Cardiff University

Michel Foucault: Law, Power, and Knowledge

Author(s): Gerald Turkel
Source: Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer, 1990), pp. 170-193
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Cardiff University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1410084
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 MichelFoucault:Law, Power,andKnowledge

GERALDTURKEL*

Thejudgesof normalityarepresenteverywhere. Wearein thesocietyof theteacher-judge,

the doctor-judge,the educator-judge,the 'social-worker'-judge; it is on them that the
universalreignof the normativeis based;and each individual,whereverhe may find
himself,subjectsto it his body, his gestures,his behaviour,his aptitudes,his achieve-
ments.I
MichelFoucault'swritingschallengedominantapproachesto the analysisof
law.2 For Foucault, law is neither a condition for the liberationof the
individual,nor is it solely the result of class domination.Law cannot be
adequatelycomprehendedfrom the standpointsof subjects of action -
whethertheybe basedon individualism,class,or gender- or fromthe general
structuresthroughwhicheverydaylifeis producedandexperienced.Foucault
claimedthatliberalism,Marxism,andstandpointsrootedin knowingsubjects
of action are inadequatebecausethey sharea 'juridico-discursive model of
power'.3Thismodellimitsthe analysisof lawandpowerbecauseit formulates
them as thingsthat are possessedby agentsof action, as repressive,and as
centralizedin core structuressuchas legalinstitutionsand the state.
By contrast,Foucaultconceptualizedpoweras it is exercised,as multiple
anddecentralized,andas productiveof socialstructuresandknowledge.Law
is an elementin the expansionof power- or, more accurately- powers.In
modernsociety,law combineswith powerin variouslocationsin ways that
expand patternsof social control, knowledge,and the documentationof
individualsfor institutionallyusefulends.Ultimately,legalityand associated
techniquesof knowledge and control expand to define and to provide
empiricalknowledgeof everyaspect,everyfibreof society.Most especially,
legalitycombineswith otherdiscoursesto formthe individualas the locusof
evergreaternetworksof administrativecontrol.
Foucault'scontributionsto criticalinquirydefyclassification.He was very
much opposed, for example, to being pigeon-holedas a Marxist or as
extendingNietzsche'scritiqueof knowledgedespitehis acknowledgement of

* Associate
Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Delaware,
Newark, Delaware 19716, United States of America

This articleis part of a serieswhichdeals with the work of theoristswho have substantially
influencedcontemporaryunderstandingof law and society.Each articleprovidesan effective
introductionto the ideas of a majortheorist,along with a scholarlyappraisalof the writer's
The serieswillbe of interestto both studentsand specialists.
significance.

170
the crucialimportanceof theirworksfor his own studies.*He usedthe works
of other scholarsfor developinghis unique line of enquirywithout being
especiallyconcernedwithestablishingconsistencywiththem.For thisreason,
while his studiesuse Marxiancategoriesof class, ideology,capitalaccumu-
lation,andthelabourprocess,he wasnot onlyscornfulof theofficialMarxism
that was congealedin the French CommunistParty, but he also faulted
Marx'spoliticaleconomyfor its continuitywithliberalismand its tendencies
to view liberationin economisticterms. In a similarvein, while he shares
structuralism's searchforunderlyingsocialforces,theimportanceof formand
language, his work stands in opposition to structuralism'sclaims about
universal categories and its incapacities to analyse social change and
transformations in knowledgeand power.His historicalstudiesare aimedat
opening up those points of transformationin organization,power, and
knowledgethat demonstratethe contingencyratherthan the universalityof
categoriesof knowledge,law, and morality.His workunderminesmodernist
notionsof thecentralityof the individual,of formallaw,of progress,andthat
emancipationcan be realizedthroughthe growthandapplicationof scientific
knowledge.Yet his studiescontributeto establishingcriticalknowledgethat
opposesdomination,especiallyin its rationallegally-administered formsthat
assertpowerthroughclaimsto knowledge.He viewedopposition,revolt,and
the possibilitiesfor liberationin specificallylocatedstruggles.5
Michel Foucault'sanalysisof the law/powerrelationshipis complexand
often startlingdue to its rich descriptionsand literaryforce. He focuseson
particularinstitutionsandspecifichistoricalchanges.His studiesdemonstrate
that the interrelationships among legal discourses,variousforms of know-
ledge, political economy, techniquesof power, and institutionsof social
control form a logic of power that is most fully graspedby analysingits
detailedapplications.This approachis developedthroughparticularstudies
of philosophy, psychology, medicine,criminallaw and punishment,and
sexuality.To adequatelyunderstandFoucault'sapproachto law,however,an
appreciationof its locationin his widermethodologicalframeworkand his
analysisof poweris necessary.

REASON,SCIENCE,AND EXCLUSION

Michel Foucault (1926-1984)was born in Portier, France, the son of a

surgeon.As is often the case with highly originalintellectuals,Foucault's
academiccareerdid not follow a conventionalpath. He studiedin France's
mostprestigiousinstitutionsof higherlearning,includingthe Lyc~eHenriIV
and L'Ecole Normale Superieure.He receiveddegreesin philosophyand
psychology,travelledwidely,andworkedin a varietyof academicpositionsin
Sweden,Poland,WestGermany,Tunisia,and the UnitedStatesof America.
In 1970,at theageof forty-four,he receiveda positionat theCollegede France
in Paris,one of the most prestigiousand lofty academicpositionsin France.
Priorto this, his academicappointmentsin Franceweremodest.
171
1. Philosophy and Science
Foucault credits FriederichNietzsche's literary power and genealogical
methodas inspirationalfor his own work.'It wasNietzschewho specifiedthe
powerrelationas the generalfocus, shallwe say, of philosophicaldiscourse-
whereasfor Marx it was the productionrelation.'6Based on Nietzsche,
Foucaultformulatedpoweras the corerelationfromwhichmoralityemerges
ratherthan fromuniversalprinciplesof truthor transcendentalvalues.The
truth of moralityis to be found in the particularconditionsthat give rise
to it. The circumstancesof everydaylife at particularmomentsin history
must be investigatedto demonstratesources of moral claims and ethical
definitions.Moreover, Nietzsche inspired his belief that enquiry should
not formulate universal truths, that studies should not yield congealed
ethics or moralities but, rather, demonstratethe contingency of power
and claims to truth by transgressingthat which is assumedand taken for
granted.
Yet Foucault'sapproachto law andpoweralso grewout of a moregeneral
dissatisfactionwithphilosophicalreasonand science.He soughtto overcome
contemplativephilosophyfirstthrougha commitmentto politicalaction by
joiningthe CommunistPartyand,later,throughthe studyof psychologyand
psycho-pathologythatincludedobservationof psychiatricpracticesin mental
hospitals. This led to the publication of Maladie Mentale et Personnalite in
1954.After this study, Foucault'scriticalapproachto philosophicalreason
and the sciencesbecamemore focused around their capacitiesto exclude
experiences,practices,and languagesthat fell outside of their logics. He
soughtto revealthat rangesof experiencewere'forcedto be silent'through
categoriesand methodsof analysisthat eitherexcludedor redefinedthemin
termsconsistentwith reasonand science.7Partof his concernwas to recover
thatwhichwassilencedin a waythatenabledtheunderstanding of experiences
before they were shaped and redefinedby socially sanctionedscience and
philosophy.
For Foucault, the philosophyand the sciencesthat emergedduringthe
Enlightenmentand that havedevelopedthroughthe modernepochradically
exclude forms of thought, language, association, action, and experience
that are deemed to be aberrant.Allied with processesof differentiation,
exclusion, physical and social isolation, and various regimes of puri-
fication, reason and scientificenquirygeneratediscoursesof domination.
Most centrallyin the institutionallybased knowledgesof mental illness
and crime, but also in the social arenas of the military,education,work,
medicine, and sexuality, rules of classification,of truth and falsity, of
individuality,and, most generally,of coherenceare established.These rules
are the grounds for conceptualizingand operationallydefiningstandards
of normality.Based on these normalizingstandards,the pathological,the
criminal,and the deviant are defined. Normalizingdiscourses,grounded
in dominant institutions, rationality and science, combine with juridical
categories and state power to form interlinking patterns of knowledge and
control.
172
2. Reason, Madness, and Confinement
Foucault'smethodologicalapproachto studyingtheseissueswas initiatedin
MadnessandCivilization.Thisstudyfocuseson how reasonandsciencecame
to exclude, redefine, and dominate aspects of social life as 'madness'.
Foucault'scentralconcernis to recoverthat point of historicaltransition
whenreasonandsciencebecamedominantformsof recognitionanddiscourse
over the range of human behavioursand individualsthat would become
'mad'.By capturingthis historicalturningpoint, it is possibleto revealthe
patternof social relationsand the natureof experiencebeforethey became
categorizedand organizedthroughthe discoursesof psychology,psychiatry,
andlaw.Byutilizingsourcesthatshowthebefore,during,andafterdiscourses
and understandingsthat characterizedthe emergenceof madness as a
psychiatricandlegalcategory,it is possibleto demonstratehow observations,
facticity,and objectivereasonemerged.In addition,it is possibleto locate
thesecategoriesanddiscoursesin the broadersocietyof whichtheywerepart.
The criticalmomentfor the transformationof madnessoccursin France
duringthe middleof the seventeenthcentury,indeed,'a date can serveas a
landmark:1656, the decreethat founded,in Paris, the H6pital G6neral'.s
Prior to this time, fools or mad people either roamedfrom one place to
another,werefearedor scorned,wereviewedas havinga peculiarwisdom,or
were consideredto be ratherharmlessand entertaining.But it was at this
point, as had been the case with lepersin the MiddleAges, that mad people
were confined.The H6pital Generalwas establishedby the King to serve
between'the police and the courts,at the limits of the law:a thirdorderof
repression'.9It was a 'semi-judicialstructure,an administrative
entitywhich,
along with alreadyconstitutedpowers, and outside of the courts, decides,
judges,and executes'.10
Initially, confinementwas a matter of policing populations that were
disorganizedand renderedidle by patternsof labour utilizationthat were
developing with new manufacturingeconomies. 'A population without
resources,withoutsocialmoorings,a classrejectedor renderedmobileby new
economic development'was fed, preventedfrom precipitatingsocial dis-
orders, and subjected to physical and moral constraint through con-
finement.11 Yet, afterbeingtransformedinto a resourceforsecuringlabourers
andinculcatingthe habitsof labouringactivities,confinementwas overtaken
by the enormityof the socialdislocationof whichit was a part.Confinement
cameto be both too grossa patternof constraintand too limitedto meetthe
problemof dealingwithmassiveunemployedpopulations.
Madnessemergedout of the more generalcategoryof idleness.It was
constructedthroughsocialinstitutionsandmoralizingdiscoursesthatvalued
labour both as a source of wealth and, even more importantly,as moral
redemptionandpenance.Madnesswas'perceivedthrougha condemnationof
idleness', and it was increasingly used to categorize the individual who 'crosses
the frontiers of bourgeois order of his own accord and alienates himself
outside the sacred limits of its ethic'.12 More specifically, madness and
insanity combined idleness with features of scandal and dishonour. Madness
173
defineda combinationof unreasonand uselessness.It is behaviourthat is
'deranged,demented,extravagant',andthatdisplaysfeaturesof the inhuman
and a retreat from civilizationto animality that is as shameful as it is
potentiallycontagious.13 Most particularly,the dishonouringof religionand
of familiesweregroundsfor confinement.
Oncemadnesswasconfined,it wouldalso be put on publicdisplaythrough
visitationsand exhibits.It was alwaysshown,however,'on the otherside of
bars;if present,it wasat a distance,undertheeyesof reasonthatno longerfelt
any relation to it and that would not compromiseitself by too close a
resemblance'.14Themadpersonhad becomethe brute,the animalother,the
negativestandpoint,andwasdefinedby reasonas thecounterpointto reason.
As civilized individualsbecame more and more removed from natural
communitiesanddependencyon nature,theybecamemoreproneto madness,
the breakdown of societal rationality. The display of madness in its
neutralized,confinedformwouldcheckthesetendenciesin the spectators.

