ANTONIO GELUZ v.

CA AND OSCAR LAZO

G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961, EN BANC (Reyes, J.)

Key Doctrine: “It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil Code,
because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently
born alive: ‘provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.’”

Nita Villanueva met Antonio Geluz in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950, she became
pregnant by Geluz before they were legally married. To conceal her pregnancy from her parent, she had herself
aborted by Lazo. After her marriage with Geluz, she again became pregnant but her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient for her employment in COMELEC so she had herself aborted again by Lazo. Less than two years
later, she again became pregnant and was again aborted of a two-month old fetus by Lazo. Geluz at this time
was in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor
gave his consent to the abortion. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes Geluz’s basis in filing this
action and award of damages. The CA and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of
P3,000.00 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Is Geluz entitled to damages for the abortion of the fetus?
HELD:
No. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000 for the death
of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality, being incapable
of having rights and obligations.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the
one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child
on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs.
In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-
natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality (or juridical
capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a
conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly
limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive:
"provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no
dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb. The prevailing American jurisprudence
is to the same effect; and is generally held that recovery cannot be had for the death of an unborn child.

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must
be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased,
his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot expect either help, support or services from
an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the spes hominis that was the fetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss,
and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code, Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages,
if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's
indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he
was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found,
and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second
abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition
of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the
punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not
seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern
appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000
damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly
exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that: "It seems to us that the
normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife has deliberately
sought at the hands of a physician would be high-minded rather than mercenary; and that his primary concern
would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's
indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases
he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he,
but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries." It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the
abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible
act, that cannot be too severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not
excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damages that, under the
circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis. The decision appealed from is reversed, and the
complaint ordered dismissed.
 ERNESTO S. MERCADO v. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and COMELEC
G.R. No. 135083, 26 May 1999, Mendoza, J.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former (dual citizenship) arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states.

FACTS.

Mercado and Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections. A petition for disqualification was filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril against Manzano, who alleged
that Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the US. The petition is based on the ground that the
respondent is an American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration (BI) and misrepresented
himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen. In his answer to the petition, Manzano admitted that he is
registered as a foreigner with the BI as proved by an alien certificate of registration and alleged that he is a
Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and Filipino mother. He was born in the
United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen under
US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.
In other words, he holds dual citizenship.

COMELEC granted Mamaril’s petition and ordered the cancellation of his COC on the ground that
he is a dual citizen and under Section 40(d) of the LGC, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective position. Manzano filed an MR which remained pending even until the elections
were held. The motion was not resolved and instead the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution
reversing the COMELEC Second Division’s ruling and declared Manzano qualified to run, the pertinent
provision of the ruling provides:
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered
himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively
renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had
U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on
May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes
among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering 103,853 votes over his
closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained 100,894 votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained
third place with 54,275 votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor
of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private
international law which may well be settled before the highest court.

Pursuant to the said COMELEC resolution, Manzano was proclaimed as vice mayor. Hence, this petition for
certiorari filed by Mercado.

ISSUE.

1) Is Eduardo Manzano disqualified from running for any elective local position due to his alleged dual
citizenship?
 2) Is the taking of an oath of allegiance contained in Manzano’s COC sufficient to constitute
renunciation of his American citizenship?

HELD.

1) NO. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former (dual
citizenship) arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or
more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a
situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Dual
allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance
is the result of an individual’s volition. With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the
Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law.

The concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, Section 40(d) and in R.A. No.
7854, Section 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

2) YES. There is no merit in petitioners’ contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private
respondent’s COC is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally
without merit is petitioners contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been
made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of
Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.

