Political Law

MUST READ CASES (POLITICAL LAW AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW)

POLITICAL LAW

HOLY SEE v. ROSARIO, G.R. No. 101949,December 1, 1994

The Lateran Treaty established the statehood of the Vatican City "for the purpose of
assuring to the Holy See absolute and visible independence and of guaranteeing to it
indisputable sovereignty also in the field of international relations."

In view of the wordings of the Lateran Treaty, it is difficult to determine whether the
statehood is vested in the Holy See or in the Vatican City. Some writers even suggested
that the treaty created two international persons — the Holy See and Vatican City.

The Vatican City fits into none of the established categories of states, and the attribution
to it of "sovereignty" must be made in a sense different from that in which it is applied to
other states. In a community of national states, the Vatican City represents an entity
organized not for political but for ecclesiastical purposes and international objects.
Despite its size and object, the Vatican City has an independent government of its own,
with the Pope, who is also head of the Roman Catholic Church, as the Holy See or
Head of State, in conformity with its traditions, and the demands of its mission in the
world. Indeed, the world-wide interests and activities of the Vatican City are such as to
make it in a sense an "international state".

HEIRS OF DIOSDADO M. MENDOZA vs. DPWH, G.R. No. 203834, July 9, 2014

We reiterate that the DPWH is an unincorporated government agency without any

separate juridical personality of its own and it enjoys immunity from suit. The then
Ministry of Public Works and Highways, now DPWH, was created under Executive
Order No. 710, series of 1981 (EO 710). EO 710 abolished the old Ministry of
PublicWorks and the Ministry of Public Highways and transferred their functions to the
newly-created Ministry of Public Works of Highways.

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa D.D. et. al. vs.
SCOTT H. SWIFT in his capacity as Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet et.al.
G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014

If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign
agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official
capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from
suit without its consent. However, a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in
bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

In this case, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding
officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its
Political Law

crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military
duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed
to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling.

SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19,1997

Republic Act No. 6735 provided for the system of initiative and referendum for local
legislation and national statutes, without providing for initiative for the amendment of the
Constitution. A petition was filed to amend the constitution regarding term limits.
However, the SC held that the constitutional provision on people's initiatives under the
1987 Constitution (Article XVII § 2) required implementing legislation to be executory.
R.A. 6735 lacked the implementing rules for people's initiatives and such lack could not
be cured by Comelec providing rules. Congress also could not delegate its legislative
authority to Comelec, so Comelec could not validly promulgate rules on the matter as it
was not empowered to do so under law.

LAMBINO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

Lambino made a petition to amend the 1987 Constitution via people’s initiative.
However, his petition did not include the full text of the proposed amendments. The SC
ruled that the initiative did not meet the requirements of the Constitution. An amendment
is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people
sign a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. To do otherwise
would be deceptive and misleading and would render the initiative void, since there
should be both direct proposal and authorship by the person affixing their signature to
the petition.

TANADA v. ANGARA, G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state
policies. The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the basic
political creed of the nation by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not
intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They
are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial
review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading case
of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in
Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing provisions, the disregard
of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

Political Law

A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed
or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the
nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of
its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action.

OPOSA v. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083, February 30, 1993

Oposa, et al. filed a petition to prevent further logging licenses from being issued. The
Supreme Court, recognizing the intergenerational equity of the petitioners as the basis
of their standing, held that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is explicitly
provided in Art. II § 16 of the Constitution. While it is found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies, not Bill of Rights, but it is not any less important than any
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. It concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation and is assumed to exist from the inception of
mankind. Thus, those provisions are self-executing.

ESTRADA v. ESCRITOR, A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003

Considering the American origin of the Philippine religion clauses and the intent to
adopt the historical background, nature, extent and limitations of the First Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution when it was included in the 1935 Bill of Rights, it is not
surprising that nearly all the major Philippine cases involving the religion clauses turn to
U.S. jurisprudence in explaining the nature, extent and limitations of these
clauses. However, a close scrutiny of these cases would also reveal that while U.S.
jurisprudence on religion clauses flows into two main streams of interpretation -
separation and benevolent neutrality - the well-spring of Philippine jurisprudence
on this subject is for the most part, benevolent neutrality which gives room for
accommodation.

IMBONG v. OCHOA, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on
one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information
on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the
people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children, the
Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public
or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be
exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to
act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of
non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Political Law

DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR. v. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the

Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor,
National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE
MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER MEDALLE, G.R. No. 197291,
April 3, 2013

Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the
Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of
Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception,
however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public
prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion, that is, when he has exercised his
discretion “in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, patent and gross enough as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Hence, in matters
involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus may only be resorted to in
order to compel respondent tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person to take action,
but it cannot be used to direct the manner or the particular way discretion is to be
exercised, or to compel the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the
exercise of judgment or discretion.

DIMAPORO v. MITRA, G.R. No.96859, October 15, 1991

Dimaporo, while serving as Representative of Lanao del Sur, filed a COC for the post of
ARMM Governor. He lost the latter election, and despite making known his desire to
continue as Representative, was not able to return to that office. The Supreme Court did
not allow him to take office as Representative again. It differentiated a term, i.e. the
period an official may serve as provided for by law from tenure, i.e. the period that an
official actually serves. The Constitution protects the term, not the tenure. By filing the
certificate of candidacy, Dimaporo shortened his tenure. Thus, there is no violation of
the Constitution when he was prevented from re-assuming his post. A term of office
prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by law, but the period
during which an officer actually serves (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within
or beyond the power of the officer.

BAGABUYO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008

RA 9371, which provided for apportionment of lone district of City of Cagayan de Oro
was assailed on constitutional grounds, on the ground that it is not re-apportionment
legislation but that it involves the division and conversion of an LGU. The Supreme
Court held that RA 9371 is simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance
with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, section 5(4).

BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, July 8, 2009

Political Law

The filling-up of all available party-list seats is not mandatory. Actual occupancy of the
party-list seats depends on the number of participants in the party-list election. If only
ten parties participated in the 2007 party-list election, then, despite the availability of 54
seats, the maximum possible number of occupied party-list seats would only be 30
because of the three-seat cap. In such a case, the three-seat cap prevents the
mandatory allocation of all the 54 available seats.

Under Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, garnering 2% of the total votes cast guarantees a
party one seat. This 2% threshold for the first round of seat allocation does not violate
any provision of the 1987 Constitution. In the second round allocation of additional
seats, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the
Court has struck down the application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional
seats. Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that "those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
the proportion to their total number of votes" can no longer be given any effect.
Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total membership of the House of
Representatives as provided in the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be impossible
to fill up. However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to
gain a seat in the second round of seat allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number
of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as the number of
participating parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties
with guaranteed seats received in the first round of seat allocation.

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of
professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and
underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack
"well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other
sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the
"marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House
of Representatives.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give
rise to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in
economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own
members to the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-
list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for relatively well-off party-list
representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even
as they attend sessions in Congress riding in SUVs.
Political Law

The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in
party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their
constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-
defined political constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list
elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the House of
Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-
defined political constituencies," giving them a voice in law-making. Thus,to participate
in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative
district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban
poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list system.

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH

SOCORRO B. TAN, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, provides that the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of the Members of the
House of Representatives. To be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of all of the following requisites: (1) a
valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office. Absent any of the
foregoing, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction over the said contests.

JIMENEZ v. CABANGBANG, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966

The expression "speeches or debates herein" in Art. VI § 15 (1935 Constitution) only

refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions,
such as speeches (sponsorship, interpellation, privilege uttered in Committees or to
Congress in plenary session), statements and votes cast while Congress is in session,
as well as bills introduced in Congress. It also includes other acts performed by the
same either in or out of Congressional premises while in the official discharge of their
duty when they performed the acts. It does not include acts not connected with the
discharge of their office.

Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, June 22, 1993

Gordon, an incumbent elective official was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, being

appointed to other government posts, does not automatically forfeit his elective office
nor remove his ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since an
incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position, his appointment or
designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or lack of eligibility.
This provision should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the Constitution where
"(n)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his seat . . . ." The
difference between the two provisions is significant in the sense that incumbent national
legislators lose their elective posts only after they have been appointed to another
government office, while other incumbent elective officials must first resign their posts
Political Law

before they can be appointed, thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as
not being appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that ineligibility is not directly
related with forfeiture of office. ". . . . The effect is quite different where it is
expressly provided by law that a person holding one office shall be ineligible to another.
Such a provision is held to incapacitate the incumbent of an office from accepting or
holding a second office (State ex rel. Van Antwerp v Hogan, 283 Ala. 445, 218 So 2d
258; McWilliams v Neal, 130 Ga 733, 61 SE 721) and to render his election or
appointment to the latter office void (State ex rel. Childs v Sutton, 63 Minn 147, 65 NW
262. Annotation: 40 ALR 945) or voidable (Baskin v State, 107 Okla 272, 232 p 388, 40
ALR 941)." Where the constitution, or statutes declare that persons holding one office
shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another office, either generally or of a
certain kind, the prohibition has been held to incapacitate the incumbent of the first
office to hold the second so that any attempt to hold the second is void (Ala. — State ex
rel. Van Antwerp v. Hogan, 218 So 2d 258, 283 Ala 445).

