that henceforth the defendants and all those
claiming under them to desist from disturbing the ownership
of the government over the said pieces of land, and
5. To pay costs of suits.
For lack of evidence, the third-party complaint filed by the Rural Bank
of Gapan, Inc. against defendants-Spouses Blandino Salva Cruz and
Josefina Salva Cruz is hereby dismissed without pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED (Underscoring supplied).
Therefrom, the spouses Eduardo Dee and Arcelita Marquez-Dee and
the Rural Bank of Gapan, Nueva Ecija went to the Court of Appeals,
whereat their recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 55732.
As earlier stated herein, the appellate court, in a decision dated
September 26, 2002, reversed and set aside the appealed decision of
6
the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED and the
decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new
judgment is hereby rendered to read as follows:
1. Defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. is declared to have
validly and properly acquired Free Patent No. 314450 and
the corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522
over Lot Nos. 1341 and 1342, Cad 269, Sta. Rosa Cadastre,
Nueva Ecija; and
2. The title over the portion of Lot No. 1342, now covered by
TCT No. 196579 in the name of defendants-appellants
Spouses Dee is likewise declared valid for having acquired
in good faith and for value.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this recourse by the petitioner, submitting for our resolution the
following issues :
7
"I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT THE REAL PARTY-IN-
INTEREST IN THIS CASE AND THAT GREGORIO AGUNOY, SR.
HAD VALIDLY ACQUIRED FREE PATENT NO. 314450 AND
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. P-4522 OVER LOT NOS.
1341 AND 1342, CAD. 269, STA. ROSA CADASTRE, NUEVA ECIJA.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT THE TITLE OVER THE PORTION OF LOT NO.
1342, NOW COVERED BY TCT NO. 196579 IN THE NAMES OF
RESPONDENTS SPOUSES EDUARDO DEE AND ARCELITA
MARQUEZ IS VALID FOR HAVING BEEN ACQUIRED IN GOOD
FAITH AND FOR VALUE".
We DENY.
To begin with, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner
Republic is not the real party-in-interest in this case.
Basic it is in the law of procedure that every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, meaning "the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit", a procedural rule
8
and title would not therefore result in its reversion to the public domain.
Hence, the State, represented by the Solicitor General, is not the real
party in interest.

reechoed in a long line of cases decided by this Court. For sure, not
We could have, at this point, already written finis to this decision.
too long ago, in Shipside, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, citing earlier
9

Nonetheless, for the peace of mind of those concerned, we have opted

cases, we wrote:
to address the second issue raised in the petition: whether the
appellate court erred in declaring as valid for having been acquired for
xxx. Consequently, the Republic is not a real party in interest and it value and in good faith the title over the portion of Lot No. 1342,
may not institute the instant action. Nor may it raise the defense of covered by TCT No. 196579 in the name of the respondent spouses
imprescriptibility, the same being applicable only in cases where the Eduardo Dee and Arcelita Marquez-Dee.
government is a party in interest. Under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, "every action must be prosecuted or
After sleeping for an unreasonably long period of time lasting for
defended in the name of the real party in interest." To qualify a person
decades, the heirs of Eusebio Perez can longer defeat the better right
to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be
arising from the Torrens titles in the names of the present transferees
prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right
of the properties, unless and until anyone succeeds in overcoming the
sought to enforced (Pioneer Insurance v. CA, 175 SCRA 668 [1989]).
presumption of good faith in securing their respective titles.
A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as For one, even granting as true the petitioner’s allegation of a prior
distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, cadastral case - LRC Case No. 430, LRC Rec. No. 148 - involving a
subordinate or consequential interest. portion of the lots subject of Agunoy’s Free Patent, wherein a decision
was allegedly promulgated on October 24, 1960 in favor of the heirs of
Eusebio Perez, which decision, according to petitioner, was already
The very complaint in this case, supra, filed by petitioner Republic
final and executory, we are greatly bothered by the fact that none of
before the trial court unmistakably alleges that at the time Free Patent
the heirs of Eusebio Perez could show having exerted due diligence
No. 31445 and its corresponding Original Certificate of Title No. P-
towards at least attempting to accomplish the registration of the
45222 were issued to Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., "the property in question
properties involved in the said cadastral case, which properties,
(Lots 1341 and 1342) xxx was already adjudicated as private
according to petitioner and the Perezes, are identical to Lot Nos. 1341
property of the heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu", and
and 1342. Verily, were we to believe the allegations of the heirs of
that at that time, "the property in question was no longer a
Eusebio Perez in their own protest with the Bureau of Lands dated July
disposable public land". In fact, in paragraph 27(f) of the same
30, 1975, there is an express order for registration in LRC Case No.
11
complaint, petitioner further alleged:
430, as follows:

f) Furthermore, it was found that prior to the issuance of Free Patent

"WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered affirming the order of
No. 314450 on January 18, 1967, Lot 1341 of Sta. Rosa Cadastre,
general default heretofore entered and ordering the registration of Lots
Nueva Ecija, which was one of the two (2) parcels of land applied for
Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-47200, situated in the Barrio of Marawa,
by Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., was already the subject of an application for
Municipality of Jaen, Nueva Ecija, containing a total area of 21.9284
registration filed by the heirs of Eusebio Perez in 1958 before the Court
hectares in the following manner:
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, docketed as LRC Case No. 430, LRC
Record No. 14876, and wherein a Decision was promulgated on
October 24, 1960 adjudicating Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-47200 as xxx xxx xxx
private properties of said heirs-claimants. The aforesaid Decision was
already final and executory at the time the patent was issued to
defendant Gregorio Agunoy, Sr". (Except for the underscoring on "as From as early as October 24, 1960, when the aforequoted decision in
private properties", the rest are of the petitioner itself). LRC Case No. 430 was promulgated, to as late as February 6, 1967,
when OCT No. P-4522 of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr. was issued, or a
slumber lasting for more than six (6) years, the heirs of Eusebio Perez
With the very admissions by the petitioner itself in its basic pleading had numerous opportunities to cause the implementation of the said
that Lots No. 1341 and 1342 are already private properties of the registration order. Inexplicably, they let this chance passed
heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, and are, therefore, "no by. Vigilantibus, sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, the law aids
longer disposable public land" over which the then Bureau of Lands, the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights. And speaking of
12

now Lands Management Bureau, "no longer had any jurisdiction rights, one may not sleep on a right while expecting to preserve it in its
and control", we are simply at a loss to understand how petitioner pristine purity.13

Republic can still profess to be the real party-in-interest in this case,

and insists that the disputed properties are still part of the public
For another, Jose Mendigoria, Public Lands Inspector and Investigator
domain. If ever, the real party-in-interest could be none other than the
heirs of Eusebio Perez and Valeriano Espiritu, but certainly not the of the Bureau of Lands, made the following remarks in his certification
dated February 28, 1966: 14
petitioner.

10. Remarks: Attached hereto is the certification of the Clerk of

Then, too, it is striking to note that even as the complaint is basically
Court and the Register of Deeds, Cabanatuan City for ready
one for reversion of private property to the mass of public domain,
references in connection with the speedy issuance of patent in
petitioner did not implead either the heirs of Eusebio Perez or that of
favor of the applicant.
Valeriano Espiritu. Without doubt, if our decision hereon were to be in
favor of petitioner, the real beneficiary thereof is not the State. And
because, as no less admitted by the petitioner, the lands subject of this It is informed in this connection that the survey claimants of these
case are no longer part of the public domain, the nullification of Lots, 1341 for Eusebio Perez and 1342 for Valenciano Espiritu
Agunoy’s Free Patent P-314450 and OCT No. P-4522 would not result could not be located in the locality. The lots were already
in the reversion of the lands subject thereof to the mass of public land. abandoned by them so that in the year 1941, the present applicant
And the government, not being the real party-in-interest, is without took possession of the land thru his tenants.
personality to institute reversion proceedings. So it is that in an earlier
case, we had an occasion to say:
10

Countering the foregoing certification, petitioner Republic claims that a

There is no merit in petitioners' contention that only the State may
bring an action for reconveyance of the lots in dispute. To reiterate, Lot
2344 is a private property in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the Santiago family. The nullification of its free patent
more recent verification survey conducted on February 15, 1988 by
Geodetic Engineer Melencio Mangahas, also of the Bureau of Lands,
reveals an anomaly in the issuance of Agunoy, Sr.’s Free Patent No.
314450. Again, we quote from petitioner’s complaint, particularly
paragraph 27 (c) thereof, to wit:
c) The results of the verification survey conducted by Geodetic
Engineer Melencio Mangahas of the Bureau of Lands on February 15,
1988 on the premises confirmed the earlier findings of said Office that
Lot 1341 Cad. 269 of Sta. Rosa Cadastre, Nueva Ecija, covered by
Free Patent No. 314450 and OCT No. P-4522 in the name of Gregorio
Agunoy, Sr., is identical to Lots 1, 3 and a portion of 87,674 square
meters of Lot 4 of the amended Plan Psu-47200 which was surveyed
and approved on January 21, 1966 in the name of Eusebio Perez. It
was verified likewise that Lot 1341 is within Barrio Marawa, Jaen,
Nueva Ecija.
in Animas, or that said patent and title are still in the name of the
person who committed the fraud or misrepresentation, as in Acot,
Animas, Republic vs. CA and Del Mundo and Director of Lands vs.
Abanilla, et al.and, in either instance, there were yet no innocent third
parties standing in the way.
Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioner’s own judicial admission, the
lots in dispute are no longer part of the public domain, and there are
numerous third, fourth, fifth and more parties holding Torrens titles in
their favor and enjoying the presumption of good faith. This brings to
mind what we have reechoed in Pino vs. Court of Appeals and the
20

As between the February 28, 1966 certification of Jose cases therein cited:
21

Mendigoria, supra, which led to the issuance of Agunoy’s OCT No. P-

4522 and numerous derivative titles descending therefrom, and
[E]ven on the supposition that the sale was void, the general rule that
the February 15, 1988 verification survey of Geodetic Engineer
the direct result of a previous illegal contract cannot be valid (on the
Melencio Mangahas, cited in the aforequoted paragraph of petitioner’s
theory that the spring cannot rise higher than its source) cannot apply
complaint, which led to nothing, suffice it to quote herein what this
here for We are confronted with the functionings of the Torrens System
Court has said in PEZA vs. Fernandez: 15

of Registration. The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a fraudulent or

forged document of sale may become the ROOT of a valid title if the
xxx. Indeed, the inevitable consequences of the Torrens system of land certificate of title has already been transferred from the name of the
registration must be upheld in order to give stability to it and provide true owner to the name of the forger or the name indicated by the
finality to land disputes, forger.

and in Heirs of Brusas vs. Court of Appeals: 16

It is even worse in this case because here, there is no forger to speak
of. The remark of Land Inspector Jose Mendigoria about the
abandonment by Eusebio Perez and Valenciano Espiritu cannot, by
The real purpose of the Torrens System of land registration is to quiet
itself, be fraudulent. And, for all we know, that remark may even turn
title to land and stop forever any question as to its legality. Once a title
out to be the truth. What petitioner perceives as fraud may be nothing
is registered the owner may rest secure without the necessity of
more than the differences of professional opinions between Land
waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador de su casa,
Inspector Jose Mendigoria and Geodetic Engineer Melencio
to avoid the possibility of losing his land. Indeed, titles over lands under
Mangahas. But regardless of who between the two is correct, the hard
the Torrens system should be given stability for on it greatly depends
reality is that the properties in question are no longer floating objects
the stability of the country's economy. Interest reipublicae ut sit finis
on a spring that cannot rise higher than its source, as they are now
litium.
very much ashore and firmly standing on the high solid ground of the
1ªvvphi 1.nét

Torrens system of land registration. 1aw phi 1.nét

If at all, the discrepancy in the two (2) separate survey reports of

Mendigoria and Mangahas can only be imputable to either the past or
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
more recent officials of the Bureau of Lands.
AFFIRMED and this petition DENIED.

Of course, we are well aware of the rule reiterated in Republic vs.

SO ORDERED.
Court of Appeals and Santos, that, generally, the State cannot be put
17

in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents. In that

very case, however, citing 31 CJS 675-676, we went further by saying - G.R. No. 134209 January 24, 2006

"xxx. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an vs.
ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations xxx, the CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public
authorities as well as against private individuals"
DECISION

In any event, the verification survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer

Melencio Mangahas on February 15, 1988 came almost twenty-two
(22) years after the February 28, 1966 certification of Jose Mendigoria;
more than twenty-one (21) years after the issuance of Agunoy Sr.’s
Free Patent No. 314450 on January 18, 1967 and its registration as
Original Certificate of Title No. P-4522 on February 6, 1967; and more
than eight (8) years reckoned from July 31, 1979 when, upon the death
of the wife of Gregorio Agunoy, Sr., the heirs executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition with Sale in favor of Joaquin Sangabol. In the
meanwhile, for about half a decade thereafter, ownership over the
properties transferred from one buyer to another, with each and every
transferee enjoying the presumption of good faith. If only on this score
alone that the present petition must fall.
There can be no debate at all on petitioner’s submission that no
amount of legal technicality may serve as a solid foundation for the
enjoyment of the fruits of fraud. It is thus understandable why petitioner
chants the dogma of fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant.
Significantly, however, in the cases cited by petitioner Republic, as
18
well as in those other cases where the doctrine of fraus et jus
19
nunquam cohabitant was applied against a patent and title procured
thru fraud or misrepresentation, we note that the land covered thereby
is either a part of the forest zone which is definitely non-disposable, as
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1dated May 29, 1998 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an
earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch
69 in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1.
The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows:
This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land
located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in
the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December
1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant
[herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said
parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID
Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria
Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-
in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty
(30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no
mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person
having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof.
On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . .
filed an opposition to the application on the ground that neither the
applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; that the
muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona-fide acquisition
of the lands applied for or of his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of (an)
owner; that the applicant’s claim of ownership in fee simple on the
basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of . . .; and that
the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.
On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default
as against the whole world, with the exception of the Office of the
Solicitor General, and proceeded with the hearing of this registration
case.
After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . .
applicant rested her case. The Solicitor General, thru the Provincial
Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the admission of the exhibits.
Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest (sic) that the Government
had no evidence to adduce. 3
In a decision4 dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered
judgment for herein respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto
her the parcels of land in question and decreeing the registration
thereof in her name, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the
parcels of land situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing on
Plan AP-03-003447 containing an area of 3,131 square meters,
appearing on Plan AP-03-003446 containing an area of 15,322
containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant
Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel
Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together with all the
improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in
her name in accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14,
[should be 141] as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This
adjudication, however, is subject to the various
easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws, presidential
decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions which should be
annotated/ projected on the title to be issued. And once this decision
becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be
immediately issued. (Words in bracket added)
With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial
court, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No.
37001.
As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision
of May 29, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Republic’s present recourse on its basic submission that
the CA’s decision "is not in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the
evidence, since respondent has not established with the required
evidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title in respect of the
subject lots which would warrant their registration under … (P.D. 1529
or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141." In particular, petitioner Republic faults
the appellate court on its finding respecting the length of respondent’s
occupation of the property subject of her application for registration and
for not considering the fact that she has not established that the lands
in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to
alienable and disposable property.
Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released
by positive act of the Government so that they may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, are not capable of
private appropriation.5 As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title do not apply.6 Given this postulate, the principal issue to
be addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in
question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable
lands of the public domain.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act7 and the
Constitution8 classifying lands of the public domain into "agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks," do not necessarily
refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense
growth of trees and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui 9-
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is merely
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx
Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,10 which embodies
the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State – the source of any asserted right to ownership of land.11 All
lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively
belong to the State.12 Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been
reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a
private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public
domain.13 Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of
classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest
or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive
Branch of the government and not the court.14 Needless to stress, the
onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the
land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable
rests with the applicant.15
In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are
already alienable and disposable. Wrote the appellate court:
The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the
public domain cannot be sustained as it is directly against the above
doctrine. Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle established in
the earlier cases . . . that open, exclusive and undisputed possession
of alienable public land for period prescribed by law creates the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be
public land and becomes private property …. (Word in bracket and
underscoring added.)
The principal reason for the appellate court’s disposition, finding a
registerable title for respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-
interest’s open, continuous and exclusive occupation of the subject
property for more than 30 years. Prescinding from its above
assumption and finding, the appellate court went on to conclude,
citing Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC)16 and Herico vs. DAR,17 among other cases, that, upon the
completion of the requisite period of possession, the lands in question
cease to be public land and become private property.
Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not,
however, winning cards for the respondent, for the simple reason that,
in said cases, the disposable and alienable nature of the land sought to
be registered was established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there
lies the difference.
Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the
proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the
land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It calls for
proof.18 Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the
survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which, needless to
state, provided no information respecting the classification of the
property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not
sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be
registered forms part of the public domain.19
It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public
lands has been a notorious practice resorted to in land registration
cases.20 For this reason, the Court has made it a point to stress, when
appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the
case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands
need an express and positive act from the government. 21
The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and
her predecessor-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and
continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little
moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by
adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be
registered as title.22
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed
decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondent’s
application for original registration of title in Land Registration Case No.
N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69,
is DENIED.
No costs.
G.R. No. 107751 June 1, 1995
LETICIA P. LIGON, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CELIA LIPANA-REYES, Presiding
Judge, Branch 81, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Iglesia ni
Kristo and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br.
82, granting the motion of respondent of Iglesia ni Kristo to direct
petitioner to surrender the owner's duplicate of the certificates of title in
her possession.
On 19 October 1990 respondent Iglesia ni Kristo (INK) filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for specific
1
performance with damages against the Islamic Directorate of the
Philippines (IDP) docketed as Civil Case No. Q90-6937. Respondent
INK alleged in its complaint that by virtue of an Absolute Deed of Sale
dated 20 April 1989 IDP sold to it two (2) parcels of land located at
Tandang Sora, Barrio Culiat, Quezon City, both of which IDP is the
registered owner. The parties stipulated in the deed of sale that the
IDP shall undertake to evict all squatters and illegal occupants in the
property within forty-five (45) days from the execution of the contract.
IDP failed to fulfill this obligation. Hence INK prayed that the trial court
order IDP to comply with its obligation of clearing the subject lots of
illegal occupants and to pay damages to INK.
IDP alleged in its answer that it was INK which violated the contract by
delaying the payment of the purchase price and prayed that the
contract of sale be rescinded and revoked.
On 15 June 1991 INK filed a motion for partial summary judgment on
the ground that there was actually no genuine issue as to any material
fact.
On 12 September 1991 the trial court rendered partial judgment, and
on 7 October 1991 an amended partial judgment granting the reliefs
prayed for by INK except the prayer for damages which was to be
resolved later.
On 22 January 1992 INK filed a motion in the same case praying that
petitioner Leticia Ligon, who was in possession of the certificates of
title over the properties as mortgagee of IDP, be directed to surrender
the certificates to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the
registration of the Absolute Deed of Sale in its name. INK alleged that
the document could not be registered because of the refusal and/or
failure of petitioner to deliver the certificates of title despite repeated
requests.
On 31 January 1992 petitioner Ligon filed an opposition to the motion
on the ground that the IDP was not served copy of the motion, and the
ownership of the INK over the property was still in issue since
rescission was sought by the IDP as a counterclaim. She prayed that
the motion be denied, but should it be granted, the Register of Deeds
be directed after registration to deliver the owner's duplicate copies of
the new certificates of title to her.
On 15 February 1992 petitioner filed a Supplemental Opposition
questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court because the motion
involved the registrability of the document of sale, and she was not
made a party to the main case.
On 2 March 1992 the trial court granted the motion of INK and ordered
petitioner to surrender to INK the owner's copy of RT-26521 (170567)
and RT-26520 (176616) in open court for the registration of the
Absolute Deed of Sale in the latter's name and the annotation of the
mortgage executed in favor of petitioner on the new transfer certificates
of title to be issued to INK.
2
On 6 April 1992, on motion of petitioner Ligon, the trial court
reconsidered its order by directing her to deliver the certificates of title
to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. 3
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking
the annulment of the two (2) orders. However, on 28 October 1992 the
Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the orders of the
trial court.
Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the trial court erred: (a) in
ruling that it had jurisdiction over petitioner; (b) in upholding the orders
of the trial court even as they violated the rule prohibiting splitting of a
single cause of action and forum-shopping; (c) in holding that INK is
the owner of the property and entitled to registration of its ownership;
and, (d) in holding that INK has a superior right to the possession of
the owner's copies of the certificates of title.
Upon prior leave, the IDP intervened alleging that prior to the issuance
by the trial court of the order of 2 March 1992, its legal Board of
Trustees filed a motion for intervention informing said court that the
sale of the properties was not executed by it but was made possible by
a fake Board of Trustees, hence, the sale is void. The trial court denied
the motion since jurisdiction over the incident properly belonged to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Conformably therewith,
IDP brought the matter before the SEC which later declared that the
sale of the properties was void. Thus, IDP banks on this favorable
decision in similarly seeking the nullification of the questioned orders of
the trial court.
Under our land registration law, no voluntary instrument shall be
registered by the Register of Deeds unless the owner's duplicate
certificate is presented together with such instrument, except in some
cases or upon order of the court for cause shown. In case the person
in possession of the duplicate certificates refuses or fails to surrender
the same to the Register of Deeds so that a voluntary document may
be registered and a new certificate issued, Sec. 107, Chapter 10, of
P.D. No. 1529 clearly states:
Sec. 107. Surrender of withheld duplicate
certificates. — Where it is necessary to issue a
new certificate of title pursuant to any involuntary
 instrument which divests the title of the registered principal action. This principle is based on expediency and in
8