3. Madness,Law,andMedicine
Madnesswas a way of excludingactions and individualsand makingthem
into negative others because they unreasonablyviolated rules that were
developingin the seventeenthand eighteenthcenturies.1 5 'Libertine'beliefs
and actionsthat violatedsexualcodes of the bourgeoisfamily,violationsof
sacredfamilyresponsibilities,violationsof the properrelationshipbetween
passionandthoughtweretheboundariesfor differentiating mentalalienation
as as unreasonable,sick, and abnormalconditionthat distinguishedit from
crimeandotherformsof nonconformityanddeviance.As such,madnesswas
subjectto a combinationofjuridicalandmedicalauthority.It was treatedas a
physical,animaldisorderthatdemandeda reconstitutionof thesubjectat very
deep levels. With the failureof generalconfinementby the late eighteenth
centuryand the differentiationof madnessas a disorderrequiringmedical
attention,the segregationandtreatmentof insanitybecamemorespecialized.
The establishmentof asylumsby Pinelat the Bicetreand the Quakersled by
SamuelTuke in York were effortsat reformingthe treatmentof insanity.
These reformswere rooted in a therapeuticapproachthat sought to instil
responsibilityandthe recognitionof guiltin theinsaneperson.Theysoughtto
establish:
... for the madman a consciousness of himself.... From the acknowledgement of his
status as an object, from the awareness of his guilt, the madman was to return to his
awareness of himself as a free and responsible subject, and consequently to reason.1•
The asylumwas anchoredin laws that categorizedthe insane as minors
whose treatmentrequiredspecializedparentalprotectionin the asylum,an
institutionmodelledon the patriarchalfamily. Legallysanctionedreforms
modelledon patriarchalfamilialismsought to inculcatereason and moral
uniformityinto the insaneby combiningthe valuesof familyandwork.Most
profoundly,theasylumandits criteriaof successrequireda deepcomplicityof
the patientin an act of mentalredefinitionof the self that was an internal
analogueto criminallaw and punishment:
174
 The asylum. .. was a juridicialspacewhereone was accused,judgedand sentenced,and
fromwhichone was releasedonly by the versionof the trialthat took placeat a deeper,
psychologicallevel- thatis, byrepentance.Madnesswasto bepunishedinsidetheasylum,
evenif declaredinnocentoutsideof it. ... It was to be imprisonedin a moralworld.17

In MadnessandCivilization,Foucaultdemonstratedhow formsof human

expression,social relations, and activities deemed unproductive,beyond
reasonand shamefulwereencapsulatedmorally,spatially,and cognitivelyin
juridico-psychological practicesand languages.Similarly,in TheBirthof the
Clinic,Foucaultanalysesthetransformation in medicinein thelateeighteenth
century.Especiallysignificantare the changesin medicinefrom a systemof
classificationthat reliedon the rapportand sharedcultureof physiciansand
patients,bothpredominantlyfromtheprivilegedclasses,to the establishment
of scienceas an anatomo-clinicalmethod.The democratizationof medical
practice and education, especially through the legal changes and state
formationduringthe FrenchRevolution,led to the establishmentof clinical
hospitalsas the site of medicalpractice.Here,diseasetook on a newaspectas
doctors, generallynot sharing the cultural assumptionsand language of
patients,focusedmoreon the physicaldisplayand symptomson the body of
the patient,and 'openedup a few corpses'to observethe interiorof diseased
bodies.18 In clinicalpractice,new relationsbecamevisible,new knowledges
about diseasebecamepossible.19The whole notion of 'publichealth'and,
indeed,of the socialas a knowableobject,was largelybasedon the collection
of healthstatisticsgatheredfromclinics.Thesedata,whenrenderedinto facts,
were formativefor policy-makingand the legal regulationof nutrition,
sexuality,the workplace,housing,and, not coincidentally,conceptsof social
pathology as formulatedby Emile Durkheim.20 Here we see the coming
togetherof the state,law,andmedicinein reformulating thebodyanddisease.
The institutionalization of the clinicalhospitallocatedthe patientin a quasi-
scientificjuridicalspacesimilarto the asylum.

