TURKEY'S NEED FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION ERGUN ÖZBUDUN

RELIGION, EDUCATION AND THE CONSTITUTION LEVENT KÖKER

A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED MEHMET BARANSU
ALEVI OPENING: NEW MARGINS, NEW VALUES NECDET SUBAÞI
ISSUE ZERO - SPRING 2010

TURKISH REVIEW

EXPERT NAMES
DISCUSS THE WHY TURKEY
DEFECTS OF
TURKEY’S 1982
NEEDS A REVISED
CONSTITUTION CONSTITUTION?
 FOREWORD
SPRING 2010

T
Countdown
urkey is passing through a critical period in its democratic history. The political and
judicial debate in Turkey is often misread abroad as a struggle between the "good
old secularists" and the "bad new Islamists" and is misperceived as a fight for
power between these distinctively opposing ideological camps. This dichotomous
reading of Turkish politics does an injustice not only to Turkey but also to the plu-
ralistic nature of the sides of the debate. The multi-colored mosaic of Turkish poli-
tics cannot and should not be reduced to a black-and-white Kafkaesque tableau.
True, the political scene in Ankara can often make one feel dizzy and perplexed, but
the debate itself is breathtaking.
Turkish Political Review One reason for the failure to feel the vividness of the debate and the "multi-
No: Zero / Spring 2010 voicedness" of the debating sides is the portrayal of the debate in the "embedded
Owner on Behalf of Feza Gazetecilik A.Þ. media" as taking place in the political, judicial and military "battlefield" of power
Ali Akbulut politics, where the actors are rude politicians, brutish soldiers and distant high court
Chief Executive Officer
Ekrem Dumanlý
judges. True, the debate has a frontline where words are used as weapons, but the
Editor-in-Chief hinterland of that debate is much wider and inclusive. There is a quite healthy intel-
Kerim Balcý lectual, artistic and public debate going on behind the frontline. In the hinterland
Advisory Board the camps are vaguer, positions are more flexible, discussions are wiser. The "good
Prof. Mithat Sancar, Prof. Naci Bostancý,
Ass. Prof. Ömer Çaha, Ass. Prof. Ýhsan old secularists" are not always good, not all of them are old and secularism has all
Yýlmaz, Dr. Gökhan Bacýk
kinds of meanings producing proponents ranging from Anglo-American secularists
Creative Director
Fevzi Yazýcý to secular fundamentalists. The "bad new Islamists" are no longer Islamists; they
Managing Editor are not so new, in fact, and as Turkey's renowned sociologist Professor Faruk Birtek
Emrah Ülker
observes: "We have a situation in which the so-called Islamists are more democrat-
Associate Editors
Levent Kenez, Betül Akkaya Demirbaþ ic than the secularists. It's what Hegel would call a contradiction without dialectic."
Art Director & Design The Turkish Political Review (TPR) regards this contradiction as a dialogic one.
Mustafa Saðlam
Unfortunately the dialogic dimension of the debate is underrepresented in the
Chief Copy Editor
Helen P. Betts influential media, and more often than not the commentaries in circulation are pro-
Copy Editors duced for mass consumption within a pop-culture perspective of supply and
Zoha Khalili, Miralem Jakirlic, Brianna
Buck, Rebecca Doffing, Ann Butler,
demand. An oxymoronic intellectual populism presides over political analyses of
Mikaela Leeden what is going on in Turkey. The TPR has been born out of a need for an all-
Editorial Assistants embracive, long-sighted, deep analysis of the social, cultural and political debate
Alpay Sevim
Þeyma Akkoyunlu shaping the future of Turkish democracy.
Müzdelife Büþra Kaçar The current issue of the TPR is numbered "Issue Zero" with this all-embracive-
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Turkish Political Review readers of the journal to be included in its "launching countdown." This Issue Zero
Ahmet Taner Kýþlalý Cad. No: 6 of the TPR is in fact an invitation to you to come and join the family, with your con-
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contents
ARTICLES
Turkey amid fierce power struggle between
old and new mindsets, By Lale Kemal 18-23
TPR DEBATE 46-61
Turkey's need for a new constitution,
By Ergun Özbudun 24-29 TURKEY’S
DEFECTIVE
The meaning of a constitution and constitutional
movements in Turkey, By Ümit Kardaþ 30-35
CONSTITUTION
The TPR Debate deals with the
Religion, education and the Turkish Constitution: constitutional amendment
a critical assessment, By Levent Köker 36-45 package that the Justice and
Development Party brought to CONTENTS

The Turkish 'Ergenekon' through Arab eyes Parliament and was carried to
By Ibrahim el-Beyyumi Ghanem 62-67
a referendum. The Turkish
Political Review (TPR) gath-
Naming what is going on in Turkey: from a 'for the people despite the people' ered together three individuals
elitism to a 'for the people with the people' democracy, By Ýhsan Yýlmaz 68-75
from different political persua-
sions to debate a particular
Council of State's coefficient ruling: appellatre judiciary
and constitutional order, By Mustafa Þentop 76-79 aspect of the constitutional
amendment: reform of the
Alevi opening: new margins, new high judiciary. Ahmet Gündel,
values, By Necdet Subaþý 88-96 a retired chief prosecutor at the
Supreme Court of Appeals;
DOSSIERS Atilla Kart, an attorney and
A guide for the perplexed: Why the Turkish deputy from the main opposi-
military stages coups, By Mehmet Baransu 6-17
tion Republican People's Party;
and Professor Mithat Sancar, a
What is the problem: reactionaryism or leftist and democratic intellec-
parochialism? By Ahmet Ünal 80-87 tual, participated in the debate.
Contributors, By Müzdelife Büþra Kaçar 4-5
Cartoon Review: The Sledgehammer Incursion,
By Mesut Çevikalp 120-123
Think Tank Tracker, By Erdoan Shipoli 124-129
Survey Review: Foreign policy backed by public,
By Betül Akkaya Demirbaþ 134-139
Column Tracker, By Kerim Balcý 140-145
Chronicle, By Betül Akkaya Demirbaþ 146-151
Contextualized dictionary of Turkish politics,
By Deniza Sokolova 152-155
OBITUARY
My artist friend and comrade-in-arms Þakir Eczacýbaþý
died at age 81, By Ara Güler 130-133
BOOK REVIEWS
Galip L. Yalman's Transition to Neoliberalism,
By Emre Barca 156-158
Insight Turkey delves into the depths of Turkish
politics, By Müzdelife Büþra Kaçar 159
Dersaadet: Ýstanbul, The Gate to Bliss,
By Müzdelife Büþra Kaçar 159

Professor Naci Bostancý added INTERVIEWS

Conceptual framework of Turkish foreign policy John L. Esposito: ‘Authoritarian versus
in AK Party era, By Mehmet Yýlmaz 104-109 his own commentary on the
democratic politics defines the Turkish debate.’
subject in a separate segment. By Þeyma Akkoyunlu 98-103
Gang movies or the illegal protagonists of the screen, Last word with Hanri J. Barkey,
By Mahmud Nedim Hazar 110-119 By Mesut Çevikalp 160
 SPRING 2010
Contributors
Ergun Özbudun
Professor Ergun Özbudun teaches constitutional law at the Faculty of Law and the Faculty of Economics,
Administrative and Social Sciences at Bilkent University in Ankara. He headed the academic commission that pre-
pared a draft text for the revised constitution proposed by the AK Party in 2007. His latest books include
Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP, which he co-authored with William Hale, and
Democratization and the Politics of Constitution Making in Turkey, co-authored with Ömer Faruk Gençkaya.
Özbudun contributed the article on "Turkey's need for a new constitution" (pp. 24-29) to this volume of the TPR.
Levent Köker
Professor Levent Köker teaches public law and politics at the Faculty of Law of Atýlým University in Ankara. He has
published many books and articles about Turkish politics and democracy. Demokrasi Eleþtiri ve Türkiye
[Democracy, Criticism and Turkey] (2008), Aydýnlanma ve Hukuk [Enlightenment and Law] (2008) and
Modernleþme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi [Modernization, Kemalism and Democracy] (2009) are among his best-
known books. Köker contributed to the current volume of the TPR with his article "Religion, education and the
Turkish Constitution: a critical assessment" (pp. 36-45).
Ümit Kardaþ
Dr. Ümit Kardaþ is a retired military judge and a renowned analyst of civilian-military relations and the military
judiciary in Turkey. Kardaþ worked as a military prosecutor at the time of 1980 coup and fought torture.
Besides his contributions to several volumes, he has penned books that include Hukuk Devlete Sýzabilir mi?
[Can law infiltrate the state?] (2006) and Ötekiler Ýçin Sivil Ýtaatsizlik Rehberi [A guide to civil disobedience for
the others] (2008). Kardaþ wrote "The meaning of a constitution and constitutional movements in Turkey," (pp.
30-35) for this volume of the TPR.
M.Nedim Hazar
M. Nedim Hazar is a columnist for the Zaman daily and a regular film critic for the Aksiyon newsweekly. He has
published several books on daily politics and its representation in art. Leprom [Leproma] (1998), Barbarlarý
Beklerken [While waiting for the barbarians] (2002) and Bir Aþka Krallýðým [My royalty of a love] (2004) are
among his best-known books. He penned Maskeli Balon & Medyatik Bir Ýnfazýn Anatomisi [Masked balloon &
anatomy of a media lynching] (2008) under the penname of Ferhat Barýþ. His "Gang movies or the illegal pro-
tagonists of the screen," appears on pp. 110-119.
Necdet Subaþý
Assistant Professor Necdet Subaþý teaches the sociology of religion in the Public Relations Department of Gazi
University's Faculty of Communications in Ankara. Subaþý works in the fields of Alevis, modernity and religion, Islamic
philosophy, religion and state, and Islam in Europe. His latest books include Öteki Türkiye'de din ve modernleþme
[Religion and modernization in the other Turkey] (2003), Alevi Modernleþmesi [Modernization of Alevis] (2005) and
Sýnýrlarý Yoklamak [Examining the boundaries] (2007). Subaþý was behind the AK Party government's Alevi opening,
and he headed the Alevi workshops. He wrote "Alevi opening: new margins, new values" for the TPR (pp. 88-96).
Mustafa Þentop
Assistant Professor Mustafa Þentop teaches Turkish legal history at the Faculty of Law of Marmara University in
Ýstanbul. Þentop is currently the president of the Economic and Social Research Centre (ESAM). A frequent com-
mentator on the Turkish higher education system, Þentop has published Osmanlý Yargý Sistemi ve Kazaskerlik
[Ottoman Judicial System and the Military Judiciary] (2005) and contributed to several volumes on college
entrance exams and the coefficient system as applied in Turkey. His "Council of State's coefficient ruling: appel-
late judiciary and constitutional order," appears on pp. 76-79.
4 5
Ýbrahim al-Bayoumi
Ghamen
Professor Ibrahim al-Bayoumi Ghanem teaches political science at Cairo University and is a member of the Center
for Social and Criminal Studies at the same university. Ghanem is also a retired ambassador and works at the
Egyptian National Social Research Center. He writes on civil society, the waqf system and politics in the Muslim
world in general and in Egypt in particular. Among his several books Al-fikr al-siyasi li 'l-imam Hasan al-Banna [The
political thought of Hasan al-Banna] (1992) and Al-Awqaf wa al-Siyasah fi Misr [Waqf and politics in Egypt] (1998)
are best known. Ghanem contributed to the TPR with "The Turkish 'Ergenekon' through Arab eyes" (pp. 62-67).
Ahmet Ünal
Ahmet Ünal is a freelance education reporter and a writer on politics, education, defense and security issues.
Previously he worked for the Zaman daily as a local representative in Ýzmir, as education reporter and finaly as
the news director of the daily. Ünal is a board member of the Writers Union of Turkey. His most recent book is
Gizli Atatürkçülük Projesi [Secret Ataturkism project] (2009). Ünal wrote "What is the problem: reactionaryism or
parochialism?" (pp. 80-87), where he analyzed the real mindset behind the coefficient problem of the Turkish
higher education system.
Lale Kemal
Lale Kemal is the Ankara representative of the Taraf daily and a regular columnist of Today's Zaman. Kemal
is also the Turkey correspondent for Jane's Defence Weekly. An expert on military expenditure, armament
issues, Turkish arms purchases and civilian-military relations, Kemal has contributed to several volumes on
civilian-military relations including the now famous Almanac series of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies
Foundation (TESEV) and published Kurt Kapanýnda Kýsýr Siyaset [Barren politics in the wolf trap] (1997). Kemal
contributed to the TPR with "Turkey amid fierce power struggle between old and new mindsets" (pp. 18-23).
Mehmet Baransu
Mehmet Baransu is a young journalist working for the Taraf daily. His contacts with democratic officers
helped him uncover illegal activities by certain groups within the army. He was given the 2009 Sedat
Simavi Award by the Turkish Journalists Association (TGC) for his groundbreaking reporting. Recently he
published his book Karargah [the headquarters] (2010), where he disclosed evidence of the Sledgehammer
coup plot. Baransu wrote "A guide for the perplexed: Why the Turkish military stages coups" (pp. 6-17) for
the current volume of the TPR.
Ýhsan Yýlmaz
Assistant Professor Ýhsan Yýlmaz teaches at the International Relations Department of Fatih University in Ýstanbul.
Formerly a professor with SOAS at the University of London, Yýlmaz has published two books: Muslim Laws, Politics
And Society In Modern Nation States: Dynamic Legal Pluralisms In England, Turkey And Pakistan (2005) and Islam
and Peacebuilding: Gulen Movement Initiatives (2010; co-authored with John L. Esposito). Yýlmaz contributed to the
TPR with "Naming what is going on in Turkey: from a 'for the people despite the people' elitism to a 'for the people
with the people' democracy" (pp. 68-75).
Mehmet Yýlmaz
Mehmet Yýlmaz is the editor-in-chief of the Bugün daily. An expert on Israeli religious movements and Turkish
foreign policy, Yýlmaz has published Mafdal: Radikal Saðýn Ýsrail Dýþ Politikasýna Etkisi [National Religious Party:
Influence of the Radical Right on Israel's Foreign Policy] (2003). Yýlmaz is a renowned commentator on Turkish
foreign policy, domestic Turkish politics and media-state relations. He wrote "Conceptual framework of Turkish
foreign policy in the AK Party era," (pp. 104-109) for the TPR, where he tried to write the initial entries of the new
dictionary the Turkish foreign policy decision makers are using.
DOSSIER SPRING 2010

A guide for the

perplexed: Why the
Turkish military
stages coups

D
uring the coup of Feb. 28, 1997, the military chose the
media as its ally and used it as a means to conduct
psychological warfare. Taraf has become the center of
attraction for some democratic officers within the mil-
itary discontent with the coup initiatives and attempts.
They deliver documents and papers they consider
useful to Taraf because they are sure that these will be published
without being subjected to any sort of censorship

MEHMET BARANSU tution and that politics is subordinate to military institu-

Turkey is a country where relations between the state,
the military and politics have always been intricate and
complicated. The sustained linkage between politics
and the armed forces must be the consequence of this
special state of affairs. Yet state-military relations
should be reconsidered with particular reference to the
place of the military in the Ottoman state. The
Ottoman Empire, which conveyed the features of the
religion of Islam to the structure of the state, denied the
involvement of non-Muslim groups in the sphere of
military service. This made military service and the pro-
fession a special and valuable asset and a desirable
vocation. The military profession, denied to certain
groups of Ottoman subjects, was a sort of elite, and this
service further became sacred because of the strong
emphasis on religion. In other words, to become a priv-
ileged subject, one does not necessarily have to be a
higher-ranking military officer; being an ordinary officer
would suffice for greater respect and esteem. On the
other hand, the consequences of this elitism would
inevitably be felt in the political sphere. In this way, the
view suggesting that the military is an upper-class insti-
tions and actors emerged in the late Ottoman era.
However, there was a problem: How would the mili-
tary, whose rule was justified by religious precepts,
become involved in politics in a modern state? It is
generally acknowledged that this issue has been the
most pressing one for the Turkish military since the
establishment of the Turkish Republic. But how did the
military overcome this problem? As a matter of fact, a
review of Turkey's near past confirms that this problem
has never been fully resolved by the military. Even
though some partial successes may be referred to in
this respect, the military secured these successes by
relying on alliances. These alliances became the reason
for a military tutelage regime and a number of military
coups.
Pre-republican history of Turkish military in politics
For this reason, to better understand the relationship
between the military and politics, the military and
coups, the military and juntas and the military and
civilians, it is essential to have a better and fuller grasp
of the developments before the foundation of the
republican regime in Turkey. Therefore, it would not be

6 87
 DOSSIER SPRING 2010 ARTICLE IN BRIEF: The tradition of military interventions in Turkey goes back to the Ottoman era. The republican elite inherit-
ed the violent policies of the Committee of Union and Progress. The May 27, 1960 coup served as a model and harbinger of this tradition of
military coups. The military chooses an ally each time it plots to intervene in politics. Starting from Feb. 28, 1997 coup the ally of the pro-
junta actors has been the media. As such, the existence of democratic voices in the media is crucial in resisting the coup plots. Taraf is one
such democratic voice in the media.
unreasonable to recall the following for the sake of
determining the special place of the military profession
in this land: Pro-junta and pro-coup activities and
movements attracted attention and gained fertile
ground before and after the establishment and consoli-
dation of the republican regime on this soil. By bearing
in mind that 12 Ottoman sultans were toppled by mili-
tary force, it will be easier to understand the roots of the
coup tradition and the special place of the military in
Turkish history.
The removal of Abdülaziz, one of the late Ottoman
sultans, from office by Mithat Paþa and his friends and
the accompanying political affairs during this process
may actually suggest that the Ottoman Empire, which
conquered the territories of the Byzantine Empire, also
borrowed its tradition of political entrapments. The
involvement of the members of
Sultan Abdülaziz Committee of Union and Progress in
(1830-1876) was the political affairs in the late Ottoman era
32nd sultan of the
Ottoman State. He and their attempts to stage coups and
was ousted by a create juntas and secret enterprises
junta headed by proved to be costly for this country. The
Mithat Paþa (1822-
Ottoman army failed to respond effec-
1884), a former
prime minister, and tively and decisively to the insurgencies
Hüseyin Avni Paþa in the Balkans region in the late 1800s
(1819-1876), the and early 1900s. Because of the illegal
chief of General
pro-junta activities sponsored by the
Staff, in 1876. The
Committee of Union and Progress, the
ousted sultan was
found dead four military was defeated by local gangs and
days later, both his had to withdraw from the Balkan
ankles were cut.
region. The harm done by the illegal activities of the
Committee of Union and Progress was not limited to
this withdrawal; because of these activities, the eastern,
western and southern parts of the country as well as its
capital were invaded by European countries.
This chaotic and destructive process ended thanks to
the Turkish nation, which waged a war of liberation
against the invaders in the Anatolian region, and the
people's willingness and determination to achieve
independence. As a consequence of this process, one
era was replaced by another, and a republican regime
was established in the place of the Ottoman Empire.
However, it was not the end of the game -- the
ancient custom proved to be alive still; despite a new
government taking office in Ankara and a new state
being created, the elitist sentiments within the military
were nowhere near dead. The supporters of Committee
of Union and Progress-style activities in the military
restarted their pro-junta moves and worked tirelessly to
8 9
make sure that they became influential in the political
sphere once again. This tendency was so strong that
even the military officers who fought against European
countries in the war of liberation were accused of trea-
son by the sponsors of these illegal activities with the
arrival of the republican regime, and ultimately they
were removed from power. Despite the republic being
founded as a result of the sacrifices and the efforts of
the Anatolian people, the nation itself became the
number one target of the pro-junta actors.
Religious values demonized
To this end, they first attempted to deal with the reli-
gious values of the people. Martial courts were set up to
punish the sons of this nation because of their religiosi-
ty on groundless and unsubstantiated charges whose
legality and appropriateness still remain controversial.
Being a Kurd, an Alevi or an Armenian
would suffice to be treated as a criminal
by the pro-junta actors; innocent people
were sentenced to death by these courts.
The magnitude and gravity of the arbi-
trary trials was so visible and sizeable that
the residents of a city were bombed
because they were considered insurgents
simply for failing to pay taxes. The killing
of thousands of people through extrajudi-
rule of a single party that reigned for two decades agreed with their terms and adopted their worldview. The elections on
cial measures and means was considered May 14, 1950, were
ordinary during this period of time. between 1930 and 1950. The Democrat Party (DP) was However, the election results proved that this was not
a turning point for
Likewise, millions of people were forced founded in January 1946. This party, despite strong the case at all. These concerns led the CHP administra- the advance of
to migrate elsewhere. The military officers opposition and pressure, won 62 seats in the general tion to decide to monitor the people and keep secret democracy in the
elections held in July 1946. records of the persons they identified as dangerous. country. The
who frequently argued that they laid the foundations of Democrat Party,
the young republic believed that such violent means Despite some electoral fraud by the Republican As a consequence of these developments, a new headed by Adnan
were legitimate in order to achieve their goals. This People's Party (CHP), founded by former military offi- political figure would emerge as an influential actor; Menderes, received
approach, which holds that everything is justifiable in cers, the DP won a huge number of seats in this was Adnan Menderes, who served as rapporteur 53.5 percent of the
Parliament, something that attracted a great deal of for a commission in Parliament, where the CHP was vote and came to
order to preserve political power, became the governing power, ending the
philosophy of the state with the creation of the republi- attention. In addition, the DP became a haven for the only party until 1945. Menderes resigned from his long-standing rule
can regime. In this new era the legacy of the Ottoman oppressed people; this raised concerns among the elitist position at the commission after refusing to approve a of the CHP backed
era was dismissed, and the pressure on the different circles and the military actors who felt they were losing draft law on the administration of land proposed by the by the military.
PHOTOS: ARCHIVE
ethnic groups in the empire reached serious levels. In their privileged positions in society. They were particu- government led by Þükrü Saraçoðlu. Menderes, along
addition to the Armenians and Kurds, the Anatolian larly worried because the CHP went to the effort to cre- with Refik Koraltan and Fuat Köprülü, was expelled
Greeks and religious people became enemies of the ate a new state, and in order to achieve this goal the from the party by the CHP Disciplinary Board because
state in this new period. party used illegal and violent methods, including the of their opposition to the land reform, on June 12, 1945.
The holders of political power in the young republic, extrajudicial killings of a huge number of innocent peo- Subsequently, another prominent figure, Celal Bayar,
of which the military actors claimed to be the founders, ple. Therefore, they were concerned because of the resigned from the party and his office. All these devel-
tried to make the smooth transition to a multiparty sys- growing interest in a newly emerging political party opments resulted in the creation of the DP on Jan 7,
tem several times; however, whenever they sensed that despite the measures they took to make sure they 1946. Menderes was elected the deputy from Kütahya
political power was slipping out of their hands, these remained in power. In other words, the CHP believed in the general elections held in 1946. Shortly after his
actors would decide to return to a single-party regime. that thanks to their practices and measures, including election, Menderes became the number two figure in
Turkey moved to a multiparty system after the lengthy coercive and violent actions, the Turkish nation had the DP after party chairman Bayar.
 DOSSIER SPRING 2010

After the 1960 Menderes comes to power
military coup, The elections on May 14, 1950, were a turning point
Menderes and some
other figures in his
for the advance of democracy in the country. The DP
government were received 53.5 percent of the vote and came to power,
imprisoned on ending the longstanding rule of the CHP backed by the
Yassýada, a small military. Menderes remained in power as the prime
island in the Sea of
Marmara. Menderes minister and the chair of the party for a decade. During
and two ministers his term in office, Menderes attracted attention due to a
from his cabinet number of political initiatives that consolidated the
were sentenced to
democratic order in Turkey. The Menderes-led govern-
death by a martial
court ment launched a process of industrialization and
PHOTOS: ARCHIVE urbanization. The activities of the government were
mostly visible during this period of time in such fields
as health, energy, education, insurance and banking.
Turkey first encountered the notion of development
during Menderes' reign.
This state of affairs received the attention of the mili-
tary, which views itself as the elite class and the true
holder of power in this country. Members of the mili-
tary, aware of their inability to acquire power in this
environment, interfered with the political administra-
tion by a staging a coup on May 27, 1960. The motive
and justification for the coup publicized by the military
were quite interesting: The military staged the coup
arguing that a government elected by popular vote was
moving the country toward a repressive regime and
internal turmoil. Another interesting justification was
that it was taking action and measures against the anti-
secular practices it argued were sponsored by the DP
government. Some military officers were of the opinion
that the DP was a threat to Turkey's Atatürkist and sec-
ular regime.
Based on these justifications, Menderes and some
other figures in his government were imprisoned on
Yassýada, a small island in the Sea of Marmara.
Menderes and two ministers from his cabinet were
sentenced to death by a martial court appointed by the
National Unity Committee (MBK) established by mili-
tary officers. The justifications for the death penalties
included allegations that university students were
slaughtered in meat grinders under the supervision of
the DP government. The pro-junta actors generated
fabrications and lies that would serve as justifications
for the killings of these undesired politicians at a court
they created.
Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan and Foreign
Minister Fatin Rüþtü Zorlu were executed on the morn-
ing of Sept. 16, 1961, whereas Prime Minister
Menderes was hanged on Ýmralý Island on Sept. 17.
Despite it being an established custom to carry out exe-
cutions early in the morning, the military even deprived
Menderes of this gesture and right, showing their
eagerness to exact revenge with his execution.
The May 27 coup would serve as a model and har-
binger of a tradition, given that it was the
first military coup in Turkey. The coup-
makers suspended the elected govern-
ment, arguing that it violated the consti-
tution.
Military interventions every 10 years
The constitution drafted in 1961 in the
aftermath of the military coup under-
mined the noble principles of the previ-
ous constitution drafted in 1924. The
1924 constitution stated that sovereignty
rests with the nation without any condi-
tions; this provision was changed in the
new constitution, which stated that the
Turkish nation employs its sovereignty through the
authorized bodies under the principles of the constitu-
tion. The sovereignty was transferred from the parlia-
ment elected by the people to other institutions. In
other words, some shareholders were invented to act as
partners in the popular sovereignty. These included the
Turkish Armed Forces (TSK), the Constitutional Court,
the Council of State and the Court of Accounts, which
were all set up to protect the regime.
The tradition established on May 27 would take on a
different dimension with the 1971 military memoran-
dum. The military would enjoy the advantage of stag-
ing a coup without shutting down Parliament. On
March 12, 1971, the military asked for some changes to
legislation and a new government that would readily
abide by its orders. In so doing, it once again came to
power, this time without relying on violent means.
Parliament acted as if it had no other choice. On Sept.
12, 1980, Turkey experienced yet another military coup
and administration. It became obvious with this coup
that the military had internalized coups as a means of
coming to power and that it reserved the right to exer-
cise this option when it felt it was necessary. All the
developments signaled this. Since 1938, the military has
proved itself able to interfere with politics by relying on
various justifications. Moreover, it was not a reflexive
move, but rather a wholesale plan drafted and imple-
mented by an institution.
1980 coup was different
by means of its preparation
On the other hand, there is one interesting thing that
distinguishes the 1980 military coup from others. The
TSK had assigned a general to lay out the roadmap for
the coup one year earlier. Gen. Necdet Ürüð, the com-
mander of the 1st Army at the time, was assigned the
task of coordinating the coup process
and drafting all necessary plans. The Prime Minister
Menderes was
plan, called the Bayrak (Flag) Action hanged on Ýmralý
Plan, would use all means necessary to Island on Sept. 17,
create fertile and appropriate ground for 1961, a day after
a military coup. Finance Minister
Hasan Polatkan and
The overall situation before the coup Foreign Minister
was as follows: The country was in the Fatin Rüþtü Zorlu
grip of terrorism and assassinations by were executed.
1979, and hundreds of young people
were being shot dead on the streets. A
number of murders were committed in
an attempt to create a chaotic environ-
ment. Within a very short period of time,
two renowned professors, prosecutor Gün Sazak, who
served as a minister in an earlier cabinet, and CHP
deputy and former Prime Minister Nihat Erim were
assassinated in 1980. Many other deaths followed these
political assassinations; however, the murderers were
never caught. The situation was just what the military
desired. Society was polarized and chaos was dominant
everywhere. Hundreds of people were dying on the
streets every day. Those who supplied the weapons and
committed the murders remain a mystery. However,
the street fights ceased with the arrival of the military
coup on Sept. 12, 1980. Surprisingly, no politicians have
been assassinated since then.
The actions of the military officers who assumed
power in the aftermath of Sept. 12 was the greatest
response to those who held that the Turkish military
would never undertake such detailed plans for a coup.
Some 650,000 people were detained during the military
administration. The personal information of 1,683,000

10 11
 DOSSIER SPRING 2010
On Sept. 12, 1980, people was stored for future use. A total of 230,000
Turkey experienced
people were brought to trial in 210,000 lawsuits, and
yet another military
coup and adminis- 517 were sentenced to death. Out of these people, 52
tration. It became were executed. The files of another 259 were referred to
obvious with this Parliament for approval before execution. Seventy-one
coup that the mili-
thousand people were prosecuted under Articles 141,
tary had internal-
ized coups as a 142 and 163 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK). A total
means of coming to of 98,404 people were tried for membership in a terror
power. Gen. Kenan organization. Two hundred ninety-nine people died in
Evren, the chief of
General Staff and
prison, 14 of whom died in hunger strikes. Ninety-five
the leader of the of these people were reported to have been killed in
coup (in the center), "conflicts," and 43 were reported to have committed
would be the next suicide. Thirty thousand people were laid off because
president of the
country they were politically "harmful," and
PHOTO: ARCHIVE another 30,000 sought refuge in another
country. Another 300 people died suspi-
ciously. One hundred seventy-one peo-
ple were tortured to death. Nine hun-
dred thirty-seven films were banned.
The activities of 23,677 associations were
suspended. Four hundred journalists
were tried, with prosecutors demanding
sentences of 4,000 years in prison in
total, and they were sentenced to 3,315
12
years, six months in jail. Forty-seven judges were
removed from office. Thirty-one journalists served time
in jail, and another 300 journalists were assaulted while
three were killed. A total of 303 lawsuits were filed
against 13 larger newspapers. Thirty-nine tons of paper
and journals were destroyed. Parliament was suspend-
ed, and members of the cabinet were arrested. Political
parties, associations and unions were dissolved.
This is merely a partial list of what the Sept. 12 mili-
tary administration did. The military tracked down
thousands of people before the coup; some of them
were arrested after the coup and some of these people
were executed, while others languished in prison for
years. And all these plans were drafted by
Ürüð, who was assigned the task of laying
the foundations for the coup one year
before it took place. During this process,
the military patiently waited for the out-
break of street violence, where people
were murdered and leading figures were
assassinated.
Similar roadmaps were
employed in the 1990s
The military, which resumed its plans in
1996, a decade after the end of the military
administration set up by the Sept. 12 coup,
sponsored the creation of illegal organiza-
tions including the Western Working
Group (BÇG) in an attempt to address the
alleged threat posed by the pro-Islamist
Welfare Party (RP) government. This
organization gathered information about
persons working in private and public
institutions. Having a veiled wife was
turned into a crime, and some people were
declared dangerous because of their piety.
Some made it onto the list because they
were Kurds. Just like in Nazi Germany, a
number of people were "labeled" in secret
lists drafted by an illegal organization.
Orders for the fulfillment of this labeling
task were forwarded to the relevant units
all across the country. The state officially
began gathering information on its citizens
for future use through the methods and
means employed by the military. The mili-
tary also made note of religious officers
working in its units. They were expelled
from the military because of this reason.
The expelled officers were not given the
right to object to or appeal their expulsion.
There was no possibility of appeal because
there was no institution in existence to
which they could appeal. It was impossible
to appeal the rulings of the Supreme
Military Council (YAÞ). And the pro-junta
actors did not hesitate to rely on all means available to
break down the barriers to the fulfillment of their goals.
Secularism and Atatürkism were used as justifications
and pretexts to carry out their activities. The military
was committing a crime by hiding behind Atatürk and
claiming that the principle of secularism was being vio-
lated.
Even though it did not directly come to power in this
period called the "Feb. 28 process," the military was
able to drive the undesired government away and
ensure the creation of another one it favored. This cabi-
net did everything the military asked of it. During this
process a group within the military also secured disso-
lution of the RP and oversaw a process whereby the
rising star of this party, Recep Tayyip Erdoðan, was
sentenced to prison because he recited a poem during a
peaceful party demonstration. Erdoðan, who was the
13
mayor of Ýstanbul at the time, was banned The military was
from politics and sent to jail because of the able to use the
media as a means
recitation of a poem.
for psychological
This institution, which orchestrated crucial warfare. Back in
developments in the country, was shocked 1997, the headlines
by the election results of the general elec- of the three largest
circulating newspa-
tions held in November 2002. The person pers set the step-
sent to jail and banned from politics ping stones of the
founded a political party, and that party Feb. 28 process.
came to power in a landslide victory. Even That is why this mil-
itary intervention
though he was still banned from politics, was named a post-
his party ran in the elections without him modern coup.
being at the head of the party, and the
party won with such a majority that it
would be able to change the Constitution,
which was drafted by figures from the
Sept. 12 military coup.
This was a big disappointment for
this group, who until that point had been
fairly sure that Erdoðan would never
become a prominent political figure thanks
to the measures they had taken against
him. Taking the new situation into consid-
eration, they started drafting another plan
just as they did in 1980 and 1997.
Military is not the only actor
It should be recalled that the brief history
of military coups as narrated above should
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the military was the only actor sponsoring
the coup process. The military was able to
accommodate the style of the coups to the
political environment, and it was quite successful in
making sure that non-military figures were also
involved in the process. Another thing that needs to be
investigated with respect to the relationship between
the military and coups is the influence of the internal
dynamics of the military over the ambition to stage a
coup. In addition, whether the training the military offi-
cers receive influences their ambition to intervene in
political affairs also remains a question to be investigat-
ed.
As noted before in this essay, the military entered
into alliances to ease their interference in political
affairs. These alliances were shaped in accordance with
the political and social circumstances of the time.
Therefore, one mistake that analysts have made in rela-
tion to the military is the argument that the coups were
all staged under the guidance of external actors, includ-
 DOSSIER SPRING 2010
Former Chief of ing the United States. The fact that the most
General Staff Gen. recent coup attempts were effectively cir-
Hilmi Özkök was
cumvented by former Chief of General Staff
known for his firm
belief in democracy. Gen. Hilmi Özkök, who worked tirelessly to
It is revealed today preserve the democratic order, confirms that
that Özkök had this argument is not particularly valid. In
effectively circum-
other words, the drafting of the most recent
vented several coup
attempts during his plans in the absence of any instruction or
tenure (2002-2006). orders from the US or the European Union
shows that there have always been some
military figures in this country eager to stage
a coup. This, of course, does not necessarily mean that
the military did not receive external support from the
US in the military coups staged in 1960 and 1980. On
the other hand, it no longer seems realistic to argue
that the military would not consider staging a coup in
the absence of a provocative element.
Therefore, depending on the outlook of the conjec-
ture, the military either chooses the ally that best fits its
goals and interests, or it does not raise any objection to
an external actor using it, as was the case with the 1960
coup when the US chose to side with the Turkish mili-
tary in order to fulfill its own goals in the region. For
the coup of Feb. 28, 1997, the military chose the media
as its ally and used the media as a means through
which to conduct psychological warfare, thus
the label "postmodern coup."
Postmodern coup staged
through the media
As a matter of fact, this postmodern
coup was something that the military
had been gradually doing through
the media since the local elec-
tions held on March 27, 1994,
when it became apparent
that the RP was marching
towards political power. In
response to the electoral
success of the party, certain
papers published public sur-
veys and research to grasp the
true dimensions of the rise of the
RP. The dominant state ideology
and the military simply wanted to
measure the potential threat
posed by this party. The conclu-
sions were negative according
to their understanding of
Turkish politics. The RP was
dangerous, and it had to be stopped.
Subsequent to this conclusion, the
psychological warfare that was waged
through some media outlets started. This
campaign that would lead the country to a
military coup started with events in
Germany, where supporters of a radical
Islamic group led by Cemalettin Kaplan,
who declared himself the Islamic caliph, held
a rather irritating and repugnant demonstra-
tion against the Turkish state. The demon-
stration made it into the headlines of newspapers. The
choice of highlighting the Kaplan issue was quite wise.
It was chosen to demonstrate that the RP would facili-
tate creation of a state governed by Shariah. The logic
was that the rise of the RP would encourage all other
radical religious groups to mobilize their efforts, just like
the Kaplan movement did in Germany. The military
used the media in the coup process to prove that there
was an intrinsic relationship between the rise of the
party and the rise of fundamentalist movements here
and abroad.
The media's eagerness to serve the military in Turkey
is not surprising, either. The media made an effort to
ensure that the proper conditions for a military coup
were in place before the first military coup staged However, democratic circles favored the AK Party cult to explain the silence and indifference of some The AK Party came
in 1960; what is more, it has always showed to power with the
government because of its relations with the EU and its media outlets to what is happening currently despite
support of not only
eagerness to play the same role. eagerness to maintain the democratic order. Believing their not having any stake in the military's agenda. the religious, but
However, just as the military changes its atti- that their traditional plan would work this time as well, On the other hand, this is not that surprising given also the liberal and
tude and allies depending on the changing condi- the military wondered why things did not go as the conditions and circumstances in Turkey. It is known social democrat cir-
tions and circumstances, the media have also had cles. Its firm stance
smoothly with the media; because of these unexpected that the media suffer from excessive pressure from the
against the April 27
various motives for its decision to align itself outcomes, the military became more aggressive. The military. This pressure, which became even more visible e-memorandum
with the military. In the 1960 military coup, April 27 e-memo posted on the website of the General during the Feb. 28 postmodern coup process, seems to boosted the support
the media lent its support for ideological Staff, under the rule of Chief of General Staff Gen. be the primary reason why some media outlets have of liberal circles for
the AK Party
reasons; however, the situation was quite Yaþar Büyükanýt, was the product of these circum- failed to act decisively in cases of military coups.
different in Turkey in 2000. Media bosses, stances. Taraf as a new player in the media
aware of the influence of the media and The AK Party and Turkey's intellectuals reacted This also explains the success and aggressive per-
eager to make their fortunes by relying on strongly to this memo. Taking this unexpected formance of the Taraf daily, which attracts attention
this influence, wanted to secure the mate- response into consideration, the military and the media because of its brave actions with regard to military-
rial and financial benefits that were to be actors supportive of military action had to make a civilian relations. Taraf, which relies on a policy favoring
awarded by the state. There was only one reversal. This was a turning point in Turkish history, democracy, is also distinct from many other publica-
way to do this: to get along with the mili- when military-civilian relations entered a new era. The tions because of its independence. Due to these fea-
tary, the true owner and manager of the military lost crucial positions on the battleground in its tures, Taraf has attracted some democratic officers
state apparatus. fight with civilians. within the military who are unhappy with the coup ini-
The plan was perfect; the military Even though the easy manipulation of the media by tiatives and attempts. These democratic officers deliver
toppled the RP, which it viewed as a the military can be explained by the media bosses' documents and papers they consider useful to Taraf
danger to the regime, whereas the media motivation to make their fortunes, this does not explain and to myself because they are sure that these docu-
bosses made it to the lists of world's the silence of those media organs that do not allow ments will be published without being subjected to any
richest men within a few years. themselves to be manipulated by the military. It is diffi- sort of censorship. This actually negates the argument
15
 DOSSIER SPRING 2010
Taraf’s willingness that Taraf is being abused and used by
to publish damaging
some bigger actors. Additionally, the pres-
stories about the
armed forces has sure on me because of my news reports
energized individu- and coverage shows the importance and
als in various state significance of the type of journalism that
offices to leak infor-
mation to the press.
the Taraf daily promotes. More than 40
Taraf revealed sev- lawsuits have been filed with different
eral coup plans. courts against me because of the news
Among these the reports I have published in Taraf with
Sledgehammer plan
was probably the regard to the coup plans; a substantial
most striking. Gen. number of these lawsuits were filed fol-
Çetin Doðan lowing a request by the General Staff. This
(above), former
demonstrates the magnitude of the pres-
commander of the
1st Army, was sure on the media in Turkey. The most
arrested due to his serious suits were filed with respect to my
involvement in this coverage of the Cage Operation Action
plot.
PHOTO:TURGUT ENGÝN
Plan, where the coup-makers planned the
murders of non-Muslims and the bombing
of mosques to create a chaotic environ-
ment in the country. In addition to these
lawsuits, I should also note the threats I
occasionally receive because of my work.
In conclusion, the recent coup attempts
have confirmed this fact: the potential
threat of a military coup is still imminent
in Turkey. Another fact that these plans
reveal is that the drafting of the coup
plans is the rule, whereas the motives
vary depending on the circumstances. In
other words, coup plans are generated all
16
the time within the military based on dif-
ferent justifications and motives. The
plans have different names. The plan
becomes "Sledgehammer" during a cer-
tain period, while the name is changed to
"Cage" at a different time. Even though
the members of a junta retire, they extend
their support for coup plans as external
actors. The success of these plans depends
on whether the efforts of a brave soldier
or journalist are sufficient to abort the
attempts, given that there is no other
mechanism to deal with this danger and
threat. For instance, it is evident that for-
mer Chief of General Staff Gen. Özkök
effectively aborted the coup plan drafted
by Gen. Çetin Doðan, former commander
of the 1st Army, thanks to the information
he received with respect to the
Sledgehammer coup plan. The Taraf daily,
which published the Action Plan to Fight
Reactionaryism, may have prevented a
process that would probably have taken
the country to the edge of a military coup.
If the fact that this plan sought to make
sure that innocent people would be
viewed as criminals by planting weapons
in their homes is taken into account, the
gravity of the whole plan becomes more
obvious.
Seclusion and superiority complex
Taking a look at how the military promotes the self-
perception suggesting that it is the true owner of this
country will provide some insights and clues regard-
ing its eagerness to interfere in politics. Even a super-
ficial review and investigation will suffice to prove
that this feeling and perception are dominant within
the military. Military officers reside in well-protected
lodging facilities in Turkey. The fact that their hospi-
tals are different, that their healthcare system is differ-
ent and that the courts they are brought to trial in are
The secluded life
different proves that they feel different and distin- that a military
guished from ordinary people. No further explanation cadet lives leads
is actually needed to recall that this difference refers him to believe that
he is a member of
to some sort of dominance and superiority. This
an institution
implies that the military views itself as the driving charged with mod-
force of modernization in Turkey and a distinct and ernizing the coun-
try. This must be
elite class.
the number one
The secluded life that a military cadet lives and the
motive and reason
training he receives actually lead him to believe that for the eagerness of
he is a member of an institution charged with mod- the military to
stage coups.
ernizing the country, and this must be the number
one motive and reason for the eagerness of the mili-
tary to stage coups. In the meantime, I would like to
recall a common mistake made in analyses of the mil-
itary. It is commonly held in Turkey that the illegal
juntas that have penetrated into the army seek to
sponsor coups independent of the military itself.
However, as noted above, the conditions for interfer-
ence with the political order are like gifts for the mili-
tary, and it is always ready to utilize the opportunity.
Because this is the case and because interference in On the other hand, this perception of superiority is
politics becomes so attractive for the military, it further confirmed by the Constitution, which refers to
should be no surprise to witness that even some low- the military as the protector and guardian of the
ranking military officers have been involved in the domestic political regime of the Republic of Turkey.
recent coup plans and attempts. On the other hand, Under Article 35 of the Internal Service Code, it is the
as a psychological factor, the fact that the cadets who duty of the armed forces to protect and guard the
received such idealist training in military schools and Republic of Turkey as well as the homeland of the
academies have to address the problems of the ordi- Turks as outlined by the Constitution. The same arti-
nary soldiers when they become officers causes cle underlines that this duty is assigned to the mili-
greater disparity between real life and the content of tary. Reference to this assignment is important, but it
the training they received. An officer who views him- is also understandable considering that all the three
self as a member of a privileged institution cannot constitutions introduced in Turkey were sponsored
find the appropriate atmosphere in the conditions of a and drafted under the auspices of the Turkish Armed
small military unit to satisfy his superiority complexes, Forces (TSK). Because Turkey does not have a civilian
and this drives him towards illegal initiatives seeking constitution, the military did not hesitate to list some
to interfere with the political order. privileges for itself in the constitution it sponsored.
17
ARTICLE SPRING 2010
Turkey amid
fierce power
struggle
between old
and new
mindsets
The power struggle between the
staunchly secular, military-led estab-
lishment and the political authority
has tarnished not only the image of
the armed forces but Turkey as well.
The military resists not only account-
ability and transparency of its budget
but also redefining military courts'
duties, which have given it wide room
for maneuver in maintaining its privi-
leged status and an escape from the
review of civilian courts
18
Lale Kemal
T
urkey, NATO's only Muslim member
and a European Union candidate
country, has been the scene of a bit-
ter power struggle over the past sev-
eral years between old and new
mindsets. The old mindset, led by the
staunchly secular Turkish Armed
Forces (TSK), seeks to maintain its power if necessary
through non-democratic means, under which inter-
vention in politics through the use of force is still an
option, even in the 21st century. The new Turkey,
representing people from all walks of life, including
Kurds, Armenians and Alevis as well as the Turkish
Sunnis in the majority, has begun resisting the fear-
based policies imposed on the citizens from the top.
The military-dictated 1982 Constitution, prepared
after the 1980 military coup, therefore, cannot fit this
new Turkey, which has been breaking taboos, neces-
sitating a brand new road map to push the country
toward democratic standards.
Behind the fight that has raged in recent years
between the establishment -- led by the military and
supported by senior members of the judiciary, a
ILLUSTRATION: YUNUS EMRE HATUNOÐLU
product of the 1982 Constitution -- and the conser-
vative, Islam-based Justice and Development Party
(AK Party) government lies the question of whether
civilian authorities will be able to both rule and gov-
ern or if they will continue sharing their power with
the appointed bureaucrats led by the uniformed men,
though this system causes instability.
As an important reflection of a fierce power strug-
gle in Turkey, but also as a sign that the country has
been settling its score with the deep state, the once-
untouchable armed forces have begun feeling the
heat. Over 50 of its active duty and retired top offi- are several retired generals. The alleged involvement Military begins to feel the heat
cers, including some service commanders, have been of military personnel in anti-government activities, The bitter power struggle taking place between old
arrested or are facing charges over either triggering disclosed by the investigation into Ergenekon, raises and new Turkey is evident now more than ever as
armed unrest to unseat the government or allegedly serious concerns, as a report released by the EU last the military has come under the spotlight and its
making coup plots such as the recently disclosed plot October on Turkey's progress on meeting the union's privileged status has increasingly been subject to crit-
code-named Sledgehammer. democratic criteria noted. icism.
Prosecutors allege that in 2003, military officers As the military, for the first time in the history of With about 1 million personnel, the majority of
plotted to undermine the AK Party by sowing unrest the Turkish Republic, has come across a situation whom are conscripts, the TSK is the second biggest
through staged bombings of religious sites, including where its senior members, both active duty and military within NATO, after the US. The TSK has
Fatih Mosque in Ýstanbul. The alleged actions includ- retired, are being charged with serious crimes, fresh staged four military coups since 1960 and released an
ed nearly provoking a conflict with neighboring reforms are being prepared to introduce accountabili- electronic memorandum on April 27, 2007, warning
Greece. ty and transparency to military expenditures as well the AK Party in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent
In another investigation, among the roughly 200 as to limit to a certain extent the areas of responsibili- then-Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül from becoming
defendants arrested and facing trial under the ty of military courts, which exist to protect the president.
Ergenekon probe, launched almost three years ago, autonomous status of the TSK. The TSK sees itself as the guardian of the secular
19
ARTICLE SPRING 2010 ARTICLE IN BRIEF: The bitter power struggle taking place between old and new Turkey is evident now more than ever
as the military has come under the spotlight and its privileged status has increasingly been subject to criticism. In addition to the
civilian judiciary, which most of the time sides with the establishment, the military judicial system also requires a serious overhaul
to bring it up to democratic standards. Contrary to some views in Turkey, an accountable, transparent and democratically overseen
military makes for a strengthened military sector while it will ease the heavy burden on taxpayers.