AVELINO v. CUENCA, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949

As there were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto,

excluding Confesor), twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three
senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall
constitute a quorum, “the House” does not mean “all” the members. Even a majority of
all the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority of “all
the members of the House” and a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less
number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of
a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have
ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested,
there would be no doubt about Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been
elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and
one abstained

OSMENA v. PENDATUN, G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960

Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any speech or debate" in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be
questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of
Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always
been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their
words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be
questioned in Congress itself. Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other
place" than Congress. Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has
invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible
"for words spoken in debate."

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005
Political Law

Congress did not give President the power to exercise discretion in making a law, only
the power to ascertain the facts necessary to exercise the law. The criteria for valid
delegation are that: (1) Law is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate (2) Law fixes a standard, the
limits of which are determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions.

GARCILLANO v. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, G.R. No.

170338, December 23, 2008

It would be an injustice if a citizen is burdened with violating a law or rule he did not get
notice of. It consists of “publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines” (Civil Code Art. 2) and the law shall only take
effect 15 days after said publication. Publication via the Internet alone is considered
invalid since the provisions state that the rules must be published in the OG or in a
newspaper. According to RA 8792, an electronic document serves as the functional
equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it does not make the
Internet a medium for publishing laws, rules, and regulations. The rules must also be
republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of 12 Senators as it is a
continuing body independent of the Senate before it, and its own rules state that they
expire after every Senate.

BENGZON v. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE, G.R. No. 89914, November 20,
1991

Investigations must be in aid of legislation in accordance with duly published rules of

procedure and must respect the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by the
inquiries. Senator Enrile’s privilege speech that prompted the committee investigation
contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation, only a call to look into a possible
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The call seems to fall under the
jurisdiction of the courts rather than the legislature, such as the case filed with the
Sandiganbayan. For the Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable
controversy already before the Sandiganbayan would be an encroachment into the
exclusive domain of the court.

SENATE v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006

In question hour, attendance is meant to be discretionary. In aid of legislation,

attendance is compulsory. In the absence of a mandatory question period, it becomes a
greater imperative to enforce Congress’ right to executive information in the
performance of its legislative function. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry,
department heads can only exempt themselves by a valid claim of inquiry. The only
officials exempt are the President on whom the executive power is vested and members
of the Supreme Court on whom the judicial power is vested as a collegial body as co-
equal branches of government. For § 1, the requirement for Presidential consent is
limited only to appearances of department heads in the question hour but not in
Political Law

inquiries in aid of legislation unless a valid claim of privilege is made by the President or
Executive Secretary.

Although some executive officials hold information covered by “executive privilege”,

there can be no implied claim of executive privilege thereby exempting some officials
from attending inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress has a right to know the reasons
behind the claim of executive privilege before an official would be exempt from the
investigation.

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK v. SENAE COMMITTEE ON BANKS, FINANCIAL

INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCIES, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007

The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of the power to punish contempt
is based on the principle of self-preservation. As the branch of the government vested
with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority
and punish contumacious acts against it. Such power is sui generis, as it attaches not to
the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to the sovereign character of the
legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate branches of government.

ABAKADA v. PURISIMA, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008

Any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny

and investigation. In particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the
following: (1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the
budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments
to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation and (2) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by
the Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.

Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative

agency to present the proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to
Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a "right" or
"power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As such, a
legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an
inward-turning delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially
delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or structure of the
Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing,
applying or implementing its own laws.

LIDASAN v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967

Political Law

The Constitution has 2 limitations for bills: 1) Congress can not conglomerate under 1
statute heteregeneous subjects, and, 2) The title of the bill must be couched in
language sufficient to notify legislators and the public of the import of the single title.
Complying with the second directive is imperative since the Constitution does not
require Congress to read a bill’s entire text during deliberations.

BELGICA et al. v. OCHOA JR.; SJS v. DRILON et al.; NEPOMUCENO v.

PRESIDENT AQUINO III, G.R. No. 208566, G.R. No. 208493, G.R. No. 209251,
November 19, 2013

The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in
Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation,
pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are
able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or
beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes
individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow.

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the
GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As
these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed
and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation
would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which
subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to
decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without
knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with
his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislators with legitimate projects.

TAGUIWALO, et. al. vs. Aquino et. al. G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014

The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision
cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were
withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.
Political Law

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, CHAIRPERSON, BAGONG ALYANSANG

MAKABAYAN, et al. vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 209287, February 3, 2015

If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its
meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion
and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Herein, the Executive has
violated the GAA when it stated that savings as a concept is an ordinary species of
interpretation that calls for legislative, instead of judicial determination.

Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states: 5) No law shall be passed authorizing
any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.

Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code provide: Section 39.
Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits.—Except as otherwise
provided in the General Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations
authorized in the General Appropriations Act for programs and projects of any
department, office or agency, may, with the approval of the President, be used to cover
a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations: Provided, that the creation of
new positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to be funded from budgetary
savings except when specifically authorized by law: Provided, further, that whenever
authorized positions are transferred from one program or project to another within the
same department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts appropriated for
personal services are also deemed transferred, without, however increasing the total
outlay for personal services of the department, office or agency concerned.

On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of any
savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects of
any department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular
appropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the
latter expressly limits the authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA to
only those in his own Department out of the savings in other items of his own
Department’s appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a valid authority
to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP. Augmentations under the DAP which
are made by the Executive within its department shall, however, remain valid so long as
the requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with.

ESTRADA v. DESIERTO, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001

Political Law

Estrada had constructively resigned, because both elements of resignation were

present, namely: 1. Intent 2. Acts of relinquishment (calling for snap election in which
Estrada would not be a candidate, listening to Pimentel's advice for resignation,
negotiation for peaceful and orderly transfer of power, declaring his intent to leave
without anything about reassuming the presidency, etc.)

As for prosecution of cases against him, resignation or retirement is not a bar to

prosecution. Neither was there a pending impeachment case when he resigned; if this
were a bar to a criminal prosecution, then he would be perpetually immune. Finally,
Congress has already recognized Arroyo as the new President, and so the decision can
no longer be reviewed by the Court.

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL and ALFREDO S. LIM vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

When the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon.
The first sentence refers to the executive clemency extended to former President
Estrada who was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of
imprisonment. The sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to
his civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were
expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Furthermore, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., “[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office,” neither
makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President
Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public elective office have been restored. A
preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its
intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its
operation much less prevail over its text. Hence if the pardon was intended be
conditional, it should have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself.
Since it did not make an integral part of the decree of pardon, the 3rd preambular
clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended.

NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY, G.R. No. 180643, September

4, 2008

Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the
President. It exists to protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its
purpose, among others, is to assure that the nation will receive the benefit of candid,
Political Law

objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of information between the

President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and arriving
at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution.
The confidentiality of the President’s conversations and correspondence is not unique. It
is akin to the confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the
right to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated by public interest and the
constitutionally ordained separation of governmental powers.

AKBAYAN v. AQUINO, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008

The diplomatic negotiations privilege bears a close resemblance to the deliberative

process and presidential communications privilege. It may be readily perceived that the
rationale for the confidential character of diplomatic negotiations, deliberative process,
and presidential communications is similar, if not identical.

MANALO v. SISTOZA, G.R. No. 107369, August 11, 1999

Conformably, as consistently interpreted and ruled in the leading case of Sarmiento III
vs. Mison, and in the subsequent cases of Bautista vs. Salonga, Quintos-Deles vs.
Constitutional Commission, and Calderon vs. Carale; under Section 16, Article VII, of
the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of the government to be appointed by
the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest
in the President alone.

It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require
the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of respondent
officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments.

MATIBAG v. BENIPAYO, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect

immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Political Law

Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes
an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress.

PIMENTEL v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005

Ad-interim appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity.

Both of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended
only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any
time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments are not
submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a way of
temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

DENNIS FUNA v. ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, et al.,

G.R. No. 191644, February 19, 2013

The language of Section 13, Art. VII of the Constitution makes no reference to the
nature of the appointment or designation, as such, the prohibition against dual or
multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary.

DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,

FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 191672, November 25, 2014

The concerned GOCCs are vested by their respective charters with various powers and
functions to carry out the purposes for which they were created. While powers and
functions associated with appointments, compensation and benefits affect the career
development, employment status, rights, privileges, and welfare of government officials
and employees, the concerned GOCCs are also tasked to perform other corporate
powers and functions that are not personnel-related. All of these powers and functions,
whether personnel-related or not, are carried out and exercised by the respective
Boards of the concerned GOCCs. Hence, when the CSC Chairman sits as a member of
the governing Boards of the concerned GOCCs, he may exercise these powers and
functions, which are not anymore derived from his position as CSC Chairman. Such
being the case, the designation of Duque was unconstitutional.

MARITIME INDUSTRY AUTHORITY vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 185812, January 13, 2015

The Court cannot rule on the validity of the alleged approval by the then President
Estrada of the grant of additional allowances and benefits. MIA failed to prove its
Political Law

existence. The alleged approval of the President was contained in a mere photocopy of
the memorandum... The original was not presented during the proceedings. A copy of
the document is not in the Malacañang Records Office.

Further, “the grant of allowances and benefits amounts to double compensation

proscribed by Art. IX(B), Sec. 8 of the 1987 Constitution.”

DE CASTRO v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010

Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday
of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the
regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115
days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days.
Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e.,
the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-
day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no
position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court.
It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an
absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of
Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers neither discussed,
nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments under Section 15,
Article VII, or its effects on the 90-day period, or vice versa. They did not need to,
because they never intended Section 15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the
Supreme Court, or in any of the lower courts.

GARAFIL v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 203372, June 16, 2015

Paragraph (b), Section 1 of EO 2 considered as midnight appointments those

appointments to offices that will only be vacant on or after 11 March 2010 even though
the appointments are made prior to 11 March 2010. EO 2 remained faithful to the intent
of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: the outgoing President is prevented
from continuing to rule the country indirectly after the end of his term.

IBP v. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 141284. August 15, 2000

Calling out armed forces is discretionary power solely vested in the President’s wisdom
but the matter may be reviewed by the Court to see whether or not there was grave
abuse of discretion.

SANLAKAS v. REYES, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004

Actual invasion/rebellion and requirement of public safety are not required for calling out
the armed forces. Nothing prohibits President from declaring a state of rebellion; it
springs from powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief. Finally, calling out of
the armed forces is not the same as a declaration of martial law.
Political Law

DAVID v. ARROYO, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot
decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-
owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine
when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the
President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest
that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise
all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency
powers act passed by Congress.

MARCOS v. MANGLAPUS, G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989

Imelda Marcos wanted to return home from Hawaii. Her return was prevented by Pres.
Aquino. She invoked her rights to travel and abode.

The SC upheld the decision to prevent her from returning to the Philippines as an
exercise of the President’s residual powers. Whatever power inherent in the
government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. The President's
residual power is for protecting people's general welfare, preserving and defending the
Constitution, protecting the peace, attending to day-to-day problems. Even the
Resolution proposed in the House urging the President to allow Marcos to return shows
recognition of this power. Residual powers are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty to safeguard and protect general welfare.

YNOT v. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving
the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of
lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures. This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first
instance by these lower courts.

MIRANDA v. AGUIRRE, G.R. No. 133064, September 16, 1999

A political question connotes a question of policy and referred to those questions which
under the constitution were 1) to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or
2) in regard to which full discretionary authority had been delegated to the
legislative/executive branch of government.
Political Law

Political questions are concerned with issues on the wisdom and not legality of a
particular measure. Additionally, a political question has no standards by which its
legality or constitutionality could be determined. A purely justiciable issue implied a
given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such
right and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law for said breach of right.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH

G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., G.R. No. 202242, April 16, 2013

A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several provisions were indeed
adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to bicameralism. It is also very clear that the
Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in
the JBC because it was not in the exercise of its primary function – to legislate. In the
creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four (4)
regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of government. In
so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it was
in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch of
government. Hence, the argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the
House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC,
any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of Representatives, is
constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress.

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA, vs. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO,

THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014

a.) Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:

SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. - In every

case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination
is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members of the Council must be
obtained for the favorable consideration of his nomination.

A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting
requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant is questioned.
Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her
inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes “unanimous” instead of the “majority
vote” required in the preceding section. Considering that JBC-009 employs the term
“integrity” as an essential qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a
person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all the members
of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that “integrity” as used in the rules must
be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a
situation where an applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that the
“unanimity rule” only comes into operation when the moral character of a person is put
in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to an
applicant’s moral uprightness.
Political Law

ROMUALDEZ v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice. This Court has similarly stressed
that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the
statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.

FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND

INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, represented by Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas, G.R.
No. 173121, April 3, 2013

The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. It is tasked
to exercise disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, save only for
impeachable officers. The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or
omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction extends only to public officials
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher. Consequently, any
act or omission of a public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27
is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other
investigative agencies.

BRILLANTES v. YORAC, G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990

Yorac, as Associate COMELEC Chairman, was appointed by the President as

Chairman of the COMELEC. Brillantes challenged Yorac’s appointment for being
contrary to Article IX-C, Sec. 1(2) of 1987 Constitution, where "(I)n no case shall any
Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity." The SC agreed. The appointment was unconstitutional. Article IX-A,
Sec. 1 provides for the independence of ConCom from the executive department.

DAZA v. SINGSON, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989

The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting in a political

realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission
on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it
to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives
in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by
Singson. Daza questioned such replacement on the ground that the LDP’s
reorganization was not permanent and stable.

The LDP has been existing for more than one year and its members include the
Philippine President, and its internal disagreements are expected in any political
organization in a democracy. The test that the party must survive a general
Political Law

congressional election was never laid down in jurisprudence. The Court ruled in favor of
the authority of the House to change its representation in the CoA to reflect at any time
the permanent changes and not merely temporary alliances or factional divisions
without severance of loyalties/formal disaffiliation that may transpire in the political
alignments of its members.

AGAN v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, January 21, 2004

Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides that in times of national
emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency
and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v. SECRETARY OF DSWD, G.R. No. 175356, December

3, 2013

Traditional distinctions exist between police power and eminent domain. In the exercise
of police power, a property right is impaired by regulation, or the use of property is
merely prohibited, regulated or restricted to promote public welfare. In such cases, there
is no compensable taking, hence, payment of just compensation is not required.
Examples of these regulations are property condemned for being noxious or intended
for noxious purposes (e.g., a building on the verge of collapse to be demolished for
public safety, or obscene materials to be destroyed in the interest of public morals) as
well as zoning ordinances prohibiting the use of property for purposes injurious to the
health, morals or safety of the community (e.g., dividing a city’s territory into residential
and industrial areas).

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION v. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. 122846, January 20,
2009

Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in
general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide
enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police
power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to
protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous
and varied actions by the State. These range from the regulation of dance halls, movie
theaters, gas stations and cockpits. The awesome scope of police power is best
demonstrated by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal
system, its use has rarely been denied.

REPUBLIC v. CASTELLVI, G.R. No. L-20620, August 5, 18974

Political Law

The SC said that the prices in 1959 will apply since in 1947, they did not possess the
property with a permanent characteristic seeing that they were just leasing on a yearly
basis. Their possession did not also deprive the owner of the benefits of the land since
they were paying rent. It was only in 1959 when they filed the expropriation proceedings
that they gained possession with a permanent character when the lower court granted
them such possession. The price of Php 10.00 however was quite high taking in
consideration that the said properties could be sold on a range of Php 2.50 – 4.00 per
sq meters and the fact that the value of the peso went down. The proper price is now at
Php5.00 per square meters.
This case is doctrinal for giving the elements of a compensable taking, to wit:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property
2. For more than a momentary period
3. Under warrant or color of legal authority
4. The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected
5. The owner must be ousted of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

HACIENDA LUISITA INCORPORATED v. PARC, G.R. No. 171101, April 24, 2012

Precisely because due regard is given to the rights of landowners to just compensation,
the law on stock distribution option acknowledges that landowners can require payment
for the shares of stock corresponding to the value of the agricultural lands in relation to
the outstanding capital stock of the corporation.

FIRST CLASS CADET ALDRIN JEFF P. CUDIA OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY

ACADEMY, REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER RENATO P. CUDIA, WHO ALSO
ACTS ON HIS OWN BEHALF, AND BERTENI CATALUÑA CAUSING vs. THE
SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY (PMA), THE
HONOR COMMITTEE (HC) OF 2014 OF THE PMA AND HC MEMBERS, AND THE
CADET REVIEW AND APPEALS BOARD (CRAB)
G.R. No. 211362, February 24, 2015

Contending that Cadet Cudia was dismissed without being afforded due process, the
petitioners filed the instant petition assailing the dismissal of Cadet Cudia from the PMA.
In order to be proper and immune from constitutional infirmity, a cadet who is sought to
be dismissed or separated from the academy must be afforded a hearing, be apprised
of the specific charges against him, and be given an adequate opportunity to present his
or her defense both from the point of view of time and the use of witnesses and other
evidence. In the case at bar, the investigation of Cadet 1CL Cudia’s Honor Code
violation followed the prescribed procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was
notified of the Honor Report from Maj. Hindang. He was then given the opportunity to
explain the report against him. He was informed about his options and the entire
process that the case would undergo. Thus, the petitioners could not argue that Cadet
Cudia was not afforded due process.