4. Of Archaeology,Space,and Time
Whilethestudiesof madnessandmedicineareanalysesof particularhistorical
changes that implicatelaw in patterns of controlled exclusion, Foucault
developeda generalperspectiveon reasonedexclusionin both TheOrderof
Thingsand TheArchaeologyof Knowledge.TheOrderof Thingsformulatesthe
differencesin knowledgebetweenthe classicalperiodandmodemknowledge
that emergesat the end of the eighteenthcenturyand the beginningof the
nineteenthcentury.The classicalperiod orderedknowledgethroughstruc-
turesthatlocatedelementsin spatialrelationswithone another,thatgenerally
emphasizedthe ways in which things were reproducedthrough rules of
representationwhich fosteredresemblance,that stressedpermanenceover
change,and that relatedthingsthroughexpansiveanalogies.21 By contrast,
sincethe end of the eighteenthcenturyknowledgehas beenorderedthrough
concepts of organic relationships,organic processes,functionalrelations,
temporalrelations,the invisibleconnectionsamong parts ratherthan their
175
most visible representations,and, perhapsmost importantly,a historical
orderingof reality:
From the nineteenth century, History was to deploy, in a temporal series, the analogies
that connect distinct organic structures to one another. This same History will also,
progressively, impose its laws on the analysis of production, the analysis of organically
structured beings, and, lastly, on the analysis of linguistic groups. History gives place to
analogical organic structures, just as Order opened the way to successive identities and
differences.22

In this light, Foucaultanalysesmoreparticulartransitionsin knowledges

fromthe classicalperiodto the modern.For example,in politicaleconomy,
there is a change from how elementsare representedin exchangeto the
underlyingrelationsof the processesof production.Problemsof forms of
production,of scarcity,the organizationof labour,and utopiasthatenvision
an end of history become prominent.This transitionis demonstratedby
changesin the analysisof labourfromthe roleof labourin representing value
in the writingsof Adam Smithto the role of labourin producingvalue as
analysedby David Ricardo.Ricardo'sanalysisof labour 'singlesout in a
radicalfashion,for thefirsttime,[how]the worker'senergy,toil, andtimeare
boughtand sold, and the activitythatis the originof the valueof things'.23
Increasingly,the notions of process,of history,of function,of organism
cometo definehumanityitself.Humanity,throughtheself-impositionof these
categoriesof knowledge,becomesan 'operationalconceptin the sciencesand
philosophythatemergedin the earlynineteenthcentury'andbecomesa body
thatis knownthroughtechnicalscienceslikephysiologyand a historyrooted
in social,economic,and politicalconditions.24Humanitybecomesan object
of knowledgethroughcategoriesof knowledgethat stress self-production,
reproduction,and humans as 'living, labouring and speaking beings'.25
Increasingly,'modernthoughtis advancingtowardsthat regionwhereman's
Othermustbecomethe Sameas himself'.26

5. Discourse and Exclusion

These analyses of the transformationof knowledgeshow the qualitative
differencesbetweenclassicaland modernthought.Knowledgeis constructed
throughdiscourseswhichdefineand envelopaspectsof the body,experience,
and thought that are initiallyexcludedfrom reason and science.Now, the
processof knowledgeformationcan itself becomean objectof knowledge.
Onceknowledgeformshumanityas boththesubjectandobjectof enquiry,the
discursivepracticesthroughwhich aspectsof human activityand thought
become excluded,aberrant,and deviantcan themselvesbecome topics of
enquiryandarticulation.Foucaultconceptualizesthesediscursivepracticesas
both proceduresand as conditionsof communication.27
First,thereare 'proceduresof exclusion'whichlimitandcontroldiscourse
throughits internalrelations.Includedhereareproceduresthatplacecertain
topicsand objectsof knowledgeoutsideof majorlocationsof discussionand
analysis. This marginalizes these topics and objects of knowledge to the
176
peripheriesof discourses.In addition, that which is marginalizedis also
divided-offfrom other objectsof enquiryso that it can be rejectedas either
unreasonableor as havinga peculiarmagicalpower. Madnessis a primary
example of this. Moreover, that which is marginalized,divided-off,and
rejectedbecomesexcludedfrom determiningthe criteriaof what is trueand
false. The criteriaof what is true and false are, initially,bound up with the
purposesof knowledge.Yet thesecriteriaaredifferentiated fromthelocations
where they were formed and the power relationswithin which they were
embedded.Theyaredistancedfromthe contextswhereknowledgeis created
and articulatedand, most importantly,sought after. Each speciality of
knowledge- jurisprudence,criminology,sociology, geography,economics,
and so on - seeks to establishits own rationalityand range of empirical
validation.28
Second, there are procedureswithin discourse that impose limits and
controls.Therearepracticeswhichclassify,order,anddistributediscoursesas
well as make them seem unpredictable.First, there is commentaryon the
primary texts, such as constitutions and key rulings of courts. These
commentariesfacilitatediscourseby providingmultiplemeaningsto such
things as statutes, constitutions,and court rulings,therebymaking them
problematicand worthyof furtherdiscourse.At the sametime,by repeating
the primarytext, commentarydelimitsthe rangeof legaldiscourse.Another
sourceof internalcontrol is the notion of the author,not necessarilyas an
individualperson,but,ratheras a boundaryof consistencyandlimitationthat
is shapedthroughidentity.The 'author'makesdiscourseappearas activity,as
originatingin an entitywithan identitythatformsa coreandpartialreference
to discourse,therebyprovidinga boundaryto it. Similarly,themorecollective
identity of disciplines as anonymous systems of rules, techniques, and
instrumentsthat serveto bothmakenewdiscoursespossibleat the sametime
thattheylimitthelegitimaterangeof enquiry.Disciplinesdissociatetheworld
into objects of enquiry that are knowable through particularpractices.
Knowledgeis compartmentalized as the worldis dissociated.
Third, discoursesare controlledby the conditionsthat restrictaccess to
communicationand shapethe processof communication,limitingdiscourse
to speakerswho are deemed 'qualified'in terms of formal educationand
professionalcertification,patterns of language and gestures that delimit
discourse,communicationsthroughspecializedlanguagesandjournals,and
the particulargroupsto which discourseis restricted.These last aspectsof
controlcombinewith the othersthat we discussedat the point of discursive
action,at thepointwherediscourseoccurs.In effect,discoursebecomesa form
of exclusivecommunicationand interaction.It evaluateslanguages,individ-
uals, and patternsof interactionfrom the standpointof disciplineswhich
combineidentitiesof authorswith questsfor truththat are dividedoff from
practicalpurposes.For Foucaulttheseaspectsof knowledgecan be overcome
by a methodthatcriticizesdiscourseas an 'imposition'of knowledgepractices
on things.29 The 'pure' knowledge-seeking of discourses results from a
differentiation that elevates discourse above objects of enquiry, making them
177
into fields that have eitherno or limitedmeaningsprior to discourse.The
meaningsthat discoursegeneratesare the effectsof discursivepracticesand
mustbe seenas such.Meaningsand the discoursesthat generatethemshould
be analysedas discontinuousevents. Meaningand discourseshift with the
relations that characterizehistorical periods. They must be analysed as
materialrelationsthat are formativefor subjects.

LAWAND DISCIPLINE
In the early 1970s, Foucault began to write directlyon how power and
knowledgeshape crime, criminallaw, and the relationshipsamong legal,
medical,and socialsciencediscourses.Comparedwithhis earlierwork,there
was a shift,or, at least,a pronounceddifferencein emphasisin thesewritings.
He becamelessfocusedon processesinternalto discourseandmoreconcerned
withthe transformation of relationsbetweenpowerandknowledge.Thisshift
is partiallyexplainedby changinghistoricalconditions.
The upheavalsthat beganin May 1968in Francetransformedthe political
and intellectualterrain.Demands for participatorydemocracyby student
activistswho pronouncedthe need for and initiatedthe self governanceof
educationalinstitutions,the occupationof factoriesby workers,the forma-
tion of common political associationsand strike support committeesby
workersand students,and the emergenceof issuesof women'sliberation,the
environment,and minoritiesopenedup politicalaction and discourse.3aIn
particular,there were sharp criticismsof dogmatic Marxist formulae of
politicaleconomy,class, and the 61itismof the CommunistPartyleadership.
The role of the intellectualas representingrevolutionaryconsciousness
throughuniversalisticscientificand moraldiscoursewas challenged.
New approachesto knowledgeandpoliticswerebeingcreatedthatstressed
themes raised by Foucault:there are a multiplicityof networksof social
control and strugglesare localized.Under these conditions,the intellectual
should participatein specific struggles and engage in concrete actions.
Emancipatoryknowledgemustrevealspecificmechanismsof powerandserve
the developmentof local strategies.Foucaultwas associatedwithmovements
for prisoners'rightsthatwerebegunby hungerstrikesby politicalprisonersin
1970. He was active in the PrisonInformationGroup and other effortsto
createsituationsthroughwhich prisonerscould articulatetheir own needs.
This led Foucaultto study issues of knowledgeand powerin the arenasof
politics,criminallaw, criminology,and penology.
For Foucault, knowledgecannot adequatelybe analysed either as an
expressionof poweror as purelyan instrumentof power.To be sure,these
relations between knowledge and power have some validity: discursive
knowledgerequiresformsof powerthatenableclassification,recordkeeping,
accumulation,and systematiccommunication.Yet powerand the exerciseof
powerrequirethe formationof usefulknowledge.Powerand knowledgeare
mutually dependent, intersect with one another and, often, are so inter-
penetrated as to form a unity:
178
 We shouldadmit... thatpowerproducesknowledge(andnot simplyby encouragingit
becauseit servespoweror by applyingit becauseit is useful);thatpowerand knowledge
directlyimply one another;that there is no power relationwithout the correlative
constitutionof a fieldof knowledge,nor any knowledgethat does not presupposeand
constituteat the sametimepowerrelations.These'power-knowledge' relationsare to be
analysed,therefore,not on the basis of a subjectof knowledgewho is or is not free in
relationto thepowersystem,but,on thecontrary,thesubjectwhoknows,theobjectsto be
known,and the modalitiesof knowledgemust be regardedas so many effectsof these
fundamentalimplicationsof power-knowledge andtheirhistoricaltransformations.31