principles of Turkey's founder, Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk, and uses Article 35 of its Internal Service
Law as the basis for its interventions. The Internal
Service Law, whose abolishment the EU has called
for, was implemented after the 1960 coup. It charges
the TSK with the duty of protecting and watching
over the Turkish homeland and the Republic of
Turkey as defined by the Constitution. The problem
with Article 35 is that the authority designated to
protect and supervise is the TSK, as opposed to a
civilian political authority.
The TSK's coups were not necessarily staged on
the grounds that the Turkish secular system was in
danger. For example, the 1960 and the 1980 military
coups were precipitated by concerns that political
authorities were not able to bring law and order to
the country or were involved in corruption.
Through reforms made in 2003 and 2004, the gov-
ernment has raised the curtain of secrecy concerning
TSK activities. The turning point in the public debate
of subjects considered taboo in Turkish politics, start- another step toward lifting the veil of secrecy on this
Military reforms initiated in the early 2000s
marked a positive beginning in Turkey, rais-
ing hopes that the country's highly politicized procurement. In 2003, Parliament's
military establishment would finally come
under democratic civilian oversight
ing with the TSK, was prompted by the EU Helsinki
Summit in December 1999, when Turkey was grant-
ed EU candidate status. The first serious efforts to
democratize the civilian and military sectors were ini-
tiated in the aftermath of a grave financial crisis that tion highlighted the inhibition and reticence of
erupted in February 2001. Reforms that paved the
way for good governance, such as diminishing the
TSK's active role in the political domain and parlia-
mentary supervision of the Defense Ministry budget
and extra-budgetary resources allocated to defense
through audits by the Audit Court, were initiated
after the financial crisis. These reforms were legislated the ruling AK Party has slowed down major reforms
by the AK Party, which came into power as the sole
ruling party in November 2002.
After a legal amendment, National Security
Council (MGK) activities and decisions, which pro-
vided the legal grounds for the influential role the
TSK plays in political life, were reduced to the level of informal mechanisms. Senior members of the armed
"recommendations to the Cabinet."
Another significant law is the Public Financial
Management and Control Law (KMYKK), which
went into effect in January 2005. This law stipulates
parliamentary oversight of the TSK's budget -- con-
sisting of the military budget allocated through the
Defense Ministry and the extra-budgetary resources
allocated to defense -- through the Court of
Accounts. With a decree that was passed in February
2004, the road was opened for the Audit Court to
supervise military expenditures and any extra-budg-
etary defense expenditures upon a demand from the
Parliament Speaker's Office.
The third regulation bringing about civilian over-
sight of military expenditures was realized with an
amendment made to the last clause of Article 160 of
the Constitution in 2004 (See the box on page 68 for
Article 160).
With this amendment, the principle of auditing
TSK-held state property through the Supreme Audit their views on domestic and foreign policy issues expenditure. However, these audits are based on Turkey has the sec-
Court at the request of Parliament was legalized, ond largest army in
going beyond their remit, including on Cyprus, eth- accounting records and take the form of desk
NATO. When extra-
nicity, the South-East, secularism, political parties reviews. Auditors are not allowed to conduct on-the- budgetary resources
matter. During this period, Parliament and other non-military matters. On a number of spot checks. Moreover, the court remains unable to are added, Turkey’s
also made an attempt to initiate a occasions, the General Staff reacted publicly to politi- audit movable assets belonging to the military, pend- military expendi-
democratic oversight mechanism to cians and media reports." ing adoption of the draft Law on the Audit Court,"
tures are estimated
to be about $20 bil-
prevent fraudulent acts in weapons Similarly, the regulatory statute necessary for the the report said. lion per year. The
Audit Court to conduct audits of TSK expenditures The Defense Ministry budget is set at TL 15.9 bil- Turkish army is still
corruption investigation committee has yet to be passed due to the military's ongoing lion for fiscal year 2010; it was TL 14.5 billion in 2009. reliant on high tech-
nologies from
launched an investigation into claims objections. As a matter of fact, a delegation from the But extra-budgetary resources allocated for defense
that the state had sustained a $180 General Staff opposed a bill on the Audit Court on are not included and not open to the public. When
abroad for about 75
percent of its arms
million loss in the procurement of air- March 13 during its first debate at a subcommittee of extra-budgetary resources are added, military expen-
borne early warning and control (AEW&C) systems. Parliament's Planning and Budgetary Commission ditures are estimated to be about $20 billion per year,
However, the investigation was terminated and the over grounds of military secrecy. An AK Party deputy according to unofficial data.
government approved the purchase of four AEW&Cs talking to the author of this article, however, said that The 2008 yearbook of the Stockholm International
worth $1.5 billion. The termination of the investiga- contrary to the military's reasoning in its opposition Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) has revealed that
to this court auditing military expenditures, the priva- Turkey, categorized as a middle-income country, has
Parliament and the government when it comes to cy rules of every institution will be respected. had military expenditures between 1998 and 2003 of
scrutinizing military bids. Article 160 stipulates auditin gof all institutions, he 4.4 percent, 5.4 percent, 5.0 percent, 5.0 percent, 4.9
Reforms face obstacles recalled. percent and 4.9 percent of gross domestic product
However, it is worth noting that the impact of the The EU progress report has noted the lack of (GDP), respectively.
majority of the abovementioned reforms has not yet progress on the oversight of military expenditures. Turkey is estimated to spend about $4 to $5 billion
been fully felt on the ground. This is mainly because "No progress has been made on strengthening leg- per year on arms purchases; though it has also given
islative oversight of the military budget and expendi- emphasis in the past several years to research and
both in the military and in the civilian sector since tures. Likewise, the Defense Industry Support Fund development (R&D) projects to boost its local
2005, playing into the hands of those seeking to (SSDF), from which most procurement projects are defense industry, it is still reliant on high technolo-
maintain their power. As the EU report in October financed, is still an extra-budgetary fund excluded gies from abroad for about 75 percent of its arms.
last year stated: "The armed forces have continued to from parliamentary scrutiny. Parliament has no man- Military judiciary
exercise undue political influence via formal and date to develop security and defense policies. As In addition to the civilian judiciary, which most of
regards auditing, under the Constitution, the Audit the time sides with the establishment, the military
forces have expressed on a large number of occasions Court can carry out external ex-post audits of military judicial system also requires a serious overhaul to

20 21
ARTICLE SPRING 2010

bring it up to democratic standards. The government The military judiciary has existed since its inception accused of engaging in terror- Commissioned by the UK
introduced a mini Constitutional reform package in in the 1961 Constitution. ism and also over suspicions Department for International
late March with judicial reforms comprising the Among the problems existing within the military regarding a munitions-filled Development, Jan. 11 2002).
greater part. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoðan judicial system in Turkey include the ambiguity sur- truck discovered in Ankara, in Statistics released on March 15
says the steps are crucial for Turkey's EU member- rounding the measures that establish boundaries of separate interviews with two showed that the unemploy-
ship bid. The package includes a constitutional action for military courts vis-à-vis civilian courts, newspapers, Hürriyet and ment rate has reached 13.5
amendment that would enable the prosecution of which creates disaccord between these two institutions Milliyet (Today's Zaman, percent, while unofficial figures
members of the military in civilian courts over crimes and thus widens the territory of military jurisdiction as March 16). put this number at 20 percent.
such as attempts to unseat the government. military courts gradually began trying soldiers and mil- "We asked [Gen. Berk's] Added to the problem is
The EU progress report last year stated that judicialitary personnel not only for their military offenses but opinion of the incident. The Turkey's reliance on foreign
practice on the jurisdiction of military courts needs toalso for their general offenses. The military courts have commander told us several sources for about 75 percent of
comply with EU practice. since become the only courts of justice that concern times that he has no links to its critical arms technologies,
The military has been putting the judiciary under military personnel and are authorized to try civilians the allegations," the military despite efforts to reduce this
pressure over the Ergenekon case, it also stated. for a variety of offenses -- not just for offenses related chief told Hürriyet, to which dependency. Therefore, much
"During a press briefing in April, the Chief of to national defense, the implementation of the military Gen. Koþaner added, "And we of Turkey's resources allocated
General Staff made comments on the Ergenekon draft and the maintenance of military discipline. The have no hesitation that this is for defense do not create
TSK's once-respected image, despite the case." meaningful job opportunities
five different interventions into politics, Gen. Berk is accused of put- in the defense sector; to the
Contrary to the perception that the military contrary, they turn into a
has begun to deteriorate since the ting into operation an alleged
tutelage system has prevented harm to Turkey's recent disclosure of coup plots target- military plot to undermine the heavy burden on taxpayers.
secular character, it has inflicted serious injury ing its own citizens. Added to that are ruling AK Party and certain Meanwhile, the row between
on the country's democratization process lead- top commanders' remarks defending religious communities in the the government and the secu-
military suspects embroiled in coup eastern province of Erzincan. larist establishment has
ing to social, political and economic instability plot allegations in an attempt to put The plot would frame individ- weighed on financial markets
pressure on civilian prosecutors. uals in certain religious organi- as investors fret about political
case and on the indictment, thus putting the judiciary The image and reputation of the TSK will be pro- zations for crimes they did not stability in the $650 billion
under pressure. Some senior members of the armed tected if it does not stand by its personnel who com- commit by planting hand economy.
forces lent support to military personnel standing mit crimes and helps judicial bodies to exercise their grenades and munitions in their homes and offices. A Turkey has continuously paid the price for its arms
trial," it said. duty, Hüseyin Çelik, an AK Party deputy chairman, civilian prosecutor summoned the general twice to acquisitions, regardless of whether they are a neces-
Another mechanism in Turkey's established order told the media on March 26. give testimony on the issue, but he has not yet com- sary means of deterrence. The absence of democratic
to create prerogatives for the military is the distinc- Çelik was referring to Turkish Chief of General plied with the order. civilian control over the TSK raises serious questions
tion between military and civilian courts. The basic Staff Gen. Ýlker Baþbuð's remarks to the media, dur- Benefits for TSK and the country about the rationale behind Turkish arms purchases.
function of military courts, which gained constitu- ing which he publicly expressed his position against Contrary to some views in Turkey, an accountable, If Turkey has been seriously polarized, this is
tional status after the 1960 coup and maintained this the probe into Ergenekon. He once termed a military transparent and democratically overseen military because the country has for the first time been openly
status after the 1980 coup, is to protect the plot drafted by an active duty colonel a "piece of makes for a strengthened military sector while it will debating once-taboo topics such as the military's role
autonomous superior position of the army within the paper." The plot was aimed at undermining the AK ease the heavy burden on taxpayers. in politics. This debate, if not today, will in the future
system ("Security Sector in Turkey: Questions, Party. The fact that the principle of accountability in the help bring democratic standards to the country.
Problems, and Solutions," Hale Akay, February 2010, Gen. Baþbuð and Land Forces Commander Gen. security sector is for the public good was elucidated
TESEV). Iþýk Koþaner expressed strong disbelief in the justness in research carried out by the World Bank in 2002 EXTRA READING
The military courts have extensive powers that pro- of an ongoing investigation in Erzincan in which 3rd among countries to whom it gave credit. The Lale Sarýibrahimoðlu, "Türk Silahlý Kuvvetleri," in
tect the military from the review of civilian courts. Army Commander Gen. Saldýray Berk stands research illustrated that the inclusion of defense Ümit Cizre (ed.), Almanak Türkiye 2005 - Güvenlik
expenditures in public expenses was an ultimately Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim (Almanac Turkey
beneficial mechanism because it provided for a bet- 2005: Security Sector and Democratic Oversight),
ter understanding and acceptance of defense policies TESEV: Ýstanbul, 2006, pp. 52-81.
IV. AUDIT COURT (AS AMENDED ON MAY 22, 2004) by the public, it provided the reasons and justifica- Ümit Kardaþ, "Military Judiciary," in Ali Bayramoðlu
ARTICLE 160. The Audit Court shall be charged with auditing, on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, all accounts related to revenues, expenditures and tions for defense expenses and it facilitated a more and Ahmet Ýnsel (eds.), Almanak Türkiye 2006-2008:
properties of the government departments financed by general and subsidiary budgets, with taking final decisions on the acts and accounts of the responsible offi- efficient and rational use of defense expenses. Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim (Almanac
cials and with exercising the functions required of it by law in matters of inquiry, auditing and judgment. Parties concerned may file a single request for reconsider- Turkey 2006-2008: Security Sector and Democratic
(Nicole Ball and Malcolm Holmes, "Integrating
ation of a final decision of the Audit Court within 15 days of the date of written notification of the decision. No applications for judicial review of such decisions shall
Defense into Public Expenditure Work," Oversight), TESEV: Ýstanbul, 2009, pp. 66-72.
be filed in administrative courts. … The establishment, functioning, supervisory procedures, qualifications, appointments, tasks and duties, rights and obligations
and other matters concerning the status of its members and guarantees of the president and the members of the court shall be regulated by law.
23
22
ARTICLE SPRING 2010
Turkey's
need
for a new
constitution
None of the three republican constitu-
tions (those of 1924, 1961 and 1982)
were made by a freely chosen and
broadly representative constituent
assembly through interparty negotia-
tions and compromises. On the con-
trary, state elites played a predomi-
nant role in the making of all three con-
stitutions with little input from civil
society. This article analyzes the partial
amendments that the Constitution has
undergone so far and Turkey's ongoing
search for an entirely new, liberal and
democratic constitution
24
Ergun Özbudun
H
istorically speaking, none of
Turkey's three republican constitu-
tions (those of 1924, 1961 and 1982)
were made by a freely chosen and
broadly representative legislative
assembly through a process of inter-
party negotiations and compro-
mises. The 1924 Constitution was made by an essen-
tially single-party legislative assembly almost totally
dominated by Mustafa Kemal's (Atatürk) newly
founded People's Party. Although the Constitution
was democratic in spirit and contained no signs of the
approaching authoritarian single-party regime (1925-
1946), it provided a convenient instrument for this
regime since it established no checks and balances
against the absolute power of parliamentary majorities.
The 1961 Constitution and the 1982 Constitution
were both products of military interventions (those of
1960 and 1980, respectively). In their making, the mili-
tary committees that carried out the coups (the
National Unity Committee [MBK] in 1960 and the
National Security Council [MGK] in 1980) played a
predominant role. In both cases, the ruling military
council was one of the chambers of the bicameral con-
stituent assemblies. In neither case was the civilian
wing of the constituent assembly (the House of
Representatives in 1960-61 and the Consultative
Assembly in 1981-83) based on free popular elections.
The former was based on an essentially cooptative sys-
tem which totally excluded the supporters of the over-
thrown Democrat Party (DP), and the latter comprised
160 members, all of whom were appointed by the rul-
ing MGK.
The MGK went much further than its predecessor in
excluding all civil society inputs in the making of the
1982 Constitution. All political parties were closed
down, and no political party member (as of Sept. 11,
1980) was eligible for the Consultative Assembly.
Furthermore, in contrast to the 1961 constituent
assembly, the powers of the two chambers were exces-
sively unequal. The MGK had the final say over the
draft prepared by the Consultative Assembly, with no
mechanism to resolve the differences of opinion
between the two bodies. Thus, the Consultative
Assembly, composed mostly of bureaucrats, played
only a consultative role, as its name indicated.
Furthermore, in the referendum stage, only "construc-
tive" criticism was allowed; critical comments about
the transitional articles as well as campaigning for a
"no" vote were banned; no criticism was allowed
against Gen. Kenan Evren's speeches in favor of the
new Constitution. Gen. Evren was at the time the
chairman of the MGK and the head of state. Finally,
the constitutional referendum was combined with the
election of the president of the republic for seven years
in which Evren was the sole candidate. Thus, a "yes"
vote for the Constitution also meant a "yes" vote for
the presidency of Evren. Under these circumstances,
the referendum of Nov. 7, 1982, produced a 91.37 per-
cent majority in favor of the Constitution, a result rem-
iniscent of election results in totalitarian countries.
1982 Constitution: authoritarian, statist and tutelary
The way in which it was made strongly determined
the content of the 1982 Constitution. Thus, it clearly
reflected the authoritarian, statist and tutelary mentali-
ty of its founders. The military founders of the
Constitution had very little trust in civilian politicians,
which they often expressed in highly blunt terms.
Thus, they designed the Constitution to limit the
domain of civilian politics as much as possible. Under
the original version of the Constitution, all civil society
organizations other than political parties were banned
from engaging in political activities. Trade
unions, volunteer associ-
ations, foundations, public professional
organizations and cooperative societies were not
allowed to support political parties, receive support
from political parties or cooperate among themselves.
These restrictions were repealed through a constitu-
tional amendment in 1995.
The military authors of the 1982 Constitution also
restricted the activities of political parties with a long
list of vague party bans in the Constitution and even
more draconian restrictions in the Law on Political
Parties. Thus, so far 25 political parties (six under the
1961 Constitution and 19 under the 1982 Constitution)
have been banned by the Constitutional Court, and
many leaders and members of such parties have been
banned from political activities for a period of five years
by the prohibition ruling of the court. Despite some
limited improvements brought about by the constitu-
tional amendments of 1995 and 2001, the legal regime
25
of political parties still constitutes one of the most
objectionable "democracy deficits" in the Turkish polit-
ical system. Thus, a recent (March 2009) report by the
Venice Commission (European Commission for
Democracy through Law) of the Council of Europe
strongly criticized the Turkish constitutional and legal
rules concerning the prohibition of political parties. The
report concludes that "the basic problem with the
Turkish rules on party closure is that the general
threshold is too low, both for initiating procedures and
for prohibiting or dissolving parties. This is in itself in
abstracto deviating from common European democrat-
ic standards, and it leads too easily to action that will
be in breach of the ECHR [European Convention on
Human Rights], as demonstrated in the many Turkish
cases before the European Court of Human Rights."
With the aim of limiting the domain of civilian poli-
tics in mind, the Constitution established a number of
tutelary institutions designed to check the powers of
ILLUSTRATION: CEM KIZILTUÐ
the elected agencies and to narrow the space for civil-
ian politics. Foremost among such institutions was the
Presidency of the Republic. The combination of the
constitutional referendum with the election of the next
president of the republic gave Gen. Evren (the sole
candidate) the possibility of exercis-
ing tutelary
powers over
elected gov-
ernments for a
period of seven
years (1982-
1989). In fact, he
often described
himself as the
"guarantor" of the
Constitution. This
tutelary role was
strengthened by the
broad powers given to
the president by the
Constitution, as will be
shown below. The
ARTICLE SPRING 2010 ARTICLE IN BRIEF: The 1982 Constitution established a number of tutelary institutions designed to check the powers of
the elected agencies and to narrow down the space for civilian politics. Foremost among such institutions was the Presidency of the
republic. The National Security Council, the Higher Education Board and the judiciary were conceived as other tutelary institution
designed to protect the values of the state elites against the actions of elected governments. The constitutional crisis of Turkey took
on an acute form starting from the spring of 2007, triggered by the conflict over the election of a new president of the republic.
military authors of the Constitution might have possi-
bly thought that after Evren's term came to an end, his
successor would also be a military person or at least
someone acceptable to the military.
Another institution was the strengthened MGK. The
original text of the Constitution gave members of the
military the majority of seats in the council and stipu-
lated that the decisions of the council should be given
priority consideration by the Cabinet, thereby render-
ing such decisions binding, if not in theory at least in
practice. A third tutelary institution was the Higher
Education Board (YÖK), which was designed to put
universities in order and under strict discipline. The
president of the republic was given the power to
appoint the chairman and some members of YÖK as
well as university rectors. Finally, the president of the
republic was given broad discretionary powers with
ILLUSTRATION: CEM KIZILTUÐ
regard to the judiciary, such as appointing
the judges of the Constitutional Court
(three of them directly and eight of
them from among three candidates
nominated by the other high courts
and YÖK), one-fourth of the mem-
bers of the Council of State (the
highest administrative
court), the members of the
Supreme Board of Judges and
Prosecutors (HSYK) (from among three
candidates nominated by the two high courts)
and the chief public prosecutor of the Supreme
Court of Appeals and his deputy from among five
candidates nominated by the Supreme Court of
Appeals. Thus, the judiciary was conceived of as
another tutelary institution designed to protect
the values of the state elites against the actions
of elected governments.
Finally, the military obtained important pow-
ers, privileges and immunities as a price for
relinquishing power to elected civilian insti-
tutions (exit guaranties as they are com-
monly called). In addition to the MGK
26
mentioned above, the military was exempted from the
review of the Court of Accounts and the State Auditing
Board (YDK). The decisions of the Supreme Military
Council (YAÞ) regarding high-level military appoint-
ments, promotions and expulsions from the military
were closed to judicial review. The laws and law-
amending ordinances (decree laws) passed by the
MGK regime (1980-1983) were exempted from a
review of constitutionality by the Constitutional Court.
Furthermore, the Law on the Secretariat-General of
the MGK provided that the secretary-general shall be a
high-level military person and endowed the secretariat
with broad executive powers.
The politics of constitutional amendments
It is no wonder that the 1982 Constitution met with
severe criticism almost from its inception. In the years
that followed, most political parties and leading civil
society institutions such as the Turkish Bar Association
(TBB), the Turkish Union of Chambers and
Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and the Turkish
Industrialists and Businessmen's Association
(TÜSÝAD) proposed entirely new constitu-
tional drafts or at least radical changes to
the Constitution. Consequently, starting
from 1987, the Constitution underwent 15
amendments. The general direction of
these amendments was to improve liberal-
democratic standards, although some of them
dealt with rather trivial matters. Despite these
positive changes, it is generally agreed that it was
not possible to completely clear the illiberal and
tutelary spirit of the 1982 Constitution. In the summer
of 2007, constitutional debates took a new turn when
the governing Justice and Development Party (AK
Party) initiated a process for the making of an entirely
new constitution, as will be analyzed below.
The constitutional amendments of the 1990s, as well
as those of 2001 and 2004, were accomplished through
a process of intense interparty negotiations and com-
promises and adopted by strong majorities in
Parliament. Thus, it was hoped that after so many
decades of internecine interparty conflict, the time had
come for a period of "elite convergence," that would
result in the making of a liberal and democratic consti-
tution based on a broad consensus [The terms "elite
settlements" and "elite convergences" were developed
by Michael Burton, Richard Gunther and John Higley
in their "Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin
America and Southern Europe: an Overview" and in
John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., "Elites and
Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and
Southern Europe" (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1992), pp. 323-24, 339]. However,
the constitutional crisis of 2007 seems to have baf-
fled this hope of elite convergence, as will be spelled
out below. At the time of this writing, Turkey seems
to be in a deep constitutional crisis and deadlock
with little hope of achieving constitutional consoli-
dation in the near future.
The constitutional crisis of 2007-2008
Turkey's constitutional crisis took on an acute form
starting from the spring of 2007 and was triggered by
the conflict over the election of a new president of the approved by referendum on Oct. 21 with a 68.95 per-
republic. Article 102 of the Constitution in force at the cent majority and a turnout rate of 67.51 percent.
time had foreseen four parliamentary rounds for the
election of the president. The quorum needed was
two-thirds of the full membership of the assembly in
the first two rounds and an absolute majority of the full the annulment by the Constitutional Court of the
membership in the third and fourth rounds, a mini-
Historically speaking, none of the three
republican constitutions of Turkey was made
by a freely chosen and broadly representative
legislative assembly through a process of
interparty negotiations and compromises
mum of 367 and 276 votes, respectively. The
Constitution contained no special quorum rule for
opening the meeting of the assembly, in which case
according to the general rule in Article 96, the quorum
should have been one-third of full membership,
namely 184 deputies. At that time, the AK Party did
not have a sufficient majority to elect its own candidate Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Kurdish
in the first two rounds, but it did have a comfortable
majority to elect him in the third or fourth rounds.
At that point, maneuvers of dubious legal validity
started. It was claimed that a two-thirds majority in the
first round was not only the decisional quorum, but
also the quorum required for the opening of the ses-
sion. After the first round, in which a two-thirds
majority was not obtained because of the boycott of
opposition deputies, the main opposition party, the
Republican People's Party (CHP), carried the case to
the Constitutional Court, and the court, in an extreme-
ly controversial ruling rendered on May 1, endorsed
the claim of unconstitutionality.
As a result of this deadlock, Parliament decided to
call new elections as required by the Constitution. At
the same time, the AK Party majority in Parliament,
with the support of a minor opposition party, the
Motherland Party (ANAVATAN), amended certain
articles of the Constitution, shortening the legislative
period from five to four years and providing for the
popular election of the president for a maximum of
two five-year terms. The amendment was challenged
by outgoing President Ahmet Necdet Sezer before the
Constitutional Court, who also submitted it to a refer-
endum. However, this time the court rejected the claim
of unconstitutionality and the amendment was
The period starting from the so-called "367 crisis" can
indeed be characterized as a series of "constitutional
battles." The two other peak points of this battle were
amendments to Articles 10 and 42 of the Constitution
and the closure case against the AK
Party. The first issue is popularly
known as the "headscarf amendment."
Evidently, its aim was to abolish the
headscarf ban on female university stu-
dents by changing Article 10 on equali-
ty by adding the phrase "in the utiliza-
tion of all kinds of public services" and
adding a new paragraph to Article 42
on the right to education that runs as follows: "No one
shall be deprived of his/her right to higher education
for any reason not explicitly specified by law. The limits
on the exercise of this right shall be regulated by law."
The amendment was supported not only by AK Party
deputies, but also by those of the ultranationalist
nationalist Democratic Society Party (DTP) and some
independents. It was adopted by a record-high majori-
ty of 411 votes.
However, the amendment was carried to the
Constitutional Court by CHP and Democratic Left
Party (DSP) deputies, on the contention that it was
against the first three unamendable articles of the
Constitution (in this case, against the principle of secu-
larism) and therefore, null and void. On June 5, 2008,
the court, in another controversial ruling, annulled the
amendment. In fact, Article 148 of the Constitution
precludes substantive review of constitutional amend-
ments and limits the court's competence over them to
27
ARTICLE SPRING 2010
three specific procedural questions, i.e., whether the
proposal is signed and adopted by the required num-
ber of deputies and whether it is debated twice in the
plenary. The Constitution has no explicit or implicit
rule allowing the court to review the compatibility of a
constitutional amendment with the unamendable arti-
cles of the Constitution. Indeed, under the 1982
Constitution, the court rejected three requests for such
a review (one in 1987 and two in 2007), declaring itself
not competent in the matter.
The resulting situation gives the court almost total
power of control over constitutional amendments. The
characteristics enumerated in Article 2 ("a democratic,
secular and social state governed by the rule of law,
respectful of human rights, committed to the nationalism
of Atatürk, and based on the principles specified in the
preamble within an understanding of social peace,
national solidarity and justice") are so vague and broad
that almost no constitutional amendment can be con-
ceived that is not in one way or another related to one of
these characteristics. Thus, this interpretation amounts to
ILLUSTRATION: CEM KIZILTUÐ
an almost complete usurpation of the constituent power
by the Constitutional Court, which can only be described
as an extreme example of "juristocracy."
The constitutional crisis was further aggravated by
the closure case against the AK Party. In March 2008,
28
the chief public prosecutor of the Supreme Court of
Appeals opened a closure case against the AK Party.
He claimed that the AK Party had become a focal
point of anti-constitutional activities intended to
undermine the secular character of the state. Although
evidently he had been collecting evidence against the
AK Party for a long time, the start of the proceedings
seems to have been triggered by the constitutional
amendment concerning the headscarf issue.
On July 30, 2008, the Constitutional Court
announced its ruling (Constitutional Court decision, E.
2008/1, K. 2008/2, July 30, 2008, Resmî Gazete, Oct. 24,
2008, No. 27034). Even though a majority of the judges
(six out of 11) voted in favor of banning the party, the
qualified majority (three-fifths, or seven members out
of 11) required by the Constitution was not obtained.
Therefore, the party was not banned, but 10 members
concluded that the AK Party had become a focus of
anti-secular activities and decided to deprive it partially
of state funding (a sanction also provided by the
Constitution for less severe cases of violation).
The Constitutional Court's ruling conforms neither
to the European standards for party prohibitions devel-
oped by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) and the Venice Commission of the Council of
Europe nor even to the much more restrictive provi-
sions of the Turkish Constitution (Article 68). It is
based on a certain assertive and authoritarian under-
standing of secularism without parallel in any Western
democracy. One of the main justifications for its ruling,
according to the Constitutional Court, was the consti-
tutional amendment concerning the headscarf
issue, although the amendment was adopted by
a nearly three-fourths majority of the
assembly that included not only the
AK Party deputies but also those of the
MHP and the DTP. At any rate, con-
demning a party for an act of Parliament
that is clearly within the limits of its
constituent power is unheard of in the practice of
European democracies. Furthermore, many of the
accusations in the indictment of the chief public prose-
cutor are statements by party leaders and members
within the universally acceptable limits of the freedom
of expression.
Constitutional issues and political cleavages
The overtly antagonistic nature of the recent con-
stitutional debates cannot be properly understood
without an analysis of political cleavages in Turkey. It
is generally agreed upon that the origins of the pres-
ent party system in Turkey are based on a center-
periphery cleavage. Starting with the Ottoman times
and continuing in the republican era, the center was
essentially composed of the bureaucratic state elites
with a strong authoritarian and tutelary mentality as
the carriers of top-down Westernizing reforms with
little input from civil society. The periphery, on the
other hand, comprised all the other sectors of society
that had little or no part in the conduct of govern-
ment. With the transition to a multi-party system in
the late 1940s, the periphery was organized and rep-
resented by a series of center-right parties -- the
Democrat Party (DP), the Justice Party (AP), ANA-
VATAN, the True Path Party (DYP) and now the AK
Party -- while the CHP remained as the main repre-
Turkey seems to be as far away as ever from former
constitutional consensus and consolidation. for fear that the AK Party will establish a
The only way out of the present impasse
seems to be a clear and strong mandate
from the people for a new and truly
democratic constitution
sentative of the center. In the electoral arena, the
center-right parties always dominated the scene.
Thus, in 15 general parliamentary elections from
1950 to 2007, the average vote percentage of the cen-
ter-right (or right) parties was 63.5, as opposed to
33.8 percent for the left parties. In this period, the
percentage for the right parties varied between 55.7
in 1977 and 71.7 in 2007. However, this dominance
was interrupted by three direct military interventions
(1960, 1971 and 1980) and the so-called "postmod-
ern coup" of 1997 by another important actor of the
center, namely the armed forces.
The whole philosophy of the 1982 Constitution, as
outlined above, clearly reflects the authoritarian and
tutelary outlook of the center. Thus, once again we are
witnessing a struggle for power between the centrist
coalition (the CHP, the armed forces and the higher
judiciary) and the AK Party, which has established
itself as the main representative of the periphery. The
role of the higher judiciary in this conflict is evident not 6. William Hale and Ergun Özbudun, Islamism,
only in the three dramatic cases referred to above, but
also in many other lesser cases. Clearly, the higher
judiciary sees itself not as the defender of individual
29
rights and liberties but as the guardian of the "sublime
interests of the state." Hence the AK Party govern-
ment's plans to reform the judiciary in order to
strengthen its democratic legitimacy and the higher
judiciary's fierce resistance to such efforts. Although
the AK Party's project for an entirely new, liberal and
democratic constitution seems to have been shelved at
least for the time being, a partial constitutional amend-
ment addressing the most urgent "democracy deficits"
in Turkey is clearly needed.
Under these circumstances, it seems difficult to arrive
at a broad-based constitutional consensus in the short
and medium-run. There is a wide gap between the con-
stitutional positions of the AK Party and its liberal allies
on the one hand, and those of the CHP and its allies
among the state elites, namely the armed forces and the
higher judiciary, on the other. While the
intends to remove these tutelary
vestiges, the latter favors preserving them
majoritarian version of democracy that
will pave the way for an authoritarian
Islamic regime. Thus, Turkey seems to be
as far away as ever from constitutional
consensus and consolidation. The only
way out of the present impasse seems to
be a clear and strong mandate from the people for a
new and truly democratic constitution.
READ ALSO
1. Ergun Özbudun and Serap Yazýcý, Democratization
Reforms in Turkey, 1993-2004, Ýstanbul: TESEV, 2004.
2. Venice Commission, "Opinion on the Constitutional
and Legal Provisions Relevant to the Prohibition of
Political Parties in Turkey," Venice, March 13-14, 2009,
CDL-AD (2009) 006, paras. 30, 107.
3. Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Faruk Gençkaya,
Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-
Making in Turkey, Budapest and New York: Central
European University Press, 2009.
4. Ergun Özbudun, Türkiye'nin Anayasa Krizi, Ankara:
Liberte Yayýnlarý, 2009.
5. Ergun Özbudun, "Changes and Continuities in the
Turkish Party System," Representation, Vol. 42, No. 2
(2006), p. 130.
Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the
AKP, Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics,
New York and London; 2009.
ARTICLE SPRING 2010
The meaning of a
constitution and
constitutional
movements in
Turkey
Despite the fact that it bears signs
of Western standards in terms of
rights and freedoms, the 1961
Constitution gave way to military
guardianship and a split judicial
regime. The 1982 Constitution,
which transforms the democratic
and social state into a cliché,
serves as the major obstacle
before further democratization
and liberalization. Today, we have
a historic opportunity to make a
democratic and civilian constitu-
tion whose governing paradigm
and principles are built on nation-
al consensus
30
Ümit Kardaþ
T
here was no teaching of human
rights and fundamental freedoms
in the Ottoman Empire.
Restrictions on the sphere of the
political administration were
introduced much earlier in the
West. The principle of equality
before the law was promoted by the 1789
Revolution, whereas the 1848 revolutions all over
the Europe introduced principles of economic
equality. However, human rights received attention
in the Ottoman Empire only in the mid-19th centu-
ry. Behind the radical changes in the West we see
both powers of ideology (freedom, equality, liberal-
ism, individualism, democratic sovereignty) and
material powers (class and political struggle). The
developments in the West were outcomes of a
process of struggle.
The bourgeoisie, which attracted popular support
against feudal and aristocratic institutions, played a
determinative role in the West. This was not exactly
the case with the Ottoman Empire, which lacked a
tradition of creative thinking and a bourgeoisie class
that would readily fight for the restriction of the
administrative power and further rights and free-
doms. The primary concern in the period between
1789, when Selim III came to power, and 1918 was
to keep the multinational empire alive.
Subsequent to the French and American revolu-
tions, the Western world experienced the first wave
of constitutionalism in the US, France, Sweden,
Norway, Holland and Greece. During this period,
individual rights and freedoms were not recognized
in the Ottoman Empire, where there was no equali-
ty before the law or effective protection of life and
property. In an attempt to make some progress in
this field, the Ottoman rulers proclaimed the
Gülhane Hatt-ý Hümayun (Gülhane Royal Decree),
a move dictated by external actors. As a unilateral
action of the sultan, this document was in the form
of a decree. It was inherently insufficient in terms of
recognition of some fundamental rights and free-
doms; however, the decree was important consider-
ing that it was just a start. The reason for its insuffi-
ciency was the still immature liberalism in Ottoman
territories and the lack of a bourgeoisie class. But it
should be recalled that the decree made references
to such noble notions as equality before the law,
the inviolability of human dignity and the protec-
ILLUSTRATION: CEM KIZILTUÐ
tion of life and property.
Subsequent reformatory decrees were further pro-
claimed in the Tanzimat era to implement the
Gülhane Royal Decree, which described only gener-
al principles. The most important of the series of
decrees is the Islahat Fermaný (Improvement
Decree), whose proclamation was dictated by for-
eign powers. The objective of this decree was to
introduce equality for non-Muslims in the empire.
Both decrees were by no means constitutions.
The Western states as well as Balkan constitu-
tionalism have played a role in Turkey's transition
to a constitutional order. Romania (an autonomous
principality of the Ottoman state in this period)
adopted an electoral system via a constitutional
document introduced in 1834. This was interesting
31
considering that the Ottoman state silently
approved the transition of one of its principalities to
a constitutional system even though it did not have
one. The Romanian voters endorsed in a plebiscite a
constitutional document inspired by the Belgian
Constitution in 1864. Serbia, an autonomous princi-
pality back then, also created its own constitution in
1869.
First constitutional document of the Ottomans:
Kanun-i Esasi
The first constitutional document of the Ottoman
Empire was the Kanun-i Esasi (Basic Law), promul-
gated in 1876. Even though it introduced visible
innovations with respect to individual rights and
legal safeguards, the document did not create a
body or institution. Whether the Ottoman Basic
Law of 1876 is a constitution is a matter debate.
Münci Kapani holds that it was not a real constitu-
tion but a constitutional chart that could be viewed
as a grant to the people (Charte Constitutionelle).
Transition to the second constitutional order was
made via amendments in 1909 to the Basic Law,
which, this time, genuinely restricted the monarchy.
For the first time, a constitutional monarchy and
parliament were created in terms of the reinvention
of the state apparatus and individual rights.
The period in the aftermath of 1918 witnessed the
issue of creating a nation state. In this era, the 1921
Basic Law was the outcome of the ambition to carry
out the war of liberty relying on a constitution and a
legal foundation.
The Basic Law of 1924 was created by a regular
parliament in accordance with the classical constitu-
tional approach and methodology. The document
adopted a liberalist and individualist approach
referring to natural law with regard to the philo-
sophical roots and limits of rights and freedoms.
This approach is best visible in Article 68 of this
Constitution: "Every Turk is born free and leads his
life as a free man. Freedom means the ability to do
everything that shall not do any harm to others."
The article made no reference to the interests of the
state, national interests, the indivisible integrity of
the state with its nation, national security and pub-
lic interest as restrictions to the enjoyment of rights.
The liberal and individualist impact of the French
Revolution is observable in this document.
The 1961 and 1982 constitutions refrained from
liberal tendencies. The 1924 Constitution is more
ARTICLE SPRING 2010 ARTICLE IN BRIEF: The constitutions of Turkey were products of the historical environments they were created in. The 1921
and 1924 constitutions carry the signs of liberation and nation state formation as their priorities. The 1961 and 1982 constitutions were
products of constituent assemblies created under military rules and they were not based on national consensus. The 1982 Constitution can-
not be viewed as a real constitution and it is impossible to fix it because of its language, content and philosophy. Today, we have a historic
opportunity to make a democratic and civilian constitution whose governing paradigm and principles are built on national consensus.

liberal and individualist; the reference to "Turk" as rights and freedoms; however, this reference is
the subject of the rights and freedoms is the only linked to an ethnic identity -- Turkish nation or
contentious issue in this document. Article 88 of Turkish nationalism. The basic goal of the
the 1924 Constitution states that "people living in Constitution, the document says, is to create a
Turkey as citizens are considered Turks regardless democratic state based on the rule of law with all
of their religion and race." This statement acknowl- legal and social foundations. This Constitution was
edges the religious and racial differences but stress-pretty comprehensive in terms of classic rights and
es that the notion "Turkishness" does not bear a freedoms and social and political rights compared
to many European constitutions. It furthermore
religious or racial connotation and that it refers to a
geographical (Turkey's people) and political (bond restricts the sphere of authority of Parliament to
of citizenship) entity. I hold that even though this make sure that the legislative authority is not
emphasis did not intend to make a national or reli- employed to limit the scope of rights and freedoms.
gious reference, the subject points to a dominant ("The fundamental laws and freedoms shall be
ethnic identity. The citizen is the subject in a dem- restricted by law only in accordance with the letter
ocratic definition; therefore, it is not proper to and spirit of the Constitution," Article 11). While Is the 1982 Constitution a real constitution?
define ethnic identity. the main subject of the rights and freedoms spelled The 1982 Constitution, which was created in the
The 1924 Constitution envisaged a system where out in the 1924 Constitution was the "Turk" and aftermath of a military coup, sanctifies the state,
the power to legislate and the power to administer the "Turks," the subject is "all people" in the 1961 leaves the individual unprotected, reinforces state
and govern were combined. This Constitution was Constitution. Therefore, the main subject is the authority and military tutelage and imposes serious
human being. However, this restrictions over fundamental rights and freedoms.
Constitution also created the In fact, constitutions are supposed to be based on
The 1982 Constitution sanctifies the state, National Security Council (MGK), a the fundamental rights and freedoms spelled out in new state and power
leaves the individual unprotected, reinforces semi-military institution whose the declarations. The letter and spirit of a constitu- that emerged in the cir-
state authority and military tutelage and functions and duties are prescribed tion is to introduce principles, institutions and rules cumstances of the
imposes serious restrictions over fundamental in the Constitution; this institution that will help achieve a social cohesion that envis- Turkish War of
was further given administrative ages further democracy, peace and harmony. It is Independence. The leaders
rights and freedoms powers by the Constitution, which not proper to describe texts that do not serve to of the war wanted to rely on
also created a military Supreme achieve this goal as constitutions. For this reason, it legitimacy and legality and stage
more like a majority democracy rather than a plu- Court of Appeals that expands the sphere of the the war under the existence of a new constitution.

ILLUSTRATION: CEM KIZILTUÐ

ralist one. The primary reason for this outcome was
the perception that the main issue was to trans-
form and modernize the state and the society back
then. Its rejection of a constitutional review of the within its competence.
law, its reference to the Council of State as an
organ of the political administration and its
acknowledgment of the role of extraordinary courts
of law were all about the political and ideological
goals of the new regime. By this Constitution, the
judiciary was actually asked to serve as the watch-
dog of the regime and the republican revolutions.
Besides, judicial review of administrative and leg-
islative actions was discouraged in this period. The while freedom was the rule and restriction the
single-party regime, contrary to the Constitution,
was authoritarian and repressive in terms of rights
and freedoms.
1961 Constitution and the
creation of a military judiciary
The preamble of the 1961 Constitution, drafted
in the aftermath of a military coup, refers to some
is not possible to view the 1982 Constitution as a
military judiciary. The Constitution provides that real constitution considering its content, process of
the military judicial institutions may prosecute creation and the procedure by which it was adopt-
civilians in connection with some actions that fall ed. The 1982 Constitution further expanded the
sphere of military tutelage. The amendments made
The military has become more influential over to this Constitution in connection with the recom-
the political administration subsequent to amend- mendations spelled out in the EU progress reports
ments made to the Constitution in the aftermath did not ensure a radical change in its letter, spirit,
of the 1971 military intervention with respect to objective or philosophy. It is not possible to fix this
the organization and powers of the MGK; more Constitution because of its language, content and
importantly, the Military Administrative Court philosophy. This Constitution, which transforms
was authorized to review administrative actions the democratic and social state into a cliché, serves
and processes by military personnel. Moreover, as the major obstacle before further democratiza-
tion and liberalization.
exception in the 1961 Constitution, the military The procedure followed in
intervention sought to reverse this. The number of drafting the Turkish Constitution
reasons and justifications to restrict rights and The National War of Liberation in Turkey started
freedoms was increased in the Constitution with with local and regional congresses representing
further amendments later on that introduced willingness and determination, from the Sivas
vague restrictions including the indivisible integri- Congress through the Turkish Parliament. The need
ty of the state with the nation. for a new constitution was raised with regard to the
The draft that was prepared by a committee of
executive deputies and then referred to the assem-
bly was more like the action plan of a government.
The fact that this paper was referred to as a pro-
gram for people was a confirmation of this argu-
ment. The draft was a culmination of a long process
from the local congresses through the creation of a
national assembly. It should be noted that civilian
elements were at the forefront in the foundation of
the republican regime. The draft sought to consoli-
date national unity rather than introduce restric-
tions upon the political administration, and it put
an emphasis on the assembly as the sole represen-
tative of the nation.
The 1924 Constitution was created by the second
national assembly on April 20. The constitutional
committee acted unilaterally and referred a draft to
the general assembly without being asked to do so.
Despite the fact that the Grand National Assembly
was not a founding parliament, it was considered

32 33
ARTICLE SPRING 2010

fully authorized to make a new constitution because A second draft was prepared by the faculty of attempt to show that discussion and consensus over
it was held that it had an inherent right to represent political science at Ankara University. A referendum governing principles are easier:
the nation. The goal was to create a strong state was another first in the process whereby the 1961 1. A constitution makes no reference to institu-
order; however, Parliament -- and not the adminis- Constitution was adopted. Despite the fact that it tions facilitating military guardianship; military
tration -- should be the center of this strength. The bears signs of Western standards in terms of rights bureaucracy is under civilian command; and exter-
1924 Constitution represented a liberal worldview and freedoms, the 1961 Constitution gave way to nal security is the number one job of the military.
in terms of human rights and freedoms. The 1921 military guardianship and a split judicial regime. The 2. Judicial independence and impartiality are the
Constitution was a unique example that was an amendments made to this Constitution in 1971 fundamental elements of the right to a fair trial. The
interim solution and a product of the circumstances removed the noble items and consolidated the mili- achievement of such independence and impartiality
of that period, stretching from the War of tary tutelage. For the first time, a clause creating a will resolve the issue of a split judiciary.
Independence through the foundation of the repub- higher military administrative court was inserted in 3. People are born as free men. The task of the
lic. The 1924 Constitution, on the other hand, rep- the Constitution. The multiparty regime that became administration and the state is to make sure that
resents transition to a period where the revolutions unstable because of economic turmoil and increased everybody enjoys the human rights and freedoms
were fully implemented and the nation state was terrorist activities which started in 1975 faced a vio- that are legally safeguarded. Exceptions and restric-
lent military coup staged on Sept. 12, tions that impede the enjoyment of these rights and
1980. The MGK created a constituent freedoms are unacceptable. Fundamental rights and
The constitution should make no reference assembly by a law promulgated on freedoms are interpreted in light of international
to institutions facilitating military June 29, 1981. The assembly assigned conventions and judgments rendered by the
guardianship and it should guarantee pro- a commission of 15 members for European Court of Human Rights.

ILLUSTRATION: CEM KIZILTUÐ

drafting of a constitution. Written 4. Freedom of expression can be restricted only
tection of the rights, cultures, customs and on grounds of promotion of violence, provocation
statements and recommendations
languages of the people living in Turkey were received from relevant institu- and defamation.
tions and experts during the prepara- 5. The Constitution guarantees protection of the
built. However, the multiparty regime was aban- tory stage of the draft. The Constitution was dis- rights, cultures, customs and languages of the peo-
doned in 1960, when a military coup was staged cussed at an advisory assembly and approved by the ple living in Turkey. It ensures peaceful coexistence
and a new constitution was sought. The 1961 MGK. The draft was ratified in a plebiscite held on with all our differences.
Constitution is the outcome of the military coup Nov. 7, 1982. 6. The republic, an indivisible whole, recognizes
and the conditions that laid the groundwork for National consensus for a civilian constitution local autonomy in order to strengthen the principle
that coup. This Constitution was drafted at a time The 1921 and 1924 constitutions were the out- of local administration, and it does this taking
when a military administration was still in power by comes of special periods and conditions and were should be referred to Parliament for further deliber- administrative regions into consideration. This is
an elitist assembly of representatives and the created by Parliament without seeking national ations and debate. Finally, the text approved at the particularly important to help in resolving the
National Unity Committee (MBK), where 37 mili- consensus for the constitutional principles assembly should be voted on by the people. The Kurdish problem.
tary officers served as delegates. enshrined within. The 1961 and 1982 constitutions, work and studies during these stages should all be 7. The state is a non-ideological apparatus created
The first constituent assembly however, were made by the advisory assemblies transparent, and the views and contributions of the to protect the rights and freedoms of all segments
For the first time in 1961, Turkey experienced the created by the coup-makers, who imposed their community and individuals should be received. The of society and individuals, to ensure the enjoyment
creation of a constitution by constituent assembly. logic on these assemblies. To conclude, the consti- procedure by which it was drafted is as important as of these rights and freedoms, to achieve social and
Even Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the tutions made thus far were drafted in the absence of the content of a constitution. Fulfillment of the individual welfare and to overcome poverty within
republic, preferred a more moderate option over a a national consensus on the governing principles; principles and goals of the new constitution the framework of the rule of law.
constituent assembly because of strong reactions for this reason, they failed to last for a long time. depends on the existence of a broad national con- 8. The security expenses and activities (of the mil-
against it. There were three stages in the making and Today, we have a historic opportunity to make a sensus. The American Constitution of 1787 and the itary, the police and the national intelligence
ratification of the 1961 Constitution: preparation of democratic and civilian constitution whose govern- 1978 Spanish Constitution are fine examples of this. agency) and the preparation of the National
the preliminary drafts, parliamentary debate and a ing paradigm and principles are built on national The new constitution should be comprehensive Security Policy Document are handled under the
referendum. The MBK and the military assigned consensus. Constitutions are documents of national and inclusive to the extent that even minorities feel oversight of Parliament.
seven law professors from the faculty of law at Ýstan- consensus. This national consensus should be they are represented by it. Authoring the articles is National consensus over general principles, some
bul University for preparation of a preliminary draft achieved via comprehensive agreement by a repre- a technical job that constitutes the final stage of the of which are presented above, and the creation of a
constitution. This academic committee was further sentative and authoritative board over the funda- making of the constitution. It is difficult to achieve new constitution via a civilian process are critical for
expanded to include three other professors from mental paradigm and principles of a constitution; consensus on technical matters; conversely, a con- the full realization of the principles and goals of this
Ankara University and created a preliminary draft subsequently, a commission of experts should work sensus on general principles is easier. For this rea- Constitution and increased popular support for the
that was subsequently referred to the MBK. on the articles of the draft, and the final product son, I would like to make the following points in an entire process.

