X.

RULES 40 TO 45

1. Heirs of Arturo Garcis v. Mun. of Iba

G.R. No. 162217, July 22, 2015

BERSAMIN, J

Doctrine: The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be taken for granted, or easily dismissed, or
lightly treated. The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition for
review under Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the
review by a superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In
contrast, the discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise
of its primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion.

Facts: The municipality of Iba Zambales erected a public market on Bueno’s land and took a substantial portion
thereof. Aggrieved Bueno Filed a case with the MTC which ruled in favor of Bueno. After due proceedings, the
MTC ruled in favor of Bueno. Thence, the Municipality of Iba filed its notice of appeal, but the MTC denied due
course to the notice of appeal. Thus, the Municipality of Iba filed its petition for certiorari in the RTC in Iba,
Zambales to assail the denial of due course by the MTC. The case was assigned to Branch 69 which ultimately
granted the petition for certiorari. Petitioner’s Bueno now questions the decision and now invoked Rule 42 as a
mode of appeal. Which was denied by the CA.

Issue: Although admitting that their petition for review under Rule 42 was inappropriate, the petitioners maintain
that they substantially complied with the requirements of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, and pray that the Court
exercise its equity jurisdiction because a stringent application of the Rules of Court would not serve the demands of
substantial justice.

Held: The CA is correct in denying the appeal. Rule 42 is different than 41 under 41 the petitioners should have filed
a notice of appeal in the RTC within the period of 15 days from their notice of the judgment of the RTC, and within
the same period should have paid to the clerk of the RTC the full amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees. The filing of the notice of appeal within the period allowed by Section 3 sets in motion the remedy of
ordinary appeal because the appeal is deemed perfected as to the appealing party upon his timely filing of the notice
of appeal. It is upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time, and the expiration of the time to appeal of the
other parties that the RTC shall lose jurisdiction over the case.

The distinctions between the various modes of appeal cannot be taken for granted, or easily dismissed, or lightly
treated. The appeal by notice of appeal under Rule 41 is a matter or right, but the appeal by petition for review under
Rule 42 is a matter of discretion. An appeal as a matter of right, which refers to the right to seek the review by a
superior court of the judgment rendered by the trial court, exists after the trial in the first instance. In contrast, the
discretionary appeal, which is taken from the decision or final order rendered by a court in the exercise of its
primary appellate jurisdiction, may be disallowed by the superior court in its discretion. Hence the SC affirms the
denial of the CA.
Estinozo vs. CA

G.R. No. 150276. February 12, 2008

Doctrine: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy.

Facts: Cecilia Estinozo, a townmate of the complainants (Gaudencio Ang, et al), while in Sogod, Southern Leyte,
represented to them that she was one of the owners of Golden Overseas Employment and that she was recruiting
workers to be sent abroad. On the promised date of their departure, however, private complainants never left the
country. He then asked from the said complainants the payment of placement and processing fees totaling
P15,000.00. They were then informed by petitioner that there were no available plane tickets and that they would
leave by September of that year. After the failed promises of Estinozo, the complainants filed case for estafa against
her which they eventually won, the trial court finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa by false
pretenses.

The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. within the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for
reconsideration or a petition for review, Estinozo filed with the appellate court a Motion for Extension of Time to
File a Motion for Reconsideration. On June 28, 2001, the CA, in the challenged Resolution, denied the said motion
pursuant to Rule 52, Section 1 of the Rules of Court and Rule 9, Section 2 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court
of Appeals (RIRCA). Estinozo then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the June 28, 2001 Resolution of the
CA.The appellate court denied the same, on August 17, 2001, in the other assailed Resolution.

Displeased with this series of denials,Estinozo instituted the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,arguing,
among others, that: (1) her previous counsel, by filing a prohibited pleading, foreclosed her right to file a motion for
reconsideration of the CA’s decision, and consequently an appeal therefrom; (2) she should not be bound by the
mistake of her previous counsel especially when the latter’s negligence and mistake would prejudice her substantial
rights and would affect her life and liberty.

Issue: Whether or not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy in assailing the CA’s decision
denying her appeal?

Held: No. Considering that, in this case, appeal by certiorari was available to Estinozo, she effectively foreclosed
her right to resort to a special civil action for certiorari, a limited form of review and a remedy of last recourse,
which lies only where there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually
exclusive remedies. Certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy.

Even granting arguendo that the instant certiorari petition is an appropriate remedy, still this Court cannot grant the
writ prayed for because there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the CA in the challenged issuances.
The rule, as it stands now without exception, is that the 15-day reglementary period for appealing or filing a
motion for reconsideration or new trial cannot be extended, except in cases before this Court, as one of last
resort, which may, in its sound discretion grant the extension requested.

It is well to point out that with petitioner’s erroneous filing of a motion for extension of time and with her non-filing
of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review from the CA’s decision, the challenged decision has already
attained finality and may no longer be reviewed by this Court. The instant Rule 65 petition cannot even substitute
for the lost appeal—certiorari is not a procedural device to deprive the winning party of the fruits of the judgment in
his or her favor. Relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when
the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of procedure.
Heirs of Sps. Reterta vs. Sps. Mores

G.R. No. 159941 August 17, 2011

Ponente: BERSAMIN

Doctrine: The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when appeal is available
notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given due course to and granted the petition for certiorari
for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due
course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the
order of the RTC granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
evidently constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

Facts: The petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC in Trece Martires
City, averring that they were the true and real owners of the parcel of land situated in Tanza, Cavite, having
inherited the land from their father. Spouses Mores, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC
had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to the land being friar land, and that the petitioners had no
legal personality to commence a civil case. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the land subject of
this case is a friar land and not land of the public domain which gives to the Director of Lands the exclusive
administration and disposition of Friar Lands. More so, the determination whether or not fraud had been committed
in the procurement of the sales certificate rests to the exclusive power of the Director of Lands. Hence this Court is
of the opinion that it has no jurisdiction over the nature of this action. The petitioners then filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same. Therefore, the petitioners assailed the dismissal via petition for
certiorari, but the CA dismissed the petition holding that the basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to
lie is that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. CA denied the
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari.

