Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Deborah L. Hanagan
H O O V E R I N S T I T U TIO N P RES S
STANFORD UNIVERSITY STANFORD, CALIFORNIA
Amy Zegart
Davies Family Senior Fellow
Hoover Institution
The Puzzle
has changed or that operational activities are not achieving the desired
effect. Learning could result in new or adapted plans and activities and
as such would be reflected in revised strategies and campaign plans;
organizational structures; resources; operational missions, operating
procedures, and ways of fighting; doctrine; and education, training, and
exercise programs.
Experience operating together in multinational missions can increase
a coalition’s effectiveness since the member states’ military forces are
more likely to become interoperable over time. This is because they
establish common operational procedures, overcome language barri-
ers, and develop a measure of trust in each other. In addition, successful
action by an organization (demonstrated capacity) can generate more
impetus for its use in other situations. For example, NATO seemed to
demonstrate in the 1990s that it had the combat power and expertise
to deal with the conflicts in the Balkans, particularly the challenges
associated with complex peace operations. This prior experience was
a factor in the Alliance’s deliberations about whether and how to get
involved in Afghanistan.
The two drivers identified above are linked. Political will is critical
initially since this driver dictates operational action. Political will can be
weak but it can be sustained by organizational capacity. Organizational
capacity can either enhance or undermine political will and thus coali-
tion cohesion depending on whether it facilitates or hinders change and
adaptation. If the operational coalition can learn (recognize that the
character of the conflict has changed or identify that its campaign plan
is not achieving the objectives) and subsequently has the capacity to
adapt in such areas as organizational structures, operating procedures,
or military missions, it is more likely to sustain political will and thus
cohesion in the face of potentially destructive fraying forces. ISAF’s
case represents a bottom-up situation. The multinational operational
adaptations helped sustain strategic-level political will and commit-
ment at both the national and NATO levels. As such, ISAF’s capacity
to adapt generated and sustained cohesion which ensured the coalition
did not fracture under the pressure of the multiple fraying forces.
Alliances and coalitions are generated and exist within the conditions
of a given strategic environment. Furthermore, dramatic shifts in the
strategic environment can be the precipitating agents for change within
military organizations, especially if they possess the capacity to learn
and adapt. This means alliances and coalitions can change significantly
over time. In the case here, not only did NATO undergo incremental
changes after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, but it seems this
has been NATO’s character since its foundation in 1949. The NATO
of the early days of the Cold War looked nothing like the NATO at
the end of the Cold War. Similarly, the NATO of 1989 was substan-
tially different from the NATO that became involved in Afghanistan.
More important, the changes that occurred in the 1990s—which led to
NATO actually undertaking military action for the first time in its his-
tory and shifting the type of activities it was prepared to undertake—
laid important foundations that were relevant for Afghanistan and for
ISAF. Therefore, to explain NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan it is
necessary to look back in time.
After Hitler’s Third Reich was defeated and World War II ended in
Europe in May 1945, there was no allied plan for a continuing military
alliance. As a consequence, the United States ended the lend-lease pro-
gram and the allies executed rapid troop drawdowns and demobiliza-
tions.14 Within a year of Germany’s surrender, American armed forces
deployed in Europe decreased from 3,100,000 to 391,000, British forces
decreased from 1,321,000 to 488,000, and Canadian forces decreased
from 299,000 to zero.15
However, several negative political, economic, and military develop-
ments between 1945 and 1948 brought Europe close to collapse.16
They included the need to deal with tens of millions of refugees and
displaced persons.17 This was exacerbated by severe food shortages and
a dollar crisis that undermined the effort to rebuild nations devastated
by war. Soviet subversion of politics in occupied Eastern Europe was
France for new sites, primarily in West Germany. The secretary general
and his staff moved to a new NATO headquarters established in Brus-
sels, Belgium, in 1967.30 Other organizational changes included the cre-
ation of a small multinational operational force called the ACE Mobile
Force.31 In response to Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean,
the allies created the Maritime Air Force Mediterranean command in
Naples.32 In general, the Alliance continually worked to improve its
capacity to plan for and conduct operations. It instituted annual pro-
gram reviews to monitor the development of national military forces.
