Section 2, Rule XVI, Book V, Rules and Regulation Implementing the Labor Code provides that any employer

who seeks to
dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal.
In cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.

Hence, before termination of employment can be legally effected, the employer must furnish the worker with two (2) written
notices, i.e. a notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and the
subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. 15G.R. No. 133573 June 20, 2000

LEAH ICAWAT and ROMEO ICAWAT, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ARIEL CADIENTE SANTOS and JOSE F. YAPE,
respondents.

Citing Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services [Phil.], Inc. vs. NLRC, 264 SCRA 307 [1996].

Section 2, Rule XVI, Book V, Rules and regulations implementing the Labor Code provides that any employer who seeks to
dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular act or omission constituting the ground for his
dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the worker’s last known address (Icawat vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 334 SCRA 75, 81 [2000]). G.R. No. 172670 January 20,
2009

RBC CABLE MASTER SYSTEM AND/OR EVELYN CINENSE, Petitioners,

vs.
MARCIAL BALUYOT,

In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that the dismissal of an employee is for a valid
cause.28 G.R. No. 182070 February 16, 2011

E.G & I. CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and EDSEL GALEOS, Petitioners,

vs.
ANANIAS P. SATO, NILO BERDIN, ROMEO M. LACIDA, JR., and HEIRS OF
ANECITO S. PARANTAR, SR., namely: YVONNE, KIMBERLY MAE,
MARYKRIS, ANECITO, JR., and JOHN BRYAN, all surnamed PARANTAR,
"In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that [the] dismissal of an employee is for a valid
cause."37 G.R. No. 168757 January 19, 2011

RENATO REAL, Petitioner,

vs.
SANGU PHILIPPINES, INC. and/ or KIICHI ABE,
Citing Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc. v. Santos, G.R. No. 165968, April 14, 2008,

Thus, as an illegally or constructively dismissed employee, respondent is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement, if viable, or
separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer viable; and (2) backwages. These two reliefs are separate and distinct from each
other and are awarded conjunctively.25lavvphil

G.R. No. 177937 January 19, 2011

ROBINSONS GALLERIA/ROBINSONS SUPERMARKET CORPORATION

and/or JESS MANUEL, Petitioners,
vs.
IRENE R. RANCHEZ
Citing : Siemens v. Domingo, G.R. No. 150488, July 28, 2008

an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer
viable, and backwages. G.R. No. 187200 May 5, 2010

GOLDEN ACE BUILDERS and ARNOLD U. AZUL, Petitioners,

vs.
JOSE A. TALDE
An employee who is illegally dismissed is entitled to the twin reliefs of full backwages and reinstatement. If reinstatement is not
viable, separation pay is awarded to the employee. G.R. No. 152166 October 20, 2010

ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC. and ROBERT KUAN, Chairman,

Petitioners,
vs.
ESTRELITO NOTARIO,

_______________________________________

The Court is not persuaded.

It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. If he 16

claims a right granted by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence, relying on the
strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent. The test 17

for determining on whom the burden of proof lies is found in the result of an inquiry as to
which party would be successful if no evidence of such matters were given. In an illegal 18

dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of an
employee was for a valid cause. However, before a case for illegal dismissal can prosper,
19

an employer-employee relationship must first be established. Thus, in filing a complaint

20

before the LA for illegal dismissal, based on the premise that he was an employee of
respondents, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove the employer-employee relationship by
substantial evidence. 21

In regard to the above discussion, the issue of whether or not an employer-employee

relationship existed between petitioner and respondents is essentially a question of
fact. The factors that determine the issue include who has the power to select the
22

employee, who pays the employee’s wages, who has the power to dismiss the employee,
and who exercises control of the methods and results by which the work of the employee is
accomplished. Although no particular form of evidence is required to prove the existence of
23

the relationship, and any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be
admitted, a finding that the relationship exists must nonetheless rest on substantial evidence,
which is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion. 24

G.R. No. 189255 June 17, 2015

JESUS G. REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
GLAUCOMA RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC., EYE REFERRAL CENTER and MANUEL
B. AGULTO,

Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted.