owner against his consent or where a voluntary accordance with the policy against multiplicity of suits.
instrument cannot be registered by reason of the
refusal or failure of the holder to surrender the
The records of the case show that the subsisting mortgage lien of
owner's duplicate certificate of title, the party in
petitioner appears in the certificates of title Nos. 26520 and 26521.
interest may file a petition in court to compel
Hence, the order of the trial court directing the surrender of the
surrender of the same to the Register of Deeds.
certificates to the Register of Deeds in order that the deed of sale in
The court, after hearing, may order the registered
favor of INK can be registered, cannot in any way prejudice her rights
owner or any person withholding the duplicate
and interests as a mortgagee of the lots. Any lien annotated on the
certificate to surrender the same and direct the
previous certificates of title which subsists should be incorporated in or
entry of a new certificate or memorandum upon
carried over to the new transfer certificates of title. This is true even in
such surrender. If the person withholding the
the case of a real estate mortgage because pursuant to Art. 2126 of
duplicate certificate is not amenable to the process
the Civil Code it directly and immediately subjects the property upon
of the court, or if for any reason the outstanding
which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of
owner's duplicate certificate cannot be delivered,
the obligation for whose security it was constituted. It is inseparable
the court may order the annulment of the same as
from the property mortgaged as it is a right in rem — a lien on the
well as the issuance of a new certificate of title in
property whoever its owner may be. It subsists notwithstanding a
lieu thereof. Such new, certificate and all
change in ownership; in short, the personality of the owner is
duplicates thereof shall contain a memorandum of
disregarded. Thus, all subsequent purchasers must respect the
the annulment of the outstanding duplicate.
mortgage whether the transfer to them be with or without the consent
of the mortgagee, for such mortgage until discharged follows the
Before the enactment of P.D. No. 1529 otherwise known as property. It is clear therefore that the surrender by petitioner of the
9

the Property Registration Decree, the former law, Act No. 496
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, and all jurisprudence
interpreting the former law had established that summary reliefs such
as an action to compel the surrender of owner's duplicate certificate of
title to the Register of Deeds could only be filed with and granted by
the Regional Trial Court sitting as a land registration court if there was
unanimity among the parties or there was no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest, otherwise, if the case
became contentious and controversial it should be threshed out in an
ordinary action or in the case where the incident properly belonged. 4
certificates of title to the Register of Deeds as ordered by the trial court
will not create any substantial injustice to her. To grant the petition and
compel INK to file a new action in order to obtain the same reliefs it
asked in the motion before the trial court is to encourage litigations
where no substantial rights are prejudiced. This end should be
avoided. Courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do
not really impair the proper administration of justice. The rules are
intended to insure the orderly conduct of litigations because of the
higher objective they seek, which is, to protect the parties' substantive
rights.10

Under Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is now provided that "Courts of First WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28
Instance (now Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction October 1992 is AFFIRMED.
over all applications for original registration of titles to lands, including
improvements and interest therein and over all petitions filed after
SO ORDERED.
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions." The above
provision has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction G.R. No. 103727 December 18, 1996
vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred
upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON MARIANO SAN PEDRO Y
Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits the change has simplified
ESTEBAN, represented by its HEIR-JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR,
registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the
ENGRACIO F. SAN PEDRO, petitioner-appellant,
authority to act not only on applications for original registration but also
vs.
over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to
COURT OF APPEALS (Second Division) AURELIO OCAMPO,
hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
DOMINADOR D. BUHAIN, TERESA C. DELA CRUZ, respondents-
petitions.
5

appellees.

The principal action filed by INK in Civil Case No. Q-90-6937 before
G.R. No. 106496 December 18, 1996
the trial court was for specific performance with damages based on a
document of sale. Such action was well within the exclusive
jurisdictions of the Regional Trial Court. When IDP, the defendant in
6
ENGRACIO SAN PEDRO, CANDIDO GENER, ROSA PANTALEON,
the trial court, did not question the genuineness and validity of said VICENTE PANTALEON, ELEUTERIO PANTALEON, TRINIDAD SAN
deed of sale and its obligations thereunder, the summary judgment PEDRO, RODRIGO SAN PEDRO, RICARDO NICOLAS, FELISA
issued by the court granting the reliefs sought by INK was also an NICOLAS, and LEONA SAN PEDRO, petitioners,
exercise of its general jurisdiction. vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Sixteenth Division) and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Hence, when INK filed a motion for the issuance of an order from the
same court to compel the holder of the duplicate certificates of title to
surrender the same to the Register of Deeds for the registration of the
deed of sale subject of the principal action, the motion was a
necessary incident to the main case. When the sale of the property
was upheld by the court in its judgment and the defendant was directed
to comply with its terms and conditions, the right of INK to have the HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p
same registered with the Register of Deeds could not be disregarded.
To assert and enjoy its right, INK should be allowed to seek the aid of
The most fantastic land claim in the history of the Philippines is the subject
the court to direct the surrender of the certificates of title. Since
of controversy in these two consolidated cases. The heirs of the late
Regional Trial Courts are courts of general jurisdiction, they may
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban laid claim and have been laying claim to the
therefore take cognizance of this case pursuant to such ownership of, against third persons and the Government itself, a total land
jurisdiction. Even while Sec. 107 of P.D. 1529 speaks of a petition
7
area of approximately 173,000 hectares or "214,047 quiniones," on the
1

which can be filed by one who wants to compel another to surrender
the certificates of title to the Register of Deeds, this does not preclude
a party to a pending case to include as incident therein the relief stated
under Sec. 107, especially if the subject certificates of title to be
surrendered are intimately connected with the subject matter of the
basis of a Spanish title, entitled "Titulo de Propriedad Numero 4136" dated
April 25, 1894. The claim, according to the San Pedro heirs, appears to
cover lands in the provinces of Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, Rizal, Laguna and
Quezon; and such Metro Manila cities as Quezon City, Caloocan City,
Pasay City, City of Pasig and City of Manila, thus affecting in general lands
extending from Malolos, Bulacan to the City Hall of Quezon City and the
land area between Dingalan Bay in the north and Tayabas Bay in the
south.2
Considering the vastness of the land claim, innumerable disputes
cropped up and land swindles and rackets proliferated resulting in
tedious litigation in various trial courts, in the appellate court and in the
Supreme Court, in connection therewith.
3
We have had the impression that our decisions in Director of
Forestry, et al. v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]; Antonio, et
al. v. Barroga, et al., 23 SCRA 357 [1968]; Carabot, et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., 145 SCRA 368 [1986]; Republic v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et al., 186 SCRA 88 [1990]; Widows and Orphans
Association, Inc.(WIDORA) v. Court of Appeals, et al., 212 SCRA 360
[1992]; NAPOCOR v. Court of Appeals, et al., 144 SCRA 318
[1986]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, et al., 135 SCRA 156 [1985];
and Director of lands v. Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336 [1994] terminated
4
the controversy as to ownership of lands covered by Spanish Land
Titles, for it is the rule that, once this Court, as the highest Tribunal of
the land, has spoken, there the matter must rest:
It is withal of the essence of the judicial function
that at some point, litigation must end, Hence,
after the procedures and processes for lawsuits
have been undergone, and the modes of review
set by law have been exhausted, or terminated, no
further ventilation of the same subject matter is
allowed. To be sure, there may be, on the part of
the losing parties, continuing disagreement with
the verdict, and the conclusions therein embodied.
This is of no moment, indeed, is to be expected;
but, it is not their will, but the Court's, which must
prevail; and, to repeat, public policy demands that
at some definite time, the issues must be laid to
rest and the court's dispositions thereon accorded
absolute finality. [Cited cases omitted]
5
It is, therefore, to the best interest of the people and the Government
that we render judgment herein writing finis to these controversies by
laying to rest the issue of validity of the basis of the estate's claim of
ownership over this vast expanse of real property.
The following facts are pertinent in the resolution of these long drawn-
out cases:
G.R. NO. 103727
G.R No. 103727, an appeal by certiorari, arose out of a complaint for 6
recovery of possession and/or damages with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. This was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 104, Quezon City in its
decision dated July 7, 1989, the dispositive portion of which reads:
7 8
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered,
dismissing the complaint against the defendants
Aurelio Ocampo, Dominador Buhain and Teresa
dela Cruz and ordering plaintiff to pay each of the
herein defendants, the sum of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) as and for attorney's fees,
and to pay the costs of suit.
The said complaint for recovery of possession of real property and/or
reconveyance with damages and with a prayer for preliminary
injunction was filed on August 15, 1988 by Engracio San Pedro as heir-
judicial administrator of the "Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban" against Jose G. De Ocampo, Aurelio Ocampo,
MARECO, Inc., Rey Antonio Noguera, Teresa C. dela Cruz,
Gaudencio R Soliven, Diomedes Millan, Carmen Rayasco, Dominador
D. Buhain, Mario D. Buhain, Jose D. Buhain, Arestedes S. Cauntay,
Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu (El Mavic Investment &
Development Corporation), Capitol Hills Realty Corporation and Jose
F. Castro. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-88-447 in
Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
In the complaint, it was alleged, among others: (1) that Engracio San
Pedro discovered that the aforenamed defendants were able to secure
from the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City titles to portions of the
subject estate, particularly Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1386,
8982, 951975-951977, 313624, 279067, 1412, 353054, 372592,
149120, 86404, 17874-17875, all emanating from Original Certificate of
Title No. 614 and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 255544 and
9
264124, both derivatives of Original Certificate of Title No. 333; (2) that
the aforesaid defendants were able to acquire exclusive ownership and
possession of certain portions of the subject estate in their names
through deceit, fraud, bad faith and misrepresentation; (3) that Original
Certificates of Title Nos. 614 and 333 had been cancelled by and
through a final and executory decision dated March 21, 1988 in relation
to letter recommendations by the Bureau of Lands, Bureau of Forest
Development and the Office of the Solicitor General and also in relation
to Central Bank Circulars dated April 7, 1971, April 23, 1971,
September 12, 1972 and June 10, 1980; and (4) that the issue of the
existence, validity and genuineness of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136
dated April 25, 1894 which covers the subject estate had been
resolved in favor of the petitioner estate in a decision dated April 25,
1978 by the defunct Court of First Instance, Branch 1 of Baliwag,
Bulacan pertaining to a case docketed as Special Proceeding No. 312-
B.10
Summons were served on only five of the aforementioned defendants,
namely, Aurelio Ocampo, MARECO, Inc., Teresita G. dela Cruz,
Dominador Buhain and Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. 11
On February 7, 1989, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the
complaint against Mareco, Inc. for improper service of summons and
against Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu for lack of cause of
action considering that the registered owner of the parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 86404 is El Mavic Investment and Development
Co., Inc., not Manuel Chung and Victoria Chung Tiu. 12
Trial on the merits proceeded against the private respondents
Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
On July 7, 1989, the lower court rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint based on the following grounds: (a) Ocampo, Buhain and
Dela Cruz are already the registered owners of the parcels of land
covered by Torrens titles which cannot be defeated by the alleged
Spanish title, Titulo Propriedad No. 4136, covering the subject estate;
and (b) the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan entitled
"In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the late Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban" specifically stated in its dispositive portion that all
lands which have already been legally and validly titled under the
Torrens System by private persons shall be excluded from the
coverage of Titulo Propriedad No. 4136. 13
The motion for reconsideration thereof was denied, and so, the
14
petitioner estate interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. On
January 20, 1992, the appeal was dismissed for being unmeritorious
15
and the lower court's decision was affirmed with costs against the
petitioner estate. The appellate court ratiocinated:
(1) neither the Titulo Propriedad No. 4136 nor a
genuine copy thereof was presented in the
proceeding below;
(2) the illegible copy of the Titulo presented in
court was not registered under the Torrens system
hence, it cannot be used as evidence of land
ownership;
(3) the CFI decision invoked by petitioner estate in
its favor expressly excluded from the Titulo titled
lands of private individuals;
 (4) the Titulo is inferior to that of the registered
titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz as
correctly ruled by the lower court;
(5) there is no evidence showing that OCT No. 614
from which titles of Ocampo, Buhain and Dela
Cruz originated was already cancelled, hence, the
lower court did not err in not declaring the same as
null and
void. 16
The aforementioned petition for letters of administration over the
intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban was filed on
December 29, 1971 with the defunct Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Fifth Judicial District, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan. The petition
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 312-B was initiated by Engracio San Pedro
and Justino Z. Benito who sought to be appointed as administrator and
co-administrator, respectively.
On February 29, 1972, after the jurisdictional facts were established,
evidence for the petitioners was received by the lower court without
any opposition. 21

Not having obtained a favorable judgment on appeal, the petitioner

estate, on March 16, 1992, filed the present petition 7 docketed as
1
On March 2, 1972, then Presiding Judge Juan F. Echiverri issued an
G.R. No. 103727. Order appointing Engracio San Pedro as Administrator of the subject
estate.22

G.R. NO. 106496

On March 11, 1972, the Court issued letters of administration in favor
of Engracio San Pedro upon posting of a bond in the sum of Ten
G.R. No. 106496, a petition for review on certiorari, began as a
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). 23

petition for letters of administration over the intestate estate of the

18

late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban which eventually resulted to an

Order dated November 17, 1978 declaring inter alia, Titulo de
19
On February 7, 1974, Administrator Engracio San Pedro was ordered
Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect. to furnish copies of the letters of administration and other pertinent
orders approving certain dispositions of the properties of the estate to
the following entities:
The dispositive portion of the said Order reads:
20

(a) The Commanding General

WHEREFORE, this Court so orders that:
Philippine Constabulary
Camp Crame, Quezon City
1) The Decision dated April 25, 1978 is
reconsidered and set aside.
(b) The Solicitor General
Manila
2) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null
and void and of no legal force and effect and that
(c) The Government Corporate Counsel
therefore no rights could be derived therefrom.
A. Mabini St., Manila

3) All orders approving the sales, conveyances,

(d) The City Mayors of Quezon City & Caloocan
donations or any other transactions involving the
lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
are declared invalidated, void and of no force and (e) The Governors of Rizal, Quezon and Bulacan
effect.
(f) The City Treasurers of Quezon City and
4) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. Caloocan
4136 are excluded from the inventory of the estate
of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
(g) The Provincial Treasurers of Quezon, Bulacan
and Rizal
5) The heirs, agents, privies or anyone acting for
and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano San
(h) The PHHC, Diliman, Quezon City
Pedro y Esteban are enjoined from representing or
exercising any acts of possession or ownership or
from disposing in any manner portions of all the (i) The PAHRRA Quezon Boulevard, Quezon City
lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
and to immediately vacate the same.
(j) The Municipal Treasurers of the various
municipalities in which properties of the estate are
6) Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito as co- located; and
administrators submit in Court within twenty days
their final accounting and inventory of all real and
personal properties of the estate which had come (k) Office of Civil Relations, Camp Crame, Quezon
into their possession or knowledge under oath. City and Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City. 24

7) This case is hereby re-opened, to allow
movants-intervenors to continue with the
presentation of their evidence in order to rest their
case.
The above Order was issued so as to protect the general public from
any confusion brought about by various persons who had been
misrepresenting themselves as having been legally authorized to act
for the subject estate and to sell its properties by virtue thereof.