To improve interoperability, it created educational establishments and
began multinational training exercises. The NATO Defense College
was established in 1951; initially located in Paris, it moved to Rome
in 1966. The NATO (SHAPE) School at Oberammergau, Germany,
was established in 1953.33 The first combined training maneuvers were
held in fall 1951.34 The exercise program expanded rapidly and in 1953
approximately one hundred training exercises were held throughout
the NATO area. They ranged from command post exercises at SHAPE
headquarters to multinational maneuvers by air, land, and sea forces.35
All of the changes were oriented toward strengthening the Alliance’s
deterrence and defensive capabilities. But at the same time, the Alliance
expanded its strategic approach. When the flexible response concept was
adopted in 1967, the North Atlantic Council also adopted the recom-
mendation of the Harmel Report to encourage détente with the Soviet
Union. This was mainly due to a divergence in member threat percep-
tions as tensions relaxed and relations normalized between Western
Europe on the one hand and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union on
the other.36 NATO accommodated this divergence by balancing defense
with détente. Over the course of the 1970s and 1980s, the Alliance
endeavored to normalize relations with the Warsaw Pact countries via
political dialogue focused on confidence-building measures as well as
arms control, disarmament, and balanced force reductions.37
Overall, the Alliance seemed to demonstrate it was a learning
organization. It proceeded deliberately in creating relevant political
and military structures as the strategic environment changed and it
was flexible enough to reform or disband subsidiary bodies when it
the landscape of Europe. The initial impetus for what developed into
sweeping strategic changes was the economic crisis in the Soviet Union
and Warsaw Pact countries. President Mikhail Gorbachev’s actions to
revitalize the Soviet Union had unintended consequences which spi-
raled out of his control, particularly when he made it clear Moscow
would not intervene in Eastern Europe.41 He effectively overturned the
Brezhnev doctrine that called for the use of force to prevent Eastern
Bloc countries from making economic or political reforms.42
NATO leaders recognized that Gorbachev was a different kind of
Soviet leader and that his domestic and foreign policy initiatives cre-
ated an unprecedented strategic opportunity. For example, he withdrew
military forces from Afghanistan, took a dramatic step in arms control
negotiations by signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
treaty in December 1987, and unilaterally reduced the size of the Soviet
armed forces by half a million men. His cuts in defense expenditures
were part of a broader effort to overhaul the Soviet Union’s moribund
economy.43 But even as late as spring 1989, when the communist world
in Europe was on the cusp of dramatic change, NATO leaders were
hedging their bets, calculating that Gorbachev’s reforms would be lim-
ited, that the USSR would retain substantial conventional and nuclear
capabilities, and that therefore the bipolar nuclear standoff would con-
tinue.44 They could not conceive that Gorbachev’s initiatives would
lead to political changes throughout central, eastern, and southeastern
Europe which would subsequently overturn the security environment.
They miscalculated. Europe’s political landscape transformed in
1989 as Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
and Romania successively adopted political pluralism as a result of
democratic elections, the collapse of the communist regimes, or an
outright coup d’état. The result was a wholesale rejection of com-
munism and a movement toward market economies.45 These events
were accompanied by extensive migration to the West when Hungary
opened its borders in September. The opening of the East German
border and the Berlin Wall followed in November, at which point the
Iron Curtain effectively dissolved.46 The long-standing goal of German
reunification was achieved in under a year.47 The Soviet Union itself
their political support to the US-led coalition and warned Iraq not to
violate Turkey’s territorial integrity. The allies logistically supported
the deployment and transit of American and European forces. They
deployed the air component of the ACE Mobile Force and air defense
assets, including Patriot batteries, to Turkey. Additionally, twelve
members contributed ground, air, and naval forces to the coalition.60 In
effect, NATO took a very small step toward conducting conventional
military operations out-of-area.
The next NATO summit in Rome in November 1991 continued the
Alliance’s organizational adaptation. The allies unveiled a new strategic
concept: dialogue, cooperation, and defense. The concept built on the 1990
London Declaration, integrated the political and military elements of
Alliance policy, and took a broad approach to security promotion in the
new European landscape.61
The allies created a virtue out of necessity. In a security environment
where military challenges could range from conventional conflict with
a resurgent Russia to the spillover of small-scale civil conflicts, terror-
ism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and humanitarian cri-
ses, NATO opted to emphasize mobility and flexibility from a smaller
pool of multinational military forces. The forces would be trained and
prepared to conduct a variety of missions, some of which were new,
ranging from collective defense to crisis management, peacekeeping,
and humanitarian assistance.62
NATO has always been more than a military security pact. It has a
political and social vision, as well as military and nonmilitary objec-
tives. However, the nonmilitary side of NATO was relatively invisible
during the Cold War. This nonmilitary side became much more visible
after 1989. In effect, the end of the Cold War, the transformation of
the European political landscape, and the new security challenges pro-
vided an opening for the Alliance. Member nations maintained their
overall goal of preserving stability and peace on the continent but the
Alliance changed what it did to achieve this goal. In particular, NATO’s
political dimension expanded as it endeavored to achieve an ambitious
vision of a Europe whole and free. Ultimately, NATO actions followed
two broad tracks in the 1990s in response to two distinct security chal-
lenges: the post-communist transition and war in the Balkans. Both
tracks were oriented toward achieving security and fulfilling the vision.