It is an oft-repeated rule that in labor cases, as in other administrative and quasi-judicial

proceedings, 'the quantum of proof necessary is substantial evidence, or such amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.’ ‘The burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an
issue’." Since it is Valencia here who is claiming to be an employee of Classique Vinyl, it is
21

thus incumbent upon him to proffer evidence to prove the existence of employer-employee
relationship between them. He "needs to show by substantial evidence that he was indeed
an employee of the company against which he claims illegal dismissal." Corollary, the 22

burden to prove the elements of an employer-employee relationship, viz.: (1) the selection
and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and
(4) the power of control, lies upon Valencia.
Indeed, there is no hard and fast rule designed to establish the aforementioned elements of
employer-employee relationship. "Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the
23

relationship may be admitted." In this case, however, Valencia failed to present competent
24

evidence, documentary or otherwise, to support his claimed employer-employee relationship

between him and Classique Vinyl. All he advanced were mere factual assertions
unsupported by proof.

In fact, most of Valencia's allegations even militate against his claim that Classique Vinyl was
his true employer. For one, Valencia stated in his Sinumpaang Salaysay that his application
was actually received and processed by CMS which required him to submit the necessary
requirements for employment. Upon submission thereof, it was CMS that caused him to sign
an employment contract, which upon perusal, is actually a contract between him and CMS. It
was only after he was engaged as a contractual employee of CMS that he was deployed to
Classique Vinyl. Clearly, Valencia's selection and engagement was undertaken by CMS and
conversely, this negates the existence of such element insofar as Classique Vinyl is
concerned. It bears to state, in addition, that as opposed to Valencia's argument, the lack of
notarization of the said employment contract did not adversely affect its veracity and
effectiveness since significantly, Valencia does not deny having signed the same. The CA,
25

therefore, did not err in relying on the said employment contract in its determination of the
merits of this case. For another, Valencia himself acknowledged that the pay slips he
26

submitted do not bear the name of Classique Vinyl. While the Court in Vinoya v. National
Labor Relations Commission took judicial notice of the practice of employer to course
27

through the purported contractor the act of paying wages to evade liabilities under the Labor
Code, hence, the non-appearance of employer's name in the pay slip, the Court is not
inclined to rule that such is the case here. This is conside1ing that although CMS claimed in
its supplemental Position Paper/Comment that the money it used to pay Valencia's wages
came from Classique Vinyl, the same is a mere allegation without proof Moreover, such
28

allegation is inconsistent with CMS's earlier assertion in its Position Paper that Valencia
29

received from it non-cash wages in an approximate amount of ₱3,000.00. A clear showing of

the element of payment of wages by Classique Vinyl is therefore absent.

Aside from the afore-mentioned inconsistent allegations of Valencia, his claim that his work
was supervised by Classique Vinyl does not hold water. Again, the Court finds the same as a
self-serving assertion unworthy of credence. On the other hand, the employment contract
which Valencia signed with CMS categorically states that the latter possessed not only the
power of control but also of dismissal over him, viz.:

xxxx

2. That the employee shall observe all rules and regulations of the company during the
period of employment and [the] lawful instructions of the management or its representatives.
Failure to do so or if performance is below company standards, management [has] the right
to immediately cancel this contract.

xxxx 30

Clearly, therefore, no error can be attributed on the part of the labor tribunals and the CA in
ruling out the existence of employer-employee relationship between Valencia and Classique
Vinyl.

Further, the Court finds untenable Valencia's argument that neither Classique Vinyl nor CMS
was able to present proof that the latter is a legitimate independent contractor and therefore,
unable to rebut the presumption that a contractor is presumed to be a labor-only contractor.
"Genera1ly, the presumption is that the contractor is a labor-only [contractor] unless such
contractor overcomes the burden of proving that it has the substantial capital, investment,
tools and the lik.e." Here, to prove that CMS was a legitimate contractor, Classique Vinyl
31

presented the former's Certificate of Registration with the Department of Trade and Industry
32

and, License as private recruitment and placement agency from the Department of Labor
33