By declaring in his COC that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant
of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true
faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has,
as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and
anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with
the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as
an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship. His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made
under oath.
 Republic vs. Chule Y. Lim (2004)
G.R. No. 153883 | 2004-01-13

KEY DOCTRINES
Rule 108 proceedings may either be summary or adversary in nature; Even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 in an adversary
proceeding; Requirement of electing Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority applies only to legitimate children; Exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship; No court order required for the continued use of a surname which a person
has already been using since childhood

FACTS
Respondent Chule Y. Lim filed a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. She petitioned for the correction of the following errors in her
birth certificate:
(a) her surname "Yu" which was misspelled as "Yo" in her birth certificate. She
has been using "Yu" in all her school records and in her marriage certificate. She
presented a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)[3] to further
show the consistency in her use of the surname "Yu". S
(b) her father's name in her birth record was written as "Yo Diu To (Co Tian)"
when it should have been "Yu Dio To (Co Tian)
(c) her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino
considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was
Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter
attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.
(d) it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate
child when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her
parents were never married.
Placida Anto, respondent's mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her
parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her daughter's father
were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in
China.
The RTC granted respondent's petition. The Republic of the Philippines appealed
the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the RTC's decision.
Hence, this petition by the Republic contending that the CA erred (1) in ordering
the correction of the citizenship of respondent Chule Y. Lim from "Chinese" to
"Filipino" despite the fact that respondent never demonstrated any compliance with the
legal requirements for election of citizenship, (2) in allowing respondent to continue
using her father's surname despite its finding that respondent is an illegitimate child.

ISSUE
Are illegitimate children born of Filipino mothers required to elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority? NO.
RULINGS
Requirement of electing Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority
applies only to legitimate children
The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional
requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority. It
cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed
the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may
elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and
sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and
shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid
statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the
Philippines."
Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino
citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the case of
respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that her Chinese father
and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required to comply with
said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen.
By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically
became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is a Filipino since birth without
having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority.

Rule 108 proceedings may either be summary or adversary in nature

Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either
be summary or adversary in nature.
If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship
or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary.

Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 in an
adversary proceeding
Even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves
of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one
where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully
and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed
and considered. (see Republic vs. Valencia)
We take it that the Republic's failure to cite this error amounts to a recognition
that this case properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court considering
that the proceeding can be appropriately classified as adversarial (i.e. involves substantial
corrections and changes in entries in the civil register)

Exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises

constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in Misamis
Oriental when she was 18 years old. The exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship

No court order required for the continued use of a surname which a person has
already been using since childhood
The Republic's second assigned error is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not
allow respondent to use her father's surname. What it did allow was the correction of
her father's misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can remember.
In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to use her
father's surname.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the respondent is now 47 years old. To bar her
at this time from using her father's surname which she has used for four decades without
any known objection from anybody, would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of the
reasons allowed for changing one's name or surname is to avoid confusion.
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates the use of aliases,
allows a person to use a name "by which he has been known since childhood" (Lim Hok
Albano v. Republic). Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the illegitimate
children of their father from using his surname (De Valencia v. Rodriguez).
While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname, there is no
such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been
using since childhood.
The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false
impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed
change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the
family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general. In this case,
the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China would probably be prejudiced or
be the object of future mischief. In respondent's case, the change in the surname that
she has been using for 40 years would even avoid confusion to her community in
general.
*MyLegalWhiz edited
 PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO v. TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO
G.R. No. 173540, 22 January 2014, SECOND DIVISION (Perez, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and
exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his
parents.

FACTS

Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful
wife of the deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was
solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town.
According to her, the fact of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II, records were destroyed.
Thus, only a Certification was issued by the LCR.

In her Answer, Peregrina essentially averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who
died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude
Parish in Davao City.

During trial, Tecla presented: (1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido
(Climaco) and Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with Eustaquio; (2)
Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944 issued by the Office of the Civil
Registrar (Talibon, Bohol); (3) Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of
the Civil Registrar General, NSO; (4) Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the
Civil Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally destroyed during the liberation
of Manila; (5) Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido, Eustaquio Avenido, Jr. and Editha Avenido; (6)
Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30
September 1942; (7) Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second World War
issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that they cannot furnish as requested a true
transcription from the Register of Birth of Climaco Avenido; (8) Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating
that he was born on 30 March 1943 to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla; (9) Electronic copy of the Marriage
Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.

Conversely, Peregrina testified on her marriage with Eustaquio and how she took care of him and her
knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a common law wife of Eustaquio. She also presented:
(1) Marriage Contract between Peregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the date of marriage on 3 March 1979;
(2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single when he contracted marriage
with Peregrina although he had a common law relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4)
children, among others.

The RTC denied Tecla’s petition and Peregrina’s counter-claim. On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of
Tecla by declaring the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing the marriage between Peregrina
and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and void.