On August 30, 1976, a Motion for Intervention and an Opposition to the

The consideration and approval of the
administrator's final accounting and inventory of
the presentation of movants-intervenors' evidence
as well as the consideration of all other incidents
are hereby set on December 22, 1978 at 8:30 a.m.
Petition was filed by the Republic of the Philippines alleging, inter alia:
4. That under Presidential Decree No. 892, dated
February 16, 1976, Spanish titles like the TITULO
is absolutely inadmissible and ineffective as proof
of ownership in court proceedings, except where
 the holder thereof applies for land registration
under Act 496, which is not true in the proceedings
at bar;
5. That no less than the Supreme Court had
declared TITULO DE PROPIEDAD NO. 4136 as
invalid;
6. That, moreover, the late Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban and/or his supposed heirs have
lost whatever rights of ownership they might have
had to the so-called Estate on the ground of
inaction, laches and/or prescription;
7. That, accordingly, there is no estate or property
to be administered for purposes of inventory,
settlement or distribution in accordance with law,
and all the inventories so far submitted, insofar as
they embraced lands within the TITULO, are
deemed ineffective and cannot be legally
considered; and
8. That the Republic of the Philippines has a legal
interest in the land subject matter of the petition
considering that, except such portions thereof had
been (sic) already the subject of valid adjudication
or disposition in accordance with law, the same
belong in State ownership. 25
On February 15, 1977, the Republic filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings. 26
On February 16, 1977, the Republic's Opposition to the Petition for
Letters of Administration was dismissed by means of the following
Order issued by Judge Benigno Puno:
WHEREFORE, for lack of jurisdiction to determine
the legal issues raised, the Court hereby
DISMISSES the "Opposition" dated August 30,
1976, filed by the Office of the Solicitor General;
likewise, for lack of merit, the Motion to Suspend
Proceedings dated February 15, 1977, filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General is DENIED.
The administrator Engracio San Pedro and the Co-
administrator Justino Z. Benito are ordered to
furnish the office of the Solicitor General all copies
of inventories already filed in Court within ten (10)
days from notice hereof. 72
On March 9, 1977, a motion for reconsideration was filed by the
Republic. 28
On April 25, 1978, the lower court then presided over by Judge Agustin
C. Bagasao, rendered a 52-page decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the existence, genuineness and
authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of
the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, issued on April
29, 1984, in the name of the deceased Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, covering a total
area of approximately 214,047 quiniones or
173,000 hectares, situated in the Provinces of
Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, Quezon City and
Caloocan City;
(b) Declaring Engracio San Pedro, Candido
Gener, Santiago Gener, Rosa Pantaleon, Vicente
Pantaleon, Eleuterio Pantaleon, Trinidad San
Pedro, Rodrigo San Pedro, Ricardo Nicolas, and
Teresa Nicolas, as the true and lawful heirs of the
deceased Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban and
entitled to inherit the intestate estate left by the
said deceased, consisting of the above-mentioned
tract of private land covered and described by said
above-mentioned Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 of
the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan, excluding
therefrom: (a) all lands which have already been
legally and validly titled under the Torrens System,
by private persons, or the Republic of the
Philippines, or any of its instrumentalities or
agencies; (b) all lands declared by the government
as reservations for public use and purposes; (c) all
lands belonging to the public domain; and, (d) all
portions thereof which had been sold, quitclaimed
and/or previously excluded by the Administrator
and duly approved by a final order of the Court,
except those which may hereafter be set aside,
after due consideration on a case to case basis, of
various motions to set aside the said Court order
which approved the said sales, quit-claims, and/or
exclusions;
(c) The designation of Atty. Justino Z. Benito as
co- administrator, is hereby revoked to take effect
immediately, to obviate any confusion in the
administration of the Estate, and to fix the
responsibilities of administration to the co-heir
Administrator, Engracio San Pedro, whose
appointment as such is hereby confirmed. The
said co-administrator Justino Z. Benito is hereby
ordered to render his final accounting of his co-
administration of the Estate, within thirty (30) days
from receipt of copy hereof;
(d) The Co-Heir-Administrator, Engracio San
Pedro is hereby ordered to amass, collate,
consolidate and take possession of all the net
estate of the deceased Don Marino San Pedro y
Esteban, as well as all other sets and credits
lawfully belonging to the estate and/or to take
appropriate legal action to recover the same in the
proper Courts of Justice, government offices or
any appropriate forum; and to pay all taxes or
charges due from the estate to the Government,
and all indebtedness of the estate, and thereafter,
to submit a project of partition of the estate among
the lawful heirs as herein recognized and
declared.
It is, however, strongly recommended to His
Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos that, to
avoid the concentration of too much land to a few
persons and in line with the projected urban land
reform program of the government, corollary to the
agricultural land reform program of the New
Society, the above intestate estate of the late Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban should be
expropriated or purchased by negotiated sale by
the government to be used in its human
settlements and low cost housing projects.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED. 29
On May 17, 1978, the Republic moved for a reconsideration of the
above decision. 30
On June 5, 1978, administrator Engracio San Pedro filed a
Manifestation and Petition for the Inhibition of the then newly appointed
Presiding Judge Oscar Fernandez. On July 12, 1978, after the
Republic filed its Reply to the Petition for Inhibition, Judge Fernandez
denied the said petition. 31
After hearings were conducted on the Republic's Motion for
Reconsideration, Judge Fernandez issued the aforestated
Order dated November 17, 1978 which, in essence, set aside Judge
32
Bagasao's decision dated April 25, 1978 by declaring Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 as null and void and of no legal force and effect,
thus, excluding all lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
from the inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban.
The petitioners-heirs of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
appealed to the Court of Appeals and alleged that the lower court did
not act with impartiality when it granted the Republic's motion for
reconsideration which was merelypro forma, thereby overturning a
prior declaration by the same court of the existence, genuineness and
authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the
deceased Mariano San Pedro. 33
On March 11, 1992, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the
petitioners-heirs. In affirming the assailed Order dated November 17,
34
1978, the appellate court focused its discussion solely on the issue of
whether or not the lower court erred in declaring Titulo de Priopriedad
No. 4136 null and void. The appellate court ruled that the petitioners-
heirs failed to controvert the Republic's claim that Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 is invalid on the following bases; (a) non-production of the
original of the subject title; (b) inadmissibility of the photostat copies of
the said title; and (c) non-registration of the subject Spanish title under
Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) as required by Presidential Decree
No. 892 (Discontinuance of the Spanish Mortgage System of
Registration and of the Use of Spanish Titles as Evidence in Land
Registration Proceedings).
The petitioners-heirs moved for a reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals' decision by invoking certain cases wherein the validity of
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 had been allegedly recognized. The
Court of Appeals refused to be swayed and denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. 35
Hence, the herein petition, docketed as G. R. No. 106496, was filed
36
on September 18, 1992.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings in G.R. Nos. 103727
and 106496, this Court resolved to consolidate both cases on
September 15,
1994. 7
3
While these cases were pending before us, several parties filed
separate motions for intervention which we denied on different
occasions for lack of merit.
In G.R No. 103727, the grounds relied upon for the grant of the petition
are as follows:
I. That petitioner-appellant as plaintiff in Civil Case
No. Q-88-447, RTC, Branch 104 was denied due
process of law due to gross negligence of lawyer,
which respondent court grossly failed to take
cognizance of.
II. That the respondent court committed grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of
jurisdiction in not remanding the case for trial and
in affirming the lower court's null and void
judgment. 38
In G.R No. 106496, the petitioners-heirs present the following
assignment of errors, to wit:
First. Respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the
appealed order which resolved a question of title
or ownership over which the lower court as an
intestate court has no jurisdiction and over the
vigorous and repeated objections of the
petitioners.39
Second. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the order of Judge Fernandez setting
aside the order and decision of Judge Puno and
Bagasao; Judge Fernandez thereby acted as an
appellate court reviewing, revising, amending or
setting aside the order and decision of Judges of
equal rank. 40
Third. Respondent Court of Appeals has no
jurisdiction to uphold the order of Judge
Fernandez who without jurisdiction, set aside the
order of Judge Puno and the decision of Judge
Bagasao, both of which were already final. 41
Fourth. Respondent Court of Appeals was
unmindful of the fact that Judge Fernandez was
appointed by President Marcos to reverse Judge
Bagasao, regardless of the evidence, thereby
unmindful that petitioners were denied the cold
neutrality of an impartial tribunal.
42
Fifth. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not
considering the evidence presented before Judges
Echiverri, Puno and Bagasao and merely adopted
the order of Judge Fernandez who never received
a single piece of evidence, notwithstanding the
1906 Guide title over Hacienda Angono in
Binangonan, Rizal, the boundary owner stated
therein being Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban,
and the November 1991 en banc decision of the
Supreme Court upholding the Guido title. 43
Of paramount importance over and above the central issue of the
probative value of the petitioners' Spanish title in these cases is the
propriety of the lower court's resolution of the question of ownership of
the subject San Pedro estate in the special proceedings case. Thus,
before we address ourselves to the issue of whether or not petitioners'
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is null and void and of no legal force and
effect, it is best that we first determine whether or not the lower court,
acting as a probate court, in the petition for letters of administration,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
settling the issue of ownership of the San Pedro estate covered by
Titulo Propriedad No. 4136.
Petitioners-heirs, in G.R No. 106496, on the one hand, contend that
the lower court, then CFI, Bulacan, Branch IV, had no jurisdiction as an
"intestate court" to resolve the question of title or ownership raised by
44
the public respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of
the Solicitor General in the intestate proceedings of the estate of
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban. 45
The public respondent, on the other hand, invoking its sovereign
capacity as parens patriae, argues that petitioners' contention is
misplaced considering that when the Republic questioned the
existence of the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, the lower
court became duty-bound to rule on the genuineness and validity of
Titulo de Propriedad 4136 which purportedly covers the said estate,
otherwise, the lower court in the intestate proceedings would be
mistakenly dealing with properties that are proven to be part of the
State's patrimony or improperly included as belonging to the estate of
the deceased. 46
A probate court's jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who
the heirs are and what shares are due them as regards the estate of a
deceased person. Neither is it confined to the issue of the validity of
wills. We held in the case of Maniñgat v. Castillo, 7 that "the main
4
function of a probate court is to settle and liquidate the estates of
deceased persons either summarily or through the process of
administration." Thus, its function necessarily includes the examination
of the properties, rights and credits of the deceased so as to rule on and analytical discussion of the rationale for reconsidering and setting
whether or not the inventory of the estate properly included them for aside Judge Bagasao's Decision dated April 25, 1978.
purposes of distribution of the net assets of the estate of the deceased
to the lawful heirs.
Considering the definiteness of our holding in regard to the correctness
of Judge Fernandez' disposition of the case, i.e., the issuance by the
In the case of Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, we stated, thus:
48
lower court of the assailed Order of November 17, 1978, we now focus
on the core issue of whether or not the lower court in G.R No. 106496
committed reversible error in excluding from the inventory of the estate
. . . questions of title to any property apparently still
of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban all lands covered by
belonging to estate of the deceased maybe
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 primarily on the ground that the said title
passed upon in the Probate Court, with the
is null and void and of no legal force and effect. Juxtaposed with this is
consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third
the issue of whether or not the appellate court, in both cases, G.R.
persons . . .
Nos. 103727 and 106496, erred in not recognizing Titulo de Propriedad
No. 4136 as evidence to prove ownership by the Late Mariano San
Parenthetically, questions of title pertaining to the determination prima Pedro of the lands covered thereby.
facie of whether certain properties ought to be included or excluded
from the inventory and accounting of the estate subject of a petition for
It is settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which took
letters of administration, as in the intestate proceedings of the estate of
effect on February 16, 1976, the system of registration under the
the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban, maybe resolved by the probate
Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles
court. In this light, we echo our pronouncement in the case of Garcia
or grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered
v. Garcia that:
49
under the Land Registration Act within six (6) months from the date of
53

effectivity of the said Decree or until August 16, 1976. Otherwise,

54

. . . The court which acquired jurisdiction over the non-compliance therewith will result in a re-classification of their
properties of a deceased person through the filing lands. Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable
55

of the corresponding proceedings, has supervision evidence of land ownership. 56

and control over the said properties, and under the

said power, it is its inherent duty to see that the
Section 1 of the said Decree provides:
inventory submitted by the administrator appointed
by it contains all the properties, rights and credits
which the law requires the administrator to set out Sec. 1. The system of registration under the
in his inventory. In compliance with this duty, the Spanish Mortgage Law is discontinued, and all
court has also inherent power to determine what lands recorded under said system which are not
properties, rights and credits of the deceased yet covered by Torrens title shall be considered as
should be included in or excluded from the unregistered lands.
inventory. Should an heir or person interested in
the properties of a deceased person duly call the
All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply
court's attention to the fact that certain properties,
for registration of their lands under Act No. 496,
rights or credits have been left out in the inventory,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
it is likewise the court's duty to hear the
within six (6) months from the effectivity of this
observations, with power to determine if such
decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used
observations should be attended to or not and if
as evidence of land ownership in any registration
the properties referred to therein belong prima
proceedings under the Torrens system.
facie to the intestate, but no such determination is
final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of
the said properties. [Emphasis Supplied]
50
Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally
registered under the Spanish Mortgage Law may
be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised
In view of these disquisitions of this Court, we hold that the lower court
Administrative Code, as amended by Act. 3344.
did not commit any reversible error when it issued the Order dated
November 17, 1978 which set aside Judge Bagasao's decision dated
April 25, 1978 and declared Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 as null and The Whereas clauses of the aforesaid Decree specify the underlying
void, consequently excluding all lands covered by the said title from the policies for its passage, to wit:
inventory of the estate of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other
A corollary issue sought to be ventilated by the petitioners-heirs as forms of conveyances of large tracts of public and
regards the assailed Order of November 17, 1978 is the impropriety of private lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers
Judge Fernandez' act of granting the motion for reconsideration filed appear to have been perpetrated by unscrupulous
by the public respondent Republic since, Judge Fernandez did not persons claiming ownership under Spanish titles
personally hear the intestate case. Petitioners thus dubbed him as a or grants of dubious origin;
"reviewing judge." By setting aside the Decision dated April 25, 1978 of
his predecessors in CFI, Branch IV, Baliuag, Bulacan, namely, Judge
Benigno Puno and Judge Agustin C. Bagasao, respectively, Judge WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have
often resulted in conflicting claims and litigations
Fernandez, acting as a "reviewing judge," proceeded without authority
and/or jurisdiction.
51
between legitimate title holders, bona
fide occupants or applicants of public lands, on the
one hand, and the holders of, or person claiming
There is no question that, barring any serious doubts as to whether the rights under the said Spanish titles or grants, on
decision arrived at is fair and just, a newly appointed judge who did not the other, thus creating confusion and instability in
try the case can decide the same as long as the record and the property ownership and threatening the peace and
evidence are all available to him and that the same were taken into order renditions in the areas affected;
consideration and thoroughly studied. The "reviewing judge" argument
of the petitioners-heirs has no leg to stand on considering that "the fact
WHEREAS, statistics in the Land Registration
that the judge who penned the decision did not hear a certain case in
its entirety is not a compelling reason to jettison his findings and Commission show that recording in the system of
conclusion inasmuch as the full record was available to him for his registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is
practically nil and that this system has become
perusal." In the case at bar, it is evident that the 41-page Order dated
52

November 17, 1978 of Judge Fernandez bespeaks of a knowledgeable obsolete;

 WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not
yet been brought under the operation of the
Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are
now ineffective to prove ownership unless
accompanied by proof of actual possession;
WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to
discontinue the System of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of Spanish
titles as evidence in registration proceedings under
the Torrens system;
In the case of Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, et
al., 7 we took cognizance of this Decree and thus held that caution
5
and care must be exercised in the acceptance and admission of
Spanish titles taking into account the numerous fake titles that have
been discovered after their supposed reconstitution subsequent to
World War II.
In both cases, petitioners-heirs did not adduce evidence to show that
Titulo de Propriedad 4136 was brought under the operation of P.D. 892
despite their allegation that they did so on August 13, 1976. Time and
58
again we have held that a mere allegation is not evidence and the
party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Proof of
59
compliance with P.D. 892 should be the Certificate of Title covering the
land registered.
In the petition for letters of administration, it was a glaring error on the
part of Judge Bagasao who rendered the reconsidered Decision dated
April 25, 1978 to have declared the existence, genuineness and
authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 in the name of the
deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban despite the effectivity of P.D.
No. 892. Judge Fernandez, in setting aside Judge Bagasao's decision,
emphasized that Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, under P.D. 892, is
inadmissible and ineffective as evidence of private ownership in the
special proceedings case. He made the following observations as
regards the Titulo, to wit:
The Solicitor General, articulating on the dire
consequences of recognizing the
nebulous titulo as an evidence of ownership
underscored the fact that during the pendency of
this case, smart speculators and wise alecks had
inveigled innocent parties into buying portions of
the so-called estate with considerations running
into millions of pesos.
Some, under the guise of being benign heroes
even feigned donations to charitable and religious
organizations, including veterans' organizations as
smoke screen to the gargantuan fraud they have
committed and to hood wink further other gullible
and unsuspecting victims. 60
In the same light, it does not escape this Court's onomatopoeic
observation that the then heir-judicial administrator Engracio San
Pedro who filed the complaint for recovery of possession and/or
reconveyance with damages in G.R No. 103727 on August 15, 1988
invoked Judge Bagasao's Decision of April 25, 1978 in support of the
Titulo's validity notwithstanding the fact that, by then, the said Decision
had already been set aside by Judge Fernandez' Order of November
17, 1978. We are in accord with the appellate courts' holding in G.R
No. 103727 insofar as it concludes that since the Titulo was not
registered under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act, said Titulo is inferior to the registered titles of the
private respondents Ocampo, Buhain and Dela Cruz.
This Court can only surmise that the reason for the non-registration of
the Titulo under the Torrens system is the lack of the necessary
documents to be presented in order to comply with the provisions of
P.D. 892. We do not discount the possibility that the Spanish title in
question is not genuine, especially since its genuineness and due
execution have not been proven. In both cases, the petitioners heirs
were not able to present the original of Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136
nor a genuine copy thereof. In the special proceedings case, the
petitioners-heirs failed to produce the Titulo despite a subpoena duces
tecum (Exh. "Q-RP") to produce it as requested by the Republic from
the then administrators of the subject intestate estate, Engracio San
Pedro and Justino Benito, and the other interested parties. As an
alternative to prove their claim of the subject intestate estate, the
petitioners referred to a document known as "hypoteca" (the Spanish
term is 'hipoteca') allegedly appended to the Titulo. However, the said
hypoteca was neither properly identified nor presented as evidence.
Likewise, in the action for recovery of possession and/or reconveyance
with damages, the petitioners-heirs did not submit the Titulo as part of
their evidence. Instead, only an alleged illegible copy of the Titulo was
presented. (Exhs. "C-9" to "C-19").
The Best Evidence Rule as provided under Rule 130, section 2 of the
Rules of Court is stated in unequivocal terms. Subparagraphs (a) and
(b) of the said Rule read:
Sec. 2. Original writing must be
produced; exceptions. — There can be no
evidence of a writing the contents of which is the
subject of inquiry, other than the original writing
itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
xxx xxx xxx
Sections 3 and 4 of the same Rule further read:
Sec 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or
destroyed — When the original writing has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction
or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some
authentic document, or by the recollection of
witnesses.
Sec. 5. Secondary evidence when original is in
adverse party's custody. — If the writing be in the
custody of the adverse party, he must have
reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice
and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails
to produce the writing, the contents thereof may be
proved as in the case of its loss. But the notice to
produce it is not necessary where the writing is
itself a notice, or where it has been wrongfully
obtained or withheld by the adverse party.
Thus, the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely
substitutionary in its nature, such as photocopies, as long as
the original evidence can be had. In the absence of a clear
showing that the original writing has been lost or destroyed
or cannot be produced in court, the photocopy submitted, in
lieu thereof, must be disregarded, being unworthy of any
probative value and being an inadmissible piece of
evidence. 61
Hence, we conclude that petitioners-heirs failed to establish by
competent proof the existence and due execution of the Titulo. Their
explanation as to why the original copy of the Titulo could not be
produced was not satisfactory. The alleged contents thereof which
should have resolved the issue as to the exact extent of the subject
intestate estate of the late Mariano San Pedro were not distinctly
proved. In the case of Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, we pointed
62
out that:
 Secondary evidence is admissible when the We are now stating before this
original documents were actually lost or destroyed. court that there was such a
But prior to the introduction of such secondary document examined by the
evidence, the proponent must establish the former NBI insofar as the signatures
existence of the document. The correct order of of Alejandro Garcia and
proof is as follows: existence; execution; loss; Manuel Lopez Delgado are
contents. This order may be changed if necessary concerned and they are found
in the discretion of the court.
63
to be authentic. 64

In upholding the genuineness and authenticity of Titulo de Propriedad The following significant findings of Judge Fernandez further lend
No. 4136, Judge Bagasao, in his decision, relied on: (1) the testimony credence to our pronouncement that the Titulo is of dubious validity:
of the NBI expert, Mr. Segundo Tabayoyong, pertaining to a report
dated January 28, 1963 denominated as "Questioned Documents
. . . the NBI in its Questioned Document Report
Report No. 230-163"; (2) a photostat copy of the original of the Titulo
No. 448-977 dated September 2, 1977 (Exhibit "O-
duly certified by the then Clerk of Court of the defunct Court of First
RP") concluded that the document contained
Instance of Manila; and (3) the hipoteca Registered in the Register of
material alterations as follows:
Deeds of Bulacan on December 4, 1894.

a) On line 15 of "p, 1, Title" and on line 5 of "p. 2,

Judge Fernandez, in his November 1978 Order which set aside Judge
Title," the word "Pinagcamaligan" was written after
Bagasao's April 1978 decision correctly clarified that the NBI report
"Pulo;"
aforementioned was limited to the genuineness of the two signatures of
Alejandro Garcia and Mariano Lopez Delgado appearing on the last
page of the Titulo, not the Titulo itself. When asked by the counsel of b) On line 16, "p. 1, Title," "un" was converted to
the petitioners-heirs to admit the existence and due execution of the "mil;"
Titulo, the handling Solicitor testified:
c) On Line 18, "p. 1, Title," "mil" was written at the
xxx xxx xxx end of "tres" in "tres mil;"

ATTY. BRINGAS: d) On line 19 of "p. 1, Title," a semblance of "mil"

was written after "setentay tres;"
With the testimony of this
witness, I would like to call the e) On line 6, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to a
distinguished counsel for the semblance of "uni;" and
government whether he
admits that there is actually a
titulo propiedad 4136. f) On line 8, "p. 2, Title," "un" was formed to "mil."