Both tracks also converged.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the
Alliance took its first steps in operating out-of-area as it undertook a
mission to “project stability” in central and eastern Europe. Over time,
its relations with the post-communist countries focused on supporting
their political transition, creating new structures to ensure East-West
cooperation, and encouraging and assisting defense reform, civil-
ian control of the military, and arms control. In general, the Alliance
established an extensive range of contacts with all of the transitioning
countries, to include Russia, that facilitated mutual understanding and
reduced historic suspicions. It also gradually moved the transitioning
countries toward interoperability with NATO military forces.
The deepening relations were accompanied by pressure from many
of the democratizing countries for NATO membership. In 1991,
instability in the Soviet Union and conflict in Yugoslavia raised con-
cerns in central and eastern Europe about a potential wave of refu-
gees from the unraveling Soviet Union or a spillover of violence from
the disintegrating Yugoslavia.63 However, the allies were not ready for
the political repercussions of enlarging the Alliance toward the east.
Moreover, the defense establishments of the aspirant countries were
incompatible with NATO.
Instead, the Alliance moved toward a structure that institutionalized
regular consultations with the democratizing countries. In October
1991, the US secretary of state, James Baker, and the German foreign
minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, proposed the creation of the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council as a forum for East and West to discuss
political and military issues.64 The forum was established at the Rome
Summit in November 1991.65
Within two weeks of the first Cooperation Council meeting at
which nine central and eastern European countries joined the body,
the Soviet Union dissolved. Alliance leaders agreed that membership
should be extended to the newly sovereign states.66 By June 1992,
twelve more countries joined the body.67
Consultations initially focused on residual Cold War issues such
as the withdrawal of Russian troops from eastern Europe. However,
in 1992, as conflict in Yugoslavia spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the
Cooperation Council discussed peacekeeping. In December 1992, the
Council agreed members would share peacekeeping experiences and
possibly train together.68 In June 1993, the members agreed to actu-
ally engage in peacekeeping operations together under the auspices of
the United Nations or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe.69 However, the Cooperation Council was not the right struc-
ture to facilitate the military integration required for NATO and part-
ner nations to operate together.
The introduction of the Partnership for Peace program met this
need. Adopted at the NATO Summit in Brussels in January 1994,
it complemented the continuing operation of the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council.70 All of the partner nations were invited to join
(it was also open to other countries). Besides providing a mechanism for
developing convergent and cooperative military capabilities, Partner-
ship for Peace was purposefully focused on strengthening the ability
of all nations to undertake multinational operations—in particular,
peacekeeping, humanitarian, and search-and-rescue operations.71
Participation in Partnership for Peace included specific require-
ments of partner nations. These included the inculcation of democratic
principles and respect for human rights, civilian control of the military,
and transparent defense processes. They also had to develop military
forces able to operate with NATO, participate in peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations, and actively involve themselves in joint plan-
ning, training, and exercises with NATO.72 The program was a con-
the mission’s end date approached, the allies and partners agreed to
extend the military presence in Bosnia since the security provided by
the forces was essential for continued progress on the civil side.93 The
31,000-man Stabilization Force (sixteen allies and twenty-two part-
ners) was activated in December 1996. It operated for eight years until
the Alliance turned the mission over to the European Union.94
For the Alliance’s peace support mission in Bosnia, the military forces
were distributed into three multinational task forces. Thus NATO’s
first operational employment of land forces was in a purely multi-
national formation.95 The command’s headquarters element rotated
every six months. This NATO mission was part of a larger interna-
tional effort in Bosnia. The Dayton Peace Accord identified three lines
of effort—military, civil, and political—which were mutually support-
ing and interdependent. To facilitate coordination among the military,
governmental, and nongovernmental agencies involved in the coun-
try, the Implementation and Stabilization Force commanders created
a civil-military coordination working group to synchronize activities.96
Due to shortfalls in resources on the civil side, the NATO forces ended
up undertaking a wide range of nonmilitary activities (humanitarian
assistance, election support, reconstruction, and support to police
reform) in addition to their specified military tasks.97 At the strategic
level, SHAPE supported the mission by creating a program to train
troops in civil-military coordination skills. It also drafted policy and
doctrine on civil-military coordination to ensure a proper level of mil-
itary involvement in civilian tasks.98
The resolution of the Bosnia conflict did not end war in the Balkans.
The next conflict area was Serbia and its province of Kosovo. The deep
roots of the conflict were tied to tensions between Muslim Kosovar
Albanians and Orthodox Serbs. Yugoslav federal forces were deployed
to Kosovo five times between 1945 and 1990 to quell civil disturbances
before Yugoslavia disintegrated.99 By 1991, Serbian political appoin-
tees controlled the executive and administrative institutions in Kosovo
and 6,000 Serbian police maintained a fragile calm.100 But in 1996
the Kosovo Liberation Army began an armed insurrection targeting
Serbian police, supposed Albanian collaborators, and Serbian civil-
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