ISSUE:
 Did Tecla’s evidence presented during the trial prove the existence of the marriage of Tecla to
Eustaquio?

RULING:

YES. While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not
regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be
recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between his parents.

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present
during the marriage ceremony, and of Tecla herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by
the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent and admissible
evidence. The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These are
relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract
were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may be
admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

The RTC committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the testimonies of Adelina, the sister of
Eustaquio who testified that she personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother
EUSTAQUIO and Tecla on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; Climaco, the eldest son of Eustaquio and
Tecla, who testified that his mother Tecla was married to his father, Eustaquio, and Tecla herself; and (2) the
documentary evidence mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the
marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of
its contents, were shown by the very evidence the trial court has disregarded.

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by the testimonies of
Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most
Holy Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.
 SILVERIO VS. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 174689. October 22, 2007. | J. Corona, First Division

Marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between
a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by Rommel will substantially reconfigure
and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual).

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in
the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil
Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be
understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. xxx
the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone
sex reassignment.’xxx

FACTS: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in
his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. He alleged in his petition that he was born
in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4,
1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth. His
sex was registered as "male."

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts
as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in
a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation.

He likewise underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined
by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued
a medical certificate attesting that he had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, he lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his
name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to
"female." No opposition to the petition was made.

RTC rendered a decision ratiocinating that Rommel filed the petition not to evade any law or judgment
or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth
records compatible with his present sex. Granting the petition would be more in consonance with the
principles of justice and equity. With his sexual re-assignment, Rommel who has always felt, thought
and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Rommel’s misfortune to be trapped
in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him.

RTC also stated that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in
granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness
on the part of Rommel and her fiancé and the realization of their dreams.

On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision
lacked legal basis. The CA ruled that there is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the
certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not a person’s first name can be changed on the ground of sex reassignment.
NO. (2) Whether or not entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex may be changed on the
ground of equity. NO.

RULING: (1) A person’s first name cannot be changed on the ground of sex reassignment. (2) Entries
in the birth certificate as to first name or sex may not be changed on the ground of equity. (NOTE: The
latter part of the decision is more relevant to our topic)

A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed on the Ground of Sex Reassignment

Rommel’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to
make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery.
However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction
a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
Rommel’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry
and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any
compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

No Law Allows the Change of Entry in The Birth Certificate as to Sex on the Ground of Sex
Reassignment

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is: "Clerical or typographical
error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying,
transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records:
Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the
petitioner.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change
means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute." The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: ‘All other matters
pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws’. But there is no such
special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at
the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant
(the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law
legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or
her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.

For these reasons, while Rommel may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through
the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry
for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries
in his birth certificate.
Entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex may not be changed on the ground of
equity.

However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting
parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by Rommel will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a
man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions
of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others.
These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.

It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "no judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license
for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not
to make or amend it.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008, QUISUMBING, J.

KEY DOCTRINE: Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally
intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here
thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at
maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in
Birth Certificate before the RTC-Laguna. In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981
and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary
male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition
where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was
diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy and that at early age it was discovered that she has small ovaries. Few
years later, tests revealed that her ovarian structures has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has
become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be
changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

RTC granted her petition, ordering to make corrections in the birth certificate, including among
others the changing of name from Jennifer to Jeff and gender from female to male.

Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the
abovementioned ruling.

ISSUE: Is the trial court correct in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate?

RULING: YES.

Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or "inappropriate" appearance of
male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male
hormone.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female
nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondent's body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached
the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological
support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male.
Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his
body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its
due course in respondent's development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
 In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter
so innately private as one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo
medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as
having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the
Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as
society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus,
to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who
are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent's
position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual
deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's congenital condition and his
mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how
respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique
circumstances in this case.
As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not
a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow. The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent's
change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such
a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LIBERTY ALBIOS
G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013, THIRD DIVISION (Mendoza, J.)

Key Doctrine: “For consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A
“freely given” consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.”

Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia Calo, as evidenced by a
Certificate of Marriage. Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife
because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab
initio. Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine the existence of a collusion but stated that she could not
make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation. The RTC declared the
marriage void ab initio since the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the
testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties
went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the U.S. and never again communicated with her; and that,
in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The RTC,
thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
ISSUE:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
HELD:
No. Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer. A “freely given” consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and
deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered
defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force,
intimidation, and undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable
of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real
consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also
conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of
their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced
by their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that
they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with
no real intention of entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties
would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a
relation. It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties
whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated,
defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because
the parties have absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.

The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective,
considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an
apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.

The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish
a life together is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The
same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation. A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by
law. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the
Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential
and formal requisites precribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided
by law, it shall be declared valid.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the
Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely,
(1) non- disclosure of a previous conviction involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a
pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug
addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground
for an action to annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws
does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud
may only be brought by the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because
Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare
such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of
its benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the
courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a
marriage of convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient
situation.
 RENE RONULO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014, J. Brion

Key Doctrine: The law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal
appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.

Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
Catholic Parish Church in Ilocos Norte. On the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest refused to
solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey
and Claire proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church.
They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite
having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.

An information for violation of Article 352 of the RPC was filed against the petitioner before the MTC of
Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony. Petitioner, while admitting that he
conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the
marriage as contemplated by law. The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 and
imposed on him a P200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The RTC
affirmed the findings of the MTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that
although there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides
minimum standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the
contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that
they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal age.

The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
is vague and does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that a marriage
ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family
Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and
a marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and
attested to by the solemnizing officer. The petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove
that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.

Held: We find the petition unmeritorious.

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the
solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, the
petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is
whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage
ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what
constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the FC are clear on these matters. Article 6 of the
Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each
other as husband and wife." Pertinently, Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly
defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no
prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. As to the first requirement,
the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the
second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven, through
the testimony of Florida (Joey’s mom), that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each
other as husband and wife.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was
illegal. Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a
valid marriage certificate (license?). In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple
had no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship. The marriage ceremony,
therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of
good faith.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in
the present case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage
certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed
above.
 JAIME O. SEVILLA, Petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, Respondent
G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

Key Doctrine: absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No.
2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In
the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence
of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

In a Complaint in 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969,
through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's
father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the
City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister
of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract
before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his
supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry,
consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married
civilly on 19 May 1969, and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 1969 at the Most Holy Redeemer
Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the National
Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her
for 25 years.

In its Decision dated January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court
made the following justifications:

Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of a
license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I",
"E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan,
and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792
was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage
contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious

Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:

In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified
that they"failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the
reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said testimony We cannot
therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract was not
issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy
of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was issued but
rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered."
Simply put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would
have contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.

Issue: whether or not the certifications (three) from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no
Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient
to declare their (Jaime and Carmelita) marriage as null and void ab initio

Ruling: We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work cannot
give you our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the
existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed
to state with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact
that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said
person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook
was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to
locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No.
2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In
the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that
absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage,
the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to
be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
 SYED AZHAR ABBAS, "PETITIONER"VS. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, "RESPONDENT"
G.R. No.183896, 2013-01-30, VELASCO, JR., J.

KEY DOCTRINE: Marriages solemnized without a valid marriage license, except those covered by Chapter 2 of the
Family Code, are null and void.

Petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani citizen, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas, a Filipino citizen, with the RTC of Pasay City. Syed alleged the
absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No.
269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his
marriage to Gloria. He alleged that he and Gloria met and got married in Taiwan. Thereafter, he went
to his mother-in-law’s residence in the Philippines to undergo some ceremony, which was one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of the ceremony. During
the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He did not know that the ceremony was a marriage
until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a
marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. He went to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of
their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. The Municipal Civil
Registrar issued a certification that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he
submitted, was the number of another marriage license. He also alleged that Gloria had filed bigamy
cases against him in 2001 and 2002.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract
bearing their signatures as proof. She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a
marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and
said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an application
for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the
marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing
officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.
Furthermore, she has a daughter with Syed. Also, she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had
married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous marriage. Gloria
stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not
know if said marriage had been celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their
marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.

The RTC held that the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio since there
was no valid marriage license which is an absence of a formal requisite. On appeal, the CA reversed
the RTC’s decision in ruling that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that
Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid
down by law.