Held: Yes. The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when appeal is available
notwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given due course to and granted the petition for certiorari
for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader interest of justice demanded that certiorari be given due course
to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result that would befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the
RTC granting the motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter evidently constituted
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the availability of appeal, or other
remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court has declared
that the requirement that there must be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law admits of exceptions, such as:
(a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party;
(b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment;
(c) where there may be danger of a failure of justice;
(d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient;
(e) where the issue raised is one purely of law;
(f) where public interest is involved; and
(g) in case of urgency.
Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to destroy the
comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of the discretion of the
court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition or
mandamus, and that in the exercise of superintending control over inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided
by all the circumstances of each particular case "as the ends of justice may require." Thus, the writ will be
granted whenever necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.

Manaloto vs. Veloso III

G.R. No. 171365. October 6, 2010

Doctrine: Jurisprudence has settled the “fresh period rule,” according to which, an ordinary appeal from the RTC to
the Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial
court dismissing or denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Facts: Ermelinda Manaloto, et al. (petitioners) filed an unlawful detainer case against Ismael Veloso III
(respondent). The MeTC ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered respondent to vacate. The RTC reversed the
MeTC decision. After successive appeals, the case went up to the Supreme Court which affirmed the decision of the
RTC and that decision became final and executory.

While respondent’s appeal of the MeTC’s decision was pending before RTC Branch 88, he filed before RTC Branch
227 a Complaint for damages because the respondent supposedly suffered embarrassment and humiliation when
petitioners distributed copies of the above-mentioned MeTC decision in the unlawful detainer case to the
homeowners of Horseshoe Village while respondents appeal was still pending before the Quezon City RTC-Branch
88 and a Complaint for breach of contract since petitioners, as lessors, failed to make continuing repairs on the
subject property to preserve and keep it tenantable.

Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss respondent’s complaint. RTC Branch 227 dismissed respondent’s
complaint for violating the rule against splitting of cause of action, lack of jurisdiction, and failure to disclose the
pendency of a related case. Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 227 decision on September 26, 2003.
He filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said judgment on October 10, 2003, which RTC-Branch 227 denied in an
Order dated December 30, 2003. Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 227 order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration on February 20, 2004, and he filed his Notice of Appeal on March 1, 2004. However, the RTC-
Branch 227, in an Order dated March 23, 2004, dismissed respondent’s appeal for being filed out of time.
Respondent received a copy of the RTC-Branch 27 order dismissing his appeal on April 30, 2004 and he filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the same on May 3, 2004. The RTC-Branch 227, in another Order dated May 31,
2004, granted respondent’s latest motion.

The CA then gave due course to the appeal and ruled in favor of respondent on his claim for damages and ordered
the petitioners to pay him moral damages. In a Petition for Review before the SC, petitioners now contend that
respondent’s appeal was filed out of time and the decision of the RTC which dismissed respondent’s complaint had
already attained finality.

Issue: Whether or not Ismael Veloso (respondent) timely filed his appeal?

Held: Yes. In this case, respondent received a copy of the Resolution dated September 2, 2003 of the RTC-Branch
227 dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. Q-02-48341 on September 26, 2003. Fourteen days thereafter, on
October 10, 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said resolution. The RTC-Branch 227 denied
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated December 30, 2003, which the respondent received on
February 20, 2004. On March 1, 2004, just after nine days from receipt of the order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration, respondent already filed his Notice of Appeal. Clearly, under the fresh period rule, respondent was
able to file his appeal well-within the prescriptive period of 15 days, and the Court of Appeals did not err in giving
due course to said appeal.

5. Latorre v. Latorre

GENEROSA ALMEDA LATORRE, petitioner, vs. LUIS

ESTEBAN LATORRE, respondent

G.R. No. 183926 March 29, 2010

NACHURA, J.:

Doctrine: The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in questions
of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA
on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is
filed with the Supreme Court only on questions of law.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

Facts: In October 2000, petitioner filed before the RTC of Muntinlupa City a Complaint for Collection and
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunctiona ainst her own son, herein
respondent, and one Ifzal Ali. Petitioner allegged that respondent leased a parcel of land thatthey co-owned to Ifzal
in Dasmarinas Village and that respondent declared that he is the sole owner of the said parcelof land. Respondent
immediately filed a Motion to Dismiss onthe sole ground that the venue of the case was improperly laid. He stressed
that while the complaint as denominated as one for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute sale
with application for Injunction, in truth the case was a real action affecting title to and interest over the subject
property. Since the subject property is located in Makati City, respondent argued that petitioner should have filed the
case before the RTC of Makati City and not of Muntinlupa City. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss of the
respondent on January 2, 2001. However, on April 20, 2001, the RTC dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction
because the case should have been filed in RTC Makati. Petitioner filed an MR which was denied hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the
Rules of Civil Procedure on alleged pure questions of law directly filed to the SC is the proper remedy in the case at
bar?

Held: No. In Murillo v. Consul we laid down a doctrine that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. In that case, this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions of
the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where judgment
was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the
Supreme Court.
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) on questions of fact or
mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions
of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is filed with the
Supreme Court only on questions of law.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question
of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.

In her Reply to respondents Comment, petitioner prayed that this Court decide the case on the merits. To do so,
however, would require the examination by this Court of the probative value of the evidence presented, taking into
account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate this controversy on the merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do.
It thus becomes exceedingly clear that the filing of the case directly with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court will not be
entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals.

6. Alfredo v. Borras

Sps. Alfredo vs. Sps. Borras

G.R. No. 144225

Doctrine: In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court reviews only errors of law and not
errors of facts. The factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on this Court. This applies
with greater force when both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are in complete agreement on their factual
findings. In this case, there is no reason to deviate from the findings of the lower courts. The facts relied upon by the
trial and appellate courts are borne out by the record. We agree with the conclusions drawn by the lower courts from
these facts.