34 35
ARTICLE SPRING 2010
Religion,
U
education and
the Turkish
Constitution:
a critical
assessment
The current state of affairs in
Turkey regarding the issues of reli-
gion, education and the
Constitution contradicts the most
important dimensions of freedom
of religion or belief. Three major
problem areas are the existence of
a Directorate of Religious Affairs,
the obligatory religion courses in
primary and higher education and
the headscarf ban that closes the
gates of universities to the veiled
women. The urgent need for a con-
stitutional and statutory reform is
still waiting to be realized for
Turkey to fulfill not only its interna-
tional legal obligations but also to
eradicate internal conflicts in its
legal system
36
Levent Köker
nder the title of "the right to free-
dom of conscience, religious belief
and conviction," Article 24/4 of the
Turkish Constitution stipulates that
"[e]ducation and instruction in reli-
gion and ethics shall be conducted
under state supervision and control.
Instruction in religious culture and moral education
shall be compulsory in the curricula of primary and sec-
ondary schools. Other religious education and instruc-
tion shall be subject to the individual's own desire, and
in the case of minors, to the request of their legal repre-
sentatives." Although the wording states quite explicitly
that there are two different kinds of religious education,
one compulsory, the other optional, this important
clause has been interpreted and implemented as if the
Constitution promulgates only compulsory religious
education in primary and secondary schools. Moreover,
"education and instruction in religion and ethics" is
understood most commonly by state authorities as the
instruction of the fundamental principles of (Sunni)
Islam as approved of by the Directorate of Religious
Affairs (Diyanet). This practice of religious education
has not only led to a series of violations regarding free-
dom of religion or belief, but has also been a source of
deep controversy among Muslim and non-Muslim
communities and individuals in Turkish society.
Even if the rights of non-Muslim communities and
individuals have been under the protection of the
Treaty of Lausanne, the state authorities' interpretation
of the stipulations pertaining to the rights of non-
Muslim minorities have always been suspicious vis-à-
vis the language used therein and the universal princi-
ples of the modern rule of law. Explicitly put, the official
interpretation of the term "non-Muslim minorities"
includes only Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish
communities, whereas no specific religious or ethnic
community has been mentioned in the treaty. This offi-
cial interpretation of the treaty, therefore, led to a neg-
lect of the rights and liberties of ancient Syriac,
Nestorian and Chaldean Christian communities or
caused some problems regarding freedom of religion
for newly formed communities.
Leaving aside the problems faced by non-Muslim
communities, major problems caused by the constitu-
tional provision mentioned above pertain to the rights
and freedoms of the vast majority of Turkish society
who regard themselves as Muslims. In contrast to an
outsider's view of Turkey as a predominantly Muslim
society, there happen to be sharp differences, hence a The formation and increasing role of the Diyanet
highly significant degree of cultural and religious plu- Established territorially in a region (mostly Anatolia)
ralism reflected in certain fault lines like that of the whose inhabitants had become "Islamized," the
Sunni-Alevi divide, or that of Hanafi and Shafii (mostly
Kurdish) denominations within the Sunni majority, or
Turkish Republic was inevitably faced with the problem
of religion as an important part of the emerging nation-
that of the practicing and non-practicing members al identity. Anatolia, historically being a territory with
within the greater society, etc. As each of these groups almost a third non-Muslim population in the 19th and
might have developed their own understanding of reli- early 20th centuries, has become a 99 percent Muslim
gious belief and practice, the undifferentiated imple-
mentation of the constitutional provision has caused
serious stress, controversy and human rights violations
land due to the Armenian "Great Catastrophe" of 1915
and the population exchange with Greece in 1924. The
"asset tax" law of 1942 (Varlýk Vergisi) which discrimi-
reflected in some recent decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Turkish
nated against non-Muslims, and the riots of Sept. 6-7,
1955 should be noted also as major historical events
Council of State (hereafter
Danýþtay). In addition to this
major problem area caused by
that contributed to the almost
total disappearance of non-
Muslims from Turkey, leaving
Leaving aside the
problems faced by
non-Muslim com-
the misinterpretation of the very small Greek and Armenian munities, major
communities in Ýstanbul and in problems caused
compulsory education in reli-
by the Constitution
gion, there are also other consti- some Anatolian towns, and very
few and marginalized communi-
pertain to the
tutional promulgations related to rights and free-
any discussion of the legal status ties of ancient Christians mainly doms of the vast
and practice of freedom of reli- in the south and the east. majority of Turkish
society who regard
gion or belief in contemporary Thus, the Kemalist founders of
themselves as
Turkey. If one example is the the republic in 1923 had to face a
Muslims
ban on the headscarf in higher dilemma: The population of the PHOTO: TURGUT ENGÝN
education, the other is the con- republic consisted of different
stitutional status of the Diyanet. ethnic groups such as Turks,
What follows is a critical Kurds, Laz, Albanians,
assessment of the present Circassians, etc., who were unit-
Turkish Constitution regarding ed under the banner of Islam for
national (millî, a term reflecting
the ways in which it stipulates
the relations between religion, still the old Ottoman meaning of
education and the state. Since a religious community) struggle.
the universal standards of free- The founders, on the other hand,
dom of religion or belief provide for the guidelines of had a project of modernizing society from above, using
the critical analysis I wish to pursue, and so far as these the power of the state to establish a new nation-state,
standards include the establishment clause, the free and in order to realize this project they had to replace
exercise clause and the requirement of equal respect, the religious institutions, most notably the Caliphate
the assessment will focus on three major problem areas and the office of the Þeyhülislam, the superior authority
in Turkey. The first problem area concerns the institu- in religious matters. The historical but partial resolution
tional framework within which the relations between of this dilemma took place in 1924 when a law passed
religion, education and the state have been established, by Parliament abolished the Caliphate and the office of
that is, the historical formation and present status of the the Þeyhülislam, establishing instead the Diyanet. I say
Diyanet. The second problem area pertains to the ways the resolution was "partial" because these legal-institu-
in which the constitutionally compulsory education in tional changes had to be supported by cultural policies
religion and ethics is understood and implemented. to eradicate the strong religious (Islamic) element that
Finally, the third problem regards the now famous existed in the traditional national identity.
issue of the ban on women students wearing the head- Resulting from the failure of establishing a culturally
scarf in higher education. pluralist polity with Muslim and non-Muslim commu-
37
ARTICLE SPRING 2010 ARTICLE IN BRIEF: This article is a critical assessment of the present Turkish Constitution regarding the ways in which it stipu-
lates the relations between religion, education and the state. The article focuses on three major problem areas in Turkey. The first problem
area concerns the institutional framework within which the relations between religion, education and the state have been established (the
Diyanet). The second problem area pertains to the ways in which the constitutionally compulsory education in religion and ethics is imple-
mented. Finally, the third problem is the now famous issue of the ban on women students wearing the headscarf in higher education.

nities, the republic had established the new institution
of the Diyanet. The new institution had been so organ-
ized as to deal with the problems of Muslims in ethics
(ahlâk), faith (itikadât) and worship (ibadât), giving the
law-making and judicial powers of the office of the
Þeyhülislam to the legislature, that is, the Turkish
Parliament, and to the secular courts.
When this new institutional design took place in
1924, the constitution of the new republic had an article
stating that "the religion of the Turkish state is the reli-the Prime Minister. In the 1982 Constitution, however,
gion of Islam." Reflecting the dominant role of Islam in
mobilizing Anatolian Muslims for national struggle, this
article would be abolished in 1928, and the principle of
laicism (secularism) would be constitutionalized some
nine years later, in 1937.
As for the issue of religious education, having stated
already the provisions for non-Muslims in the
Lausanne Treaty, for the Muslim population, we have
to mention that religious education continued at all lev-
Starting with the university reform of 1933,
which closed down both the Darülfünun and its
school of theology, religious education was
erased from school curricula at all levels in
organized education until 1949
els of organized education in Turkey until the early
1930s, when authoritarian secularist policies were
adopted. Starting with the university reform of 1933,
which closed down both the Darülfünun (meaning lit-
erally the realm of sciences, a name given to a modern
higher education institute established in the late 19th
century) and its school of theology, religious education
was erased from school curricula at all levels in organ-
ized education until 1949.
With an increasing visibility in the public and political one of the immutable principles of the Turkish
role of Islam after Turkey's transition to a multi-party
politics in 1945, a new theology school was opened
together with religious vocational schools to educate
imams and preachers, hence the allowing of optional
religion courses in primary and secondary schools after
1949. Together with the increasing public and political
role of Islam in Turkey, and as a consequence of socie-
tal modernization and popular understanding by rela-
tively conservative-minded parents of religious voca-
tional schools as places where children learn their reli-
gion properly, the numbers of these schools increased.
The overall modernization of Turkish society, thus, political violence, especially among Turkish youths, in
resulted in the increasing role of the Diyanet in public the 1970s was the lack of education with the aim of the
and educational affairs. internalization of national values (again, the term millî
The increasing role of the Diyanet can be seen most is used to imply Islamic traditions).
notably in the change of its constitutional status. The Problems arising from the constitutional status and
institution had no constitutional status when it was the actual practice of compulsory religious education
established in 1924. In the 1961 Constitution, the As the foregoing passage suggests, the relationship
Diyanet gained constitutional status as an organ of the between religion and the state has been changed from
central state administration, attached to the Office of "religion as the legitimizing ideology" to "religion as an
instrument of political control," the latter becoming
the status of the Diyanet was redefined so as to func- more and more explicit as the need for increased state
tion "in accordance with the principles of secularism, control over society increased. The abolishment of the
removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming caliphate and the office of the Þeyhülislam, the estab-
at national solidarity and integrity" (Article 136). lishment of the Diyanet and the
Reflecting a conservative and authoritarian reaction in acceptance of the unification of
Turkish politics to the social and political unrest and instruction (Tevhid-i Tedrisat)
street violence in Turkish society during the 1970s, this have marked the initial phases of
provision gives the Diyanet the duty to provide for cul- a project to establish a modern
tural (ideological) means of social integration. state with a united, homogeneous
Even if this constitutional arrange- national culture. So far as this
ment is sufficient to show the increas- "nation-building" project has
ing public and political role of the succeeded in social and economic
Diyanet, we cannot help but mention modernization, the ensuing pub-
another provision in Article 89 of the lic presence of religious, denomi-
Political Parties Act. Placed under the national and cultural differences
part of the act that promulgates prohi- has alarmed the state to the
bitions for political parties, Article 89 extent that it has worked to find
stipulates an important prohibition for new institutional mechanisms for
the protection of the secular state which reads as fol- societal control. This need backed
lows: "Political parties cannot pursue aims that violate by the authoritarian-conservative
Article 136 of the Constitution pertaining to the organi- idea that religion and traditional
zation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs functioning culture are an important pillar of societal integration
in accordance with the principles of secularism, paved the way for the promotion of the constitutional-
removed from all political views and ideas and aiming legal status of the Diyanet and the acceptance of com-
at national solidarity and integrity." This stipulation has pulsory religious education in primary and secondary
a kind of constitutional status, for it is formulated so as school curricula.
to protect secularism, which in turn has been defined as The official justification for this change in the
approach of the state towards religious education has
Constitution. been provided by the National Security Council
This increased role of the Diyanet in Turkish public (MGK):
and political life is further reinforced by its central role "By taking this new decision, religious education will
in designing the curricula of compulsory religious edu- be introduced in every primary, middle and high school
cation in primary and secondary schools. Leaving the on a compulsory basis. Consequently our pupils will
discussion of the problems created by this institutional receive religious education from state schools. In the
framework to the following section, we have to empha- majority of Western countries religious education is
size that the authoritarian conservative mentality that given by schools. In fact, compulsory religious educa-
placed its stamp on almost every aspect of the current tion in schools is compatible with secularist principles.
Turkish Constitution has shared the judgment that the In this matter Ataturk stated, ‘Religion must be taken
fundamental reason that gave way to the outbreak of out from the hands of ignorant people, and the control
should be given to the appropriate people.' For these
reasons, we will introduce compulsory religious educa-
tion in our schools."
This official justification of the acceptance of compul-
sory religious education by the military junta of the
1980s refers to the "undisputable" and "infallible" per-
sonal cult of Atatürk and tries to reconcile this policy
choice with secularism and a modern idea of religious
education in democratic and secular societies. Attempts
at reconciling compulsory religious education in Turkey
with the experience of Western democracies have not
been confined to the views of the military founders of
the 1982 Constitution. Referring occasionally to the
wording of Article 24 of the
Deciding on a case
Constitution, many supporters of filed by the parents
compulsory religious education in of a fourth grade
Turkey argue that the courses in student in primary
school, the 5th
fact aim at providing students with
Administrative
knowledge about religion in gen- Court in Istanbul
eral, Islam in particular and ethics. ruled that the state
So far as the wording of the authorities' denial
Constitution is concerned, it is not
of the parents'
request that their
easy to say that it is incorrect since child be exempted
the Constitution makes a distinc- from compulsory
tion between "education and religious courses
violates both the
instruction in religious culture and
ethics" and "other religious educa-
Constitution and the
European
tion." Three cases, all filed by Convention on
Turkish citizens belonging to the Human Rights
PHOTO: UÐUR ÖZTÜRK
Alevi community, one in the
ECtHR (Hasan and Eylem Zengin
v. Turkey, 2007) and two others in the Danýþtay, how-
ever, suggest that the compulsory education in religion
has been implemented as a kind of catechistic instruc-
tion of Sunni Islam and discriminates against the Alevi
identity.
Deciding on a case filed by the parents of a fourth
grade student in primary school, the 5th Administrative
Court in Istanbul ruled that the state authorities' denial
of the parents' request that their child be exempted
from compulsory religious courses violates both the
Constitution and the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). Mentioning the different types of reli-
gious education stipulated in Article 24 of the
Constitution, the court decided that the current practice
of compulsory religious instruction is against the
Constitution and also violates Article 2 of Protocol No.
1 of the ECHR, which requires government respect for
parents' philosophical and religious beliefs in educa-

38 39
ARTICLE SPRING 2010

tion, with an absolute failure of enabling the child to
develop critical approaches to religious claims. This pre- convictions, be they religious or philosophical, through-
liminary court decision of 2006 was approved by the
Danýþtay in 2008. In its 2008 decision, the Danýþtay
refers to the 2007 decision of the ECtHR. The impor-
tance of the dates is that even though the preliminary
court decision had been made before the ECtHR
explained its verdict on the case Hasan and Eylem
Zengin vs. Turkey (the Zengin Case), the Ýstanbul court
followed almost an identical line of reasoning.
The importance of the ECtHR decision in the Zengin
case is that the court establishes the actual practice of
compulsory religious education as violating the ECHR.
According to the ECtHR:
The TCC exceeded the limits of its competences as a
judicial organ entitled to settle a dispute over the
constitutionality (and hence legal validity) of a
statutory law and functioned like a legislative body,
regulating what the notion of freedom entails
other subjects. It enjoins the State to respect parents' reforms, do not satisfy the demands of the Alevi com- and Atatürk's secularism, the basic motive behind the
munity. On the other hand, there are also other groups polished scenes has been that of establishing an
out the entire State education programme." (The quo- and individuals in Turkish society who are not Alevis authoritarian system of social and political control.
tations are from "Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey," but are still against compulsory religious education, no The ban on women's head coverings in higher edu-
[Appl. No. 1448/04], ECtHR, Oct. 9, 2007, paragraphs matter what the curricula is. Although we have no case cation: A Turkish peculiarity!
48 and 49.) filed representing these radical secularist groups and In December 1988 a law was passed by the Turkish
Now, according to Article 90 of the Turkish individuals in society, their voice hitherto unheard does Parliament stipulating that "it is compulsory to show
Constitution, as amended in 2004, "In the case of a not mean that they do not exist. up in contemporary attire in institutions of higher edu-
conflict between international agreements in the area of Another important point worth mentioning here is cation, in classrooms, laboratories, clinics, policlinics
fundamental rights and freedoms duly put into effect that the Diyanet uncompromisingly asserts that the and the corridors. It is acceptable to cover the shoulders
and the domestic laws due to differences in provisions Alevis do not make up a different identity to be recog- and hair with a scarf or turban for reasons of religious
on the same matter, the provisions of international nized. In stark contrast to the self-image and self belief." The former leader of the military junta, who
agreements shall prevail." The ECHR, beyond doubt, understanding of the Alevi community as a different became the president after the approval of the 1982
falls into that category of international agreements that sect within the Islamic religion Constitution by popular vote,
There has been no
shall prevail over the domestic statu- with its own particular symbols filed a case against this law, statutory law stipu-
tory laws that contradict its provi- and rituals and their resulting arguing that it is unconstitutional lating women's
sions. In view of the above quota- demands such as the public for reasons of violating not only dress in public or in
tions from the European court deci- recognition of the cemevi as a the fundamental and immutable
institutions of high-
er education during
sion, there shall be no doubt that "place of worship," the Diyanet principle of secularism men- or after Atatürk,
there is a conflict with domestic laws constantly emphasizes that the tioned in Article 2 of the and there is still no
in Turkey that regulate compulsory Alevis belong to the same reli- Constitution and protected by such legally binding
religious education. Thus, an idea gious tradition as Sunni Islam Article 4, mentioning its
norm, except the
TCC decision of 1991
still prevailing in the Diyanet and and that the cemevi cannot be immutability, but also other con- PHOTO: ÝSA ÞÝMÞEK

"The right of parents to respect for their religious and with some scholars of Islamic theology -- including the recognized as a place of worship. stitutional provisions such as the
philosophical convictions is grafted on to this funda- president of the Diyanet, Professor Ali Bardakoðlu -- It should be noted that public Article 10 provision of equality
mental right, and the first sentence does not distin- and academics in Turkish divinity schools that the deci- recognition of the cemevi as a before the law, the Article 24
guish, any more than the second, between State and sion of the European court does not require a reorgani- place of worship not only provision of freedom of religion,
private teaching. In short, the second sentence of zation of religious education courses as optional seems means recognizing the Alevi conscience and conviction and
Article 2 aims at safeguarding the possibility of plural- to be groundless. identity, it will also result in Article 174, which protects the
ism in education, a possibility which is essential for the Despite this clear and legally binding verdict of the creating some material benefits modernizing reforms made dur-
preservation of the ‘democratic society' as conceived by European court, the Diyanet's insistence on sustaining for the Alevi community, ing Atatürk's single-party rule. In
the Convention. In view of the power of the modern the existing compulsory constitutional status of reli- including reduced payments for 1989, the Turkish Constitutional
State, it is above all through State teaching that this aim gious education suggests that the majoritarian under- expenses such as electricity or Court (TCC) made its decision
must be realized. … standing of Sunni Islam prevails. Much has been said water, etc., benefits shared by mosques and recog- accordingly and established a very important verdict
"Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 does not permit a distinc- and written on the ways in which these courses, even nized churches and synagogues. based on arguments of crucial importance that still
tion to be drawn between religious instruction and in their present content, modified after a series of In a similar vein, the Diyanet also emphasizes that have impacts on the continuation of the ban on
compulsory religious education, after a revised and women's head coverings in Turkish institutions of
reformed curricula, provides children with an adequate higher education.
knowledge of Alevism, whereas the Alevi community According to the TCC, the clause "for reasons of reli-
Treaty of Lausanne and freedom of religion still emphasizes their demand for non-compulsory reli- gious belief" is in contradiction with the principle of a
The most important stipulation regarding freedom of religion or belief is Article 38/2 of the treaty: "All inhabitants of gious education. democratic and secular rule of law because "national
Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance This ongoing conflict between the religious establish- sovereignty is the basis of democratic structure," thus a
of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals." [italics added]. All other articles in the treaty ment (Diyanet and its supporters) and the Alevi com- regulation that places heavy emphasis on the necessi-
pertaining to the rights and freedoms of minorities use the same language, like "all inhabitants of Turkey" or munity can also be read as a sign that the republican ties of religion cannot be democratic. From the perspec-
"Turkish nationals" without mentioning any specific religious or denominational community: "Turkish nationals establishment in Turkey does not want to lose its con- tive of the principle of secularism, the court states that
belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish trol over the religious and cultural practices of its citi- "only a secular state is a democratic state. …
nationals. In particular, they shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any zens. In spite of the fact that the military junta tried to Secularism is connected in individual and social levels
charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with justify the constitutional status of compulsory religious as well as in the affairs of the state with the requisites of
the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein." (Art. 40) [italics added]. education through references to Western democracies free thought that lie outside the metaphysical thought.

40 41
ARTICLE SPRING 2010
It renders it compulsory to fulfill the requisites of reason dom to cover one's head and shoulders, that is freedom
and science in regulating individual and social life." to wear a "headscarf or türban," is not included. With
Another of the TCC's arguments is that the freedom this decision, the TCC exceeded the limits of its compe-
to cover the "shoulders and hair for reasons of religious tences as a judicial organ entitled to settle a dispute
belief" contradicts the principle of equality before the over the constitutionality (and hence legal validity) of a
law because "from the perspective of the Constitution, statutory law and functioned like a legislative body,
religion is not a precondition for enjoying certain rights. regulating what the notion of freedom entails.
For those who believe in various different religions and Ever since, the women's headscarf has been one of
for those who do not believe in any religion, they are the main issues concerning freedom of religion or belief
free to express their religion and belief within the limits in Turkey. The case of Leyla Þahin v. Turkey in the
of freedom of religion and conscience. … In a secular ECtHR internationalized the problem, resulting in a
state which treats all citizens as equals regardless of European court decision establishing that the decisions
their belief in religious matters, differences of religion or of the Turkish court do not violate the ECHR. I wish to
denomination cannot be a reason for discrimination. In now draw attention to two interesting points regarding
the regulation against which the case is filed, however, the European court's decision on the Þahin case.
there happens to be recognition of a concession to the The first point pertains to the requirement of the
allegedly Islamic head covering. … Recognizing the presence of a law that restricts certain rights and free-
freedom to the cover shoulders and hair with a head doms mentioned in the ECHR. In the Turkish case,
covering or turban for reasons of religion, a way of giv- however, there is no statutory law restricting freedom
of dress in institutions of higher edu-
cation, but only the interpretation of
It is not clear why wearing headscarves is the TCC's 1991 decision mentioned
imposed only on women while abstinence above. The European court, howev-
from pork and alcohol is imposed on all er, decided that the term "law"
includes not only statutory law but
Muslims and obeying the Ten Commandments
high court decisions as well. This
is imposed on all Jews and Christians understanding of the term "law"
may not be mistaken, but in view of
ing directions, is in a sense an imposition. Forcing per- the TCC's decisions regarding the restrictions on the
sons to get dressed in this or that way and to cover freedom of religion or belief, I think the European
their heads would create a privilege from the perspec- court's broader definition of law including the TCC
tive of those who belong to a different or even to the decision is disputable for some important reasons. If
same religion." one reason is the fact that the TCC exceeded its compe-
All in all, in its initial verdict on the headscarf issue, tence as a judicial organ and attempted to function as a
the TCC regarded the recognition of freedom of dress legislative organ, the other and more important reason
including the headscarf for women in institutions of is that the TCC set rather undefined limits, not only to
higher education as unconstitutional. The importance the headscarf but also to the freedom of dress for all
of this decision lies in the fact that the court reiterated it individuals. Reiterating the evaluations made in the
on several occasions. In 1989, for instance, another law 1989 decision, the TCC concluded in 1991:
was passed by Parliament stipulating that "in institu- "Consequently, either for reasons of religious belief
tions of higher education, freedom of dress is recog- or for other reasons, the dress in institutions of higher
nized provided that the attire does not contradict pre- education must not contradict the modern situation. In
vailing statutory law." This time a case was filed by the the Constitutional Court decision [of 1989] mentioned
"main opposition party" (the Social-Democratic above, this point was explained as ‘Either religious or
People's Party, SHP) in Parliament, one of the subjects not, dress that is against being modern and that contra-
entitled to file a case as such according to the dicts regulations stipulated by the revolutionary codes
Constitution, with similar arguments. In this case, how- cannot be seen as adequate'."
ever, the TCC decided that the law is not unconstitu- The crucial point here is that, before going into a
tional and that in terms of the "freedom of dress," free- detailed argumentation on whether the ban on the
42
headscarf in institutions of higher education is justified,
as the TCC and the European court say, for the protec-
tion of "the rights and freedoms of others" and "public
order" and whether the ban is "necessary in a demo-
cratic society," we have to discuss if the ban is "pre-
scribed by law." As for an answer to this question, the
European court says the TCC decision is "law" that has
prescribed a limitation to a way of dress, the headscarf,
for the sake of enabling the TCC with the powers of a
legislature that may establish future restrictions on
other forms of dress which it does not see fit for a con-
temporary (modern) situation.
Together with Peter G. Danchin [see the Read Also
section of this article for Danchin's article on the issue],
one may think that "since the earliest days of the
republic, Turkey has had laws and decrees requiring
‘contemporary costume' in the
public sphere. Atatürk himself
signed a 1923 decree on dress and
the Hat Law of 1925, and the Law
Relating to Prohibited Garments
of 1934 required religious clothing
not to be worn outside of times of
worship and laid down dress
guidelines for students and civil
servants." Even though this is
true, we have to underline the fact
that there has been no statutory
law stipulating women's dress in
public or in institutions of higher
education during or after Atatürk,
and there is still no such legally
binding norm, except the TCC
decision of 1991. It should be
noted also with a heavy emphasis that the ban on the
headscarf in Turkish institutions of higher education
resulting from the so-called law established by the TCC
being put into practice strictly after the Feb. 28, 1997
military intervention, which resulted in the resignation
of the Erbakan government.
As for the other aspects of the European court deci-
sion on the Þahin case, I have to say that I am in
absolute agreement with Carolyn Evans, in whose criti-
cisms one may also find a thorough criticism of the
TCC decisions as well. According to Evans, writing on
the European court decisions on the Dahlab v.
Switzerland and Þahin v. Turkey cases, for instance, the
argument that the freedom to veil is against "gender
equality" cannot be sustained as a valid argument. For
43
Evans, "this is a serious issue that deserves proper con-
sideration, but it did not receive such consideration by
the court in either case. In both cases the court made
the assertion that wearing the veil is incompatible with
gender equality, but in neither case did it flesh out the
reasoning behind this statement beyond saying that it
‘appears to be imposed on women by a precept which
is laid down in the Koran.' The way in which the word
‘imposed' is used here is loaded. Most religious obliga-
tions are 'imposed' on adherents to some extent, and
the court does not normally refer to the obligations in
such negative terms. It is not clear why wearing head-
scarves is any more imposed on women by the Quran,
than abstinence from pork or alcohol is imposed on all
Muslims, or than obeying the Ten Commandments is
imposed on Jews and Christians. Both Ms. Dahlab and
Ms. Þahin lived in societies where
there was no imposition by the The TCC draws a dis-
state that required women to wear tinction between
particular religious clothing -- traditional, unedu-
cated and innocent
indeed, it is clear from the cases
that the governments in question
women covering
their heads in accor-
were unsupportive of the wearing dance with the tra-
ditions of rural life,
of Muslim clothing. In this cir-
and educated
cumstance, the adoption of the
women covering
headscarf by educated, intelligent their heads with
women might be better described what the TCC calls a
as voluntary compliance with "türban" as a sym-
bol of political
what they perceived to be a reli- Islam, threatening
gious obligation." the secular founda-
Another point that is worth men- tions of the republic
PHOTO: MUSTAFA KÝRAZLI
tioning here is the European
court's "justification for banning
the headscarf that it is incompati-
ble with a tolerant, secular society that respects the
rights and freedoms of others." According to Evans,
"there is no evidence that Ms. Þahin was intolerant of
the views of others. She did not engage in any behavior
that involved attempting to force her views on others.
She was not guilty of any disciplinary offence at univer-
sity other than those related to clothing and she did not
belong to any of the fundamentalist groups within
Turkey. At some level, the court seems to be saying
that anyone who is sufficiently serious about advertis-
ing the fact that they are Muslim must be, by definition,
intolerant. Of course, the court does not make that
point explicitly, but this equating of Islam with intoler-
ance (and Islamic woman with oppression) seems to
inform the court's judgment implicitly."
ARTICLE SPRING 2010
In the criticisms I quoted from Evans, one may easily
replace the word "court" with "the Turkish
Constitutional Court." Like the European court, the
TCC also established lines of reasoning and justifica-
tion almost identical to that of the European court.
One important difference of the TCC decisions, how-
ever, regards a distinction made between two types of
Turkish women. Echoing the unjustified argumenta-
tion mentioned above pertaining to the issue of gen-
der equality, the TCC draws a distinction between
traditional, uneducated and innocent women cover-
ing their heads in accordance with the traditions of
rural life, and educated women covering their heads
with what the TCC calls a "türban" as a symbol of
political Islam, threatening the secular foundations of
the republic.
This is a self-contradictory statement since, on the
one hand, women wearing headscarves are regarded
as victims of an intolerant and oppressive religious
The Diyanet thinks it represents the correct inter-
pretation of Sunni Islam and it has a self-image
that its interpretation of Islam as such must be
recognized and internalized by all Muslims in
Turkey, regardless of their sects or denominations tional
practice and, on the other, they are seen as bearers of
a political ideology, conscious of a political project
with the aim at undermining secularism and estab-
lishing an Islamic state. All these attempted justifica-
tions for the ban on women's head covers serve, on
the contrary, for the exclusion from public and educa-
tional life of many women who either insist on wear-
ing a headscarf as a fulfillment of the requisites of
their religion, or for other social and cultural activities effective legal protection provided in Article 89 of
that they have no chance of participating in unless
they put on their scarves or veils.
Coupled with the recognition of a kind of law-
making power to the courts, this self-contradictory
and unjustified line of reasoning seems to be the real
obstacle vis-à-vis the realization of a fuller freedom of
religion or belief not only in Turkey but also in the
contemporary world.
For reasons of space I refrain from going into a
detailed criticism of another TCC decision on the
"unconstitutionality" of some recent amendments
made in Articles 10 and 42 of the Turkish
44
Constitution. It should suffice here to point out that
the amendments in 2008 passed in Parliament by 411
votes out of a total of 550 had reinforced the meaning
of equality before the law (Article 10) and prohibited
any unlawful restriction on the right to education
(Article 42). Although the intention of the amend-
ments mentioned in the justification stated the desire
to lift the ban on women's headscarves, the wording
made no explicit mention of the ban, and despite a
clear restriction on the powers of the TCC in review-
ing the constitutionality of the constitutional amend-
ments, the TCC exceeded once again the constitu-
tional limits set on its judicial competence and decid-
ed that the amendments were unconstitutional.
Conclusion
Freedom of religion or belief entails three interrelated
dimensions. The first regards the obligation of the state
not to establish an official religion. Replacing the word
"Congress" with "the state," we may recite the First
Amendment of the US Constitution:
The state "shall make no law
respecting an establishment of reli-
gion." The second dimension, again
stated in the First Amendment, as
well as in other national and interna-
legal documents, regards the
free exercise of religion and belief.
The third dimension is the require-
ment on the part of state and public authorities and pri-
vate citizens to respect differences in religion or belief.
As for the first dimension, the constitutional and
legal status of the Diyanet seems to be violating the
burden on the state not to create an establishment
on religion. The constitutional status of the Diyanet
as a public administration unit with the task of
maintaining national unity and solidarity and the
the Political Parties Law are not the only reasons
behind this conclusion. The Diyanet is a good exam-
ple of a religious establishment created by the state
due to its huge public bureaucracy and its incompa-
rably high degree of enjoyment of public funds.
Perhaps the most important factor in this conclu-
sion, however, is the very fact that the Diyanet rep-
resents the correct interpretation of Sunni Islam and
that it has a self-image that its interpretation of
Islam as such must be recognized and internalized
by all Muslims in Turkey, regardless of their person-
al and community sects or denominations. So,
Alevis and Sunnis, Hanafis and Shafiis, practicing (2) Article 13 of the Turkish Constitution promulgat-
and non-practicing citizens of Turkey shall listen to ing that "fundamental rights and freedoms may be
and preferably follow what the Diyanet says about restricted only by law" and that there is no law restrict-
religious matters. In view of both the moral and ing student attire in institutions of higher education,
legal requirements embedded in the notion of free- and also Article 42 of the Turkish Constitution stipulat-
dom of religion or belief and the contemporary ing that no one can be deprived of the right to educa-
requirements of multiculturalism, this state estab- tion.
lishment of religion cannot be accepted. (3) The moral and legal principle of equal respect to
Disestablishment of the Diyanet as a constitutional which every human being is entitled to regardless of his
and public organ seems to be the most adequate or her religion or belief system.
solution that will fulfill the requirements of religious It seems to be the case that the current state of affairs
freedom and pluralism in Turkey. in Turkey regarding the issues of religion, education
Compulsory religious education curricula designed and the Constitution contradicts the most important
under the heavy influence of the Diyanet is another dimensions of freedom of religion or belief. The urgent
aspect of Turkey's practices violating "the establish- need for a constitutional and statutory reform is still
ment clause." Constitutional distinction between com- waiting to be realized for Turkey to fulfill not only its
pulsory instruction and education international legal obligations
"in religious culture and ethics" but also to eradicate internal The ban on women's
head coverings in
and other "optional" religious conflicts in its legal system and institutions of high-
education cannot be sustained as a perhaps more importantly to er education in
reason for the ongoing practice of become a country with full Turkey is a violation
religious education because there recognition of human freedom of the state's
requirement not to
is an apparent contradiction in conformity with the moral prohibit or interfere
between the current practice and requirements of contemporary with the free exer-
the requirement of the state to multicultural democracy. cise of religion. At
some point the uni-
respect the parents' religious
beliefs and philosophical convic- READ ALSO
versities had estab-
lished “convincing
tions. So, it seems necessary for Ýþtar B. Tarhanlý, Müslüman rooms” where
Turkey to opt for eradicating the Toplum, "Laik" Devlet, “enlightened” pro-
Türkiye'de Diyanet Ýþleri fessors tried to con-
compulsory status and establish-
vince veiled girls to
ing at least some form of optional Baþkanlýðý [Muslim Society, uncover themselves
courses in religious education. "Secular" State, The Presidency and come to the uni-
As for the ban on women's of Religious Affairs in Turkey], versity only after
they did so
head coverings in institutions of Ýstanbul: Afa, 1993. PHOTOS: TURGUT ENGÝN
higher education in Turkey and in Recep Kaymakcan, "Religious
view of the criticisms mentioned Education Culture in Modern
above both for the TCC and European court decisions, Turkey", ed. Marian de Souza et al., International
this seems to be a violation of the state's requirement Handbook of Religious, Spiritual and Moral
not to prohibit or interfere with the free exercise of reli- Dimensions of Education, Springer, Dortrect (Holland),
gion. The unjustified ban on women's head coverings 2006, pp. 449-460.
in Turkey violates: Carolyn Evans, "The 'Ýslamic Scarf' in the European
(1) Article 38/2 of the Lausanne Treaty and is against Court of Human Rights," in Melbourne Journal of
the law in a more general sense because according to International Law 4; (2006) 7(1), 52.
Article 37 of the same treaty "Turkey undertakes that Cf. Peter G. Danchin, "Suspect Symbols: Value
the stipulations contained in Articles 38 to 44 shall be Pluralism as a Theory of Religious Freedom in
recognized as fundamental laws, and that no law, no International Law," in The Yale Journal of International
regulation, nor official action shall conflict or interfere Law, Vol. 33:1, Winter 2008, pp. 1-61.
with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation, Mehmet Semih Gemalmaz, Türk Kýyafet Hukuku ve
nor official action prevail over them." Türban, Istanbul: Legal, 2005.
45
DEBATE SPRING 2010
TPR debate:
Turkey's defective
constitution
Turkey has been engaging in a fateful discussion about the future and nature
of its democracy. This is a multifaceted discussion. It has an intellectual
dimension running in conference halls and in academic papers. It has a
political dimension in Parliament and party headquarters. It even has a public
dimension that defines the content of dinner table conversation. Everyone is
speaking about where Turkey is going. A particular dimension of this discus-
sion is the constitutional amendment package the Justice and Development
Party has brought to Parliament and will probably carry to a referendum.
The Turkish Political Review (TPR) gathered together three individuals from
different political persuasions concerning the constitutional amendment to
debate a particular aspect of the package: reforming the high judiciary
46
T
he Turkish Political Review
(TPR) gathered together
three individuals, all from
different political persua-
sions concerning the consti-
tutional amendment, to
debate a particular aspect of
the package: reforming the
high judiciary. The amend-
ment package as it came to
the Turkish Parliament sug-
gests a redefinition of the
membership structures of
the Constitutional Court
and the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors
(HSYK); it restructures the relationship between the
civilian and military judiciaries; and it limits the authori-
ty of judicial organs over party closures. The TPR
brought three experts with differing views about the
reform to debate these judiciary-related aspects of the
package.
Ahmet Gündel is a retired chief prosecutor at the
Supreme Court of Appeals. He has been writing in the
national media on the constitutional amendment and
has been both supportive and critical of the package
article-wise.
Atilla Kart is both a professional lawyer and a deputy
from the main opposition Republican People's Party
(CHP) from Konya. He is understandably against the
package and is critical of not only the content of the
package, but also the subject of this amendment, i.e., he
thinks the Justice and Development Party (AK Party or
AKP [There is a redundant discussion in Turkey over
how to write the acronym of the Justice and
Development Party. The party prefers and has patented
its acronym as AK Party, but there are those who
oppose either the party or this form of the acronym and
47
prefer AKP instead. In this debate and in other articles Ahmet Gündel, a
in this volume we preferred to use whichever form the retired chief
prosecutor; Atilla
author or the speaker chose to use.]) is not a legitimate
Kart, a deputy from
player when it comes to drafting a constitution. the main opposition
The third speaker in the debate is Professor Mithat party; and Mithat
Sancar, a leftist and democratic intellectual, as he Sancar, a leftist
intellectual, partici-
defines his political stance. Despite the fact that he is
pated in the first TPR
critical of the AK Party government's timid steps on debate. Kerim Balcý
amending the Constitution, he believes the current was the moderator,
package fits with his ideals for Turkey's future. and Naci Bostancý
contributed to the
The TPR debate on the constitutional package took debate with his
place at a fairly early stage of the discussion in Turkey. observations
The debate on the public platforms continued, and the PHOTO: MEVLÜT KARABULUT
parliamentary commission even made some minor
changes to the draft.
Moderator: As far as I understand, there is consensus
over the need for a thorough constitutional reform in
Turkey. Even the honorary chief prosecutor of the
Supreme Court of Appeals, who criticizes the fact that
the AK Party is undertaking this mission, said, "Turkey
should do this, but this should not be done by the AK
Party." What aspects of this amendment concern the
judiciary?
Ahmet Gündel: Almost all actors agree that Turkey
needs an amended Constitution because this
Constitution is a product of the military coup staged in
1980. A review of this Constitution reveals that it
restricts the sphere of action of the civilian and elected
governments while expanding the space of action of the
military, judiciary and particularly the high judiciary. For
this and other reasons, many agree that this
Constitution needs to be changed. The need for consti-
tutional reform has become even more imminent
because of recent developments. However, there are
also some objections, claiming that this Parliament and
the AK Party government are not authorized to make
these changes because of the recent Constitutional
Court decision implying that the AK Party has become
DEBATE SPRING 2010
a center of anti-secularist activities. The council's decision to annul the Higher Education
Without delving into too many details, I would like to Board's (YÖK) introduction of a new coefficient system
stress that the need for a constitutional amendment is for university entrance exams was plainly illegal. [For
even more imminent at the present time. From the mil- more on the new coefficient system and its annulment
itary perspective, it is obvious that the April 27 memo- by the council, see Mustafa Þentop's "Council of State's
randum has served as a catalyst to make us ponder coefficient ruling: appellate judiciary and constitutional
such an amendment. The recently revealed secret plans order," pp. 98-101, and Ahmet Ünal's "What is the
to topple the government drafted by some military offi- problem: reactionaryism or parochialism?" pp. 102-108,
cers and the launch of a discussion as to whether the both in this issue.] A detailed review of this case
civilian or military judiciary is authorized to address this shows that there are serious violations involved.
issue and some rulings by some of the civilian prosecu- I should further recall that the office of the chief pros-
tors and courts referring these cases to the military judi- ecutor at the Supreme Court of Appeals is authorized to
ciary suggesting that they were competent to deal with file a dissolution case with the Constitutional Court
these cases show that such a constitutional amendment against a political party that receives millions of votes in
is a pressing need. The annulment of the amendment the general elections. In other words, the fate of a polit-
made to Article 250 of the Code on ical party, the sine qua non of a dem-
Criminal Procedure (CMK) by the ocratic political order, is at the discre-
Constitutional Court confirms the
This Constitution tion of a prosecutor. The chief prose-
urgency of an amendment. restricts the sphere cutor's frequent appearance in the
A review of legislative activities of action of the civil- media using a language of threats
reveals that the Constitutional Court implying that he may file another law-
has made gravely unlawful decisions
ian governments suit against the ruling AK Party is not
with respect to the decisions of while expanding that tolerable in any democracy.
Parliament, relying on the pretext of of the military, judici- If you look at the recent actions of
unconstitutionality. These decisions the HSYK, you would notice some
ary and particularly
give the impression that the court seriously illegal practices. For more
acted deliberately to circumvent the the high judiciary than 19 years I worked in the HSYK,
sphere of Parliament. The and I was directly affected by its prac-
Constitutional Court decision on the 367 quorum tices. But I will not mention these periods. Let me give
debate is the plainest example of this sort. Likewise, the some recent examples, however. The HSYK's decision
annulment of a package of constitutional amendments to review and discuss the decisions and deliberations
changing Articles 10 and 42 of the Constitution, which with respect to the Ergenekon investigation and its
introduced equality among students in educational eagerness to act on the side of the defendants in the
institutions, by the Constitutional Court was a real Ergenekon case confirm that an institution set up to
problem. The same could also be said with regard to ensure judicial independence actually undermines the
the court's decision to declare the AK Party a center of principle of judicial impartiality and independence.
anti-secularist activities. I should recall that these are I am not just talking about the change in the work-
not decisions that our nation can accept. places of judges and prosecutors overseeing this case.
Council of State: an alternative body of opposition This is the legal authority of the board. However, even
On the other hand, if you take a look at the Council in exercising this authority, the board may have pushed
of State, which supervises the actions of the executive its limits.
organs, it becomes obvious that the council transgresses It should also be recalled that the HSYK interfered
its authorities and violates the inviolability of the discre- with the content of the investigation into and the sub-
tion of the government, turning its supervision of sequent arrest of the Erzincan prosecutor as well as the
administrative action with respect to legality to some issuance of a subpoena for the commander of the 3rd
sort of supervision of appropriateness. It is also evident Army. Of course, changing who occupies the post of
that the Council of State arbitrarily interferes with polit- prosecutor is the natural authority and power of the
ical affairs and has become an alternative body of oppo- board. However, this change should have been carried
sition. out in accordance with procedure, law and custom.
48
Removing a prosecutor from office at a time when he power for eight years in Turkey. What would you nor-
had already initiated an investigation in a crucial case mally expect from a party that has been in power for
and after the police had made arrests in connection eight years? You would expect effective remedies to
with this ongoing investigation was not ethical or remove the contradictions in the system, fix the prob-
appropriate. This means there was interference with the lems and shortcomings and introduce visible solutions
judicial process. in the constitutional, social and economic fields. You
On the other hand, if you take a look at the Council would further expect measures to deal with unemploy-
of State, it becomes evident that the council acts with ment, poverty and other social problems. These are the
political motives on key issues and makes annulment duties and jobs of political administrations. But what do
decisions accordingly. In addition, the chief prosecutor we have instead? We have a party identity that has
of the Supreme Court of Appeals serves as a major exploited the entire system during this period, created
obstacle to and blocker of political parties. The HSYK, its own capital groups, excluded the notion of civil ser-
created to maintain judicial independence and impar- vants in public administration and replaced it with the
tiality, has turned into an institution that local prosecu- notion of party officers, and favored the media organs
tors and judges are afraid of. All these judicial institu- taking its side.
tions have created a system of guardianship and tute- What does this political administration do now? It
lage over the legislature, the frequently relies on a dis-
political administration, the course of democratization on
"The HSYK, created
to maintain judicial
political parties and the local the one hand but adopts a independence and
prosecutors and judges. With harsh stance of opposition impartiality, has
these facts at hand, it would against the system on the turned into an insti-
be illogical to oppose the con- other. This is a game. On the
tution that local
prosecutors and
stitutional amendments. one side, you see efforts judges are afraid
Some problems might be seeking to ensure rapproche- of," says retired
cited with regard to the con- ment with the EU up until prosecutor Ahmet
Gündel. The HSYK is
tent of the proposed articles. 2004. And some of our intel- the seven member
These have been discussed lectuals eager to legitimize Supreme Board of
publicly, anyway. We notice that the draft articles have these efforts and these political actors are aligned with Judges and
been amended in accordance with the outcome of the the political administration. Actually, these intellectuals Prosecutors.
Ýn the photo, the
ongoing discussions. I am on the side of those who should have analyzed this political identity through aca- deputy chair of the
wish to make some contributions. All parties should demic and political prisms. HSYK Kadir Özbek
adopt a constructive approach. Wholesale opposition Now, you see the prime minister reacting to Israel in (center), and other
members of the
does nothing good for the sake of achieving a resolu- Davos, where he is remembered for his famous "One
HSYK are seen dur-
tion. minute!" showdown. However, you also see the same ing a meeting.
Moderator: I will now ask Konya deputy Atilla Kart administration assuming a role in the implementation
to speak. We all are familiar with his stance from his of the Greater Middle East Project during the March 1
press statements. He holds that there are different motion process. [The speaker refers to the March 1,
motives and intentions behind this judicial reform and 2003 motion in the Turkish Parliament on US troop
constitutional change. Mr. Kart, do you see any motives deployment in Turkey to open a second front against
other than those Mr. Gündel has just outlined behind Saddam-era Iraq. The motion was supported, at least
this initiative? on the surface, by the government, yet it was rejected
Atilla Kart: Mr. Gündel referred to the mistakes and by Parliament.] You also see that the security of Turkey
flaws of all constitutional institutions except the political has been delegated to Israel through a contract on the
administration. Of course, we will be discussing these Heron unmanned aircraft. The prime minister reacts to
mistakes, but in doing this, we have to level some criti- Peres in Davos but refrains from exercising his right to
cism against the political administration as well. To be terminate the contract.
consistent and convincing, I believe we should adopt Religious movements should be under protection
such an impartial and integrated approach. There are some attempts to promote religious move-
We are talking about a government that has been in ments seeking to infiltrate the state apparatus. My
49
DEBATE SPRING 2010

statements may be upsetting to some, but out of self- these facts at this point. Yes, this is a fact in Turkey: that with intellectual and political responsibility. program. In addition, it should be noted that the party
respect I must remain true to my political stance. I am you appoint somebody you consider close to you to a Moderator: Thank you very much; I will come back did not go beyond the content of these recommenda-
not obsessed with such [religious] structures. I believe key position in public administration. However, this to you and hopefully, we will be discussing why you tions. The AKP did the minimum during this process.
that religious communities and orders are essential for was not as blatant in the past. object to the content of the proposed package of consti- The political administrations before the AKP, includ-
the promotion of diversity and pluralism in the coun- If the notion of the party officer has become domi- tutional amendments in the next round. Now I will ing the coalition government formed between the DSP
try. I also believe that their presence should be taken nant in public administration, there will be no democ- invite Professor Mithat Sancar to speak. What parts of [Democratic Left Party], ANAP [now ANAVATAN, the
under constitutional protection and that their rights racy or rule of law regardless of the bright and brave this package refer to a need in terms of the high judici- Motherland Party] and the MHP [Nationalist
to expression should be guaranteed. This is my sin- content of the constitutional amendment you propose. ary? Movement Party] refrained from fulfilling the require-
cere opinion. I have expressed this view in my party If you do this, you will be fooling us. Now I have a 10- Mithat Sancar: Why did we come to this constitu- ments to become a full member in the EU. They, too,
conventions and in public gatherings. I strongly page report on the activities of the Gülen movement. tional amendment? Is the AKP doing this as part of a introduced some packages, but their efforts fell short
believe that this issue should be reviewed with refer- You see that they are very influential in the media, edu- democratic project, or are there any other factors moti- and they frequently relied on the pretext of preserving
ence to Article 24 of the Constitution, on the freedom cation and health sectors. This is no problem at all. You vating the party figures to take this initiative? I would the national interest to avoid compliance with EU rules
of religion and thought. Therefore, I may call this a civil society organiza- like to elaborate on this subject. and standards. Conversely, the AKP acted sincerely and
would suggest that an automatic and tion. But let us make a record of this; Now Mr. Kart argues that the AKP has created its tried to achieve the standards set by the EU. However,
It is important, in the
reactionary stance against religious let us run an audit of the movement. own capital groups and media organs. However, we it did not have an additional program and agenda that
communities is wrong. case of constitutional Let us monitor its activities under the could actually say that those go beyond the noble con-
But is this the case in Turkey? Is the review and supervision law of associations. This is what I am capital groups have created tent of EU standards. TÜPRAÞ is Turkey's
second-largest tax-
whole issue in Turkey about the pro- of administrative deci- saying. the AKP. Undoubtedly, there But we all now appreciate payer, and its priva-
tection of their fundamental rights and sions and actions, not Of course, it is important, in the case had been some interactions. why they did not. The AKP tization in 2004 was
freedoms? Take the Gülen movement, of constitutional review and supervi- However, the AKP did not was busy dealing with the canceled by the
to mix review by Council of State.
for example. We have been drawing sion of administrative decisions and emerge out of the blue. And, coup plans whose details are
attention to this for five years. I believe
means of legality and actions, not to mix review by means of of course, a new financial now being publicized while
TÜPRAÞ was priva-
tized once again in
that the political administrations have appropriateness legality and review by means of appro- class has emerged. The Feb. trying to introduce some 2005. This time its
limited influence in the public adminis- priateness. And of course the judiciary 28 process was actually an bold reforms to facilitate privatization cost
four times more
tration. The parties in power are changing all the time. should not act to replace the political administration. attempt to stop the rise of accession to the EU. In other
than the initial pri-
However, it is essential to maintain a lasting and effec- But look what the judiciary does: The judiciary does not this new middle class. The words, the AKP was trying vatization effort
tive public administration dedicated to serving the peo- object to any privatization process; it says it is up to the votes the AKP received in to make sure that other state PHOTO: MEHMET GÜLER

ple of this country. I am of the opinion that the creation political administration to make decisions on privatiza- the 2002 elections should not organs acknowledged its
of a public administration system based on merit and tion. It only objects to the privatization of, say, be surprising at all. The AKP administration while intro-
seniority is essential for the sake of the achievement of Seydiþehir Eti facilities for a payment of $3.5 million relied on an existing dynamic. This dynamic took it to ducing all these reforms. For this reason, some of its
the notion of public service. To this end, I would like to when it is actually worth $3.5 billion. It says you cannot power. You may call it its own capital groups or set of practices were inconsistent with democratic standards.
recall that the notion of "party officer" has become pass the shares of Tüpraþ over to a select group of busi- communal relations; that does not make any difference. This ambivalence between introducing reforms and
dominant in the public administration system in Turkey nessmen you prefer in one of the rooms of the Ministry There are a number of different dynamics that played a getting along with the state institutions turned the AKP
in the past few years. of Industry and Trade. It says you should not sell Seka role in the rise of the AKP. into a center of contradictions. We now appreciate that
We all now know that the promotion of public ser- facilities to your relatives at a visibly too-low price. Why The AKP came to power by promising change in this was not a groundless fear. The party had to deal
vants whose spouses do not wear the headscarf is do we not make this distinction? I believe that any 2002, and because of this promise it received the sup- with a coup plan almost every month, and most proba-
blocked. It is nonsense to act as if we are not aware of work ignoring these facts would not be reconcilable port of the traditional capital groups. And when it set bly the leadership of the party was aware of these plans.
down the lines of its eagerness for EU membership, the The president as the watchdog of the regime
party also attracted the support of big capital groups. In The discussion over the presidency that took place in
other words, it did not fight the older capital groups. 2007 was a crucial one. The 1982 Constitution views the
THE GÜLEN MOVEMENT AND THE CURRENT POLITICAL DEBATE Quite the contrary, it attracted a great deal of support. president as the protector and watchdog of the regime.
The French say "Les absents ont toujours tort" -- the absentees are always wrong. Among the anti-government criticism of the main opposition party, the CHP, and But I should also note that the AKP did not have a The drafters of the Constitution were pretty sure that
the secular fundamentalists of Turkey, the Gülen movement has become "l'absent" of the current political debate. The secular fundamentalists prefer to use vague solid democratic program with reference to the issue the president would always be a figure that they would
language in their claims about the movement. They rarely refer to the movement by name, and the term they do use ("cemaat," or community in Turkish) in fact cov- under discussion. Their program did not set a clear favor and like. For this reason, they expanded the
ers all religiously motivated non-political movements in Turkey. In a nutshell, in their perception the cemaat is so powerful that it controls the government, controls framework for an integrated process of democratiza- sphere of his authorities. They realized that in the event
the police and is even able to manipulate legal processes. Since the claims are never clear cut, they are almost irrefutable, and even if they are clear and open allega-
tion. It included nice words and statements. The AKP's of losing this post, the institutions of the guardianship
tions, the Gülen movement does not have an official representative body to refute them other than the advocates of Fethullah Gülen himself. The claims about the
Gülen movement and its manipulation of the legal process pertaining to the Ergenekon case have been echoed in some recent English language articles penned by work and efforts at democratization mostly include the system would take over. What was controversial back
American writers. Dr. Ýhsan Yýlmaz's article "Naming what is going on in Turkey: from a 'for the people despite the people' elitism to a 'for the people with the people' recommendations of the EU in fulfillment of the criteria then was not a debate over Shariah or the headscarf.
democracy" in this volume (pp. 68-75) presents an academic criticism of these articles. for full membership rather than its own terms in its The presidency is a key for the regime, and those who