ANG TIBAY v. CIR, G.R. No. L-46496, February 27, 1940

Political Law

The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due
process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary
rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character.

PEOPLE v. CAYAT, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal

protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation
based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3)
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all
members of the same class.

BIRAOGO v. PTC, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010

In the instant case, the fact that other administrations are not the subject of the PTC’s
investigative aim is not a case of selective prosecution that violates equal protection.
The Executive is given broad discretion to initiate criminal prosecution and enjoys clear
presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance thereof. For petitioners to
overcome that presumption, they must carry the burden of showing that the PTC is a
preliminary step to selective prosecution, and that it is laden with a discriminatory effect
and a discriminatory purpose. However, petitioner has sorely failed in discharging that
burden.

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION v. PHILIPPINE

BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC., G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973

As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful

assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been
sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a coveted boon — at once the
shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming
ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice
have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can produce economic goods
that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration against police officers,
not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore
inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.

BAYAN v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2005

Political Law

A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds
of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to "lawful cause" does
not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be "peaceable" and entitled to protection. Neither are the
words "opinion," "protesting" and "influencing" in the definition of public assembly
content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words "petitioning the
government for redress of grievances" come from the wording of the Constitution, so its
use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of
all rallyists and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.

CHAVEZ v. GONZALES, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

It is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of
restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1)
a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or
one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; or
(2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject
matter of the utterance or speech. The cast of the restriction determines the test by
which the challenged act is assayed with.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP

VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY
vs. COMMISSION OF ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD
CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON
G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

When petitioners, a Diocese and its Bishop posted tarpaulins in front of the cathedral
which aimed to dissuade voters from electing candidates who supported the RH Law,
and the COMELEC twice ordered the latter to dismantle the tarpaulin for violation of its
regulation which imposed a size limit on campaign materials, the case is about
COMELEC’s breach of the petitioners’ fundamental right of expression of matters
relating to election. Thus, the COMELEC had no legal basis to issue said order as the
tarpaulins were not paid for by any candidate or political party and the candidates
therein were not consulted regarding its posting. It was part of the petitioner’s advocacy
against the RH Law. Jurisprudence which sets the limit to free speech of candidates
during elections but do not limit the rights of broadcasters to comment on the
candidates do not apply to the petitioners, as the petitioners are private individuals who
have lost their right to give commentary on the candidates when the COMELEC ordered
the tarpaulin removed. Second, the tarpaulin is protected speech. The size of the
tarpaulins is fundamentally part of protected speech, as it is important to convey the
advocacy of the petitioners, who are also part of the electorate. More importantly, every
citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and
political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin
was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party
or party-list group. The COMELEC, therefore, has no jurisdiction to issue its order as it
Political Law

lacks the requisites of a valid content-based regulation of speech. Third, the tarpaulins
and their messages are not religious speech, as they do not convey any religious
doctrine of the Catholic Church. With all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the church
doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the
Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the
posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis.
The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its
nature as speech with political consequences and not religious speech.

IN RE: JURADO, A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC April 6, 1995

Liability for published statements demonstrably false or misleading, and derogatory of

the courts and individual judges, is what is involved in the proceeding at bar — than
which, upon its facts, there is perhaps no more appropriate setting for an inquiry into the
limits of press freedom as it relates to public comment about the courts and their
workings within a constitutional order.

SWS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001

SWS and Kamahalan Publishing seek to enjoin COMELEC from enforcing Sec. 5.4 of
RA 9006 (Fair Election Act) which prohibits the publishing of election surveys 15 days
before the election of national candidates and 7 days before the election of local
candidates. The petitioners wish to publish surveys covering the entire election period
and argue that the resolution violates their right to free speech and expression. The SC
held that the resolution is invalid as because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and that (3) the
governmental interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than
suppression of freedom of expression.

RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES AND SPS. MARGARITA AND DAVID SUZARA, vs. ST.
THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, AND JOHN DOES,
G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014

The concept of privacy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in
former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy, where
he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational
privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy. Of the three, what is
relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as
the right of individuals to control information about themselves.

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and

ALLAN CHOACHUY, G.R. No. 179736, June 26, 2013
Political Law

An individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code should not be
confined to his house or residence as it may extend to places where he has the right to
exclude the public or deny them access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of another’s
residence," therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations which an individual
considers as private, including a business office. In this day and age, video surveillance
cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of everyone.
The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is
reasonable expectation of privacy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to
privacy would be affected, was obtained. Simply put, a person have a "reasonable
expectation of privacy" in his property, whether he uses it as a business office or as a
residence and that the installation of video surveillance cameras directly facing his
property or covering a significant portion thereof, without his consent, is a clear violation
of their right to privacy.

AGLIPAY v. RUIZ, G.R. No. L-45459, March 13, 1997

Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, filed for a
writ of prohibition against Juan Ruiz, Director of Posts, to stop him from selling postage
stamps which commemorated the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by
the Catholic Church in Manila. Petitioner alleges that this violates the Constitutional
provision prohibiting the use of public money for the benefit of any religious
denomination. The Court denied the petition. The Director of Posts acted by virtue of
Act No. 4052 which appropriated 60,000 pesos for the cost of printing of stamps with
new designs. The stamps themselves featured a map of the Philippines. The
government’s goal was to promote the Philippines. There was no religious goal. The
proceeds of the sale of the stamps also went to the government and not to any church.

AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY v. CITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-9637, April 30, 1957

American Bible Society (ABS) is a nonstock, nonprofit, religious missionary corporation

distributing and selling bibles/gospel portions in the Philippines. ABS was informed that
it has to comply with Ordinance No. 3000 (obtain a mayor’s permit) and Ordinance No.
2529 (pay municipal license fee for the period covering 1945 to 1953 and amounting to
5, 821.45). ABS paid in protest and filed a case to declare said Ordinances void and to
seek a refund. Trial court dismissed case. SC ruled that Ordinance 3000 is valid as it
merely requires a mayor’s permit. Ordinance 2529 is also valid but cannot be made to
apply to ABS because such license fee constitutes a restraint in the free exercise of
religion. The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right could only be justified like other restraints of freedom of
expression on the grounds that there is clear and present danger of any substantive
evil, which the State has the right to prevent.

EBRALINAG v. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT, G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993

Political Law

Petitioners in this consolidated petition are high school and elementary students from
Cebu who were expelled for not participating in the flag ceremony of their schools. They
are represented by their parents. As Jehovah’s Witnesses, they consider the flag as an
idol which, according to their religion, should not be worshipped. They believe that the
flag ceremony is a form of worship which is prohibited by their religion. Respondents
counter by invoking RA 1265, Department Order 8 and the ruling of Gerona v. Secretary
of Education which upheld that all students should participate in the flag ceremony. The
Court reversed the Gerona ruling and ruled in favor of the petitioners. Expelling them
based on their religious beliefs would be a curtailment of their right to religious
profession and worship and their right to free education.

Iglesia Ni Cristo v. CA (1996)

The Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) operates a TV program titled “Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.” The
Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television classified such program as rated X,
being not fit for public viewing as it offends and constitutes an attack against other
religions. The SC held that INC is protected by Art. III, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. The
Board failed to show any imminent or grave danger that would be brought about by the
telecast of the show. Also, the show itself is not an attack against, but rather a criticism
of, other religions. Such ground (i.e., criticism) is not a valid ground in order to prohibit
the broadcasting of the show. SC also affirmed MTRCB’s power to regulate these types
of television programs citing the 1921 case of Sotto v Ruiz regarding the Director of
Post’s power to check as to whether or not publications are of a libelous character.

RUBI v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919

The right to travel can validly be suspended in the valid exercise of police power.

CHAVEZ v. PEA, G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002

The right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a

final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information,
military and diplomatic secrets, and similar matters affecting national security and public
order.

STONEHILL v. DIOKNO, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe
the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed,
the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs
Political Law

Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific
offense had been alleged in said applications.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. MARK JASON CHAVEZ Y BITANCOR ALIAS

“NOY”, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014

The Miranda rights is a right guaranteed by the Constitution to the accused during
custodial investigation. Republic Act No. 7438 even expanded its definition to “include
the practice of issuing an ‘invitation’ to a person who is investigated in connection with
an offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the
‘inviting’ officer for any violation of law.” This means that even those who voluntarily
surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. For one,
the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenario. Chavez is also being
questioned by an investigating officer in a police station. As an additional pressure, he
may have been compelled to surrender by his mother who accompanied him to the
police station.