Facts: The private respondents, spouses Armando Borras (Armando) and Adelia Lobaton Borras (Adelia), filed a
complaint for specific performance against Godofredo and Carmen before the Regional Trial Court of Bataan.
Armando and Adelia alleged in their complaint that Godofredo and Carmen mortgaged the Subject Land for
P7,000.00 with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). To pay the debt, Carmen and Godofredo sold the
Subject Land to Armando and Adelia for P15,000.00, the buyers to pay the DBP loan and its accumulated interest,
and the balance to be paid in cash to the sellers.In their answer, Godofredo and Carmen and the Subsequent Buyers
(collectively petitioners) argued that the action is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Petitioners pointed out
that there is no written instrument evidencing the alleged contract of sale over the Subject Land in favor of Armando
and Adelia. Petitioners objected to whatever parole evidence Armando and Adelia introduced or offered on the
alleged sale unless the same was in writing and subscribed by Godofredo. Petitioners asserted that the Subsequent
Buyers were buyers in good faith and for value. As counterclaim, petitioners sought payment of attorney’s fees and
incidental expenses.

Issue: Whether or not the court should review the factual findings of the lower courts.

Held: In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, this Court reviews only errors of law and not errors of
facts. The factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on this Court. This applies with greater force
when both the trial court and the Court of Appeals are in complete agreement on their factual findings. In this case,
there is no reason to deviate from the findings of the lower courts. The facts relied upon by the trial and appellate
courts are borne out by the record. We agree with the conclusions drawn by the lower courts from these facts.
7. People v. Corpuz

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ELIZABETH BETH CORPUZ, appellant.

[G.R. No. 148198 October 1, 2003]

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Doctrine: Findings of FACTS of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses and
probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by this Court great respect, if not
conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing and monitoring at close range, the
conduct, deportment and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify before the trial court. However, this principle
does not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued cogent FACTS and circumstances of
substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case.

FACTS: Private complainants Belinda Cabantog, Concepcion San Diego, Erlinda Pascual and Restian Surio went to
Alga-Moher International Placement Services Corporation to apply for employment as factory workers in Taiwan.
They were accompanied by a certain "Aling Josie" who introduced them to the agency’s President and General
Manager Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes. Mrs. Reyes asked them to accomplish the application forms. Thereafter, they
were told to return to the office with P10,000.00 each as processing fee. Private complainants returned to the agency
to pay the processing fees but Mrs. Reyes was not at the agency that time, but she called appellant on the telephone
to ask her to receive the processing fees. Thereafter, appellant advised them to wait for the contracts to arrive from
the Taiwan employers. Two months later, nothing happened to their applications. Thus, private complainants
decided to ask for the refund of their money from appellant who told them that the processing fees they had paid
were already remitted to Mrs. Reyes. When they talked to Mrs. Reyes, she told them that the money she received
from appellant was in payment of the latter’s debt. Thus, private complainants filed their complaint with the
National Bureau of Investigation which led to the arrest and detention of appellant. While the case was before the
trial court, private complainants received the refund of their processing fees from appellant’s sister-in-law.
Consequently, they executed affidavits of desistance from participation in the case against appellant. Appellant
resolutely denied having a hand in the illegal recruitment and claimed that she merely received the money on behalf
of Mrs. Reyes, the President/General Manager of Alga-Moher International Placement Services Corporation, where
she had been working as secretary. The trial court rendered the decision finding the appellant guilty as charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court should review the factual findings of the RTC.

HELD: It is axiomatic that findings of FACTS of the trial court, its calibration of the collective testimonies of
witnesses and probative weight thereof and its conclusions culled from said findings are accorded by this Court great
respect, if not conclusive effect, because of the unique advantage of the trial court in observing and monitoring at
close range, the conduct, deportment and demeanor of the witnesses as they testify before the trial court. However,
this principle does not apply if the trial court ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued cogent FACTS and
circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case. The exception obtains in this
case. The records of the case show that Alga-Moher International Placement Service Corporation is a licensed
landbased recruitment agency. Its license was valid until August 24, 1999. Likewise, appellant was its registered
secretary while Mrs. Evelyn Gloria H. Reyes is its President/General Manager. Part of its regular business activity is
to accept applicants who desire to work here or abroad. Appellant, as secretary of the agency, was in charge of the
custody and documentation of the overseas contracts. It is clear that all appellant did was receive the processing fees
upon instruction of Mrs. Reyes. She neither convinced the private complainants to give their money nor promised
them employment abroad.
In the case at bar, we have carefully reviewed the records of the case and found that the prosecution failed to
establish that appellant, as secretary, had control, management or direction of the recruitment agency. Appellant
started her employment with the agency on May 1, 1998 and she was tasked to hold and document employment
contracts from the foreign employers. She did not entertain applicants and she had no discretion over how the
business was managed. The trial court’s finding that appellant, being the secretary of the agency, had control over its
business, is not only non sequitur but has no evidentiary basis.

8. PAL v. CA

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 127473. December 8, 2003.

Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

Submitted by:SISON, ALDOUS FRANCIS P.