51
DEBATE SPRING 2010

initiated this discussion knew that. The president is against the AKP's activities are two factors that motivat- intentions or motivations. They want to block a process how these attempts have become influential and ambi-
authorized to make appointments to a number of insti- ed the party to take action with respect to the constitu- of transformation. It has become evident by now that it tious.
tutions including YÖK [the Higher Education Board], tional amendments. Let me elaborate on this: is impossible to create a whole new constitution after I want governance by the party I voted for. I do not
the HSYK and the Constitutional Court. It is obvious that the HSYK has an oligarchic struc- the annulment of the constitutional amendments lifting want an administration led by the military. They have
The AKP was trying to address the demands of its ture. Those who are opposed to any change in this the headscarf ban by the Constitutional Court. In this ruled this country for many years; they even made us
supporters for more freedoms while it also sought to institution today have made similar statements in the case, the idea of making a new constitution should be celebrate the anniversary of the May 27 military coup.
introduce bold reforms that would be determinative past. In 1982, I was a college student. I know that the dropped so that the judiciary will no longer act as a fac- They made us celebrate the day when the prime minis-
over the popular support that it would receive in the vast majority of those who oppose a constitutional tor blocking further constitutional change and transfor- ter was executed. I remained silent, like a lamb.
upcoming elections, but in doing this the party leaders change now were harshly criticizing the structure of the mation. It will not be possible to introduce influential However, people are now different in this country;
were also working to make sure that the state elites HSYK back then. This is a unique invention with critical reforms with regard to the Kurdish issue or other fields Turkey is integrated with the world. The issue is not
would not oppose their actions. They were acting par- authorities. However, the AKP's ambition to rush for of democratization unless this HSYK and Constitutional about the AK Party. The eagerness of the military to
ticularly carefully to ensure that they were well protect- the introduction of a change to the structure of the Court are purged of the current oligarchic structure. maintain its dominance is not connected to this party.
ed against coup plans emanating from the army. The HSYK is due to the July decrees [the appointments to Likewise, it is also a great possibility that the Ergenekon Let us put the CHP in place of the AK Party. The high
April 27 memo is a plain confirmation of what I am the Turkish high judiciary, which are made in July] process will be circumvented by judiciary and the military would The 1982
arguing right now. The memo posted by the General rather than its oligarchic composition. In July, a com- serious interference. act the same way. It does not Constitution views
Staff, followed by the extensive support by the judiciary prehensive change will be introduced in the HSYK. To repeat, I believe that the make any difference for the mili- the president as the
protector and
-- the Constitutional Court's decision on the 367 quo- Those who are familiar with the operation of judicial AKP launched this initiative to tary. It cares whether it is possible
watchdog of the
rum controversy -- demonstrated that there is a strong institutions know well that this is a period of decrees. survive the destructive moves of to preserve its position. Our regime. The drafters
cohort of opponents to further democ- The HSYK has already taken measures its opponents. But regardless of its debate is not about the AK Party. of the Constitution
ratization. And the political adminis- to circumvent the efforts and work of intention, I am saying that they Turkey has been discussing a seri- were pretty sure
The AKP was busy that the president
tration was to choose submission or the prosecutors and judges handling are contributing to the democrati- ous constitutional change for the
determination to stand against this
dealing with the coup the Ergenekon investigation. They fre- zation process in Turkey. I am not last three years. The opposition
would always be a
figure that they
front. In other words, these institutions plans whose details quently offer pirate lists. [According to saying that they are not democrat- blocked the process by making would favor and
seemed to want to wage a war against are now being publi- the constitutional process, the list of ic at all, but they feel they are obli- reference to parliamentary immu- like. When Abdullah
Gül was nominated
the political administration to protect cized while trying to judges and prosecutors that will be gated to do this. I define myself as nity. The current deadlock would as a candidate for
their privileges. introduce some bold appointed, removed or promoted is a leftist and a democratic intellec- have been overcome if the the presidency, the
I believe this: that the AKP was prepared by the Ministry of Justice and tual. This reform initiative fits the attempt had been made in con- army reacted with
ready to act as a central-right party if it
reforms to facilitate is brought to the agenda of the HSYK Turkey I envision. I am of the view sensus. The AK Party government the April 27 e-memo

had been treated moderately. It was accession to the EU by the undersecretary of the ministry.
ready to assume the role of a favorable The judicial members of the HSYK
state party. But its opponents did not want to provide have been preparing their own lists and trying to
this opportunity. Their moves shifted the AKP to the impose those lists on the two members from the
brink of life or death. Because it was aware that its Ministry of Justice for some time now. These lists are
choices would determine its fate, the AKP chose to act called pirate lists in the Turkish media.] The only thing
like a democratic party. The reforms it introduced the undersecretary can do is to leave the meetings so
sought to protect the party's identity and existence from that those lists are never voted on. Now any setback in
its opponents; however, they also addressed the issue the Ergenekon investigation will negatively affect this
of the guardianship regime in Turkey. The recently process and the AKP will have to pay an expensive bill
revealed documents now confirm that it would pay a in this case. If the Ergenekon process is blocked or
pricy bill if it had not played a decisive role with regard reversed, of course the AKP will be influenced by this,
to the ongoing Ergenekon investigation. but I think Turkey will pay the actual bill.
At the beginning, the AKP adopted a cautious Let us take the issue of constitutional amendments.
approach vis-à-vis this case. However, its opponents do The AKP included this on its agenda in 2007. They
not seem to be able to accept a tie or a slight defeat. For offered a draft; their opponents objected to this submis-
this reason, they had to go as far as they could. The end sion, asking why the AKP, rather than others, had pre-
of this road is still uncertain, but the AKP is drifting to pared a draft. They initiated the opening process with-
the end. out preliminary work; the opponents questioned the
I mean the coup threat as well as the threat directed state of unpreparedness. In other words, certain circles
by the Ergenekon gang and the judicial blockage have consistently opposed its actions regardless of its
that the moves are pretty impor-
tant steps even if they are still far
from being satisfactory. The pack-
age is a move forward for the sake
of further democratization in Turkey despite its short-
comings. This is how I see this package.
Moderator: Thank you Mr. Sancar. Mr. Gündel, let us
take a brief look at the content of the package. Is the
current package an interim solution as underlined by
Sancar to avoid strong resistance by some influential
institutions, or can we consider it a final solution?
Ahmet Gündel: Mr. Kart implied that I never posed
any criticism against the government and that I acted as
the representative of the political administration. Our
current debate is not on the activities of the govern-
ment. I am not a member of any party. However, we
have witnessed some unpleasant situations during the
period since 2002. We would have said the same if the
CHP were in power in place of the AK Party. In 2002,
the AK Party came to power. Since then, attempts have
been made to topple this government. Now we see
will not last forever. The military
and the
Constitutional Court
as well as the high judiciary enjoy cancelled his elec-
immunity; you are not allowed to tion in parliament.
PHOTO: ALÝ ÜNAL
file lawsuits against the high judi-
ciary in the local courts. The high judiciary has created a
sphere of immunity for itself. This is a problem that
should be taken care of not only by the AK Party but
also by the MHP and the CHP. The AK Party did not
exist before. The current system was applicable to the
former governments as well. We witnessed Mesut
Yýlmaz, a former prime minister, point to his shoulder
in reference to the military influence in a speech at
Parliament. This should be changed. I am aware that
there are some concerns over the AK Party because of
its religious orientation and conservative references. But
in the end, every view should find fertile ground for
itself in a democratic system.
Mr. Kart referred to religious orders and movements.
Of course they exist; they are in the US and Germany
as well. Some of them are religious, others have differ-
ent orientations. Personally, I do not like orders and

52 53
DEBATE SPRING 2010
religious communities. But I do not find them danger- to address the problem of politicization.
ous because I think such conglomerations are useful for Moderator: Mr. Gündel, If you will excuse me, I
democracy. The democratic system should protect these would like to turn to Mr. Kart. I shall specifically ask
groups. There are laws in democracies. The acts consid- him to speak about the content of the constitutional
ered crimes are stipulated by these laws and rules. package.
Atilla Kart: I am saying exactly the same thing; their Atilla Kart: I believe that I have made myself clear on
actions should be audited. how I think with respect to religious communities.
Ahmet Gündel: There would be no such thing as not What I drew attention to on this matter was the abuse
being audited, because you don't keep records of these of the political power within the set of relations
things. Ten people pick some place to perform their between such communities, political actors and busi-
prayer; no record of this could ever be kept. nesses. I am talking about unfair gains out of such a
Atilla Kart: That was not what I meant. relationship, which should disturb all of us.
Ahmet Gündel: The limit is whether they commit ter- Let me give you an example; it was Aug. 1, 2008.
rorism. No action can be taken against such groups There was a disaster in Konya where an illegally con-
unless they are involved in terrorist activities. I regret structed building offering religious training collapsed.
the recent declaration by the chief of General Staff with Eighteen young girls died in the incident. I was there to
regard to the Fethullah Gülen movement. The military investigate the case. All of these girls were living there;
cannot take action against a school of thought. It has no they all had their housing 100 meters from that build-
such right. There is no room for this in democracies. ing. The state's Religious Affairs Directorate has a
Now, Mr. Kart, you are arguing that the government boarding school and dormitory 300 meters away. There
hired people who were aligned with its is another officially legal institution
ideological stance. You are saying this The reforms the AKP offering a similar line of training near
as a member of an opposition party. this illegal building. But there is a cli-
However, we should also note that the
introduced sought to mate now where parents send their
same was done by the CHP in the protect the party's daughters to an illegal institution
past. Back then, I was serving in the identity and existence instead of the state's legal training
judiciary. We were aware of what was from its opponents; schools. The building was constructed
going on in the Justice Ministry. The illegally. There is nobody to hold
however, they also
issue is not about the CHP.
addressed the issue of responsible for this incident. This is
Unfortunately, all political parties what I referred to as unaudited struc-
argue when they are in opposition that
the guardianship tures. The government extends protec-
the judiciary should remain impartial regime in Turkey tion to this structure; we have to ques-
and independent. But when they come tion this stance. [The event Kart is
to power, they take action to make sure that the judicial referring to happened in the Taþkent district of Konya.
institutions serve their interests. The "illegality" Mr. Kart refers to is not about the insti-
Probably, the AK Party is doing the same right now tution itself but about the construction of the building
because it had such an opportunity. I believe the Justice the institution was located in. The collapse of the build-
Ministry should not remain authorized to interview the ing had nothing to do with its legality -- apparently
candidates and that the HSYK should be vested with there was a gas leak in the building, and the building
this authority. The politicization of the judiciary starts collapsed after an explosion caused by the leakage. The
from this point because the political administrations institution itself was legally operated and had passed an
recruit the candidates they consider close to their posi- official inspection only two months before the incident.
tion. Almost 100 percent of those candidates become The mentioned institution had no relation to the Gülen
judges or prosecutors later on. Then we are talking movement. Kart was particularly moved by the awful
about the politicization of the prosecutors or the judges. incident because he is a Konya deputy.]
I regret that this package does not address this problem. Turkey is not governed from Ankara
Judicial independence should start from the phase of Now I would like to underline this: This government
candidacy. If you hire a man who bases his actions and is about to accomplish what the Sept. 12 coup fell short
decisions on his ideological leaning, you will not be able of doing. The organization and mentality that was
54
behind all the coups that happened in Turkey is now
hiding behind the current administration. Turkey is not
governed from its capital city, Ankara; we should be
able to see this.
It was a Sunday when the telecommunication bill
was passed, on July 3, 2005. We did not take part in the
deliberations. Why? A change was being introduced to
Article 91 of Parliament's bylaws. This change sought to
restrict our right to speak. We did not participate in
protest of this attempt. Then we noticed that seven to
eight other bills were referred to Parliament at the same
time; these included the Cargill bill, the laws on munici-
palities and unions. [The term "Cargill bill" was coined
by Kart in reference to the bill extending the period of
amnesty granted to those corporations whose activities
were curtailed on the grounds that they had construct-
ed illegal buildings on agricultural land. Kart argues that
this bill was passed
because of pressure from
internationally prominent
company Cargill.] Finally,
the telecommunications
bill arrived. AK Party
Ankara deputy Ersönmez
Yarbay took the podium
and said: "This bill will
eliminate fundamental rights and freedoms. Let us not
discuss this in the absence of the CHP members in
Parliament. If we do this, we would undermine the
credibility of Parliament." But this proposal was made
law; the illegal wiretappings started at that point. There
is no control over such illegal wiretappings. The bill
remained in effect for three-and-a-half years. It was
annulled in January 2009. Then you see this confiden-
tial witness thing take place in 2007. We again wit-
nessed terror caused by confidential witnesses. We see
that indictments were prepared based on the state-
ments by confidential witnesses despite the absence of
any credible evidence. During this process, the gen-
darmerie, the intelligence service and the police
launched investigations all across the country. There is
no legal basis for this. Then the government objected to
the authority of the gendarmerie but remained silent
vis-à-vis the intelligence service and the police.
However, all are wrong. Is there any plausible explana-
tion for this attitude in a democracy?
You see the secret fund was $30 million in 2005; it
became $210 million in 2006 and $240 million in 2007. I
care about Nov. 5, 2007 because of its connection to the
55
Daðlýca assault. Fifty soldiers were slain there; they
were attacked by a large group of 300-400 militants.
Turkey was outraged by the raid. The prime minister
traveled to the US, where he made a statement; in that
statement, he said they had made a deal with the US
authorities to share actionable intelligence. What a big
accomplishment! However, they were supposed to
deliver the Herons in August 2007. We paid $183 mil-
lion for these aircraft. But they still have not been deliv-
ered.
It became evident that 35 American experts traveled
to Turkey on Nov. 5, 2007 for intelligence gathering.
We have information that they are still carrying out
their activities. We do not know whether this number
has increased to 135 or 235. During the discussions over
public order, we directed a question to the interior min-
ister five or six times; he got angry but finally said he
did not have any informa-
tion. I should note that The refusal of the
these statements are two smaller opposi-
recorded. The interior tion parties, the
nationalist MHP and
minister said this. What the Kurdish BDP to
have we seen? The bill on support the consti-
public order was referred tutional amendment
to Parliament; a new unit came as a surprise
to many. Salih
was set up within the Memecan carried
structure of the Interior Ministry. Isn't it the duty of the this feeling to his
Prime Ministry to coordinate the combat against terror? cartoon in the Sabah
daily, on March 21,
Didn't we authorize the Prime Ministry on this issue
2010. The scene is
three years ago? Doesn't the Office of the Prime from a prison in
Minister have the necessary political determination to 1980. The torturer
coordinate the fight against terror? speaks to his nation-
alist prisoner:
You see that foreign experts are employed based on
“Don’t look daggers
the opportunities extended by the practice of flexible at me! A day will
employment. Foreign experts may take part in a certain come and you will
project for a certain period of time, but when this even love the
Constitution I
becomes a permanent practice, there is a big problem.
made.”
What are you doing? You set up a central administra-
tive unit within the ministry and provincial education
and project directorates in 81 cities. They are supposed
to do some sociological research in relation to terrorism.
The story does not end there; authorized offices will be
opened in small towns if needed. All of us have some
connection with small towns, so we know that this
means the head of the office there will influence the
police chief and the prosecutor in that town. He
becomes the true sovereign of that place. He does the
recordings that were previously done within an institu-
tional setting there. He classifies the people based on
DEBATE SPRING 2010
their political leaning, ethnic background and so on. We are talking about judicial reform in such an envi-
This is the reality of Turkey. This means that the police ronment. We are mentioning a democratic opening.
state practice becomes even more influential. We are Where is the YÖK reform? There was an advisory
going through this process, but this issue is not dis- board for human rights; it was an important institution
cussed in Turkey. in terms of the democratization of Turkey. The board
On Nov. 4, 2002, the chairman of the AK Party said became dysfunctional because of the human rights
in the US, "We will set up a system of cooperation that report in 2004. Five years have passed since then; now
has never been witnessed in Turkey's republican histo- we are setting up a human rights board whose mem-
ry; you may be sure of this." He made promises regard- bers shall be appointed by the prime minister, and we
ing Cargill, sugar refineries and the privatization of state call this a democratic opening.
factories. These are all being done in the name of priva- I specifically want to emphasize this when I am refer-
tization, but what is actually being done is the shutter- ring to the bureaucratization of the judiciary. I believe
ing of the sugar refineries. Then March 1, 2003 arrived. that the criminal judiciary is, of course, important for
You proudly expressed your service as the co-chair of the state apparatus, but the administrative judiciary
the Greater Middle East Project. These are all issues should also be considered. We see that some of the
that we are familiar with. You traveled to Dubai in members in the structure of the administrative judiciary
September 2003 to sign some agreements. I am trying have not received legal training at all. What rule of law
to identify a political determination, identity and char- are you talking about, then? Now they are seeking to
acteristic. Now we have to identify this: expand the sphere of this structure by
Nobody is defending the military here. drafting a new constitution. I cannot
I also believe that
Sure, the military should be doing only accept subjecting party dissolutions to
its job. And yes, the judiciary must per- their presence should the prior authorization of Parliament.
form its services within the limits of its be taken under con- Discussing this with reference to
sphere of authority. But do your pro- stitutional protection democratization is fooling the people.
posals ensure this? and that their rights The AKP shall decide on the dissolu-
Bureaucratization of the judiciary tion of the CHP, and the CHP shall
to expression should
The greatest harm done by the Sept. make the decision on the dissolution
12 coup is the bureaucratization of the
be guaranteed of the AKP. Is this plausible? This is
judiciary and the judges. To this end, democratic murder.
nobody actually defends the current structure of the Moderator: Wouldn't it be better if you just take these
HSYK. The board should be reorganized from a legal objections to Parliament instead of objecting to the
standpoint. There can be no constitution in a society whole package?
where citizens' rights are not guaranteed and the sepa- Atilla Kart: Of course, we are expressing this, but we
ration of powers is not secured. Montesquieu's conclu- are sure that our objections will not be considered. The
sion points to the same thing. Now if we attempt to government is heavily occupied with party dissolution,
discuss the separation of powers with a two-century the structure of the HSYK and the organization of the
delay, I would not find that convincing. I mean, under Constitutional Court. The other articles are just incen-
Turkey's conditions if a prime minister calls the prose- tives to attract the support of diverse segments of socie-
cutor and 587 lawsuits on the immunity of the deputies ty. The prime minister, who makes frequent references
are still pending in the courts, you cannot talk about the to the national will, argues that there is no need for a
need for the political administration to introduce a popular referendum to be held in connection with this
wholesale reform to reorganize the judicial structure. package. Is it acceptable to vote on all the different
We all see that corruption is now institutionalized in amendments in a single session? Maybe as a voter, I
Turkey. I am referring to the Cargill incident. No need will endorse five and object to 21 of these amendments.
to elaborate on the Seydiþehir, Tüpraþ and Sabah-ATV But you are forced to endorse or reject all. Is this demo-
loan corruption cases. Can you imagine the interest that cratic?
should have been collected on behalf of the Treasury Moderator: Now let us move to Mithat Sancar. We
but was not collected? No need to speak on the mined did not talk about whether the constitutional package
land and the Deniz Feneri incident. would achieve its goals in the previous round. What is
56
your opinion on this matter?
Mithat Sancar: Undoubtedly, the support base of the
AKP wants a more liberal and open structure from the
system because of their interests. The limit of this is the
sphere of their interests, their vision and their reper-
toires. I am not delving into this. The AKP experienced
democracy more like a tool; however, it went through a
process of internal transformation as the pressure on it
intensified. The connection of the conservative masses
to democracy has become more genuine during this
process. At the beginning, this transformation was
vague and timid. They were referencing the European
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) rather than the
headscarf. In short, they were laying the foundation for
liberties and democracy. This has been changed as the
process advances. I believe that the need for greater
legitimacy created some sort of familiarity for at least
some circles with the rules of freedom and democracy.
AKP is the loyal son of the
republic
The only sphere where the
AKP failed to transform itself is
the mentality of engaging in
the politics that the republican
regime created. The AKP is still
the loyal son of the republic in
terms of making politics.
Turkey's modernization was
dictated from the top; you have
to create a safe haven for your-
self in the upper strata. We are
aware that the prime minister
and the AKP figures adopt a reactive stance against crit-
icism even when leveled by their own members.
Nepotism is part of the political system that the
republican regime has created, and the AKP enjoys its
benefits. Some argue that the judicial reform seeks to
maximize these benefits. I believe that these features of
the AKP are in conflict. There are big problems in the
judiciary, which was given a mission with the creation
of the republican order. The military courts constitute
the basis of this. We all know how these courts were set
up and how they made their decisions. You will see the
repercussions of the trials held to address the insurgen-
cies in Tunceli and other eastern parts of Turkey. The
judiciary is not an impartial body, anyway; it was
designed as an establishment with a special mission.
Every government wants to use such an instrument.
The first schism in this structure was observed in the
57
era of the Democrat Party (DP), which created a safe
haven for itself. They introduced some brilliant moves
similar to those introduced now. However, the 1961
Constitution consolidated the necessary institutional
settings to put an end to this. The consolidation of the
National Security Council (MGK) is a product of the
1961 Constitution. The May 27 and March 12 trials and
the trial of Deniz Gezmiþ are the dark pages of this
country. The Sept. 12 trials were a disaster that could be
mentioned in world history. The judges and prosecu-
tors' eagerness to take orders from the military during
the Feb. 28 process is shameful.
The judiciary has performed this mission for decades.
We cannot talk about an impartial judiciary. There was
no impartiality by the judiciary in cases where the sys-
tem's interests were at stake. The Hrant Dink case is
still fresh. That decision was a death decree. The Baskýn
Oran decision is an open invitation to an assault.
Remember the decision with
In the February 28
regard to Orhan Pamuk and the
process, the mem-
Council of State's coefficient bers of the appel-
decision. While all this is late judiciary were
known, it is not realistic to given a briefing at
the Army General
imply that the only problem Staff about reli-
with the judiciary is nepotism. gious reactionary-
Is the projected reform a ism in Turkey and
the policies the
synthesis of the conflicts within
the AK Party?
army suggested to
fight it. This brief-
The proposed structure of the ing is a sign of the
HSYK is much better than the delicate relation-
current system. The judiciary ship between the
military and the
becomes more independent, that's certain. The govern- judiciary in Turkey
ment gives up its benefits, it's obvious. Fifteen out of
the 21 members are to be people with a legal back-
ground. The president is not involved in the process.
The role of the high judiciary is reduced in the process.
The top administrators of the judicial bureaucracy will
lose control because 10 members are to be elected by
the judges and prosecutors. This current system based
on a mutual recognition of interests will be over.
However, the AKP is acting timidly by not including
a system where Parliament will be authorized to elect
some of the HSYK members in the package. The power
bestowed on the president, who will have the authority
to elect four members, should have been bestowed
upon Parliament.
Making a distinction between the Justice Ministry
inspectors and the board inspectors is a good idea.
Inspection is a duty carried out in addition to routine
DEBATE SPRING 2010

investigations. Authorizing the HSYK inspectors to of members serving in the court to 17 and authorizing practice of Germany. The prosecutor should not be Sancar left off. Yes, I agree that there are some prob-
conduct routine inspections is a progressive move. As Parliament to elect three members is good, but it's not allowed to initiate an investigation into a political party lems with regard to Article 69. It would be appropriate
far as permission for an investigation is concerned, I enough. The selection of the remaining 14 by the presi- without prior authorization by Parliament. Secondly, to transfer the authority of the Constitutional Court
have objections to the practice of the justice minister dent is wrong. From the very beginning, I have found the outcome of the investigation should be referred to with regard to financial supervision of political parties
serving as the traditional chair of the board. The pres- this system where the president selects one-third of the Parliament for approval. There, you should seek a to the Court of Accounts. I believe that the
ence of the minister is not a disaster, but his absence is members of official institutions to be quite dangerous qualified majority. In other words, Parliament should Constitutional Court filed such a request as well,
preferred. A bridge is needed between the political and wrong. I see this as an insult to these institutions. have the final word even if the Constitutional Court because it was performing this task by referring the
administration and the judiciary. However, the Turkish As a university professor, I have not cast my vote in the rules for the dissolution of a certain party. How could cases to experts. It is also good to see that the initiation
case confirms that justice ministers are unwilling to institutional elections held in my university for years you leave a political matter in the hands of pure of party dissolution cases is to be made by a commis-
serve as that bridge. It is enough to have the undersec- because there is no reasonable explanation for this sys- bureaucrats? It seems to me that all these are traces of sion to be set up in Parliament. However, whether this
retary of the Justice Ministry on the board because he tem. On what grounds do you appoint the candidate the guardianship system. is to be done by a commission or by a qualified majori-
performs both political and administrative functions. receiving the smallest number of votes despite an elec- Whether the constitutional package should be voted ty of the members of Parliament should be discussed
Likewise, the board should be able to pick its own pres- tion being held? This proves that, like the drafters of the on as a whole or in parts is a matter of controversy. It is further.
ident to ensure greater legitimacy and credibility of this Sept. 12 system and the Constitution, the AKP seeks to true that holding a single referendum for all the pro- However, we see that the constitutional language on
draft constitutional amendment. protect itself via state institutions. The drafters of the posed articles is a necessity in most cases. I think that "becoming a center" is still preserved. I think that the
Now let us take a look at subjecting to prior approval 1982 Constitution created the presidency as an institu- the current process suffers from some problems arising criticism by the Venice Commission in 2009 did make
the authority to initiate an investigation in relation to tion of guardianship. The coup makers wanted to make from the incoherent some references to this
The son and daugh-
judges and prosecutors; the proposal is made by the sure that the president would always be somebody stance of the AKP during issue as well. About the
ter of the republic:
board, and the approval is given by the justice minister. aligned with their worldview. The AKP now holds that this package's drafting dissolution of political par- The two statues in
But the minister is already the chair of the board. The the president will be somebody who would at least be process. A simple package ties by judicial institutions, front of the new
justice minister is not allowed to take lenient toward its policies. Therefore, could have been drafted, the amendment gives par- building of the
Turkish
action in the absence of a proposal by they are seeking somebody who would and that package could tial control to Parliament.
The AKP experienced Constitutional Court
the board. An investigation is not initi- safeguard their position. However, this have included some arti- Now I see that the issue as were made an issue
ated if the minister does not grant
democracy more like a system could be unexpectedly blocked cles on liberties, the judici- to whether the prosecutor of discussion in the
approval even if the board proposes it. tool; however, it went in the future. In particular, the crises ary and party dissolution. should seek the authoriza- Turkish Parliament.
The minister of jus-
Yet, it seems that there is a balanced through a process of we encountered during the presidential The judicial reforms tion of Parliament or tice declared that
mechanism in the system. For many internal transforma- election may be repeated. Imagine would constitute a large Parliament should grant the statue was not
years, the HSYK has been requesting right-wing voters electing another package with a number of the authority to the prose- of Lady Justice, but
tion as the pressure of a Turkish girl
the establishment of a secretariat. Now Süleyman Demirel. Imagine how this sub-themes. All these cutor is being discussed.
the draft reform has created this insti-
on it intensified system would work in that case. issues could have been Parliament referring the
from the first repub-
lican generation
tution. The appointment of the secre- Seeking to guarantee its short-term presented in a single dissolution of a political symbolizing justice
tary-general by the Justice Ministry is wrong. This interests is a reflection of the internal conflicts and package because of the common outlook surrounding party to judicial institutions would mean that and determination
at the same time;
undermines judicial independence. The secretary-gen- ambivalence of the AKP. It shows that the party does them. However, when you offer a package including Parliament is actually dictating the dissolution.
hence her eyes were
eral will be picked by the justice minister among three not have a coherent democratic project. They may elements that barely have any common ground or con- However, the judicial institutions are the best bodies to open. The " Lady of
candidates to be offered by the board. This is some sort become the victims of the system they created. nection, it will be difficult to hold a referendum for the examine the merits of the dissolution of a party. Since the Turkish
of balance, but the board could have been authorized to My biggest objection is to the fact that a substantial entire package. prosecutors are recognized as having this authority, the Republic" wore a
traditional
pick its own secretary-general. There are also demands segment of the people are convinced that the opera- The package falls short by not making any reference chief prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals has
Anatolian dress.
for a separate budget and a separate building. They are tions seek to undermine the prestige of Parliament. or amendment to Article 68 of the Constitution, on some useful opportunities and resources including the PHOTO: ALÝ ÜNAL

promising that they will do this with the introduction of
a new law. This system is more or less consistent with
the requirements referred to by the European
Commission during its consultative visits to Turkey. The
reports, however, underlined that the minister should
not serve on the board. In an attempt to secure its posi-
tion, the AKP hesitated to take action for full democra-
tization.
Proposals for Constitutional Court are not adequate
There are serious problems with regard to the struc-
ture of the Constitutional Court. Increasing the number
Parliament is an important actor with the potential to
create a consensus. That has nothing to do with politi-
cization or a lack of objectivity. In the presence of nec-
essary arrangements, Parliament is able to pick the best
candidates for the Constitutional Court via consensus.
It is not possible to agree with the objections sug-
gesting that the dissolution of parties become politi-
cized. I believe that Parliament should have greater
authority under the Venice Criteria. This is a product of
the AKP's eagerness not to create concerns for the
state elites. The system should have been based on the
party dissolution. You could have included a provision
requiring the promotion of violence as a basis for party
dissolutions, and in such a case you would have draft-
ed a package consistent with European standards. In
the end, the package falls short in many respects; but
as a whole, it is a huge step forward for the sake of fur-
ther democratization. I believe that it deserves some
critical support.
Moderator: Mr. Sancar, thank you very much. I am
giving Mr. Gündel the final word.
Ahmet Gündel: Let me continue from where Mr.
party registers. For this reason, when the prosecutor
concludes that the activities of a political party have
amounted to a level justifying its dissolution, he refers
the case to Parliament in an attempt to get authoriza-
tion to initiate a case. And, of course, we are speaking
based on developments during the term in office of the
current and previous chief prosecutors. Unfortunately,
most of the prosecutors serving in the office so far,
including current Supreme Court of Appeals Chief
Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalçýnkaya, have abused
their power and authority and powers. The basis of our

58 59
DEBATE SPRING 2010
criticism of prosecutors is the assumption that they will
always do the same thing and abuse their authority.
is inadequate. However, the actual number at times
decreases from seven to one. In some cases the deci-
However, the introduction of these new constitutional
amendments will address the issue of political and
arbitrary actions.
sions are made by only one member of the HSYK. Let
us take the election of a member to the Court of
Appeals as an example. Let us say that 35 members are
One of the problems is that there are so many justifi- to be picked. When the justice minister insists, he is
cations for dissolving a party. Even discourses against given the authority to elect four to five members. The
Article 68 may be viewed as justification to close down justice ministers love this. The two members from the
a political party. On the one hand, you are free to Council of State do not participate in the election
express what is included in Article 68 in day-to-day process. Three members remain to elect some 30
discourse but, on the other hand, when a political party members of the Court of Appeals. Each of these three
engages in such discourse, you regard this as a reason take 10 members and each are completely free to elect
to shut down that party. In other words, you are whom he or she wants. The election takes place based
allowed to express your opinions against secularism or on some subjective criteria. The board makes its deci-
against territorial integrity, but if a political party does sion in such cases with a single member instead of
the same, it will have to face a closure suit. I believe seven. The high judiciary is uncomfortable with the
that introduction of the violence criterion, as recom- projected change because of the dramatic change in
mended by the Venice Criteria, will this structure.
suffice to address this matter. I really The AKP is still the loyal Under the current election system, a
think the content of Article 68 poses separate voting session is held at the
some problems and challenges.
son of the republic in Supreme Court of Appeals for every
This question should also be asked: terms of making poli- vacant seat on the HSYK. Therefore,
What would happen if the political tics. Turkey's modern- the dominant ideological majority at
parties are not dissolved? In other ization was dictated the Court of Appeals elects its own
words, what would happen if we just candidate in all three sessions. The
from the top; you have
prosecute the perpetrators of illegal list goes to the president for approval.
acts rather than closing the party he or
to create a safe haven The president has to pick one of
she is a member of and if we just drop for yourself in the these ideological candidates. The
the idea of dissolving political parties? upper strata election of Ali Suat Ertosun hap-
This question should be directed at pened in this way. Some asked why
those who ardently advocate the closure of parties. The the president appointed Ertosun. The president had no
current Parliament and the AK Party cannot promote option but to appoint him. This confirms the unjust
such an idea for some understandable reasons. The structure of the system.
reasons that Mr. Sancar referred to are behind this This structure is being eliminated by the current pro-
flawed attempt to change the Constitution. But I am posals. A single election will be held, and the president
really surprised to see that no other democratic mecha- will be able to pick from among candidates of different
nism shows any eagerness to discuss this issue in backgrounds and ideological orientations.
Turkey. However, the division of the board into three parts
Now let us take a look at the HSYK. The board is an with regard to the appointments is not appropriate. We
important institution in shaping the local and high already criticize that the number of the members is not
judiciary because it elects all of the members in the enough. Now if you divide the 21-member board into
Supreme Court of Appeals and three-quarters of the three, each having seven members, you do not elimi-
members of the Council of State. For this reason, the nate the risk of politicization and appointments based
board has important powers and authority in terms of on ideological orientation. From this perspective, I
the election of high judiciary figures and of the believe that it would be better if the board as a whole
appointment of holders of local judicial posts. How did makes the appointments.
the current HSYK get this mechanism to work so Moderator: Thank you Mr. Gündel, Mr. Kart and
smoothly? Mr. Sancar. Turkey will continue discussing the consti-
We argue that the number of members of the HSYK tutional amendment package.
60
An evaluation on the debate:
Losing elite misreading society
Naci Bostancý
In defining ideology, Marx refers to false consciousness.
He argues that the primary reason for this is the preoc-
cupation of the proletariat with its own class relations.
In fact, a basic review of relations based on interests in
Turkey confirms that the bureaucratic and traditional
elites are becoming more preoccupied with their class
relations as they lose their privileged status. For this rea-
son, they fail to understand what's going on within
society since they attempt to interpret developments by
relying on a structure that provides justifications for
their own positions.
We know from Ibn Khaldun that the rising groups
are relatively extroverted and that
they are at least partially immune to
the state of false consciousness that
Marx referred to. What I have been
observing in Turkey is that the rising
social groups, the new elites, the
new middle classes are, unlike the
traditional bureaucrats, prone to go
beyond the sphere of their own class
relations and to reinterpret develop-
ments and events through the lenses
of other circles. Those who lost their status and posi-
tions have, on the other hand, become more introvert-
ed. Those who analyze the Justice and Development
Party (AK Party) think that this political party has seized
power and the political administration and now is trying
to create its own bourgeoisie and media groups that will
readily extend support to its actions. The media being
referred to as the one being built by the AK Party is
actually the media of the rising new elites. They are pro-
moting the AK Party. In other words, the old elite mis-
interpret the relationship. Just how Marx reversed
Hegel's dialectics, the traditional elites of Turkey must
also reverse the way they interpret these developments.
They are doing the same thing with respect to the
reasoning on the religious movements and communi-
ties. I view reasoning which suggests that these com-
munities have fairly recently emerged as a form of ill
will. The entities we call religious communities are not
agents converting individuals into some sort of leaden
soldiers. People deliberately and voluntarily join these
61
communities only if they find them attractive and rea-
sonable. If the same Fethullah Gülen had appeared
back in the 1960s, he would not have been able to
attract 10 people. And if he drew the attention and sup-
port of a large number of people in the 1980s and 1990s,
this means that there is something we need to concen-
trate on for a better understanding of this tendency and
change. The rising elites promoted the AK Party, but
they also concluded that they could align themselves
with some of the ideas and thoughts expressed by
Gülen. This is not such an irrational relationship.
Economic elites are not inherently irrational, anyway;
members of these elites make purchases and sales every
day and pursue new market opportu-
Professor Naci
nities. They should be employing a
rational logic in their communal rela- Bostancý is the dean
of the communica-
tions as well. tion taculty of Gazi
And some argue that the activities of University. Bostancý
these communities are off the books. contributed to the
TPR debate with his
How would communities exist in the
observations about
social space? They demonstrate their the debate.
existence through some institutions. PHOTO: TURGUT ENGÝN
Here we see some schools affiliated
with this community; businessmen
sponsor the construction of new schools in different
parts of the world and in Turkey. Is it possible to argue
that they remain off the books and unnoticed? Is it pos-
sible to do all this without paying the relevant taxes? A
few people may come together to create a secret organi-
zation that would remain off the books for a long time.
However, if you are referring to a group, you can no
longer argue that their activities are underground. I am
sensing some sort of deliberate misinterpretation here.
The losers try to justify developments from where they
are, and in doing so, they are suffering from false con-
sciousness in a way that validates Marx's arguments and
theses. What matters here is the difference between the
interpretations of society held by the rising and declin-
ing forces in Turkey. The elites representing the rising
classes in Turkey seem to have adopted a broader
sphere of interpretation. The declining forces, on the
other hand, are relying on a false consciousness and
interpretation. The logic of losing and winning is accen-
tuated in this subtlety, anyway.
ARTICLE SPRING 2010
Ghanem
The Turkish
'Ergenekon'
through
Arab eyes
Some Arab intellectuals have started
to talk about the possibility of the
presence of underground organiza-
tions similar to Ergenekon standing
behind the many irrational policies
that the ruling governments apply in
their own countries. The success of the
Turkish government can strengthen
the hope of the Arab powers and the
elite in the possibility of accomplishing
reforms and change, as well
62
Ibrahim el-Beyyumi
T
he name of the "Ergenekon" organi-
zation is still heavy to the Arab ear,
just as it weighs heavily on general
Turkish political life. The Arab mass
media is still unfamiliar with
Ergenekon. The role of this organi-
zation and its features are generally
still obscure to Arab societies. But the will to learn
about this organization is increasing day by day. It
seems that the frequent confrontations in the last few
years between the Justice and Development Party
(AK Party) government and this terrorist organiza-
tion, broadly covered in the media, have caused a big
alteration in the Arab consciousness, especially
among the political and cultural elite who are inter-
ested in the topic of political reformation and demo-
cratic transformation. The elite have become more
concerned than ever before about what is happening
on the sidelines of Turkish politics. They are reflect-
ing on the situation in Turkey particularly because
they see benefits for the Arab countries themselves,
especially thanks to the open-door policy the AK
Party government has been pursuing with the East
for many years.
Some Arab intellectuals, especially those with
Islamic orientations, have started to talk about the
possibility of the presence of underground organiza-
tions similar to Ergenekon standing behind the many
irrational policies that the ruling governments apply
in their own countries: policies that cause consecra-
tion of despotism, corruption and power monopolies
in the name of defending the modern state, on the
one hand, and challenging the fanatic currents, on
the other. While these governments are formulating
policies opposing national interests and obstructing
any efforts at rehabilitation, change or opening ways
of participation for political rivals, they are also resist-
ing efforts to depart from the exclusivist mentality of
guardianship over the nation and from plotting plots
in the darkness, undermining stability and endanger-
ing the rule of law. The Islamic-grounded elite per-
ceive a synchronization between the founding of the
Ergenekon organization, in the middle of the past
century (1952), and the start of a series of outrageous
confrontations between the incumbent authorities in
most Arab countries and reformist powers, especially
those with Islamic orientations. From that date on,
confrontations and clashes have not stopped, and
whenever the atmosphere calms down, the clashes
restart without any rational explanation. Until this
day, none of the reconciliation attempts between the
authorities and the reformist powers have succeeded,
although all the parties fully understand that there is
no benefit in continuing the dispute at all.
As late as 10 years ago, the Arab elite from all seg-
ments were generally uninterested in what was going
on in Turkey, except for rare occasions such as a
coup, a catastrophic earthquake or a soccer game.
The political elite rarely showed interest in what the
struggling parties in Turkey represented. But this
portrait has started to change during the last decade
as the AK Party has made ripples in the stagnant
water in the canals of the Arab-Turkish relationship.
This is not only because the AK Party is from an anti-
establishment background but also because the AK
Party government has succeeded in achieving great
steps toward reformation and democratization in less
than 10 years whereas the earlier governments failed
to achieve political reforms and democratization even
though those governments never stopped talking
about democratization or political reforms.
Nowadays, the Arab elite's perception that every-
thing is changing in Turkey is starting to deepen.
Maybe the most important part of this
new perception is the fact that the
changes have reached the military bar-
racks and soldiers are now standing in
the line of change, after years of standing
against it. Turkey is breaking the chains
which were imposed on it by powers that
benefited from the status quo. These
powers stayed in power in Turkey for
about nine decades. This is the biggest
lesson imprinted on the minds of the
majority of the Arab elite who follow the
developments and internal events in
Turkey. It is true that the Turkish mili-
tary changes slowly, but due to the suc-
cess of the elected government in
winning, until now, all the con-
frontations against Ergenekon, they
have really started to change. This
success can strengthen the hope of
the Arab powers and the elite in the
possibility of accomplishing reforms
and change, as well. In fact, the
realization of these reforms in the
Arab world is easier compared to
the Turkish situation, where the
change-opposing powers
have controlled the impor-
tant ranks in the system of
the state for such a long
period of time that they
ILLUSTRATION: CEM KIZILTUÐ
were able to obstruct
the reforms by differ-
ent allegations
before they started
to lose their
dominance
ARTICLE SPRING 2010 ARTICLE IN BRIEF: Turkey is breaking the chains which were imposed on it by powers that benefited from the
status quo. Turkish democracy is leaving the logic of exclusion and preclusion and adopting a logic of openness and inclu-
sivity. This is exactly what most Arab countries need and what their reformist elite are looking for in their respective coun-
tries. The transformation in the Turkish media's orientation changed the traditional image of Arabs in the Turkish mind
from a negative picture to a much more realistic and positive one produced by free competition in the media.
gradually due to the insistence of the reformist pow-
ers on touching the strongholds of the military, judi-
cial and bureaucratic elite.
The Arab elite observe the signals of legitimacy and
health the Turkish society is enjoying, and they envy
the Turks for this political vitality, which embraces
different political and intellectual currents. A majority
of Arab political intellectuals, be they Arabists or
Islamists, have engendered a conviction that this
Turkish vitality in the last few years has managed to
fragmentize the dreadful secular rock which con-
trolled the country for the last nine decades. This
vitality has also caused far-reaching changes in the
system of allegiances which regulated the power
equilibrium among different effective currents in the
political field. Due to all these changes, Turkish
democracy is progressing. Turkish democracy is leav-
ing the logic of exclusion and preclusion and adopt-
ing a logic of openness and inclusivity. This is exactly
what most of the Arab countries need and what their
reformist elite are looking for in their respective
ILLUSTRATION: CEM KIZILTUÐ
countries.
Switching loyalties in Turkey
The first loyalty which was broken in Turkey was
that of the businessmen to the secularist parties and
the military, because the trust of the largest business-
men in the capability of the army
and the old parties to protect
their benefits decreased.
This conviction was sus-
tained to them by the
64
reduplication of their benefits during the six-year
reign of the AK Party. In addition to that, new busi-
nessmen's associations emerged. Today business
organizations are crystallized in three big founda-
tions: the first is the biggest and eldest Turkish
Industrialists and Businessmen's Association
(TÜSÝAD), which includes great secular businessmen
and the second the Independent Industrialists and
Businessmen's Association (MÜSÝAD), which
includes great Islamic businessmen mostly supportive
of the AK Party. The third is the Turkish
Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists
(TUSKON), and this one is the newest. It includes a
great team of businessmen following the advice of
Fethullah Gülen.
The openness of Turkish policy to the Arab world
under the rule of the AK Party government has per-
mitted safer investment opportunities to Turkish
businessmen in the Arab world. This is especially
important when taking into consideration the fact
that the opportunities in other countries became less
safe due to the global economic crisis. This new situ-
ation makes businessmen's inclinations closer to the
policies of the AK Party government which obtains
stability by its adopted political visions. The business-
men are becoming more and more suspicious of the
old politics, its alliances with the deep state and its
clandestine organizations, which persistently threat-
en the stability of the country, as is seen in the case
of the Ergenekon organization, if not opposed to it
altogether. From the Arab side, the amount of Arab
countries' investment in Turkey is
still less than the amount of
Turkish investment in
Arab countries. The
amount of commercial exchange among the two
parties does not exceed $25 billion annually, with
an obvious export deficit on the side of the Arabs,
as the amount of Turkish exports to the Arab world
is $18 billion, while the amount of Turkish imports
from the Arabs is about $7 billion annually. This
explains Arab businessmen's fear of the troubles
which may result from the Ergenekon conspiracies
or any other deep state organization. Arab busi-
nessmen know very well that these types of organi-
zations generally adopt isolating policies against the
Arab world whereas they seek to support Turkey's
relations with the West and not the East and tend
to pursue international policies which give the state
the full power to rule both the economical and politi-
cal affairs. After all the powers of the "deep" state do Kemalist principles. The solidarity of the bureaucracy
not support the market economy, which the busi-
The Arab elite observe the signals of legiti-
macy and health the Turkish society is
enjoying, and they envy the Turks for this
political vitality, which embraces different
political and intellectual currents
nessmen and the money possessors prefer in general.
New media establishments
The second loyalty which the Arab elite realized
has broken up in Turkey is the loyalty of the largest
media establishments to influential negative secular
powers and the army. Media establishments were
bound for many decades to the negative secular
powers without any powerful ideological rival. These
media instruments have always favored the political
and economic positions taken by the army or those
of the secular alliances in the state, especially if they and social allegiances and the above-mentioned loy-
were blessed by the army. The situation is different
now. On the one hand, Islamically motivated groups
entered the journalistic arena with dozens of satellite
channels, national and local radio stations and maga-
zines; on the other hand, some of the Turkish deep-
rooted secular newspapers' possessions have passed
to organizations, groups or businessmen who have
Islamic pedigrees. There are already many publishing
houses and research institutions which help form the
perceptions of people and redraw the boundaries of
old loyalties on new bases, leaning toward Islamic
references and also deriving their power from wide
public support.
This transformation in the Turkish media's orienta-
tion helped change the traditional image of Arabs in
the Turkish mind from a negative picture to a much
more realistic and positive picture produced by free
competition in the media. Thus, whenever the deep
state powers and Ergenekon lose a media agent to
the democratic powers, especially to ones with more
Islamic grounding, Arab intellectuals regard this as a
gain on their side. This is so especially because the
deep state opposes any Turkish-Arab rapprochement
and seeks a permanent cultural and political divide
between Turkey and the Arab world.
The third loyalty which was broken up is the loyal-
ty of the general bureaucracy to the army and
has been always an important guarantee for the army
because a loyal bureaucracy would
help the army impose its principles
and put them in action. Such loyalty
ensures obedience to military orders
whenever they wished, without any
serious resistance. This loyalty is now
less strong and less coherent after the
entrance of a large number of demo-
cratic and religious people into the
political field. It is also said among the Turkish media
and cultural centers that there has been a gradual
replacement of the old secularist individuals who
were previously dominant in the state establishments
and organizations with a new generation with more
democratic minds. There are also signals that this
replacement has reached the heart of the military and
the judicial institutions, which were the two pillars of
Kemalist secularism for the last eight decades.
This corrosion and breaking up of the secular political
alties resulted in a loss of power by the deep state
and its clandestine groups, while at the same time a
large portion of the Anatolian people have stayed
loyal to their Islamic principles.
Transformation in Turkish-Arab relations
This corrosion and reformation of loyalties accord-
ing to new bases and the distancing of these loyalties
from the traditional powers (negative secular and
exclusive military powers) in the Turkish system is
one of the important factors which explains why
Turkish democracy is improving and secular domi-
nance is fading. This improvement is what the Arab
65
ARTICLE SPRING 2010
elite admire most. And maybe the main reason for ing the elected government whenever a crisis hap-
the transformation Turkish-Arab relations are wit- pens. Arab intellectuals' analyses tend to say that this
nessing is the depth of the transformation that deep-rooted Turkish army tradition will become a
reforms the power equation in the political system thing of the past as the reforms have already reached
from bottom to top, and not the other way. This is the heart of the military itself. The reforms have
the biggest lesson to be taken by Arab intellectuals pushed the army to reshape itself to fit in the political
from the Turkish example, especially after it had system, which insistently seeks the path of democra-
attempted so many times to change the state from cy, wants to recover Turkey's global prominence
the top but hit a dead end while losing its connection through political reforms and tries to break the
with its grass roots. chains of suffering binding the Turkish people under
In the past few years, Arab intellectuals and Islamic the pretexts of "defending secularism" and "protect-
organizations have examined the successes of the ing Kemalist principles." If this analysis is true,
Turkish government, looking for ways to apply les- Turkish-Arab relations will be more easily managed
sons from the Turkish example for the benefit of their compared to before Turkey's successes against the
own states. They have analyzed not just the success Ergenekon organization.
in stepping forward on the road of democratization The battle is ongoing, and the Arab intellectual and
and political reformation but also the government's political powers as well as different Turkish groups
ability to block the powers opposing democracy and are still waiting to see the consequences of the fight
defeat them using normal and peaceful legal proce- between the army, the judiciary and the civilian gov-
ernment.
In the past, the specter of any
Arab secularists act as though they are political crisis could push the army to
blind to the conspiracy the Turkish govern- seize power through a direct (1960,
ment is facing, just because the accused 1971, 1980) or indirect (1997) over-
throw. But today, the army finds itself,
people in this case are not Islamists and do
for the first time in history, in the
not belong to any of the Islamic groups defense and not on the attack. This
time it is defending its prestige.
dures, in addition to its ability to expand its social Because this prestige is targeted by accusations
base and gain new supporters including those which pointing to high-ranking retired and active duty gen-
had traditionally remained loyal to secular powers. erals. If these accusations are proven, this will mean
What really draws the attention of many Arab that the army, which is supposed to defend the
intellectuals is the rational stances the military estab- Constitution and impose respect for the law, has
lishment has started to adopt against the persistent become a cell of extralegal actions and is opposing
confrontations between the government on one side the public will and the elected constitutional institu-
and Ergenekon, with the deep-state powers, on the tions.
other. After the detention of about 70 officers, some What is new in Turkey?
of whom are high ranking and most of whom are Despite the media kerfuffle accompanied by the
retired, the General Staff declared that it would not detention of several army officers, members of the
hide any of the accused, even if he were from their judiciary and others who are suspected of involve-
institution. This reveals that the reformation has ment in a conspiracy against the incumbent AK Party
reached the heart of the Turkish Armed Forces government, and despite the ruthless campaigns trig-
(TSK), inside the General Staff, which has been man- gered by the opposing parties, especially by the
aged since August 2008 by Gen. Ýlker Baþbuð. Republican People's Party (CHP), the General Staff
Coups no longer has not attempted to overthrow the government.
There are many signals which confirm that the What is new in Turkey that makes it nearly impossi-
Turkish army is not going to try its old actions such ble to overthrow the Turkish government?
as threatening the government on the pretext of In our opinion, there are many reasons, like the
defending the state's secular system and overthrow- large popularity of the AK Party, which received 16
66
million votes in the last parliamentary elections
(2007) and has 47 percent of the parliamentary spots.
This government is carrying out an ambitious reform
program which aims to place Turkey among the sta-
ble democratic countries of the world and qualify it
for membership in the European Union. Previous
experiments have ensured that foreign direct or indi-
rect support is a prerequisite for the success of a mili-
tary coup in Turkey. Without this, the possibility of a
military overthrow becomes weaker.
ILLUSTRATION: CEM KIZILTUÐ
There are also the great accomplishments of the
AK Party government, especially in the field of rais-
ing Turkish citizens' standards of living (Turks have
more than $10,000 average per capita annual income
today). The AK Party government also improved
Turkey's economic performance (the
Turkish economy is currently 16th in
the world) and ended many of its
conflicts with neighboring
countries.
All these causes are sub-
stantial and bear much
importance in preventing
any overthrow attempt by
the army. But the most
important reason, in our
opinion, is the wave of
change that is taking place
among the Turkish army
ranks and inside the General
Staff. Today, the General Staff
looks more open to civil governance,
but its ranks are less coherent in their stance
on the political changes and democratic reforms led
by the AK Party government.
This partial openness of the General Staff to civil
life, its understanding of democratic needs and its
perception that the old loyalties on which it leaned in
the past have changed mean that Turkey is about to
complete another stage on the way of democratic
reforms and conformation to the pillars of liberty and
the rule of law.
But many people in the Arab world are still asking,
"Does this mean that the age of military coups has
come to an end in Turkey?" Most of the supporters
of political reforms, powers of democratic transfor-
mation and resisters of despotic systems in our Arab
societies wish that the answer would be a clear "yes,"
especially after they see Turks enjoy using their
67
rights, choosing their rulers, living under normal liv-
ing standards and feeling proud of their rulers and
their rightful position in the international community.
They also yearn to see their presidents act the same
way as the Turkish president and want to see civil
society organizations in their countries participating
positively in reform processes and confronting chal-
lenges. While the supporters of negative secularism
and totalitarian rule in Turkey and in most of the
Arab countries wish that Ergenekon and deep state
conspirators would escape punishment, just because
of their hatred of the religious reformist powers
which brought this government to the ruling deck
twice, they also wish that the hour hand of Turkey's
political watch would turn back to "coup time" and
that the military would impose its guardian-
ship.
Blindness of the Arab secularists
Arab media establishments in
general and the governmental
ones in particular do not care
very much about observing
the confrontation happening
between the Turkish gov-
ernment and Ergenekon. In
addition, Arab secularists act
as though they are blind to
the conspiracy the Turkish
government is facing, just
because the accused people in
this case are not Islamists and do
not belong to any of the Islamic groups.
We are accustomed to seeing them very inter-
ested if the event has something to do with fanatic
groups. They volunteer to expose the precocious
intentions of these groups, which are, they allege,
against the rule of law, human rights, constitutional
legitimacy and the democratically elected govern-
ment. But this time, they've closed their eyes and
ears and act according to the "I don't see, I don't
hear and I don't speak" way.
What we see today in the confrontations between
the Turkish government and the deep state powers
is, in fact, a democratic authority that respects the
national will that brought it to power trying to use
this will to stand on its own two feet so as to break
the chains of fear which were planted by the team of
politicians who leaned for years on the help of terror-
ist covert organizations such as Ergenekon.
ARTICLE SPRING 2010 Ýhsan Yýlmaz