MARIETA DE CASTRO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015

The right to remain silent and to counsel can be invoked only in the context in which
the Miranda doctrine applies – when the official proceeding is conducted under the
coercive atmosphere of a custodial interrogation. There are no cases extending them to
a non-coercive setting. The rights are invocable only when the accused is under
custodial investigation. A person undergoing a normal audit examination is not under
custodial investigation and, hence, the audit examiner may not be considered the law
enforcement officer contemplated by the rule. By a fair analogy, Marieta may not be
said to be under custodial investigation. She was not even being investigated by any
police or law enforcement officer. She was under administrative investigation by her
superiors in a private firm and in purely voluntary manner. She was not restrained of her
freedom in any manner. She was free to stay or go. There was no evidence that she
was forced or pressured to say anything.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEDARIO CALANTIAO y DIMALANTA

G.R. No. 203984, June 18, 2014

The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is
"to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be
armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence
within reach." It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect
(1) law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have
lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to
ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the
control and within the reach of the arrestee.
Political Law

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014

A person apprehended or arrested cannot literally mean any person apprehended or

arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read in context and understood in
consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends persons arrested or apprehended
for unlawful acts listed under Article II of the law. Hence, a drug test can only be made
upon persons who are apprehended or arrested for violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for any
crime not listed under Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act is tantamount to unduly
expanding its meaning. Furthermore, making the phrase “a person apprehended or
arrested” in Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful
acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory
drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime. Moreover, “a waiver
of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.”

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR COGAED Y ROMANA

G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014

One of these jurisprudential exceptions to search warrants is “stop and frisk”. “Stop and
frisk” searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests under the
Rules of Court. Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be
committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and within
reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to
preserve the evidence.

The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation where the
police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the
experience of the police officer. Hence, they should have the ability to discern — based
on facts that they themselves observe — whether an individual is acting in a suspicious
manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her
personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. It is
the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of
suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by
another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and
reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one’s
basic right to security of one’s person and effects. Police officers cannot justify unbridled
searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is compliance with the
“genuine reason” requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the
public.

MAPALO v. LIM, G.R. No. 136051, June 8, 2006

The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives evidence,
whether voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal or
Political Law

administrative proceeding. The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against

himself.

GOVT. OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA, G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also
be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked
in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence
or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, Jr., ET AL v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., G.R.

No. 203335. February 18, 2014

Charging offenders of violation of RA 10175 and the RPC both with regard to libel;
likewise with RA 9775 on Child pornography constitutes double jeopardy. The acts
defined in the Cybercrime Law involve essentially the same elements and are in fact
one and the same with the RPC and RA 9775.

RENATO M. DAVID vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 199113, March 18, 2015

David argued that the Court has disregarded the undisputed fact that he is a natural-
born Filipino citizen, and that by re-acquiring the same status under R.A. No. 9225 he
was by legal fiction “deemed not to have lost” it at the time of his naturalization in
Canada and through the time when he was said to have falsely claimed Philippine
citizenship in his Miscellaneous Lease Application. However, while Section 2 declares
the general policy that Filipinos who have become citizens of another country shall be
deemed “not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,” such is qualified by the phrase
“under the conditions of this Act.” It provides that those natural-born Filipinos who have
lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country shall re-acquire their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.

COQUILLA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, July 13, 2002

A person loses Philippine citizenship and domicile of origin by becoming a U.S. citizen
after enlisting in the U.S. Navy, as residence in the U.S. is a requirement for
naturalization as a U.S. citizen. This results in the abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines. The person may only be said to have been domiciled in the Philippines
again once he repatriates or by an act of Congress, but the period before this act of
reacquisition will not count in the residency requirement for elected officials. His status
during that period is one of an alien who has obtained an immigrant visa and has
waived his status as a non-resident.
Political Law

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, G.R. No.

183110, October 7, 2013

A Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship is different from judicial

naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen
and asks a court to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In the second,
the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the
privilege of becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements required under CA
473.

ELECTION, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

YRA v. ABANO, G.R. No. 30187, November 15, 1928

Abano was a native of Meycauayan who studied in Manila, where he was registered to
vote. After completing his studies as a lawyer, Abano returned to Meycauayan and ran
for office though his cancellation of voter’s registration in Manila was denied because of
his failure to deposit in the mails on time. In ruling in Abano’s favor, the Court explained
that the registration of a voter does not confer the right to vote; it is but a condition
precedent to the exercise of the right. Registration is a regulation, not a qualification.

SVETLANA P. JALOSJOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al., G.R. No.

193314, February 26, 2013

A change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time, otherwise the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue.

CASAN MACODE MAQUILING v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL

ARNADO y CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013

Dual citizens by naturalization are required to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order
to qualify as a candidate for public office. If by the time an aspiring candidate filed his
certificate of candidacy, he was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of
Filipino and foreign citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was not qualified
to run for a local elective position. By being barred from even becoming a candidate, his
certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning.

Being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted. This
leaves the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the
rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.

OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 205136,

December 2, 2014
Political Law

The COMELEC has no discretion to give or not to give due couse to COCs. The Court
emphasized that the duty of the COMELEC to give due course to COCs filed in due
form is ministerial in character, and that while the COMELEC may look into patent
defects in the COCs, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The
question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of the COMELEC. The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for
the position he is seeking involves a determination of fact where parties must be
allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions. Thus, in simply relying on
the Memorandum of Director Amora Ladra in cancelling Kimberly’s COC and denying
the latter’s substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition to deny due course to or
cancel said COC, the Court finds that the COMELEC once more gravely abused its
discretion.

LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE v. COMELEC and MIGUEL VILLAFUERTE, G.R. No. 206698,

February 25, 2014

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that the false representation in the
contents of the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) must refer to material matters in order to
justify the cancellation of the COC. Material misrepresentation under the Omnibus
Election Code refers to “Qualifications for elective office” (residency, age, citizenship, or
any other legal qualifications necessary to run for local elective office as provided in the
Local Government Code) coupled with a showing that there was an intent to deceive the
electorate.

GONZALES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011

We find it necessary to point out that Sections 5 and 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646,
contrary to the erroneous arguments of both parties, did not in any way amend the
period for filing "Section 78" petitions. While Section 7 of the said law makes reference
to Section 5 on the procedure in the conduct of cases for the denial of due course to the
CoCs of nuisance candidates (retired Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in his
dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Commission on Elections explains that "the ‘procedure
hereinabove provided’ mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer to Section 6
which does not provide for a procedure but for the effects of disqualification cases, [but]
can only refer to the procedure provided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance
candidates x x x."), the same cannot be taken to mean that the 25-day period for filing
"sec. 78" petitions under the oec is changed to 5 days counted from the last day for the
filing of COCs. The clear language of Section 78 certainly cannot be amended or
modified by the mere reference in a subsequent statute to the use of a procedure
specifically intended for another type of action. Cardinal is the rule in statutory
construction that repeals by implication are disfavored and will not be so declared by the
Court unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. In addition, it is noteworthy that
Loong, which upheld the 25-day period for filing "Section 78" petitions, was decided
long after the enactment of R.A. 6646. In this regard, we therefore find as contrary to
Political Law

the unequivocal mandate of the law, Rule 23, Section 2 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure.

As the law stands, the petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC "may be filed at
any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy."

SILVERIO R.TAGOLINO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ, G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013

The existence of a valid certificate of candidacy (COC) is a condition sine qua non for a
disqualified candidate to be validly substituted. If the COC is thereby cancelled or
denied due course, the candidate cannot be validly substituted.

RENATO M. FEDERICO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 199612, January 22, 2013

When there has been no valid substitution, the candidate with the highest number of
votes should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor.

EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and

EDGAR "EGAY" S. SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 212398, November 25, 2014

San Luis filed a disqualification case against co-gubernatorial candidate Ejercito. The
COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En banc granted the disqualification petition.
In the said petition, San Luis alleges that Ejercito was distributing an “Orange Card” with
the intent to entice voters to vote for him and that Ejercito exceeded the allowable
amount for campaign funds. Ejercito alleges that a preliminary investigation should have
been conducted prior to the decision of the COMELEC. In this regard, the Supreme
Court ruled that, As contemplated in paragraph 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, a
complaint for disqualification filed before the election which must be inquired into by the
COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact
been committed. Where the inquiry results in a finding before the election, the
COMELEC shall order the candidate's disqualification. In case the complaint was not
resolved before the election, the COMELEC may motu propio or on motion of any of the
parties, refer the said complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary
investigation.