1. Law, Truth,and the Body of the Accused

In keeping with themes and frameworksdevelopedin his earlierworks,
Discipline and Punish describes changes in punishment,penology, and
criminallawfromtheclassicalperiodthroughthenineteenthcentury.Yet,the
core problemshifts from discourseto the power-knowledgecomplex.With
this shift, moreover,comes a new conceptualizationof the body: the body
becomesthe pointat whichpoweris exercisedandknowledgeis generated.It
is the key objectupon whichcriminallaw, state power,penology,and allied
social sciencesare inscribed.Moreover,the juridicalsubjectemergesfrom
relationsof power,fromtechnicalmanipulationsandmoraldiscoursefocused
on the body.
'The Body of the Condemned',the firstchapterof Disciplineand Punish,
contraststwo regimesof punishment,'a publicexecutionand a time-table'.32
In thefirst,theexecutionof Damienstheregicidein 1757,Foucaultprovidesa
four-pagedescriptionof the sentenceand how, accordingto contemporary
observers,it wascarriedout. Thefollowingindicatesthe severityandexcessive
use of violenceappliedto the body of the condemned:
Bouton,an officerof thewatch,leftus thisaccount;' ... Thentheexecutioner,his sleeves
rolledup, took the pincers,whichhad beenespeciallymadefor the occasion,and which
wereabouta foot anda halflong,andpulledofffirstat thecalfof therightleg,thenat the
thigh,and fromthereat the two fleshypartsof therightarm;thenat the breasts'.33
In the second,punishmenttakesthe formof a dailyregimenas drawnup by
Leon Faucherin 1837.For example:
Art. 17.Theprisoners'daywillbeginat sixin themorninginwinterandat fivein summer.
Theywillworkforninehoursa daythroughouttheyear.Two hoursa daywillbe devoted
to instruction.Workandthedaywillendat nineo'clockin winterandeightin summer.34
A key shift betweentheseregimesof punishmentand law is theirphysical
and sociallocation.In the firstformof punishment,torturingthe body of the
condemnedis a publicspectacle.In the second,the punishmentis withdrawn
from publicview and is locatedin the institutionalspaceof the prison.The
reverse is the case for legal proceedings. In the classical period, the
investigationand judgmentof the accusedwas accomplishedout of public
view. Legal proceedings used torture in an effort to get at the truth. Through
gradations of pain applied to the body of the accused, a confession could be
obtained. The criminal was taken as responsibly supporting the secret
179
proceduresof the investigation.By contrast, the trial in modern legal
proceedingsis a distinctlypublic attempt to get at the truth. It relies on
proceduresof publicargumentationandevidencewhichdemandthatviolence
not be exercisedagainstthe accusedto extractinformationor a confession.
The characterizationof the body is also transformed.In the first regime
of punishment,punishmentis directlyinflictedon the body so that pain can
be registeredon the criminalfor publicview. The punishmentof the body
accordswith punishmentof a criminalaction. In the second regime,the
punishmentinflictedon the body plays more of a mediatingrole for a legal
regimethatseeksto get at someessenceof thecriminal.Punishingthebodyis a
meansof affectingan interiorof thecriminal:the soul,the heart,themind,the
will.
Knowledgeplays an increasinglyimportantrole in makingjudgements
about crimeand the criminal:'knowledgeof the offence,knowledgeof the
offender,knowledgeof the law: these three conditionsmake it possible to
grounda judgementin truth'.35What is most distinctiveabout the change
initiatedin the earlynineteenthcenturyis the extentto whichlegalcategories
become intertwinedwith psychological,psychiatric,criminological,and
sociologicalknowledges.These knowledgesare used to diagnose,to prog-
nosticateandtojudgecriminalsandcriminalactsthatgo wellbeyondthelegal
proscriptionsabout the application of punishmentsto offences. These
knowledgesare concernedwith reforming,rehabilitating,and shapingthe
future behaviour of the criminal. Criminal law becomes embedded in
discoursesof clinicalsciencesand an arrayof regimesthat seek to treatthe
criminal,to curethe criminal.
For example, law and psychiatryare blended in judging whether the
perpetratorof a criminalact was of soundor unsoundmindat the timeof the
act. Whilelaw playsa dominantrolein definingthe act, a combinationof law
and psychiatrydeterminesthe degreeof responsibilityof the perpetrator.If
the perpetratorwas mad, then treatingher or him as a criminalwould be
inappropriatesince the criminalis definedas a rational,wilful, and self-
determiningactor. For this reason, the examinationof the criminalfor
possibleinsanitycameto precedejudgment.It was 'externaland anteriorto
the sentence'and it 'loosenedthe hold of the law on the authorof the act'.36
On the one hand, the higherthe degreeof madness,the lowerthe degreeof
guilt. On the other hand, the higherthe degreeof madness,the lower the
degreeof rationalityand the greaterthe dangerposedby the perpetrator.The
perpetratorwho is mad is 'someoneto be put away and treatedratherthan
punished'.37
The interpenetrationof legal and non-legalknowledgeshas generatedan
incrediblycomplex,incoherent,andconfusingarrayof concepts.As the non-
legalelementsof criminallaw haveexpanded,the role of judgehas expanded
froma focusedconcernwiththecriminallawandits applicationto judgments
about the character,the underlyingnature of the perpetrator,and the
complexity of the circumstances of the act. Moreover, the judge is not alone in
judging:
180
 Throughoutthe penalprocedureand the implementation of the sentencethereswarmsa
wholeseriesof subsidiaryauthorities.Small-scalelegalsystemsand paralleljudgeshave
multipliedaroundtheprincipaljudgment:psychiatric or psychologicalexperts,magistrates
concernedwith the implementation of sentences,educationalists,membersof the prison
service, all fragment the power to punish.... The whole machinery... creates a
proliferationof the authoritiesof judicialdecision-makingand extendsits powersof
decisionwellbeyondthe sentence.38

2. Law, Political Economy, and Political Technology

Whatapproachis bestsuitedforcomprehending thesetransformations of law
and punishment?Foucault rejectsDurkheim'sanalysis penalof evolution
becauseit studies'only the generalsocial forms'and attributesthe apparent
developmentof leniencyof punishmentto the developmentof individualism.
Durkheim,with his emphasison law as an index of social organizationand
morality, virtually neglects analysing changes in punishment from the
standpointof 'newtacticsof power'."9Ruscheand Kirchheimer,on the other
hand,areviewedas pivotal.FoucaultviewsRuscheand Kirchheimer's 'great
work', Punishmentand Social Structures, as providing 'a number of essential
referencepoints'.40 Ratherthanrootingpunishmentin the 'illusion'of beliefs
regardingmoralityor as an effortto reducecrime,Ruscheand Kirchheimer
'relatethe differentsystemsof punishmentwith the systemsof production
withinwhichthey operate'.4'Slavery,feudalism,mercantilecapitalism,and
industrialcapitalismeach had a distinctive pattern of punishmentthat
enhancedthe supplyand control of labourunderalternativeconditionsof
production.
Whilethereis considerablemeritfor this approachto law andpunishment,
Foucaultarguesthat politicaleconomydoes not go deep enough. It is too
general,too macrosociological. A perspectiveis neededthatgetsat thewaysin
which the body is fully mastered,fully controlled,and fully preparedfor
socially useful tasks, including production. This perspectivemust link
particularinstitutionalcontextsto knowledgesof the body and techniquesof
its control.It mustcapturethe 'politicaltechnology'of the body, the 'micro-
physics of power' that includes but goes beyond political economy in
analysingthe 'strategy'- the 'dispositions,manoeuvres,tactics,techniques'-
throughwhichpoweris exercisedso that 'domination'can be analysednot
only as appropriation,but as particularpractices.42Criminallaw, criminal
justice, and punishmentmust be analysed as a highly 'complex social
function',as a 'politicaltactic', as an 'epistemologico-juridical
formation'
through which the penal system has been humanized and knowledge
generated,and a way in which the body has become both the site for the
realizationof powerand as a mediatorof power.43