ISSUE: Is the marriage null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license?

RULING: YES.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She
failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where,
admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she
presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the license,
having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria
and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the
license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could
have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present
this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value. In the case
of Republic v. Court of Appeals such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.

In the case of Carino v. Carino, it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their
office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.
The case of Carino further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been
overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the
marriage was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. Gloria has failed to
discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license
was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would
not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage
license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria's failure to produce a copy of the alleged
marriage license.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives
are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up
for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of
evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as
it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license,
a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
 SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent G.R. No.
201061, 3 July 2013, Carpio, SECOND DIVISION

Key Doctrine: Words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil
status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family
Code.
Art. 148 applies even if both parties are in bad faith.
Facts
Benjamin married Azucena Alegre in Caloocan City on 10 September 1973. In 1979, Benjamin
developed a romantic relationship with Sally Bangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and
supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as
husband and wife. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father who was against the relationship,
Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally,
knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
The Benjamin and Sally had two children and acquired several properties during the cohabitation
(3 properties under the name of both as spouses and one named to Sally). The relationship ended in 1994
and Sally filed criminal actions for falsification and bigamy against Benjamin. Benjamin in turn filed a
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage. After
Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally1 filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or injunction which the CA never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before the trial
court citing the pendency of her petition before the Court of Appeals.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of Benjamin, it ruled that the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but because of the lack of a marriage license therefore, no
bigamy was committed. The court further ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in
her answer as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin
and his brothers and the phrase “married to Sally Go” was merely descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in
the title.
The CA partially granted the petition of Sally. It ruled that the property relations of the parties are
governed by Art. 148 of the FC. 2 Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time,
null and void ab initio
Issue
What's the status of the relationship of the parties and their property relations?
Ruling

1While Benjamin only included the four properties mentioned in the case, Sally put in her answer 37 properties she wants the
court to partition.

2 The CA ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of Appeals found that the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the
absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No.
61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally.
 Their marriage is non-existent and void ab initio. Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10
September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their
marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage on 7 March 1982,
the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting. On the purported marriage of
Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of
Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally.
There is no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Art. 35 of the FC, a marriage solemnized without a
license, except those covered by Art. 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void from the
beginning.” The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules
on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the NCC, contracts which are absolutely simulated
or fictitious are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus, the CA did not err in sustaining the trial
court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Bigamy is not committed in this case, for bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have
all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.
As to property relations
The court sustained the ruling of the CA that Art. 148 of the FC governs the property relations of
the parties. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.Benjamin and Sally cohabited without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the CA correctly
excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his children
as advance inheritance.
As regards the remaining properties, the only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 were in the name of Benjamin with the descriptive title “married to Sally.” The property covered
by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally with the descriptive title “married to
Benjamin” while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of
Sally as a single individual. Words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of
the civil status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no coownership under Article 148 of the Family
Code
*the court ruled that Sally waived her right to present evidence. The TC had already reset the meetings six
times all on Sally's instance.
 RENE RONULO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 182438, 2014-07-02, BRION, J.

KEY DOCTRINE: A marriage ceremony is that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003. However,
on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize
the marriage because the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, they proceeded to
Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner Ronulo, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony
to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage
certificate. He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the
principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited guests.

An information for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, was filed against Ronulo before
the MTC for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony. The prosecution’s witnesses are the
veil sponsor and cord sponsor in the said wedding and testified that a wedding ceremony took place
wherein the bride walk down the aisle, the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and
sign a document. The mother of Joey testified that several days after the wedding, she went to the
municipal local civil registrar where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to
the couple. Ronulo, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the
couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.

The MTC found Ronulo guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed on
him a P200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law). It held that Ronulo’s act
of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony and that in performing a marriage ceremony
without the marriage license, he violated Article 352 of the RPC. The RTC affirmed the findings of
the MTC. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE: Is Ronulo liable for performing an illegal marriage ceremony?

RULING: YES.

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform
or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section
44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be
promulgated by the proper authorities. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the
solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case,
Ronulo admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage.