PENERA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 131613, November 25, 2009

Penera was disqualified as a mayoralty candidate for engaging in election campaigning

before the campaign period. The Court ruled in her favor. A candidate is any person
aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a certificate of candidacy.
Any person who files a certificate of candidacy within the period for filing shall only be
considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy. Accordingly, a candidate is only liable for an election offense for
acts done during the campaign period, not before. Any unlawful act or omission
Political Law

applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period,
when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate. Before the start of the
campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSTAPHA

J. OMAR, G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014

As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in
order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by
mere technical objections. Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are
subject to liberal construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or
even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a
speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality is for the purpose of
promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives − ensuring the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving
just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election
contest is imbued with public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and
pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the
uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the
corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its command, whom the people
truly chose as their rightful leader.

ANGEL G. NAVAL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND NELSON B. JULIA

G.R. No. 207851, July 08, 2014

It bears noting that the actual difference in the population of the old Second District from
that of the current Third District amounts to less than 10% of the population of the latter.
This numerical fact renders the new Third District as essentially, although not literally,
the same as the old Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his argument
that Sanggunian members are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the
district which elected him for the third and fourth time is the same one which brought
him to office in 2004 and 2007. Accordingly, Naval is disqualified to serve another term
a Sangguniang Member.

Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of the three-term limit rule, does not
undermine the right to equal representation of any of the districts in Camarines Sur.
With or without him, the renamed Third District, which he labels as a new set of
constituents, would still be represented, albeit by another eligible person.

JOSEPH B. TIMBOL vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 206004, February

24, 2015

Petitioner filed the instant petition contending that he was denied due process for being
considered a nuisance candidate even before a clarificatory was even conducted. The
SC ruled that nuisance candidates are persons who file their certificates of candidacy
Political Law

"to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the
voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona
fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed
and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate." To minimize
the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificates of candidacy
may be denied due course or cancelled by respondent. This denial or cancellation may
be “motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party,” “subject to an
opportunity to be heard.” Respondent in this case declared petitioner a nuisance
candidate without giving him a chance to explain his bona fide intention to run for office.
Respondent had already declared petitioner a nuisance candidate even before the
clarificatory hearing. This was an ineffective opportunity to be heard.

GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014

There is no question that the COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily
authorized to enforce election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations –
or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations just because it
feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned. It does have
discretion, but such discretion is something that must be exercised within the bounds
and intent of the law. The COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules especially if
it has consistently interpreted a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever
it has to change the rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis.
Clearly, the respondent in this instance went beyond its legal mandate when it provided
for rules beyond what was contemplated by the law it is supposed to implement.

FORTICH v. CORONA, G.R. No. 131457, November 17, 1998

It must be emphasized that a decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court

or tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, is
by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is elementary
that jurisdiction of a body, court or tribunal is an essential and
mandatory requirement before it can act on a case or controversy. And even if said
body, court or tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, but has acted in excess of its
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, such act is still invalid. The decision
nullifying the questioned act is an adjudication on the merits.

REPUBLIC v. EXPRESS TELLECOMMUNICATION, CO. INC. G.R. No. 147096,

January 15, 2002

The 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC were not published in a newspaper of general
circulation, thus, they did not take effect. Even though the 1993 Rules were filed with
the UP Law Center, in accordance with Section 3, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code, the same is not the operative act that gives rules valid force and
Political Law

effect since the bulletin of codified rules by the ONAR is furnished only to the Office of
the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, and other public
officers or agencies specified by Congress. Publication in the Official Gazette or
newspaper of general circulation is required before laws can take effect.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GSIS v. MOLINA, G.R. No. 170463, February 2, 2011

The assailed resolutions pertain only to internal rules to regulate GSIS personnel, thus,
there was no need to comply with the publication or filing requirements. According to the
UP Law Center’s guidelines, “interpretative regulations, and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public” need not be filed with the center.

PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE v. SM PRIME HOLDINGS INC., G.R. No. 170599,

SEPTEMBER 22, 2010

the LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory
and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. In
expounding on this issue, the Court held that the adjudication of pollution cases
generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special
law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides for another forum. The Court further ruled that
although the PAB assumed the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control
Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases, this does not preclude the
LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its area of responsibility and to
impose fines as penalty.

OPLE v. TORRES, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of
privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc.
Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-
important freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of
some basic rights of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates
the administrative power of the President to make rules and the legislative power of
Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by
law.

KILUSANG MAYO UNO v. BAYAN MUNA, G.R. No. 167798, April 16, 2006

A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two
ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can enter into a
memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the government entities
can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular functions under
existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format, especially
Political Law

if the uniform format will result in substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum
compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise
of legislative power.

Panay Autobus Co. v. Philippine Railway Co. (1933)

Public Service Commission granted the Phil. Railway Co. the power to fix its own rates
in order to compete with the rates of road trucks and auto buses. Such grant is invalid.
The Legislature delegated to the PSC the power of fixing rates of public services but it
was not authorized by law to delegate to Phil. Railway Co. the power to alter its freight
rates whenever it should find it necessary to do so, because the PSC cannot determine
whether such new rates will be just and reasonable.

Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA (2000)

Parcels of land owned by petitioner were taken by the DAR for distribution pursuant to
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. It was dissatisfied with the valuation of the
land so it filed a petition for a determination of just compensation for its property with the
RTC. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB.

Pursuant to Rule XIII, Sec. 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the decision of the
Adjudicator on the land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought to the RTC
designated as a Special Agrarian Court within 15 days from receipt of the notice thereof.
Since Veterans’ petition in the RTC was filed beyond the 15-day period, the RTC
correctly dismissed the case.

HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING OMBUDSMAN,

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; HON. ROGELIO L. SINGSON, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS SECRETARY vs.
JOSEFINO N. RIGOR, G.R. No. 206661, December 10, 2014

Falsification of an official document such as the SALN is considered a grave offense. It

amounts to dishonesty. Both falsification and dishonesty are grave offenses punishable
by dismissal from the service, even for the first offense, with forfeiture of retirement
benefits, except accrued leave benefits, and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service. The act of falsifying an official document is in
itself grave because of its possible deleterious effects on government service. At the
same time, it is also an act of dishonesty, which violates fundamental principles of
public accountability and integrity. Under Civil Service regulations, falsification of an
official document and dishonesty are distinct offenses, but both may be committed in
one act, as in this case. The constitutionalization of public accountability shows the kind
of standards of public officers that are woven into the fabric of our legal system. To
reiterate, public office is a public trust, which embodies a set of standards such as
responsibility, integrity and efficiency. Unfortunately, reality may sometimes depart from
Political Law

these standards, but our society has consciously embedded them in our laws so that
they may be demanded and enforced as legal principles, and the Court is mandated to
apply these principles to bridge actual reality to the norms envisioned for our public
service.

SALES v. CARREON, G.R. No. 160791, February 13, 2007

All 83 appointments are void. The CSC is required to publish the list of vacant positions
and such publication shall be posted by the chief personnel or administrative officer of
all local government units in the designated places. The vacant positions may only be
filled by the appointing authority after they have been reported to the CSC as vacant,
and only after publication. In this case, the publication of vacancies was made even
before the positions involved actually became vacant.

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES EMMPLOYEES’ UNION

(CAAP-EU) vs. CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINE, et al.,
G.R. No. 190120, November 11, 2014

Apropos then is the Court’s ruling in Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy Regulatory
Board v. Barin, to wit: however, abolition of an office and its related positions is different
from removal of an incumbent from his office. Abolition and removal are mutually
exclusive concepts. From a legal standpoint, there is no occupant in an abolished office.
Where there is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the
constitutional guarantee of security of tenure does not arise in the abolition of an office.
On the other hand, removal implies that the office and its related positions subsist and
that the occupants are merely separated from their positions. Based on the premise that
there was a valid abolition of ATO, in the absence of any bad faith, we rule that the ATO
employees’ right to security of tenure was not violated.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. MARICELLE M. CORTES

G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014

Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2)
recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising
immediate supervision over the appointee.1 Here, it is undisputed that respondent
Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in
fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari. The defense of respondent Cortes
that her appointment was made by the Commission En Banc and that his father, a
member of the Commission, abstain from voting for his appointment did not cure the
nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the
prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment of
IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and neutrality
of the Commission En Banc.
Political Law

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS

AURELIO M. UMALI vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JULIUS CESAR V.

VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CABANATUAN
G.R. No. 203974, April 22, 2014

The plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into a
highly urbanized citys should be participated by the qualified registered voters of the
entire province of Nueva Ecija not of Cabanatuan City only. While conversion to an
HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution we nevertheless
observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration of
boundaries. As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of boundaries" involves and
necessarily entails a change in the geographical configuration of a local government
unit or units. However, the phrase "boundaries" should not be limited to the mere
physical one, referring to the metes and bounds of the LGU, but also to its political
boundaries. It also connotes a modification of the demarcation lines between political
subdivisions, where the LGU’s exercise of corporate power ends and that of the other
begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must be "substantial" for it to be within the
ambit of the constitutional provision.

CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON. DARLENE

MAGNOLIA R. ANTONINO-CUSTODIO vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 199439, April 22, 2014

Designing and implementing a local government unit’s own "organizational structure

and staffing pattern" also implies the power to revise and reorganize. Without such
power, local governments will lose the ability to adjust to the needs of its constituents.
Effective and efficient governmental services especially at the local government level
require rational and deliberate changes planned and executed in good faith from time to
time. However, the assailed decision by respondent Commission on Audit was
anchored on Section 28, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 186, otherwise
known as the Government Service Insurance Act, as amended by Republic Act No.
4968, which proscribes all supplementary retirement or pension plans for government
employees.

NAVARRO v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011

Republic Act 9355 is valid and constitutional. The exemption from the minimum land
area requirement – when the Local Government Unit to be created consists of one or
more islands – is expressly stated in the Local Government Code for municipalities but
is absent in the requisites for the creation of a province, but such exemption is expressly
stated in Art. 9(2) of the Local Government Code Implementing Rules and Regulations
(LGC-IRR). The omission of the exemption in the case of provinces was intended to be
corrected by Art. 9(2) of the LGC-IRR to reflect the true legislative intent. This will also
be consistent with the declared policy to provide said local government units genuine
and meaningful local autonomy by construing liberally the contiguity and minimum land
Political Law

area requirements for prospective local government units in order to achieve the desired
results.

MMDA v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000

The MMDA’s power is limited to administration and implementation of metro-wide

services in Metro Manila and is not a Local Government Unit nor a public corporation
endowed with legislative power nor police power to enact ordinances for the closure or
opening of roads. It can only lay down policies and coordinate with various agencies, as
well as the private sector.

LEAGUE OF CITIES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, April 12, 2011

The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. Senator Pimentel during the deliberations
showed that Republic Act 9009 would not apply to the conversion bills then pending
deliberation in the Senate during the 11th Congress, for Local Government Units
covered by the Cityhood Laws belong to a class of their own, having proven themselves
viable and capable to become component cities of their respective provinces (by being
tourism spots, centers of trade and commerce, points of convergence of transportation,
and havens of agricultural, mineral and other natural resources).

AQUINO v. ROBREDO, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010

Republic Act 9716 is constitutional. Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution requires a
250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not for
a province. Records of the Constitutional Commission show that the population was not
the sole determinant of the creation of a legislative district.

SEMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008

Sec. 19, Art. VI of Republic Act 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the
ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities. Regional legislative
bodies may be delegated the power to create municipalities and barangays provided in
Sec. 10, Art, X of the Constitution but only Congress may create provinces and cities.

ORDILLO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 93054, December 4, 1990

The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the CAR. The Constitution is clear
that the autonomous regions must consist of more than one province, as the term
“region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. Further, it can be
seen from Republic Act 6766 (Organic Act of the CAR) that Congress never intended
that a single province can constitute an autonomous region; otherwise, the province will
be composed of two sets of officials: one for the Ifugao Local Government Unit and
another set of regional officials for the CAR, both of whom will be exercising executive
and legislative powers over the same area.
Political Law

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO v. MENDEZ, G.R. No. 103702, December 6, 1994

The Municipality of San Andres attained a status closely approximating that of a de

facto municipal corporation, by virtue of the circumstances of the case, such as the
existence of governmental acts (e.g., EO 174 classifying the municipality of San Andres
as a fifth class municipality) that point to the state’s recognition of the continued
existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Furthermore, by virtue of Sec. 442 (d) of
the Local Government Code, which states that municipal districts “organized pursuant to
presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of
elective municipal officials holding office” at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall
be considered regular municipalities, it has now attained the status of a de jure
municipality. Also, the petitioner challenged the legality of EO 353 only thirty years after
its issuance. A quo warranto proceeding assailing the lawful authority of a political
subdivision should be timely raised.

SAMPIANO v. INDAR, A.M. No. RTJ-05-1953, December 21, 2009

The IRA may not be automatically released. The automatic release of the IRA under
Sec. 286 is a mandate to the national government through the Department of Budget
and Management to effect automatic release of the said funds from the treasury directly
to the local government units, free from any holdbacks or liens imposed by the national
government, but this automatic realease of the IRA from the national treasury does not
prevent the proper court from deferring or suspending its release to particular local
officials when there is a legal question presented in court as to the rights of the parties
to receive the IRA.

PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 195770, July 17, 2012

There was no recentralization as the local government units have no power over a
program for which funding has been provided by the National Government under the
General Appropriations Act, even if the said program is within the jurisdiction of an LGU.
The programs and services involved in the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program are
funded by the National Government, which it may designate to implementing agencies
such as the DSWD. The concept of local autonomy does imply the establishment of
local government units into mini-states, as what is involved in local autonomy is
decentralization of administration and not of power.

GANCAYCO v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011

Congress granted the city government, through its city council, police power by virtue of
the Revised Quezon City Charter, which allowed the regulation of the construction of
buildings. Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
the exercise of police power, but the methods and means used in exercising such
power to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable
relation to the end in view. The ordinance in question is valid as the city’s primary goal
in enacting it was to increase health and safety of the city since these arcardes were
Political Law

intended to provide safe and convenient passageways along the sidewalk for
pedestrians.

SJS v. LIM, G.R. No. 187836, November 25, 2014

The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod is vested with the power to “reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the
city”116 subject to the pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also settled that an
ordinance may be modified or repealed by another ordinance.

The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been
lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life,
security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence
of the oil depots, we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan
Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.

PARAYNO v. JOVELLANOS, G.R. No. 148408, July 14, 2006

The Resolution was an invalid exercise of police power as the Ordinance which served
as its basis only prohibits gasoline service stations within 100 meters from any school,
church or hospital, and not gasoline filling stations. The ordinance makes a distinction
between gasoline filling stations and gasoline service centers, prohibiting the latter and
not the former. Also, there was no due process as the Sangguniang Bayan sought to
abate the alleged nuisance (Parayno’s gasoline filling station) without proper judicial
proceedings.

CITY OF MANILA v. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA, G.R. No. L-14355,

October 31, 1919

Though the City Charter of Manila allows it to expropriate land for public purposes, the
right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation in that where
the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how it may be taken, the
necessity of taking a particular property is a question for the courts to decide. In this
case, the first condition on expropriation by the City of Manila was met, as the land
sought to be expropriated is private but the second condition (public purpose) was not
met as it was not shown that the extension of the street was necessary and its
extension through the cemetery was also not shown to be necessary as other lots have
been offered to the city free of charge.

JIL CHRISTIAN SCHOOL FOUNDATION v. CITY OF PASIG, G.R. No. 152230,

August 9, 2005

The expropriation was improper as there was no valid and definite offer. Before a local
government unit can exercise the power of eminent domain, there must first be a) an
ordinance enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive,
in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
Political Law

proceedings over a particular private property; b) The power of eminent domain is

exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless; c) There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article
III of the Constitution and other pertinent laws; and d) A valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer
was not accepted. There was no offer because the letter Pasig sent the Cuangcos and
the invitation to the engineer’s office only proved its intent to acquire the property for a
right of way and did not amount to a valid and definite offer.

ONGSUCO v. MALONES, G.R. No. 182065, October 27, 2009

The rentals and goodwill fees imposed by the municipal ordinance are charges, making
the municipal ordinance void and unenforceable as there was no valid public hearing
conducted as mandated by Sec. 186 of the Local Government Code, which expressly
provides that ordinances levying taxes, fees or charges cannot be enacted without any
public hearing.

QUEZON CITY v. BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS, G.R. No. 162015, March 6,

2006

Bayantel is exempt from realty taxes on its properties that are actually, directly and
exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise. Congress may grant a tax exemption
previously withdrawn by the LGC. Despite the fact that Sec. 5, Article X of the
Constitution gives local legislative bodies the power to tax, their exercise of this power
may be subject to guidelines and limitations as Congress may provide. Thus, the power
to tax is still primarily vested in Congress. Through Sec. 232 of the Local Government
Code which provides that “a province or city or municipality within the Metropolitan
Manila Area may levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property...not hereinafter
specifically exempted,” the Congress highlighted its power to thereafter exempt certain
realties from the taxing power of local government units. The use, in turn, of the same
phrase “exclusive of this franchise” in Republic Act 7633, which was the basis for
Bayante’s exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC, shows the intention on the part
of Congress to once again remove from the LGC’s delegated taxing power all of the
franchisee’s properties actually, directly and exclusively used in the pursuit of its
franchise.

MIAA v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006

MIAA, not being a government-owned and controlled corporation, is exempt from real
estate tax because it is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers. An
instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government not integrated within
the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. Sec. 133 of the LGC states that the
taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays shall not extend to the
levy of taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
Political Law

instrumentalities. This constitutes a limitation imposed by Congress on the local

government’s exercise of the power to tax. Furthermore, the power of local
governments to tax national government instrumentalities is construed strictly against
local governments and the rule is that a tax is never presumed and that there must be
clear language in the law imposing the tax.