Doctrine: Factual findings of the appellate court are generally binding on us especially when in complete accord
with the findings of the trial court. This is because it is not our function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over
again. However, this general rule admits of exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b)
when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual findings are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and, (h) where
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions
without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the
respondent, or where the findings of fact of the disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

FACTS: Private respondent Judy Amor purchased three confirmed plane tickets for her and her infant son, Gian
Carlo Amor as well as her sister Jane Gamil for the May 8, 1988, 7:10 a.m.flight. On May 8, 1988, Judy with Gian,
Jane and minor Carlo Benitez, nephew of Judy and Jane, arrived at the Legaspi Airport at 6:20 a.m. for PR 178.
Carlo Benitez was supposed to use the confirmed ticket of a certain Dra. Emily Chua.[5] They were accompanied by
Atty. Owen Amor and the latters cousin, Salvador Gonzales who fell in line at the check-in counter with four
persons ahead of him and three persons behind him[6] while plaintiff Judy went to the office of the station manager
to request that minor plaintiff Carlo Benitez be allowed to use the ticket of Dra. Chua.[7] While waiting for his turn,
Gonzales was asked by Lloyd Fojas, the check-in clerk on duty, to approach the counter. Fojas wrote something on
the tickets which Gonzales later read as late check-in 7:05. When Gonzales turn came, Fojas gave him the tickets of
private respondents Judy, Jane and Gian and told him to proceed to the cashier to make arrangements.[8]

Salvador then went to Atty. Amor and told him about the situation. Atty. Amor pleaded with Fojas, pointing out that
it is only 6:45 a.m., but the latter did not even look at him or utter any word. Atty. Amor then tried to plead with
Delfin Canonizado and George Carranza, employees of petitioner, but still to no avail. Private respondents were not
able to board said flight. The plane left at 7:30 a.m., twenty minutes behind the original schedule.[9]
On cross-examination, Fojas testified that he did not know how many waitlisted or non-revenue passengers were
accommodated or issued boarding passes in the 7:00 a. m. and in the afternoon flight of May 8, 1988.[15]

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment upholding the evidence presented by private respondents

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC ruling that private respondents were late in checking-in

Held: No. Both issues call for a review of the factual findings of the lower courts.

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the general rule is that only questions of
law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court.[18]Factual findings of the appellate court are
generally binding on us especially when in complete accord with the findings of the trial court.[19] This is because it
is not our function to analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.[20] However, this general rule admits of
exceptions, to wit:

(a) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (c) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when the judgment of the
Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual findings are conflicting; (f) when
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and, (h)
where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions
without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent,
or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted
by the evidence on record.[21]

Petitioner invokes exception (b).

After a careful review of the records, we find no reason to disturb the affirmance by the CA of the findings of the
trial court that the private respondents have checked-in on time; that they reached the airport at 6:20 a.m., based on
the testimonies of private respondent Judy Amor, and witnesses Salvador Gonzales and Atty. Owen Amor who were
consistent in their declarations on the witness stand and corroborated one anothers statements; and that the testimony
of petitioners lone witness, Lloyd Fojas is not sufficient to overcome private respondents evidence.

We have repeatedly held that the truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their
testimonies.[23] In the present case, it cannot be said that the quality of the testimony of petitioners lone witness is
greater than those of the private respondents. Fojas testified that when respondents went to the check-in counter,
there were no more persons in that area since all the passengers already boarded the plane.[24] However, the
testimonies of Manuel Baltazar and Judy Amor together with the manifest, Exhibits E, E-1 and E-2, point to the fact
that many passengers were not able to board said flight, including confirmed passengers, because of
overbooking.[25]

It is a well-entrenched principle that absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion or any palpable error in its
findings, this Court will not question the probative weight accorded by the lower courts to the various evidence
presented by the parties. As we explained in Superlines Transportation Co. Inc., vs. ICC Leasing & Financing
Corporation:[26]

The Court is not tasked to calibrate and assess the probative weight of evidence adduced by the parties during trial
all over againSo long as the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are consistent with or are not palpably contrary
to the evidence on record, this Court shall decline to embark on a review on the probative weight of the evidence of
the parties.[27] (Emphasis supplied)

It is also well established that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal except on very strong and cogent grounds.[28] Petitioner failed to demonstrate that
the trial court committed any error in upholding the testimonies of private respondents witnesses. We find that the
CA committed no reversible error in sustaining the findings of facts of the trial court.

Private respondents who had confirmed tickets for PR 178 were bumped-off in favor of non-revenue passengers.
Witness Manuel Baltazar, a former Acting Manager of petitioner, evaluated the manifest for PR 178 and found that
there were non-revenue passengers allowed to go on board. He specifically identified the family of Labanda, a
certain Mr. Luz, petitioners former branch manager, and, a certain Mr. Moyo. [29] Although petitioner had every
opportunity to refute such testimony, it failed to present any countervailing evidence. Instead, petitioner merely
focused on assailing the credibility of Baltazar on the ground that he was a disgruntled employee and a relative of
private respondents. Apart from the bare allegations in petitioners pleadings, no evidence was ever presented in
court to substantiate its claim that Baltazar was a disgruntled employee that impelled him to testify against
petitioner.

In fine, the findings of fact of the trial court, as sustained by the CA, have to be respected. As we have consistently
held, trial courts enjoy the unique advantage of observing at close range the demeanor, deportment and conduct of
witnesses as they give their testimonies. Thus, assignment to declarations on the witness stand is best done by them
who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh firsthand the testimony of a witness.

9. Augusto v. Rios

AUGUSTO, et al V RISOS & OMOLON

GR NO. 131794 DEC. 10, 2003

PONENTE: JUSTICE CALLEJO SR.

DOCTRINE:

It is elementary that an interlocutory order is not appealable.

FACTS:

In a dispute over a piece of property, the RTC issued an order for Augusto, et al to produce the OCT for
registration of Omolon’s adverse claim. Augusto, et al filed a notice of appeal from said order which was denied due
course by the RTC as the order was not appealable given its interlocutory nature. Such denial was assailed by the
instant Rule 65 petition.

ISSUE:

1. WON the order is appealable

HELD:

The petition is dismissed as such order being an interlocutory order is not appealable

10. Escueta v. Lim

ESCUETA VS. LIM – 512 SCRA 411

G. R. NO. 137162; JANUARY 24, 2007
PONENTE: AZCUNA J.

DOCTRINE: Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court states that a petition provided for in either of the preceding
sections must be verified within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other
proceeding to set aside…xxx

The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings
and not from the date he actually read the same.

FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals entitled Lim vs.
Escueta. Respondent Rufina Lim filed an action to quiet title to real property against petitioners.
In her amended complaint, Lim alleged that she bought the hereditary shares of petitioners Rubio, the heirs of Luz
Baloloy and other co-heirs, paying therefore a down payment and earnest money in the amount of P102,169.86 and
P450,000.00 respectively as agreed in the contract of sale between them. In the said contract, it has been agreed that
respondent will then pay the balance upon acquisition of certificates of titles by petitioners. However, petitioners
refused to receive the balance of P100,000.00 from respondent Lim and failed to deliver the corresponding
certificate of titles over the property.

As to petitioner Escueta, despite her knowledge that the lots have already been sold to respondent, it is alleged that a
simulated deed of sale was effected by Rubio in her favor and that such raised doubts and clouds over respondent’s
title.

Petitioners filed their separate answers alleging that respondent Lim has no cause of action. The Baloloys failed to
appear at the pre-trial and upon motion of the respondent, the trial court declared the Baloloys in default. The trial
court allowed evidence ex parte in favor of respondent Lim and thereafter rendered partial decision against the
Baloloys dated July 23, 1993.

The Baloloys filed a petition for relief from judgment and order dated July 4, 1994, but this was denied by the trial
court hence, appeal to the CA was taken challenging the order denying the petition for relief.

Trial on the merits ensued between respondent and petitioners Rubio and Escueta. After the trial the court rendered
its decision dismissing the complaint and amended complaint of Lim against petitioners.

The CA affirmed the trial court’s order and partial decision pertaining to the Baloloys but reversed the later decision
pertaining to Rubio and Escueta.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court should review the factual circumstances surrounding the case.

HELD: The petition lacks merit. The contract of sale between petitioners and respondent is valid. Baloloy was
represented by his attorney-in-fact, Alejandrino Baloloy. In the Baloloys answer to the original complaint and
amended complaint, the allegations relating to the personal circumstances of the Baloloys are clearly admitted.

“An admission, verbal or written, made by a party during the proceedings in the same case does not require proof.”
The “factual admission in the pleadings on record dispenses with the need xxx to present evidence to prove the
admitted fact.” It cannot, therefore, “be controverted by the party making such admission, and is conclusive” as to
them. All proofs submitted by them “contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection
is interposed by a party or not.” Besides, there is no showing that a palpable mistake has been committed in their
admission or that no admission has been made by them.

Pre-trial is mandatory. The notices of pre-trial had been sent to both the Baloloys and their former counsel of
record. Being served with notice, he is “charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by him. “ He must
see to it that his client receives such notice and attends the pre-trial”. What the Baloloys and their former counsel
have alleged instead in their Motion to Lift Order of as in Default dated December 11, 1991 is the belated receipt of
Bayani Baloloy’s special power of attorney in favor of their former counsel, not that they have noit received the
notice or been informed of the scheduled pre-trial. Not having raised the ground of lack of a special power of
attorney in their motion, they are now deemed to have waived it. Certainly, they cannot raise it at this late stage of
the proceedings. For lack of representation, Bayani Baloloy was properly declared in default. Sec. 3 Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court)
There is no reason for the Baloloys to ignore the effects of the rule. “The 60-day period is reckoned from the time
the party acquired knowledge of the order, judgment or proceedings and not from the date he actually read the
same.”

The evidence on record as far as this issue is concerned shows that Atty. Arsenio Villalon, Jr., the former counsel of
record of the Baloloys received a copy of the partial decision dated June 23, 19934 on April 5, 1994. At that time,
said former counsel is still their counsel of record. The reckoning of the 60-day period therefore is the date when
the said counsel or record received a copy of the partial decision which was on April 5, 1994. The petition for relief
was filed by the new counsel on July 4, 1994 which means that 90 days have already lapsed or 30 days beyond the
60-day period. Moreover, the records further show that the Baloloys received the partial decision on September 13,
1993 as evidenced by Registry return cards which bear the numbers 02597 and 02598 signed by Mr. Alejandrino
Baloloy.

11. Springfield Dev. Corp v. RTC Judge of Mis. Occ.

SPRINGFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, INC. and HEIRS OF PETRA CAPISTRANO PIIT,

Petitioners, vs. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL,
BRANCH 40, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION
BOARD (DARAB), DAR REGION X DIRECTOR, ROSALIO GAMULO, FORTUNATO TELEN, EMERITA
OLANGO, THERESA MONTUERTO, DOMINGO H. CLAPERO, JOEL U. LIM, JENEMAIR U. POLLEY,
FIDELA U. POLLEY, JESUS BATUTAY, NICANOR UCAB, EMERIA U. LIM, EMILITO CLAPERO,
ANTONINA RIAS, AURILLIO ROMULO, ERWIN P. CLAPERO, EVELITO CULANGO, VILMA/CRUISINE
ALONG, EFREN EMATA, GREGORIO CABARIBAN, and SABINA CANTORANA, Respondents.

G.R. NO. 142628 February 6, 2007

Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Doctrine:

The prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly provides for an appeal from the DARAB
decisions to the CA. The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain
administrative bodies to the CA, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of rank and stature,
and logically, beyond the control of the latter. Given that DARAB decisions are appealable to the CA, the inevitable
conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC's control.

Facts: Petra Piit previously owned a lot in Cagayan de Oro (CDO). A portion of this lot was sold to Springfield
which thendeveloped the property into a subdivision called Mega Heights Subdivision

DAR, through its Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, issued a Notice of Coverage placing theproperty under the
coverage of RA 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. Piit opposed said coverage.
DARAB Provincial Adjudicator Salcedo declared the property as residential and not suitable for agriculture. The
Regional Director filed a notice of appeal which Salcedo disallowed for being pro forma and frivolous. The decision
became final and executory and Springfield continued with the development of the property.

DAR Regional Director filed a petition for relief from judgment of the DARAB decision. DARAB granted the
petition. It directed the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office to proceed with the documentation, acquisition, and
distribution of the property to the true and lawful beneficiaries. DARAB ordered the heir of Piit and Springfield to
pay the farmer-beneficiaries corresponding the value of the property since the property has already been developed
into a subdivision.

