Taruc vs.
Bishop Dela Cruz
Facts:
Petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent Church (PIC).
On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners
expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church.
Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz
before the Regional Trial Court.They contended that their expulsion was
illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due
process of law.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of religious rights in this case?
Held:
No. The expulsion/excommunication of members of a religious
institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials,
and the laws and canons, of said institution/organization. It is not for the
courts to exercise control over church authorities in the performance of
their discretionary and official functions. Rather, it is for the members of
religious institutions/organizations to conform to just church regulations.
“Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious
organization except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights
may be the subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have
jurisdiction to determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession
of church property.” Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the
present case.
School District v. Schempp
Facts of the case
The Abington case concerns Bible-reading in Pennsylvania public schools. At
the beginning of the school day, students who attended public schools in the
state of Pennsylvania were required to read at least ten verses from the
Bible. After completing these readings, school authorities required all
Abington Township students to recite the Lord's Prayer. Students could be
excluded from these exercises by a written note from their parents to the
school. In a related case -- Murray v. Curlett -- a Baltimore statute required
Bible-reading or the recitation of the Lord's Prayer at open exercises in
public schools. Murray and his mother, professed atheists -- challenged the
prayer requirement.
Question
Did the Pennsylvania law and Abington's policy, requiring public school
students to participate in classroom religious exercises, violate the religious
freedom of students as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?
Conclusion
The Court found such a violation. The required activities encroached on both
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment since the readings and recitations were essentially religious
ceremonies and were "intended by the State to be so." Furthermore, argued
Justice Clark, the ability of a parent to excuse a child from these ceremonies
by a written note was irrelevant since it did not prevent the school's actions
from violating the Establishment Clause.