COURT: The plain and evident purpose was definitely to

enlarge the area of the titulo. According to Mr.
Tabayoyong of the NBI, there are still "pieces of
Would you comment on that black ashes around the rings of the portions which
Solicitor Agcaoili? are indications of burnings". The burnings were
made on the very portions where there were
previous erasures, alterations and intercalations.
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
Understandably, the burnings were done to erase
traces of the criminal act. 65

We are precisely impugning

the titulo and I think the
In the case of National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et
question of counsel is already
a1. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, in reinstating the trial court's
66

answered by witness. The

judgment therein, sustained the finding that:
parties have not yet
established the due existence
of the titulo. . . . The photostatic copy (in lieu of the lost
original) of the Spanish title in the name of
Mariano San Pedro shows obvious alterations and
ATTY. BRINGAS:
intercalations in an attempt to vastly increase the
area and change the location of the land described
We are constrained to ask this in the original title . . .
matter in order to be candid
about the question. The
Anent the inadmissibility as evidence of the photostat copy of the
witness is a witness for the
Titulo, we sustain the lower court's analysis, as affirmed by the
government, so with the
appellate court, viz:
testimony of this witness for
the government to the effect
that there is actually in To begin with, the original of Titulo de Propiedad
existence titulo propiedad No. 4136 was never presented in Court. Upon
4136; we are asking the request of the Government, a subpoena duces
question candidly to the tecum (Exhibit "Q-RP") was issued to the two
government counsel whether administrators, Engracio San Pedro and Justino
he is prepared to state that Benito as well as to other interested parties to
there is really in existence produce the original of Titulo de Propriedad No.
such titulo propiedad 4136. 4136. But no one produced the titulo. What the
parties did was to pass the buck to one another.
ATTY. AGCAOILI:
 Without any plausible explanation at all on as to
why the original could not be produced, the Court
cannot take cognizance of any secondary
evidence.
It was explained that the titulo after changing
hands, finally fell into the hands of a certain Moon
Park of Korea but who later disappeared and that
his present whereabouts could not be known.
Strangely enough, despite the significance of the
titulo, no serious efforts on the part of the
claimants-heirs were exerted to retrieve this
document of vital importance despite the Court
order to produce it in order to determine its
authenticity.
It would not be enough to simply say that Moon
Park's whereabouts are unknown or that there are
not enough funds to locate him. The only logical
conclusion would be that the original would be
adverse if
produced. 76
As regards the hipoteca which allegedly defines the metes and bounds
of the subject intestate estate, the petitioners-heirs have not
established the conditions required by law for their admissibility as
secondary evidence to prove that there exists a document designated
as Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136. Hence, the same acquires no
probative value.68
At this juncture, our decision dated June 28, 1968 in Director of
Forestry, et al. v. Hon. Emmanuel M. Muñoz, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan, Branch I, et al. is enlightening. In said
69
case, private respondent, Pinaycamaligan Indo-Agro Development
Corporation, Inc., (PIADECO), claimed to be the owner of some 72,000
hectares of land located in the municipalities of Angat, Norzagaray and
San Jose del Monte, province of Bulacan, and in Antipolo and
Montalban, province of Rizal. To prove its ownership Piadeco relied on
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 dated April 28, 1894. Scholarly opining
that the Titulo is of doubtful validity, Justice Conrado V. Sanchez,
70
speaking for the Court, stated that:
But an important moiety here is the deeply
disturbing intertwine of two undisputed facts. First.
The Title embraces land "located in the Provinces
of Bulacan, Rizal, Quezon, and Quezon
City." Second. The title was signed only by the
provincial officials of Bulacan, and inscribed only in
the Land Registry of Bulacan. Why? The situation,
indeed, cries desperately for a plausible answer.
To be underscored at this point is the well-
embedded principle that private ownership of land
must be proved not only through the genuineness
of title but also with a clear identity of the land
claimed. (Oligan v. Mejia, 17 Phil. 494, 496; Villa
Abrille v. Banuelos, 20 Phil. 1, 8, citing Sison v.
Ramos, 13 Phil. 54 and Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil.
202; Licad v. Bacani, 51 Phil. 51, 54-56; Lasam v.
Director, 65 Phil. 367, 371. This Court ruled in a
case involving a Spanish title acquired by
purchase that the land must be concretely
measured per hectare or per quinon, not in mass
(cuerpos ciertos), (Valdez v. Director, 62 Phil. 362,
373, 375). The fact that the Royal Decree of
August 31, 1888 used 30 hectares as a basis for
classifying lands strongly suggests that the land
applied for must be measured per hectare.
Here, no definite area seems to have been
mentioned in the title. In Piadeco's "Rejoinder to
Opposition" dated April 28, 1964 filed in Civil Case
3035-M, it specified that area covered by its Titulo
de Propiedad as 74,000 hectares (Rollo in L-
24796, p. 36). In its "Opposition" of May 13, 1964
in the same case, it described the land as
containing 72,000 hectares (Id., p. 48). Which is
which? This but accentuates the nebulous identity
of Piadeco's land, Piadeco's ownership thereof
then equally suffers from vagueness, fatal at least
in these proceedings.
Piadeco asserts that Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban, the original owner appearing on the title,
acquired his rights over the property by
prescription under Articles 4 and 5 of the Royal
Decree of June 25, 1880, (Rollo of L-24796, p.
184) the basic decree that authorized adjustment
of lands. By this decree, applications for
adjustment — showing the location, boundaries
and area of land applied for — were to be filed
with the Direccion General de Administration Civil,
which then ordered the classification and survey of
the land with the assistance of the interested party
or his legal representative (Ponce, op. cit., p. 22).
The Royal Decree of June 5, 1880 also fixed the
period for filing applications for adjustment at one
year from the date of publication of the decree in
the Gaceta de Manila on September 10, 1880,
extended for another year by the Royal Order of
July 15, 1881 (Ibid.). If Don Mariano sought
adjustment within the time prescribed, as he
should have, then, seriously to be considered here
are the Royal Orders of November 25, 1880 and of
October 26, 1881, which limited adjustment to
1,000 hectares of arids lands, 500 hectares of land
with trees and 100 hectares of irrigable lands
(See: Government v. Avila, 46 Phil. 146, 154;
Bayot v. Director of Lands, 98 Phil. 935, 941.
Article 15 of the Royal Decree of January 26, 1889
limited the area that may be acquired by purchase
to 2,500 hectares, with allowable error up to 5%.
Ponce, op cit., p. 19). And, at the risk of repetition,
it should be stated again that Piadeco's Titulois
held out to embrace 72,000 or 74,000 hectares of
land.
But if more were needed, we have the Maura Law
(Royal Decree of February 13, 1894), published in
the Gaceta de Manila on April 17, 1894 (Ibid., p.
26; Venture, op. cit., p. 28). That decree required a
second petition for adjustment within six months
from publication, for those who had not yet
secured their titles at the time of the publication of
the law (Ibid.). Said law also abolished the
provincial boards for the adjustment of lands
established by Royal Decree of December 26,
1884, and confirmed by Royal Decree of August
31, 1888, which boards were directed to deliver to
their successors, the provincial boards established
by Decree on Municipal Organization issued on
May 19, 1893, all records and documents which
they may hold in their possession (Ramirez v.
Director of Land, supra, at p. 124).
Doubt on Piadeco's title here supervenes when we
come to consider that title was either dated April
29 or April 25, 1894, twelve or eight days after the
publication of the Maura Law.
Let us now take a look, as near as the record
allows, at how Piadeco exactly acquired its rights
under the Titulo. The original owner appearing
thereon was Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
From Piadeco's explanation — not its
evidence (Rollo of L-24796, pp. 179-188) we cull
the following: On December 3, 1894, Don Mariano
 mortgaged the land under pacto de retro,
redeemable within 10 years, for P8,000.00 to one
Don Ignacio Conrado. This transaction was said to
have been registered or inscribed on December 4,
1894. Don Mariano Ignacio died, his daughter,
Maria Socorro Conrado, his only heir, adjudicated
the land to herself. At about the same time,
Piadeco was organized. Its certificate of
registration was issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission on June 27, 1932. Later,
Maria Socorro, heir of Don Ignacio, became a
shareholder of Piadeco when she conveyed the
land to Piadeco's treasurer and an incorporator,
Trinidad B. Estrada, in consideration of a certain
amount of Piadeco shares. Thereafter, Trinidad B.
Estrada assigned the land to Piadeco. Then came
to the scene a certain Fabian Castillo, appearing
as sole heir of Don Mariano, the original owner of
the land. Castillo also executed an affidavit of
adjudication to himself over the same land, and
then sold the same to Piadeco. Consideration
therefor was paid partially by Piadeco, pending the
registration of the land under Act 496.
The question may well be asked: Why was full
payment of the consideration to Fabian Castillo
made to depend on the registration of the land
under the Torrens system, if Piadeco was sure of
the validity of Titulo de Propiedad 4136? This, and
other factors herein pointed out, cast great clouds
of doubt that hang most conspicuously over
Piadeco's title.
Moreover, in the case of Widows & Orphans Association, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, we categorically enunciated that the alleged Spanish title,
71
Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, had become bereft of any probative
value as evidence of land ownership by virtue of P.D. 892 as contained
in our Resolution dated February 6, 1985 in a related case
entitled Benito and WIDORA v. Ortigas docketed as G.R No. 69343.
On March 29, 1985, an entry of final judgment was made respecting
G.R. No. 69343.
Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, the prior
declarations by this Court relating to the issue of the validity of Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136 preclude us from adjudicating otherwise. In
the Muñoz case, we had cast doubt on the Titulo's validity. In
the WIDORA case, the Titulo's nullification was definitive. In both
cases, the Republic and the estate of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban
were on opposite ends before this bench. In the case en
banc of Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the Court
72
explained the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, viz:
. . . conclusiveness of judgment — states that a
fact or question which was in issue in a former suit
and was there judicially passed upon and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far
as the parties to that action and persons in privity
with them are concerned and cannot be again
litigated in any future action between such parties
or their privies, in the same court or any other
court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same
or different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has
been held that in order that a judgment in one
action can be conclusive as to a particular matter
in another action between the same parties or their
privies, it is essential that the issue be identical. If
a particular point or question is in issue in the
second action, and the judgment will depend on
the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment between the same
parties or their privies will be final and conclusive
in the second if that same point or question was in
issue and adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus v.
Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity
of cause of action is not required by merely identity
of issues.
The issue, whether Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is valid or
not, must now be laid to rest. The Titulo cannot be relied
upon by the petitioners-heirs or their privies as evidence of
ownership. In the petition for letters of administration the
inventory submitted before the probate court consisted solely
of lands covered by the Titulo. Hence, there can be no "net
estate" to speak of after the Titulo's exclusion from the
intestate proceedings of the estate of the late Mariano San
Pedro.
In G.R No. 103727, the Titulo cannot be superior to the Torrens Titles
of private respondents Buhain, Ocampo and Dela Cruz, namely TCT
No. 372592 (Exh. "2", Buhain), TCT No. 8982 (Exh. "2" — De
Ocampo) and TCT No. 269707 (Exh. "2" — Dela Cruz). Under the73
Torrens system of registration, the titles of private respondents became
indefeasible and incontrovertible one year from its final decree. More
74
importantly, TCT Nos. 372592, 8982, 269707, having been issued
under the Torrens system, enjoy the conclusive presumption of
validity. As a last hurrah to champion their claim to the vast estate
75
covered by the subject Spanish title, the petitioners-heirs imputed fraud
and bad faith which they failed to prove on the part of the private
respondents as regards their Torrens titles and accused their own
counsel of gross negligence for having failed to call the proper
witnesses from the Bureau of Forestry to substantiate the petitioners-
heirs' claim that OCT No. 614 from which private respondents were
derived is null and void. It is an elementary legal principle that the
negligence of counsel binds the client. The records show that the
76
petitioners-heirs were not at all prejudiced by the non-presentation of
evidence to prove that OCT No. 614 is a nullity considering that their
ownership itself of the lands being claimed was not duly proved. In the
case of Villa Rhecar Bus v. Dela Cruz, et al., 7 we held:
7
It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner
neglected his responsibilities to his client. This
negligence ultimately resulted in a judgment
adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such
mistake binds the client, the herein petitioner. As a
general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of
his counsel. (Que v. Court of Appeals, 101 SCRA
13 [1980] Only when the application of the general
rule would result in serious injustice should an
exception thereto be called for. Under the
circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue
prejudice against the petitioner has been
satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only
an unsupported claim that the petitioner bad been
prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel,
without an explanation to that effect.
Sans preponderance of evidence in support of the contention
that the petitioners-heirs were denied due process on
account of the negligence of their counsel, the writ
of certiorari is unavailing.
It bears repeating that the heirs or successors-in-interest of Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban are not without recourse. Presidential Decree
No. 892, quoted hereinabove, grants all holders of Spanish Titles the
right to apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within six (6) months
from the effectivity of the Decree. Thereafter, however, any Spanish
Title, if utilized as evidence of possession, cannot be used as evidence
of ownership in any land registration proceedings under the Torrens
system.
All instruments affecting lands originally registered under the Spanish
Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344.
In view hereof, this is as good a time as any, to remind the Solicitor
General to be more vigilant in handling land registration cases and
intestate proceedings involving portions of the subject estate. It is not
too late in the day for the Office of the Solicitor General to contest the
Torrens titles of those who have acquired ownership of such portions
of land that rightfully belong to the State.
In fine, the release of the matured Land Bank Capital Bonds issued in
favor of Mariano San Pedro y Esteban on August 13, 1968 sought by
one Catalino San Pedro, alleged heir, legal holder and owner of Titulo
de Propriedad No. 4136 is a matter not ripe for adjudication in these
cases. Firstly, Catalino San Pedro is not a party in any of the two cases
before us for review, hence, this Court in a Resolution dated May 10,
1993, denied Catalino's motion for leave to reopen and/or new trial.
78
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the March 21, 2002 Amended Decision2 and the
July 22, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV
No. 62391. The Amended Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the dispositive part of the original D E C I S I
O N of this case, promulgated on November 19, 2001,
is SET ASIDE and another one is entered AFFIRMING in
part and REVERSING in part the judgment appealed from,
as follows:

And, secondly, the aforementioned bonds were not included in the

"1. Declaring [Respondent] Romana de Vera the
inventory of the subject estate submitted by then administrators,
rightful owner and with better right to possess the
Engracio San Pedro and Justino Benito before the probate court.
property in question, being an innocent purchaser
for value therefor;
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petitions in G.R Nos.
103727 and 106496 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
"2. Declaring Gloria Villafania [liable] to pay the
following to [Respondent] Romana de Vera and to
Consequently, in G.R No. 103727, the decision of the Court of Appeals [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and Julie] Abrigo, to wit:
dated January 20, 1992 is hereby AFFIRMED.
As to [Respondent] Romana de Vera:
In G.R No. 106496, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. ₱300,000.00 plus 6% per
(1) Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is declared null annum as actual damages;
and void and, therefore, no rights could be derived
therefrom;
2. ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages;
(2) All lands covered by Titulo de Propriedad No.
4136 are excluded from the inventory of the estate
3. ₱50,000.00 as exemplary
of the late Mariano San Pedro y Esteban;
damages;

(3) The petition for letters of administration,

4. ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 312-B,
fees; and
should be, as it is, hereby closed and terminated.

5. Cost of suit.
(4) The heirs, agents, privies and/or anyone acting
for and in behalf of the estate of the late Mariano
San Pedro y Esteban are hereby disallowed to As to [Petitioner-]Spouses [Noel and
exercise any act of possession or ownership or to Julie] Abrigo:
otherwise, dispose of in any manner the whole or
any portion of the estate covered by Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136; and they are hereby ordered 1. ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages;
to immediately vacate the same, if they or any of
them are in possession thereof.
2. ₱50,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
This judgment is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED. 3. ₱30,000.00 as attorney’s

fees;

G.R. No. 154409 June 21, 2004

4. Cost of suit."4

Spouses NOEL and JULIE ABRIGO, petitioners,

vs. The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
ROMANA DE VERA, respondent.
The Facts
DECISION
Quoting the trial court, the CA narrated the facts as follows:
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"As culled from the records, the following are the pertinent antecedents
Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under amply summarized by the trial court:
the Torrens system, the law gives ownership priority to (1) the first
registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and ‘On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania sold a house and lot located at
(3) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. This Banaoang, Mangaldan, Pangasinan and covered by Tax Declaration
provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered No. 1406 to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go. The said
under the Torrens system. sale became a subject of a suit for annulment of documents between
the vendor and the vendees.
The Case
‘On December 7, 1993, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40 of
Dagupan City rendered judgment approving the Compromise
Agreement submitted by the parties. In the said Decision, Gloria
Villafania was given one year from the date of the Compromise
Agreement to buy back the house and lot, and failure to do so would
mean that the previous sale in favor of Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and
Rosita Cave-Go shall remain valid and binding and the plaintiff shall
voluntarily vacate the premises without need of any demand. Gloria
Villafania failed to buy back the house and lot, so the [vendees]
declared the lot in their name.
‘Unknown, however to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go,
Gloria Villafania obtained a free patent over the parcel of land involved
[on March 15, 1988 as evidenced by OCT No. P-30522]. The said free
patent was later on cancelled by TCT No. 212598 on April 11, 1996.
‘On October 16, 1997, Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go,
sold the house and lot to the herein [Petitioner-Spouses Noel and Julie
Abrigo].
‘On October 23, 1997, Gloria Villafania sold the same house and lot to
Romana de Vera x x x. Romana de Vera registered the sale and as a
consequence, TCT No. 22515 was issued in her name.
‘On November 12, 1997, Romana de Vera filed an action for Forcible
Entry and Damages against [Spouses Noel and Julie Abrigo] before
the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan docketed as Civil
Case No. 1452. On February 25, 1998, the parties therein submitted a
Motion for Dismissal in view of their agreement in the instant case that
neither of them can physically take possession of the property in
question until the instant case is terminated. Hence the ejectment case
was dismissed.’5
"Thus, on November 21, 1997, [petitioners] filed the instant case [with
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City] for the annulment of
documents, injunction, preliminary injunction, restraining order and
damages [against respondent and Gloria Villafania].
"After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered the assailed
Decision dated January 4, 1999, awarding the properties to
[petitioners] as well as damages. Moreover, x x x Gloria Villafania was
ordered to pay [petitioners and private respondent] damages and
attorney’s fees.
"Not contented with the assailed Decision, both parties [appealed to
the CA]."6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its original Decision promulgated on November 19, 2001, the CA
held that a void title could not give rise to a valid one and hence
dismissed the appeal of Private Respondent Romana de Vera.7 Since
Gloria Villafania had already transferred ownership to Rosenda Tigno-
Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, the subsequent sale to De Vera was
deemed void.
The CA also dismissed the appeal of Petitioner-Spouses Abrigo and
found no sufficient basis to award them moral and exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees.
On reconsideration, the CA issued its March 21, 2002 Amended
Decision, finding Respondent De Vera to be a purchaser in good faith
and for value. The appellate court ruled that she had relied in good
faith on the Torrens title of her vendor and must thus be protected. 8
Hence, this Petition.9
Issues
Petitioners raise for our consideration the issues below:
"1. Whether or not the deed of sale executed by Gloria
Villafania in favor of [R]espondent Romana de Vera is valid.
"2. Whether or not the [R]espondent Romana de Vera is a
purchaser for value in good faith.
"3. Who between the petitioners and respondent has a better
title over the property in question."10
In the main, the issues boil down to who between petitioner-spouses
and respondent has a better right to the property.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is bereft of merit.
Main Issue:
Better Right over the Property
Petitioners contend that Gloria Villafania could not have transferred the
property to Respondent De Vera because it no longer belonged to
her.11 They further claim that the sale could not be validated, since
respondent was not a purchaser in good faith and for value. 12
Law on Double Sale
The present case involves what in legal contemplation was a double
sale. On May 27, 1993, Gloria Villafania first sold the disputed property
to Rosenda Tigno-Salazar and Rosita Cave-Go, from whom
petitioners, in turn, derived their right. Subsequently, on October 23,
1997, a second sale was executed by Villafania with Respondent
Romana de Vera.
Article 1544 of the Civil Code states the law on double sale thus:
"Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be movable property.
"Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property.
"Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain
to the person who in good faith was first in the possession;
and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the
oldest title, provided there is good faith."
Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of immovables
transfers ownership to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the
first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith
presents the oldest title.13 There is no ambiguity in the application of
this law with respect to lands registered under the Torrens system.
This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 152914 which
provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or other voluntary instrument --
except a will -- purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take
effect as a conveyance or bind the land until its registration.15 Thus, if
the sale is not registered, it is binding only between the seller and the
buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons.16
In the instant case, both Petitioners Abrigo and respondent registered
the sale of the property. Since neither petitioners nor their
predecessors (Tigno-Salazar and Cave-Go) knew that the property
was covered by the Torrens system, they registered their respective
sales under Act 3344.17 For her part, respondent registered the
transaction under the Torrens system18 because, during the sale,
Villafania had presented the transfer certificate of title (TCT) covering
the property.19
Respondent De Vera contends that her registration under the Torrens
system should prevail over that of petitioners who recorded theirs
under Act 3344. De Vera relies on the following insight of Justice
Edgardo L. Paras:
"x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration
Act (and has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the
subsequent sale is registered not under the Land
Registration Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale
is not considered REGISTERED, as the term is used under
Art. 1544 x x x."20
We agree with respondent. It is undisputed that Villafania had been
issued a free patent registered as Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
P-30522.21 The OCT was later cancelled by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 212598, also in Villafania’s name.22 As a consequence of the
sale, TCT No. 212598 was subsequently cancelled and TCT No.
22515 thereafter issued to respondent.
Soriano v. Heirs of Magali23 held that registration must be done in the
proper registry in order to bind the land. Since the property in dispute in
the present case was already registered under the Torrens system,
petitioners’ registration of the sale under Act 3344 was not effective for
purposes of Article 1544 of the Civil Code.
More recently, in Naawan Community Rural Bank v. Court of
Appeals,24 the Court upheld the right of a party who had registered the
sale of land under the Property Registration Decree, as opposed to
another who had registered a deed of final conveyance under Act
3344. In that case, the "priority in time" principle was not applied,
because the land was already covered by the Torrens system at the
time the conveyance was registered under Act 3344. For the same
reason, inasmuch as the registration of the sale to Respondent De
Vera under the Torrens system was done in good faith, this sale must
be upheld over the sale registered under Act 3344 to Petitioner-
Spouses Abrigo.
Radiowealth Finance Co. v. Palileo25 explained the difference in the
rules of registration under Act 3344 and those under the Torrens
system in this wise:
"Under Act No. 3344, registration of instruments affecting
unregistered lands is ‘without prejudice to a third party with a
better right.’ The aforequoted phrase has been held by this
Court to mean that the mere registration of a sale in one’s
favor does not give him any right over the land if the vendor
was not anymore the owner of the land having previously
sold the same to somebody else even if the earlier sale was
unrecorded.
"The case of Carumba vs. Court of Appeals26 is a case in
point. It was held therein that Article 1544 of the Civil Code
has no application to land not registered under Act No. 496.
Like in the case at bar, Carumba dealt with a double sale of
the same unregistered land. The first sale was made by the
original owners and was unrecorded while the second was
an execution sale that resulted from a complaint for a sum of
money filed against the said original owners. Applying
[Section 33], Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,27 this
Court held that Article 1544 of the Civil Code cannot be
invoked to benefit the purchaser at the execution sale though
the latter was a buyer in good faith and even if this second
sale was registered. It was explained that this is because the
purchaser of unregistered land at a sheriff’s execution sale
only steps into the shoes of the judgment debtor, and merely
acquires the latter’s interest in the property sold as of the
time the property was levied upon.
"Applying this principle, x x x the execution sale of
unregistered land in favor of petitioner is of no effect
because the land no longer belonged to the judgment debtor
as of the time of the said execution sale."28
Petitioners cannot validly argue that they were fraudulently misled into
believing that the property was unregistered. A Torrens title, once
registered, serves as a notice to the whole world.29 All persons must
take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of the registration. 30
Good-Faith Requirement
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer
to acquire the immovable in good faith and to register it in good
faith.31 Mere registration of title is not enough; good faith must concur
with the registration.32 We explained the rationale in Uraca v. Court of
Appeals,33 which we quote:
"Under the foregoing, the prior registration of the disputed
property by the second buyer does not by itself confer
ownership or a better right over the property. Article 1544
requires that such registration must be coupled with good
faith. Jurisprudence teaches us that ‘(t)he governing principle
is primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right).
Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale
cannot defeat the first buyer’s rights except where the
second buyer registers in good faith the second
sale ahead of the first, as provided by the Civil Code. Such
knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of
her rights under the law, among them, to register first her
purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso,
knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale
defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second
sale, since such knowledge taints his prior registration with
bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil
Code for the second buyer being able to displace the first
buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over
the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout
(i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer’s
rights) ---- from the time of acquisition until the title is
transferred to him by registration, or failing registration, by
delivery of possession.’"34 (Italics supplied)
Equally important, under Section 44 of PD 1529, every registered
owner receiving a certificate of title pursuant to a decree of registration,
and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking such
certificate for value and in good faith shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances, except those noted and enumerated in the
certificate.35Thus, a person dealing with registered land is not required
to go behind the registry to determine the condition of the property,
since such condition is noted on the face of the register or certificate of
title.36 Following this principle, this Court has consistently held as
regards registered land that a purchaser in good faith acquires a good
title as against all the transferees thereof whose rights are not recorded
in the Registry of Deeds at the time of the sale.37
Citing Santiago v. Court of Appeals,38 petitioners contend that their
prior registration under Act 3344 is constructive notice to respondent
and negates her good faith at the time she registered the
sale. Santiago affirmed the following commentary of Justice Jose C.
Vitug:
"The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in
time, stronger in right). Knowledge by the first buyer of the
second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except
when the second buyer first registers in good faith the
second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33).
Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the
first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register, since
such knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see
also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No 58530, 26
December 1984) In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22
June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held that it is essential, to
merit the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the
second realty buyer must act in good faith in registering his
 deed of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA Phil 744; Tajonera vs. Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27 March
99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R. 95843, 02 September 1992). 1981),"46