3. Law, Punishment,and Representationsof Power

Foucault's concrete historical study elaborates on this methodological
approach. In keeping with his analysis of the differences between the classical
181
periodand moderntimes,Foucaultcharacterizespublicexecutionsthrough
the end of the eighteenthcenturyas a form of representationin which the
power of the sovereignmonarchoverwhelmsthe criminal.This serves to
demonstratethe powerof the monarchdirectlyon thebodyof thecondemned
in a publicspectacle.Torturereproduced:
... the crime on the visible body of the criminal. ... It also made the body of the
condemnedmantheplacewherethevengeanceof thesovereignwasapplied,theanchoring
pointfora manifestationof power,anopportunityof affirmingthedyssymetryof forces.44
Thepowerof the sovereignradiatedthroughthe bodyof societyand,through
the courtand the executioner,was directlydemonstratedto the populaceas it
was pittedagainstthe criminal.
A varietyof factorsled to the transitionfrom publictortureto a greater
reliance on the prison. The spectacle of public punishment, for one,
increasinglybecamean occasionfor the crowdto supportthe criminalrather
thanthe powerof the monarch.Protestsat the site of publicexecutionforced
'tyranny to confront rebellion'in a manner that weakened rather than
enhancedmonarchicalpower.45This tacticalchange, along with the view
developedduringthe Enlightenmentthat humanity- includingthe humanity
of the criminal- ought to be respected,supportingthe view that criminal
justiceshouldpunishratherthan revenge.
Also, thereweremassiveshiftsin the typesof crimethatweretakingplace.
Overall,crimewas becomingmore directedat propertythan at persons.'A
generalmovementshiftedcriminalityfromthe attackof bodiesto the moreor
lessdirectseizureof goods.'46Crimewasbeingconductedmoreby individuals
or smallgroupsratherthanby largeorganizedarmedgangs.Criminalitywas
becomingbothmoremarginalto societyandmoreskilled,moreprofessional.
This changingpatternof crimerequireda less intensebut moredetailedand
interventionistformof punishment.
Anothersourceof changeweremovementsfor reformlocatedwithin the
legal professionand the criminaljustice system. Lawyers,criminaljustice
administrators,legal scholars,and politicalactivistshad developedcritiques
of criminallaw and punishment.They arguedthat the law and its imple-
mentationwereconfusedbecauseof a multiplicityof courtsand overlapping
of differentlegalsystems.Overall,thisconstituteda 'badeconomyof power'in
which there was too much power concentratedin lowerjurisdictions,too
muchdiscretionfor judges,and 'extremepower'allocatedto prosecutors.47
Theneedfor reformwas largelya resultof the identityof sovereigntywiththe
king and the discretionof judgesand the powerof prosecutorsthat followed
fromit. Thehallmarkof the arbitrariness of thislegalorderwas the use of the
pardoningpowerby the king that was integralto all proceedingsin criminal
law and punishment.Reformersdemandedmorehomogeneityof justice,its
betterdistribution,and a rearrangement of powerthatmadeit moreregular,
moredetailed,moreeffective,and moreconsistent.

4. Sovereignty, Capitalism, and Labour Control

The locus of the transformation in criminal law and punishment was the
182
conjoiningof the struggleagainstthe 'super-power'of the sovereignand the
legal transformationassociated with the growing distinction between il-
legalities of rights and illegalitiesof property that went along with the
developmentof capitalism.As capitalismdeveloped,the notion of detailed
rights of peasants came increasinglyinto conflict with the capacity of
landownersto use their propertyfor economic purposesas they saw fit.
Increasingly,old obligationsderivedfrom rightswere abandoned.Disputes
and illegalitiesthat had been articulatedthroughdiscoursesof legal rights
werereplacedby discoursesof illegalitiesof propertieswhich'thenhad to be
punished'.48
Moreover,as wealthincreasinglytook the formof capitalthatwasinvested
in industrialenterprises,both the controlof labourand the requirementthat
the propertyof the owner be secured- the machinery,the tools, the raw
materials,the product, the inventory - became basic to the production
process.Whileworkersactingon thelegacyof feudalrightsoftenviewedit as a
right 'to collect bits of iron or rope around ships or to resell the sugar
sweepings',the securityof capitalistrelationsof productionnecessitatedthat
such acts be renderedinto illegalitiesof property.49Therewas, in effect, a
class-based'redistribution of illegalities'that disadvantagedthe workersand
advantagedthe bourgeoisie.Workerswereincreasinglysubjectedto criminal
law groundedin propertywhile the bourgeoisieretainedlaws that defined
illegalitiesthroughrights:
Thisgreatredistribution of illegalitieswasevento be expressedthrougha specialization
of
legal circuits:for illegalitiesof property- for theft - therewere ordinarycourts and
punishments;for the illegalitiesof rights - fraud, tax evasion, irregularcommercial
operations- special legal institutionsapplied with transactions,accommodations,
reducedfines,etc.Thebourgeoisiereservedto itselfthefruitfuldomainof theillegalityof
rights.50
The challenge to monarchicalsovereigntycombined with changes in
productionandpropertyled to changesin criminallaw andpunishment.The
directionof changewas to make 'punishmentand repressionof illegalitiesa
regularfunction,coextensivewith society . .. to insertthe powerto punish
more deeplyin the social body'.51What was requiredwas not only a more
regular,less arbitrarycriminallaw and punishment,but a patternof control
thatwas as detailedas the new relationsof production.This transformation,
moreover,was conductedthrougha socialdiscoursethat stressedthe needto
defendand maintainsocietyratherthan a discoursethat pittedthe criminal
againstthe sovereign.It stressedthe humanityof the criminal,and the notion
that the individual,actingon the basis of will, enteredinto a contractwith
society:'Inacceptingthelawsof societythecitizenis alsoacceptingthelawsby
whichhe may be punished.'52The discoursehad a utilitarianstandardthat
made the pain of punishmentsufficientto exceed the gains derivedfrom
illegalitiesso that the likelihoodof repetitionof the crimeby the criminalbe
prevented, that the crime not be imitated by others, and that the future of
social order be secured. Criminal law, in line with this, must be codified and
rationally organized both in terms of the nature of crimes and their
183
punishments.Criminalproceedingsmust disavow the use of torture and
proceedon the basisof commonreason,rationalargument,andevidencethat
seeks to demonstratethe truth in ways consistent with philosophy and
principlesof science.Also, andof greatimportanceto Foucault'sanalysis,the
determinationof punishment'musttakeinto accountthe profoundnatureof
the criminalhimself,the presumabledegreeof his wickedness,the intrinsic
qualityof his will'.53Sentencingbecomesan individualmatter,raisingthe
dilemma of 'how one is to apply fixed laws to particularindividuals'.54
Ultimately,it is somethinginternalto the criminal,that is, criminalitythatis
the focus of criminallaw and punishment.The criminallaw and punishment
becomesa technology,an applicationof powerto the bodyas a mediator,as a
methodof gettingat the interior,at the soul.