and Employment. Indeed, these documents are not conclusive evidence of the status of
CMS as a contractor. However, such fact of registration of CMS prevented the legal
presumption of it being a mere labor-only contractor from arising. In any event, it must be
34

stressed that "in labor-only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee

relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The
contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is
responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been
directly employed by the principal employer. The principal employer therefore becomes
solidarily liable with the labor-only contractor for all the rightful claims of the
employees." The facts of this case, however, failed to establish that there is any
35

circumvention of labor laws as to call for the creation by the statute of an employer-employee
relationship between Classique Vinyl and Valencia. In fact, even as against CMS, Valencia's
money claims has been debunked by the labor tribunals and the CA. Again, the Court is not
inclined to disturb the same.

In view of the above disquisition, the Court finds no necessity to dwell on the issue of
whether Valencia was illegally dismissed by Classique Vinyl and whether the latter is liable
for Valencia's money claims.

While the Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and the protection of the
working class, it should not be supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically
decided in favor of labor. Management also has its rights which are entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of simple fair play. Out of its concern for the less privileged in life,
the Court has inclined, more often than not, toward the worker and upheld his cause in his
conflicts with the employer. Such favoritism, however, has not blinded the Court to the rule
that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established
facts and the applicable law and doctrine. 39

.R. No. 192558 February 15, 2012

BITOY JAVIER (DANILO P. JAVIER), Petitioner,

vs.
FLY ACE CORPORATION/FLORDELYN CASTILLO,

The Court is not unmindful of the State's policy to zealously safeguard the rights of our
workers, as no less than the Constitution itself mandates the State to afford full protection
to labor. Nevertheless, it is equally true that the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer,
authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. 38 The constitutional
policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress
employers.39 Certainly, an employer cannot be made to answer for claims that have
neither been sufficiently proved nor substantiated. South cotabato

It would negate the imposition upon them of moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney's fees. These forms of indemnity may only be imposed on a concrete showing of
38

bad faith or malice on the part of petitioners. November 20, 2017

39

G.R. No. 200576

MAERSK-FILIPINAS CREWING, INC. and AP MOLLER SINGAPORE PTE

LTD., Petitioners
vs.
ROSEMARY G. MALICSE (Legal wife of the deceased seafarer Efren B. Malicse,
representing the latter's estate), Respondent

Citimg: Olaybal
v. OSG Shipmanagement Manila, Inc., G. R. No. 211872, 22 June
2015, 760 SCRA 221; Heirs of Dela Cruz v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers,
Inc., G.R. No. 196357, 20 April 2015, 756 SCRA 141; Abante v. KJOS Fleet
Management Manila, 622 Phil, 761 (2009).

here are exceptions to the general rule that the findings of fact of labor tribunals, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this court. In Medina v. Asistio, Jr: 80

It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this Court being bound by the findings of
fact made by the Court of Appeals. The rule, however, is not without exception. Thus,
findings of fact by the Court of Appeals may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court in
the following instances, none of which obtain in the instant petition:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil.15 [1942]); (3) Where
there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v.People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953);
(5) Whenthe findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957;
unrep.);** (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee
(Evangelista v. Alto Suretyand Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA
622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]);** (8) When the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9)
When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals
is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on
record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]). 81

In labor cases, if the petitioner before this court can show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the National Labor Relations Commission, the assailed Court of Appeals ruling (in the
Rule 65 proceedings) will be reversed. "Labor officials commit grave abuse of discretion
when their factual findings are arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence." 82

If the petitioner can show that "the [labor] tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically or in
total disregard of evidence material to the controversy," the factual findings of the National
83

Labor Relations Commission may be subjected to review and ultimately rejected. 84

In addition, if the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter are in direct conflict with the National
Labor Relations Commission, this court may examine the records of the case and the
questioned findings in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. 85

It is the petitioner’s burden to justify the existence of one of the exceptions to the general rule
for this court to conduct a factual review. In this case, we find that petitioner has failed to
discharge this burden.

G.R. No. 169303 February 11, 2015

PROTECTIVE MAXIMUM SECURITY AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
CELSO E. FUENTES, Respondent.

IV