xxx xxx xxx Respondent in Good Faith

"Registration of the second buyer under Act 3344, providing The Court of Appeals examined the facts to determine whether
for the registration of all instruments on land neither covered respondent was an innocent purchaser for value.47After its factual
by the Spanish Mortgage Law nor the Torrens System (Act findings revealed that Respondent De Vera was in good faith, it
496), cannot improve his standing since Act 3344 itself explained thus:
expresses that registration thereunder would not prejudice
prior rights in good faith (see Carumba vs. Court of Appeals,
"x x x. Gloria Villafania, [Respondent] De Vera’s vendor, appears to be
31 SCRA 558). Registration, however, by the first buyer
the registered owner. The subject land was, and still is, registered in
under Act 3344 can have the effect of constructive
the name of Gloria Villafania. There is nothing in her certificate of title
notice to the second buyer that can defeat his right as
and in the circumstances of the transaction or sale which warrant
such buyer in good faith (see Arts. 708-709, Civil Code;
[Respondent] De Vera in supposing that she need[ed] to look beyond
see also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480; Taguba vs.
the title. She had no notice of the earlier sale of the land to
Peralta, 132 SCRA 700). Art. 1544 has been held to be
[petitioners]. She ascertained and verified that her vendor was the sole
inapplicable to execution sales of unregistered land, since
owner and in possession of the subject property by examining her
the purchaser merely steps into the shoes of the debtor and
vendor’s title in the Registry of Deeds and actually going to the
acquires the latter's interest as of the time the property is
premises. There is no evidence in the record showing that when she
sold (Carumba vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 558; see
bought the land on October 23, 1997, she knew or had the slightest
also Fabian vs. Smith, Bell & Co., 8 Phil. 496) or when there
notice that the same was under litigation in Civil Case No. D-10638 of
is only one sale (Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA
the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 40, between Gloria
138)."39 (Emphasis supplied)
Villafania and [Petitioners] Abrigo. She was not even a party to said
case. In sum, she testified clearly and positively, without any contrary
Santiago was subsequently applied in Bayoca v. Nogales,40 which held: evidence presented by the [petitioners], that she did not know anything
about the earlier sale and claim of the spouses Abrigo, until after she
had bought the same, and only then when she bought the same, and
"Verily, there is absence of prior registration in good faith by
only then when she brought an ejectment case with the x x x Municipal
petitioners of the second sale in their favor. As stated in
Court of Mangaldan, known as Civil Case No. 1452. To the
the Santiago case, registration by the first buyer under Act
[Respondent] De Vera, the only legal truth upon which she had to rely
No. 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to the
was that the land is registered in the name of Gloria Villafania, her
second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer. On
vendor, and that her title under the law, is absolute and indefeasible. x
account of the undisputed fact of registration under Act No.
x x."48
3344 by [the first buyers], necessarily, there is absent good
faith in the registration of the sale by the [second buyers] for
which they had been issued certificates of title in their We find no reason to disturb these findings, which petitioners have not
names. x x x."41 rebutted. Spouses Abrigo base their position only on the general
averment that respondent should have been more vigilant prior to
consummating the sale. They argue that had she inspected the
Santiago and Bayoca are not in point. In Santiago, the first buyers
property, she would have found petitioners to be in possession. 49
registered the sale under the Torrens system, as can be inferred from
the issuance of the TCT in their names.42 There was no registration
under Act 3344. In Bayoca, when the first buyer registered the sale This argument is contradicted, however, by the spouses’ own
under Act 3344, the property was still unregistered land.43 Such admission that the parents and the sister of Villafania were still the
registration was therefore considered effectual. actual occupants in October 1997, when Respondent De Vera
purchased the property.50 The family members may reasonably be
assumed to be Villafania’s agents, who had not been shown to have
Furthermore, Revilla and Taguba, which are cited in Santiago, are not
notified respondent of the first sale when she conducted an ocular
on all fours with the present case. In Revilla, the first buyer did not
inspection. Thus, good faith on respondent’s part stands.
register the sale.44 In Taguba, registration was not an issue.45

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed

As can be gathered from the foregoing, constructive notice to the
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
second buyer through registration under Act 3344 does not apply if the
property is registered under the Torrens system, as in this case.
SO ORDERED.
We quote below the additional commentary of Justice Vitug, which was
omitted in Santiago. This omission was evidently the reason why G.R. No. 171531 January 30, 2009
petitioner misunderstood the context of the citation therein:
GUARANTEED HOMES, INC., Petitioner,
"The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been vs.
held to refer to registration under Act 496 Land Registration HEIRS OF MARIA P. VALDEZ, (EMILIA V. YUMUL and VICTORIA V.
Act (now PD 1529) which considers the act of registration as MOLINO), HEIRS OF SEVERINA P. TUGADE (ILUMINADA and
the operative act that binds the land (see Mediante vs. LEONORA P. TUGADE, HEIRS OF ETANG P. GATMIN (LUDIVINA
Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900, Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). G. DELA CRUZ (by and through ALFONSO G. DELA CRUZ),
On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser HILARIA G. COBERO and ALFREDO G. COBERO) and SIONY G.
acquires such rights and interest as they appear in the TEPOL (by and through ELENA T. RIVAS and ELESIO TEPOL,
certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or JR.), AS HEIRS OF DECEDENT PABLO PASCUA, Respondents.
encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not
required to explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon
DECISION
its face, indicates. The only exception is where the purchaser
has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of the
seller or of such liens or encumbrances which, as to him, is Tinga, J.:
equivalent to registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs.
IAC, G.R. 75336, 18 October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69
This is a petition for review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the
Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 22 March 20052 and Resolution
dated 9 February 20063 in CA-G.R. CV No. 67462. The Court of since the transfer of ownership over the property was registered
Appeals reversed the 12 November 1999 Order of the Regional Trial through the issuance of TCT No. T-10863 in favor of petitioner as early
Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 734 which granted the motion to as 1969. They also claimed that respondents have no cause of action
dismiss filed by Guaranteed Homes, Inc. (petitioner). The appellate against the Assurance Fund since they were not actually deprived of
court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. ownership over the property, as they could have recovered the
property had it not been for their inaction for over 28 years.25
The factual antecedents are as follows:
The RTC granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss.26 Noting that
respondents had never claimed nor established that they have been in
Respondents, who are the descendants of Pablo Pascua (Pablo), filed
possession of the property and that they did not present any evidence
a complaint seeking reconveyance of a parcel of land with an area of
to show that petitioner has not been in possession of the property
23.7229 hectares situated in Cabitaugan, Subic, Zambales and
either, the RTC applied the doctrine that an action to quiet title
covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 404 in the name of
prescribes where the plaintiff is not in possession of the property.
Pablo.5 In the alternative, the respondents prayed that damages be
awarded in their favor.6
The trial court found that the complaint per its allegations presented a
case of implied or constructive trust on the part of Cipriano who had
OCT No. 4047 was attached as one of the annexes of respondents’
inaccurately claimed to be the sole heir of Pablo in the deed of
complaint. It contained several annotations in the memorandum of
extrajudicial settlement of estate which led to the issuance of TCT No.
encumbrances which showed that the property had already been sold
T- 8241 in his favor. As the prescriptive period for reconveyance of a
by Pablo during his lifetime to Alejandria Marquinez and Restituto
fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years reckoned from
Morales. Respondents also attached copies of the following documents
the date of the issuance of the title, the trial court held that the action
as integral parts of their complaint: Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
for reconveyance had already prescribed with the lapse of more than
No. T-8241,8 TCT No. T-8242,9TCT No. T-10863,10 the Extrajudicial
28 years from the issuance of TCT No. T-10863 on 5 November 1969
Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales11 executed by
as of the filing of the complaint on 21 November 1997.
Cipriano Pascua, Sr. (Cipriano), and the Deed of Sale with
Mortgage12 between spouses Albino Rodolfo and Fabia Rodolfo
(spouses Rodolfo) and petitioner. The RTC added that it is an enshrined rule that even a registered
owner of property may be barred from recovering possession of
property by virtue of laches.
In their complaint,13 respondents alleged that Pablo died intestate
sometime in June 1945 and was survived by his four children, one of
whom was the deceased Cipriano.14 On 13 February 1967, Cipriano The RTC further held that petitioner had the right to rely on TCT No. T-
executed a document denominated as "Extrajudicial Settlement of a 8242 in the name of spouses Rodolfo. Petitioner is not obliged to go
Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales,"15 wherein he declared himself as beyond the title considering that there were no circumstances
the only heir of Pablo and confirmed the sales made by the decedent surrounding the sale sufficient to put it into inquiry.
during his lifetime, including the alleged sale of the disputed property to
spouses Rodolfo.
Concerning the Assurance Fund, the RTC held that the claim against it
had long prescribed since Section 102 of P.D. No. 1529 provides for a
Respondents likewise averred that on the following day 14 February six-year period within which a plaintiff may file an action against the
1967, TCT No. T-824116 was issued in the name of Cipriano "without fund and in this case the period should be counted from the time of the
OCT No. 404 having been cancelled."17 However, TCT No. T-8241 was issuance of the challenged TCT No. T-10863 on 5 November 1969 and
not signed by the Register of Deeds. On the same day, TCT No. T- thus expired in 1975.
8242 was issued in the name of the spouses Rodolfo and TCT No. T-
8241 was thereby cancelled.18 Subsequently, on 31 October 1969, the
Undaunted, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.27
spouses Rodolfo sold the disputed property to petitioner by virtue of a
Deed of Sale with Mortgage. Consequently, on 5 November 1969, TCT
No. T-8242 was cancelled and TCT No. T-1086319 was issued in the The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s order.28 In ordering the
name of petitioner.20 reinstatement of the complaint, the appellate court ruled that the
averments in respondents’ complaint before the RTC make out a case
for quieting of title which has not prescribed. Respondents did not have
It was further averred in the complaint that Jorge Pascua, Sr., son of
to prove possession over the property since petitioner as the movant in
Cipriano, filed on 24 January 1997 a petition before the RTC of
a motion to dismiss hypothetically admitted the truth of the allegations
Olongapo City, Branch 75, for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate
in the complaint. The appellate court found that possession over the
of OCT No. 404, docketed as Other Case No. 04-0-97.21 The RTC
property was sufficiently alleged in the complaint which stated that
denied the petition.22 The trial court held that petitioner was already the
"neither petitioner nor the Rodolfo spouses ever had possession of the
owner of the land, noting that the failure to annotate the subsequent
disputed property" as "a number of the Pascua heirs either had been
transfer of the property to it at the back of OCT No. 404 did not affect
(still are) in actual, continuous and adverse possession thereof or had
its title to the property.
been enjoying (still are enjoying) the use thereof."29 By the same token,
laches had not set in, the Court of Appeals added.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss23 the complaint on the grounds that
the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations, more than 28 years
The appellate court further held that the ruling of the RTC that
having elapsed from the issuance of TCT No. T-10863 up to the filing
petitioner is an innocent purchaser for value is contrary to the
of the complaint, and that the complaint states no cause of action as it
allegations in respondents’ complaint.
is an innocent purchaser for value, it having relied on the clean title of
the spouses Rodolfo.
Hence, the present petition for review.
Impleaded as defendants, the heirs of Cipriano filed an answer to the
complaint in which they denied knowledge of the existence of the The sole issue before this Court revolves around the propriety of the
extrajudicial settlement allegedly executed by Cipriano and averred RTC’s granting of the motion to dismiss and conversely the tenability of
that the latter, during his lifetime, did not execute any document the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the RTC’s ruling.
transferring ownership of the property.24
The petition is meritorious.
The Register of Deeds and the National Treasurer filed, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, an answer averring that the six (6)-year
period fixed in Section 102 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 for It is well-settled that to sustain a dismissal on the ground that the
complaint states no cause of action, the insufficiency of the cause of
the filing of an action against the Assurance Fund had long prescribed
action must appear on the face of the complaint, and the test of the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of
action is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court could
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
of the complaint. For the purpose, the motion to dismiss must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint.30 The admission, however, is limited only to all material and
relevant facts which are well pleaded in the complaint.31
The factual allegations in respondents’ complaint should be considered
in tandem with the statements and inscriptions on the documents
attached to it as annexes or integral parts. In a number of cases, the
Court held that in addition to the complaint, other pleadings submitted
by the parties should be considered in deciding whether or not the
complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action. 32 Likewise,
other facts not alleged in the complaint may be considered where the
motion to dismiss was heard with the submission of evidence, or if
documentary evidence admitted by stipulation discloses facts sufficient
to defeat the claim.33 For while the court must accept as true all well
pleaded facts in the complaint, the motion does not admit allegations of
which the court will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule
apply to legally impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence,
nor to facts which appear by record or document included in the
pleadings to be unfounded.34
In the case at bar, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to
dismiss. At the hearing, the parties presented documentary evidence.
Among the documents marked and offered in evidence are the
annexes of the complaint.35
Based on the standards set by this Court in relation to the factual
allegations and documentary annexes of the complaint as well as the
exhibits offered at the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the inescapable
conclusion is that respondents’ complaint does not state a cause of
action against petitioner.
Firstly, the complaint does not allege any defect with TCT No. T-8242
in the name of the spouses Rodolfo, who were petitioner’s
predecessors-in-interest, or any circumstance from which it could
reasonably be inferred that petitioner had any actual knowledge of
facts that would impel it to make further inquiry into the title of the
spouses Rodolfo.36It is basic that a person dealing with registered
property need not go beyond, but only has to rely on, the title of his
predecessor-in-interest. Since "the act of registration is the operative
act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are
concerned," it follows that where there is nothing in the certificate of
title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or
any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore
farther than what the Torrens title upon its face indicates in quest for
any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his
right thereto. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and
conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens system
seeks to insure would entirely be futile and nugatory. The public shall
then be denied of its foremost motivation for respecting and observing
the Torrens system of registration. In the end, the business community
stands to be inconvenienced and prejudiced immeasurably. 37
Contrary to the assertion of respondents, OCT No. 404 was expressly
cancelled by TCT No. T-8241. The alleged non-signature by the
Register of Deeds Soliman Achacoso, , does not affect the validity of
TCT No. T-8241 since he signed TCT No. T- 8242 and issued both
titles on the same day. There is a presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty. The presumption is further bolstered by
the fact that TCT No. T-8241 was certified to be on file with the
Registry of Deeds and registered in the name of Cipriano. It is enough
that petitioner had examined the latest certificate of title which in this
case was issued in the name of the immediate transferor, the spouses
Rodolfo. The purchaser is not bound by the original certificate but only
by the certificate of title of the person from whom he had purchased the
property.38
Secondly, while the Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and
Confirmation of Sales executed by Cipriano alone despite the
existence of the other heirs of Pablo, is not binding on such other heirs,
nevertheless, it has operative effect under Section 44 of the Property
Registration Decree, which provides that:
SEC. 44. Statutory Liens Affecting Title. — Every registered owner
receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration,
and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate
of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all
encumbrances except those noted on said certificate and any of the
following encumbrances which may be subsisting, namely:
xxxx
Even assuming arguendo that the extrajudicial settlement was a
forgery, the Court still has to uphold the title of petitioner. The case law
is that although generally a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and
conveys no title, there are instances when such a fraudulent document
may become the root of a valid title.39 And one such instance is where
the certificate of title was already transferred from the name of the true
owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser. For then, the vendee had
the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate.40
The Court cannot give credence to respondents’ claims that the
Extrajudicial Settlement of a Sole Heir and Confirmation of Sales was
not registered and that OCT No. 404 was not cancelled by the Register
of Deeds. The Register of Deeds of Zambales certified that the
extrajudicial settlement was recorded on 14 February 1967, per Entry
No. 18590. This is in compliance with Section 56 of Act No. 496,41 the
applicable law at the time of registration, which provides that:
Sec. 56. Each register of deeds shall keep an entry book in which he
shall enter in the order of their reception all deeds and other voluntary
instruments, and all copies of writs and other process filed with him
relating to registered land. He shall note in such book the year, month,
day, hour, and minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in
which they are received. They shall be regarded as registered from
the time so noted, and the memorandum of each instrument when
made on the certificate of title to which it refers shall bear the same
date. [Emphasis supplied]
Registration in the public registry is notice to the whole world. Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land shall be, if registered, filed
or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province or city
where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all
persons from the time of such registering, filing or entering. 42
Thirdly, respondents cannot make out a case for quieting of title since
OCT No. 404 had already been cancelled. Respondents have no title
to anchor their complaint on.43 Title to real property refers to that upon
which ownership is based. It is the evidence of the right of the owner or
the extent of his interest, by which means he can maintain control and,
as a rule, assert right to exclusive possession and enjoyment of the
property.44
Moreover, there is nothing in the complaint which specified that the
respondents were in possession of the property. They merely alleged
that the occupants or possessors are "others not defendant Spouses
Rodolfo"45 who could be anybody, and that the property is in actual
possession of "a number of the Pascua heirs"46 who could either be the
respondents or the heirs of Cipriano. The admission of the truth of
material and relevant facts well pleaded does not extend to render a
demurrer an admission of inferences or conclusions drawn therefrom,
even if alleged in the pleading; nor mere inferences or conclusions
from
facts not stated; nor conclusions of law; nor matters of evidence; nor
surplusage and irrelevant matters.47
The other heirs of Pablo should have filed an action for reconveyance
based on implied or constructive trust within ten (10) years from the
date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the
certificate of title over the property.48 The legal relationship between
Cipriano and the other heirs of Pablo is governed by Article 1456 of the
Civil Code which provides that if a property is acquired through mistake
or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee
of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
From the above discussion, there is no question that petitioner is an
innocent purchaser for value; hence, no cause of action for
cancellation of title will lie against it.49 The RTC was correct in granting
petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
Lastly, respondents’ claim against the Assurance Fund also cannot
prosper. Section 101 of P.D. No. 1529 clearly provides that the
Assurance Fund shall not be liable for any loss, damage or deprivation
of any right or interest in land which may have been caused by a
breach of trust, whether express, implied or constructive. Even
assuming arguendo that they are entitled to claim against the
Assurance Fund, the respondents’ claim has already prescribed since
any action for compensation against the Assurance Fund must be
brought within a period of six (6) years from the time the right to bring
such action first occurred, which in this case was in 1967.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67462 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The 12 November 1999 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City, Branch 73 in Civil Case No. 432-097 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988
EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF
DEEDS AVITO SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
and ATTY. HECTOR P. TEODOSIO, respondents.
Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners.
Rico & Associates for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No.
64432 and the private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject matter
of these two (2) cases and the instant case is the same — a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which
triggered the filing of the earlier petitions. These facts and events are
cited in our resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as
follows:
. . . This case has its origins in a petition for
reconstitution of title filed with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known
as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in
the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original
Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued
in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S.
Baranda The Court issued a writ of possession
which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and
Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that
they also have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot
No. 4517. The Court, after considering the private
respondents' opposition and finding TCT No.
25772 fraudulently acquired, ordered that the writ
of possession be carried out. A motion for
reconsideration having been denied, a writ of
demolition was issued on March 29, 1982. Perez
and Gotera filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 6,
1982, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Perez and Gotera filed the petition for review on
certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before
the Supreme Court. As earlier stated the petition
was denied in a resolution dated January 7,1983.
The motion for reconsideration was denied in
another resolution dated March 25, 1983, which
also stated that the denial is final. This decision in
G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the entry of
judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The
petitioners in the instant case G.R. No. 64432--
contend that the writs of possession and
demolition issued in the respondent court should
now be implemented; that Civil Case No. 00827
before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed
only to delay the implementation of the writ; that
counsel for the respondent should be held in
contempt of court for engaging in a concerted but
futile effort to delay the execution of the writs of
possession and demolition and that petitioners are
entitled to damages because of prejudice caused
by the filing of this petition before the Intermediate
Appellate Court. On September 26, 1983, this
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order ' to
maintain the status quo, both in the Intermediate
Appellate Court and in the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo. Considering that (l)there is merit in the
instant petition for indeed the issues discussed in
G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827
before the respondent court have already been
passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and (2) the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Intermediate Appellate Court was only intended
not to render the petition moot and academic
pending the Court's consideration of the issues,
the Court RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court not to take
cognizance of issues already resolved by this
Court and accordingly DISMISS the petition in Civil
Case No. 00827. Immediate implementation of the
writs of possession and demolition is likewise
ordered. (pp. 107-108, Rollo — G.R. No. 64432)
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a
motion for reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R.
No. 64432. On this same date, another resolution was issued, this time
in G.R. No. 62042, referring to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-
parte motion of the private respondents (Baranda and Hitalia) for
execution of the judgment in the resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and
March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court
issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case No.
00827 which covered the same subject matter as the Resolutions
above cited pursuant to our Resolution dated December 29, 1983. The
resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432 became final
on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following
order:
Submitted are the following motions filed by
movants Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia
through counsel dated August 28, 1984:
(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment
of Resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March
9, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme
Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution
dated December 29, 1983 Promulgated by
 Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R.
No. 64432;
(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely
ministerial under Act 496, therefore she must
register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this
Court and that of Honorable Supreme Court.
Finding the said motions meritorious and there
being no opposition thereto, the same is hereby
GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
25772 is hereby declared null and void and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is hereby
declared valid and subsisting title concerning the
ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further
ordered to register the Subdivision Agreement of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as prayed
for." (p. 466, Rollo--G.R. No. 64432)
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for
reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of
Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on the ground that there was a
pending case before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition,
Injunction under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda,
against the former which remained unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and
G.R. No. 64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the
Regional Trial Court and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and
implement the judgments of this Court. They prayed that an order be
issued:
1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
Branch XXIII, under Hon. Judge Tito G. Gustilo
and the acting Register of Deeds Helen P. Sornito
to register the Order dated September 5, 1984 of
the lower court;
2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-
106098 and once cancelled to issue new
certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the
premises. (p. 473, 64432 Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a
Resolution in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions
as prayed for. Acting on another motion of the same nature filed by the
petitioners, we issued another Resolution dated October 8, 1986
referring the same to the Court Administrator for implementation by the
judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders
dated November 6,1986 and January 6,1987 respectively, to wit:
ORDER
This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation
submitted by the movants through counsel on
October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen
Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and
formerly acting register of deeds for the Province
of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the
Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting
Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated
November 5, 1986.
Considering that the motion of movants Atty.
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia dated
August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of
the writ of possession was granted by the
Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its
Resolution dated September 17,1986, the present
motion is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds,
Province of Iloilo, is hereby ordered to register the
Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as
prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
ORDER
This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the
Surrender of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo
S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2,
1986, in compliance with the order of this Court
dated November 25, 1 986, a Motion for Extension
of Time to File Opposition filed by Maria Provido
Gotera through counsel on December 4, 1986
which was granted by the Court pursuant to its
order dated December 15, 1986. Considering that
no Opposition was filed within the thirty (30) days
period granted by the Court finding the petition
tenable, the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby
ordered to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days from
the date of this order, after which period, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared
annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo is
ordered to issue a new Certificate of Title in lieu
thereof in the name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate shall
contain a memorandum of the annulment of the
outstanding duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio
Perez, private respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No.
62042, filed a motion for explanation in relation to the resolution dated
September 17, 1986 and manifestation asking for clarification on the
following points:
a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for
the cancellation of TCT T-25772, should the same
be referred to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned
in the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it
already deemed granted by implication (by virtue
of the Resolution dated September 17, 1986)?
b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986
include not only the implementation of the writ of
possession but also the cancellation of TCT T-
25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p. 536,
Rollo — 4432)
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we
issued a resolution dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and
stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx
 Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was memorandum or notice of Lis
made on January 7, 1983 and in G.R. No. 64432 Pendens has been registered
on May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the as provided in the preceding
implementation of our resolutions, this COURT section, the notice of Lis
RESOLVED to refer the matters concerning the Pendens shall be deemed
execution of the decisions to the Regional Trial cancelled upon the
Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to registration of a certificate of
apply disciplinary sanctions upon whoever the clerk of court in which the
attempts to trifle with the implementation of the action or proceeding was
resolutions of this Court. No further motions in pending stating the manner of
these cases will be entertained by this Court. (p. disposal thereof."
615, Rollo-64432)
That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders annotated on T-106098, T-111560, T-111561 and
dated November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed as Civil
Deeds AvitoSaclauso annotated the order declaring Transfer Case No. 15871, now pending with the
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and void, cancelled the same Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta
and issued new certificates of titles numbers T-111560, T-111561 and Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido and
T-111562 in the name of petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs, versus Eduardo
Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of TItle No. T-106098. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."