5. Docile Bodies, Knowledge,and Social Usefulness

The prison,the characteristicform of punishmentthat emergesthroughthe
nineteenthcentury,worksbothas an 'apparatusof knowledge'thatdevelopsa
'whole corpus of individualizingknowledge'aroundthe criminalpotential
within the individual,and as an institutionthat attempts to change the
behaviour,the habits,andthe veryattitudeof the inmatethroughtherapeutic
regimes.55In this endeavour,the prisonshareswith otherinstitutions- the
school, the hospital,the asylum,the factory,the military- the formationof
techniquesand knowledgethat disciplinethe individualfor socially useful
ends.Whiletherearea varietyof 'disciplines'that areinstitutionallylocated,
they sharea commonlogic, a commonapproachto the individualthat was
emergingin the eighteeenthcenturyand that has beenelaboratedandcarried
throughinto the present:
Disciplineproducessubjectedand practicedbodies,'docile'bodies.Disciplineincreases
the forcesof the body(in economictermsof utility)anddiminishedthesesameforces(in
politicaltermsof obedience).In short,it disassociatespowerfromthe body;on the one
hand,it turnsit intoan 'aptitude',a 'capacity',whichit seeksto increase;on theotherhand
it reversesthecourseof theenergy,thepowerthatmightresultfromit, andit turnsit intoa
relationof strictsubjection.56
Thereare innumerableparticularsourcesof disciplinethat influenceand
borrowknowledgeandinstitutionalpracticesfromone another:in secondary
education,in militarytraining,in the organizationof the detaileddivisionof
labour in the factory, in the organizationof space in the hospital, in the
regimen of prison life.57 All of these particularscontribute to making
discipline'a political anatomy of detail', a 'micro-physics'of power that
analysesand reassemblesspecificbehaviours,gestures,andmovementsof the
individualthroughrepetitivetrainingand detailedscrutinyfrom the stand-
point of politicalcontrol.58
Disciplineis partiallyaccomplishedthroughreorderingspace and time.
Spatially,individualsare enclosed, confined in specializedlocations: the
school, the workshop, the prison. Here, they are set off from one another, each
given a specific location where they can be observed, supervised, compared,
184
judged. Moreover,the varietyof institutionalcontrolstend to supportand
reinforce one another. Military control over a territory, for example,
facilitatesthe supervisionof contagiousdiseases.Administrativespace and
therapeuticspace overlap,servingto 'individualizebodies, diseases,symp-
toms, lives and deaths'.59Individualshave significanceprimarilyin termsof
theirinstitutionalclassification,as in the case of a particulardiseaseor, as in
the caseof the military,the school,the workshop,theirrank.Classificationis
both a techniqueof knowledgeand of power.
Theorganizationof timealso enablesthecontrolof individualactivity.The
time-tableenablesrepitition,for example.The redefinitionof actionthrough
detailedmovements,each of whichhas a standarddurationthat is to be co-
ordinatedwith othermovementshavingstandarddurationsand with objects
suchas machineryorguns,makestimea modalityof control.'Timepenetrates
the body and with it all the meticulouscontrolsof power.'60As the body is
reinventedthrough temporal sequencing,through the administrationof
detailedmotionseachtimedto co-ordinatewithothermotionsandthings,it is
increasinglyconstructedas a resourceto be mined,but a resourcethat may
havelimits,that may becomeresistantbeforeit becomesexhausted.
Disciplineis constructedthroughknowledgesthatarethemselvesproducts
of the disciplinarypractices.Disciplineis exercisedthrougha 'hierarchical
observation'in which space is constructedand individualsare located in a
mannerthat facilitatessurveillanceof themby observersthat are eithertheir
supervisorsorin waysthattheycannotknowwhethertheyarebeingobserved.
Indeed,observationis a core architecturaltheme in designingworkshops,
prisons,schools,hospitals,asylums,and militarybarracks:
... to permitaninternal,articulatedanddetailedcontrol- to rendervisiblethosewhoare
inside it; in more general terms, an architecturethat would operate to transform
individuals:to act on those it shelters,to providea hold on theirconduct,to carrythe
effectsof powerrightto them,to makeit possibleto knowthem,to alterthem.Stonescan
makepeopledocileand knowable.,1
Thecreationof spacesof observationthatisolatetheindividual,openingup
the details of her or his conduct to scrutiny, is a characteristicof all
disciplinary,institutions.Theconductof workin the factoryandeducationin
the school, for example,combinethe accomplishmentof useful tasks with
surveillance.Indeed,the conductof the activityis designedso that it can be
observed.

6. Norms of Behaviourand Examinations

The observationof disciplinedactivitygives rise to normsof behaviourthat
are naturalpreciselybecausethey are observed,becausethey are averages
drawn from what people do.62 Correct behaviouris normal behaviour
preciselyin the sensethatit is whatis in the rangeof whatobservationtellsus
people do. As such, both punishments and rewards are designed for
correction: to get individuals, in particular ranks and specialities, to behave in
ways that adhere to a norm. Individuals are differentiated from one another,
185
comparedto one on the basisof a norm,an averagethat is constructedfrom
observationsof theirbehaviours.Theyareinducedto meetthatnormand,at
themargins,to be deemedincompetent,abnormal.Normalization,'oneof the
greatinstrumentsof power',makespeopleboth formallyequal,sincetheyare
judgedby the samestandards,andindividuated,sincetheyaresee as different
in termsof this standard.63
The examinationmost fully and most immediatelycombinessurveillance,
control, and differentiationover the individualin the very constitutionof
disciplinaryactivity.In education,forexample,theexamination,'a constantly
repeated ritual of power.. . enabled the teacher, while transmittinghis
knowledge,to transformhis pupilsinto a whole field of knowledge'.64It is
throughexaminations- in theprison,the hospital,the school,the asylum,the
barracks- thatthe individualis madeinto an objectof knowledgein localized
disciplinaryactivities.The combinedeffectsof examinationsis to renderthe
individual'intoa fieldof documentation',into a 'case'suitableforcontroland
domination.65In this light, individualismis not a privilegedstatus,as may
havebeenthe case underfeudalism,but a constructof disciplinaryregimes:
As powerbecomesmoreanonymousand morefunctional,thoseon whomit is exercised
tend to be more stronglyindividualized;it is exercisedby surveillanceratherthan
ceremonies,by observationratherthan commemorativeaccounts.... In a systemof
discipline,the child is more individualizedthan the adult, the patientmore than the
healthyman,the madmanand the delinquentmorethanthe non-delinquent.66
Jeremy Bentham'sPanopticonembodies the disciplinaryregime. It is,
essentially,an observationtowerthatis surroundedby a verticalbankof cells.
Eachcell has a windowfacingoutsideand a windowfacingthe observation
tower.A lightshinesfromthetowerin sucha wayas to illuminateeachcellwhile
makingit impossiblefor the person in each cell - a madman,a patient,a
condemnedman, a worker,or a schoolboy- to observethe observer.67Here
nevera
'visibilityis a trap',theinmateis renderedintoan 'objectof information,
subjectof communication'.68 ThePanopticonis a situationin which'surveillance
is permanentin its effects'becausethe inmateis in 'a state of consciousand
permanentvisibilitythat assuresthe automaticfunctioningof power'.69

7. Why Prison?
Yet whatneedsto be explainedis whytheprison,theinstitutionalextensionof
disciplinarylogic into the area of criminallaw and punishment,which was
recognizedas a failurein bothreformingcriminalsandreducingcrimefromits
inceptionand, despitethis, has been constantlyextendedand complimented
by less total forms of surveillance,halfway houses, parole, and so on.70
Foucaultpointsout that the 'monotonouscritiqueof the prisonalwaystakes
one of two directions:eitherthat the prisonwas insufficientlycorrective,and
that the penitentiarytechniquewas still at a rudimentarystage;or that in
Thesecriticisms
attemptingto be correctiveit lost its powerof punishment'.71
have invariably been met by proposals aimed at strengthening the prison's
disciplinary techniques and associated patterns of knowledge accumulation.
186
 Thepersistanceand,indeed,theelaborationof theprisonmustbe explained
on grounds other than its success in reducingcrime and in reforming
criminals.It can be partiallyexplainedby the fact that the prisonextendsa
more general pattern of disciplinarypower. Its consistency with other
disciplinaryinstitutions- the factory,the school,theasylum,the hospital,the
military- is a sourceof supportanddevelopment.Similarly,criminologyand
relatedscientificdiscoursesof crimearelargelyderivativeof knowledgesthat
are establishedin the prison. A complex of knowledges is established,
includingcriminallaw,whichoriginatesin andis boundedby theinstitutional
contextof the prison.
From the standpointof capitalistpoliticaleconomyand class conflict,the
prison has been perpetuatedbecause it 'has succeededextremelywell in
producingdelinquency,a specific type, a politically or economicallyless
dangerous- and,on occasion,usable- formof illegality'.72Criminallaw,the
prison, and associateddiscoursestransformworkers'resistanceto labour
disciplineandto privateownershipof themeansof productionintoillegalities,
subjectingthemto extensiveand detailedsurveillance.Moreover,illegalities
arechangedinto delinquencies,into pathologies:
The delinquentpopulationmade crime predictable,could be used to provideillegal
servicesfor therulingclass(hencethe Marxistdisdainfor the lumpen-proletariat),
andby
theirveryformsof socialityandconditionsof lifefunctionedas a negativereferencepoint
for the workingclassas a whole.73
As resistanceis criminalizedand renderedinto delinquencies,the capacities
for collectiveworking-classactions are weakened.Criminalizationand the
productionof delinquenciesare historically-situated
tacticsof power.