R
Naming what is going
on in Turkey: from a
‘for the people despite
the people’ elitism to a
‘for the people with
the people’ democracy
Republican Turkish history is full of mili-
tary coups and unproven accusations justi-
fying a coup against the government. Most
recent ones were fortunately unearthed by
a handful of brave journalists and prosecu-
tors. Documented evidence, witness testi-
mony, wiretapped conversations, weapons
and so on all point to an underground ter-
ecently there has been an increase in
the number of newspaper and aca-
demic journal articles published in
the US about the Ergenekon terror
organization case in Turkey. This case
was opened by prosecutors when
police discovered around two
dozen hand grenades on the roof of a house in a
suburb of Ýstanbul. The homeowner said that they
belonged to a retired army officer, and it was later
found that said army officer's fingerprints were all
over the grenades. This retired army officer was not
just anybody. He was a close friend of retired Gen.
Veli Küçük, who has for years been accused of being
behind a secret underground terror organization with
deep connections to the state. In the 1990s, even
though there was strong circumstantial evidence of
his illegal activities, even a parliamentary commission
was unable to question him.
The story does not end here. The hand grenades
were also connected to some terror attacks. When
the hand grenades were discovered, a few were miss-
ing from their storage case. Criminologists later
young military officers, and nobody mentioned the biased, lack convincing arguments, are full of blanket
allegedly missing youth afterward. Thus nobody was
shocked to see the connection between the retired
accusations without any substantiating evidence and
are simply written with an anti-AK Party political
general, other retired military officers, hand grenades
that were "stolen" from the military and a plot
agenda. These pieces also mostly reflect the views of
Turkish ultranationalists and American pro-Israeli
against the democratically elected government.
Prosecutors have spoken to several witnesses,
neocons who are AK Party enemies and who disre-
gard several objective Western analyses. They suffer
legally wiretapped several people, searched homes
and offices of many people with warrants and pre-
also from several Orientalist inaccuracies, false
assumptions and a lack of sufficient knowledge of
pared three indictments so far, amounting to thou-
sands of pages, with millions of pages of documented
Islam in Turkey.
These anti-AK Party pieces emphasize that the
evidence, not to mention hundreds of bombs, light
anti-tank weapons (LAWs), all sorts of rifles, illegal
army has been the pioneer of democratization in
Turkey and is the only genuine protector of secular-
wiretapping of many impor- ism and democracy in the
The Ergenekon
tant people, secret reports country, implying that by
investigation lead to
about almost every public enfeebling the army with the
figure in the country, assassi- Ergenekon case, the
several digs around
Turkey, unearthing
nation plans targeting impor- "Islamists" in Turkey will eas- LAWs, bombs and
other munitions for
tant people including Prime ily establish a dictatorship. As future use. Some of
Minister Recep Tayyip we will see now below, a brief the munitions found
Erdoðan and so on. analysis of recent Turkish his- were apparently
stolen (or taken)
Documented evidence, wit- tory shows that their positive
ness testimony, wiretapped claims about the army are not
from the army

ror organization with deep connections to
some high-ranking military officers, named
Ergenekon. But some pieces that appear in
the West somehow give a carte blanche on
truth to the Ergenekon suspects and accept
their claims as true
proved that these missing hand grenades were used
in attacks on the staunchly secularist, ultra-national-
ist and anti-Justice and Development Party (AK
Party) Cumhuriyet newspaper. Every time the news-
paper's entrance was bombed, the headlines in cer-
tain newspapers pointed fingers at the AK Party gov-
ernment and questioned whether Turkey was
becoming an Islamist state. So the discovery was
phenomenal. For the first time in Turkish history,
there was proof that a plot against the democratically
elected government was in action such that the gov-
ernment would unjustly be accused of paving the
way for Islamist terrorism so the people would not
re-elect the government or alternatively so a coup
would be justified.
Republican Turkish history is full of military coups
and also full of unproven accusations justifying a
coup against the government, such as one rumor that
Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was butchering --
literally, in mincemeat machines -- thousands of dis-
senting youngsters or burying them under the
asphalt roads. Even though nobody reported any
missing people, newspapers attacking the Menderes
government claimed that the exact figures would be
known by that autumn. But that spring, on May 27,
1960, the Menderes government was toppled by
conversations, weapons and
so on all point to an under-
ground terror organization
with deep connections to
some high-ranking military
officers. The case is now
before a court in Ýstanbul,
and the media is closely
watching. Until very recently,
while one section of the
media extensively covered
the case, one section stayed
away from it and did not
report it properly, covering the case only when prose-
cutors or the police made so-called "mistakes," such
as detaining elderly people or arriving at the homes
of the suspects in the very early hours of the morn-
ing. The pieces that have recently appeared in the
West show that the Western media also do not ana-
lyze the substantiated claims in the indictments but
instead try to convince their readers that the whole
situation is about the AK Party trying suppress its
opponents and that everything is a conspiracy against
secularism and its protector, the army. This piece
endeavors to show that the articles that have
appeared in the Western media and journals are
entirely true, that moderniza-
tion, secularization and
democratization have strong
civilian roots and that the
army has sometimes opposed,
prevented and even stopped
these processes.
Army's role in politics
Ottoman history is full of
army uprisings and coups.
These were not for lofty
ideals, but either about their
payroll or about resisting the
modernization attempts of the sultans and their
viziers. There has always been a power struggle
between the modernizing and Westernizing foreign
ministry, the reactionary army and Islamic scholars
who were divided between modernizers and the
reactionary army. By 1913, after murdering the
defense minister and threatening the prime minister,
the army-backed Ýttihat ve Terakki resolved the con-
flict for the benefit of the army. This hegemonic posi-
tion of the army continued until very recently. It must
be noted that by the end of the 19th century, the
army was full of young military officers who had
received a Western education, were socially Darwinist

68 69
ARTICLE SPRING 2010 ARTICLE IN BRIEF: This piece endeavors to show that the articles that have appeared in the Western media and journals
are biased, lack convincing arguments, are full of blanket accusations without any substantiating evidence and are simply written with
an anti-AK Party political agenda. These pieces also mostly reflect the views of Turkish ultranationalists and American pro-Israeli neo-
cons who are AK Party enemies and who disregard several objective Western analyses. They also suffer from several Orientalist inaccu-
racies, false assumptions and a lack of sufficient knowledge of Islam in Turkey.

with no trust of ordinary people and were crudely public has only extremely rarely heard military offi- [GDP] at the time) was reportedly embezzled from moving toward an Islamist theocracy. But they are
positivistic, with secularist and nationalist ideas also. cers speaking of the virtues of democracy, pluralism the Treasury by bankers who were secularist support- unable to explain the support given to the party from
This ideology has continued up until now as well. and the importance of civilian governance. ers of the army. Generals also invited the judiciary to liberal, leftist, democrat, pro-Western and secular
The establishment's ideology in Turkey has always The army has also secured every important issue in their headquarters and briefed them on the dangers quarters. They also fail to address why EU politicians,
held that it was the army that emancipated Turkey Turkey in addition to its constitutional partnership of the alleged Islamist threat. The generals -- without institutions, bureaucrats, reports and so on support
from the occupied forces in early 1920s. But it is never with political power by way of deciding all important any democratic or civilian supervision -- signed sev- the AK Party's actions and do not question its legiti-
mentioned that the Ottomans lost the Balkan territo- issues at the National Security Council (MGK) (until eral lucrative contracts and military agreements with macy and democratic credentials. The only answer so
ries as a result of intra-army conflicts and an ultra- very recently ministers had to follow the MGK's Israel. European Union reports on Turkey constantly far is the CHP argument voiced by deputies Þahin
politicized army. It was also army leaders such as "orders"). In the old Turkey, the governing capacity underline that the Turkish army meddles with poli- Mengü and Onur Öymen, that it was the Zaman
Enver Pasha that decided to take the Ottomans into of the politicians was weak, thus the bureaucracy, tics, is not subordinate to the civilians, is not account- daily and its Brussels representative Selçuk Gültaþlý
World War I. They were also the ones who lost the especially soldiers, filled the power vacuum in the able and is not transparent. Very recently, Chief of that brainwashed the Europeans. The crucial question
war. The resistance movement in Turkey started in Southeast. Unfortunately, this pattern tends to be General Staff Gen. Ýlker Baþbuð boasted in Brussels of why Armenians in Turkey reportedly voted for the
1919, just after the occupation of Ottoman lands and self-enforcing all over the world. As more power and that if he did not give permission, a judge with a AK Party in the July 22, 2007 general elections, when
Anatolia, and it was civilian elite leaders who started decision-making passed to the security bureaucracy, search warrant from the court could not enter a mili- the AK Party got 47 percent of the overall vote, has
this resistance. In most places, the army had been the popular image of the state as authoritarian and tary compound to search despite serious charges, not been addressed or answered by those who claim
dissolved because of the armistice agreement anyway. unaffectionate, if not merciless and impersonal was showing that Turkish generals see themselves as that the AK Party is after an Islamist dictatorship,
In Erzurum and Sivas, it was also mainly the civilian reinforced. In this catch-22 situation, this further above the law. Today, many something "seen" by some
elite (tribal leaders, politicians, religious scholars, Sufi reduced the legitimacy of the political system in the people object to the army American pro-Israeli An unforgettable
brotherhood leaders, etc.) who eyes of the population and prevented being above the law, but Likudniks but not by public relations flap
by Baþbuð occurred
paved the way for the resistance and
the establishment of Parliament on
The Turkish army has the legislative and executive bodies
from becoming effective rule-making
they are portrayed by con-
stant propaganda cam-
Armenians living in Turkey.
Blindly supporting
when he showed TV
cameras a used LAW
April 23, 1920, in Ankara. The mem- not come to terms institutions. A vicious cycle of paigns as objecting to the Ergenekon and boasted that it
bers of the first Parliament were with pluralist democ- bureaucratic domination tended to existence of the army, an The pieces that appear in was not a weapon
but merely a pipe.
the West somehow give a
mainly from these backgrounds. It racy. It meddles with perpetuate itself. It is telling to note accusation without any
carte blanche on truth to
Baþbuð also implied
was this Parliament and people's that Daniel Pipes wrote in his latest solid evidence. that the unearthed
money, goods and effort that re-
politics in the name anti-AK Party and anti-Fethullah Pro-democracy alliance the Ergenekon suspects weapons might
established the army. But after victo- of national unity, Gülen piece, "If the military retains versus the bureaucratic oli- and accept their claims as belong to police, but
garchy and its supporters true while they refuse to later the company
ry, these elite from several back- security and secular- its independence…" Pipes and his that produces these
grounds were purged by the former similar-minded friends do not com- The AK Party is a result of credit the evidence put for-
ism as if civilians do changes in society; it is not ward by the prosecutors.
weapons tracked
down their unique
members of the staunchly secularist prehend that this neo-Orientalist-
and nationalist Ýttihat ve Terakki. A not care about them bon-pour-Orient approach is an the cause. Turkish society Their excuse so far is that serial numbers and
has for some time had a found they had been
new party was formed (the insult to Turkish people, an insult the indictments are thou-
sold to the army,
Republican People's Party, CHP), and its ideology repeated with different wording very recently by new coalition. This is a sands of pages long and not the police
still resembles Ýttihat ve Terakki's ideology. Until Israeli President Shimon Peres. coalition between the newly the supporting evidence
1950, there was an authoritarian one-party rule Frequently, the generals have targeted politicians, emerging observant Muslim comprises millions of
strongly backed and protected by the army. Even thinkers, social activists, human rights activists, reli- middle class of Anatolia, a pages. But that does not
today, the Turkish army has not come to terms with gious leaders and journalists. For instance, during the new socially conservative stop these writers from
pluralist democracy, and from time to time, they notorious Feb. 28, 1997 postmodern coup process, but economically liberal passing judgment in the
meddle with politics in the name of national unity, upon orders from the generals, some liberal journal- bourgeoisie, pro-EU urban- cases. It must also be noted
security and secularism as if civilians do not care ists who did not agree with the generals -- such as ites of the major cities, that it is not only the police
about these issues. respected journalist Cengiz Çandar -- were wrongly democratic Kurds and a majority of leftists. Some of or the prosecutors who have suspicions about the
Even though only a few of them voice it publicly, accused of being supporters of the terrorist Kurdistan these groups are, of course, intermingled, and the suspects -- several judges have constantly reviewed
because of the education they get, many military gen- Workers' Party (PKK). One of the accused, Akýn boundaries between them are blurred. Likewise, the files of the detained suspects every two weeks
erals in Turkey firmly believe that they are superior to Birdal, the head of a human rights group, survived an these groups may be represented, overrepresented or and continue to keep them in prison.
civilians in all respects and that they are the only ones assassination attempt. The assassin is now in jail underrepresented in the AK Party. But one thing is Pro-Ergenekon pieces that appear in the US refuse
who know Turkey, its issues, problems, challenges, together with some generals on charges of being certain: Mr. Erdoðan knows very well -- despite indi- to discuss, for instance, the original documents dis-
opportunities and so on. It is easy to understand this members of the ultranationalist Ergenekon terrorist cating otherwise at times -- that he has to respond to covered in the houses of generals Veli Küçük and
from all their public speeches. Moreover, with the organization. During the Feb. 28 process, $50 billion the demands of this coalition. Þener Eruygur. In one of these documents, the prose-
exception of ones like Gen. Hilmi Özkök, the Turkish (almost one-fifth of the gross domestic product Anti-AK Party pieces accuse the AK Party of slowly cutors discovered the original copy of the constitution

70 71
ARTICLE SPRING 2010
of the Ergenekon organization. When asked about misquote their sources.
the document, Küçük briefly replied that it was sent The notorious "Cage plan" prepared by Col.
to him and that he likes to keep serious documents Dursun Çiçek is another case in point. The plan
like that in his archives. In his agenda, notes were included planting bombs and weapons in student
found in his handwriting reminding him to take the dormitories associated with the Gülen movement and
"things" out so that the sun shines on them or to then prosecuting the residents on terrorism charges
turn them around regularly. When asked about the in a military court. Four different forensic institutions
notes, he replied that they were about how to prepare (including the gendarmerie, another blow to the
pickles. Prosecutors do not believe him and think that police-conspiracy thesis) have so far confirmed that
they are about keeping secret bombs "fit and in the original signature on the plan does indeed belong
shape." When asked about why he had harassed the to Col. Çiçek, but he and his supporters still argue
late Armenian journalist Hrant Dink when Dink was that the document should be sent to Brussels for fur-
on trial, he said that he was passing by when he saw ther tests. These ultranationalists and Euroskeptics
a crowd outside a court building and accidentally are unaware of their argument's legal implications, as
entered the courtroom where Dink was being judged. thousands of people in Turkey have been imprisoned
Another telling fact about the Ergenekon case is Lt. on the basis of the Turkish forensic reports and their
Col. Mustafa Dönmez's imprisonment files were not sent to Brussels. This
by a military court for stealing a large also shows how the army and
number of bombs and weapons from The Turkish public bureaucratic oligarchy sees itself as
the military. Prosecutors learned of his has only extremely above the Turkish law and judicial
involvement through documents dis- rarely heard military institutions.
covered in other suspects' homes and Lastly, these allegedly conspiring
via legal wiretaps. Police have found
officers speaking of police officers and prosecutors must
bombs, weapons and ammunition in the virtues of democ- be irrational to fabricate false evi-
his summer home and in a secret loca- racy, pluralism and dence to harm the military. Only a
tion, the map of which was found hid- the importance of few years ago, Erdoðan, the mayor of
den in the cover of Dönmez's agenda Ýstanbul at the time, was sent to
planner. Forensic scientists confirmed
civilian governance prison just because he recited a
that the handwriting was his. But he poem that was included in state-
continues to deny the accusations and argues that the sanctioned schoolbooks. It is obvious what could
police planted the weapons. Military officers accom- happen to these allegedly conspiring police officers
panying the police during the search have testified and prosecutors if they were caught red-handed.
against Dönmez. Dönmez could not explain his They must be unintelligent not to see this almost
secret map, either. Thus, the military court sentenced inevitable end. But then, if they are so unintelligent,
him to prison. how could they successfully conspire against an army
Even this single case shows that Ergenekon case that employs many thousands of military officers with
is not simply about the AK Party suppressing its so many skills, extraordinary education, billions of
opponents or the support given to it by police who dollars worth of equipment and a number of intelli-
are allegedly associated with Gülen. This evidence - gence agencies? And, how come not even a single
- and many thousands more like it documented in one of these allegedly conspiring police officers have
the indictments -- has somehow been omitted from been caught by the military intelligence organizations
the pro-Ergenekon pieces. Instead of discussing or the National Intelligence Organization (MÝT)? It
and if possible refuting these concrete cases, writers should also be noted that not only the police but also
such as Pipes, Rachel Sharon-Krespin, Michael the MÝT prepared several reports supporting the evi-
Rubin, Barry Rubin, Soner Çaðaptay and so on base dence against the Ergenekon terror organization.
their arguments on scaremongering, mindreading Democratic leaks and generals'
and blanket accusations. They also quote selectively inconsistencies vis-a-vis the truth
from pro-Ergenekonian non-academic and nonob- This section could be the longest part of this piece,
jective pieces published in Turkey or, reportedly, but it needs to be short. The biggest blow to the pro-
72
Ergenekon thesis that it is an AK Party-police con- occurred when he showed TV cameras a used LAW
spiracy against secularism is the existence of many and boasted that it was not a weapon but merely a
democratic military officers of all ranks. The Turkish pipe. He carefully shied away from discussing the
public has watched in amazement as different fac- several other unused LAWs discovered alongside the
tions in the army have quarreled and as top-secret used ones in land bought by Yeditepe University
information about antidemocratic plots has been chairman and former Ýstanbul Mayor Bedrettin
fearlessly leaked, presumably by democratic officers. Dalan, who is now a fugitive. Baþbuð also implied
In some cases, it is obvious that the leaked informa- that the unearthed weapons might belong to police,
tion could only be accessed by the top brass. Some of but later the company that produces these weapons
this leaked information has humbled the generals in tracked down their unique serial numbers and found
public and paved the way for questions as to whether they had been sold to the army, not the police. The
they've been fully forthcoming. Thus, in addition to public has also heard that the used "pipes" were
prosecutors, judges buried because they
Lt. Col. Mustafa
and police, there are were needed for train-
Dönmez was sen-
also many anti- ing on how to use these tenced to four years
Ergenekon and pro- weapons. Thereafter, by the General Staff
democracy military countless jokes, satirical Military Court in a
ruling announced on
officers. If the pieces and criticisms of
Ergenekon case is an Baþbuð appeared in the
Feb. 5, 2010.
Dönmez was also
anti-military plot, these media, but Baþbuð did dismissed from the
military, as he was
military officers should not break his silence on
the person responsi-
also be ironically this. It was also reported
labeled as anti-military. recently that several
ble for weaponry
that was found
One such leak was army branches had qui- buried underground
just before the presi- etly applied to the in Ankara's Zir
Valley in January
dential elections in courts and had gotten 2009
2007, when it became public that a Constitutional their "stolen" and then discovered weapons back, PHOTO: MEHMET YAMAN
Court member -- Osman Paksüt, the son of a CHP even though they initially publicly denied that the
politician -- had secretly visited Gen. Baþbuð, obvi- weapons belonged to them.
ously to discuss the pending court judgment on the Speculation and accusations about
elections. To the astonishment of almost everyone, the Gülen movement
the court declared that a quorum of two-thirds was As mentioned above, the main thrust of the pro-
needed for the elections to take place, a fabricated Ergenekonian argument is that the Ergenekon case is
requirement that had not surfaced during any previ- a conspiracy against the protector of secularism in
ous elections. It was also reported that the Baþbuð- Turkey, the army, by the so-called "Islamist" and
Paksüt meeting was kept secret by turning the lights "shadowy" Gülen movement, which allegedly wants
and CCTV cameras off. After Baþbuð was appointed to establish an Islamist dictatorship in Turkey. But so
chief of General Staff, the Zaman daily published a far, no evidence -- other than mindreading -- has
news story claiming that a retired top general -- been put forward. Many academic studies conducted
whose name was withheld -- told the daily that he in the West have called it an apolitical moderate
warned Baþbuð about juntas in the army. Baþbuð has movement reinterpreting Islamo-Turkish heritage
never denied this allegation. along the lines of Ottoman and Anglo-Saxon secular-
In another case, Baþbuð boasted live on the air that ism, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and
he would sue Taraf writer Mehmet Baransu for libel, inner spiritually with a socially active mindset for the
as Baþbuð claimed the Taraf reporter had published betterment of the world in tune with the zeitgeist.
false and fabricated news about the army. Although a There are several academic books and journal arti-
year has passed, the hyper-litigant army has not filed cles on the movement. About 10 international confer-
a case against Baransu on this issue. ences have specifically focused on the movement,
An unforgettable public relations flap by Baþbuð and more than 200 papers have been presented at
73
ARTICLE SPRING 2010
these conferences. Many Western academics have It has been repeatedly noted by Çaðaptay and oth-
referred to the movement in their works. Several ers that Gülen has said that "every method and path
objective analyses of the movement have suggested is acceptable, [including] lying to people." Even
that the movement challenges the stereotypical staunch Gülen enemies have not put forth such
Oriental misperceptions regarding Islam-secularism, claims. Analyses that are expected to be more or less
Islam-politics, Islam-democracy and Islam-this objective should not include such groundless accusa-
worldliness. The sophisticated discourse of Gülen and tions without a reliable reference. These anti-Gülen
the movement associated with his name make life pieces simply borrow all the negative words and
difficult for armchair Orientalist and neo-Orientalist terms that would irritate a Western reader, but none
analysts. But even armchair analysts could find suffi- of these are true, and clear definitions are never
cient literature on the abovementioned issues. It given. It seems that for these writers, where Gülen is
would then be easier to understand how Gülen offers concerned, anything could be written about him,
an Islamic paradigm to the Muslim self to accommo- such as Sharon-Krespin's great lie about him: "Gülen
date him/herself in secular and democratic settings. … considers himself a prophet." She does not even
Moreover, anyone familiar with Max know that in the Muslim creed no
Weber's work on the Protestant prophet can come after the last
European Union
ethic would not find it puzzling to prophet and that to claim otherwise
see an Islamic scholar asking his reports on Turkey makes a Muslim non-Muslim. It is
audience to not ignore this world constantly underline puzzling to see such a piece pub-
but to endeavor for success as long that the Turkish army lished in an allegedly academic jour-
as the intention is attaining God's
pleasure.
meddles with politics, nal such as the Middle East
Quarterly.
It has also been claimed that there is not subordinate to
Some, like Çaðaptay, write without
are many Gülen followers in the civil the civilians, is not any proof or evidence that "the
service but that they hide their true accountable and is Gülen-controlled parts of the judici-
identity. This is a complicated issue ary and police have also wielded ille-
and without knowing the intricacies
not transparent gal wiretaps against those entangled
of Turkey it is difficult to understand. in the Ergenekon case, leaking inti-
First of all, Gülen has been publicly preaching for mate details of their private lives." This self-contra-
almost the last 50 years. Records of his sermons have dictory statement fails to show the reader how these
sold millions of copies. He has dozens of books wiretaps are illegal if the judiciary is involved and
which have sold millions of copies. Several surveys how come they have become part of the indictments
have indicated that about 80 percent of the popula- accepted by the courts. There is, of course, no proof
tion sympathizes with his views. If representative that these police and prosecutors are men who follow
bureaucracy would be expected to exist in a typical Gülen. These writers fail to mention the fact that sev-
democracy, it is only natural that there would be eral Ergenekon suspects were caught with illegal
many Gülen sympathizers in the civil service. But it is recordings and pictures in their possession and that
important to underline what kinds of views these sometimes they were caught not by the police but by
people have. Gülen and his movement support the gendarmerie, hence there are no grounds to claim
democracy, a liberal market economy, a passively that these illegal items were planted by the police, as
non-assertive secular state, freedoms, human rights Ergenekon suspects usually claim. It must also be
and so on. But these people also have spiritual con- noted that when former Land Forces Commander
cerns and endeavor to be religiously observant indi- Gen. Yaþar Büyükanýt was to be appointed chief of
viduals in their daily lives. There are several similar General Staff, there was a bombardment of every sin-
individuals and groups around the world. With this in gle cell phone, e-mail inbox and Internet website
mind, Gülen is a competent zeitgeist-friendly guide used by high-ranking officers in the Turkish army
because he blends human rights, fundamental free- accusing him of being everything from a secret Jew to
doms, several aspects of modernity, spirituality and a corrupt officer. The oligarchy's men instantly
Islam. blamed their scapegoat Gülen at that time, but after-
74
wards incriminating evidence was found in the office "shadowy," "Islamist" and "radical" by pro-Israelis,
of Büyükanýt's rival for the position of chief of the movement will hopefully pressure the AK Party
General Staff, Gen. Eruygur (an Ergenekon suspect ), government to be more massacre-tolerant.
well-protected in the army compounds. Gen. Eruygur Conclusion
today allegedly has amnesia. Referring to this, Gen. What is happening in Turkey is not about secular-
Büyükanýt himself has said he was also a victim of ism or democracy being under siege by Islamists. It is
Ergenekon. Somehow, these important and publicly about the disestablishment of the militarist and anti-
known details are omitted in the pieces that address democratic bureaucratic oligarchy, a process which is
the Western audience, an insult to these people. applauded and commended by the regular EU
It is difficult to assess why Gülen has suddenly reports, objective observers, the general public -- who
became a target, but it seems that as the movement is have voted four times consecutively for the AK Party
one of the major supporters of democracy in the -- and Turkey's non-Muslim minorities. As John L.
country and would like to see the army in its proper Esposito put it very recently: "The old political parties
place, out of politics, this is against Israeli interests. and secular elites have proven impotent, incapable of
As declared by Israeli organizing a broad-
Fethullah Gülen and
President Peres, in the based, effective opposi-
his movement sup-
past it was much easier tion with a popular mes- port democracy, a
for Israel to strike politi- sage that speaks to the liberal market econ-
cal, strategic, diplomatic political and economic
omy, a passively
non-assertive secu-
and military deals with challenges that Turkey lar state, freedoms,
the support of the
Turkish generals. But
faces. In contrast, [the
AK Party] has affirmed
human rights and so
on. But these people
also have spiritual
this can only partially the secular nature of the concerns and
explain what is going Turkish state, the separa- endeavor to be reli-
on, as the Gülen move- tion of religion and the giously observant
ment could have easily state. But, in contrast to individuals in their
been targeted indirectly its predecessors' hardline
daily lives
PHOTO: ONUR ÇOBAN
without sacrificing the secular fundamentalism
names and identities of with its anti-religious
neo-con, Zionist and pro-Israeli writers. A possible bias, [the AK Party] has insisted that secularism can
but reasonable explanation of these writers' ground- include a public space for belief as well as non-belief.
less but fierce attacks on the movement without hid- It has introduced important political and economic
ing their identities could be to show the AK Party reforms, advanced Turkey's cause for membership in
government that the Israeli matter is indeed serious. the European Union, addressed human rights issues
After the AK Party government started questioning and struggled with resolving the Kurdish and the
Israeli attacks on Palestinian territories, these com- Armenian 'questions'. The process has not been
mentators might have decided that one of AK Party's without its pitfalls and problems. … Yes, there has
Achilles heels is the Gülen movement. Even though been a departure from the legacy of the past with
there are many differences between the movement major implications for Turkey and Muslims every-
and the party, they share a common goal of a more where. Turkey has become more democratic, with a
democratic, stable and prosperous Turkey that is a more open political and social system, a more broad-
member of the EU. Thus, the movement openly sup- based electorate and leadership, and a greater
ports every democratic move in the country, includ- emphasis on rule of law that includes the accounta-
ing those of the AK Party. While Zionist, Likudnik bility of all institutions, including the military. What
and neo-con assaults on the AK Party increase its we are seeing is not a showdown between secularists
prestige at home and in the greater Middle East, the and so-called Islamists or the demise of the secular
movement is more vulnerable to such attacks as it is state, but a process of normalization and the matur-
associated with schools in more than 120 countries, ing of Turkey's democracy, institutions and the rule
and if it can be "character assassinated" as being of law."
75
 ARTICLE SPRING 2010
Council of State's
coefficient ruling:
appellatre
judiciary and
constitutional order
The recent decisions by the Higher
Education Board with respect to the col-
lege placement exams are considered
administrative acts, and for this reason
they are subject to the review of the
Council of State. YÖK decided to abolish
an unegalitarian coefficient system
applied in the evaluation of the placement
exams and the Council of State cancelled
the newly introduced egalitarian system.
The eagerness of the judiciary, which is
supposed to review the legality of the
acts, to serve as lawmakers reveals a
juristocratic tendency
76
Mustafa Þentop
I
t is not surprising to witness that the Council
of State interferes with the college admission
and placement system in Turkey and
attempts to determine the governing princi-
ples of the placement exam. The recent deci-
sions by the Higher Education Board (YÖK)
with respect to the college placement exams
are considered administrative acts, and for this reason
they are subject to the review of the Council of State.
Previously, the Council of State made a different deci-
sion on a similar case filed under different circum-
stances. The coefficient system introduced by YÖK in
1999 and revised in 2002, under which different coeffi-
cients are applied to the same questions for exam-takers
from different schools, was approved by the Council of
State, which ruled that YÖK is authorized to make the
necessary regulations in this matter, adding that the
system was in full accordance with existing legislation.
Those who considered these rulings held that subse-
quent decisions by YÖK would also be legally valid.
YÖK was also of the same view; however, the Council
of State in July 2009 annulled YÖK's new egalitarian
coefficient system, thus, disappointing those consider-
ing the issue from a purely legal perspective.
Historical evolution of the coefficient system
The Constitution, as well as the law, underlines that
the principles governing college placements are deter-
mined by YÖK. Relying on this authority, YÖK intro-
duced a system in 1982 under which the placement
points of the examinees were determined by a single
coefficient that applied to all exam-takers; this single
coefficient system lasted through to 1998. The military,
which, in reliance on the decisions taken by the
National Security Council (MGK) meeting on Feb. 28,
1997, staged a post-modern coup, opposed this system
where the graduates of vocational schools were com-
peting with graduates of other schools under the same
conditions. Despite the fact that they were disadvan-
taged in comparison to graduates of other schools in
terms of the quality of their education and the content
of the curricula, the graduates of vocational schools,
including religious schools, were attracting attention
because of their striking successes in the placement
exams. To make sure that they were not placed in pop-
ular departments, a particularly unique and equally ille-
gal method was developed. According to this method,
graduates of religious schools would get 0.2 point for
each correct answer in the exam, whereas the graduates
of regular schools would receive 0.5. Regular school
graduates would receive a point if they picked two cor-
rect answers, but in the case of religious school gradu-
ates they needed 5 correct answers for the same point.
It was impossible for religious school graduates to be
placed in the department of their choice even if they
answered all the questions in the exam. This system,
devised to ensure that religious school graduates would
be unable to earn the right to admission to the universi-
ty department of their choice, should have been applied
to the graduates of other vocational schools because it
was legally impossible to exclude the graduates of these
schools. By doing so, the drafters of this system
deprived the graduates of vocational schools of equal
competition, a fundamental principle of law.
Prevention of school transfers
The drafters of the system did not stop there; students
at the religious schools wanted to change their schools
considering that they would be unable to get a place-
ment in college. The government in power during the
post-modern coup period,
under pressure from the mili-
tary, passed a directive pre-
venting the students from reli-
gious schools from moving to
other schools. Under this
directive, the transfer from
vocational schools to other
regular schools was banned.
The graduates of vocational
schools, including religious
schools, were left with one sin-
gle option: to take the college
placement exam where the principle of equality had
been violated.
It is now obvious that these two practices were imple-
mented in full accordance with the instructions
addressed by the generals of the time to YÖK and the
Ministry of Education during the period of the Feb. 28
post-modern coup. Students negatively affected by
YÖK's decision to change the placement system in 1998
filed a lawsuit with the Council of State seeking the
annulment of the unequal coefficients. In its ruling, the
council noted that YÖK is authorized to take such
action and to determine a system that it concludes will
serve the best interests of the students; the ruling fur-
ther underlined that students at the religious schools
and vocational schools cannot be considered equal to
the students at regular schools; and, finally, it found the
system of unequal coefficients legally valid. This was an
77
astonishing reasoning that may not be justified by any
principle in the history of law. Students who were
studying for the exam in consideration of the previous
system appealed against the decision, asking for a waiv-
er of the application of the unequal coefficient system
for at least that year because they were doing all the
necessary preparations in accordance with the system
they were accustomed to. In their appeal, they were
referring to the principle of acquired rights; however,
the Council of State dismissed this request as well.
A huge number of students and their families suffered
from the repercussions of this visibly unfair practice that
has remained in place for over a decade. Some families
had to send their children abroad to further their stud-
ies, but those who cannot afford this option had to
postpone or give up on their dreams of going to a col-
lege or department they had chosen. A number of voca-
tional school graduates were deprived of their right to
an education. During this process, a substantial number
of students had to spend time The coefficient sys-
and effort dealing with the psy- tem was designed to
chological problems they prevent graduates of
state-run religious
encountered because of this
unfair practice; some had to deal
schools, but the stu-
dents of all the voca-
with the permanent impact of tional suffered from
such problems. the system.
PHOTO: MEVLÜT KARABULUT
YÖK's new placement exam
In early 2009, YÖK attempted to
fix this unfairness by rearranging
the system of college placement
exams and particularly by
addressing the coefficient prob-
lem. First, it entirely changed the college placement
exam and introduced a two-stage exam system instead
of the former where students were required to sit one
sole session. The board also introduced different types
of exams for students who had to make their choices
out of these exams depending on the major they would
like to study. Six months later, the board also decided to
apply a single coefficient for all examinees.
The Ýstanbul Bar Association appealed this decision;
despite the fact that the bar was not affected by the
decision, the Council of State admitted the appeal. It
should be noted that a lawsuit appeal is admitted by the
council only if the applicant is visibly affected by the
respective action or decision. However, the council had
previously turned down a number of applications on the
grounds that the applicant was not directly affected by
the action being appealed.
ARTICLE SPRING 2010
ARTICLE IN BRIEF: YÖK decided to abolish the current inegalitarian coefficient system and adapt an egalitarian
one, but the new system was annulled by the Council of State on the grounds that the graduates of normal and vacational
schools are not legally equal and that there should be an insurmountable difference between the coefficients applied to the
gradiates of these schools. It is obvious that in order to maintain the domination of some principles devised during the
process of the Feb. 28 military coup legal rules are set aside by the council if deems it necessary.