However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D.
separate case (Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of 152, the cancellation of subject Notice of Lis
Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new certificates of titles Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled
issued to the petitioners. This was upheld by the trial court after setting upon the registration of the certificate of the Clerk
aside its earlier order dated February 12, 1987 ordering the of Court in which the action or proceeding was
cancellation of lis pendens. pending, stating the manner of disposal thereof.

This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042 Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which
and G.R. No. 64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated the Notice of Lis Pendens was based is still
February 12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the pending with the Intermediate Court of Appeals,
notice of lis pendensin the new certificates of titles. only the Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this
Honorable Court in a mere cadastral proceedings
can order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said
Pendens. (pp. 68-69, Rollo)
motion to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for
appropriate action.
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of
by the Supreme Court resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set
Iloilo, Branch 23 denied the petitioners' motion to reinstate the
aside his February 12, 1987 order and granted the Acting Register of
February 12, 1987 order in another order dated September 17, 1987,
Deeds' motion for reconsideration.
the petitioners filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction to compel the respondent judge
to reinstate his order dated February l2, 1987 directing the Acting The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil
Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from
new certificates of titles issued in the name of the petitioners. cancelling the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this
Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432. A corollary issue is on
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a
the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a
notice of is pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name
notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
of the petitioners, the petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an
urgent ex-parte motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens
annotated thereon. Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No.
4517 of Sta. Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R.
No 62042 and G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo
filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta
granted the motion and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo
Provido before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the
to cancel the lis pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-
instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the Provides' counsel, a notice of
106098; T-111560; T-111561 and T-111562.
is pendens was annotated on petitioners' Certificate of Title No. T-
106098 covering Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for
reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued
an order dated October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
That the undersigned hereby asks for a
reconsideration of the said order based on the
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is
second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to
the reason why respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12,
wit:
1987 order directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice
of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.
"At any time after final
judgment in favor of the
This petition is impressed with merit.
defendant or other disposition
of the action such as to
terminate finally all rights of Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042.
the plaintiff in and to the land Although Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and
and/or buildings involved, in Perfecta Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not
any case in which a impleaded as parties, it is very clear in the petition that Maria Provido
was acting on behalf of the Providos who allegedly are her co-owners
in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in her name and the names of
the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E" G.R.
No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues raised by petitioners
Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042 was as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution
proceedings, respondent Judge Midpantao L. Adil
had the authority to declare as null and void the
transfer certificate of title in the name of
petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and her other co-
owners. (p. 3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies
to G.R. No. 62042 contrary to the trial court's findings that they were
not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of
Iloilo in the reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the
name of Providos over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and
void for being fraudulently obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098
over the same parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the name
of petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia valid and
subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March
25,1983 long before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private
respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay
the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well
as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate
implementation of the writs of possession and demolition in the
reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara
Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following
manner:
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the
real rights of the party causing the registration
thereof With the lis pendens duly recorded, he
could rest secure that he would not lose the
property or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens
serves as a warning to a prospective purchaser or
incumbrancer that the particular property is in
litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the
same, unless of course he intends to gamble on
the results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14,
RuIes of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3,
11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3,
citing cases.) (Natanov. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481,
485-486)
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts
obtaining in this case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated
in the cases of Victoriano v. Rovila (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council
of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and
Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that:
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of
pendency which has been filed in a proper case,
cannot be cancelled while the action is pending
and undetermined, the proper court has the
discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar
circumstances, as for instance, where the
evidence so far presented by the plaintiff does not
bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and
where the continuances of the trial, for which the
plaintiff is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying
the determination of the case to the prejudice of
the defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The
Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, supra)
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way
to the Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to
block but unsuccessfuly the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042
and G.R. No. 64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in
sustaining the respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the
notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over
Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground of
pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In
upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on
Section 77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the
first paragraph thereof which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final
judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be
cancelled upon Order of the Court after proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or that it is not
necessary to protect the rights of the party who
caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled
by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of
the party who caused the registration thereof.
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could
have been misled by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this
matter when in fact he was the same Judge who issued the order
dismissing Civil Case No. 15871 prompting the private respondents to
appeal said order dated October 10, 1984 to the Court of Appeals. The
records of the main case are still with the court below but based on the
order, it can be safely assumed that the various pleadings filed by the
parties subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the
defendants therein) touched on the issue of the validity of TCT No.
25772 in the name of the Providos over Lot Number 4571, Sta.
Barbara Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042
and G.R. No. 64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the
Register of Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis
pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the
duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument
presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which
complies with all the requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is
not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform
the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons
therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in
accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with
regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in
pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him
for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the
action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such
instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land
Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru
the Register of Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words
and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning
must be determined from the language employed and the statute must
be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127
SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union
[IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the
function of the Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens
certificate of title is clear and leaves no room for construction.
According to Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English
Language — the word shall means "ought to, must, ...obligation used
to express a command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or
directives to express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a
Register of Deeds with reference to the registration of deeds
encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial in nature. The
respondent Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to
file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order
directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the
certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In
case of doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any
deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he should have asked
the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now, the
Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration
Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the
full implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No.
62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the
notice of lis pendensannotated in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the
respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to become
part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil
Case No. 15871 filed by the private respondents involves another set
of parties claiming Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of
Title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12,
1987 order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is
REINSTATED. All subsequent orders issued by the trial court which
annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs against
the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 185063 July 23, 2009
SPS. LITA DE LEON and FELIX RIO TARROSA, Petitioners,
vs.
ANITA B. DE LEON, DANILO B. DE LEON, and VILMA B. DE
LEON, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing
and seeking to set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 dated August
27, 2008 and October 20, 2008, respectively, of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88571. The CA affirmed with modification the
October 4, 2006 Decision3 in Civil Case No. Q04-51595 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 22 in Quezon City.
The Facts
On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the People’s
Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional
Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a 191.30 square-
meter lot situated in Fairview, Quezon City. Subsequently, on April 24,
1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite officiated by the
Municipal Mayor of Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija. To this union were born
Danilo and Vilma.
Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot thus purchased,
PHHC executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of
Bonifacio. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 173677
was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, "single."
Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the subject lot to her
sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners
herein. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 (Deed of
Sale) did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita.
Thereafter, or on May 23, 1977, Bonifacio and Anita renewed their
vows in a church wedding at St. John the Baptist Parish in San Juan,
Manila.
On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died.
Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale and had
TCT No. 173677 canceled. They secured the issuance in their names
of TCT No. N-173911 from the Quezon City Register of Deeds.
Getting wind of the cancellation of their father’s title and the issuance
of TCT No. N-173911, Danilo and Vilma filed on May 19, 2003 a Notice
of Adverse Claim before the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
protect their rights over the subject property. Very much later, Anita,
Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC in Quezon
City. In their complaint, Anita and her children alleged, among other
things, that fraud attended the execution of the Deed of Sale and that
subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that he was still the owner of
the parcel of land. In support of their case, they presented, inter alia,
the following documents:
a. A Real Estate Mortgage execution by Bonifacio in favor of
spouses Cesar Diankinay and Filomena Almero on July 22,
1977.
b. A Civil Complaint filed by Bonifacio against spouses Cesar
Diankinay and Filomena Almero on November 27, 1979 for
nullification of the Real Estate Mortgage.
c. The Decision issued by the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City, promulgated on July 30, 1982, nullifying
the Real Estate Mortgage.4
The Tarrosas, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, averred
that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property inasmuch
as he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. As further
alleged, they were not aware of the supposed marriage between
Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale.
After several scheduled hearings, both parties, assisted by their
respective counsels, submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts with Motion,
to wit:
1. The parties have agreed to admit the following facts:
a. Bonifacio O. De Leon, while still single x x x, purchased
from the [PHHC] through a Conditional Contract to Sell on
July 20, 1965 a parcel of land with an area of 191.30 square
meters situated in Fairview, Quezon City for P841.72;
b. On April 24, 1968, Bonifacio O. De Leon married plaintiff
Anita B. De Leon before the Municipal Mayor of Zaragosa,
Nueva Ecija. Both parties stipulate that said marriage is valid
and binding under the laws of the Philippines;
c. On June 22, 1970, Bonifacio O. De Leon paid [PHHC] the
total amount of P1,023.74 x x x. The right of ownership over
the subject parcel of land was transferred to the late
Bonifacio O. De Leon on June 22, 1970, upon the full
payment of the total [price] of P1,023.74 and upon execution
of the Final Deed of Sale;
d. After full payment, Bonifacio O. De Leon was issued [TCT]
No. 173677 on February 24, 1972;
 e. On January 12, 1974, Bonifacio O. De Leon executed a
Deed of Sale in favor of defendants-spouses Felix Rio
Tarrosa and Lita O. De Leon disposing the parcel of land
under TCT No. 173677 for valuable consideration amount of
P19,000.00 and subscribed before Atty. Salvador R.
Aguinaldo who was commissioned to [notarize] documents
on said date. The parties stipulate that the Deed of Sale is
valid and genuine. However, plaintiff Anita De Leon was not
a signatory to the Deed of Sale executed on January 12,
1974;
f. That plaintiff Anita B. De Leon and the late Bonifacio O. De
Leon were married in church rites on May 23, 1977 x x x;
g. The late Bonifacio O. De Leon died on February 29, 1996
at the UST Hospital, España, Manila;
h. The said "Deed of Sale" executed on January 12, 1974
was registered on May 8, 1996 before the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City and [TCT] No. N-173911
was issued to Lita O. De Leon and Felix Rio Tarrosa.5
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On October 4, 2006, the RTC, on the finding that the lot in question
was the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita, rendered judgment in
favor of Anita and her children. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiffs and against defendants in the following manner:
(1) Declaring the Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974
executed by the late Bonifacio O. De Leon in favor of
defendants-spouses Lita De Leon and Felix Rio Tarrosa void
ab initio;
(2) Directing the Register of Deed of Quezon City to cancel
Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-173911 in the name of
"Lita O. De Leon, married to Felix Rio Tarrosa" and restore
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 173667 in the name of
"Bonifacio O. De Leon";
(3) Ordering the defendants-spouses to pay plaintiffs the
following sums:
(a) P25,000.00 as moral damages;
(b) P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(c) P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus appearance
fee of P2,500.00 per court appearance;
(d) Costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, the Tarrosas appealed to the CA. As they would submit, the
RTC erred:
(1) in finding for the plaintiffs-appellees by declaring that the
land subject matter of the case is conjugal property;
(2) in not declaring the land as the exclusive property of
Bonifacio O. De Leon when sold to defendant-appellants;
(3) in ruling that defendant-appellants did not adduce any
proof that the property was acquired solely by the efforts of
Bonifacio O. De Leon;
(4) in declaring that one-half of the conjugal assets does not
vest to Bonifacio O. De Leon because of the absence of
liquidation;
(5) in cancelling TCT No. N-173911 and restored TCT No.
[173677] in the name of Bonifacio O. De Leon;
(6) in awarding moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees to the plaintiffs-appellees.6
The Ruling of the Appellate Court
On August 27, 2008, the CA rendered a decision affirmatory of that of
the RTC, save for the award of damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of
suit which the appellate court ordered deleted. The fallo of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated
October 4, 2006, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Quezon City
in Civil Case No. Q-04-51595 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, in that the award of moral and exemplary damages
as well as attorney’s fees, appearance fee and costs of suit are hereby
DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
Just like the RTC, the CA held that the Tarrosas failed to overthrow the
legal presumption that the parcel of land in dispute was conjugal. The
appellate court held further that the cases they cited were inapplicable.
As to the deletion of the grant of moral and exemplary damages, the
CA, in gist, held that no evidence was adduced to justify the award.
Based on the same reason, it also deleted the award of attorney’s fees
and costs of suit.
The Tarrosas moved but was denied reconsideration by the CA in its
equally assailed resolution of October 20, 2008.
Hence, they filed this petition.
The Issues
I
Whether the [CA] gravely erred in concluding that the land purchased
on installment by Bonifacio O. De Leon before marriage although some
installments were paid during the marriage is conjugal and not his
exclusive property.
II
Whether the [CA] gravely erred in ruling that the Lorenzo, et al. vs.
Nicolas, et al., and Alvarez vs. Espiritu cases do not apply in the case
at bar because in the latter the land involved is not a friar land unlike in
the former.
III
Whether the [CA] gravely erred in affirming the decision of the trial
court a quo which ruled that petitioners did not adduce any proof that
the land was acquired solely by the efforts of Bonifacio O. De Leon.
IV
Whether the court of appeals gravely erred in affirming the decision of
the trial court which ruled that one-half (1/2) of the conjugal assets do
not vest to Bonifacio O. De Leon because of the absence of liquidation.
Our Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The Subject Property is the
Conjugal Property of Bonifacio and Anita
The first three issues thus raised can be summed up to the question of
whether or not the subject property is conjugal.
Petitioners assert that, since Bonifacio purchased the lot from PHHC
on installment before he married Anita, the land was Bonifacio’s
exclusive property and not conjugal, even though some installments
were paid and the title was issued to Bonifacio during the marriage. In
support of their position, petitioners cite Lorenzo v. Nicolas7 and
Alvarez v. Espiritu.8
We disagree.
Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at
the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v.
Court of Appeals9 teaches, even necessary to prove that the property
was acquired with funds of the partnership. Only proof of acquisition
during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the
property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the
properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still
apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. 10
In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and
covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only
transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well settled
that a conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent, to a contract to sell. In
both types of contract, the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor’s
obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future
and uncertain event, usually the full payment of the purchase price, so
that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would
stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.11 In other
words, in a contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is
not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price, unlike in a
contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the thing sold. 12
Such is the situation obtaining in the instant case. The conditional
contract to sell executed by and between Bonifacio and PHHC on July
20, 1965 provided that ownership over and title to the property will vest
on Bonifacio only upon execution of the final deed of sale which, in
turn, will be effected upon payment of the full purchase price, to wit:
14. Titles to the property subject of this contract remains with the
CORPORATION and shall pass to, and be transferred in the name of
the APPLICANT only upon the execution of the final Deed of Sale
provided for in the next succeeding paragraph.
15. Upon the full payment by the APPLICANT of the price of the lot
above referred to together with all the interest due thereon, taxes and
other charges, and upon his faithful compliance with all the conditions
of this contract the CORPORATION agrees to execute in favor of the
APPLICANT a final deed of sale of the aforesaid land, and the
APPLICANT agrees to accept said deed, as full performance by the
CORPORATION of its covenants and undertakings hereunder.13 x x x
Evidently, title to the property in question only passed to Bonifacio after
he had fully paid the purchase price on June 22, 1970. This full
payment, to stress, was made more than two (2) years after his
marriage to Anita on April 24, 1968. In net effect, the property was
acquired during the existence of the marriage; as such, ownership to
the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.
Such presumption is rebuttable only with strong, clear, categorical, and
convincing evidence.14 There must be clear evidence of the exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses,15 and the burden of proof rests upon
the party asserting it.16
Petitioners’ argument that the disputed lot was Bonifacio’s exclusive
property, since it was registered solely in his name, is untenable. The
mere registration of a property in the name of one spouse does not
destroy its conjugal nature.17 What is material is the time when the
property was acquired.
Thus, the question of whether petitioners were able to adduce proof to
overthrow the presumption is a factual issue best addressed by the trial
court. As a matter of long and sound practice, factual determinations of
the trial courts,18especially when confirmed by the appellate court, are
accorded great weight by the Court and, as rule, will not be disturbed
on appeal, except for the most compelling reasons.19 Petitioners have
not, as they really cannot, rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the
lot in question. In this regard, the Court notes and quotes with approval
the following excerpts from the trial court’s disposition:
The defendants, however, did not adduce any proof that the property in
question was acquired solely by the efforts of [Bonifacio]. The
established jurisprudence on the matter leads this Court to the
conclusion that the property involved in this dispute is indeed the
conjugal property of the deceased [Bonifacio] De Leon.
In fact, defendant even admitted that [Bonifacio] brought into his
marriage with plaintiff Anita the said land, albeit in the concept of a
possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name. The property
was registered only in 1972 during the existence of the marriage.
However, the absence of evidence on the source of funding has called
for the application of the presumption under Article 160 in favor of the
plaintiffs.20
The cases petitioners cited are without governing applicability to this
case simply because they involved a law specifically enacted to govern
the disposition of and ownership of friar lands. In Lorenzo, the Court
held that the pervading legislative intent of Act No. 1120 is "to sell the
friar lands acquired by the Government to actual settlers and
occupants of the same."21 The Court went on further to say in Alvarez
that "under the Friar Lands Act of 1120, the equitable and beneficial
title to the land passes to the purchaser the moment the first
installment is paid and a certificate of sale is issued."22 Plainly, the said
cases are not applicable here considering that the disputed property is
not friar land.
1awph!1
There can be no quibbling that Anita’s conformity to the sale of the
disputed lot to petitioners was never obtained or at least not formally
expressed in the conveying deed. The parties admitted as much in
their Joint Stipulation of Facts with Motion earlier reproduced. Not lost
on the Court of course is the fact that petitioners went to the process of
registering the deed after Bonifacio’s death in 1996, some 22 years
after its execution. In the interim, petitioners could have had work—but
did not—towards securing Anita’s marital consent to the sale.
It cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit
on the consequence of the husband alienating or encumbering any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. 23 To a
specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband, as
administrator, must, as a rule, be with the wife’s consent. Else, the sale
is not valid. So it is that in several cases we ruled that the sale by the
husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the
consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing that the latter
is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes. The nullity, as
we have explained, proceeds from the fact that sale is in contravention
of the mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of the Code.24 Since Art. 166
of the Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it
follows that the acts or transactions executed against this mandatory
provision are void except when the law itself authorized their validity. 25
Accordingly, the Deed of Sale executed on January 12, 1974 between
Bonifacio and the Tarrosas covering the PHHC lot is void.
Interest in the Conjugal Partnership Is
Merely Inchoate until Liquidation
As a final consideration, the Court agrees with the CA that the sale of
one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership
is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest
of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy,
which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not
ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the community
as a result of the liquidation and settlement.26 The interest of each
spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber
ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership
after its dissolution.27 Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half
of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation
of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it
is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there
are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their
respective heirs.28
Therefore, even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion
of the conjugal partnership, the sale is still theoretically void, for, as
previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the
conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership.
Nevertheless, this Court is mindful of the fact that the Tarrosas paid a
valuable consideration in the amount of PhP 19,000 for the property in
question. Thus, as a matter of fairness and equity, the share of
Bonifacio after the liquidation of the partnership should be liable to
reimburse the amount paid by the Tarrosas. It is a well-settled principle
that no person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another.29
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 88571 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150091 April 2, 2007
YOLANDA O. ALFONSO, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT
AND HOUSING CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present controversy traces its roots to the purportedly irregular
issuance of several transfer certificates of title (TCTs), which has
resulted in two sets of derivative titles, one set bearing the date of
registration of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 as May 3,
1917; the other, as April 19, 1917. OCT No. 994 is one of five OCTs
covering the vast Maysilo estate.
In the midst of this land-titling irregularity, petitioner Yolanda O. Alfonso
(petitioner), then the register of deeds of Caloocan City, was found
administratively liable for allegedly "acquiescing" to the change of the
date of the registration of OCT No. 994 from May 3, 1917 to April 19,
1917, and for making it appear that there were two OCT Nos. 994.
Consequently, she was dismissed from government service for grave
misconduct and dishonesty.
Petitioner has come to this Court to seek a reversal of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision1 of July 27, 2001 and its Resolution2 of
September 21, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 61082, affirming the dismissal
ordered by herein public respondent Office of the President (OP).
From the labyrinthine twists and turns that the facts have taken, the
following are relevant to the disposition of this administrative case:
OCT No. 994 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the name
of Maria de la Concepcion Vidal pursuant to the December 3, 1912
Decision of then Judge Norberto Romualdez in C.L.R. Case No. 4429.
In accordance with this decision, the Court of Land Registration issued
on April 19, 1917 Decree No. 36455, which was received for
transcription by the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917. OCT
No. 994 covered 34 lots located in Caloocan City with an aggregate
area of 13,312,618.89 square meters.3
In an Order of May 25, 1962, the then Court of First Instance of Pasig,
Rizal, in Civil Case No. 4557, "In Re: Petition for Substitution of
Names," directed the Register of Deeds of Rizal to cancel the name of
Maria de la Concepcion Vidal in OCT No. 994 and to substitute the
names of her alleged grandchildren/heirs: Bartolome Rivera, Eleuteria
Rivera (Rivera), Josefa R. Aquino, Gregorio R. Aquino, Rosauro
Aquino, Pelagia R. Angeles, Modesta R. Angeles, Venancio R.
Angeles, Felipe R. Angeles and Fidela R. Angeles.4
An action for partition and accounting was subsequently filed by the
alleged heirs sometime in 1965 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Caloocan City, against Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. Then RTC Branch 120
Judge Fernando A. Cruz granted the action for partition in a Decision
of December 29, 1965, which became final and executory per the
court’s certification of June 7, 1966.5
Three commissioners were appointed by the Caloocan RTC to submit
their recommendations on the partition prayed for. It appeared, though,
that the commissioners failed to comply with their duties, prompting the
registered owners to file a motion to cite them in contempt of court, on
which no action was shown to have been taken.6
In the meantime, the different lots of OCT No. 994 were acquired by
several persons and/or entities, which led to the issuance of several
TCTs. Three of these titles, TCT Nos. 270921,7 2709228 and
2709239 covering Lots 1-G-1, 1-G-2 and 1-G-3, were issued to private
respondent Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation (Phil-
Ville) on September 15, 1993. On Phil-Ville’s TCTs, it was stated that
OCT No. 994 was registered on May 3, 1917, and that the same was a
transfer from TCT No. C-14603/T-73.10
On May 22, 1996, Rivera, one of the substituted owners of OCT No.
994, filed with the Caloocan RTC, Branch 120, in Civil Case No. C-424,
a motion for partition and segregation of lots 23-A, 24, 25-A, 26, 28, 29
and 31 (covering an area of 1,572,324.45 square meters), praying that
the lots be awarded in her favor and titled in her name.11
By Order of September 9, 1996, Judge Jaime D. Discaya approved the
recommendation12 made by the court-appointed commissioners that
Lots 23, 28-A-1 and 28-A-2 be segregated from OCT No. 994, and
ordered the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City "to issue new
certificates of title in the name of Eleuteria Rivera x x x."13 In the court’s
Order of September 17, 1996, the surrender of the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title of OCT No. 994 "if the same is no longer available,
lost or otherwise" was dispensed with.14
It appears that another order of November 28, 199615 was issued by
Judge Discaya directing petitioner to implement the September 9, 1996
Order for the issuance of the three new certificates of title in the name
of Rivera.
Petitioner thus issued TCT Nos. C-31453516 for Lot No. 28-A-1, C-
31453617 for Lot No. 28-A-2, and C-31453718 for Lot No. 23, based on
the technical descriptions mentioned in the September 9, 1996 Order,
and all in the name of Rivera. It was uniformly stated in these TCTs