Springfield and the heirs of Piit filed with the RTC a petition for annulment of DARAB decision and all its
subsequent proceedings contending that the DARAB decision was rendered without affording petitioners any notice
and hearing.

On motion of the farmer-beneficiaries, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction

Springfield and Piit filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order alleging that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it ruled that the annulment of judgment filed before it is actually an action for certiorari in
different color and stated that what is sought before the RTC is annulment of DARAB Decision and not certiorari, as
DARAB Decision is void ab initio for having been rendered without due process of law.

CA dismissed the petition ruling that RTC does not have jurisdiction to annul the DARAB Decision because it is
co-equal with the DARAB. CA ordered the elevation of the DARAB records before it declaring that it overlooked
the fact that Springfield and Piit likewise applied for a writ of prohibition against the enforcement of the DARAB
decision which they claim to be patently void. CA likewise dismissed the MR.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to annul a final judgment of the DARAB.

Held:

No, the RTC has no power to annul a decision rendered by a court or quasi-judicial body of equal ranking.

Significantly, B.P. Blg. 129 does not specifically provide for any power of the RTC to annul judgments of quasi-
judicial bodies. However, in BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the
Court ruled that the RTCs have jurisdiction over actions for annulment of the decisions of the National Water
Resources Council, which is a quasi-judicial body ranked with inferior courts, pursuant to its original jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, under Sec. 21(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, in relation to acts or
omissions of an inferior court. This led to the conclusion that despite the absence of any provision in B.P. Blg. 129,
the RTC had the power to entertain petitions for annulment of judgments of inferior courts and administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking. This is also in harmony with the "pre-B.P. Blg. 129" rulings of the Court
recognizing the power of a trial court (court of first instance) to annul final judgments. Hence, while it is true, as
petitioners contend, that the RTC had the authority to annul final judgments, such authority pertained only to final
judgments rendered by inferior courts and quasi-judicial bodies of equal ranking with such inferior courts.
The prevailing 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, expressly provides for an appeal from the DARAB
decisions to the CA. The rule is that where legislation provides for an appeal from decisions of certain
administrative bodies to the CA, it means that such bodies are co-equal with the RTC, in terms of rank and stature,
and logically, beyond the control of the latter.

The Court notes that the CA, indeed, failed to resolve petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of prohibition,
which, significantly, focuses on the alleged nullity of the DARAB Decision. On this score, the CA found that the
application for the issuance of the writ of prohibition was actually a collateral attack on the validity of the DARAB
decision. But, a final and executory judgment may be set aside in three ways; and a collateral attack, whereby in an
action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is nevertheless made as an incident thereof, is one of
these. This tenet is based upon a court's inherent authority to expunge void acts from its records. Despite recognizing
the need to resolve petitioners' application for the writ of prohibition in its Resolution dated January 12, 1999, the
CA nonetheless summarily denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration in its Resolution dated February 23, 2000,
leaving the matter hanging and unresolved.

The radical conflict in the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and the DARAB as regards the nature of the
subject property necessitates a review of the present case. In this regard, the CA is in a better position to fully
adjudicate the case for it can delve into the records to determine the probative value of the evidence supporting the
findings of the Provincial Adjudicator and of the DARAB. In addition, the CA is empowered by its internal rules to
require parties to submit additional documents, as it may find necessary to promote the ends of substantial justice,
and further order the transmittal of the proper records for it to fully adjudicate the case. After all, it is an avowed
policy of the courts that cases should be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation
of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of
justice would be served better.

12. Yuk Lik Ong v. Co

Yuk Ling Ong vs. Co

GR No. 206653; February 25, 2015

Ponente: Mendoza, J.

Doctrine: In annulment of judgment, lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or
final order is either lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner. The former is a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of
the courts over the subject matter or nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the
service of summons or other processes on the petitioner.

FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were married in 1982. Sometime in 2008, she received a subpoena from the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) stating that her permanent residence visa was being cancelled and
that a court has already nullified her marriage to respondent. Upon her arrival at the BID, she was given two
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent and another document which is an order by the
court declaring that her marriage was void ab initio. Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 on the ground of extrinsic fraud because defendant deliberately used a different address so
that she will not be notified of the case and lack of jurisdiction over her person as she has never received summons
for both of the cases filed against her. The Court of Appeals denied her petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition shall prosper under both grounds

RULING: Yes, but only as to lack of jurisdiction over the person. Annulment of judgment is an equitable principle
not because it allows a party-litigant another opportunity to reopen a judgment that has long lapsed into finality but
because it enables him to be discharged from the burden of being bound to a judgment that is an absolute nullity to
begin with. Petitioner raises two grounds to support her claim for annulment of judgment: (1) extrinsic fraud and (2)
lack of jurisdiction. Her contention on the existence of extrinsic fraud, however, is too unsubstantial to warrant
consideration. The discussion shall then focus on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. The former is
a matter of substantive law because statutory law defines the jurisdiction of the courts over the subject matter or
nature of the action. The latter is a matter of procedural law, for it involves the service of summons or other
processes on the petitioner.
The server’s return utterly lacks sufficient detail of the attempts undertaken by the process server to personally serve
the summons on petitioner. The server simply made a general statement that summons was effected after several
futile attempts to serve the same personally. The server did not state the specific number of attempts made to
perform the personal service of summons; the dates and the corresponding time the attempts were made; and the
underlying reason for each unsuccessful service. He did not explain either if there were inquiries made to locate the
petitioner, who was the defendant in the case. These important acts to serve the summons on petitioner, though
futile, must be specified in the return to justify substituted service.

13. De Vera v. Santiago

WILFREDO DE VERA, EUFEMIO DE VERA, ROMEO MAPANAO, JR., ROBERTO VALDEZ,

HIROHITO ALBERTO, APARICIO RAMIREZ, SR., ARMANDO DE VERA, MARIO DE VERA, RAMIL
DE VERA, EVER ALMOGELA ALDA, JUANITO RIBERAL, represented by PACITA PASENA CONDE,
ANACLETO PASCUA, ISIDRO RAMIREZ, represented by MARIANO BAINA, SPOUSES TRUDENCIO
RAMIREZ and ESTARLITA HONRADA, ARNEL DE VERA, ISABELO MIRETTE, and ROLANDO DE
VERA, Petitioners,

vs.