Council of State ruling: legal ground or pretext?
A number of scholars as well as YÖK considered the
previous rulings of the Council of State and held, based
on these rulings, that the council would not annul this
administrative action given that the council had former-
ly decided that the coefficient issue fell within the
sphere of authority of the board. However, the council
cancelled this newly introduced system, arguing that it
was contrary to existing legislation. The most recent rul- the right to study in their chosen field even if they
ing on the coefficient involves a number of legal and
logical contradictions. Subsequent to making reference
to Article 42 of the Turkish Constitution, stating that the serve as a definite obstacle to vocational school gradu-
procedure on the exercise of the right to an education is
determined by law, the Council of State recalls the rele-
vant provisions and terms of Higher Education Law no.
2547 and Basic Law for National Education no. 1739
and underlines that YÖK is fully authorized in the
determination of the governing principles for the college
placement exam. The said laws outline the principles
and procedures to be used in the devising of the univer-
It would be a mistake to expect that the
Council of State will remember that YÖK is
authorized with regard to the placement
exam when annulling a decision that serves
the interests of religious school graduates.
sity placement exam and the impact of performance in
secondary school in the final score to be used in this
placement. Despite the fact that it lists all these items, There is no plausible answer for this question. There is a
the council ruling finds the new coefficient system illegal pretty unusual and awkward statement in the text of the
by making reference to the regulations of the Feb. 28
coup era and the decisions of the Council of State dur-
ing this period of time. However, the legal reasoning
referred to in this ruling actually confirms that YÖK is
authorized to regulate the college placement exam.
In consideration of the legal grounds referred to by
the council in its ruling, YÖK reintroduced a new coeffi-
cient system that it believed would satisfy the council's
reasoning. However, the Council of State annulled this
decision as well despite the fact that YÖK's new system
envisaged different coefficients for the examinees from
different schools. For the council, the difference in the
coefficients was not big enough. Its new ruling provides
insights into the background of the Council of State's
approach vis-à-vis the issue. In the ruling, the council
not only insists that there should be some difference
between the coefficients that would apply to the gradu-
ates of different schools but also makes its point on the
magnitude of this difference. According to the council,
the difference between the coefficients should be insur-
mountable.
What does this mean? The difference between the
coefficients should be big enough to make sure that
vocational school graduates should not be able to earn
answer all the questions correctly in the exam. In this
case, under the council's view, the coefficient should
ates so that they will not be able to overcome this barri-
er. Therefore, there is no other option that could be
employed in the college placement exam; the only thing
to do is to retain the former coefficient system (0.5/0.2
or 0.8/0.3) determined during the period of the Feb. 28
coup.
What sort of legal grounds does the Council of State
rely on when requiring the preservation of the insur-
mountable difference in the coefficient?
Actually, these are not legal grounds.
There is no need to provide a lengthy
explanation for this. What legal rule
requires the introduction of a coefficient
that the students cannot overcome?
There is no answer to this, and there
cannot be. Why are the coefficients (0.15
for regular schools and 0.13 for voca-
tional schools) illegal and the former coefficients (0.8 for
regular schools and 0.3 for vocational schools) legal?
ruling of the council: the ruling argues that the YÖK
decision will destroy the education system framed by
judicial decisions. Is this a legal answer? The council is
the first in the world to argue that the education system
is framed by judicial decisions.
The most contradictory and awkward part of the
ruling asserts that there is a legal difference between
the status of high school graduates. But if there is
such a difference between vocational school gradu-
ates and high school graduates, why are they taking
the same exam? Should not those who hold a differ-
ent legal status take different exams? If the students
taking the same exam are subject to the same sys-
tem, should their score not be assessed based on the
same coefficient? The Council of State provides no
explanation for this contradiction.
What is the Council of State actually doing?
For over a decade since the Feb. 28 post-modern mil-
itary coup, the Council of State has reviewed the legality
of administrative decisions with respect to its former
rulings rather than with the laws in effect. In other
words, the criterion of legality is whether the relevant
decision is in accordance with the previous rulings of
the council. It appears that the council is strongly
opposed to changing the decisions and rulings made
during the Feb. 28 coup process. It stages this opposi-
tion by making decisions and issuing rulings obviously
contrary to the law.
In one of its rulings (released by the 8th Chamber on
Feb. 7, 2006), the council notes when annulling an
amendment to the directive on high schools offering
distance learning opportunities that the appealed terms
of the directive are obviously contrary to legal provi-
sions, the education process framed and consolidated by
judicial decisions, public interest
and the requirements of the
profession. It should be noted
that in this ruling, the council
recognizes its decisions as the
criterion for the validity of
administrative actions and deci-
sions. However, this violates
Article 125 of the Turkish
Constitution, which states:
"Judicial power is limited to the
verification of the conformity of
the actions and acts of the
administration with law. No judicial ruling shall be
passed which restricts the exercise of the executive func-
tion in accordance with the forms and principles pre-
scribed by law, which has the quality of an administra-
tive action and act, or which removes discretionary
powers." In addition, the legal rules the council argues
have taken root were replaced by others. In other
words, the council refers to its former rulings relying on
the legal rules that do not now exist and proceeds to
annul administrative decisions or actions.
In another ruling (by the 2nd Chamber on Oct. 26,
2005), the council quotes from the preamble of the
Constitution: "The recognition that no protection shall
be accorded to any thought or view contrary to Turkish
national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the
existence of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish
historical and moral values or the nationalism, princi-
ples, reforms and modernism of Atatürk…" However,
the underlined part was taken out of the Constitution
by Law no. 4709 on Oct. 3, 2001 and replaced with the
word "an activity." In a ruling released in 2005, the
council ignores an amendment made in 2001 and pro-
ceeds in accordance with a legal rule that does not exist
anymore. A provision that was abolished is used by the
council four years after its abolishment. This means that
legal rules are not considered by the council.
The fact that the council previously held that YÖK is
authorized to make the relevant decision on the coeffi-
cient was because those decisions were against the
interests of religious school graduates. It would be a
mistake to expect that the Council of State will remem-
ber that YÖK is authorized with regard to the place-
ment exam when annulling a decision that serves the
interests of religious school graduates.
It appears that the ideological attitudes of the appel-
late judiciary become so obvious and sharp in Turkey
that this amounts to the gravi-
The willingness of
ty of setting aside the law. The
the Council of State
council takes decisive action to to annul all the
make sure that university egalitarian arrange-
administrations are not ments convinced
authorized to determine the
many students that
the Council was
procedure to be employed in applying a simili-
the assessment of the final tude of the
scores of students seeking Sledgehammer
admission to college. To main-
coup plan. “The
Sledgehammer of
tain the domination of some the Council of State
principles devised during the is on the top of the
process of the Feb. 28 military students!” reads
the placard carried
coup, legal rules are set aside if necessary. This ideologi- by a veiled religious
cal stance of the appellate judiciary creates serious prob- school student.
PHOTO: KÜRÞAT BAYHAN
lems for the principle of the separation of powers. The
eagerness of the judiciary, which is supposed to review
the legality of the acts, to serve as lawmakers reveals a
juristocratic tendency. It appears that the judiciary has
been trying to consolidate this juristocracy in Turkey for
over a decade. The appellate judiciary seeks to block the
proper functioning of legislation and the political
administration; it also employs an ideological block to
restrict the enjoyment of fundamental rights and free-
doms. The judiciary, which should take a lead role in
the further democratization and improvement of stan-
dards of human rights, adopts instead a restrictive func-
tion. The most urgent problem in Turkey is to ensure
that the judiciary acts within the boundaries of the con-
stitutional order and is freed from its ideological stance.
The coefficient issue is a case study only.

78 79
DOSSIER SPRING 2010
Ahmet Ünal
What is
O
fficial arguments made by most
intellectuals assert that underde-
velopment inherently caused by
the problem: being part of the Eastern world
was the primary reason for the
reactionaryism Ottoman Empire's defeat by the
occupying forces in World War I.
For this reason, these intellectuals
or parochialism? argue, Turkey must become part of the Western world
and adopt European norms. As such, the new repub-
lic picked "contemporary civilizational levels" as its
primary objective to fulfill through the revolutions led
by Atatürk, the founder of the republican regime.
Traditional items, symbols and signs used in the daily
lives of ordinary people, including attire, the calendar,
the alphabet and educational institutions, were
replaced by their Western counterparts. The Civil Law
focusing on social and familial life was borrowed from
the Swiss Civil Code while the laws on economic and
cultural affairs were entirely renewed.
A group of Ankara-based new intellectuals asked
villagers to stay on the periphery to make sure that
modernization could become sustainable; these intel-
lectuals particularly discouraged them from migrating
to Ýstanbul and Ankara. In so doing, these big cities
would serve as role models for the small cities. Up
until recently, people who served in the military as
low-ranking privates because of their limited financial
resources were banned from walking around elite
neighborhoods. Parochial people should stay on the
periphery until the completion of the modernization
process in the capital and other big cities. Nevzat
Tandoðan, who served as the governor of Ankara for
17 years starting in 1929, forbid the display of tradi-
tional customs and attire by the rural people on the
streets of the capital city. Tandoðan tells writer
Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, known for his parochial
identity and poverty: "If nationalism is needed, we
introduce that; if communism is needed, we do that.
You have two jobs: to be farmers and grow crops and
to serve in the military when called." [This particular
quotation is cited by D. Mehmet Doðan in his
Alparslan Türkeþ MHP ve Gölgedeki Adam published
ILLUSTRATION: CEM KIZILTUÐ
by Ocak Press.]
The headscarf issue, along with the religious
schools training clerics, which were used as a justifica-
tion for military interventions, were actually caused by
the intellectuals' fear of the periphery. Unlike the
commonly held view, the problem is not reactionary-
80
ism alone; the discourse of reactionaryism is used to
conceal the fear of parochialism. Women wearing the
headscarf, religious schools as well as vocational
schools have become victims of this approach. The
Alevi and Kurdish issues may be considered from this
perspective as well. A rather rude Jacobin line of
thinking was adopted to keep the issue away from the
center instead of serving the periphery. If one consid-
ers that 60 percent of Turkish citizens were living in
rural areas as late as the 1980s, the dimensions and
magnitude of the problem can be appreciated.
For decades, no railway or highway was built in the
eastern parts of Anatolia. On the 40th anniversary of
the foundation of the republican regime, there was no
asphalt road or railway system that connected Van,
one of the largest cities in eastern Turkey, to Ankara. whereas the underdeveloped East was on the other.
In connection with this problem, the number of
schools remained fairly small. The Republican
People's Party (CHP), the party in power, did not
have a local liaison office in the eastern part of TurkeyThe ruling elite turned its back on provincial people,
John Dewey, the founder of pragmatist philoso-
phy, stayed in Turkey for two months and submit- compared to the psychological
ted a report on the Turkish education system to
Atatürk. Teachers' colleges and village institutes
were opened in accordance with this report
in 1946, when Turkey moved to a multiparty system.
Intellectuals who had never seen the eastern cities
were elected as deputies in the national assembly,
where crucial decisions were made regarding the
administration of the country.
For the coup-makers who toppled the government
in 1960, the Democrat Party (DP) deputies were sec-
ond-class citizens; they called the deputies "tails"
whereas they regarded themselves "heads." For them,
the 60 percent of the Turkish population that voted for their schools were closed down and they had to deal
the DP were also tails and illiterate. With the 1971 and with provocative racial attacks. The "Cage Action
1980 military coups, Turkey's route was realigned with
the West and NATO after a short break during which
the country moved back and forth along leftist and
rightist ideologies. The coups were also warnings to
the people on the periphery who sought to have a say
in the political administration. All parties were dis-
solved because they contradicted the fundamental
assumptions of the republican elite.
The size of the country's population was constantly
on the rise in the mid-'80s and early '90s, when a
huge number of rural residents moved to the cities
because of rapid advancements and improvements in
the economy, transportation and communication
under the leadership of Turgut Özal. The gap between
the official intellectuals and the peripheral people was
further expanded; at such a delicate time, elitist intel-
lectuals debated whether a visa should be made a
requirement for admission into urban areas.
Minorities pay bill for enlightenment
A large part of the educated population was killed
in World War I and the War of Independence. In the
post-war period, Turkish intellectuals and administra-
tors had difficulty reconciling their admiration for the
West with reality. The civilized West was on one side
However, the allied forces that occupied almost all
parts of Turkey left outraged and confused masses
behind when they withdrew from Turkish territories.
but the ruthless aggressiveness of
the Westerners during the war
traumatized the elite. This can be
breakdown in pro-US actors in
the Eastern world caused by US
assaults and indiscriminate
attacks against civilians in the
aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks.
The age of enlightenment influenced the Ottoman
intellectuals who founded the republican state. The
new philosophies led to the emergence of new
notions of nobles and commoners. However, interest-
ingly enough, Western ideas were used most exten-
sively against the non-Muslim minorities in Anatolia.
The nationalist worldview that became a state ideolo-
gy with the arrival of the republican regime turned the
lives of the minorities into a hell: taxes were raised,
Plan," currently under prosecution by a court of law,
involves attacks against clerics and churches as well as
the murder of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink.
However, the Ottoman era was relatively a paradise
for non-Muslims. The nationalist movements pro-
voked by the European states to facilitate the partition
of the Ottoman state turned the peaceful homeland of
the Greek and Armenian minorities into a battlefield.
The elementary and secondary schooling system of
81
DOSSIER SPRING 2010 ARTICLE IN BRIEF: The headscarf issue, along with the religious schools training clerics, which were used as a justifica-
tion for military interventions, were actually caused by the intellectuals' fear of the periphery. Unlike the commonly held view, the
problem is not reactionaryism alone; the discourse of reactionaryism is used to conceal the fear of parochialism. The bans intro-
duced by military administrations are eagerly preserved by courts. Each time the governments tried to overcome the restrictions
on the religious schools or the religious attires higher judiciary interrupted.

the Ottoman era was completely abandoned in the equipped to become influential and successful in eco-
republican era subsequent to the introduction of a nomic life." In fact, the Turkish elite also wanted to
bill on the merger of education and teaching in 1924. use Dewey's views for a new historical philosophy;
The Young Turks, who pursued their studies in however, no progress was made on this matter [Extra
European countries, as well as the new intellectuals, information on Dewey's mission to Turkey can be
who were influential in the foundation of the repub- found at Bahri Ata, "The Influence of An American
lican regime, abolished the madrasa system of the Educator (John Dewey) on the Turkish Educational
Ottoman state; the Education Ministry was author- System," 200 Years of Turkish-American Relations, 4-
ized to govern all schools including those formerly 9 November 2000.]
governed by minorities. Teachers' schools modeled Nearly 80 young people who served in the military
on the progressive schools of the US and the École as low-ranking trainers were sent to the villages as
Normale Supérieure of France were created in met- educators after a six-month training period in 1936.
ropolitan cities; in addition, Turkish school adminis- The first village institute was opened in 1940, two
trators were appointed to the minority schools where years after Atatürk's death. Twenty-one village insti-
courses in the Turkish language were made obligato- tutes were inaugurated in villages that had large agri-
cultural fields. Both girls and boys
attended these schools. The stu-
The nationalist worldview that has become state dents trained in these schools
ideology with the arrival of the republican regime were supposed to serve as teach-
turned the lives of the minorities into a hell. ers in the same schools after
graduation and to train the vil- were found to be undesirable by the elite. Ýnönü they were closed down in 1930 because of a lack of The infamous
However, the Ottoman Empire was a safe heaven removed Tonguç from office when he decided to abol- students. No similar school training religious clerics February 28
lagers on modern cattle breeding
for non-Muslims; it is now a lost paradise and agricultural methods. ish the village institutes. The schools, which were was opened until 1949. As a consequence, people who National Security
Council meeting.
The opening of additional village closely monitored by the state, were accused of train- had died were buried without the performance of reli- The decisions
ry; the crosses in the classrooms of these schools institutes, first introduced for pragmatic reasons, was ing communists and insulting the Turkish Armed gious rituals because there were no people qualified to taken in the coun-
Forces (TSK). fulfill this task in the villages. This drew a reaction cil brought the end
were also removed. Schools refusing to employ a stopped by President Ýsmet Ýnönü, who actually start- of the Refah-Yol
Turkish teacher or converting their students to ed the project, on the pretext that the schools were Common fate of village institutes from the people, and even the foreign press published
Government and
and imam-hatip schools coverage of the public outrage against this problem started an era of
Christianity, i.e., Bursa American College, were training communists in 1946 at a time when a demo-
The case of imam-hatip schools (IHL) is pretty (Yeniþafak daily, June 29, 2005). forceful re-secular-
forced to suspend teaching activities for a while. cratic regime was formally instituted. Many years later,
much the same as the case of the village institutes. The report "Religious education and religious institu- ization in Turkey.
Institute stuck in the village Ýnönü would say in his memoirs that his most impor- PHOTO: ALÝ ÜNAL
Both were introduced under the auspices of the state, tions," drafted by Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, head of the
The administrators of the young republic pursued tant actions included the institution of a multiparty
and both admitted the sons of provincial families as Religious Affairs Directorate, and subsequently
policies to make sure that the revolution was adopted system and the introduction of village institutes. These
students. However, the regime abandoned the idea referred to Parliament in 1950, reflects the overall out-
by the people. They studied the views of well-known schools were completely abolished in 1954 by the DP
when it realized it did not get the expected results. look of the country back then. "Measures should be
educators from around the world. The works of John administration. Left-wing writers argue that this was a
The only difference between the former and the latter taken to make sure that our young people and chil-
Dewey, an American scholar known as the founder of counterrevolution staged by the opponents of
is that the public wanted to keep the former alive and dren are protected against the missionary efforts and
pragmatist philosophy, were translated into Turkish; Atatürk's revolutions.
the latter dead. The elitists at the center treated both propaganda of other religions as well as the harmful
some time later, he was invited to Turkey. In 1924 Those who praise the village institutes overlook a
as second-class institutions. The graduates of both actions and influences of political and social sects or
Dewey traveled to Turkey, where he was welcomed in detail: Professor Cahit Tanyol, known for his
institutions were unwelcomed by the state because orders. Children have been trained as opponents to
a special ceremony under the auspices of Enver Atatürkist views, argues in his book entitled "Çankaya
the administration of the state was so serious that it religion in schools by reliance on different means;
Behnan Þapolyo. Dewey, who examined the educa- Dramý"(Çankaya Drama) that the rural people were
could not be left to rural people who were supposed everything has been done to make sure that they live
tion system for two months, submitted his final report treated condescendingly despite a formal discourse
to work to further production. as atheists. If the young people of the present time are
"The Report and Recommendation on Turkish praising the role of villagers in official days and occa-
IHL schools were opened in 29 centers in 1924 to not communists yet, we owe this to the strong reli-
Education" to the Ministry of Education. Teachers' sions. Noting that villagers were viewed as a tool for
train clerics. The school principals, who did not receive gious tradition dominant in their families."
schools and village institutes were created in accor- exploitation, Tanyol further recalls that the sons of vil-
any formal religious training, were expected to edu- In 1949 when the government was gradually abolish-
dance with the views of Dewey, who also met lagers were not admitted to boarding schools and sent
cate clerics loyal to republican ideas and views. The ing the village institutes, 10-month-long religious
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish to European countries for advanced studies. According
language and science courses constituted a majority -- courses were introduced. The number of IHL schools
Republic. Atatürk delivered speeches during this peri- to Tanyol, who argues that not a single rural boy was
religious classes were of secondary importance. The had visibly been on the rise during the term of the DP
od suggesting a pragmatist approach; for instance, he admitted to a boarding school, efforts by Ýsmail Hakký
schools didn't find favor in the eyes of the public, and and the subsequent military regime; however, only
once said, "The sons of this nation should be Tonguç, the founder of the village institute project,

82 83
DOSSIER SPRING 2010

male students were admitted to these schools, which the general; the headscarf ban in IHL schools has Former Prime
Minister Necmettin
were transformed into vocational schools offering been in place up until now. Coups, IHL and the head- Erbakan (left) had
four-year education in the aftermath of the military scarf Some of the articles in the final declaration to step down due
intervention on March 12, 1971. Their title was issued by the National Security Council (MGK) that to the pressure of
changed to imam-hatip high school in 1973; the grad- convened on Feb. 28, 1997, during Necmettin the Turkish Armed
Forces, headed
uates of these schools were given the right to transfer Erbakan's term in office are directly related to our then by the chief of
to the literature departments of universities. present discussion: General Staff,
The graduates of these schools had bright opportuni- - The number of educational institutions responsible Ýsmail Hakký
Karadayý (right)
for training enlightened clerics faithful to the republi-
ties because of their loyalty to their nation and state at PHOTO: ALÝ ÜNAL
a time when young people generally tended toward can regime and Atatürkist principles should be kept to
leftist ideologies. The duration of the education at an optimum level in strict accordance with the spirit
these schools was further extended to seven years and letter of the bill consolidating the educational
during the term of a coalition government formed by institutions.
the left-wing and secular CHP and pro-Islamic - Practices and actions in relation to violations of the
National Salvation Party (MSP). Twenty-nine addi- law on legal attire that will make Turkey look like an
tional IHL schools were opened, increasing the total underdeveloped state should be prevented; the terms
number to 101. Political administrations did not hesi- of the laws and particularly the decisions by the
tate to open new IHL schools up until the Sept. 12, Constitutional Court on this matter should be fully
1980 military coup. Even though no additional IHL observed without any compromise.
schools were opened between the 1980 military coup Erbakan had to resign from office in the aftermath of
the Feb. 28, 1997 postmodern

The customs from the provinces were transported to coup process and the Welfare
Party-True Path Party (Refahyol)
urban centers because of rapid urbanization during government was dissolved. The
Turgut Özal's term in office in the 1980s. During this first three grades of the IHL
process of urbanization, women replaced their schools were closed down by a
law requiring an eight-year-long
regional attire, which gave a rural impression, with
uninterrupted elementary educa-
the turbans displayed in designer stores tion during the term in office of ities with the drama of the IHL schools and the village dents who covered their heads.
liberal Mesut Yýlmaz in response institutes, which were not wanted in the city centers. In some respect, the bans were tragic as well. The
and 1985, their graduates were given the right to pur- to the requests of the MGK. The new practice turned The customs in the periphery were transported to young girls who were torn between observing their
sue further studies in any university department. In the IHL into a four-year high school. urban centers because of the rapid urbanization in customs and obeying the bans suffered an identity cri-
1985, Anatolian IHL schools offering courses taught in Ten years later, the statement posted on the Web site 1980s. During this process of urbanization, women sis. They were either to remove the headscarves and
foreign languages were introduced. of the General Staff on April 27, 2007 -- also known replaced their regional attire, which gave a rural lead a life contrary to their beliefs or face the risk of
The IHL schools started admitting female students as the e-memorandum -- is a blatant example of the impression, with turbans displayed in designer stores. expulsion from their work or school. The Religious
in connection with a ruling by the Council of State as distance between the ruling elite and ordinary people. The turbans and other modern apparel exhibited by Affairs Directorate was still insistent that the headscarf
a result of a lawsuit filed by a parent who wanted to Parts of the statement focusing on actions compared models in fashion shows were more attractive. was a religious requirement under Islamic precepts. In
register his daughter in 1976. However, the military to the disruptive and separatist movements staged The elitist rulers, fearing an Islamic revolution similar such a case, what were the women caught between
regime banned female students from wearing reli- against the unity and territorial integrity of the country to the Iranian experience in 1979, refrained from rely- religion and the state's laws supposed to do? Was
gious attire. Retired Gen. Hasan Saðlam was appoint- are pretty interesting: ing on scientific analyses for a proper understanding there a logical explanation for asking female students
ed minister of education in the aftermath of the Sept. - A Quran recitation competition was held on the of the process of change triggered by urbanization. pursuing their degrees in religious schools to lead a
12 coup. Three months after he came into office, very same day as National Sovereignty Day, celebrat- Some were outraged, some were really afraid and life contrary to what they learned at these schools?
Saðlam stressed that the headscarf was in complete ed on April 23; however, this activity was canceled some frankly believed that women should be Regardless of their ideological stance and orienta-
opposition to the principles of Atatürk and further after influential public and media pressure. Europeanized. The ordinary people, who constituted tion, all human rights groups condemned the said
sought the view of the Religious Affairs Directorate on - On April 22, 2007, a chorus of girls from Mardin, the majority, stated in regularly held public polls that bans. The left-wing Human Rights Association (ÝHD),
the matter. Referring to Atatürk's statements affirming Gaziantep and Diyarbakýr recited hymns in Þanlýurfa. students should be allowed to pursue their studies known for its activities focusing on the rights of the
the right of women to wear religious attire, the direc- 'Turban' preferred over headscarf because of its mod- without going against their customs and traditions. In Kurds, stressed in a declaration titled "The headscarf
torate pointed out that the headscarf was a religious ern look other words, female students who did not wear head- issue and attitudes of principle" that the headscarf ban
requirement. However, this response did not satisfy The "turban," or headscarf, issue shares some similar- scarves were not at all uncomfortable with the stu- actually interfered with the private life of a human

84 85
DOSSIER SPRING 2010
being and was not merely discrimination. they were not banned by law.
Professor Þerif Mardin, a renowned sociologist, This time, Erdal Ýnönü, the leader of the political
holds that the headscarf ban is not democratic. party known as the successor of the CHP, took the
Mardin further says: "Regardless of whether they are new bill to the Constitutional Court. The higher court
religious or not, people in Europe have developed a did not annul the bill; however, it further expanded
philosophy of attaining the good and the proper. They the sphere of the ban via a controversial interpreta-
have produced thousands of pages. Our republican tion. The legal reasoning publicized in 1991 was a
teaching does not encourage the search for the complete contradiction. In the end, the ban was
good… If you study Atatürkist ideology, you will upheld, but the penalties issued in connection with
the headscarf ban were abolished.
notice that it is pretty superficial. This ideology has not
produced anything good for society." To Mardin, The AK Party government, acting together with the
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), amended two
intellectuals are afraid of discussing laicism because if
they hold such a discussion, they may end up in jail provisions of the Constitution. Subsequent to the
(Zaman daily, May 24, 2008). amendments introduced in February 2008, Articles 10
Headscarf-like hat also banned and 42 were changed as follows (inserted amend-
Zeynep Nur Ýncekara, a medical school student who ments shown in parentheses):
was expelled from class by the professor because she Article 10: All individuals are equal without any dis-
attended the session with a hat covering her head and crimination before the law, irrespective of language,
neck, filed a complaint with the Directorate of Human race, color, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief,
Rights at the Prime Ministry. On March 8, 2010, the religion and sect, or any such considerations.
No privilege shall be granted to
any individual, family, group or
The young girls who were torn between observing class. State organs and adminis-
their customs and obeying the bans suffered an trative authorities shall act in
identity crisis. They were either to remove the compliance with the principle of
headscarves and lead a life contrary to their beliefs or equality before the law in all
their proceedings (and in uti-
face the risk of expulsion from their work or school lization of all forms of public
services.)
Higher Education Board (YÖK) ruled that a student Article 42: No one shall be deprived of the right
may not be asked to step out of a class without mak- to learning and education. The scope of the right to
ing a record of the incident in writing. The decision education shall be defined and regulated by law.
was promising because of the possibility that it may (No one should be deprived of the right to higher
save students from public humiliation, even though it education due to any reason not explicitly written
does not mean that they may attend classes with in the law. Limitations on exercising this right shall
headscarves on. be determined by the law.)
The bans introduced by military administrations are The amendments, which made no explicit refer-
eagerly preserved by courts. The Turgut Özal govern- ence to attire or religious freedom, received over-
ment made a law in 1988 lifting the headscarf ban. whelming support from the deputies in Parliament.
The law stated that wearing modern attire in higher Despite this huge support, the CHP took the matter
education institutions was obligatory, adding that cov- to the Constitutional Court, which affirmed the
ering the neck and the head with a headscarf on the CHP's arguments and stance. The amendment was
grounds of religious belief and requirement was also used as evidence in the case filed by the chief
allowed. The Constitutional Court, upon the applica- prosecutor with the Constitutional Court demanding
tion of President Kenan Evren, reviewed the law and the dissolution of the AK Party. The court did not
subsequently concluded that it was unconstitutional. dissolve the party; however, the majority ruled for
In response, the government introduced new legisla- suspension of state aid the party was entitled to
tion in 1990 stating that all types of attire were receive. The CHP, on the other hand, is busy attract-
allowed in higher education institutions provided that ing the support of women wearing the chador.
86
Similarity between the ECtHR
and the Turkish Jacobins
The rulings by the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) affirming the headscarf ban in Turkey
are welcomed by those who seek the continuation of
the ban. The ECtHR, which rules in favor of the sup-
porters of armed terror, shares a similar line of reason-
ing and thinking with the elitist groups in Turkey
when it comes to the headscarf issue. In the end, this
affects the Turkish people's views on the EU and
breeds anti-Western sentiments.
In 1998, Leyla Þahin, a medical student at Ýstanbul
University's Medical School, applied to the ECtHR
arguing that her expulsion from school on the
grounds that she was wear-
ing a headscarf was in breach
of the European Convention
on Human Rights. However,
the court unanimously ruled
that the headscarf ban in
Turkey was not in violation
of religious freedom. Þahin,
who was unable to pursue
her degree in Turkey, com-
pleted her studies in Vienna.
The ECtHR's ruling, putting
strong emphasis on laicism,
constituted case law for local
courts handling hundreds of similar cases in Turkey.
In other applications, the ECtHR still insisted that the
legislation banning students from attending classes
with their headscarves on was not in breach of the
European Convention on Human Rights.
Coefficient issue and vocational schools
IHL schools are considered vocational schools. The
measures taken to make sure that the graduates of
these schools are not admitted to departments other
than theology faculties also negatively affected the
graduates of other vocational schools. Let's explain
this with an example: Consider a student at the com-
puting section of a vocational school; it is almost
impossible for this student to be admitted to the
department of computer engineering because of the
coefficient system of the college placement examina-
tion. However, a student who never took a class on
computers in a regular high school may be placed in
this department.
The Higher Education Board (YÖK), chaired by
Professor Yusuf Ziya Özcan, appointed by President
87
Abdullah Gül, agreed on a new coefficient system in
July 2009 that would address the problem. The gradu-
ates of regular high schools, who would lose their
advantage if the new system were implemented, raised
objections; the Council of State stayed the execution of
the decision. In response to this ruling, the YÖK decid-
ed on a new coefficient; however, the Council of State
adopted a similar stance this time as well. The YÖK
objected to the decision, referring to the possibility of
irreversible damage for the students. In mid-March,
the board settled on a milder regulation that it hopes
will satisfy the Council of State. The resolution of this
issue will apparently take a long time because Turkey's
elite, backed by ECtHR rulings, are not willing to allow
the rise of the conservative
periphery. The Feb. 28
Process was trig-
The circles seeking to
gered by military
secure their interests in tanks riding
reliance on laws at a time through the streets
when the world is globaliz- of Sincan after a
controversial
ing may agree on the same Jerusalem Night
terms, though behind dif- hosted the
ferent masks. Selfishness Iraninan ambassa-
does not remain silent in dor to Ankara
PHOTO: ALÝ ÜNAL
the body of the human
being; when it finds a way
out, it evolves into tribalism
and into racism. It may
even turn into fanaticism if bred by prejudice. The
20th century is full of examples proving that racist
ideologies have much in common regardless of
national differences (similarities between Fascism
and Nazism). The selfish actors first exploit their
nearest; subsequently, they destroy everything that
reminds them of the fact that they were actually
wrong. Those who underline that religious, racial,
linguistic and social diversity is a source of richness
have to preserve the universal principles despite all
pressures and provocations.
READ ALSO:
On the coefficient decision of the Council of State:
Mustafa Þentop, "Council of State's coefficient ruling:
Appellate judiciary and constitutional order," Current
issue of TPR, pp. 76-79.
On the headscarf decision of the Constitutional Court
and the ECtHR, Levent Köker, "Religion, Education,
and the Turkish Constitution: A Critical Assessment,"
Current issue of TPR, pp. 36-45.
ARTICLE SPRING 2010
Alevi opening:
new margins,
new values
Turkey has recently launched a new
initiative to address the Alevi issue as
part of a greater set of accelerated
moves towards democratization. To
this end, a series of workshops were
held. These workshops were expected
to lay out a roadmap, to agree on a
set of solutions, to create a fertile
ground between the state and the
Alevis, to determine the short-term
steps and take action to implement
the agreed measures, to address the
expectations of the general public
and to make sure that the resolution
of the problems that the Alevis
encounter in their daily lives is
viewed as a necessity
by the entire nation
88
Necdet Subaþý
T
urkey has recently launched a new
initiative to address the Alevi issue
as part of a greater set of accelerat-
ed moves towards democratization.
The overall goal of the initiative is
to make sure that Alevis' demands
are considered and reviewed by the
state. To this end, a series of workshops was held; the
first of the series took place with the participation of
Alevi delegates (June 3-4, 2009, Ankara), whereas the
second was attended by academics (July 8, 2009,
Ýstanbul) and the third by theologians (Aug. 19, 2009,
Ankara). A fourth workshop was held in Ankara with
the participation of representatives of civil society
organizations on Sept. 30, 2009, and the fifth with the
participation of media representatives in Ýstanbul on
Nov. 11, 2009. Subsequent to a session drawing par-
ticipation from former and current deputies in Ankara
on Dec. 17, 2009, a mixed workshop was held with
the participation of some delegates who had already
participated in the previous meetings, on Jan. 28-30,
2010.
A detailed description of Alevism and its historical
dynamics is essential for the sake of understanding
the fundamental issues discussed at these meetings
and whether the workshops will become useful.
Alevis are considered Muslims incorporating some
unique features of the Anatolian region where Islam
emerges in the forms of Sunnism and Alevism. The
Sunni tradition has survived based on normative
assets including written sources, while Alevism has
been conveyed to the next generation through oral
narratives. It is possible to refer to some common
aspects of Alevism and Sunnism; however, it would
not be fair to argue that they appear to be an integrat-
ed part. Because of their religious emphases that
openly exclude each other and their attitudes, rituals
and reference systems, Sunnism and Alevism seem to
be two distinct traditions.
Alevism is still alive with features borrowed from
different religions, faiths, belief systems and schools
of thought including Islam. While it is open to contact
with other faiths and views, Alevism should be
regarded as the synthesis of all these interactions.
Research confirms that the authentic core of Alevism
bears traces of a number of faiths including Islam,
Christianity, Shamanism and Buddhism. It is impor-
tant to note that Islam serves as the main mould for
this amalgam. The difficulties encountered in defining
the basic characteristics of Alevism are mostly due to
the fact that the said feature of this unique group is
ignored in relevant discussions.
Alevis are dispersed all over the Anatolian region.
Because the official establishment does not allow the
declaration of a religious identity in Turkey, it is not
possible to predict the exact number of Alevis.
However, based on some simulations and analyses,
scholars generally agree that this figure ranges
between 7 and 10 million. Alevis, on the other hand,
argue that there are 20 million Alevis in Turkey. These
figures the different sides would like to rely on are
significant considering that such assumptions give
some insight into the probable approaches of different
actors vis-à-vis the problem; to this end, the political
mystery the figures bear cannot be ignored.
Understandable Alevi diversity
It should be noted that the dispersed nature of
Alevism allows some sort of diversity caused by
understandable reasons in the Anatolian region. The
dominant approach makes reference to the linkage
and correlation started by the conversion of the Turks
to Islam. It is interesting to observe that not only the
Alevis but also the Sunnis of Turkey and Turkish
communities that embraced Islam as it is framed
mostly by the perspective that Ali and his followers
generated in the history of Islam show a special con-
nection and affinity with Ali that may not be observed
in other Muslim communities.
The Alevi issue cannot be resolved without consid-
89
ering this theological and political background focus- The first of the Alevi
ing on Ali. Even though it has transferred some fea- workshops took
place with the par-
tures from Shiism, which emerged from the uncondi-
ticipation of Alevi
tional loyalty to the political and religious charisma of delegates in Ankara
Ali, it could be argued that Alevism has created a path on June 3-4, 2009.
of its own. State Minister Faruk
Above all, Alevism cannot be regarded as a reli-
Çelik (on the left at
the central table)
gious tradition shaped by urban experiences. This is a headed this first
pretty new state of affairs. The religious imagination workshop
PHOTO: ALÝ ÜNAL
of nomadic Turks found some useful themes in
Alevism. It is important to recall that Turks made their
first contact with Islam through the messengers put-
ting special emphasis upon Ali and that their Islamic
understanding has been greatly influenced by this ref-
erence. Alevism parted ways with the Sunni and
Shiite interpretations of Islam at the beginning; how-
ever, it never disconnected with these traditions. In
fact, this contact is a dominant characteristic of its
syncretic nature. Likewise, Alevism managed to create
an amalgam of pre-Islamic religious traditions and
Islamic features. Islam, which remained as the major
source of its character, has also generated a sphere of
faith open to different faiths and religious traditions.
Alevism has undergone huge transformations
over the centuries. The transformation was so huge
that the Alevi tradition has moved from a mystical
pantheism to a materialist pantheism. For this rea-
son, what distinguishes Alevis, who are considered
by neither the Sunnis nor the Shiites as proper
Muslims, is the difference in the ways they perform
ARTICLE SPRING 2010 ARTICLE IN BRIEF: Alevis are unable to resolve their inherent and internal problems on their own. They expect the state
to lead the achievement of unity and cooperation between different groups. Arguments suggesting that Alevism is not part of Islam
and that it should be considered a separate faith are attracting greater attention and interest from the media. The course of the dis-
cussions over laicism serve as the major point for differentiation between Alevi groups. The Alevi community is now prone to attract
the support of the EU to make sure that their problems are reviewed with special reference to the influence of the EU.

their religious rituals. Ishak, Baba Ilyas and Sheik Bedreddin, were motivat- Alevism as it is known at the present time started to regime's emphasis upon secular values generated
Evolutionary stages of Alevism in Anatolia ed by social and economic reasons rather than reli- surface after the 16th century. During this process, the excitement among the Alevis, who felt they could be
The evolution of Alevism in Anatolia may be divid- gious objections. The Babaism movement, which dis- Safavid order came closer to the Shiite sect, and in loyal to the new regime. However, the republican
ed into three periods: the first may be called the plays interesting features considering that it serves as this way a new form emerged as a consequence of the regime created trauma for the Alevis, who had to
emergence and development of Alevism. This period the harbinger of the non-Sunni groups in the reli- state's preventative measures and the Alevis' strate- experience greater difficulties in this period. The clo-
is known among Sunnis as the period of the red- gious history of Anatolia, draws attention for its mes- gies. When Alevism was referred to in the 17th centu- sure of religious places, legal measures that declared
headed (Kýzýlbaþ), in reference to the red hood the sianic, syncretic, mystic and heterodox characteristics. ry, this reference actually suggested the presence of a their spiritual leaders illegal, the exclusion of their
followers of the Alevi faith used to wear. During this It is already known that nomads were mostly marginalized and isolated group. The state oppression faith from the school curricula and the indifference of
process, Alevism was born and gained a historical opposed to the central administration in the Ottoman and repression subsequent to the red-headed revolts the state to their mystic beliefs and practices led to the
dimension. The second stage is the lengthy historical era. The greater centralization of the administration led them to seek refuge in remote parts of the disappearance of their enthusiasm. To this end, it is
process where the Alevis evolved as a group distinct made the nomads more concerned about their cultur- Anatolian region in an attempt to escape the brutality still not possible to talk about a coherent relation
from the dominant Sunni communities with its own al and social independence. of the state; in other words, the Alevis were forced to between Alevism and the state's secular establish-
special rituals and heterodox nature; during this The cultural differentiation between the social go underground. The systematic attempts to keep ment.
process, the Alevis felt they had to hide their identity groups as well as the subsequent alienation was them away from the political administration mini- As a consequence of their structural characteristics,
and customs for the sake of survival. The third period accompanied by the economic difficulties that deterio- mized their contact with the established order, and in the position of Alevis as perpetual opponents forced
refers to the position and status of rated the socio-political position. The most places they were pushed towards an illegal posi- them to have contact with the radical leftist move-
the historical Alevism in the mod- relations of the Anatolian Turkmens tion. The limitation of mar- ments. Alevis who rapidly
ern era. The historical roots of the
Some argue that with the Shiite Turkmens in Iran led riages to the Alevi people became secular by relying
As part of the Alevi
opening President
evolution of Alevism in Anatolia Alevism is a sect or them to oppose the Ottoman admin- alone during this process on leftist terminology failed Abdullah Gül paid a
shed light on their position within faith, whereas some istration. The combination of this created a special communal to present a modern inter- visit to an Alevi-
the social structure. The Alevism opposition with the Safavids' political identity for the members of pretation of their faith in a Bektashi gathering
refer to it as a mode house in Tunceli
that emerged as the combination of and military movements served as an the group. Work to record timely manner. On the
political and social events during
of culture and set of emerging threat for the Ottoman the teachings and the rituals other hand, the fact that
and watched the
semah ceremony
the era of the Anatolian Seljuks and cultural motives. state. The huge support by a substan- were initiated as late as this they were exploited as an on Oct. 5, 2009
PHOTO: ONUR ÇOBAN
which was subsequently conveyed Others argue that tial part of the Anatolian people period. element of provocation in
to the Ottoman social structure has, Alevism is a distinct towards a new state on the eastern The framework needed for the incidents that broke out
over time, become the faith of a border of the state could have led to a tradition forced to isolate in predominantly Alevi cities
community that required distinction
religion that has noth- its collapse. This danger forced the itself to survive was provided and towns, including Çorum
from Sunnism. Alevis, who had ing to do with Islam Ottoman state to rely on violent and in such an environment of and Kahramanmaraþ, raised
limited contact with the state during often cruel methods to oppress the deprivation. Alevis have concerns over the fate and
the Ottoman as well as the republican eras, have, up insurgencies in the Anatolian region after the creation generated an exclusive form future of the community.
until recently, remained as a large social group that of the Safavid state in the 16th century. During this of hatred out of any pain Some incidents and rows
refrained from expressing their identity because of process, the Alevis served as the carriers of the oppo- and anguish they had to between Alevis and Sunnis
fear of repression. Even though the birth of Alevism site culture, and they did so despite everything they deal with including the made the state even more
can be traced back to the periods when Turks were had to deal with; eventually, they had to pay the price killing of Huseyin, the grandson of the Prophet concerned and ambitious to build social integrity and
first converted to Islam, their position within the for their choice very dearly. The presence of the Muhammad, in Kerbela; in this way, they positioned cohesion through modern and secular values.
Anatolian social structure was visibly shaped in nomadic Turkmens represented by the Alevi senti- themselves as a group in opposition to the Ottoman Alevis are now able to take their requests and wish-
Ottoman history. To this end, it is necessary to recall ments and identity within the Ottoman social struc- state. This opposition has become permanent over es to any platform despite the fact that they are pretty
that the emergence of Alevism as a structure was ini- ture has over time become a source of threat. Their time. Alevis who disconnected from the Safavid order diverse in terms of representation. With the compli-
tiated by the tense and troubled relations between interest in the Safavid order as well as their undeni- and were unable to connect with Shiite-Jafari theolo- cated structure and organization, organizational inco-
Yavuz Sultan Selim (b. 1470 - d. 1520) and the able roles in the insurgencies that broke out in the gy have preserved their cultural inventory -- which herence, and their beliefs, discourse and practices that
Safavid Shah Ismail (b. 1487 - d. 1524). As far as same period in Anatolia attracted the wrath of the most of the time could be viewed as folkloric -- along are almost disconnected with the tradition, Alevis
Ottoman history is concerned, this period of time is state. It should be noted that the interest of the Alevis with their rituals that gained a religious dimension complain about the visible erosion that jeopardizes
regarded as an era of pacifism from the point of view in the Safavids may not be explained by religious with time. their existence, and they expect genuine interest and
of the Alevis. motives alone. Their uncomfortable position must Alevi-state relations in the republican era attention from the state to remove and address their
Alevi insurgencies in the Ottoman era have taken them away from the Ottoman state. For Alevis wanted to be sure when the republican concerns over their future.
The Seljuk and Ottoman eras witnessed a number instance, it is now evident that the primary motive in regime was established that what they had to go To this end, the 1980s were times when the Alevis
of insurgencies against the central administration. a series of revolts known as the Jalali insurgencies was through in the past would not be repeated. The abol- attempted to make their voice heard and forwarded
Most of these revolts, including those led by Baba the troubles caused for social and economic reasons. ishment of the Khilafat Movement and the republican their demands to the relevant circles. The erosion of

90 91
ARTICLE SPRING 2010

identity as well as the faith and rituals along with the Alevis of new generations to develop an interest in and cultural breakdown -- they attract attention with tinct religion that has nothing to do with Islam. The
discrimination they had to face were all perceived as radical ideological movements and a sentiment of their heterogenous characteristics. The differences current tension in Turkish domestic politics as well as
an alarm bell; consequently, the Alevis took steps to deprivation and alienation. In fact, the developments between the Alevi groups constitute solid grounds for the international attempts to interfere with this exclu-
make sure that the relevant public institutions and are critical, and unless adequate measures are taken, real differentiations that go beyond diversity. These sive problem has created fertile ground for the rise of
actors addressed their problems. What constitutes the Alevis may cause serious security problems because of grounds lead to the emergence of different and even new forms of Alevism with different claims and man-
basic parameters of their faith is still controversial their visible involvement in radical movements and conflicting demands voiced by different groups. dates.
among the Alevis; however, there is a visibly growing anti-state actions. The political movements ignoring However, unlike past measures, the primary motive The Justice and Development
demand by the Alevis asking for the recognition of the Alevis as well as the political actors exploiting for resolving the Alevi question now does not have Party and the Alevi workshops
their presence and identity by the state in accordance their presence are equally dangerous. The state of anything to do with security concerns. While security The AK Party government declared in its party pro-
with the founding principles of the political establish- ignorance and exploitation is the primary factor concerns are considered important in taking effective gram that it would launch an initiative to start a dem-
ment and regime. behind the ever-expanding sphere of the Alevi ques- steps, they cannot be regarded as the only motive for ocratic process which will also include addressing the
Failure of the state to tion. In addition to the indifference taking action. The actual goal is to make sure that the problems of the Alevis. To this end, the government
address the Alevis' problems The Alevis are prone to addressing and resolving their Alevis have the same rights as those enjoyed by the announced in February 2009 that it had prepared a set
Alevis often become part of daily problems, the rather inconclusive other citizens. To this end, Alevis should have the of actions that will deal with their problems and that
to identifying their
discussions and political analyses it was also ready to discuss the matter with the Alevis.
because of their historical, cultural orientation and faith attempts and palliative initiatives
launched to deal with their troubles
right to lead as free a life as the Sunnis do in this
country. However, this discourse of equality has not In so doing, the government officially recognized by
and ideological problems. They are in as heterodox, popular have raised concerns and discomfort offered a credible agenda for the Alevis so far; in other this initiative -- also famously known as the Alevi
search of rebuilding their own identi- Islam and a cultural among the Alevi people. Unsatisfied words, the Alevis still have concerns and reservations opening -- the presence of the Alevis and pledged to
ty by putting strong emphasis on with the measures taken, Alevis vis-à-vis what they were offered. The requests and take action and consider their demands and prob-
lifestyle because of lems. The process focusing
their distance from Sunni society and developed interest in some import- demands of the Alevis
the secular state and relying on the tradition of oral ed solutions to cope with their towards their recognition by on the resolution of the
Even though it is
related to the
claims of discrimination, exclusion, narratives problems; as a consequence of this the state as equal citizens problems of the Alevis was Bektashi Sufi lineage,
deprivation and being forced to interest, the religious content of the still remain unanswered. On officially started with a series Alevism has created
become second-class citizens. Even though some of of workshops. its own path. Ali's
community has vanished and their political rhetoric the other hand, the fact that
poster (in the center
these arguments are regarded as exaggerations by has gained a harsh dimension refusing to cooperate these rights should be legal- The workshops seeking to of the photo) are an
some, nobody could deny that it is now time to admit with external actors. In addition to such an extreme ly recognized for them consider and review the pri- integral part of the
that the Alevis constitute a group whose rights and language and style, an exclusionary discourse has rather than granted as gifts mary problems Alevis Alevi worship houses
PHOTO: KÜRÞAT BAYHAN
demands have been ignored so far and to recognize emerged among some Alevi groups; the visibly grow- should be taken into encounter and their
their rights in accordance with the ideals of a demo- ing interest in such a violent rhetoric has raised con- account. demands and requests with
cratic society. cerns among the state organs and the majority of the The actual emphasis on a special reference to
However, it should be noted that the state has Alevi people. the demands of the Alevis is democracy and human
failed to consider the demands and problems of the Alevi demands are not homogenous shaped by a political sensitivity that mostly refers to rights were scheduled to take place in seven stages.
Alevis and take effective measures to address these The demands of the Alevis do not display homoge- the expression of their identity. Alevis claim that their Above all, the workshops sought to discuss the reac-
problems thus far. This state of negligence has led the nous features considering their geographical, ethnic presence and identity have been denied since the tions and demands of the Alevis on a healthy ground.
Ottoman period; they also often put emphasis upon To make sure that the discourses and reactions which
their distinctive characteristics that they argue need to were previously publicized in different circles and
be protected in the presence of a Sunni majority. environments and further consolidated by harsher
Safavid Order While discussing historical events Alevis refer to dif- elements are held and reviewed calmly, it was essen-
This order, which was free of extreme religious views and tendencies in the beginning, has acquired features of ferent forms of Alevism on different occasions, and tial to invite the relevant parties for a healthy discus-
Shiism over time and turned into a political and military power. The sheiks of the Safavid Order relied on the sup- this serves as the major obstacle to the creation of a sion of the matter and subsequently to offer realistic
port of Turkmen nomads in the Anatolian region in their cause to assume power in Iran. Due to the support of the homogenous understanding of Alevis. The syncretic and reasonable solutions based on a ground of dia-
nomadic Turkmen people, Ismail Safavi declared himself shah of Iran in 1501 and created the dynasty of Safavids. characteristic of Alevism suffices to explain this diver- logue to be achieved by these parties. To this end, it
Subsequent to coming into power, Shah Ismail recognized Shiism as the official sect of the state and in so doing, sity. For this reason, the question "Which Alevism?" was also necessary to include the Alevis, NGOs and
parted ways with his own tradition as well as the path of his supporters in Anatolia. Under Shah Ismail's adminis- remains a tough one. This diversity led to the emer- academic and political actors as well as representa-
tration, Safavids deployed propagandists to different parts of the Anatolian region in an attempt to call the rural gence of differing claims of representation of the tives of theology and the media in the process.
residents and urban settlers to initiate a religious opposition movement and political insurgency. Even though the authentic Alevi identity by diverse groups. Some The workshops particularly sought to achieve the
discomfort of some social groups along with the religious opposition created some influence, the Ottoman state argue that Alevism is a sect or faith, whereas some following results:
decisively addressed this problem and repressed the revolts. refer to it as a mode of culture and set of cultural - To find out the views of the relevant actors with
motives. Some now even argue that Alevism is a dis- regards to Alevism