QUEZON CITY v. ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008

While Congress has the inherent power to tax and grant tax exemptions, Sec. 5, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution confers on municipal corporations a general power to levy
taxes and otherwise create sources of revenue and they no longer have to wait for a
statutory grant of these powers. In interpreting statutory provisions on municipal fiscal
powers, doubts will be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. In this case, the “in
lieu of other taxes” provision does not expressly provide in clear and unambiguous
language what kind of taxes ABS-CBN is exempted from, and as a claim of tax
exemption is not favored nor presumed in law but must be clearly shown, ABS-CBN is
liable for Quezon City’s franchise tax.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS v. CITY OF DAVAO, G.R. No. September 16, 2008

Smart is liable to pay Davao’s franchise tax because its legislative franchise did not
expressly provide the specific taxes from which it was exempt. The “in lieu of all taxes”
clause in Smart’s legislative franchise did not expressly and categorically state that the
exemption applies to both local and national taxes and thus, the phrase in question
must be applied only to national internal revenue taxes. Tax exemptions are never
presumed and are construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the
taxing authority.

SANGALANG v. IAC, G.R. No. 71169, December 22, 1988

The Mayor’s act is valid because in this case, the city has the power to open a city
street for public use. Despite loss of privacy among Bel-Air residents, more important
than this is the duty of a local executive to take care of the needs of the majority at the
expense of the minority.

CITY OF MANILA v. TEOTICO, G.R. No. L-23053, January 29, 1968

The applicable provision is that of Art. 2189 of the Civil Code as it governs liability due
to “defective streets”, which Teotico alleged to be the cause of his injuries. Sec. 4 of the
City Charter is not decisive on the issue as it refers merely to liability arising from
negligence in general, regardless of the object thereof, while Art. 2189 governs liability
due to “defective streets” in particular. On the allegation of the City of Manila that it is
not liable because the street where Teotico was injured was a national highway, the
Court ruled that under Art. 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality on which responsibility is
Political Law

placed. It is enough that the said province, city or municipality have either control or
supervision over the said street or road.

TORIO v. FONTANILLA, G.R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978

The provision simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it
does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to
commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the
special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the public performed
in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as claimed was
not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town inhabitants is
not a conclusive test. For instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income
for the nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of
public schools, jails, and the like which are for public service.

KANANGA v. MADRONA, G.R. No. 141375, April 30, 2003

Sec. 118 of the Local Government Code, requiring that boundary disputes involving
municipalities or component cities of different provinces be jointly referred for settlement
to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned, has no application in this case since
one party is an independent component city. Since there is no legal provision
specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary disputes between a municipality and an
independent component city, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be
used and as the RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except
those expressly withheld from their plenary powers, the RTCs have the power to hear
and resolve the dispute in the case at bar.

SOCRATES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002

The recall assembly was proper. Hagedorn is not disqualified from running in the recall
election as any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the
prohibition on serving for more than 3 consecutive terms contained in Sec. 43 of the
Local Government Code. Any subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate re-election after three consecutive terms and the intervening period
constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

MONTEBON v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180444, April 8, 2008

Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code provides that an elective local official cannot
serve for more than three consecutive terms, and that voluntary renunciation of office
for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. For an official to be
disqualified from running because of the three-term limit, the official must have been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and he must
have fully served three consecutive terms. In this case, there was an interruption in
Potencioso’s second term as municipal councilor as he succeeded the retired Vice
Mayor Mendoza. Such succession in local government offices is by operation of law and
Political Law

does not constitute voluntary renunciation of office. Thus, since the succession did not
amount to a voluntary renunciation of office (which does not interrupt the continuity of
service), Potencioso could not be said to have fully served his second term and as
such, he is entitled to run for another term as municipal councilor.

MENDOZA v. LAXINA, G.R. No. 146875, July 14, 2003

The re-taking of an oath of office by a duly-proclaimed but subsequently unseated local

elective official is not a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-assumption into
his office. Once Laxina was proclaimed and duly sworn into office the first time, he
became entitled to assume office and exercise its functions. The pendency of an
election protest is not sufficient basis to stop him from assuming office or discharging
his functions. When the COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending appeal issued
by the MTC in favor of Fermo, the MTC’s decision proclaiming Fermo as winner of the
election was stayed and the status quo – or when Laxina was occupying the office of
Barangay Captain – was restored. As such, the re-taking of his oath was a mere
formality, because through the stay of the MTC’s decision, it was as if the writ of
execution was not issued and he was not ousted from office.

VALLES v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000

Lopez is not disqualified. Sec. 40(d) of the Local Government Code uses the term ‘dual
citizenship’ as a disqualification, meaning dual allegiance. For candidates like Lopez
with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of
their certificate of candidacy to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.
As such, if in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen
and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto, such a declaration, under oath, operates as
an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. In this case, Lopez should not be
disqualified as the Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the
place of his/her birth. Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father.
Also, the fact that Lopez was born in Australia did not amount to her losing her
Philippine citizenship. Furthermore, the fact that Lopez was a holder of an Australian
passport and had an alien certificate of registration did not mean that she was
renouncing her Filipino citizenship since a renunciation must be express to result in the
loss of citizenship.

MERCADO v. MANZANO, G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999

Manzano should not be disqualified because the “dual citizenship” meant in Sec. 40 (d)
of the Local Government Code as a ground for disqualification, refers to “dual
allegiance”. Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by
the said states, while dual allegiance, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. For
Political Law

candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon
the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual
citizenship. Manzano‘s oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the
fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, shows his
election of Philippine citizenship.

MONDANO v. SILVOSA, G.R. No. L-7708, May 30, 1955

The investigation and suspension were illegal because, although provincial supervision
over municipal officials belongs to the Provincial Governor and he may submit written
charges before the Provincial Board and suspend the official, the charges in this case
are not malfeasances contemplated under Sec. 2188 of the Revised Administrative
Code. The charges may be considered as involving moral turpitude, but before the
Provincial Board/Governor may formally charge and suspend the petitioner, there must
first be a conviction which was lacking in this case.

TALAGA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 196804, October 9, 2012

Talaga deliberately made misrepresentations in his COC, therefore the same was null
and void. The false representation here must be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. To prevent
a candidate from running in an electoral race, one may resort to either a petition for
disqualification under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code (the effect of which will be
the prohibition of the person from continuing as a candidate) or to a petition to deny due
course to, or cancel, a certificate of candidacy grounded on a statement of a material
representation in the said certificate that is false (the effect of which is the cancellation
or denial of due course of the person’s certificate, with the said person not treated as a
candidate at all – as if she never filed a COC). A person whose COC was cancelled
does not give rise to a valid candidacy and therefore cannot be substituted by another
person.

PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. No. 187167, August 6, 2011

Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to
delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn,
this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime
space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights,
namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article
33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic
zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Political Law

VINUYA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

The Latin phrase, ‘erga omnes,’ has since become one of the rallying cries of those
sharing a belief in the emergence of a value-based international public order. However,
as is so often the case, the reality is neither so clear nor so bright. Whatever the
relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its full potential remains to be
realized in practice.

The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus cogens. In
international law, the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that
command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus
cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not
admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent
authority.

As a general principle – and particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of

time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration – the Executive
must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing
a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and
those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether
further steps are appropriate or necessary.

ANG LADLAD v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain
norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations
outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state of international
law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Petitioner has not
undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of
international law to ascertain their true status.

PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTHCARE ASSOCIATION v. DUQUE, G.R. No.

173034, October 9, 2007

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies
when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force
of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article
VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go
Political Law

through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal

law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.

PIMENTEL v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the
sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative
with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the
country’s mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is
vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or
withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise
transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President
has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into
treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence
of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him.
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all
the Members of the Senate."

Prosecutor v. Galic (Trial Judgment, ICTY, 2003)

Galic was convicted of crimes against humanity for acts during the Siege of Sarajevo in
the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His many acts included intentionally launching
attacks to spread terror among the civilian population, which he defended as an act of
military necessity. The Court convicted him, explaining that if excessive casualties are
expected to result, the attack should not be pursued. The test for proportionality is
whether a reasonably well-informed person in the circumstances of the actual
perpetrator, making reasonable use of the information available to him or her, could
have expected excessive civilian casualties to result from the attack.

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (American Case, 1980)

This was a wrongful death action brought under the American Alien Torts Statute
charging Pena-Irala, then the Inspector-General of the police in Paraguay, of torturing to
death a teenage Paraguayan. The Court held that deliberate torture under the color of
official authority violated customary international law, regardless of the nationality of the
parties.