Lemon v Kurtzman
Facts of the case
Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the
state to pay for aspects of non-secular, non-public education. The
Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and provided funding for non-
public elementary and secondary school teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Island’s statute was
passed in 1969 and provided state financial support for non-public
elementary schools in the form of supplementing 15% of teachers’ annual
salaries.
The appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers
in Pennsylvania who believed that the statute violated the separation of
church and state described in the First Amendment. Appellant Lemon also
had a child in Pennsylvania public school. The district court granted the state
officials’ motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees
were citizens and tax payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in
question declared unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The district court found in
favor of the appellees and held that the statute violated the First
Amendment.
Question: Do statutes that provide state funding for non-public, non-secular
schools violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority
as to the Pennsylvania statute and 8-1 as to the Rhode Island statute. The
Court held that a statute must pass a three-pronged test in order to avoid
violating the Establishment Clause. The statute must have a secular
legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
promotes nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster “excessive government
entanglement with religion.” The Court held that both the state statutes in
question had secular legislative purposes because they reflected the desire
of the states to ensure minimum secular education requirements were being
met in the non-public schools. The Court did not reach a holding regarding
the second prong of the test, but it did find that the statutes constituted an
excessive government entanglement with religion. In the Rhode Island
program, the amount of oversight of teachers and curricula required to
ensure that there is no unnecessary injection of religion into secular topics
would require the government to become excessively involved in the
nuances of religious education. The same danger holds true for the
Pennsylvania statute, which additionally provides state funding directly to a
church-related organization. Government financial involvement in such
institutions inevitably leads to “an intimate and continuing relationship”
between church and state. The Court also noted the potential political
implications of public funding, as there is a risk of religious issues becoming
politically divisive.
In his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the intrusion
of the government into the running of non-public schools through grants
and other funding creates the entanglement that the Establishment Clause
prohibits. He also argued that non-secular schools are so thoroughly
governed by religious ideologies that any amount of public funding supports
those doctrines, which the Framers of the Constitution dictated the
government must not do. Justice Hugo L. Black joined in the concurrence,
and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the parts relating to case numbers
569 and 570. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a separate concurrence in
which he argued that the danger was not only that religion would infiltrate
the government, but also that the government would push secularization
onto religious creeds. An analysis of the statutes in question shows that they
impermissible involve the government in “essentially religious activities,”
which the Establishment Clause is meant to prevent. In his opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Byron R. White wrote that
the majority opinion goes too far and, in restricting the use of state funds in
non-secular schools, creates an obstacle to the use of public funds for
secular education. He argued that there was no proof that religion would
invade secular education or that the government oversight of the use of
public funds would be so extensive as to constitute entanglement.
Tilton v Richardson
Facts of the case
The federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provided construction
grants to church-sponsored higher educational institutions. The grants were
to be used for the construction of non-religious school facilities. The Act also
stipulated that twenty years after the grant had been given, schools were
free to use the buildings for any purpose.
Question
Did the Act violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that only the 20-year limitation portion
of the Act violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The Court
invalidated the 20-year clause, arguing that subsidizing the construction of
facilities used for non-secular purposes would have the effect of advancing
religion. The Court held that the church-related institutions in question had
not used their federally-funded facilities for religious activities, and that the
facilities were "indistinguishable from a typical state university facility." The
Court also held that the Act did not excessively entangle the government
with religion, noting that college students were less susceptible to religious
indoctrination, that the aid was of "nonideological character," and that one-
time grants did not require constant state surveillance.
Zobrest v Catalina
Facts of the case
James Zobrest was deaf since birth. He attended public school through the
eighth grade where the local school board provided a sign-language
interpreter. Zobrest's parents elected to send their son to a Roman Catholic
high school and requested that the local school board continue to provide
their son with a sign-language interpreter. The school board denied the
request on constitutional grounds. The Zobrests then filed suit, alleging that
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment required the school district to provide the
interpreter and that the Establishment Clause did not bar such relief. The
District Court granted the school district summary judgment on the ground
that the interpreter would act as a conduit for the child's religious
inculcation, thereby promoting his religious development at government
expense in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Question
May a school district decline to provide an interpreter to a deaf child based
on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
No. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the
Court held that the Establishment Clause did not bar the school district from
providing the requested interpreter. Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that,
because the IDEA creates no financial incentive for parents to choose a
sectarian school, the presence of an interpreter is not linked to the state and
is the result of the private decision of individual's parents. "The service at
issue in this case is part of a general government program that distributes
benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'handicapped' under the IDEA,
without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of
the school the child attends," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Capitol Square Review Board v Pinette
Facts of the case
In 1993, the Ku Klux Klan organization attempted to place an unattended
cross on Capitol Square, the state-house plaza in Columbus, Ohio, during the
1993 Christmas season. Ohio law makes Capitol Square a forum for
discussion of public questions and for public activities, and gives the
Advisory Board responsibility for regulating access to the square. The Board
denied the application of the Ku Klux Klan to erect the cross on
Establishment Clause grounds.
Question
Did the Board's denial of a permit to the Ku Klux Klan violate free speech
under the First Amendment?
Conclusion
Yes. The display was private religious speech that "is as fully protected under