92 93
ARTICLE SPRING 2010

- To get their opinions on the primary issues of the set of solutions, to create a fertile ground between the
Alevis state and the Alevis, to determine the short-term
- To determine the probable reaction of the general steps and take action to implement the agreed meas-
public vis-à-vis the opening ures, to address the expectations of the general public
- To control the flow of information to be used for a and to make sure that resolution of the problems that
roadmap the Alevis encounter in their daily lives is viewed as a
The general and particular goals necessity by the entire nation.
of the workshops were as follows: These workshops sought to determine the requests
- To make sure that the representatives of all Alevi and demands of the Alevis who had expressed their
groups regardless of their orientation will have the views and opinions in different platforms so far and
best opportunity to express their the steps as well as measures to be
views and concerns over their prob- taken for the fulfillment of the goals.
It should be admitted
lems The workshops aiming to serve as a
- To consolidate the functioning of that the state has not
bridge between the Alevis and the
Turkish democracy and to distin- made any adequate state discussed the leading problems
guish the reactions and moves that progress to maintain a of the Alevi people and reviewed the
seek to inflict harm on the harmony system of direct com- state's troubled approach vis-à-vis
and unity of Turkish people from
munication and contact the entire Alevi issue. The partici-
reasonable demands pants also discussed the current state
- To face the arguments and issues
in an effort to address
of affairs with regard to the Alevi
as pointed out by criticisms with the problems of the question at these workshops. In the
regard to the practices of secularism Alevis up until recently. face of difficulties and challenges
and human rights in the social struc- arising from the diverse nature of the
ture Alevi representatives and groups claiming proper rep-
- To create a sphere of reason to detect and address
resentation and known for their diverse demands, dif-
the issues of the Alevis ferent ideological orientations and political references,
- To maintain dialogue with the Alevi community the determination of the possible solutions to be used
- To take action in an effort to establish a channel of remains a daunting task. However, the state was
communication between the state and the Alevis
obliged to consider the demands of its citizens regard-
- To share the updates on the concrete issues with the less of these difficulties. Peaceful coexistence requires
general public and to start a process of negotiation such a basic approach.
with the participation of the relevant parties in the No adequate progress yet
possible solutions that will bring a fair, permanent It should be admitted that the state has not made any
and lasting order of peace adequate progress to satisfy the concerned parties and
By the end of these discussions and deliberations, it maintain a system of direct communication and con-
will be possible to lay out a roadmap, to agree on a tact in an effort to address the Alevis' problems. The
goal of these meetings was to create a fertile ground enumerate my observations of the Alevi reality in
where the parties would come together and discuss Turkey, as it is reads within the framework of the
resolving the issue and to initiate a process of negoti- Alevi meetings:
ation in accordance with the requirements of partici- - The Alevis are prone to identify their orientation
patory democracy. Taking grounded and lasting steps and faith as heterodox, popular Islam and a cultural
for a long-term solution would be better for visible lifestyle because of the tradition of oral narratives.
progress. - It is hard to find a channel of common discourse in
First, Alevi groups were invited to the work- the diverse world of the Alevis. Their arguments are
shops based on the differences in their discourses mostly political; in general, they hope to attract
rather than their organizational diversities. The greater support by relying on strong statements that
different views between the Alevis range from do not require academic or intellectual content and
theology to history and from perceptions of daily strength.
life to their expectations for the future, and con- - The Alevis do not display features of a homoge-
flicts between their views are also visible in many nous structure. With their diverse structures, Alevis
other fields. The initiative to get such a diverse set have conflicting and differing designs in the different
of ideas and views together and meet with the parts of the Anatolian region. However, political
state was a first in many respects. interests ensure the emergence of a common Alevi
discourse which tends to generate some settings
The Alevi opening and subsequent efforts were
welcomed by the Alevi peo- that do not offer realistic
A key Alevi ritual is
ple. The general Alevi com- arguments on the state, the
munity, including some general Muslim population semah, the circling
dance, performed by
marginal groups, views this and the Sunnis as the selected men and
initiative as a rational and majority in this country. women in a group
lasting move and considers - Alevis are unable to that can vary in size.
The dede plays a
the government's determi- resolve their inherent and
seven-stringed lute
nation as a positive gesture internal problems on their (saz, baðlama) and
and historic turning point. own. Their respect for each sings. During certain
The bold steps, the avoid- other has been eroded. They parts of the service,
the congregation
ance of a political language expect the state to lead in assumes a worship
and discourse during the the achievement of unity position, kneeling
entire process, and the exclusion of polemics and and cooperation between different groups. and sitting on their
determination over a strategy devised to keep the - A bitter debate on whether Alevism could be con- ankles, occasionally
bowing their heads to
whole process under control have attracted a great sidered a form of Islam is emerging as the non-negli- the floor in unison
deal of attention and support from people. gible criterion of the reality. This provocative discourse PHOTO: KÜRÞAT BAYHAN
The workshops, the last of which were held in eventually created a wall of separation between the
January 2010, helped determine some functional Alevis. Today, every Alevi is forced to give an answer
points on how the process is moving. At this current to this question, and the groups feel they are obliged
stage, a number of Alevis complain that the state and to identify themselves based on the answers provided

Erdebili Order and the Alevis the government is not paying much attention to their
problems; they made visible progress in the process of
Alevis are known as the Kýzýlbaþlar (literaly red-headed people) in Ottoman history. The sheiks of the Erdebili Order politicization with their diverse and competing ele-
and their followers were named the Kýzýlbaþlar because they wore red crowns and hoods. The emergence of the ref- ments; the tensions and problems they are facing as
erence to a large group of the red-headed people as the Alevis is pretty new. It is commonly believed that when the well as their reactions are due to religious, political
notion of red-headed bore the meaning of the word "rebel" in Ottoman society, it was replaced with the notion of and economic reasons. It has become evident that the
Alevi, which represents fidelity to Ali. It should also be recalled that the negative and repugnant meaning attributed groups claiming proper representation of the Alevis
to the notion of red-headed was further conveyed to the notion of Alevism. While official Ottoman documents are actually unable to attract the huge support and
before the 19th century do not make any reference to the term Alevism, the parameters defining this community authority of representation from the Alevi community
must have emerged before. Even if it is defined as a notion seeking to convert the red-headed people to Shiism at a they claim. Their assertions are based on their media
conceptual level, the abandonment of the notion may be taken as an indication of the end of an era. appearances and not on a solid ground. Below I will
to such questions. In the meantime, it is interesting to
observe that arguments suggesting that Alevism is not
part of Islam and should be considered as a separate
faith are attracting greater attention and interest from
the media. Writers with secular, leftist and ultrana-
tionalist motives and backgrounds try to make this
tendency more visible and acceptable; they even try to
present this argument as the mainstream assumption
among the Alevi community. This tendency has
become so strong that those who consider Alevism
part of Islam are forced to act timidly. The failure to

94 95
 ARTICLE SPRING 2010
address the problems of the Alevis and the eagerness
of the Sunni majority to hold the monopoly and
authority of interpretation take the Alevis towards
non-Islamic interpretations where they try to find a
new mode of identification. The approaches regarding
Alevism as part of Islam are now becoming less influ-
ential and effective. The failure to consider and
address their problems makes the non-Islam asser-
tions more attractive.
- The experiences of Alevis in urban environments
usually undermined their authentic-traditional struc-
tures. Actually, what inflicted the greatest harm on
Alevism was the reckless objections and reactions by
the new generations of their faith. The Alevi commu-
nity that voluntarily participated in the modern edu-
cation processes experienced the biggest contradiction
with their customs. The republican regime's secular
policies and curricula as well as the radical-leftist dis-
courses appear to have been
Alevi women and influential in this process,
men participate
together in reli-
which undermined the
gious rituals. The authority of the religious
headscarf is largely leaders and the legitimacy of
a cultural veil for the rituals. For many,
the Alevi women,
and as the Alevi
Alevism is currently a fabri-
population moves cation built upon raw folk-
into the city centers loric materials. Therefore,
the headscarf is this construction allows
also abandoned
PHOTO: KÜRÞAT BAYHAN
spiritual erosion in the com-
munity. A tendency to allow
the infiltration of ideological and radical elements
takes the Alevis to a discourse of opposition.
- The course of the discussions over laicism serves as
the major point of differentiation between Alevi groups.
For instance, the Alevis call for an authentic version of
laicism; they particularly invite the state to become
impartial in the provision of religious services; this invi-
tation makes a special reference to the status of the
Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet); the Alevis
further ask for a greater sphere in Turkish secularism
for their faith to achieve an equal representation.
- Most of the demands of the Alevis may be consid-
ered along with the state's policies on secularism
because Alevis regard the state's laicism as a setting
reinforcing their deprivation.
- The primary reasons for the support extended by the
Alevi community to these discourses and demands
include the visible ignorance of the need of Alevis for
a reference and identification. Special initiatives focus-
96
ing on the interests and sensitivities of the Alevi com-
munity attract their interest and attention. The dis-
courses of the new generation of Alevis are shaped by
the actors relying on these discourses. In fact, TV
channels putting emphasis upon the needs and
demands of the Alevi community reflect the diverse
points of views held by different Alevi groups.
- The state is defined by the Sunni identity, and it is
argued that the religious practices take place to pro-
tect the Sunni identification and orientation. Alevis
asking for equal treatment by the state underline the
support and attention that the Sunni community
receives; some Alevi groups eager to get the same
attention are seeking ways to come closer to the state
apparatus.
- It is apparent that there is a growing international
interest in the status of Alevis in Turkey. The special
attention from Germany, France and Belgium is also
visible. On the other hand,
this interest constitutes a
framework of reference for
use by the Alevis. The Alevi
community is now prone to
attract the interest and sup-
port of the European Union
to make sure that their prob-
lems are reviewed with a
special reference to the influ-
ence and security percep-
tions of the EU. The com-
mon ground between the Alevis asking for the resolu-
tion of the problem through a reliance on external
dynamics and those who ask for consideration of
domestic facilities is the fact that they both identify
themselves as subordinate to the tutelage of a domi-
nant actor. This should be taken into account.
The workshops constituting an important part of
the Alevi opening are over. It is now time for the final
report to be drafted by the current author, the coordi-
nator of the opening process, and the discussions this
report may spark. The report is expected to offer a
roadmap on the resolution of the current problems. It
will be possible in the coming days to see the progress
within the course of the initiative based on the con-
tent of the final report. In this way, Alevis will emerge
as a group whose presence is acknowledged by the
state, whose views and demands are considered and
counted by the state actors and whose beliefs and rit-
uals are declared sacred and untouchable.
 INTERVIEW
SPRING 2010
Esposito:
Authoritarian
versus democratic
J
politics defines the
Turkish debate
ohn L. Esposito believes that the people who subscribe
to the ideology of ‘laiklik' in Turkey or in France are
often anti-religious and secular fundamentalists and are
just as exclusivist as religious fundamentalists in their
vision. ‘Under AK Party, both the Turkish society and government
have become more representative,’ Esposito says
ÞEYMA AKKOYUNLU
John L. Esposito is a renowned professor of interna-
tional affairs and Islamic studies at Georgetown
University in Washington, D.C., and the founder of the
Prince Alwaleed Bin-Talal Center for Muslim-Christian
Understanding. Esposito's scholarly work helped bring
about not only an understanding between Muslims and
Christians but also a better understanding of what
Islam is and what is going on in the modern Muslim
world. In contrast to Muslim-democracy-skeptics, who
accuse religiously motivated Islamic political move-
ments of having secret agendas and using democratic
means for their own ends, Esposito is quite hopeful of
the future of democracy in Turkey and in other Muslim
countries. He is aware of the pains of change, though,
and prefers to portray the recent debate in Turkey as a
contestation between the old order -- classified by him
as the secularist fundamentalists -- and a new order.
Personified in the ascendance of the Justice and
Development Party (AK Party) to power in Ankara -- a
move commonly referred to as the periphery mobiliz-
ing towards the center -- this new order is character-
ized, or at least characterizes itself, as being more plu-
ralistic and more inclusive of others, including the
98
A member of the High
Level Group of the
Alliance of Civilizations,
Professor Esposito was in
Ýstanbul in March to speak
at a conference within the
scope of the Alliance of
Civilizations Ýstanbul
Conferences.
PHOTO: ONUR ÇOBAN
members of the old elite and other religious groups.
Esposito warns that the AK Party's success in being
truly what they claim they will be should be judged by
what they do. Turkish government and society,
Esposito says, is opening up with new elites coming in
rather than with old elites kept out, and Turkey is mov-
ing at a good pace of democratization. He thinks that
the old order, where people with religious leanings
joining the military or attending university were
approached with suspicion, is changing slowly. He
adds, however, that there is still more to do on a num-
ber of issues, from the headscarf ban to the Kurdish
question.
A member of the High Level Group of the Alliance
of Civilizations, Professor Esposito was in Ýstanbul in
March to speak at a conference within the scope of the
Alliance of Civilizations Ýstanbul Conferences. The
Turkish Political Review asked Professor Esposito about
his understanding of what is going on in Turkey and
about the pitfalls in the way of Turkish democracy.
Where do you see Turkish democracy moving towards?
I think that Turkey is moving forward at a good pace
in terms of democratization. In the past, there was a
legal sense that somehow the military was the protec-
121
INTERVIEW SPRING 2010 ARTICLE IN BRIEF: An alternative elite group is emerging in Turkey, and Turkey is moving at a good pace in terms of
democratization. Certain people speaking to the American audience define the debate in Turkey as a clash between secularists and
Islamists, but it is more an issue of democratic versus more authoritarian politics. In the past you might not have been able to get a
position in a university if you had a religious profile, but now, one has to move beyond that. The Turkish government is working
with the EU, US and Israel independently on the issues that it sees as in its own national interest.

tor of democracy and therefore could intervene in poli- staunchly secular Turk who is at the Washington
tics. That goes against the whole notion of democracy. I Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP). This is a very
think what I see unfolding now is a process of capabili- strong pro-Israel think tank. Well, he has an agenda.
ty. What is being said is that this is going to be a real You could see it not just in his recent article (Esposito is
democracy, and you cannot have sectors of the military referring to Soner Çaðaptay and his "What's Really
thinking of or planning a coup, whether it's an actual behind Turkey's Coup Arrests?" published in the
coup or a soft coup. Also, if one looks now at the February 2010 edition of Foreign Policy), which I
Turkish landscape in terms of positions in society, in wouldn't allow an undergraduate to publish, because
government, in security, in the military or in the corpo- he has no evidence. What we normally say in public life
rate world, we see an extended arena where there are is that you can engage in an argument, but then we say
people from different backgrounds. These people are "OK, you can put [forward] your argument, but where
becoming more and more represented. is your proof?" And that did not occur there. Now I
In fact both society and government have become had seen him just before the national elections on pub-
more representative because those who are part of the lic television in the US. Again he was portraying the
old establishment are not necessarily kept out; rather, debate in Turkey as a secular versus Islamist one.
new people are coming in. Those who were part of the Rather than that, I would see it as an issue of more
old establishment can still be political authoritarian versus more democratic.
players as long as, as in a democracy, That's what the debate is about.
they are able to get votes. The impor-
I wouldn't make Do people in the West
tant thing is that you now have people this headscarf issue listen to him or to you?
who were not able to move into cer- an issue necessarily When a Western audience hears the
tain positions before being represented world "Islamist," they don't distin-
of religious free- guish between mainstream and
in those positions.
There are still things to be resolved. dom. I would frame extremist Islamists, and Islamist means almost like "Who cares?" or "Why should we do it?" become more pluralistic have to pass through. Part of Esposito complains
There is this initiative with regard to it more in terms of dangerous. "Secular" in the US means If you don't address issues like the role of religion in the problem that Europe had and in a sense that about the readiness
that there's public space for people of certain media
the Kurds in the society, but there is basic human rights Turkish society, the question of the meaning of secular- Turkey has is that the older definitions of what consti- outlets in Turkey to
still more that needs to be done. There who believe and who do not believe. ism or the role of the military, then how do you expect tuted a nation were more limited in terms of how plu- compartmentalize
are still things to be done about the
in the society From my point of view, people who Americans to understand you? They will just see it as a ralistic they are going to be. I mean, in terms of who is the society and label
place of other religious bodies in the subscribe to the ideology of "laiklik" in struggle between seculars and Islamists, and in their a French person or who is a German and here in terms the people. He was
Turkey or in France are often anti-religious and secular particularly irritat-
society. For example, the ability of a Christian group to minds secularist people are good because they believe of how does one define Turkish nationalism and what ed to find himself
have its own training seminary or the ability of women fundamentalists. Before the last election, this particular in an open society and in a secular society, people are role does religion play in this definition. being labelled a
who choose to wear a headscarf to attend universities. person gave an example, again playing to the American free to worship or not to worship. You had a fear of extreme religious fundamentalism, Gülenist, as he was
You mean religious freedoms? audience, saying that these people's wives (AK Party invited to Turkey by
So Turkey is in fact losing a PR campaign? but you also had extremist secularists who are just as
the prime minister,
I wouldn't make this headscarf issue an issue neces- supporters) wear a headscarf and that they don't drink Things are changing. When I first came to exclusivist as religious fundamentalists in their vision. who is claimed to be
sarily of religious freedom. I would frame it more in alcohol. I find this as an American insulting because Washington in 1993 there was no significant represen- In my society there are distinctive differences between a close associate of
terms of basic human rights in the society. Men and significant numbers of Americans don't drink alcohol. tation of Turks and Turkey even in the universities. atheists and believers. One of the problems we had is Fethullah Gülen
PHOTO: ONUR ÇOBAN
women in a democracy have a right to express them- There are American Jews who don't drink alcohol, and Turkish was not taught at Georgetown University, and that as Americans became more religious, atheists have
selves whether verbally or through their dress in any somehow he was trying to portray that as a threatening there was very little visibility of courses on Turkey. The become marginalized. But we have to learn to live
way they want as long as it is not a direct threat to the thing. same thing was also true for Johns Hopkins University together. The challenge in Turkish society is to work
security of others. If she wants to wear a very short The other side of the problem is that Turkey has not and others in Washington. Now, for example, at out a set of values and attitudes of mutual respect and
skirt, that's her business; a long skirt, that's her busi- been sufficiently interested or visible in the US. I Georgetown we have Turkish language taught and we tolerance.
ness; to wear a hat, that's her business. So why not a remember having a conversation, 10 or 12 years ago, have courses on Turkey. The idea that you would not Do you think the traditional elite will adopt this set of
scarf or hijab? with a member of the Turkish Embassy in Washington. have visibility in Washington was very problematic. values?
There are people in the West who claim that Turkey I said, "Turkey is not visible enough in American socie- That is changing. Even Turkish academics and diplo- It is very clear that any elite group grasping economic
is passing through a conflict between the secularists ty, and Turkey is not interested in being visible." What mats were rarely coming and speaking to think tanks, or political power will have concerns about change.
and the religious people. What is your position? she said to me was, "You know the attitude of many but now it is much different, and we have regular pro- What you see in Turkey is that the establishments of
There are two things. One is that many of these peo- people in the Turkish government, with a sense of grams on Turkey. the secular elites were used to defining the norms
ple (who claim a conflict between the secularists and national pride, is 'Who cares?'" And this kind of conver- What additional challenges await Turkey? according to their identity, excluding other possibilities.
the religious) have a political agenda. There is a sation has occurred more than once. Their attitude was I think there is a process all societies who want to Now the challenge to them is that you have alternative

100 101
 INTERVIEW SPRING 2010

elites. They have just as good an education as the tradi- that also. members of the Gülen movement are now in the mili- The current government has attempted to work very
tional elites have. That means power sharing, having a Is this government going to take a proactive position tary or the police, but I see nothing suspicious about closely and effectively with the EU, US and to a certain
more pluralistic world and tolerating the practices one on being inclusive of old elites and also of other reli- that. This suggests that they were not welcomed in the extent with Israel, with the Muslim countries and Iran at
doesn't like. That also means competition on positions. gions to broaden their space in society? It is very military and the police, and this is exclusivism. In the a certain point of independent foreign policy, which is
There is a resistance to change, but they will have to important to see whether or not this government and old days you were called politically Islamist or religious- important for Turkish nationalism. It is very capable of
adjust to that. its policies will remain pluralist. It is a little bit like ly oriented, and if that was known then you might not saying to the US: "We will work with you so far. When
The old elite claims that the newcomers will do just President Obama trying to signal that he wants to be be able to hold that kind of position and you might not you ask for cooperation, if we see it as in the Turkish
what they did to them: exclusion. Isn't this a legitimate inclusive and so he appoints people from the be able to get into top universities. That's more com- national interest, that's fine, but if we don't see it as in
concern? Republican Party. The AK Party's core establishment mon in the old order than the new order. the Turkish national interest, we will say no!" That is
The challenge with new elites is obviously how the may be religiously oriented, but the party itself identi- I think one has to move beyond that. When it comes what the Turkish prime minister did with regard to
new elites will manage power and treat the old elites. fies as pluralistic. to the university profile, whether you are religious or Israel. On the one hand having relations with Israel, but
When you come to power, if you will in fact follow the I think the message of the AK Party to the Muslim not, whether you wear a headscarf or a short skirt, the on the other hand speaking out at that Davos meeting.
very model of your predecessors, then there is a prob- world, as well as to the West, is that the best way to issue is: "Are you academically qualified?" That's what Some people here and there might say that he kind of
Esposito thinks that lem. The challenge to those new elites is to show that develop politics in a country, whether we're talking education is about. And that should lost his temper. Why is it OK when
there are far more what they wanted and what they now have is the abili- about people of secularly oriented or religiously orient- work in every sector of society. There Prime Minister Netanyahu takes a
Americans who ty to participate and to take over old positions that were
You had a fear of
ed politics, is to develop it from within the country. If was an old order in Western universi- hard stance, but not okay when Prime
understand Islam
previously closed to them. They have to be able to say you're going to play a role in society, then you have to ties when it came to studying Islam extreme religious Minister Erdoðan does the same?
and Muslim cul-
tures than the that all they want to see is a society that is more plural- become more pluralistic because you're asking the and the Middle East. Its name was fundamentalism, but Erdoðan wants to be inclusive also
reverse. “There istic and a public space open to both belief and non- establishment to become more pluralistic. Orientalism. Are things changing in you also had extrem- when dealing with the Iranians. I see
aren't significant belief. Are they going to demonstrate that they are part When people ask what the AK Party really is, I American universities also? Turkey as attempting to say: "We will
numbers of Muslim
of the inclusive and pluralistic society with what they Yes, they are clearly changing. First
ist secularists who have relations with, to the extent we
scholars who are would say judge them by what they do, not just by
experts in American have now? That is their challenge. what they say. of all, it's not that the old order should are just as exclu- can, all the Middle Eastern Muslim
studies or in How do you evaluate their score up until now? The WINEP member you mentioned is trying to por- not exist. They have a perfect right to sivist as religious countries, and we will have relations
Christianity and I think the AK Party should be judged by this ques- tray the Gülen movement as a natural ally of the AK exist. But there is a new order. If you fundamentalists in with the EU and the West. When we
Judaism,” he
complains
tion: "Do they live up to the Party and is criticizing the movement with the same look at the membership of MESA (the disagree significantly we will say we
PHOTO: ONUR ÇOBAN standards of a pluralistic, claims. How do you evaluate the activities of this partic- Middle East Studies Association) you'll
their vision disagree." That's a very important role.
inclusive, diverse ular movement in terms of inclusiveness? see it's far more diverse. It is not dom- Turkey is no longer saying: "We will
political ideology I was asked a number of years ago by a Turkish aca- inated by the white order. There are many people from accept and want all the things you can give us at the cost
which their party demic to co-sponsor a conference on the Gülen the Middle East region, who are now citizens in the US of threatening our own independence and identity."
suggests?" And if movement held at Georgetown. They are much and are the dominant order. In my Center for Muslim- Do you think this policy can work on the
their critics espouse more visible in the US, in Washington. I have been Christian Understanding at Georgetown, we just hired a Armenian front also?
an exclusivist and co-editing, more recently, a new book on the Gülen Muslim scholar. If you look at the issue of Palestine The Turkish-Armenian issue is a very, very deep-
non-pluralistic movement and its educational initiatives. I think and Israel, there are prominent scholars who are strong seated historical issue. It is like talking about US-
position going that the challenge with the Gülen movement will critics of militant Zionism. There are American Jewish Iranian relations. You can move up to some point, but
back to the old be to assure that its profile remains pluralistic and scholars who support a Palestinian state and therefore then there is a scratch, and old memories come up. I
order, then they inclusive. I read an article that are criticized by strong Zionist Jews or non-Jews for think that Turkish-Armenian relations can move two
should be judged by says it's suspicious that their position. That diversity exists in America. It exists steps back, three steps forward, one step back two steps
in books we read that are available to students, it exists forward. The acceptance of both sides that you'll not
in positions we take. have a solution to anything unless you really negotiate
In fact I would say there is much more of a challenge is important. Negotiation means that parties are never
for people in the Middle East by means of diversity. going to totally agree. Each of us has a right to feel that
There are far more Americans who understand Islam the other is more responsible for the problem, but we
and the Muslim cultures than the reverse. There aren't can't come to the solution if each of us feels the other is
significant numbers of Muslim scholars who are experts totally responsible. Part of the recognition, then, is to be
in American studies, or in Christianity and Judaism. able to look and say that people were killed, there were
Turkey's new foreign policy is motivated by the ideas atrocities, but there were very legitimate reasons also. It
of 'peaceful coexistence' and 'zero problems with is not a black and white situation. One may be tilted
neighbors.' Do you foresee a success story in the future more to one side than the other, but one has to find a
of this policy? constructive way to move forward to negotiate.

103
DOSSIER SPRING 2010
Conceptual
O
framework of
Turkish foreign
policy in
AK Party era
The drafters of the current Turkish
foreign policy design strived to
maintain political, economic and
cultural cooperation with the
Russian Federation, the successor
of the Soviet Empire, the second
great power in world politics dur-
ing the Cold War era, without dis-
connecting from the Western
world and ending its full member-
ship status in leading internation-
al organizations including NATO
and the Council of Europe
104
Mehmet Yýlmaz
ver the last decade, Turkey has been
experiencing one of the most
important periods in its republi-
can history. Its domestic and for-
eign policies are praised on
regional and international plat-
forms and attract the attention of the
international community. The reforms
the government introduces make it a more democratic
state, whereas its strategy of cooperation, focusing on
dialogue with international actors and regional players,
polishes its image and increases its prestige.
The reason for the emergence of discussions in both
domestic and international circles focusing on where
Turkey is heading and whether it is changing its axis is
the proper appreciation for and comprehension of the
current process of globalization by Turkish society, with
its wisdom and intelligence. For instance, it did not rely
on vicious sentiments such as hatred and revenge in an
attempt to recover its losses in the Balkan Wars of 1912-
1913, the war with Russia in 1878 or World War I. Quite
the contrary, it embraced noble innovations and notions
as well as universal principles, including dedication to
democracy, respect for human rights and the protection
of religious and cultural identities and diversity earlier
than many other nations and dismissed reactionary and
ideological discourses that promoted violence.
From weak coalitions to
strong single-party administration
This flexible and constructive approach that Turkish
society has developed in the course of events facilitated
Turkey's adaptation to the emerging processes and
deeply affected the political structure of the country.
The transition to a civilian lifestyle in 1983 was surpris-
ingly easy following the military coup staged on Sept.
12, 1980. Voters have also ended the rule and adminis-
tration of politicians who turned Turkey into a country
that had problems with its neighbors and struggled
with economic issues subsequent to a visible improve-
ment in the period between 1983 and 1993. In the gen-
eral elections held on Nov. 2, 2002, the voters brought
the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), under
the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoðan, to power.
It was not only the negative impact of poor gover-
nance during the administrations of weak coalition gov-
ernments on the public in the period between 1993 and
2002 that played a determining role in this outcome, but
also the accurate interpretation of global trends by the
AK Party. Because it pursued a policy meeting the
demands of the people in Anatolia, the AK Party attract-
ed their support and consolidated its power and position
in the general elections held on July 22, 2007.
Turkey getting rid of its headaches
What factors played the greatest role in the success of
the AK Party, a party which came to power during
troubled times? What are the reasons for its landslide
election victories?
In fact, there are a number of answers to these ques-
tions; however, it seems that the most important factor
behind this success is Turkey's effort to get rid of the
"ancient" headaches that have historically prevented it
from exploiting its opportunities. The AK Party admin-
istration replaced static strategies based on the
"fixed parameters" of the Cold War era
with new domestic policies emanat-
ing from its historic experience.
For instance, a number of
bold reforms were introduced
to facilitate full membership
in the European Union, and
many legal instruments
were created to attain the
advanced standards of a
democratic regime. Much
was done to ensure the
enjoyment of the right to
assembly, a key principle and
requirement of a pluralist democ-
racy. At the same time, the adminis-
tration of this era also waged a war against
clandestine organizations and illegal enterprises,
including mobs and terrorist groups that sought to ter-
rorize and intimidate the public and disrupt social har-
mony. In addition, the foreign policy style pursued by
the final Ottoman rulers, who tended to align them-
selves with great powers in an attempt to protect the
interests of the state, was abandoned. Turkey, which
allied itself with Britain during its war with Russia,
cooperated with Germany in World War I when the
British Empire decided it was time to partition the
Ottoman state and sought to benefit from NATO's
security umbrella under the leadership of the US when
the Soviet Empire manifestly threatened its territorial
integrity, has this time developed a multidimensional
foreign policy strategy.
Cooperation rather than rivalry
Under said policy, the drafters of the current foreign
policy design strived to maintain political, economic
105
and cultural cooperation with the Russian Federation,
the successor of the Soviet Empire, the second great
power in world politics during the Cold War era, with-
out disconnecting from the Western world and ending
its full membership status in leading international
organizations including NATO and the Council of
Europe. In addition, the void in the international sys-
tem in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks in New York was keenly observed and bold
steps were taken to improve ties with countries in the
Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, regions
which have a visible Turkish legacy because of long-
term Ottoman rule. The Turkish government has sent
numerous messages to the administrators of these
countries calling for further cooperation
instead of rivalry and competition. The
Turkish nation's attempt to inte- Critics of the AK
grate with the outside world Party often claim
that Turkey has
since 1989, when the Berlin
turned its back to
Wall fell, as well as the AK the EU and the
Party's international and Western World.
domestic policies, which Turkish PM
Erdoðan's hectic
improved Turkey's image in travel schedule
the world, have created a
illustrates that
connection between the state these critiques are
and the nation. To appreciate unfounded and
proves that the
the magnitude and extent of government has a
the progress that Turkey has multidimensional
made over the last eight years, it foreign policy
will be sufficient to take a look at the
GRAPHIC:
Y. EMRE hATUNOÐLU
recent moves in the field of international
diplomacy and the notions coined in this era.
'Self-perception of civilizations'
Frequent references by prominent names and gov-
ernment figures, including President Abdullah Gül,
Prime Minister Erdoðan, Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoðlu and Economy Minister Ali Babacan, to new,
original and forceful ideas, such as proactive foreign
policy, "rhythmic diplomacy," acting on a larger scale,
multidimensional strategy, a policy of zero problems
with neighbors, a pivotal country role, Turkish vision
and creating order, confirm that the AK Party has a
solid and strong foreign policy vision. Undoubtedly,
Professor Davutoðlu has made the greatest contribu-
tion to this vision. Davutoðlu, the AK Party's top for-
eign policy designer, combined his academic proficien-
cy with his expertise as the chief adviser to the prime
minister and later foreign minister; this combination led
to the emergence of a constructive diplomacy focused
DOSSIER SPRING 2010 DOSSIER IN BRIEF: The dictionary of Turkish foreign policy contains entries such as proactive foreign policy, rhythmic diploma-
cy, acting on a larger scale, multidimensional strategy, a policy of zero problems with neighbors, a pivotal country role, creating order and a
Turkish vision. This vision foresees a strong economy, a political approach free of tension and quarrels and a worldview in harmony with its
culture and history. This vision brought a new style to diplomacy that can be summarized as locating the problems, taking care in settling dis-
putes, establishment of dialogue with the relevant parties, avoidance of thorny issues and an emphasis on the mutually agreed issues.

on the resolution of problems and the settlement of
disputes. Despite occasional criticism, it became appar-
ent that said notions were not idle and that they bear
the signs of a civilization's identity. It is evident that
Turkey's recent foreign policy was drafted in line with
certain principles and foundations from Davutoðlu's
seminal book, "Strategic Depth," published in 2001, as
well as his article "Self-perception of civilizations,"
which appeared in the academic journal Divan in 1997.
So, what are these foundations?
Turkey-centered strategic vision
It is certain that the foundation of the foreign policy
strategy pursued by the AK Party government since
2002 refers to a vision of Turkey's role in world politics.
The components of this vision include a strong econo-
my, a political approach free of tension and quarrels
and a worldview in harmony with its culture and histo-
ry. This constructive policy approach led to a stable
economy, and the economic system, resistant to dis-
Turkey is now cited as a country creating order
in its region thanks to its rapprochement with
the near abroad, the policy by which it settles its its of the Misak-ý Milli (National Pact)
disputes with neighboring countries and main-
tains cooperation with its historic rivals.
ruptive crises, created an environment where historical
and cultural values are shared with the globalized
world. The AK Party contended that political and eco-
nomic stability are the foundations of strength and
influence in foreign policy. It successfully dropped poli-
cies that might have led to social polarization and secu-
rity problems. It remained sensitive to the needs and
demands of the people and stayed away from the traps
and plots of politicians who sought to pursue disruptive
policies which relied on society's fault lines. Its focus on horizon and vision. This policy, applicable to a vast area
resolving the fundamental problems of the Anatolian
people was rewarded in the election polls.
Reinstitution of former state of affairs unlikely
From this perspective, it is actually not surprising to
witness that the AK Party, which senses the continuous
support of the nation, has pursued such "radical" and
"fundamental" policies and strategies in domestic and
foreign affairs. The people trusted their state whereas
the latter confirmed through the policies it implement-
ed that its strength was due to the overwhelming sup-
port of the nation. Prime Minister Erdoðan's public
response to Israeli President Simon Peres in Davos was Turkish Prime
Minister Recep
welcomed not only in Turkey, but throughout the Tayyip Erdoðan and
entire world. This historic incident, now famously then-Foreign
known as the "One Minute" showdown, proved that Minister Abdullah
Turkey can be a country that can "speak Turkish in its Gül sign the Treaty
establishing a
foreign policy" and state its terms if necessary [The Constitution for
author uses the term "speaking Turkish" in its meaning Europe in Rome on
used mainly by Israeli analysts. Turkey's strong lan- Oct. 29, 2004
guage against Syria back in 1998 convinced Syria to
expell the terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan from its soil
where he found safe haven till then and many Israeli
analysts suggested that Israel should "speak Turkish"
to Syria also. (Editor)].
Each move in the field of diplomacy was welcomed
by the public in this age of communication and consoli-
dated the ties between the state and the nation. In this
way, the young people who constitute a center of
power in Anatolia transformed their inherent potential
into kinetic energy rather than wasting their strength
engaging in political disputes. They
spent their time carrying out produc- barriers, and legislation was introduced to facilitate visa Rhythmic diplomacy
tion, research and integration with the procedures in an attempt to improve commercial ties Turkey's engagement with its near abroad has
world in an effort to go beyond the lim- and ensure that people can travel freely and are able to inevitably required active diplomacy. Undoubtedly, the
participate in cultural exchange. In so doing, those who visible change and transformation in the international
objectives [Misak-ý Milli is the name of drafted this foreign policy sought to minimize the dis- system influenced this strategy, which could be summa-
tance between Van and Tabriz, Erzurum and Baku, rized as a multidimensional foreign policy style. Instead
a set of six important decisions made by
the last term of the Ottoman Artvin and Batumi, Diyarbakýr and Arbil, Mardin and of being a bystander, Turkey tried to become involved in
Parliament. These decisions served as Mosul, Urfa and Aleppo and Gaziantep and Kirkuk. complicated world affairs and take part in the relevant
both the legitimacy base and the framework of the War Interstate ties were further reinforced by moves to initi- processes. In other words, it apparently dropped the
of Independence and of the foreign policy decisions in ate relations between communities. A policy of rap- classical approach of the Turkish foreign policy establish-
the following republican era. (Editor)]. prochement with Armenia was introduced to remove ment during the Cold War era, which used to determine
Opportunities for cooperation in near abroad the artificial barriers between Turkey and Armenia. its position depending on the attitudes of the major
As a matter of fact, the AK Party administration The government also took action to create consulta- powers. Turkish foreign policy makers replaced the
based its policies on these grounds. The government's tion mechanisms between countries neighboring diplomatic approach focusing on the emergence of crisis
policy, focusing on making sure that no problems with Turkey to minimize the risk of any potential conflict in with a vision stating that it is possible to act together
neighboring countries exist, also known as the "zero the region. The summits of countries neighboring Iraq without competing against each other.
problems with neighbors policy," broadened Turkey's held under the auspices of the Turkish foreign policy The intention to prevent a crisis even before its
establishment prevented the partition of Iraq, which breakout inevitably led to the development of a
inclusive of five seas (the Caspian, Black Sea, was invaded by the US in 2003. Turkey also served as dynamic and "rhythmic" foreign policy. Utmost atten-
Mediterranean, Red Sea and Persian Gulf) and five a mediator to settle disputes between Israel and Syria tion was paid to make sure that the diplomatic initia-
rivers (the Amu, Danube, Nile, Euphrates and Tigris), and acted responsibly to help Lebanon attain political tives extended to the near and far abroad were syn-
has transformed into intergovernmental strategic coop- stability and prevent another civil war in the country. chronized and designed in a way that they would not
eration meetings. Crucial decisions were made and key Turkish diplomats further pursued a fairly active overlap each other. Turkey's sincere attempts have led
terms were agreed upon in the joint ministerial meet- diplomatic style during the war between Russia and to the impression around the world that Turkey has
ings held between Turkish and Syrian as well as Georgia in 2008 to ensure that this local conflict did something to say whenever an important development
Turkish and Iraqi delegations to ensure economic sta- not transform into regional warfare. In an attempt to takes place in the Middle East, the Caucasus, the
bility and further development in the region. prevent another war in the Balkans, a tripartite mech- Balkans, Central Asia and Europe.
For instance, the construction of highways and rail- anism was established with the participation of Bosnia Country creating order in its region
ways was accelerated to remove the issue of geographic and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia. Turkey is now cited as a country creating order in its

106 107
DOSSIER SPRING 2010

region thanks to its rapprochement with the near Russia simultaneously. nent members at the UN Security Council -- the US, that ruled in Eurasia. When trying to show that it can
abroad, the policy by which it settles its disputes with New diplomatic style China, Russia, Britain and France -- and it also secured make economic, political and cultural contributions to
neighboring countries and maintains cooperation with Another of Turkey's surprising moves which was in membership in the G-20, which acts together with the the future shape of the world, Turkey relies on con-
its historic rivals. Inspired by the experience of contradiction with its classic foreign policy style has G-8. Recently, new responsibilities were added to the structive language and proves through its own policies
Germany and France, which, despite their historic rival- been its ability to create common spheres of interest already existing ones created by Turkey's membership that global and regional actors could settle their dis-
ry, worked together to lay the foundations of the with countries that were once considered to be inher- in NATO and the Council of Europe. putes and resolve their problems by creating joint
European Union, Turkey preached the idea that the ent threats to its security and territorial integrity. The It started negotiations for full membership with the spheres of cooperation. The new Turkish foreign policy
countries in its region could do the same. It also pro- improved relations with Syria, which provided safe EU and was elected as a non-permanent member of style attracts attention because of its efforts to achieve
moted the idea that cooperation with countries that havens for PKK militants in the past, and Russia, a his- the UN Security Council. During this administration, a intercultural and interfaith dialogue and dismisses the
were formerly enemies, such as Russia and Greece, was toric rival, were maintained without disconnecting from Turkish scholar, Ekmeleddin Ýhsanoðlu, was elected notorious "Clash of Civilizations" thesis advanced by
possible, cooperation which would resemble the friend- the US and European countries. By pursuing multidi- secretary-general of the Organization of the Islamic American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington in
ly relations with Syria, Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan and mensional diplomacy instead of the one-dimensional Conference (OIC). To fight Islamophobia, which has 1993. It also argues, without categorically opposing
Georgia. foreign policy style applied in the Cold War era, Turkey become a serious problem globally following the Sept. European civilization, which has historically monopo-
The question to be asked at this point is that where contributed to the enhancement of ties between the 11 attacks, Turkey and Spain jointly proposed the lized definitions of civilization, that every culture is enti-
does Turkey's confidence come from? East and the West as well as the North and the South. Alliance of Civilizations initiative. tled to contribute to the universal culture.
It would be correct to seek the answer to this ques- Turkey, which became involved in a number of regional Turkey also has observer status other intergovern- A vision of civilization
tion in the stylistic moves of Turkey's diplomacy. and global disputes including the ethnic and sectarian mental organizations, including the Organization of Most importantly, Turkey has repeatedly made it clear
Turkey did not follow the trend of the rest of the world conflicts in Iraq and the rows within NATO, offered a American States (OAS) and the African Union (AU). that a new world order is not possible if coercive meas-
in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks, when security- new diplomatic style for the relevant parties to alleviate To improve relations with the ures are employed. It suggests
As part of its newly
the tension. As the new style -- Arab League and institutional- that at a time when communica- assumed role as an
which could be summarized as ize these relations, an agree- tion is growing, the real founda- order-creating country
Another of Turkey's surprising moves which was in locating the problems, taking care in ment was signed to create a tion of power shouldn't be war- Turkey hosted and
contradiction with its classic foreign policy style has settling disputes, the establishment Turkish-Arab Cooperation fare, it should be convincing facilitated several
meeting between con-
been its ability to create common spheres of interest of dialogue with the relevant parties, Forum in 2007. The strategic people; by creating a triangle of flicting countries
freedom, security and welfare,
with countries that were once considered to be inher- the avoidance of thorny issues dur- dialogue mechanism estab- in and around the
Middle East. Turkish
ing negotiations and an emphasis on lished with the Gulf many problems can be solved.
ent threats to its security and territorial integrity the mutually agreed issues -- Cooperation Council (GCC) Turkish foreign policy makers
President Gül brought
Israeli President
became successful, Turkey's status in was institutionalized one year argue that the world needs a Shimon Peres and
oriented policies became more popular. It did not intro- the international arena was raised further. Interestingly, later. Policies were devised to new order but that the people Palestinian President
Turkey's higher profile in its region and in the world also need an international system that considers the Mahmoud Abbas
duce tighter security measures, restricting the enjoy- ensure rapprochement with distant lands including the
together in Ankara on
ment of fundamental freedoms, despite the fact it has led to another global political development. It created Indian subcontinent, the Pacific region, Africa and Latin needs and demands of human beings. If a new order is Nov. 13, 2007
been at war with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) fertile ground for nations and states that have suffered America and to seek out additional business and to be created, it should embrace all peoples, races, PHOTO: ALÝ ÜNAL

terrorist organization since 1984; quite the contrary, it the imperial and colonial ambitions of great powers,
introduced shining and bold reforms expanding the
sphere of liberties and human rights. This courageous
attitude was rewarded in 2004 when the EU started
membership negotiations with Turkey.
Moves by Germany and France, reluctant to see
Turkey become a member of the EU but also worried
that Ankara could part ways with Brussels, to slow
down the negotiation process were successfully aborted
by the strategy of zero problems with neighbors. In so
doing, Turkey has proven that the argument suggesting
that the EU will share borders with an unstable region
is unsubstantiated. Turkish foreign policy makers
signed strategic partnership agreements with Russia in
response to those who offer a privileged partnership
with the EU system. Turkey showed that it is possible
to pursue balanced relations with the US, the EU and
experienced a crisis of identity, had problems express-
ing themselves with regard to European countries and
been uneasy with being on the periphery of the inter-
national system to act more confidently. The mental
transformation in Anatolia changed the language of
politics and Turkey's reliance on constructive diplomat-
ic moves and the dismissal of the Cold War mentality
influenced the policies pursued by global and regional
actors.
Global vision
Relations with great powers constitute the other
dimension of the Turkey-centered vision. At a time
when the international system is being recreated and
rebuilt, Turkey has proven that it is willing to contribute
to the future shape of this system and the entire world.
It paid attention to the relations between the perma-
investment opportunities.
Embracive style
In conclusion, over the last eight years, Turkey has
actively contributed to the international system, which
has been going through a great transformation since
1989. In this process, Turkey relies on using original
diplomatic language instead of using the terms of oth-
ers. It abandons the Cold War strategies, based on the
classical enemy concept, and puts an emphasis on the
argument that global problems may be settled through
reliance on policies focusing on dialogue and concilia-
tion. When arguing that this Turkey-centered vision
could contribute to the concept of globalization, Turkey
makes reference to its historical experience. It frequent-
ly recalls that Turkey was one of the eight multinational
empires of history (Great Britain, Russia, Austria-
Hungary, France, Germany, China, Japan and Turkey)
nations, communities, cultures and civilizations. It fur-
ther notes that all civilizations have cognizance and
self-awareness and it is impossible to destroy them.
Turkey argues that the Atlantic-centered internation-
al system created after World War II is not just or fair
and that the new order must be pluralistic and partici-
patory. It further asserts that an order dismissing diver-
sity, failing to internalize different cultures and values
and unable to create a synthesis out of regional zones
of civilization and maintain ties with other peoples,
nations and civilizations will not last long.
READ ALSO:
Ahmet Davutoðlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin
Uluslararasý Konumu, Küre Yayýnlarý, Ýstanbul: 2001.
Ahmet Davutoðlu, "Medeniyetlerin Ben-idraki," Divan
Dergisi, 1997/1, p.11.

