Re: Election Plans

I. Facts

Governor Fafua of Isabela province is on his third term of

office when he was found guilty by the Office of the Ombudsman
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act1 and
imposed a penalty of perpetual disqualification from office.

He filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals seeking to

reverse such ruling. After six (6) months of waiting, the Court of
Appeals reversed the ruling of the office of the Ombudsman and
resolved that the penalty should only be a suspension for five (5)
months.

Since he has been dismissed from office for six (6) months
already, he resumed office where he was able to serve his
remaining term of two (2) months, before the incoming election
period. Consequently, the governor expressed his intentions to run
again for office.

II. Issues

1. Whether or not Governor Fafua can run again for office on

the next elections.

2. If he wins, whether or not the assumption of office would

constitute a start from scratch in his three-term limit rule.

III. Legal Basis

1
Republic Act No. 3019

1
 1. He cannot run again this coming election. In this situation,
the three-term limit rule shall apply notwithstanding his
failure to actually fully serve his third term.

The provision governing for the term limit of local

officials is found on Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
which states:

“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,

except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.”[Emphasis supplied].

The provision abovementioned is also repeated by

Section 43 (b) of Republic Act 71202 without any substantial
changes in wording.

To examine the pertinent constitutional provision, in

Appari v. Court of Appeals3, there was a discussion about
what a term connotes:

“The word term in a legal sense means a fixed and

definite period of time which the law describes that an
officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of
office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon
expiration of the officer’s term, unless he is authorized by law
to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer
must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most
and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases
to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was
elected or appointed.” [Emphasis supplied].

It was also reiterated in the case of Gaminde v.

Commission on Audit4 where it was said that the [T]he term

2
The Local Government Code.
3
G.R. No. L-30057, January 31, 1984, 127 SCRA 231, 240.

2
 means the time during which the officer may claim to hold
office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the
several incumbents shall succeed one another.

In the case of Aldovino, et. al. v. COMELEC and Asilo5,

the Supreme Court in analyzing the constitutional provision
relating to the three-term limit rule, pronounced:

“The limitation under this first branch of the provision is

expressed in the negative no such official shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. This formulation no more than
three consecutive terms is a clear command suggesting the
existence of an inflexible rule. While it gives no exact
indication of what to serve. . . three consecutive terms
exactly connotes, the meaning is clear reference is to the
term, not to the service that a public official may render. In
other words, the limitation refers to the term.” [Emphasis
supplied].

In other words, what the Constitution provides in

Section 8, Article X, is a three-term limit rule and not a three-
tenure limit rule. While term means the time during which
the officer may claim to hold the office as a right, the tenure
represents the term during which the incumbent actually
holds office as said by the Supreme Court in the case of
Alba v. Hon. Evangelista, et. al., and Alajar v. Alba6, along
with other cases.

Therefore, in determining whether the three-term limit

rule shall apply, it is material that there be a determination
first as to whether Governor Fafua’s right to title of his office
in his third term has been interrupted by the ruling of the
Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals.

Whether or not there was an interruption

4
401 Phil. 77, 88 (2000).
5
G.R. No. 184836, December 23, 2009.
6
G.R. Nos. L-10360 and L-10433, January 17, 1957.

3
 to the right of Governor Fafua to hold office
in his third term.

Ans. No, there was no interruption. Since the decision

of the Ombudsman was overturned, we consider the ruling
of the Court of Appeals in only suspending Governor Fafua
for five (5) months from office.

Such suspension did not effectively interrupt the term

of office of Governor Fafua since he was only prevented
from exercising the functions of his office for five (5) months;
at such time, he was still the rightful holder of the title of
governorship.

To elaborate, the second part of Section 8, Article X of

the Constitution provides that voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service of the local official
for the full term for which he was elected.

Hence, only involuntary renunciation of the office is

considered as interruption of continuity of service as an
exception to the three-term limit rule.

In deciding the case of Lonzanida v. Commission on

Elections7, the Supreme Court explained that involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full
term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity
of service.

In Aldovino8, the Supreme Court emphasized that the

meaning of the ruling in the Lonzanida case is that it is
severance of title, which renders the three-term limit rule

7
G.R. No. 135150, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 602.
8
Supra note 5.

4
inapplicable. Moreover, the Supreme Court also
pronounced:

“An interruption occurs when the term is broken

because the office holder lost the right to hold on to his
office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render
service. The latter occurs during an office holders term when
he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions
for reasons established by law. Of course, the term failure to
serve cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without
the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be
rendered so that none is really lost.” [Emhpasis supplied].

However, in the case at bar, the suspension

pronounced by the Court of Appeals does not amount
as an “involuntary severance from office” as what is
being contemplated in Lonzanida.[Emphasis supplied]

In Aldovino, the Supreme Court ruled that the

[T]emporary inability or disqualification to exercise the
functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not
be considered an effective interruption of a term because it
does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an
effective break from holding office; the office holder, while
retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions
of his office for a reason provided by law.

Moreover, the interruption by reason of losing the right

to hold on to his office cannot be equated with the failure to
render service.

The line of jurisprudence justifying that there was an

effective interruption on the concerned public official’s term
has shown one similarity: there was a loss of title that
rendered the three-term limit rule inapplicable. Such
similarity is not present in this case.

5
 While a number of cases discussed exceptions to the
application of the three-term limit rule, viz.:

In Adormeo v. Commission on Elections9, wherein a the

Supreme Court ruled that the disqualification by reason of
three-term limit rule does not apply if the official lost in a regular
election for the supposed third term but was elected in a recall
election covering that term;

In Socrates v. Commission on Elections10, wherein

succession to office was held to be an exception to the
application of the three-term limit rule; and

In Latasa v. Commission on Elections11 wherein the

Supreme Court added the context of conversion of a
municipality to a city to the exceptions of the application of
three-term limit rule.

none of those were in the context of suspension of an

official, except the case of Aldovino12, the first case wherein
the Supreme Court decided the application of the three-term
limit rule in the context of the effect of preventive suspension
on the continuity of an elective official’s term. In that case,
the Supreme Court ruled that the three-term limit shall apply
notwithstanding the previous suspension of the respondent
as municipal councilor for the same reasons applied in this
case.

2. For reasons aforementioned, it is a consequence that since

no interruption happened when Governor Fafua was
suspended, when he wins the election, it would be
considered as his fourth consecutive term as a violation of
the three-term limit rule provided in the Constitution.

9
426 Phil. 472 (2002).
10
440 Phil. 106 (2002).
11
G.R. No. 154829, December 10, 2003, 417 SCRA 601.
12
Supra note 5.

6
IV. Conclusion

It is clear from the foregoing that in the eyes of the law,

Governor Fafua is deemed to have fully served his third term
and consequently, his three consecutive terms. The governing
jurisprudence dictates that there was no interruption of his
three consecutive terms – his suspension not being the same
as losing his right to the title of his office. Consequently
winning the coming elections would constitute a fourth
consecutive term on his part which would be unconstitutional.

V. Recommendation

I recommend that Governor Fafua refrain from running

again as governor of Isabela this coming election period as it
would inevitably violate the three-term limit rule of the
Constitution, thereby invalidating the preparations that would be
exerted in the campaign in the event that he decides to run
again.

Billing:

In consideration for the careful preparation of this legal

opinion which entailed critical research and analysis of the
case, a fee of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100, 000.00)
shall be collected.