the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression." Because Capitol
Square is designated as a traditional public forum, any group may express
their views there, and the Board may regulate the content of the Klan's
expression on the plaza only if a restriction is necessary and narrowly drawn
to serve a compelling state interest.
ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (IDCP) vs. Office of the
Executive Secretary, et al (2003)
FACTS: Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-
governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the Filipino
people, especially to Muslim communities. Among the functions petitioner
carries out is to conduct seminars, orient manufacturers on halal food and
issue halal certifications to qualified products and manufacturers. On
October 26, 2001, respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46
5 creating the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating
respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its implementation.
Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive authority to issue halal
certificates and perform other related regulatory activities. Petitioner
contends that the subject EO violates the constitutional provision on the
separation of Church and State and that it is unconstitutional for the
government to formulate policies and guidelines on the halal certification
scheme because said scheme is a function only religious organizations,
entity or scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.
ISSUE: Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to freedom
of religion
RULING: The Court grants the petition. OMA deals with the societal, legal,
political and economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national
cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus, bearing in mind the
constitutional barrier between the Church and State, the latter must make
sure that OMA does not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate
the non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion" provision
found in Article III, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution. Freedom of religion
was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And
this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is
"designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to
live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and
with the common good." Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal
is a religious function because the standards used are drawn from the
Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the exclusive power to classify
food products as halal, EO 46 encroached on the religious freedom of
Muslim organizations like herein petitioner to interpret for Filipino Muslims
what food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to Cantwell v Connecticut
itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the State has in effect forced
Muslims to accept its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal Facts of the case
food. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security
Jesse Cantwell and his son were Jehovah's Witnesses; they were
and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious
proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut. The
freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of
Cantwells distributed religious materials by travelling door-to-door and by
the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with
approaching people on the street. After voluntarily hearing an anti-Roman
a democratic framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference
Catholic message on the Cantwells' portable phonograph, two pedestrians
with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable
reacted angrily. The Cantwells were subsequently arrested for violating a
freedom of personal and religious activity. There is no compelling
local ordinance requiring a permit for solicitation and for inciting a breach of
justification for the government to deprive Muslim organizations, like herein
the peace.
petitioner, of their religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the
premise that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by Question
assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The
Did the solicitation statute or the "breach of the peace" ordinance violate
protection and promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already
the Cantwells' First Amendment free speech or free exercise rights?
provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government agencies
charged with ensuring that food products released in the market are fit for Conclusion
human consumption, properly labeled and safe. Unlike EO 46, these laws do
Yes. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that while general regulations
not encroach on the religious freedom of Muslims. With these regulatory
on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions based on religious grounds were
bodies given detailed functions on how to screen and check the quality and
not. Because the statute allowed local officials to determine which causes
safety of food products, the perceived danger against the health of Muslim
were religious and which ones were not, it violated the First and Fourteenth
and non-Muslim Filipinos alike is totally avoided. The halal certifications
Amendments. The Court also held that while the maintenance of public
issued by petitioner and similar organizations come forward as the official
order was a valid state interest, it could not be used to justify the
religious approval of a food product fit for Muslim consumption. The
suppression of "free communication of views." The Cantwells' message,
petition is GRANTED. Executive Order 46, s. 2000, is hereby declared NULL
while offensive to many, did not entail any threat of "bodily harm" and was
AND VOID.
protected religious speech.
 US v Ballard
Brief Fact Summary. Ballard (Respondent) was charged with defrauding the
public by practicing a religion that he knew was false.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Religion is determined by the sincerity and depth of
the belief, not by whether it is true or false.
Facts. Respondent was convicted of using the mail to defraud the public. He
organized a religious group. He claimed that he had supernatural powers to
heal the sick and diseased. The charge indicated that Respondent knew that
these claims were false.
Issue. Is Respondent being unconstitutionally persecuted for his religious
beliefs?
Held. Yes. Although Respondent’s religion seems incredible to most, it is not
the role of a jury to determine its veracity. If this religion were subject to
such a trial, then all organized religions would need to be treated similarly.
Dissent. The government cannot prove that Respondent knew something
was false when it opts to separate religious sincerity from verity.
Discussion. The First Amendment protects the right to choose and practice a
religion of the individual’s choice. This includes freedom to believe and
freedom to act. Just because a religious doctrine cannot be proven does not
mean that it is not a religion and not protected by the United States
Constitution.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-
list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the
latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited
certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that
since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are
considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the
Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant
Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy,
freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and
that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for
the first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by
the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably
actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel. damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal

Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of
Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and
legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands
for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the
law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the
party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA
7941.
and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of
the property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the
other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of
violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals
cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely
moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
“government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be

prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has
the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s

Wisconsin v Yoder
Brief Fact Summary. Several Amish families appealed a decision convicting
them of failing to send their children to school until the age of 16 based
upon Freedom of Religion under the constitution.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The law compelling parents to send their children to
public school until the age of 16 is unconstitutional as applied because it
impermissibly interferes with the Amish religious beliefs.
Facts. Respondents Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy are members
of the Amish religion. Wisconsin’s compulsory school-attendance law
required them to cause their children to attend public or private school until
they reach 16. Respondents declined to send their children to public school
after completion of the eighth grade. Respondents were convicted of
violating the law and fined $5 each.
Issue. Did the application of the compulsory attendance law violate
respondent’s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution?
Held. The application of the law is unconstitutional as applied to the Amish.
The Amish object to the high school education because the values taught
there are in marked variance from the Amish values and way of life. It places
Amish children in an environment hostile to their beliefs and takes them
away from their community during a crucial period in their life. The Amish
do not object to elementary education. Expert Dr. Hostetler testified that the
compulsory attendance could result in not only great psychological harm to
Amish children but ultimately the destruction of the Old Order Amish church
community.
The State has the power to impose reasonable regulations for the control
and duration of basic education. Previous precedent has held that this
power must yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education
in a privately operated system. The State’s power is subject to a balancing
test when it impinges on fundamental rights such as those protected by the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interest of
parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.
In order for Wisconsin to compel such attendance, it must follow that either
the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its
requirement or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to
override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.
This Court determines that the Amish objection to the attendance is rooted
in religious beliefs that directly conflict with the compulsory school
attendance law.
The State advances two arguments. First, it notes that some degree of
education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and
intelligently in our open political system. Second, education prepares
individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. We
accept these propositions. However, the evidence adduced shows that an
additional one or two years of formal high school would do little to serve
those interests. Such education may be necessary for preparation for the
modern society in which we live, but is not for the separated agrarian
community of the Amish faith.
The State attacks respondents’ position as fostering ignorance from which
children must be protected by the State. However, the record shows that the
Amish community has been a highly successful social unit within our society,
producing productive and law-abiding citizens. The State also supports its
position on the possibility that some children will choose to leave the Amish
community. This argument is highly speculative on the record, and the
practical agricultural training and habits of industry would support children
that did choose to leave.
The requirement for compulsory high school education is a fairly recent
development, designed to not only provide educational opportunities, but
also to avoid child labor or forced idleness. In these terms, Wisconsin’s
interest in compelling school attendance is less substantial for Amish
children than for children generally.
The State finally argues that exempting the Amish children fails to recognize
the children’s substantive right to a secondary education, giving due regard
to the power of the State as parens patriae. On this record there is no need
to decide an issue in which the Amish parent’s are preventing children who
wish to further their education from attending school.
Dissent. The majority assumes that the interests at stake are only those of
the parents and the State. The children also have a legitimate interest in
their education. The inevitable effect of the decision is to impose the
parents’ notions of religious duty upon their children. It is the future of the
student, not the parents, that is imperiled by today’s decision. The views of
the two children in question were not canvassed, and should be on remand.
Discussion. The majority’s decision did not determine that the statute would
violate Constitutional rights if the children wanted to pursue further
education, but found that such a decision was unnecessary because no such
claim was made on the record. The dissent suggested that the cause should
be remanded to determine the desire of the children.
Pamil v Teleron
86 SCRA 413 – Political Law – Inviolability of the Separation of Church and