As to the second element, while Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a
“marriage ceremony” and what constitutes its “illegal” performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family
Code are clear on these matters. Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization of the
marriage is required. However, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage
ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a
solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses that
they take each other as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, Ronulo admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was
testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the Ronulo’s
allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife. Notably, the defense failed to
show that the prosecution witnesses, had any ill-motive to testify against Ronulo.
 OSCAR P. MALLION, PETITIONER, VS. EDITHA ALCANTARA
G.R. NO. 141528, October 31, 2006, SECOND DIVISION, AZCUNA, J.

The statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action, provided it grows out of the same
transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action simply because the
theory of the second would not have been open under the pleadings in the first.

FACTS:

Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City seeking a
declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of psychological
incapacity. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision because he "failed to adduce
preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking." The appeal filed with the Court of
Appeals was likewise dismissed in a resolution for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees
within the reglementary period.

After the decision attained finality, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and
void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. The wife filed a motion to dismiss
on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping which was granted. The petitioner argues that the cause of
action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because the
operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were different.

ISSUE:

Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage
license?

RULING: YES

Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment
is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a
judgment or an order on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.

Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in issue is the presence
of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to determine whether the causes of action are identical is to
ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts
essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two
actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.

Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the
declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to
sustain the first petition which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is
different from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored on the purported
absence of a marriage license.

Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action.
By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In both
petitions, petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs
is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split
the various aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the
actual status of petitioner and respondent's marriage.

Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no
valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP
4341-95, however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in
accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license
which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that
parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or
demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all
other matters that could have been adjudged in that case.

It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply
varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case. As this Court stated
in Perez v. Court of Appeals:
x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of action, provided it grows out of
the same transaction or act and seeks redress for the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different
causes of action simply because the theory of the second would not have been open under the pleadings in
the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after the loss of the first merely by having
circumscribed and limited theories of recovery opened by the pleadings in the first.

It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to
place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried
piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he
claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in
successive action to recover for the same wrong or injury.

A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either by the
pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not
at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a portion of the
grounds upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest to the presentment in a second suit
if the first fails. There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is
allowed. (Citations omitted.)

Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration,
petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present
action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the decision
dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
 RODOLFO NAVARRO v. JUDGE HERNANDO DOMAGTOY
A.M. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996, SECOND DIVISION (Romero, J.)

Key Doctrine: “A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless
before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present
had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.”

Rodolfo Navarro, the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao Del Norte, submitted evidence as to the acts
committed by Judge Domagtoy which he contends, exhibits gross misconduct, inefficiency in office and
ignorance of the law. It is alleged that Judge Domagtoy solemnized the wedding between Gaspar Tagadan and
Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife and that he performed
a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction.
Judge Domagtoy has jurisdiction in the MCTC of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was
solemnized at Judge Domagtoy's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area. The judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been used
by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a
private person. In relation to the charges against him, the judge seeks exculpation from his act of having
solemnized the marriage between Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Borga by stating that
he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. Moreover, he maintains that he did
not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1)
Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the
case in question.

The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Tagadan and Borga states that Tagadan's civil
status is "separated." Despite this, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by the judge. He presented in
evidence a joint affidavit by subscribed and sworn to before Judge Duquilla. The affidavit was not issued by
the latter judge, as claimed by Judge Domagtoy, but merely acknowledged before him. In the affidavit, the
affiants stated that they knew Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida Peñaranda who later left the conjugal
dwelling and has not returned for almost 7 years, thus giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.

ISSUE:
Is the joint affidavit a sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda’s presumptive death and ample reason for him
to proceed with the marriage ceremony?
HELD:
No. Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides “A marriage contracted by any person during
the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death
under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.”
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and
simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a
mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually
or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his
first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether
wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void,
marriage.
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction,
covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code. The judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the
justification for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside
of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's
chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in the remote place.
Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party,
Gemma del Rosario.
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing
judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer."
Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within
the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding
provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to
do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice
of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as
long as the requisites of the law are complied with.
However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he
was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing
Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge
again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal
principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to
conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law. The judiciary
should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply,
more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law.
It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. 6 It is
not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7 Otherwise, the system of justice rests
on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law. While
magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of
married persons.
 ZENAIDA BESO v. JUDGE JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Samar
A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, 28 January 2000, Ynares-Santiago, J.
Marriage may be solemnized by any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction except in cases of marriages
contracted at the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the
solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.