that Rivera’s titles were derived from OCT No. 994, which was
registered on the "19th day of April" in the year 1917.
Upon learning of this development, Phil-Ville requested then Land
Registration Authority (LRA) Administrator Reynaldo Y. Maulit to
investigate the discrepancies in the date of registration of OCT No.
994, as reflected in its TCTs and those of Rivera. 19 Phil-Ville invited
attention to petitioner’s letter of September 20, 1996 informing it that
there was only one OCT No. 994, which was transcribed or registered
on May 3, 1917, as well as to the LRA Administrator’s certification of
October 31, 1996 confirming that OCT No. 994 was issued on May 3,
1917.
Phil-Ville maintained that the issuance of the three TCTs in favor of
Rivera was "highly irregular as they cover[ed] lots already owned by
Phil-Ville, LCM Theatrical Enterprises and Bonifacio Shopping Center,
Inc."
Phil-Ville’s letter-complaint led to the conduct of an inquiry by the
Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights, and on Urban
Planning, Housing and Resettlement. On May 25, 1998, the joint
committees submitted Senate Committee Report No. 103120 which
found, among other things, that (1) "there is only one Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was issued or registered on
May 3, 1917," (2) OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is "non-existent"
for being "a fabrication perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr.
[(Vasquez, Jr.)], former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City,"
and (3) petitioner "acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith,
when she signed the TCTs issued in the name of Rivera which bear a
wrong date of registration x x x." The Senate committees
recommended that administrative cases be filed against petitioner,
Vasquez, Jr. and "all those involved in illegal and irregular land titling."
On the basis of Senate Committee Report No. 1031 and Phil-Ville’s
complaint, the LRA initiated Administrative Case No. 98-07 for grave
misconduct and dishonesty against petitioner and Vasquez, Jr. who, as
directed, filed separate explanations/comments to the charges against
them.
During the pre-trial conferences, the parties presented documentary
evidence and marked their exhibits, and a pre-trial Order was issued
on September 3, 1998.21
At the scheduled start of the formal hearing on September 6, 1998, the
parties agreed to dispense with the presentation of oral evidence, in
lieu of which they filed their respective memoranda. The case was then
considered submitted for resolution.
On February 4, 1999, the LRA, through then Administrator Alfredo R.
Enriquez, issued a Decision adopting in toto the findings and
recommendation of LRA Hearing Officer Atty. Rhandolfo Amansec, as
follows:
Consequent to the foregoing findings, the inescapable conclusion is
that the issuance by respondent Norberto Vasquez, Jr. of the Dimson
titles which bear a wrong date of registration of OCT 994 constitute
Grave Misconduct, and his subsequent insistence that April 19, 1917 is
the correct date of registration of OCT 994 constitute[s] Dishonesty in
the service. On the other hand, respondent Atty. Yolanda Alfonso’s
acquiescence in the alteration of the date of registration of OCT No.
994 in the titles of Eleuteria Rivera as well as her act of deliberately
ignoring the safeguards enunciated under the law, specially her failure
to require the presentation of a subdivision plan duly approved by the
Land Registration Authority or by the Land [M]anagement Bureau, for
the titles of Eleuteria, are sufficient basis to find her guilty of Grave
Misconduct.
Considering the pervasive adverse consequences of respondents’
acts, which impaired the very integrity of the Torrens System which
they are duty bound to protect, the extreme penalty of dismissal is
hereby recommended for both respondents Atty. Yolanda O.
Alfonso and Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr.22 (Underscoring supplied)
Subsequently, the records of Administrative Case No. 98-07 were
elevated to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for review. On June 14,
1999, then Justice Secretary Serafin R. Cuevas recommended to the
OP that petitioner, a presidential appointee, "be found guilty of Grave
Misconduct and Dishonesty" and be "dismissed from the
service."23 Pertinent portions of the letter-recommendation read:
Respondent Alfonso maintains that the said alteration of the date of
registration of OCT 994 was the sole responsibility of respondent
Norberto Vasquez, Jr. who ordered the alteration pursuant to the
Supreme Court decision in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
System vs. The Court of Appeals, et al., GR No. 103556, 17 November
1992. She claims that the preparation of transfer certificates of titles is
essentially a mechanical endeavor with the typist automatically
adopting the entries in the titles to be canceled. To examine the entry
according to her is no different from proof reading which can be best
left to subordinates citing the case of Arias v. Sandiganbayan [180
SCRA 309]. To further support her claim of innocence in the alteration,
respondent Alfonso said that upon discovery thereof, she issued
several memoranda requiring her subordinates who have participated
in the Rivera titles to explain why the alteration was made. It should be
noted however that the memoranda were issued after she signed the
Rivera titles.
It is true that respondent Alfonso could not be faulted for carrying over
to TCT No. 312804 an erroneous date of registration of OCT 994
inasmuch as the title from which it was derived from likewise bear the
said erroneous date of registration. However, the mere fact that she
consented to the acquisition of the property by and signed and issued
on 12 August 1996 TCT 312804 in the name of her children adopting
19 April 1917 as the date of registration of OCT 994 knowing the same
to be erroneous as shown by her 20 March 1996 referral of Ms.
Roqueta Dimson’s application for issuance of certificate of title citing
therein the LRA Verification Committee report is a clear case of
dishonesty, malice and bad faith. This is also a clear violation of the
Code of Conduct for Public Officials and Employees prohibiting
government officials and employees from having any interest in a
transaction requiring their approval.
xxxx
Moreover, respondent Alfonso also violated the provisions of Sections
50, 58 and 92 of P.D. 1529 for failure to require the presentation of (1)
the subdivision plan duly approved by the Land Registration Authority
or by the Land Management Bureau; and (2) proof of payment of
estate of inheritance tax.
The non-presentation of the owner’s duplicate of OCT 994 has been
satisfactorily explained by respondent Alfonso as the said presentation
was dispensed with by an order of the court.
For her failure to require the presentation of a subdivision plan for the
three titles of Eleuteria Rivera, respondent Alfonso claims that
inasmuch as the issuance of the titles is pursuant to a court order,
Sections 50 and 58 of P.D. 1529 do not apply. Said contention of
respondent Alfonso is without merit as said sections apply as long as
the title to be issued covers only a portion of a bigger tract of land. The
presentation of a duly approved subdivision plan is necessary in order
to delineate the particular portion of the lot being covered by the new
title. Had respondent Alfonso required the presentation of an approved
subdivision plan, she could have discovered the defects in the titling of
the Rivera property and could have manifested the same in court.
As to the question regarding the presentation of proof of payment of
inheritance tax, respondent Alfonso claims that no inheritance tax is
due on the estate simply because there is no inheritance involved as
the titles were issued pursuant to a court order in a judicial partition
and the adjudicatee Eleuteria Rivera is very much alive at the time of
issuance. Again, this deserves scant consideration. It does not matter
whether Eleuteria Rivera is alive or not because the subject matter of
inheritance tax is not the estate of Eleuteria Rivera but the transfer of
property covered by the subject titles by way of inheritance from the
predecessor and alleged parent Maria Concepcion Vidal to the heir
who is Eleuteria Rivera.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On November 29, 1999, the OP issued Administrative Order (A.O.) No.
99,24 ordering the dismissal of petitioner. It found that petitioner had
undermined the integrity of the Torrens system by disregarding certain
provisions of the law and had virtually compelled certain individuals
holding separate titles to litigate to protect their rights. In addition, it
was noted that petitioner "prima facie appears to have exacted a
substantial sum from one Danilo Bonifacio to expedite the release [of]
a certificate of title."25
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the OP but the
same was denied by Resolution of September 8, 2000.26
In due time, petitioner appealed the decision of the OP, as embodied in
A.O. No. 99, to the CA. She contended that the order of dismissal had
no factual and legal bases and that she was not afforded due process
especially because issues and matters, which were not agreed upon in
the pre-trial conferences and subsequently embodied in the pre-trial
order, were admitted and considered.
On July 27, 2001, the CA issued the assailed Decision discrediting
petitioner’s claim that she was denied due process, it noting that during
the hearing of her administrative case before the LRA, she was given
the chance to explain her side, and to submit voluminous documents in
her defense, which documentary evidence the DOJ and the OP
considered in arriving at their decisions.
Its own examination of the records, the CA added, did not justify a
departure from the rule that factual findings of lower courts and quasi-
judicial bodies command great respect on appeal. Thus, with a lone
dissent, that of CA Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili, it affirmed A.O. No.
99. 27
Hence, this present Petition for review on certiorari. 28
Having brought this petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
petitioner must be aware that only questions of law may be considered
for resolution.29 It is a well-settled principle that this Court is not a trier
of facts, and that respect is generally accorded to the determinations
made by administrative bodies,30 especially where, as in this case, the
findings and conclusions of the administrative and executive offices
concerned (the LRA, the DOJ and the OP) and those of the CA are
similar.
However, to lay the matter to rest and in the interest of justice, this
Court shall set aside the procedural barrier to a re-examination of the
facts to resolve the legal issues, which pertain to (1) the alleged
violation of petitioner’s right to due process and (2) the propriety of the
order of her dismissal.
In deciding this administrative case, this Court deems it fit, though, to
steer clear from discussing or passing judgment on the validity of the
derivative titles of OCT No. 994, which have spawned a number of
cases.31Reference to OCT No. 994 is made only to determine the
circumstances surrounding the dismissal of petitioner.
In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations,32 this Court laid down the cardinal primary requirements of
due process in administrative proceedings. Foremost of these
requisites is the right to a hearing, including the right to present one’s
case and submit evidence in support thereof.33 The essence of due
process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain
one’s side or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.34
As aptly observed by the CA, petitioner was given every opportunity to
explain her side and to present evidence in her defense during the
administrative investigation conducted by the LRA. Records sufficiently
show that in compliance with the "show-cause" letter of the LRA
Administrator, she submitted her written explanation, and that during
the pre-trial conferences, she presented documentary evidence.
Moreover, petitioner moved without fail for the reconsideration of the
LRA Decision, the DOJ’s recommendation on review, the OP’s order of
dismissal, and the CA Decision affirming her dismissal from
government service. At no instance, therefore, was she deprived of the
chance to question the assailed recommendations, order or decision.
Respecting petitioner’s contention that the LRA, the DOJ and the OP
had digressed from the issues and matters agreed upon during the
pre-trial conferences and thereafter embodied in the pre-trial order,
suffice it to point out that technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied in administrative proceedings.35 At any event, these
matters and issues were seasonably addressed by petitioner’s motions
for reconsideration. Hence, the possibility of surprise and maneuvering,
which the rule on pre-trial is designed to prevent,36 has altogether been
obviated.
Now, the quantum of proof required in an administrative proceeding is
only substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.37 The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person indicted was
responsible for the alleged wrongdoing or misconduct.38
It bears stressing that petitioner stood charged not for changing the
date of registration of OCT No. 994 in TCT Nos. 314535 to 314537,
which was established to have been made upon the instructions of
then Deputy Register of Deeds Vasquez, Jr. Rather, she was indicted
for acquiescing to the change by (1) issuing conflicting "certifications"
on the date of issuance of OCT No. 994; and (2) for making it appear
that there were two OCT Nos. 994. Thus, her protestations that she
had no hand in the alteration are unavailing.
Petitioner herself admits that she had signed TCT Nos. 314535 to
314537, which were issued in the name of Rivera, with the following
statement on the lower portion thereof:
IT IS FURTHER CERTIFIED that said land was originally registered on
the 19th day of April, in the year nineteen hundred and seventeen in the
Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
Volume A-9, page 224, as Original Certificate of Title No. 994,
pursuant to Decree No. 36455 issued in L.R.C. ________ Record
No. 4429, in the name of __________.
This certificate is a transfer from ORIGINAL Certificate of Title No. 994,
which is cancelled by virtue hereof in so far as the above-described
land is concerned.
xxxx
However, she argued that the so-called "certifications" were mere
entries forming part of the titles. Whether it was a "certification" or a
mere statement that she had issued is unnecessary as it does not alter
the fact that she signed several TCTs, some reflecting the date of
registration of OCT No. 994 as May 3, 1917 and the others as April 19,
1917.
The facts on record, moreover, show that petitioner had knowledge of
circumstances that suggested the existence of an irregularity.
First. On March 20, 1996, petitioner had, by letter, referred to the LRA
Legal Department the application of Ms. Roqueta Dimson for the
issuance of the certificate of title on Lot 23-A of the Maysilo estate, in
which Dimson had contended that all previously-issued titles which
were derived from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 were void ab initio.
In a subsequent letter to the LRA Administrator dated May 2,
1996,39 she raised serious doubts over Dimson’s request for annotation
of a Notice of Lis Pendens on the certificates of titles of Mt. Carmel
Farms, Inc., which were also derived from OCT No. 994. She pointedly
stated in her letter, as follows:
If we allow the registration of the Notice of Lis Pendens of Dimson,
what will prevent her to question all titles derived from OCT No. 994
issued on May 3, 1917.
To prevent the proliferation of similar request and nuisance suits, may
we request this Authority for its official stand on OCT No. 994 and the
Dimson titles. To date, the Dimson titles and their derivative titles [are]
still existing and on file at the Registries of Deeds of Kalookan and
Malabon despite the Verification Committee’s findings that they were
issued void ab initio.40
Second. Petitioner wrote Phil-Ville a letter dated September 20,
199641 in which she categorically stated that OCT No. 994 was issued
pursuant to Decree No. 36455 dated April 19, 1917, and the date of
transcription of said decree at the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Pasig, Rizal was May 3, 1917.
Third. As CA Justice Agcaoili had correctly observed in his dissent,
"petitioner had previously issued certificates of title in the names of
other individuals reflecting the true date of issue of OCT No. 994, the
mother title, i.e., May 3, 1917."42
In light of these facts, it was indeed surprising that petitioner consented
to the acquisition by her children in July 1996 of a property titled in the
name of Norma Dimson Tirado. As a consequence of this acquisition,
she issued on August 12, 1996 TCT No. 312804, to which April 19,
1917 was carried over as the date of registration of OCT No. 994.
Considering the proximity of the issuance of TCT No. 312804 to her
letters of March 20, 1996 and May 2, 1996, it is highly inconceivable
that petitioner was unaware of the supposedly altered date of
registration of OCT No. 994 that was reflected in her children’s TCT.
Parenthetically, it was because of the issuance of the TCT in her
children’s favor that petitioner was found by the DOJ to have
additionally violated the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees,43which prohibits government officials
and employees from having any interest in a transaction requiring their
approval.
Even her contention that she was without a remedy to correct an
erroneous entry that had been carried over to the derivative TCT was
belied by her filing before the RTC, Branch 120, Caloocan City, in Civil
Case No. C-424, of a Petition dated January 199744 for the correction
of the erroneous entries of "19th" and "April" on the blank spaces in the
"certification" portion of Rivera’s titles. Invoking Section 10845 of P.D.
No. 1529, she manifested that the correct dates were "3rd" and "May"
because these "are the dates appearing in the original of OCT No.
994" on file in the registry.
As for petitioner’s next contention that the issuance of Rivera’s titles
merely involved the mechanical procedure of transferring the dates
contained in the derivative titles which she, as head of office, had every
right to rely on the bona fides of her subordinates, the same deserves
scant consideration.
Unlike in Arias v. Sandiganbayan,46 upon which petitioner relies for
jurisprudential support, petitioner’s foreknowledge of facts and
circumstances that suggested an irregularity constituted added
reason47 for her to exercise a greater degree of circumspection before
signing and issuing the titles.
1awphi1.nét
Arias and the subsequent case of Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan48 were
held inapplicable in Escara v. People49because the person indicted
therein had foreknowledge of the existence of an anomaly that should
have put him on guard regarding the transaction.
It may not be amiss to mention that even Justice Agcaoili, in his dissent
to the assailed CA Decision, observed petitioner’s failure to take
precautionary measures, thus:
x x x Considering the notoriety of the Maysilo estate as the "mother of
all land titling scams," the irregularity attending the issuance of the
titles could have been avoided had petitioner exercised a little more
due care and circumspection before she affixed her signature [on the
Rivera titles]. The fact that the Maysilo estate has spawned conflicting
claims of ownership which invariably reached the courts, a fact which
petitioner cannot ignore on account of her long exposure and
experience as a register of deeds, should have impelled petitioner to
be more prudent even to the extent of deliberately holding action on
the papers submitted to her relative to the estate until she shall have
fully satisfied herself that everything was above board. x x x
xxxx
If petitioner had made further investigation (in the light of her previous
certifications and the notoriety of the Maysilo estate as a potential
breeding ground of titling irregularities) and, thus, made a timely
discovery of the error in the questioned entry, but still was in doubt on
how to proceed, she could have easily referred the matter to the LRA
Administrator en consulta as authorized by Section 117 of PD No.
1529 x x x.50 (Emphasis in the original)
Petitioner’s claim that the issuance of Rivera’s TCTs was her
ministerial duty in accordance with the final and executory order of the
trial court, deserves scant consideration too insofar as the carrying
over of the technical descriptions contained in Judge Discaya’s order
was concerned.
The date of registration of OCT No. 994, however, was a different
matter. To note, Rivera’s owner’s duplicate certificates of title were not
submitted to the register of deeds for cancellation as required in
Section 5351 of P.D. No. 1529 because Judge Discaya’s Order of
September 17, 1996 had excused the submission of the duplicate
certificates. Hence, it was left to petitioner’s office to supply the date of
registration of OCT No. 994 upon verification of the copy it had on file.
For this reason, Deputy Register of Deeds Vasquez, Jr. wrote in pencil
the missing information on the blank spaces, according to clerk Nelda
Zacarias.52 Vasquez, Jr. admitted in his February 21, 1997 reply-
memorandum to petitioner that he had "instructed one of the
employees to change [the date] from May 3, 1917 to April 19, 1917." 53
The observations of the LRA and the DOJ on petitioner’s failure to
require the presentation of the subdivision plan for Rivera’s three titles
are in keeping with the provisions of Sections 50 and 58 of P.D. No.
1529, as follows:
SEC. 50. Subdivision and consolidation plans. – Any owner subdividing
a tract of registered land into lots which do not constitute a subdivision
project as defined and provided for under P.D. 957, shall file with the
Commissioner of Land Registration or with the Bureau of Lands a
subdivision plan of such land on which all boundaries, streets,
passageways and waterways, if any, shall be distinctly and accurately
delineated.
If a subdivision plan, be it simple or complex, duly approved by the
Commissioner of Land Registration or the Bureau of Lands together
with the approved technical descriptions and the corresponding
owner’s duplicate certificate of title is presented for registration, the
Register of Deeds shall, without requiring further court approval of said
plan, register the same in accordance with the provisions of the Land
Registration Act, as amended. x x x 1a\^/phi 1.net
xxxx
SEC. 58. Procedure where conveyance involves portion of land. – If a
deed of conveyance is for a part of the land described in a certificate of
title, the Register of Deeds shall not enter any transfer certificate of title
to the grantee until a plan of such land showing all the portions or lots
into which it has been subdivided and the corresponding technical
descriptions shall have been verified and approved pursuant to Section
50 of this Decree. x x x
Upon the approval of the plan and technical descriptions, the original of
the plan, together with a certified copy of the technical descriptions
shall be filed with the Register of Deeds for annotation in the
corresponding certificate of title and thereupon said officer shall issue a
new certificate of title to the grantee for the portion conveyed, and at
the same time cancel the grantor’s certificate partially with respect only
to the said portion conveyed. x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is clearly evident from the above provisions that for petitioner-
register of deeds to issue a new certificate of title, she must require the
submission of the approved subdivision plan together with the
approved technical descriptions and the corresponding owner’s
duplicate certificate of title. Therefore, she could not have dispensed
with the submission of the subdivision plan and relied solely on the
technical descriptions provided in the court’s Order.
Likewise, this Court holds that petitioner should have required proof of
payment of inheritance tax over the portions that were transferred to
Rivera because these lots were conveyances from the estate of her
alleged grandmother, Maria Consolacion Vidal, in whose name the lots
were originally registered under OCT No. 994.
The following disquisition of the DOJ is thus noted with approval:
As to the question regarding the presentation of proof of payment of
inheritance tax, respondent Alfonso claims that no inheritance tax is
due on the estate simply because there is no inheritance involved as
the titles were issued pursuant to a court order in a judicial partition
and the adjudicatee Eleuteria Rivera is very much alive at the time of
issuance. Again, this deserves scant consideration. It does not matter
whether Eleuteria Rivera is alive or not because the subject matter of
inheritance tax is not the estate of Eleuteria Rivera but the transfer of
property covered by the subject titles by way of inheritance from the
predecessor and alleged parent Maria Concepcion Vidal to the heir
who is Eleuteria Rivera. (Underscoring supplied)
The alleged iniquity between the penalty of dismissal meted on
petitioner and the one-year suspension of Vasquez, Jr. is an issue that
cannot be resolved in this petition in the absence of facts concerning
the administrative proceedings against the latter.
A final matter. In light of the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Danilo
Bonifacio54 before the DOJ, the additional circumstance (which the OP
had considered in its Decision) that petitioner had allegedly accepted
money in exchange for the issuance of a title has become a non-issue
against her.
"Serious misconduct," as a valid cause for the dismissal of an
employee, is improper or wrong conduct; the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action; a forbidden act or dereliction of
duty, which is willful and intentional neglect and not mere error in
judgment.55 It must be grave and aggravated in character and not
merely trivial or unimportant.56 In addition, it must be directly related
and/or connected to the performance of official duties. 57 Without
question, all of these requisites are present in this case. Petitioner is
thus administratively liable for serious misconduct.
Petitioner is liable too for dishonesty defined in Civil Service
Commission v. Cayobit58 as ". . . the concealment or distortion of truth
in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the
performance of his duty."
It goes without saying that by failing to prevent the irregularity that she
had reason to suspect all along or to take immediate steps to rectify it,
petitioner had tolerated the same and allowed it to wreak havoc on our
land-titling system. Sadly, that confusion continues to rear its ugly head
to this day.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128573 January 13, 2003
NAAWAN COMMUNITY RURAL BANK INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO AND
ANNABELLE LUMO, respondents.
CORONA, J.:
Under the established principles of land registration, a person dealing
with registered land may generally rely on the correctness of a
certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond it
to determine the legal status of the property.
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the
February 7, 1997 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
55149, which in turn affirmed the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18 as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the plaintiffs-spouses are adjudged the
absolute owners and possessors of the properties in
question (Lot 18583, under TCT No. T-50134, and all
improvements thereon) and quieting title thereto as against
any and all adverse claims of the defendant. Further, the
sheriff's certificate of sale, Exhibit 4; 4-A; Sheriff's deed of
final conveyance, Exhibit 5, 5-A; Tax Declarations No.
71211, Exhibit 7, and any and all instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding in favor of the defendant, as
against the plaintiffs, and their predecessor-in-interest, which
may be extant in the office of the Register of Deeds of
Province of Misamis Oriental, and of Cagayan de Oro City,
and in the City Assessor's Office of Cagayan de Oro City,
are declared as invalid and ineffective as against the
plaintiffs' title.
"The counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
"SO ORDERED."3
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On April 30, 1988, a certain Guillermo Comayas offered to sell to
private respondent-spouses Alfredo and Annabelle Lumo, a house and
lot measuring 340 square meters located at Pinikitan, Camaman-an,
Cagayan de Oro City.
Wanting to buy said house and lot, private respondents made inquiries
at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City where
the property is located and the Bureau of Lands on the legal status of
the vendor's title. They found out that the property was mortgaged for
P8,000 to a certain Mrs. Galupo and that the owner's copy of the
Certificate of Title to said property was in her possession.
Private respondents directed Guillermo Comayas to redeem the
property from Galupo at their expense, giving the amount of P10,000 to
Comayas for that purpose.
On May 30, 1988, a release of the adverse claim of Galupo was
annotated on TCT No. T-41499 which covered the subject property.
In the meantime, on May 17, 1988, even before the release of
Galupo's adverse claim, private respondents and Guillermo Comayas,
executed a deed of absolute sale. The subject property was allegedly
sold for P125,000 but the deed of sale reflected the amount of only
P30,000 which was the amount private respondents were ready to pay
at the time of the execution of said deed, the balance payable by
installment.
On June 9, 1988, the deed of absolute sale was registered and
inscribed on TCT No. T-41499 and, on even date, TCT No. T-50134
was issued in favor of private respondents.
After obtaining their TCT, private respondents requested the issuance
of a new tax declaration certificate in their names. However, they were
surprised to learn from the City Assessor's Office that the property was
also declared for tax purposes in the name of petitioner Naawan
Community Rural Bank Inc. Records in the City Assessor's Office
revealed that, for the lot covered by TCT No. T-50134, Alfredo Lumo's
T/D # 83324 bore the note: "This lot is also declared in the name of
Naawan Community Rural Bank Inc. under T/D # 71210".
Apparently, on February 7, 1983, Guillermo Comayas obtained a
P15,000 loan from petitioner Bank using the subject property as
security. At the time said contract of mortgage was entered into, the
subject property was then an unregistered parcel of residential land,
tax-declared in the name of a certain Sergio A. Balibay while the
residential one-storey house was tax-declared in the name of
Comayas.
Balibay executed a special power of attorney authorizing Comayas to
borrow money and use the subject lot as security. But the Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage and the Special Power of Attorney were recorded in
the registration book of the Province of Misamis Oriental, not in the
registration book of Cagayan de Oro City. It appears that, when the
registration was made, there was only one Register of Deeds for the
entire province of Misamis Oriental, including Cagayan de Oro City. It
was only in 1985 when the Office of the Register of Deeds for Cagayan
de Oro City was established separately from the Office of the Register
of Deeds for the Province of Misamis Oriental.
For failure of Comayas to pay, the real estate mortgage was foreclosed
and the subject property sold at a public auction to the mortgagee
Naawan Community Rural Bank as the highest bidder in the amount of
P16,031.35. Thereafter, the sheriff's certificate of sale was issued and
registered under Act 3344 in the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Misamis Oriental.
On April 17, 1984, the subject property was registered in original
proceedings under the Land Registration Act. Title was entered in the
registration book of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City as
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-820, pursuant to Decree No. N-
189413.
On July 23, 1984, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41499 in the name
of Guillermo P. Comayas was entered in the Register of Deeds of
Cagayan de Oro City.
Meanwhile, on September 5, 1986, the period for redemption of the
foreclosed subject property lapsed and the MTCC Deputy Sheriff of
Cagayan de Oro City issued and delivered to petitioner bank
the sheriff's deed of final conveyance. This time, the deed was
registered under Act 3344 and recorded in the registration book of the
Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City.
By virtue of said deed, petitioner Bank obtained a tax declaration for
the subject house and lot.
Thereafter, petitioner Bank instituted an action for ejectment against
Comayas before the MTCC which decided in its favor. On appeal, the
Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision of the MTCC in a decision
dated April 13, 1988.
On January 27, 1989, the Regional Trial Court issued an order for the
issuance of a writ of execution of its judgment. The MTCC, being the
court of origin, promptly issued said writ.
However, when the writ was served, the property was no longer
occupied by Comayas but herein private respondents, the spouses
Lumo who had, as earlier mentioned, bought it from Comayas on May
17, 1988.
Alarmed by the prospect of being ejected from their home, private
respondents filed an action for quieting of title which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 89-138. After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered a
decision declaring private respondents as purchasers for value and in
good faith, and consequently declaring them as the absolute owners
and possessors of the subject house and lot. Petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals which in turn affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE SHERIFF'S DEED OF FINAL
CONVEYANCE WAS DULY EXECUTED AND
REGISTERED IN THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY ON DECEMBER 2, 1986;
II. WHETHER OR NOT REGISTRATION OF SHERIFF'S
DEED OF FINAL CONVEYANCE IN THE PROPER
REGISTRY OF DEEDS COULD BE EFFECTIVE AS
AGAINST SPOUSES LUMO.
Both parties cite Article 1544 of the Civil Code which governs the
double sale of immovable property.
Article 1544 provides:
". . . . Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property."
Petitioner bank contends that the earlier registration of the sheriff's
deed of final conveyance in the day book under Act 3344 should
prevail over the later registration of private respondents' deed of
absolute sale under Act 496,4 as amended by the Property Registration
Decree, PD 1529.
This contention has no leg to stand on. It has been held that, where a
person claims to have superior proprietary rights over another on the
ground that he derived his title from a sheriff's sale registered in the
Registry of Property, Article 1473 (now Article 1544) of the Civil Code
will apply only if said execution sale of real estate is registered under
Act 496.5
Unfortunately, the subject property was still untitled when it was
already acquired by petitioner bank by virtue of a final deed of
conveyance. On the other hand, when private respondents purchased
the same property, it was covered by the Torrens System.
Petitioner also relies on the case of Bautista vs. Fule6 where the Court
ruled that the registration of an instrument involving unregistered land
in the Registry of Deeds creates constructive notice and binds third
person who may subsequently deal with the same property.
However, a close scrutiny of the records reveals that, at the time of the
execution and delivery of the sheriff's deed of final conveyance on
September 5, 1986, the disputed property was already covered by the
Land Registration Act and Original Certificate of Title No. 0-820
pursuant to Decree No. N189413 was likewise already entered in the
registration book of the Register of Deeds of Cagayan De Oro City as
of April 17, 1984.
Thus, from April 17, 1984, the subject property was already under the
operation of the Torrens System. Under the said system, registration is
the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien
upon the land.
Moreover, the issuance of a certificate of title had the effect of relieving
the land of all claims except those noted thereon. Accordingly, private
respondents, in dealing with the subject registered land, were not
required by law to go beyond the register to determine the legal
condition of the property. They were only charged with notice of such
burdens on the property as were noted on the register or the certificate
of title. To have required them to do more would have been to defeat
the primary object of the Torrens System which is to make the Torrens
Title indefeasible and valid against the whole world.