State
In 1971, Fr. Margarito Gonzaga, a priest, won the election for mayoralty in
Alburquerque, Bohol. He was later proclaimed as mayor therein. Fortunato
Pamil, a rival candidate filed a quo warranto case against Gonzaga
questioning the eligibility of Gonzaga. He argued that as provided for in
Section 2175 of the 1917 Revised Administrative Code:
…in no case shall there be elected or appointed to a municipal office
ecclesiastics, soldiers in active service, persons receiving salaries or
compensation from provincial or national funds, or contractors for public
works of the municipality.
In this case, the elected mayor is a priest. However, Judge Victorino Teleron
ruled that the Administrative Code is repealed by the Election Code of 1971
which now allows ecclesiastics to run.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2175 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917 is no longer operative?
HELD: The Supreme Court decision was indecisive. Under the 1935
Constitution, “No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.” If the the doctrine of constitutional supremacy is to be
maintained, then Section 2175 shall not prevail, thus, an ecclesiastic may
run for elective office. However, this issue proved to have divided the
Supreme Court because it failed to obtain the majority vote of eight (8)
which is needed in order to declare Section 2175 of the RAC to be
unconstitutional. For this, the petition filed by Pamil must be granted and
the decision of the lower court reversed and set aside. Fr. Gonzaga is hereby
ordered to vacate the mayoralty position.
It was also pointed out (in the dissenting opinions) that how can one who
swore to serve the Church’s interest above all be in duty to enforce state
policies which at times may conflict with church tenets. This is in violation of
the separation of the church and state. The Revised Administrative Code still
stands because there is no implied repeal.
Dissenting Opinion
J. Teehankee – The Comelec ruled that soldiers in active service and persons
receiving salaries or compensation from provincial or national funds “are
obviously now allowed to run for a public elective office because under Sec.
23 of the Election Code of 1971 ‘every person holding a public appointive
office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces’ shall ipso
facto cease in their office or position on the date they file their certificates of
candidacy. This implies that they are no longer disqualified from running for
an elective office.” The Comelec further ruled that as to the two remaining
categories formerly banned under the Revised Administrative Code,
“ecclesiastics and contractors for public works of the municipality are
allowed to run for municipal elective offices under the maxim, ‘Inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius’, they being not included in the enumeration of
persons ineligible under the New Election Code. The rule is that all persons
possessing the necessary qualifications, except those expressly disqualified
by the election code, are eligible to run for public office.”
McDaniel v Paty
Facts of the case
Since its first state Constitution in 1796, Tennessee has had a statute that
prohibited ministers from serving as legislators. In 1977, Paul A. McDaniel, a
Baptist minister, filed as a candidate for the state constitutional convention.
Another candidate, Selma Cash Paty, sued for a declaratory judgment that
McDaniel was disqualified. The Chancery Court held that the statute was
unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
McDaniel’s name remained on the ballot and he was elected. After the
election, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Chancery Court and held that the statute did not restrict any expression of
religious belief. The court held that the state interest in maintaining the
separation of church and state was sufficient to justify the restrictions of the
statute.
Question
Does the Tennessee statute barring “Minister[s] of the Gospel or priest[s] of
any denomination whatever” from serving as legislators violate the free
exercise of religion guaranteed through the First and Fourteenth
Amendments?
Conclusion
Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the unanimous opinion of the
Court. The Court held that the statute made the ability to exercise civil rights
conditional on the surrender of religious rights and therefore violated the
First Amendment protection of the free exercise of religion as applied to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Although the Court hesitated to strike
down a statute that had such a long and vital national history, Tennessee
could not prove that clergy participation was dangerous to the modern
political processes.
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. concurred in the judgment. He argued that the
Tennessee statute essentially established a test of religious conviction in
order to be eligible for office that disqualified anyone with a strong enough
belief to join the clergy. Government imposition of the burden to choose
between one’s religious beliefs and the desire to seek office is an
unconstitutional restriction on the free exercise of religion. He argued that
the Establishment Clause does not give the government the power to
discriminate against religious persons seeking or holding office. Justice
Marshall joined in the opinion concurring in judgment.
Justice Potter Stewart separately concurred in the judgment, and wrote that
this case was covered by the ruling in Torcaso v. Watkins, where the Court
held that states may not condition public office on any type of religious
belief.
Justice Byron R. White wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. He
argued that, rather than violating the First Amendment protection of the
free exercise of religion, the statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Since the statute is specific to ministers, it
implies that ministers are less able to keep outside interests from interfering
with their governmental service than anyone else. Tennessee was not able
to prove the necessity of this restriction.

