Uy vs. Atty.

Gonzales

FACTS:
Complainant engaged the services of respondent lawyer to prepare and file a petition for the
issuance of a new certificate of title. After confiding with respondent the circumstances surrounding
the lost title and discussing the fees and costs, respondent prepared, finalized and submitted to him
a petition to be filed before the Regional Trial Court.

When the petition was about to be filed, respondent went to complainant’s office demanding a
certain amount other than what was previously agreed upon. Respondent left his office after
reasoning with him. Expecting that said petition would be filed, he was shocked to find out later that
instead of filing the petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title, respondent filed a letter-
complaint against him with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for Falsification of Public
Documents. The letter-complaint contained facts and circumstances pertaining to the transfer
certificate of title that was the subject matter of the petition which respondent was supposed to
have filed.

Respondent claims that he gave complainant a handwritten letter telling complainant that he is
withdrawing the petition he prepared and that complainant should get another lawyer to file the
petition thereby terminating the lawyer-client relationship between him and complainant; that there
was no longer any professional relationship between the two of them when he filed the letter-
complaint for falsification of public document; that the facts and allegations contained in the letter-
complaint for falsification were culled from public documents procured from the Office of the
Register of Deeds.

The IBP found him guilty of violating Rule 21.02, Canon 21 of the Canons of Professional
Responsibility and recommended for his suspension for 6 months.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Canon 21 of the CPR?

HELD:
No. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents
filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent due to his personal dealings
with complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the certificate of
title of the land he has redeemed from complainant. Clearly, there was no attorney-client
relationship between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the
petition was only incidental to their personal transaction.

Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his
professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and
therefore, when respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which
necessarily involved alleging facts that would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way,
violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate the filing of the affidavit-complaint against
herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and
good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold
otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his
personal or proprietary interests.
PETITION DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Orola vs. Atty. Ramos

FACTS:

Complainants, except Karen Orola, are the heirs of the late Trinidad who is married to Emilio.
Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola is the daughter of Maricar and one of Antonio's heirs.

In the settlement of Trinidads estate the parties were represented by the following: (a) Atty. Villa as
counsel for and in behalf of the Heirs of Trinidad; (b) Atty. Azarraga as counsel for and in behalf of
Heirs of Antonio,with respondent as collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as
counsel for and in behalf of Emilio, the initially appointed administrator of Trinidads estate. In the
course of the proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio moved for the removal of
Emilio as administrator and, in his stead, sought the appointment of the latters son, which the RTC
granted. Subsequently, respondent filed an Entry of Appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio
in the same case and moved for the reconsideration of the RTC Order.

Due to this, complainants filed the instant disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), claiming that he violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to represent
conflicting interests in the subject case; and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he breached
the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of Antonio. Complainants further
claimed that while Maricar consented to the withdrawal of respondents appearance, the same was
obtained only after he had already entered his appearance for Emilio. In this accord, respondent
failed to disclose such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was not able to obtain their written
consent as required under the Rules.

Respondent refuted the charges contending that he never appeared as counsel for the Heirs of
Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He averred that he only accommodated Maricar's request to
temporarily appear on her behalf and that his appearances were free of charge. He also obtained
Maricar’s permission for him to withdraw from the case and to represent Emilio. He added that he
had no knowledge that the late Antonio had other heirs and that no information was disclosed to
him by Maricar or their counsel of record at any instance. Finally, he clarified that his representation
for Emilio in the subject case was more of a mediator, rather than a litigator,and that since no
settlement was forged between the parties, he formally withdrew his appearance. In support of his
assertions, respondent submitted the affidavits of Maricar and Atty. Azarraga.

In the Report and Recommendation of the IBP, respondent was found guilty of representing
conflicting interests but was held that there was no violation of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as
complainants themselves admitted that respondent did not acquire confidential information from
his former client nor did he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in the course of his
previous employment. Considering that it was respondent's first offense, the imposition of
disbarment is too harsh thus recommended that he be severely reprimanded.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the aforementioned report
and imposed against respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule
15.03 of the Code?
HELD: Yes. Respondent is guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code because a lawyer is prohibited
from representing new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner,
whether or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases.

Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:

CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND
TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent ofall
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more
opposing parties.The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight
for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client.

Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot fully
exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests provides an
absolute prohibition from representation with respect to opposing parties in the same case.