SPOUSES EUGENIO SANTIAGO, SR., and ESPERANZA H. SANTIAGO, SPOUSES RAMON CAMPOS
and WARLITA SANTIAGO, SPOUSES ELIZABETH SANTIAGO and ALARIO MARQUEZ, SPOUSES
EFRAEM SANTIAGO and GLORIA SANTIAGO, SPOUSES EUGENIO SANTIAGO, JR. and ALMA
CAASI, JUPITER SANTIAGO, and JON-JON CAMOS, Respondents.

G.R. No. 179457 June 22, 2015

Ponente: Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE:

Under Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, if the MTC tried a case on the merits despite having no jurisdiction
over the subject matter, its decision may be reviewed on appeal by the RTC, to wit:

Sec. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.

If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional
Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the
merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further
proceedings. If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the
case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice.

FACTS:

On February 14, 2000, petitioners filed an action for reconveyance of ownership or possession with damages against
respondents before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bolinao, Pangasinan, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
939. As part of their affirmative defenses, respondents alleged that the MTC has no jurisdiction over the case. As the
combined assessed value of the disputed land is more than P20,000.00, the case is within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC.

On November 9, 2001, the MTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondents and dismissing the complaint of the
petitioners. Dissatisfied with the MTC Decision, petitioners filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 64. On June 14, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners,
reversing the findings and decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Bolinao, Pangasinan.

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, respondents filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. On May 29, 2007, the CA granted the petition for review, and annulled and set aside the Decisions of both
the RTC and the MTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Motion for reconsideration was also denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in annuling the decision of the RTC of Alaminos City for lack of Jurisdiction?
HELD:

NO. CA is not correct in its ruling with respect to the RTC. However, it is correct in ruling that the MTC has no
jurisdiction over the case for reconveyance and recovery of ownership and possession of a land with an assessed
value over P20,000.00. Under Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, if the MTC tried a case on the merits despite
having no jurisdiction over the subject matter, its decision may be reviewed on appeal by the RTC, to wit:

Sec. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction.

If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional
Trial Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall try the case on the
merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for further
proceedings. If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the
Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the
case in accordance with the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice.

Indeed, the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the case and its decision should be deemed promulgated in the
exercise of that jurisdiction. The RTC’s appellate jurisdiction, as contrasted to its original jurisdiction, is provided in
Section 22 of B.P. Blg.129, as amended, thus:

SECTION 22. Appellate jurisdiction.–Regional Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases
decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the
court of origin such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties.

The above-quoted provision vests upon the RTC the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Clearly then, the amount involved is immaterial for purposes of the RTC ’s appellate jurisdiction; all
cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved.

Hence, the CA grossly erred in nullifying the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction, and in declaring as moot and
academic the factual issues raised in the respondents' petition for review when it should have proceeded to review on
appeal the factual findings of the RTC. This is because the RTC not only has exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitioners' action for reconveyance of ownership and possession with damages, but also appellate jurisdiction over
the MTC Decision itself.
14. PNCC v. Asiavest

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. ASIAVEST MERCHANT

BANKERS (M) BERHAD, Respondent.

G.R. No. 172301, August 19, 2015

Ponente: LEONEN, J

Doctrine: Court of Appeals; Jurisdiction; Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 129 enumerates the appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals (CA). This section includes the proviso: “except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (SC).”—On the procedural issue, petitioner submits that the Court of
Appeals erred in finding that only questions of law were raised. Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
enumerates the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. This section includes the proviso: “except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court[.]” This court’s appellate jurisdiction is found in
Article VIII, Section 5(2)(e) of the Constitution: SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: .
. . . (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: . . . . (e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is
involved.

“Question of Law” and “Question of Fact,” Distinguished.—A question of law exists “when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts[,]” while a question of fact exists “when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts[.]” Questions of fact require the examination of the probative
value of the parties’ evidence.

Facts:

This case stemmed from an action for recovery of sum of money filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig by
respondent Malaysian corporation against petitioner Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC),
formerly Construction & Development Corporation of the Philippines. PNCC is a government-acquired asset
corporation.
PNCC filed this Petition assailing the Court of Appeals Decision dated June 10, 2005 dismissing its appeal, and
Resolution dated April 7, 2006 denying reconsideration. The trial court ruled in favor of Asiavest Merchant Bankers
(M) Berhad and ordered PNCC to reimburse it the sum of Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) 3,915,053.54 or its equivalent
in Philippine peso.

PNCC and Asiavest Holdings (M) Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest Holdings) caused the incorporation of an associate company
known as Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd. (Asiavest-CDCP), through which they entered into contracts to construct rural
roads and bridges for the State of Pahang, Malaysia.

In connection with this construction contract, PNCC obtained various guarantees and bonds from Asiavest Merchant
Bankers (M) Berhad to guarantee the due performance of its obligations. The four contracts of guaranty stipulate
that Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad shall guarantee to the State of Pahang "the due performance by PNCC
of its construction contracts . . . and the repayment of the temporary advances given to PNCC[.] These contracts
were understood to be governed by the laws of Malaysia.

There was failure to perform the obligations under the construction contract, prompting the State of Pahang to
demand payment against Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad's performance bonds.

On April 12, 1994, Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad filed a Complaint for recovery of sum of money against
PNCC before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. It based its action on Malaysian laws.

The trial court declared PNCC in default for failure to file any responsive pleading, and allowed Asiavest Merchant
Bankers (M) Berhad to present its evidence ex parte. The Regional Trial Court, in its Decision, rendered judgment in
favor of Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad.