Private respondents posit that, even assuming that the sheriff's deed of
final conveyance in favor of petitioner bank was duly recorded in the
day book of the Register of Deeds under Act 3344, ownership of the
subject real property would still be theirs as purchasers in good faith
because they registered the sale first under the Property Registration
Decree.

The rights created by the above-stated statute of course do not and

cannot accrue under an inscription in bad faith. Mere registration of title
in case of double sale is not enough; good faith must concur with the
registration.7

Petitioner contends that the due and proper registration of the sheriff's
deed of final conveyance on December 2, 1986 amounted to
constructive notice to private respondents. Thus, when private
respondents bought the subject property on May 17, 1988, they were
deemed to have purchased the said property with the knowledge that it
was already registered in the name of petitioner bank.

Thus, the only issue left to be resolved is whether or not private

respondents could be considered as buyers in good faith.

The "priority in time" principle being invoked by petitioner bank is

misplaced because its registration referred to land not within the
Torrens System but under Act 3344. On the other hand, when private
respondents bought the subject property, the same was already
registered under the Torrens System. It is a well-known rule in this
jurisdiction that persons dealing with registered land have the legal
right to rely on the face of the Torrens Certificate of Title and to
dispense with the need to inquire further, except when the party
concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. 8

Did private respondents exercise the required diligence in ascertaining

the legal condition of the title to the subject property so as to be
considered as innocent purchasers for value and in good faith?

We answer in the affirmative.

Before private respondents bought the subject property from Guillermo

Comayas, inquiries were made with the Registry of Deeds and the
Bureau of Lands regarding the status of the vendor's title. No liens or
encumbrances were found to have been annotated on the certificate of
title. Neither were private respondents aware of any adverse claim or
lien on the property other than the adverse claim of a certain Geneva
Galupo to whom Guillermo Comayas had mortgaged the subject
property. But, as already mentioned, the claim of Galupo was
eventually settled and the adverse claim previously annotated on the
title cancelled. Thus, having made the necessary inquiries, private
respondents did not have to go beyond the certificate of title.
Otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the Torrens Certificate of
Title would be rendered futile and nugatory.

Considering therefore that private respondents exercised the diligence

required by law in ascertaining the legal status of the Torrens title of
Guillermo Comayas over the subject property and found no flaws
therein, they should be considered as innocent purchasers for value
and in good faith.

Accordingly, the appealed judgment of the appellate court upholding

private respondents Alfredo and Annabelle Lumo as the true and
rightful owners of the disputed property is affirmed.

WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.