The Court concurs with the IBPs finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code, but finds
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months to be more
appropriate taking into consideration the following factors:first, respondent is a first time
offender;second, it is undisputed that respondent merely accommodated Maricars request out of
gratis to temporarily represent her;third, it is likewise undisputed that respondent had no
knowledge that the late Antonio had any other heirs aside from Maricar whose consent he actually
acquired, hence, it can be said that he acted in good faith; and fourth, complainants admit that
respondent did not acquire confidential information from the Heirs of Antonio nor did he use against
them any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous employment, hence, the said heirs were
not in any manner prejudiced by his subsequent engagement with Emilio.
Segovia-Ribaya vs. Lawsin

FACTS:
Azucena Segovia-Ribaya and Atty. Bartolome Lawsin entered into a retainership agreement for the
processing of registration and delivery of the certificate of title over a certain parcel of land.
Respondent acted as the representative of Heirs of the late Isabel Segovia and received P15,000 for
litigation and P39,000 for land registration expenses. In the lapse of 3 years, it was alleged that
respondent failed to fulfill his undertaking to register the subject land and deliver to complainant the
certificate of the title over the same. Complainant decided to withdraw the subject amount and sent
2 demand letters but all to no avail. Respondent asserted that the complainant’s brother, Erlindo,
asked to be reimbursed the amount of P7,500.00 which the latter purportedly paid to the land
surveyor. He also found out that he could not perform his undertaking under the retainer because
the ownership of the subject land was still under litigation. He also wanted to return the balance of
the subject amount but it was prevented because the complainant shouted and called him names in
the presence of his staff in his office.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent should be held administratively liable for violating Rules
16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code.

HELD:

Yes. Anent respondent's administrative liability, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondent's
failure to properly account for and duly return his client's money despite due demand is tantamount
to a violation of Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code which respectively read as follows:

CANON 16 A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client.

Rule 16.03 A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also
have a lien to the same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.

Records disclose that respondent admitted the receipt of the subject amount from complainant to
cover for pertinent registration expenses but posited his failure to return the same due to his client's
act of confronting him at his office wherein she shouted and called him names. With the fact of
receipt being established, it was then respondent's obligation to return the money entrusted to him
by complainant. To this end, suffice it to state that complainant's purported act of "maligning"
respondent does not justify the latter's failure to properly account for and return his client's money
upon due demand. Verily, a lawyer's duty to his client is one essentially imbued with trust so much
so that it is incumbent upon the former to exhaust all reasonable efforts towards its faithful
compliance. In this case, despite that singular encounter, respondent had thereafter all the
opportunity to return the subject amount but still failed to do so. Besides, the obligatory force of
said duty should not be diluted by the temperament or occasional frustrations of the lawyer's client,
especially so when the latter remains unsatisfied by the lawyer's work. Indeed, a lawyer must deal
with his client with professional maturity and commit himself towards the objective fulfilment of his
responsibilities. If the relationship is strained, the correct course of action is for the lawyer to
properly account for his affairs as well as to ensure the smooth turn-over of the case to another
lawyer. Except only for the retaining lien exception[23] under Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code, the
lawyer should not withhold the property of his client. Unfortunately, absent the applicability of such
exception or any other justifiable reason therefor, respondent still failed to perform his duties under
Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code which perforce warrants his administrative liability.

The Court, however, deems it proper to increase the IBP's recommended period of suspension from
the practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year in view of his concomitant failure to exercise
due diligence in handling his client's cause as mandated by Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code:

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within
a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

After a judicious scrutiny of the records, the Court observes that respondent did not only accomplish
his undertaking under the retainer, but likewise failed to give an adequate explanation for such non-
performance despite the protracted length of time given for him to do so. As such omissions equally
showcase respondent's non-compliance with the standard of proficiency required of a lawyer as
embodied in the above-cited rules, the Court deems it apt to extend the period of his suspension
from the practice of law from six (6) months to one (1) year similar to the penalty imposed in the
case of Del Mundo v. Capistrano.[24]

As a final point, the Court must clarify that the foregoing resolution should not include a directive for
the return of the amount of P31,500.00 as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors. The same
amount was given by complainant to respondent to cover for registration expenses; hence, its return
partakes the nature of a purely civil liability which should not be dealt with during an administrative-
disciplinary proceeding. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,[25] the Court recently held that its "findings
during administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no bearing on the liabilities of the parties
involved which are purely civil in nature meaning, those liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the
lawyer's professional engagement as the same should be threshed out in a proper proceeding of
such nature." This pronouncement the Court applies to this case and thus, renders a disposition
solely on respondent's administrative liability.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Bartolome C. Lawsin is found guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and
16.03, Canon 16, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective
upon his receipt of this Resolution, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.