FACTS.

Zenaida Beso charged Judge Juan Daguman with neglect of duty and abuse of authority. She alleges
in her complaint that she and Bernardito Yman marriage was solemnized by Judge Daguman in his residence
in JPR Subdivision, Calbayog City, Samar. After their wedding, Bernardito abandoned Zenaida without any
reason at all. Zenaida later on found out that their marriage was not registered with the Local Civil Registrar
and that Judge Daguman did not retain a copy of their marriage contract.

The Judge, in his comment, explained that Zenaida and Bernardito’s marriage had to be solemnized
in Calbayog City, though outside his territory as municipal judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due to the following
and pressing circumstances:
1) Judge Daguman was physically indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta. Margarita; that
Beso and Yman unexpectedly and without prior appointment came to his residence urgently
requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and there because: first, Zenaida said she must
leave that same day to be able to fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled, second, that for the parties
to go to another town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail serious problems of
finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors, third, since Zenaida will be
out of the country for a long period their marriage license would lapse and necessitate another
publication for notice, fourth, if the parties go beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage,
complainant feared it would complicate her employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as to
date and venue of marriage were considered impracticable by the parties.
2) That the contracting parties were ready with the desired documents for a valid marriage which the
Judge found all in order.
3) Zenaida is an OFW who deserved more than ordinary official attention under present Government
policy.

The Judge further avers that he believed in good faith that by so doing he was leaning on the side of
liberality of the law so that it may be not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married. As for
his failure to file the marriage contract, the Judge states that the same was beyond his control because
Bernardito absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate. He, however, tried to recover
custody of the missing documents.

The OCA, in an evaluation report, found that respondent Judge committed non-feasance in office.

ISSUE.

Was OCA’s finding in its evaluation report correct?

HELD.

YES, the Court finds the evaluation report by OCA well-taken. Jimenez v. Republic underscores the
importance of marriage as a social institution thus: "[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the
community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity
and permanence x x x.

With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among others,
that "ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts
jurisdiction; xxx” In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that: The marriage shall be
solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the
office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of
marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in
a sworn statement to that effect."

As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judge’s chambers or
courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with
Article 29, or 3.] upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.

In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance Yman was at the point of
death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to
respondent Judge that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala.
Considering that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-
Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.

Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise extra
care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise
commanded to observe extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance with
Article 23 of the Family Code.

In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge was less
than conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring
that the records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for
missing records save fortuitous events.
 Republic vs. Iyoy (2005)
G.R. No. 152577 | 2005-09-21

KEY DOCTRINES
Psychological Incapacity Must Exist at Time of Marriage (Most Serious Cases
Only); Characteristics of Psychological Incapacity; Personal Examination by Physician or
Psychologist Not a Condition Sine Qua Non; Totality of Evidence Insufficient to
Establish Psychological Incapacity; Article 36 Contemplates Downright Incapacity, Not
Mere Refusal or Neglect; Any Doubt Resolved in Favor of Validity of Marriage; Article
26, Paragraph 2 Not Applicable in the Case; Solicitor General Allowed to Intervene

FACTS
A complaint was filed by respondent Crasus Iyoy for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Fely Ada Rosal. He married Fely on 1961 in Cebu and had five children.
After the celebration of their marriage, Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a
nagger and extravagant. She left the Philippines and went to the United States. Crasus
then received a letter from Fely, asking him to sign the divorce papers, which he declined
to do. He then learned that Fely got married to an American and already had a child with
him.
At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and
abandoned Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them.
Crasus alleged that the acts demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing,
constituted a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation
to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
After the parties were given the chance to present evidence, the RTC promulgated
a judgment declaring the marriage null and void. The Court found that defendant had
indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her
marital duties, which had already existed at the time of the marriage.
The Republic appealed before the appellate court. The CA affirmed the decision
and added that under Article 26, the Filipino spouse may remarry after the alien spouse
had validly obtained divorce abroad which capacitated him to marry.
The Republic argued before the SC that abandonment and sexual infidelity of the
wife did not constitute per se psychological incapacity and that the CA erred in applying
Article 26 paragraph 2 in the present case.

ISSUE.
Should doubts be resolved in favor of marriage? YES.