SEXUALITYAND THE DISCOURSEOF REPRESSION

The History of Sexualityis Foucault'slast major work. As in his earlier

studies, he analysestransformationsin the social meaningof sexualityas
resultingfrom combinationsof legal, medical,social scientific,and admin-
istrativediscourses.These discourseson sexualityconstitutethe regimeof
truth of a historically emergent constellation of power relations that
differentiatesexualityinto particularinstitutionalpractices,formulatinga
detailedknowledgeof the individualas a sexualsubjectand as an objectfor
disciplinarycontrol.
Beyond this criticalhistory, Foucault argues against the view that the
twentiethcenturyusheredin an eraof sexualliberationaftera sexualregimeof
repressionin the Victorianera. He callsthis view the 'repressivehypothesis':
the sexuallicenceof the seventeenthcenturywas followedby an increasing
reignof repressionthat culminatedin the nineteenthcenturywhichhas been
followedby the liftingof repression.For Foucault,thisversionof sexualityis
fundamentallyflawedbecauseit does not revealhow the discourseof sexual
repression has served to strengthen legally legitimated forces of observation,
discipline, and administrative control. Not only is the repressive hypothesis
187
questionablein termsof its accountof theactualhistoryof sexualactivity,but
it misses the effect of organizingknowledgeabout sexualitythrough the
category of repression.The repressivediscourseof sexualityassumesthe
pervasivenessof sexuality,it demands that sexualitymust be discovered
throughsociallife, that sexualityis centralto personality,that sexualitymust
be madeexplicit,andthat sexualityis not so muchaboutdiscreteactionsas it
is a core feature of individual identity.74The discourse of sexuality is
everywherebecause sexuality is assumed to be repressedeverywhere,in
manifolddetails of individualexperienceand behaviour.The discourseof
repressivesexualitystimulatesthe elaborationof sexualityin the forms of
expertknowledge,supportedby beliefsthat suchknowledgeis liberatory.
Foucaultmaintainsthat 'sexwas drivenout of hidingand forcedto lead a
discursiveexistence'.75Through much of the eighteenthcentury, sexual
practiceswerecontrolledby canonlaw, Christianpastoralteaching,andcivil
law.Thesecodesfocusedoverwhelmingly on the conductof sexualactswithin
the confinesof maritalrelations.Sexual improprietieswere formulatedin
ethical-legalterms.By the late eighteenthcentury,the centralityof ecclesiast-
ical authority and the legal concern with sexual acts was undergoinga
transformation.Increasingly,the focus of the confessionwas lesson acts and
more on the individual'sfeelings,beliefs, desires,and sensibilities.Sexual
discourse was looking into the subjectiveinterior as a realm of truth.
Increasingly,instead of legal and ecclesiasticdiscoursesand institutions
dominatingsexuality,medical,psychiatric,and psychologicaldiscoursesand
practicescombinedwith legalcategoriesto definesexuality.Moreover,while
marital relations still served as the standardfor sexuality,marriagewas
increasinglycoming to be defined through rights to privacy and con-
fidentiality.Increasingly,it wastheindividualoutsideof maritalrelationsthat
was the focus of scrutiny.
These transformationsin sexualityresult from new patternsof power,
includingthe interpenetration of legalinstitutionsand discourseswith other
administrativecentresthat encapsulate,regulateand definethe body. The
proliferationof disciplinaryregimesin the school,the workplace,the prison,
the hospital,and all the otherinstitutionalsettingsthat constitutesocial life
providedthe overlappinginstitutionalcontext for sexual discourse.Con-
tributingto the emergingdiscourseon the sexualityof children,for example,
wasa focuson theschoolboyin secondaryschools.As in thecaseof theprison,
the spatial arrangementof classes, dormitories,and locations for eating
maximizedthe possibilitiesfor observationby school authorities,as did the
regimentationof bedtimeand sleepperiods.76
The sexuality of the schoolboy became a 'public problem' through
discoursesof doctors, educators,and planners." In the most enlightened
schools, close observation of schoolboy sexuality was combined with
educationin sex, birth,and procreation.The discourseon sexualitythat was
being taught was as clinical as the discourse of observation. Through similar
administrative discourses in other institutions, a whole 'sub-race' of sexual
deviants was constructed that ranged from strict legal definitions of
188
criminalityto more medicallyand psychologicallycategorizedtypes. Their
sexuality,in varyingdegrees,was judged both unproductiveand socially
dangerous.The more medicalizedthe terminology,the more likely that
individualpervertswere viewed as both victimizersand victims of their
condition:
Theywerechildrenwisebeyondtheiryears,precociouslittlegirls,ambiguousschoolboys,
dubiousservantsandeducators,cruelor maniacalhusbands,solitarycollectors,ramblers
with bizarreimpulses;they hauntedthe houses of correction,the penal colonies, the
tribunals,and the asylums;theycarriedtheirinfamyto the doctorsand theirsicknessto
thejudges.Thiswas the numberlessfamilyof pervertswho wereon friendlytermswith
delinquentsand akinto madmen.... In the courseof the centurytheysuccessivelybore
the stamp of 'moral folly', 'genital neurosis', 'aberrationof the genetic instinct',
'degenerescence',or 'physicalimbalance'.78
The new regimeof sexualityshiftedthe focus of social concernfrom the
conductof well-to-dohusbandsto the sexualityof children,the poor, and to
problemsof homosexualityand unnaturalsexuality.This shift signalleda
changefroma regimeof sexualcontrolthatsoughtto maintainfamilyhonour
rootedin codes of moralityand law that representedpower in personalized
terms to new regimesthat sought to enhancepublic health and to reform
society through population policies established in laws and elaborated
throughregulations.Thepoliticizingof sexandthe renderingof sexualityinto
legal/medicaldiscoursesdeepenedthe controlof the individual'sbehaviours
and motivations. Most significantly,the new construction of sexuality
provideda fieldof controlthat linkedbodilyacts to the widepublicproblems
like populationcontrol.The new regimegave riseto:
... infinitesimalsurveillances,
permanentcontrols,extremelymeticulousorderingsof
space,indeterminate medicalor psychologicalexaminations,to an entiremicropowerof
the body.Butit gaveriseas wellto comprehensive measures,statisticalassessments,and
interventionsaimedat the entiresocialbody or at groupstakenas a whole. Sex was a
meansof accessto boththelife of thebodyand thelife of the species."7
The discourseof sexualitygoes beyondeventhe discoursesof criminalityand
madnessto entrenchsocietaladministrative
controlsin the detailsof everyday
life.

CONCLUSION

Foucault'sanalysisof lawleadsus awayfromnotionsof theautonomyof law.

It also leadsus awayfromnotionsthatthe lawis determinedby economicand
political structures.Rather, law must be analysedin terms of its internal
relationsof powerand knowledgeas well as its relationsto otherdiscourses
and sourcesof power.
Foucault'sapproachto the relationsamonglaw, discourse,power,and the
state has been partially faulted for not focusing on those core social
institutions where power appears to be concentrated: major state bureau-
cracies, courts, legislatures, and centres of economic power.80 Foucault's
189
analysisof law and the stateis wantingbecauseit placessuchheavyemphasis
on institutionsliketheasylumandtheprisonthatareat theperipheryof social
reproduction.To be sure,the analysisof theseinstitutionsis importantsince
they control segmentsof the populationand shapepopulardiscoursesthat
serveto fragmentand to weakenoppositionto dominantpatternsof control.
Yet, wouldit not be moreappropriateto conceptualizelaw and powerat the
macrosociologicallevelof 'bigstructures'in orderto analysetheirimportance
for socialdevelopmentand broadissuesof politicalorganization?
Foucaultthoughtotherwise.For him, the problemof law, power,and the
statehas beeninadequatelyformulated:
On the Right,it was posedonly in termsof a constitution,of sovereignty,etc., thatis in
juridicalterms;on the Marxistside,it wasposedonly in termsof the Stateapparatus.s1
To get at the root of the problem,the focus must be on the specificmaterial
relationsof power, of how it is exercised,'concretelyand in detail'.82 The
detailedmechanicsof 'the investmentof the body by power'must be at the
core of inquiry,at the focal point of analysisratherthan assumedunder
juridicaland institutionalforms.83
Fromthiswe oughtnot to concludethatthe constitutionof societyandthe
state throughlaw and the detailsof power, discipline,and punishmentare
unrelated. Rather, they fully interpenetratewith one another. Juridical
equality,explicitlegalcodes, and representative
democracydevelopedalong
with the disciplinarypracticesthat shapemundaneactivity:
The generaljuridicalform that guaranteeda systemof rightsthat were egalitarianin
principlewassupportedby thesetiny,everyday,physicalmechanisms,byall thosesystems
of micro-powerthatareessentiallynonegalitarian
and assymetrical.84