Goldman v Weinberg
Facts: Goldman was a commissioned officer in the United States Air Force,
an Orthodox Jew, and an ordained rabbi. He was not allowed to wear his
yarmulke while on duty and in Air Force uniform. An Air Force regulation
mandated that indoors, headgear could not be worn "except by armed
security police in the performance of their duties."
Question: Did the Air Force Regulation violate the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment?
Conclusion: The Court held that the Air Force regulation did not violate the
Constitution. Justice Rehnquist argued that, generally, First Amendment
challenges to military regulations are examined with less scrutiny than
similar challenges from civilian society, given the need for the military to
"foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps." Since
allowing overt religious apparel "would detract from the uniformity sought
by dress regulations," the Air Force regulation was necessary and legitimate.
In 1987, Congress passed legislation which reversed this decision and
allowed members of the armed forces to wear religious apparel in a "neat
and conservative" manner.
Lee v Weisman
Brief Fact Summary. The Defendant, Rachel Weisman (Defendant), alleges
that a school sponsored, non-denominational prayer offered at a public
school graduation violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution (Constitution).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A public school cannot sponsor clerics to conduct
even a non-denominational prayer as part of a graduation ceremony as the
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support
or participate in religion or its exercise or otherwise act in a way, which
establishes a state religion, or tends to do so.
Facts. A rabbi was invited to deliver a prayer at a public school’s graduation
ceremony. The rabbi was given a copy of a pamphlet that recommended
prayers at civic ceremonies be inclusive and sensitive. The Defendant, a
student at the school, challenged the practice of having prayers at public
school graduations.
Issue. Whether including clerical members who offer prayer as part of the
official school graduation ceremony is consistent with the Religions clauses
of the First Amendment of the Constitution.
Held. No, including clerical members who offer prayer as part of the official
school ceremony is not consistent with the Religion Clause of the First
Amendment of the Constitution. The fact that the principle decided that a
cleric should offer a prayer at a public school graduation, is as if a state
statute decreed that the prayers must occur. The principal’s act of giving the
cleric guidelines for the prayer means the principal directed and controlled
the content of the prayer in direct violation of the Establishment Clause of
the Constitution, which prohibits the preferring one religion over another.
The court stated that the question is not the good faith of the school in
attempting to make the prayer acceptable to most persons, but the
legitimacy of its undertaking that enterprise at all, when the object is to
produce a prayer to be used in a formal religious exercise, which students,
for all practical purposes, are obliged to attend.
Dissent. In holding that the Establishment Clause of the Constitution
prohibits invocations and benedictions at public school graduation
ceremonies, the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) lays
waste to a tradition that is a component of an even more longstanding
American tradition of nonsectarian prayer to God at public celebrations
generally.
Concurrence. The government must not engage in religious practices.
Discussion. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the
Constitution is a specific prohibition concerning forms of state intervention
in religious affairs. The state may not consistent with the Establishment
Clause of the Constitution place school age children in a position of
participating or protesting prayer at public graduation ceremonies. If the
government regulation contains no religious preference it is valid under the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution if it (i) has a secular purpose; (ii)
has a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion and (iii) does
not produce excessive government entanglement with religion. A public
school sponsoring a nonsectarian prayer at a graduation ceremony is
considered excessive government entanglement and is invalid.
City of Lukumi v City of Hialeah
Brief Fact Summary. City ordinances passed to prevent animal sacrifices in
connection with Santeria rituals were held invalid by the Supreme Court of
the United States (Supreme Court).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral
or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny.
Where the government restricts only conduct protected by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) and fails to
enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial
harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in justification of
the restriction is not compelling.
Facts. Santeria is a religion that fused African religion with Roman
Catholicism. It called for animal sacrifices to keep the orishas (spirits) alive.
In response to the news that a Santeria church was to be built in the city of
Hialeah, the city council held an emergency public session in order to pass
three laws outlawing any animal sacrifices in connection with Santeria
rituals. All ordinances were passed by a unanimous vote. Violations were
punishable by fines not exceeding $500.00 or imprisonment no longer than
sixty days, or both.
Issue. Whether the city ordinances violate the Free Exercise Clause of the
Constitution?
Held. Yes. Judgment of the lower court reversed. The protections of the Free
Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some
religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken
for religious reasons. If the object of the law is to restrict or infringe upon
practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral and it
is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored
to advance that interest. The record in this case compels the conclusion that
suppression of the Santeria worship service was the object of the
ordinances. Here, religious practice is being singled out for discriminatory
treatment. A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of
general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. Where the
government restricts only conduct protected by the First Amendment of the
Constitution and fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other conduct
producing
substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in
justification of the restriction is not compelling. Therefore, the city
ordinances violate the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.
Concurrence. Had the ordinances here been passed with no motivation to
suppress a religious practice, but rather to prevent the cruelty of animals,
they would still be held invalid. The First Amendment looks to the effects of
the laws enacted, not the purposes for which they are enacted.
The decision of the Court is correct, but its reference to Employment
Division v. Smith is objectionable.
Discussion. The Court looked behind the facial neutrality of the law to
discern a religiously discriminatory purpose.
 Yes, by a unaminous vote. The Supreme Court's holding consisted of two
parts. First, the District violated freedom of speech by refusing the Chapel's
request to show movies on school premises solely because such movies
were religiously oriented. While non-public schools are permitted under
New York law to restrict access to their premises based on subject matter or
speaker identity, such restrictions must be reasonable and "viewpoint
neutral." In this case, the District's restriction was neither reasonable nor
viewpoint neutral, since it allowed the presentation of all other views about
family values and child rearing - except those which were presented from a
religious perspective. Second, a grant of permission to the Chapel to use the
District's premises would not have amounted to an establishment of
religion. This is because the showing of the films would neither be school-
sponsored during school hours nor closed to the public.

Lamb’s Chapel v Center Moriches School District

Facts of the case

A New York law authorized schools to regulate the after-hour use of school
property and facilities. The Center Moriches School District, acting under the
statute, prohibited the use of its property by any religious group. The District
refused repeated requests by Lamb's Chapel to use the school's facilities for
an after-hours religious-oriented film series on family values and child
rearing. The Chapel brought suit against the School District in federal court.

Question

Did the District violate the First Amendment's freedom of speech when it
denied Lamb's Chapel the use of school premises to show religious-oriented
films?

Conclusion