RULINGS.
Any Doubt Resolved in Favor of Validity of Marriage
Any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. No less than
the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
Psychological Incapacity Must Exist at Time of Marriage (Most Serious Cases
Only)
A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization. (Article 36, Family Code of the Philippines)
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. (Santos vs.
Court of Appeals)
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. (Ibid)

Characteristics of Psychological Incapacity

Psychological incapacity is characterized by:
(a) Gravity - It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage
(b) Juridical Antecedence - It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage
(c) Incurability - It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.

Personal Examination by Physician or Psychologist Not a Condition Sine Qua

Non
There is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological
incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during
the trial.

Totality of Evidence Insufficient to Establish Psychological Incapacity

Using the guidelines established by jurisprudence, this Court found that the
totality of evidence presented by Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Fely. There was no basis for declaring their marriage
null and void under Article 36.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC
was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the
absence of any other corroborating evidence.

Article 36 Contemplates Downright Incapacity, Not Mere Refusal or Neglect

 It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on
the part of the errant spouse.
The root cause for the incapacity was not identified. If the root cause of the
incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a
psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be
in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable.

Article 26, Paragraph 2 Not Applicable in the Case

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him
or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Article 26, par. 2, Family Code)
The law refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a
Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its
plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of
respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she
was still a Filipino citizen.

Solicitor General Allowed to Intervene

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar
him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal
defender of the Government.
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that
the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
fabrication or suppression of evidence.
Bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal
defender of the land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and
contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf
of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before
the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the
Court of Appeals or this Court. 
*MyLegalWhiz edited
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III
G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005, FIRST DIVISION (Quisumbing, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, paragraph 2 of Article 26 should
be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later
on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed
to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

FACTS

On 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City and subsequently begot a son and a daughter, Kristoffer and Lady
Kimberly. In 1986, Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along Kristoffer. Later, Cipriano discovered
that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son
that Lady Myros had obtained a divorce decree and married Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by
him currently resides in California.

Cipriano filed with the RTC a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the RTC granted it. The Republic,
through the OSG, sought reconsideration but it was denied.

Hence, this petition. The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage – a marriage celebrated between
a Filipino citizen and an alien. For his part, Cipriano admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case
but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he
is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Can Cipriano remarry based on Art. 26 of the Family Code?

2. Did he adduce sufficient evidence to grant his relief?

RULING:

1. YES. Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin
to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to
its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended
to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
 In view of the foregoing, the Court states the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently
obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.

The Court is also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouse is
to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious
process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to
have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would
not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the
naturalized alien spouse.

2. NO. However, the Court notes that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
Cipriano concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of his wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.

Nevertheless, the Court is unanimous in holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
(E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable
to declare, based on Cipriano’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that he is now capacitated to remarry. Such
declaration could only be made properly upon his submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

Petition granted. RTC’s decision set aside.

 CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS
G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.| J. Brion, Third Division

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as
the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. The provision was included
in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative intent is for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created
by the divorce decree.

FACTS: Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T.
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left
for Canada soon after the wedding.

He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to
discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned
to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The petition for divorce was granted on December 8, 2005.
The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite
the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the NSO informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court.

Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved with the RTC. Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading and she offered no opposition to
Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by
financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

The RTC denied Gerberts petition and concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute
the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen.
It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art. 26(2) of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of
this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

RULING: NO. Art. 26(2) of the Family Code does not extend to aliens the right to petition a court of
this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages - void and voidable marriages. In
both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists
before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the
lawful union for cause arising after the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce
between Filipino citizens.
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as
the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by
judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of
the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

An action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse
to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse
(other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally
governed by his national law.

The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien's national
law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right
in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect
of foreign judgments.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce. The Supreme Court deemed it appropriate the remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

A remand will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome Gerbert’s
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Recording of Divorce Decree in the Civil Register

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person's legal capacity
and status that must be recorded. But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the
civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the
decree's registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition
of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect.

In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree.
Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted without authority of law when it annotated the
Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn's marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the
foreign decree presented by Gerbert. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

Cancellation of Entries in the Civil Registry

The recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not
the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the
civil registry.
A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the
Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object
of special proceedings is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.
Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which
the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.