On January 30, 1995, the trial court denied PNCC's Motion to Lift Order of Default filed on December 12, 1994. On
August 11, 1995, it also denied PNCC's Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam dated December 21, 1994. PNCC
brought its case before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated June 10, 2005, dismissed PNCC's appeal for raising pure questions of
law exclusively cognizable by this court. It likewise denied reconsideration.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the appeal on the ground that it raised pure
questions of law?
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in not refusing to assume jurisdiction on the ground of forum non-
conveniens?

Held:

For the first issue, the Court ruled that on the procedural issue, petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in
finding that only questions of law were raised.

Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 enumerates the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. This section
includes the proviso: "except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court[.]" This court's
appellate jurisdiction is found in Article VIII, Section 5(2)(e) of the Constitution.

A question of law exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts[,]"
while a question of fact exists "when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts[.]"
Questions of fact require the examination of the probative value of the parties' evidence.

This Petition originated from a default judgment against petitioner. Petitioner was not able to present evidence
before the trial court. Necessarily, the errors raised from the trial court involved only questions of law.

For the second issue, one of the errors petitioner raised before the Court of Appeals is that the trial court had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and it would be more convenient for both parties if the case was
heard in the forum where the contracts were executed and performed.

Petitioner raised these contentions before the trial court in its Motion to Lift Order of Default with Affidavit of Merit
dated December 9, 1994 and Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam dated December 21, 1994. These were the
same two errors it elevated to the Court of Appeals in its Brief.

On the jurisdiction issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, is one such law that provides for the jurisdiction of
our courts. A plain reading of Section 19 shows that civil actions for payment of sum of money are within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of trial courts. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig has jurisdiction over
respondent's complaint for recovery of the sum of Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) 3,915,053.54.

Petitioner argues that "[i]n view of the compelling necessity to implead the two foreign corporations, the Trial Court
should have refused to assume jurisdiction over the case on the ground of forum non-conveniens, even if the Court
might have acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the petitioner. We find that the trial
court correctly assumed jurisdiction over the Complaint.

The trial court assumed jurisdiction and explained in its Order dated August 11, 1995 that "[o]n the contrary[,] to try
the case in the Philippines, it is believed, would be more convenient to defendant corporation as its principal office
is located in the Philippines, its records will be more accessible, witnesses would be readily available and entail less
expenses in terms of legal services." We agree.

Petitioner is a domestic corporation with its main office in the Philippines. It is safe to assume that all of its pertinent
documents in relation to its business would be available in its main office. Most of petitioner's officers and
employees who were involved in the construction contract in Malaysia could most likely also be found in the
Philippines. Thus, it is unexpected that a Philippine corporation would rather engage this civil suit before Malaysian
courts. Our courts would be "better positioned to enforce [the] judgment and, ultimately, to dispense" in this case
against petitioner.

Also, petitioner failed to plead and show real and present danger that another jurisdiction commenced litigation and
the foreign tribunal chose to exercise jurisdiction.

15. Maravilla v. Rios

Teddy Maravilla v. Joseph Rios

G.R. No. 196875; August 19, 2015

Del Castillo, J.

Digested by: FERNANDO, Kristin Jomafer C.

DOCTRINE

There are three guideposts in determining the necessity of attaching pleadings and portions of the record to petitions
under Rules 42 and 65: (1) Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it; (2) even if a document is
relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also be
found in another document already attached to the petition; and (3) a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of
the case record may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later
submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the
merits.
FACTS

Joseph Rios (Rios) filed a criminal case against Teddy Maravilla (Maravilla) for reckless imprudence resulting in
serious physical injuries before the MTCC.

The MTCC acquitted Maravilla for failure to establish proof beyond any reasonable doubt, but found him liable in
damages for the injuries sustained by Rios and was ordered to pay the sum of P20,000.00 as temperate damages. On
appeal by Rios, the RTC deleted the award for temperate damages and held Maravilla liable to pay Rios the amount
of P256,386.25 as actual and compensatory damages.

Maravilla filed a Petition for Review with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition on the ground, among others, that
some relevant and pertinent pleadings and documents, which are necessary for a better understanding and resolution
of the instant petition, were not attached therein, in violation of Section 2(d), Rule 42. Maravilla moved for
reconsideration, invoking the rule on liberal application of procedural laws. In his MR, Maravilla attached certain
portions of the record of the case in the court a quo.

However, the CA denied his MR, ruling that Maravilla still failed to comply with Section 2(d), Rule 42 of the
Revised Rules of Court. The CA found that there are allegations in the petition that draw support from the
transcripts of stenographic notes, formal offer of evidence by Rios, and the Order of the trial court that admitted said
formal offer of evidence. Maravila, however, had not appended the aforesaid documents to the petition.

ISSUE

Does failure to attach the transcripts of stenographic notes, formal offer of evidence by the respondent, and the
Order of the trial court that admitted said formal offer of evidence warrant dismissal of a Petition for Review.

RULING

YES. Under Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules), a petition for review shall be
accompanied by, among others, copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support
the allegations of the petition. Section 3 of the same rule states that failure of the petitioner to comply with any of
the requirements regarding the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

In Galvez v. Court of Appeals, the SC held that there are three guideposts in determining the necessity of attaching
pleadings and portions of the record to petitions under Rules 42 and 65 of the 1997 Rules, to wit:
First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those which are
relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support
the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of
discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition.

Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is shown that the
contents thereof can also be found in another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material
allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true
copy of the judgment is attached.

Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or reinstated
(if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve
the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits.

The guideposts, which equally apply to a petition for review filed in the CA under Rule 42, reflect that the
significant determinant of the sufficiency of the attached documents is whether the accompanying documents
support the allegations of the petition.

In Maravilla's case, however, while he submitted additional necessary attachments along with his MR, he left out
important parts of the record - excerpts of the transcript of stenographic notes, the Rios’ formal offer of evidence,
and the trial court's Order admitting said formal offer of evidence - that would support his claim that the trial court
erred in awarding damages to Rios since the latter failed to testify as to his hospital expenses and identify particular
exhibits.

Thus, none of the three guideposts spelled out in Galvez were observed in petitioner's case. The dismissal of his
petition for review was proper.