The formationof legalrightsand legalinstitutionsexpandwith the detailed

exerciseof power. Where there are legal rights, there are technologiesof
power.
Given this analysisof law and power, what role does Foucaultsee legal
institutionsas playing in acts of liberationand social reconstruction?We
answer this question and end this essay provocativelywith a statement
Foucaultmade in a 1971debateabout the formationof a people'scourt to
judgethe police:
In my viewone shouldn'tstartwiththecourtas a particularform,and thengo on to ask
howandon whatconditionstherecouldbe a people'scourt;oneshouldstartwithpopular
justice,withactsof justiceby thepeople,and go on to askwhatplacea courtcouldhave
withinthis.Wemustaskwhethersuchactsof popularjusticecanorcannotbeorganizedin
the form of a court. Now my hypothesisis not so muchthat the court is the natural
expressionof popularjustice,but ratherthat its historicalfunctionis to ensnareit, to
it withininstitutionswhichare typicalof a
controlit and to strangleit, by re-inscribing
state'sapparatus.85

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 NOTESAND REFERENCES
1 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish (1977) 304.
2 Therearenumeroussecondaryworkson Foucault.MichelFoucault:TheWillto Truth(1980)
by A. Sheridan,Foucault'sprimaryEnglishtranslator,is excellentin thebreadthandclarity
of its presentation.Sheridanstresses the philosophicalsources of Foucault'sanalytic
approach in Nietzsche. In Genealogies of Morals: Nietzsche, Foucault, Donzelot and the
ofEthics(1985)JeffreyMinsonoffersa trenchantanalysisof Foucaultthatraises
Eccentricity
importantdirectionsfor criticizingaspectsof his genealogicalapproach.'MichelFoucault'
by M. Philip in The Returnof GrandTheoryin the Human Sciences, ed. Q. Skinner (1985) 65-
82,providesa veryaccessiblegeneralintroduction.Also seeH. L. DreyfusandP. Rabinow,
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralismand Hermeneutics(1982); C. Lemert and G. Gillan,
Michel Foucault: Social Theoryas Transgression(1982); P. Major-Moetzel, A New Science of
History: Michel Foucault's 'Archaeology'of Western Culture (1983); K. Racerskis, Michel
Foucaultand the Subversionof the Intellect (1983); B. Smart, Foucault, Marxisim and Critique
(1983);M. CousinsandA. Hussain,MichelFoucault(1984);J. Rajchman,MichelFoucault:
The Freedom of Philosophy (1985); G. Gutting, Michel Foucault: Archaeology of Scientific
Reason(1989).In addition,seethreecollectionsof criticalessays:D. C. Hoy (ed.),Foucault:
A Critical Reader (1986); M. Gane (ed.), Towardsa Critiqueof Foucault (1986); and J. Arac
(ed.), After Foucault: Humanistic Knowledge,Postmodern Challenges(1988).
3 For a specificationof these issues in feministdebate about Foucault, see I. Balbus,
'DiscipliningWomen:MichelFoucaultandthePowerof FeministDiscourse'andJ. Sawicki,
'Feminismand the Powerof FoucauldianDiscourse'.Bothappearin J. Arac,op. cit., n. 1,
138-78.
4 See 'Prison Talk' in M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge:Selected Interviews, 1972-1977, ed. C.
Gordon(1980)52-4.
5 See 'CriticalTheory/Intellectual
History'and 'PracticingCriticism'in MichelFoucault:
Interviewsand Other Writings,1977-1984, ed. L. D. Kritzman (1988) 17-46 and 152-8.
6 Foucault,'PrisonTalk',op. cit., n. 4, 53. See Minson,op. cit., n. 1, 16-21,and Lemertand
Gillan,op. cit., n. 1, 22-7. For an excellentpresentationof the methodologicaldifferences
betweencritiquesof lawrootedin Marxianapproachesanda genealogicalapproachrooted
in Nietzscheand Foucault,see N. Rose, 'Beyondthe Public/Private Division:Law,Power,
and the Family' (1985) 14 J. of Law and Society 61-76.
7 M. Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1965)
XII-XIII.
8 id., p. 39.
9 id., p. 40.
10 id., pp.XII-XIII.
11 id., p. 48.
12 id., pp. 57-8.
13 id., pp. 66-7.
14 id., p. 70
15 Sheridan,op. cit., n. 1, p. 27.
16 Foucault,op. cit., n. 7, p.247.
17 id., p. 269.
18 M. Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (1973) 146.
19 id., p. 195.
20 See E. Durkheim,'Rules for DistinguishingBetweenthe Normal and the Pathological',
Chapter 4 in The Rules of Sociological Method (1938) especially pp. 55-6: 'We shall call
"normal"those social conditionsthat are the most generallydistributed,and the others
"morbid"or "pathological".'
21 Foucaultcites some marvelousexamplessuchas the inverseanalogyof plantsto animals
fromCelaspinoin the sixteenthcentury:plantsas animalsgrowingwith theirheadsdown;
plantsarelikeanimalswiththeirsutanicegoingin differentdirections,plantsmovingup and
animalsmovingdown. See TheOrderof Things:An Archaeologyof theHumanSciences(1970)21.

191
22 id., p. 219.
23 id., p. 253.
24 Sheridan,op. cit., n.1, p. 79.
25 id., p. 83.
26 Foucault,op. cit., n. 21, p. 328.
27 Sheridan,op. cit., n. 1, pp. 121-8.
28 Thisaspectof Foucault'sapproachto knowledgeparallelstheethnomethodological analysis
of the procedures through which knowledge is produced. For an overview of
ethnomethodology,see P. Atkinson,'Ethnomethodology: A CriticalReview'(1988) 14
AnnualRev.of Sociology441-565.Of mostdirectinterestis DorothySmith'sformulationof
ideologyas 'proceduresnot to know' in 'The IdeologicalPracticeof Sociology'(1974)8
Catalyst39-54. For a concreteanalysisof theideologicalproductionof a criminalcategory,
see M. Fishman,'CrimeWavesas Ideology'(1978)25 SocialProblems531-43.
29 Sheridan,op. cit., n. 1, p. 128.
30 SeeKritzman,'Introduction: FoucaultandthePoliticsof Experience'
in op. cit.,n. 5, pp.IX-
XXV for a briefdescriptionof thishistoricalmomentand its consequencesfor intellectuals
andculturalcriticism.
31 Foucault,op. cit., n. 1, pp. 27-8.
32 id., p. 7.
33 id., p. 4.
34 id. p. 6.
35 id., p. 19.
36 id., p. 20
38 id., p. 21.
39 id., p. 23.
40 id., p. 24.
41 id., pp. 24-5.
42 id., p. 26.
43 id., pp. 23-4.
44 id., p. 55.
45 id., p. 74. For studiesin comparativedevelopmentsin England,see D. Hay, P. Linebaugh,
and E. P. Thompson, Albion's Fatal Tree: Crimeand Society in Eighteenth CenturyEngland
(1975).
46 Foucault,op. cit., n. 1, p. 76.
47 id., pp. 78-9.
48 id., p. 85.
49 id., pp. 86-7.
50 id., p. 87.
51 id., p. 82.
52 id., p. 90.
53 id., p. 98.
54 id., p. 100.
55 id., pp. 123-9.
56 id., p. 138.
57 See,for example,the analysisof the technologizingof the labourprocessin H. Braverman,
Labour and Monopoly Capital (1975).
58 Foucault,op. cit., n. 1, p. 138.
59 id., p. 144.
60 id., p. 152.
61 id., p. 172.
62 id., pp. 178-9.
63 id., p. 184.
64 id., p. 186.
65 id., p. 191.
66 id., p. 193.

192
67 id., p. 200.
68 id., p. 200.
69 id.,p. 201.
70 See J. Pratt, 'The Legacy of Foucault' (1985) 13 InternationalJ. of the Sociology of Law 289-
98.
71 Foucault,op. cit., n. 1, p. 268.
72 id., p. 277.
73 J. Palmerand F. Pearce,'LegalDiscourseand State Power:Foucaultand the Juridical
Relation' (1983) 11 InternationalJ. of the Sociology of Law 361-83.
74 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, VolumeI. An Introduction(1980) pp. 17-19.
75 id., p. 33
76 id., p. 28.
77 id., p. 29.
78 id., p. 40.
79 id., pp. 145-6.
80 See S. Wolin,'Onthe TheoryandPracticeof Power'in Arac,op. cit., n. 3, pp. 179-201.
81 M. Foucault,'TruthandKnowledge'in Gordon,op. cit., n. 4, p. 115.
82 id., p. 115.
83 Foucault,'Body/Power'in Power/Knowledge, op. cit.,n. 4, p. 56.PalmerandPearce,op. cit.,
n. 73, maintainthat the stateis builtup frommicro-powersand organizesand articulates
thesepowersin a coherentwhole.
84 Foucault,op. cit., n. 1, p. 222.
85 Foucault,'On PopularJustice:A Discussionwith Maoists',in Power/Knowledge, op. cit.,
n. 4, p. 1.

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