108 109
CINEMA SPRING 2010
Gang movies or the
illegal protagonists
W
of the screen
hat has been happening since the start of the
Ergenekon investigation has already been covered
in a number of movies. The venture of illegality
does not recognize any cultural or geographic limits
and boundaries. And most of the time, cinema
serves as a brilliant mirror thanks to which we can
understand what is really happening.
"Now the whole world stands on the brink, staring down
into bloody Hell,
all those liberals and intellectuals and smooth-talkers...
and all of a sudden nobody can think of anything to say."
Watchmen (2009)
M. NEDÝM HAZAR
Historians refer to the Lumiere Brothers as the first
moviemakers. This is only partially true. True, the
Lumiere Brothers, inspired by a Kinetoscope they
saw in an exhibition in Paris, shot films; they even
invented the first successful projector. However,
Edwin S. Porter from the US was the first
moviemaker who used different scales and camera
angles as fundamental elements of the language of
moviemaking and tailored these elements together in
different rhythms and forms depending on how the
story was evolving. Porter, particularly in "The Great
Train Robbery" (1903), relied on close-ups and brief
shots in dynamic and tense scenes and innovative
techniques by which he laid the foundations of real-
ism in moviemaking. The focus of this first cinematic
movie was its narration of a gang robbing a train.
Viewers experienced the fascinating combination of
the world of gangs and visual art for the first time in
this movie.
Aware of the fact that movies narrating the story of
110
crimes or criminal enterprises attract a great deal of
attention from viewers, moviemakers and producers
have favored productions of this genre, even during
the early years of cinema. For instance, 40 movies
about gangs and crimes were screened in 1910. The
total number of productions in this genre in the his-
tory of world cinema is stunning: 87,000.
A new culture that became dominant in the US
with the arrival of a new wave of migration after the
end of World War I created new forms of crime.
Because crime changed in form, the notion of "gang"
was also influenced by this change. Cinema, viewed
as a reflection of real life on the screen, internalized
this change in a very short time.
The first gangster films The "gangster movie" trend remained influential genre, "Underworld" by Josef von Sternberg is not The movie ‘Shooter’
Gangster films, the first of which was produced in up until the 1940s; "film noir" gained prominence in considered influential or determinative as a gangster is the story of a trig-
1930, reached their peak in 1972 when the seminal 1942, drawing on the troubles of the Great movie because it was produced in the silent era. For german who thought
it was legitimate to
film "The Godfather," referred to as the first epic Depression. The "neo-noir" genre was invented in this reason, "The Public Enemy" and "Little Caesar,"
kill the president for
gangster movie, was screened. the post-Vietnam era to merge the epic gangster and where James Cagney and Edward G. Robinson, the interests of the
In the history of American moviemaking, the issue film noir genres. renowned stars of gangster movies, played the lead fatherland.
of crime becomes particularly popular in times when Of course, the fact that they narrate realistic stories roles, respectively, are remembered as the first
the country suffers from political or economic crises does not necessarily mean that gangster movies notable examples of the genre. Cagney's scary and
or turmoil. The reason is plain and simple: Every depict the real stories of gangsters. Quite the con- mysterious persona despite his "baby face" had a
country considers itself responsible for upheavals in trary, some examples of this genre produced in the significant impact on the history of the genre.
those times and exerts efforts to set things right. mid-1930s present semi-fabricated stories inspired The simultaneous appearance of Cagney with this
Moviemaking is the simplest way to do this because by the criminal enterprises of the time. persona and Peter Lorre in Fritz Lang's "M," among
cinema is the most popular visual art. Even though it is known as the first example of the the first examples of film noir in the history of cine-
111
CINEMA SPRING 2010
ma, was a coincidence. But it is also a horrible fact
because Lorre, who played a criminal in "M," and
Cagney displayed similar characteristics, and it was
hard to believe that Lorre's character was a murder-
er. This is in fact something that tells us the mysteri-
ous interpretations of the film noir and gangster gen-
res.
In the late 1930s, some other examples of the
genre inspired by Cagney were produced, including
"Angels with Dirty Faces" and "The Roaring
Twenties." The former also falls in the sub-genre of
"gang movie," which would emerge later. "Angels
with Dirty Faces" narrates the story of a protagonist
who has a tendency to commit crime and is also pre-
occupied with a gang of no-good kids who, of
course, idolize him. In this period, movies were pro-
duced suggesting that American society should be
purged of dangerous criminals.
'The Godfather' and the gangster
movie's return to the top
Gangster movies, supplanted by film noir with the
arrival of "The Maltese Falcon" (1942), continued to
be made in the subsequent decades, as evidenced by
"Dillinger" (1945). However, the actual revival of this
genre came only after the introduction of the New
Hollywood tradition, also referred to as the American
New Wave, in 1967, as first evidenced by "The
Godfather," produced in 1972.
The movie, directed by Francis Ford Coppola, took
the gangster movie genre back to the top and
brought it into the modern era. The revival of the
genre as a consequence of the end of the film noir
era helped "The Godfather" became a masterpiece.
The most striking aspect of the movie was its ability
to promote its antihero and make us connect with
him through a cathartic tie. Its ability to transfer the
genre into a colorful era should also be noted.
While production of sequels to the movie con-
tributed to Coppola's personal fortune, it also facili-
tated the emergence of other examples of the genre,
including "Once Upon a Time in America,"
"Goodfellas" and "Casino." However, this tendency
also led to the emergence of sub-genres of gangster
films, including the "hood film," the gangster movie
in black cinema; the "triad film," the Hong Kong
version of the genre; the "gang film"; and "noir com-
edy," which combines comedy and gangster films.
"Boyz n the Hood," the first film by John Singleton,
may be cited as an example of the first, "A Better
112
Tomorrow" and "Hard Boiled" by John Woo of the
second, "The Outsiders" and "The Warriors" of the
third and "Miller's Crossing" of the last.
Fantastic gangster movies
A greater breakthrough came when a comic was
adapted to the screen in "The Dark Knight," thus
introducing a fantastic dimension to the gangster
film genre. The Joker and his gang, major compo-
nents of the Batman movies that we are familiar
with, are accentuated in the film as the primary
protagonists. This inevitably converts the Batman-
centered skeleton into a Joker-centered one.
Additionally, like Don Corleone in "The
Godfather," the movie secured huge financial suc-
cess with advertisements relying on the captivating
image of the Joker. We should also remember that
Heath Ledger (the Joker), who was treated like the
star of the movie, won an Oscar. So, the gangster
movie evolved into a hybrid form: the "fantastic
gangster movie." We may take this as an extension
of the logic that seeks to make cartoon adaptations
and fantastic productions more realistic. However,
the character of the Joker, who appeared as an
exaggerated protagonist, seems to satisfy the
mature viewers of the gangster genre. This actually
points to the future direction of the genre because
it has become the primary raw material of studios,
becoming a genre on its own and not just one of
the aforementioned sub-genres. It is only a matter
of time now before new movies are produced
under its influence. The difference between
Cagney's Public Enemy, Marlon Brando's
Godfather and Ledger's Joker will definitely deter-
mine the direction of this transformation.
Turkish gang movies: detached from reality
The course of Yeþilçam, the Turkish movie indus-
try, is no different from Hollywood. The gang stories
narrated by Yeþilçam have always attracted a great
deal of attention from viewers and have made their
producers rich and popular. However, unlike the
products of the movie sectors in other countries,
Yeþilçam movies were detached from the reality. Let
us take a brief look at this: Refik Halid Karay's novel
1939 "Çete" (Gang) was turned into a movie by
Çetin Karamanbey in 1950. The movie, in which
Neriman Köksal, Ýhsan Evrim and Orhon M.
Arýburnu, the famous artists of the time, played the
leading roles, narrated the heroic story of Kýran, who
defeated enemy forces in Ýstanbul.
Even though it seems to be a kid's movie,
"Yumurcak," produced in 1961, features the story of
the daughter of a gang leader who disguises herself
as a man. The genre was so influential that gang
movies were produced even in the early 1970s, when
erotic movies were popular and regular movies failed
to attract the attention of the viewers. In this period,
the genre became an amalgam of gangster films and
soft erotic features. The movie "Hem Döðüþ, Hem
Seviþ" (Fight and Make Love) directed by Yücel
Uçanoðlu, was a soft erotic gangster movie narrating
the story of a police officer who was dealing with a
gang blackmailing wealthy women using their naked
photos. The movie propelled Behçet Nacar, who
113
played the police officer, to stardom. Among a rather The movie
lengthy list, movies such as "Krallarýn Öfkesi" (The ‘Swordfish’ is about
the relationship
Rage of the Kings), "Sürgünden Geliyorum" (I Am
between terrorist
Returning from Exile), "Skandal" (Scandal), "Eþkýya" activities and securi-
(Bandits), "Karýþýk Pizza" (Mixed Pizza) and ty council meetings.
"Fasulye" (Bean) could be considered leading exam- Every time the coun-
cil has a meeting
ples of the genre. One interesting detail is that
terrorist activities
Yýlmaz Güney, known as the forefather of the "revo- increase, and this
lutionary movie" genre, has directed and written a lays the foundation
number of gang movies. Güney, also known as the for the decisions of
the council. The
ugly king of Turkish movies, starred in the movie civilian members of
"Ýkisi de Cesurdu" (Both Were Brave) produced in the council have no
1963, which narrated the story of a gang leader in other chance but to
exile; his 1969 film "Bir Çirkin Adam" (An Ugly Man) follow the "orders"
of the military men
narrated the story of a hired assassin. In "Aç Kurtlar"
(Hungry Wolves), produced in the same year, Güney
played a bandit who eliminated a gang. The gang
movies Güney starred in also include "Yarýn Son
Gündür" (Tomorrow Is the Last Day), "Bana Kurþun
Ýþlemez" (I Am Bulletproof), "Benim Adým Kerim"
(My Name Is Kerim) and "Kovboy Ali" (Cowboy
Ali).
On the other hand, we see similarities in the fil-
mography of Cüneyt Arkýn, who became a star in the
same period of time. Arkýn, who played the lead role
in "urban gang" stories, has become an influential
artist thanks to his work as an honorable figure fight-
ing against gangs and corrupt cops as well as all sorts
of illegal activities.
Sadly, Turkish cinema was unable to achieve real-
ism in narrating stories of gangs and crimes for sev-
 CINEMA SPRING 2010
DOSSIER IN BRIEF: This dossier tells the story of gang films and protagonists of the screen, both in Western and
Turkish cinema. The author claims that the illegality of the underground world does not recognize any cultural or geographic lim-
its and boundaries. Cinema serves as a mirror of what is happening in the real world. The recent history of Turkish TV broadcast-
ing includes several TV series showcasing the underground world, the most popular of which is "Valley of the Wolves."

Valley of Wolves eral reasons; above all, there was a huge
and the hero of disparity between the imagination and
the series: Polat
Alemdar. The lifestyle of the producers and the
series deals with scriptwriters of the time and the realities
almost all contro-
versial issues in
of the country. Moviemakers were living
Turkish politics in an isolated and idealized environment
from the Kurdish called Yeþilçam, where the realities of
issue to Israeli
conspiracies. their imagined worlds did not come close
to their own realities. The number of
scriptwriters able to make a connection
with reality was quite small. Secondly,
the star system of the time did not allow the depic-
tion of such a reality in the movies. Viewers simply
would not tolerate seeing their heroes beaten up in a
movie.
However, European and American moviemakers
were still producing new examples of the "deep
state," "paradigmatic clandestine enterprise" and
"counter-guerrilla" genres. Unlike Yeþilçam produc-
tions, these were a real reflection of life.
'Any resemblance to real people
and events is purely intentional'
There is a cliché disclaimer that we encounter in
the epilogues of serials and novels, saying, "The fol-
lowing story is fictional and does not
depict any actual person or event." This is
a method employed by producers who do
not want to face legal problems; however,
a fairly different path is followed by some
others. For instance, "Z," based on a 1967
novel by Greek writer Vassilis Vassilikos
and adapted for the screen by Greek émi-
gré director Constantinos "Costa" Gavras,
calls for attention with a striking opening:
"Any resemblance to real events, to per-
sons living or dead, is not accidental. It is DELIBER-
ATE." The movie narrates the story of events sur-
rounding the murder of Gregoris Lambrakis, a leftist
parliamentarian, in Greece in 1963, even though it
makes no reference to a country. The movie casts
light on the corrupt actions of the military adminis-
tration that ruled the country during the period
between 1967 and 1974; however, similarities
between what happened in Greece and the develop-
ments in some other countries were more than visi-
ble. And it was pretty easy to draw such similarities
with the practices of the military regime in Turkey.
More interestingly, it seems that the movie, pro-
duced 50 years ago, narrates the story of contempo- Do these suckers remind you of anything?
rary Turkey: a pro-junta organization, its civilian We saw in "Swordfish," one of the most striking
extensions and corrupt relations between the media, movies of 2001, how a counterterrorist artificially cre-
bureaucracy and the judiciary. ated an environment of fear to ensure that the
What has been happening since the start of the American government set aside more funds for com-
Ergenekon investigation has already been covered in bating terror. We also saw in "The Siege" in 1998
a number of movies, including "Z." Through these that Maj. Gen. William Devereaux (Bruce Willis)
films, it is possible to understand some aspects of the insisted that under the War Powers Resolution, the
structure of the organization, the attitude of the authority vested in him by the president superseded
media and the attempts of some lawyers to distort that of courts. Surely, Gen. Devereaux regarded him-
the facts as well as political efforts to circumvent self as some sort of a hero like the Turkish junta
efforts to resolve the problem. Let us take a look at members of the Ergenekon terror organization.
some examples that may serve as a guide for reading "The Bourne Identity," a trilogy, narrates the sto-
Ergenekon properly. ries of hit men who die and kill in the name of the
Reading Ergenekon homeland and their contribution to global terror. The
through the lens of cinema movie depicts the patriotism of these people who kill
Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL) was a their pals in cold blood for the sake of the country
counterterrorist organization that was in Spain and narrates the story of a plan called Operation
between 1983 and 1987. The teams assigned by the Treadstone that is somewhat similar to the Cage
Spanish government to fight the ETA were referred Operation Action Plan plotted in Turkey. The final
to by this title. GAL, which was episode of the series, "The Bourne
quite active during the rule of the Ultimatum," was particularly
UNDOUBTEDLY, THE
Socialist Workers Party, has inter- important because of its ability to
esting similarities to the Ergenekon MOST IMPORTANT EVENT depict the story of an organization
organization; the political events in IN TURKEY'S NEAR PAST that is more professional than
Spain and Turkey back then are also IS THE SUSURLUK ACCI- Ergenekon.
similar. During the period when DENT. IN ITS AFTERMATH, Is it possible to forget "Arlington
GAL was active, journalists support-
STATE-MAFIA RELATIONS Road" (1999) by Mark Pellington?
ing and promoting further democra- The movie, which attracted a great
tization were threatened, killed or
WERE SANCTIFIED BY deal of attention because of a
jailed. Director Miguel Courtois POLITICAL PARTIES AS superb performance by Tim
made a movie depicting the activi- WELL AS TV SERIES Robbins as a cold-blooded terror-
ties of this organization in 2006. The ist, made some stunning com-
movie narrated a story revealing a number of facts ments on the relationship between the deep state
about political assassinations, buried weapons, mili- and terror.
tary officers hiding the truth and lawyers serving as We learned in "Excellent Cadavers," in which
members of the organization. renowned actor Chazz Palminteri played Sicilian
We were amazed by "Nikita" (1990), narrating the prosecutor Giovanni Falcone that a brave man could
story of a drug addict who was converted into a be a source of discomfort for not only an illegal
counterterrorist assassin. The French film was so suc- organizations but also for some core actors of the
cessful that it was remade in the US under the title justice system. We saw what could happen to honest
"Point of No Return." "The Long Kiss Goodnight," prosecutors in this movie, based on a true story,
by Renny Harlin, also narrated the story of a former which offered some insight into the barriers and
hit woman who was used in political assassinations. obstacles before the prosecutors investigating the
In "Shooter" (2007), an assassin used in a plot Ergenekon case.
against the president organized by generals says: Of course, it is perfectly possible to extend the list;
"I'm still enough of a sucker, you press that patriot the content could even amount to a book-length vol-
button, I'll sit up in my chair and say, 'Which way ume. Obviously, the venture of illegality does not
you want me to go, boss?'" recognize any cultural or geographic limits or bound-

114 115
CINEMA SPRING 2010

aries. There are sick individuals and entities who "Yýlan Hikayesi" (Snake Story), "Tatlý Kaçýklar"
view themselves as the true masters of their coun- (Sweet Nuts), "Ana" (Mother) and "Alacakaranlýk"
tries, claiming legitimacy in sponsoring illegal activi- (Twilight).
ties all over the world. And most of the time, cinema Influenced by these productions, many have decid-
serves as a brilliant mirror through which we can ed to form their own mafia enterprises; the mafia has
understand what is really happening. now become a picture depicting the situation Turkey
And the TV series… is experiencing, and there are many people deter-
With the return of the multiparty system in the mined to take part in this picture. Slaughtering a
aftermath of a three-year military administration man like Polat Alemdar, the main character in
instituted by the perpetrators of the military coup in "Kurtlar Vadisi," and shooting a gun like "Deli
1980, Turgut Özal asked the Turkish people to use Yürek" protagonist Yusuf Miroðlu as well as down-
their assets and wealth for the sake of economic loading the tunes of these productions is now part of
revival. Turkey moved to a free market economy and the daily lives of millions.
was eager to integrate with the world. Back then, the In the 1990s, nationalist mafiosos became popular; a
judicial mechanism did not operate very smoothly, number of people appeared in newspapers and on
and there were also a number of corporations on the TV shows publicly acknowledging that they were
brink of collapse and bankruptcy. Because of legal running mafia organizations. Alaattin Çakýcý was the
loopholes as well as unenforceable first known nationalist mob boss in
laws, the amount of debt that had 411 MURDERS, 137 Turkey; in the late 1990s, an inter-
gone uncollected reached a peak, esting conflict erupted between con-
ATTACKS, 175 FIGHTS,
and the mafia took the stage to ventional mobsters and nationalist
deliver justice. Mobs and gangs
110 TORTURES, THREE mafia leaders. broadcast on Turkish TV stations. The series was brother and Miroðlu even more complicated. There is The movie ‘Eagle
became a part of daily life and RAPES, 191 HARRASS- After the capture of Abdullah directed by Osman Sýnav; the first episode was one big problem: Miroðlu wants to play by his own Eye’ movie shows
screened in 1998. Sýnav's production was subse- rules, the first of which states that he does not take us what happens
replaced the legitimate judicial MENTS, 111 ARMED CON- Öcalan and the Nationalist when the deep state
Movement Party's (MHP) accession quently followed by other similar examples including any orders. The new guy in the series does not come
mechanism. FLICT, 174 THREATS loses control of a
In the 1990s, clandestine enter- to power, the nationalist mafia "Kurtlar Vadisi" and "Acý Hayat" (Painful Life). out of nowhere: He comes from the battlefield,
AND 149 INDIRECT "Deli Yürek" starts with the return of a sniper to where he was Miroðlu's commander. He was the
technology pro-
prises emerged to fill the void in abandoned its illegal activities. duced solely for it.
illegal sectors such as check fraud,
THREATS WERE FEA- In the 2000s, mafia leaders who Ýstanbul, his hometown, after the completion of his one who taught Miroðlu how to get out of handcuffs
rigging state tenders, stealing, the TURED IN THE VALLEY were sometimes presented as heroes military service; the newly discharged soldier kills a by breaking his thumb and how to kill a guerilla. His
black market, school gangs, auto OF THE WOLVES and sometimes as responsible for all few people the moment he gets off the bus. This is a name is Bozo. He lives in the mountains. His job is
theft, prostitution, human traffick- illegal activities lost their ground and scene consistent with the trope of the tough guy's fighting. For this reason, he is really mad about what
ing, labor smuggling, money laundering and many became less popular. The domination and reign of entrance into town. The character Kara Hamit is is happening in urban places, and he views the big
others; each mob organization was working like a the nationalist mafia, which started with the 1980 depicted as a famous mobster in "Deli Yürek," but he brother and Turgay Atacan as useless people who
separate business enterprise at the time. Reference to military coup, was over because of Abdullah Çatlý's has strong ties with the state as well. He is the man think they are doing something influential. His name
the notions of mafia and mobster was commonplace death, Çakýcý's detention and Mehmet Aðar's deci- of the big brother, carefully and meticulously raised is Bozo; for the first time, a Kurdish name is pro-
in the mid-1960s and 1970s; the functions and char- sion to get involved in politics. and trained. For some, the big brother in the series nounced on Turkish TV. The adventures of the lead-
acteristics of mafia groups emerging in the 1980s The creative mind, however, acted quickly to redi- represents Aðar, and for some, it's Ýbrahim Þahin. ing figures of the series later include episodes focus-
were definitively revealed with the Susurluk accident. rect attention to the appealing and tempting stories Some argue that it is merely fiction. Kara Hamit, that ing on opposition to Israel, and the series ended with
The mobster no longer meant a tougher hood, and it of the mafia by relying on other means. To this end, famous mobster, is killed; this murder, within the a sentence uttered by Atilla Ýlhan: The last Turkish
was no longer possible to do business in mafia-con- TV satisfied the people's thirst for mafias and mob- overall format of the series, means that the mobster dreamer was Mustafa Kemal.
trolled sectors without having close ties with illegal sters. On the one hand, tough guy figures who used was no longer found useful by the big brother. (The "Acý Hayat" is an important movie about a worker,
entities within the state. The Susurluk case was like to appear in old Turkish movies were used; on the same story is depicted in "Kurtlar Vadisi" -- replace- produced by Metin Erksan in 1963. The movie was
viewing a movie at home, witnessing how the state other hand, TV attracted the people's attention by ment of a mobster by a figure welcomed and spon- turned into a series about the mafia in the hands of
had turned into a mafia and how this mafia was making reference to the relations between the state sored by the state.) After his death, men loyal to Kara Sýnav. This time nationalism transcends the Turkish
positioned within the state. Television in the mid- and the mafia. After all, these were good guys who Hamit move to the side of the soldier, Miroðlu. and Russian borders and reaches Kosovo; the leading
2000s featured the life stories of those who died in were doing nice jobs for the state; that was the gen- The big brother likes Miroðlu because of his ability figure of the series bears the name Kosovalý
the Susurluk accident; the mafia became part of our eral perception. and character, and he wishes to work with him. The (Kosovar). The series starts with a gun and blood
daily life because of TV series including "Deli Yürek" The Osman Sýnav factor in Turkish mafia TV series big brother's daughter falls in love with Miroðlu, and dripping onto a white rose.
(Mad Heart), "Kurtlar Vadisi" (Valley of the Wolves), "Deli Yürek" is the first mafia series that was this makes the whole set of relations between the big The leading character in Erksan's "Acý Hayat" is a

116 117
CINEMA SPRING 2010

laborer at a shipyard. His name is Mehmet, and he Terör" was canceled because of the military's objec-
falls in love with a manicurist. A rich man gets tions. The series was launched again under a differ-
involved in the story of the shipyard laborer and the ent title by the Doðan Group after some "minor"
manicurist; the rich man starts a love affair with the modifications. It is argued that the content of the
girl. "Acý Hayat," still remembered by the older gen- series was dramatically changed by these modifica-
eration in Turkey, was remade by Sýnav in 2006, this tions and that domestic clandestine organizations
time as a TV series. Kenan Ýmirzalýoðlu played the were replaced by fictional international enemies in
lead role in the series. the series.
'The Valley of the Wolves' A number of rumors and conspiracy theories were
"Kurtlar Vadisi," a product of Sýnav's intelligence generated with regard to the series. At the same
and creativity, replaced "Deli Yürek" and captivated time, however, some real developments also took
all of Turkey. A number of renowned dramatic place. The National Intelligence Organization (MÝT)
actors, including Ýstemi Betil as well as rising stars drafted a report on "Kurtlar Vadisi"; some parts of
Necati Þaþmaz and Özgü Namal, took part in the the report were reprinted in newspapers. The report
project. The series attracted a great deal of public argues that Raci Þaþmaz, the scriptwriter, and Sýnav,
attention, becoming the most popular show on TV. the director, received the information they used in
Sýnav left the project after episode the series from a top official at a
55; however, Show TV continued IN THE HISTORY OF gendarmerie intelligence unit. The
to broadcast the series. In 2006, same report also underlined that
AMERICAN MOVIEMAK- Sýnav is a nationalist affiliated with
the Doðan Group purchased all
broadcast rights to the series, ING, THE ISSUE OF CRIME the youth branches of a nationalist
despite the fact that it was the BECOMES PARTICULARLY party and has close ties with Aðar.
show's greatest critic when the POPULAR IN TIMES WHEN The report further argues that con-
broadcast rights were held by THE COUNTRY SUFFERS victed killer Nuri Ergin dictated the
Show TV. The group spent TL characters appearing in the pro-
FROM POLITICAL OR
475,000 per episode for rights to duction, that the series actually
the series, the greatest amount
ECONOMIC CRISES OR narrated the story of convicted
ever offered for such a transfer. TURMOIL mob boss Çakýcý and that
The series, which used to start Abdülkadir Þaþmaz, a renowned
with the announcement, "This is a mafia series," figure of the Kadiri Order, played an influential role
changed this slogan after its move to Kanal D; the in its making. Soner Yalçýn, who served as adviser to
new channel preferred a quotation from a novel by the production, and director Sýnav described the alle-
Kemal Tahir: "It is the law to eat up those who are gations as baseless, while scriptwriters Bahadýr
no longer considered wolves." Özener and Raci Þaþmaz did not make any comment asked to view this as normal. The series is presented up to expectations, is now likely to be remembered “GAL” is about the
internal structure of
The series, which lasted for 97 episodes, ended or statement. as a party program equipped with some nationalist as a polynomial riddle because of its unresolved mys-
a prototype of the
with a finale guest-starring Sharon Stone and Andy Normalization of the mafia and state-mafia relations elements and sentiments. The mafia used the word teries. "Saðýr Oda" was a crime drama produced by a Turkish Ergenekon
Garcia. However, the series continued with the spin- Undoubtedly, the most important event in homeland 128 times, nation 142 times, the national controversial figure, a former Maoist who served as (upper right). “The
offs "Kurtlar Vadisi Terör" (Valley of the Wolves Turkey's recent past is the Susurluk accident. In its flag 240 times, sacrifice 144 times, country 164 times, journalist affiliated with ultranationalist circles in the Bourne Identity” is
about a spy educat-
Terror) and "Kurtlar Vadisi Pusu" (Valley of the aftermath, state-mafia relations were glorified by honor 123 times, army 255 times, map 313 times, past and was so intimate with the state that it sent
ed as a counter-
Wolves Ambush); only one episode of the former political parties as well as TV series. This glorification religion 299 times, them (Jews, Americans, Russians the ID card of JÝTEM founder Cem Ersever to his guerilla who found
was shown on TV. The movie "Kurtlar Vadisi Irak" was particularly promoted and supported by violence and Kurds) 513 times and crescent 117 times in the address. "Saðýr Oda" picked an interesting theme, himself amidst dirty
and nationalism. The mafia has been exonerated by first 55 episodes of the series. saying: "During World War II, Adolf Hitler seized the affairs of the state
(Valley of the Wolves Iraq) was produced while the
(upper left). “The
series was on break. Despite the fact that the movie "Kurtlar Vadisi." While the mafia is supposed to be These figures are even more interesting: 411 mur- gold of the Jews and converted it into gold bullion. Traitor” is about
was clearly offensive to Americans, public figures something that the state must deal with, the series ders, 137 attacks, 175 fights, 110 incidents of torture, Aware that they would lose the war, the Nazis hand- forcing people to
such as Emine Erdoðan, the prime minister's wife, polished a mafia character deliberately raised and three rapes, 191 incidents of harassment, 111 armed ed the bullion to people they trusted. One of these become traitors
sponsored by the state throughout the first 55 conflicts, three bombings, four kidnappings, 174 people was a Turk." The series was perceived as an (right)
and the late Muhsin Yazýcýoðlu, a nationalist party
leader, went to see the movie, hinting at their sup- episodes. Polat, as presented in the series, has acted threats and 149 indirect threats were featured in the imitation of "Kurtlar Vadisi." Even though the pro-
port for its message. to protect the state's interests by relying on a mafia first 55 episodes of "Kurtlar Vadisi." ducers hired the director of "Kurtlar Vadisi," the
According to some urban legends, "Kurtlar Vadisi discourse and method, and the viewers are implicitly "Saðýr Oda" (The Deaf Room), which failed to live series did not receive much attention.

118 119
CARTOONS SPRING 2010

Cartoon
Review
Dominant elements in this autumn's
Turkish cartoons were the Sledgehammer
plot , the Supreme Board of Judges and
Prosecutors, the Constitution and the
low-chair treatment the Turkish ambas-
sador to Tel Aviv received from the Israeli

A
deputy foreign minister
A majority of Turkish cartoonists have stylized the
internal contradictions of the Turkish high judiciary,
the intimate relations between the pro-junta ele-
ments within the military and the high judiciary,
the threat the Sledgehammer plan poses to the
judiciary, the constitutional amendment pack-
age, the judicial and military pressure on the
media and, of course, the closed-door policy of the continental EU
states for Turkey's membership.
While Osman Turhan of the Zaman daily depicted the high
judiciary as sitting on an army combat boot (1), Ercan Akyol of
the Milliyet daily had an opposing view of the relation between
the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government, the
high judiciary and the proposed constitutional amendments.
Akyol depicted the proposed amendments as a US-tailored AKP
constitution used to destroy the castle of the high judiciary (2).
Salih Memecan of the Sabah daily, on the other hand, had a
ILLUSTATION: DAGISTAN ÇETÝNKAYA

quite positive and anti-military view of the constitutional amend-

ment package. His cartoon (3) depicted Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdoðan caricatured as a sheriff, shaking the mili-
tary elements off of the Sept. 12 Constitution. "It's time,
already!" read the caption on the cartoon.

120
CARTOONS SPRING 2010

4- ALPEREN KÖSEOÐLU, AKSÝYON, 18 JAN, 2010 5- HASLET SOYÖZ, MÝLLÝYET, 20 FEB, 2010

1- OSMAN TURHAN, ZAMAN, 14 FEB, 2010

Alperen Köseoðlu's cartoon (4) making fun of the lower
chair treatment Turkish Ambassador to Israel Ömer
Çelikkol received from Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister
Danny Ayalon shows how the cartoonist regards Turkey's
new role in Middle Eastern politics.
Haslet Soyöz of the Milliyet daily played with the idea of
Lady Justice committing suicide with the sword of judicial
power and abandoning her scales (5). Latif Demirci, of the
Hürriyet daily, depicted Prime Minister Erdoðan's head
carved in place of Theodore Roosevelt at the US's Mount
Rushmore National Memorial (6). In the caption US
President Barack Obama tells Erdoðan that "they loved
him very much." "You are indulging me, Mr. President!"
Erdoðan replies.

2- ERCAN AKYOL, MÝLLÝYET, 6 APR, 2010 3- EMRE ÖZDEMÝR, TODAY’S ZAMAN, 10 JAN, 2010 6- LATÝF DEMÝRCÝ, HÜRRÝYET, 12 APR, 2010 7- SALÝH MEMECAN, SABAH, 27 JAN, 2010

122 123
REPORTS SPRING 2010
Think tank
tracker
A
lmost all scholars of Turkish domestic and foreign
politics agree that Turkey is changing. The argu-
ment is not about the existence of change, but
about its nature. These changes are not happening
in foreign policy only; domestic policy is also
changing. One can read all about this in reports and papers
published by think tanks that deal with Turkish politics.
ERDOGAN A. SHIPOLI
Almost all scholars of Turkish domestic and foreign
politics agree that Turkey is changing. The argument is
not about the existence of change, but about its nature
-- whether it is positive or negative. There are several
arguments that stand behind the changes that have
been made in Turkey, but it is obvious that these
changes came with the Justice and Development Party
(AK Party) government in the framework of European
Union integration and active Turkish engagement in its
neighboring regions. Moreover, the voice of the new
social elite and rising middle class asking for more
democracy pushed these changes to be even bolder.
Changes in domestic politics
In domestic politics Turkey has undergone many
revisions of previous state policies, including the
Kurdish initiative, the Alevi initiative, the Roma initia-
tive -- all of which the government included in a com-
mon framework called the "democratic initiative," a
revision of the role of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK)
in Turkish politics, etc. These new revisions have
received many criticisms but have nonetheless helped
Turkey change into a more democratic country and
124
thus gained the backing of a majority of the population
as well as world powers.
When reading about Turkish domestic policy
changes from reports and papers of Turkish think
tanks, the focus from the beginning of this year has
mainly been on the Alevi initiative and the role of the
TSK. I believe most of the "issues" Turkey has long
faced -- such as the Kurdish issue, the Armenian issue,
the Alevi issue, etc. -- are all constructed to serve a cer-
tain group of elites in Turkey. These issues have been
"securitized," whereby certain leaders or interest
groups label an issue a security matter. This process
helps them preserve their power as they label existen-
tial threats to the public, the nation, the state and their
interests, and in this way ask for permission to use
extraordinary means to fight against national threats,
and in the case of Turkey, to preserve Turkey's security,
unity and sovereignty.
Bekir Günay and Gökhan Türk, the authors of the
Ankara-based Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies'
(BÝLGESAM) report no. 22, published in 2010, suggest
that the start of the Alevi initiative must begin with
understanding how this issue is constructed and then
deconstruct it by breaking down prejudice that has
been associated with it. I agree with the authors when
they say that on many occasions, including the attacks
associated with Maraþ, Çorum and Madýmak, terrorism
has been used to make the Alevi issue a problem in
Turkey so that it can then be constructed as a security
issue.
The first suggestion that the authors make, and that I
agree with, is that the government shall decide on
whether it wants to continue its new foreign policy
engagements and be an important international actor,
or expend its energy on domestic issues. To be able to
use its energy in foreign policy, the Turkish government
seeks to democratically solve domestic issues as soon as
possible. The domestic issues that Turkey faces now,
like the Kurdish, Armenian and Alevi issues, and the
role of the military, are issues that have dissolved many
governments. The AK Party government, with its active
foreign policy, will also not take a step back from its
democratic initiatives and will once and for all, without
losing too much energy, solve the country's domestic
problems, together with the society, before again fully
focusing on foreign policy.
125
For the Alevi initiative, the authors of the report give The relationship
betweent the Turkish
several suggestions, but the more striking and easiest to
military and the civil-
fulfill are: the categorization of problems the govern- ian government has
ment will address and the immediate engagement with been a common sub-
priority issues; the identification of common values and ject for think tank
reports. This photo
the promotion of these values as the common values of summarizes the
civilization; the promotion of a common cultural her- nature of the relation-
itage and the idea that differences are a wealth, not a ship, with the chief of
reason to separate; discouraging the use of "others" General Staff frown-
ing and the Prime
while encouraging the use of "we." Decisions that will Minister Erdoðan
be made to stabilize the issue will concern the people, smiling.
while Parliament will play a key role in this. In order to PHOTO: ALÝ ÜNAL
achieve these goals, the report suggests, among others,
that the government work on raising awareness of the
symbolic, ritual and spiritual values of Alevis among the
population in an objective way, and that it put together
a common historical commission comprising academics
in the field who will research contested issues between
Sunnis and Alevis and then publish these results so
that the people can have access to objective information
on what the two groups are really about.
The problem with this report is that the authors con-
sider some issues to be very easy to fix and thereby
REPORTS SPRING 2010

underestimate the problems that are ingrained in peo-
ple's minds. Their suggestion that research carried out
by this commission enter school textbooks is, I would
say, a utopian suggestion so long as other obstacles
before this issue remain. The other suggestions offered
in this report, such as the position of "master" (dedelik)
in Alevi belief achieving the prominence it deserves,
wherein masters (dedes) are able to offer traditional
interpretations of customary laws and are trained in
theological schools, as well as the suggestion to have
both Alevi and Sunni students visit mosques and
cemevis (Alevi houses of worship) are other ways for
the government to control their lives and internal
affairs. I think the problem with religious associations in
Turkey stems from the fact that the government has
too much influence and control over them. So suggest-
ing ways on how to arrange their internal affairs will
solve no problems. Having students
visit each other's places of prayer THE PROBLEM WITH
might be a good suggestion, but it
should remain optional because put-
RELIGIOUS ASSOCIA-
ting it in the curriculum serves no TIONS IN TURKEY
purpose other than to anger, control STEMS FROM THE
and force people to do something
they might not like to do. In their last
FACT THAT THE GOV-
suggestion the authors propose that ERNMENT HAS TOO
the Directorate of Religious Affairs be MUCH INFLUENCE
independent and include all beliefs
OVER THEM
while maintaining an equal distance
from all. I think that in a secular
regime, issues of belief should be left to civil society, not self-confidence is that it won 47.5 percent of the vote.
to state institutions.
The steps that the government took for the demo-
cratic initiative, although important for democracy and
the unity of people living in Turkey, have been attacked
claims in his article "2000'li yýllarda asker ve siyaset" with the EU negotiation process, I think it is obvious has already been lost with the new Turkish political
(The military and politics in the 2000s), published by now that there is a push from the bottom up by the realities.
the pro-government, Ankara-based Foundation for general public and towards more democracy and the The second tendency, what Demirel called "con-
Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) think rule of law. This rising pressure does not leave room trolled change," is backed by those who think that by
tank's Analiz journal. The author categorizes the for the government to retreat or for a military inter- being stubborn, the TSK can damage itself and Turkey
actions of the military into two tendencies: the tenden- vention to take place. in general. So, to get the best from politics, the TSK is
cy to preserve the status quo under any circumstances, If we go back to Demirel's categorization of the to initiate some changes that it will control. What
including the use of undemocratic means; and the ten- TSK's actions and tendencies, we see that the TSK's pushed the TSK towards this change is the April 27,
dency to work on a strategy of what he called "con- first self-appointed duty is the "guardianship" of the 2007, e-memo. After this intervention, the AK Party
trolled change," making changes controlled by the mili- Republic of Turkey and its principles. Although the TSK went to the ballot box and won 47.5 percent of the
tary that will best serve the interests of the military. sees itself as the guardian of the Turkish Republic, the vote. This showed the TSK that it is damaging itself by
Scholars who deal with Turkish politics know that one problem lies in that it sees itself not only as a guardian being stubborn when it comes to its traditional meth-
of the main actors in Turkish politics are the Turkish in the military sense, defending Turkey from foreign ods of dealing with politics. Change to the social struc-
Armed Forces (TSK). The army's power grew after the threats, but also as a guardian against domestic and ture, the bureaucratic structure and the structure of the
1940s and reached its peak with the May 27, 1960 mili- foreign threats, including intervening against demands army pushed TSK leaders to think of other ways to
tary coup. The new changes taking place in Turkey coming from the people if they think these demands react.
have diminished the power of the army, and the gov- conflict with the principles of the republic. Nonetheless, there is a common ground between
ernment justifies making these This is not something scholars and reports, The BÝLGESAM
changes by saying they are part of the new in Turkey. We can see namely, that this so-called repost suggests that
criteria for EU membership. This is that Turkish politics is full "controlled change" is a the position of
why, although not always openly, of securitizations, starting defense measure taken by "master" (dedelik)
in Alevi belief
many circles in the TSK oppose the with Cyprus, the Kurdish the TSK. But, it is also should achieve the
EU and the changes it is bringing in issue, the Alevi issue, the important to note that the prominence it
Turkish politics. secular or religious regimes, TSK has opened itself to deserves, wherein
The author of this article, Demirel, etc. Similarly, reports issued discussion on taboos in masters (dedes) are
able to offer tradi-
claims that one of the problems is the by think tanks in Turkey Turkey, such as terrorism, tional interpreta-
lack of knowledge inside the TSK on during the first quarter of the Kurdish issue and for- tions of customary
what the EU will bring in and what it this year have recognized eign enemies. These open- laws and are trained
will take away. One of the forces ings to discussion have in theological
that the TSK has tried to
schools. For the first
behind the AK Party government's overcome government poli- resulted in milder talk by time in Republican
cies by speaking up against their priorities. generals when referring to terrorists, who are no longer history Alevi mas-
But what are these domestic changes that Turkey has These security moves, which I termed securitization labeled by their minority identities. Instead, the TSK ters are seen as
partners in the Alevi
made during the last decade? Many reports and schol- moves, are the best arguments of what Demirel calls tries to listen and understand their families' problems
Initiative run by the
ars agree that a new middle class is emerging together the TSK's "guardianship tendency." In his article and demands. This friction with the military and poli- government.
with a rising number of educational institutions, which Demirel refers to a retired chief of General Staff, Doðan tics has resulted in the rise among the general public of PHOTO: ALÝ ÜNAL

by several circles of the political and military elite.
Especially regarding the Kurdish issue, the main oppo-
sition parties, and sometimes the smaller opposition
parties, stood against the initiative. They claimed it
would take Turkey into a dead-end while separating
the ethnicities even further. In contrast, government
officials claim this project will unite all minorities and
people living in Turkey.
On the other hand, the changes Turkey has under-
gone since 2000, at home and abroad, have caught the
military unprepared. These changes are the result of
Turkey's firm determination to fulfill EU criteria and the
new rising demand for democracy that came with the
new AK Party government. This is what Tanel Demirel
give an opportunity to people from various back-
grounds to become educated and urbanized. The rising
number of diverse media outlets has brought Turkey
out of a media monopoly and thus paved the way for
different political views to get media coverage. Also, a
shifting of the wealth distribution from the main cities
to Anatolia has been shown to be very important for
integrating the people living there and raising their
standard of living.
Changes that have taken place in the social realm
have affected changes in the military-politics relation-
ship and increased the power of elected politicians
over military personnel. Although I agree with
Demirel when he says these changes were legitimized
Güreþ, who has said: "There is a risk of separation in
Turkey. This is what the US and the EU want." With
this tendency, the army also holds the right to decide
on the principles of the republic, laid down by Mustafa
Kemal Atatürk.
The new balances in Turkish politics seem to have
angered the military staff, claims Joshua Walker, of the
German Marshall Fund of the United States, who says
that with the rise of the AK Party and democratization
in Turkey, pro-American secularists have turned anti-
American and "anti-everything." This leaves room for
the US to speak up because there is no fear of losing
Turkish military support, as the weight of the military
both those who criticize the TSK and those who sup-
port it. Demirel gives several suggestions on how to
cope with this friction between the military and politics
as well as how to raise public awareness about the role
of the military and the role of the politicians.
During these three months, most of the reports and
papers published by think tanks in Turkey addressed
the changing role of the TSK in Turkish politics as well
as the Alevi opening that the government is dealing
with. Many scholars think the EU's silence on these
developments may jeopardize these developments and
are therefore asking the EU to get more involved in
helping the Turkish government in this democratiza-

126 127
REPORTS SPRING 2010
tion process. Many scholars also interpret the changes priority list is the same as that held by the Balkans.
in Turkish domestic politics with optimism but ask for Although Turkey is present in peacekeeping missions
domestic and international support for the Turkish gov- and economic and trade agreements as well as cultural
ernment on the Kurdish initiative in particular and the activities in the Balkans, it does not play as active a role
democratic initiative in general. as in the Middle East.
Changes in Turkish foreign policy Cengiz Candar claims in his article in Analiz that the
Reports and papers released by think tanks in Turkey new economic ties formed between Turkey and
also focus on the change in the country's foreign policy. regional countries have increased Turkish self-confi-
Not just in Turkey, but on the international platform dence about being a regional player. He also claims
also, scholars and academics are writing on the changes that not only does Turkey possess the hard power of
that Turkey has made to its foreign policy. There is, engagement but that what makes Turkey critically
without a doubt, a shift from passive and closed foreign important in the Middle East is its soft power. This in
policy to an open and active one. turn, he says, makes Turkey a rising power in the
While international think tanks such as the Middle East. Turkey has signed about 100 agreements
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, known for with Syria and Iraq in less than a month. These agree-
its pro-establishment Turkish politics, criticizes the ments address a number of fields, from security to the
Turkish government for shifting its focus from the West environment and from transport to trade, showing that
to the East, reports and publications Turkey is active in all spheres in the
by SETA and BÝLGESAM claim that Middle East. Candar says these agree-
Turkey is engaged in a two, or even
THE PRESTIGE THAT ments and the prestige that Turkey
four, front foreign policy. In fact, TURKEY HAS GAINED has gained in the Middle East give it
Turkish government officials have IN THE MIDDLE EAST the potential to break the established
underlined several times that there is balance in the Middle East, where we
GIVE IT THE POTEN-
no shift of focus in Turkish foreign have Iran on one side and Israel on
policy; rather it is a broader engage- TIAL TO BREAK THE the other.
ment of Turkish foreign policy that ESTABLISHED Most of the discussion in reports
incorporates the Middle East, Africa and papers put out by think tanks are
BALANCE IN THE
and Asia without in any way taking on the role Turkey is playing in rela-
its eyes off the West. REGION tion to Israel, the US and Iran. In this
The main architect of the new respect, Walker, a postdoctoral fellow
Turkish foreign policy, Foreign Minister Ahmet in the Transatlantic Academy, an initiative of the
Davutoðlu, labels this new policy "zero problems with German Marshall Fund, in his brief article published in
neighbors." Özdem Sanberk, a retired ambassador, the SETA Policy Brief, points out that what the world
said in his speech at the London School of Economic, is now discussing is not "where" Turkey stands, but
delivered on Dec. 4, 2009, and published in "what" Turkey is in terms of its identity. The US
BÝLGESAM's 2010 report, that these new engagements understands the importance of Turkey in any region
by Turkey in neighboring countries are new openings the US is involved in, and this is why it now considers
that are in the best interest of Turkey and serve to sta- Turkey a very important strategic partner. The US
bilize the region. knows that the Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan questions
He claims that Turkey's interest is to have stability in cannot be solved solely through military engagement
the region and that this can be secured if there is secu- but that regional actors must play an important role in
rity, independence and domestic stability in countries any solution -- and Turkey has the capacity to play a
surrounding Turkey. Furthermore, he claims that it is in critical role by engaging in the solution, a fact that puts
Turkey's interest if its neighbors prosper in terms of Turkey at the top of the US allies list.
trade and economy because new markets will open up In addition to this, the AK Party government has the
for Turkish products. Although the retired ambassador support of the US when it comes to the changes it is
also claims that Turkey is similarly interested in all making in domestic policy, including its fight against
regions around Turkey, I do not agree that the place the underworld, i.e., Ergenekon. This support is given
held by the Middle East on the Turkish foreign policy's because the US needs a strategic partner to help it
128
withdraw its forces from Iraq. With Turkey's new
engagements in the south and east, including Syria
and Iran, it has shown that it can help stabilize the
region because its regional prestige is highly valued,
Walker claims. But, moreover, the author also notes
that this new prestige, and the new engagements, has
not made Turkey turn its back on the EU, and under
no circumstances has Turkey abandoned its EU mem-
bership priority. The author also sees it as a responsi-
bility for the US to help Turkey find a lasting solution
for the country's Kurdish question.
Among other issues, Israeli-Turkish relations have
also been keeping the think tanks' agendas busy.
SETA's Ufuk Ulutaþ explains that Turkish-Israeli rela-
tions have, ever since the establishment of the Israeli
state, been tense from
time to time and very
cooperative at other times.
The peak in good relations
was reached during the
"soft coup" of Feb. 28,
1997, and was character-
ized by heavy military
cooperation. But what has
been seen and discussed
as of late is tension in
Turkish-Israeli relations.
This came about as a
result of Israeli attacks on Gaza and Lebanon in 2006,
2008 and 2009. Many scholars say that following this
latest rise in tension it will be impossible to return rela-
tions between the two countries to where they were
before. The zenith of the tense relations occurred at
the World Economic Forum at Davos, where Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoðan walked off the stage
after a harsh exchange with Israeli President Shimon
Peres, on Jan. 29, 2009. This was followed by various
small incidents in Israel and Turkey, with the biggest
one being the humiliation of the Turkish ambassador
to Israel, Ahmet Oðuz Çelikkol, on Jan. 12, 2010, by
Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Daniel Ayalon in
response to a Turkish soap opera's criticism of Israel's
actions in Palestine. Turkey recalled its ambassador,
and relations have remained tense ever since.
This is a lost opportunity for Israel and the Middle
East, as Turkey was a serious mediator in talks
between Israel and Syria. Some writers claim that
those who undermine Turkey's power in negotiations
and stability in the region are doing so only to break
129
Turkey's ties with other Middle Eastern powers, inter-
national organizations and the US. Because of this
mal-intent, some try to label Turkey a country that has
turned its back on the West. More fire was thrown at
the crises, according to some, when Turkey started
flirting with Iran at a time when the US and its NATO
allies in Europe were criticizing Iran over its nuclear
program.
What many writers in think tanks argue is that when
we analyze the Israeli and Turkish actions together, we
can see that Israeli policies towards Turkey are chaotic
and unorganized, whereas Turkey is following a more
consistent and well-organized policy towards Israel.
One of the indicators is statements made by Israeli
officials, who have clashed with each other, on the
Turkish role in the negotia- Turkey has signed
tion process between Syria roughly 100 agree-
and Israel. Domestic and ments with Syria
and Iraq in less than
international think tanks
suggest that Israel will
a month. These
agreements address
understand and accept a number of fields
Turkey's new power as a including the abol-
key actor in the Middle East, ishment of the visa
regime between
and thus cooperate accord- Turkey and Syria. In
ingly. They also put forward the photo at left, the
that Israel will work togeth- Turkish and Syrian
er with Turkey in order to foreign ministers
symbolically lift a
settle the problem of settle-
ments, Jerusalem and disputes with Syria and
border the Turkish -
Syrian border
Lebanon, as well as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. PHOTO: ALÝ ÜNAL
The same goes for Turkey. Turkey will understand that
its relations with Israel influence the whole region and
that these relations must improve in order for Turkey
to play a key role in the stabilization of the region and
for it to resume mediation efforts between parties in
the region.
In conclusion, what the reports, papers and articles
written on Turkey by Turkish or international scholars
and published by various think tanks say is that Turkey
has undergone a change in foreign policy. Some see
this change as a shift towards the East while distancing
itself from the West, whereas others simply consider
this a multidimensional foreign policy in which EU
membership remains a priority, but not the only for-
eign policy issue. This new active policy has been
labeled differently by different groups, with some call-
ing it "Islamic" and others "neo-Islamic." Some have
also termed it "neo-Ottoman," but the government
calls it a policy of "zero problems with neighbors."
 OBITUARY
SPRING 2010

My artist friend and

Þ
comrade-in-arms Þakir
Eczacýbaþý died at age 81
akir Eczacýbaþý was a person who deserved to be called
a friend of the arts. He busied himself with grand
dreams and wasn't willing to confine himself to being
just one thing. Had he just been a photographer, he
could have been the best. But he also wanted to hold
festivals. His greatest service to art was the role he played in the
establishment of the Ýstanbul Foundation for Culture and Art

ARA GÜLER lished the Eczacýbaþý factory.

Þakir Eczacýbaþý was born in Ýzmir in 1929. For others,
he may be one of Turkey's great industrialists, a friend
of the arts, a publisher, journalist, man of cinema and
perhaps a photographer thanks to me, but for me he
was a wonderful comrade-in-arms. Our lives inter-
sected not because of our shared professions but
because of the shared profession of our fathers. My
father was a pharmacy owner in Ýstanbul's Beyoðlu
district and produced Silva colognes. Þakir's father,
Ferit Bey, also produced a series of colognes. The most
well known of these was Altýn Damlasý. When I was
sent to Ýzmir by my newspaper, my father would be
sure to send cologne to Ferit Bey along with me. And
on my way back, I would bring cologne from Ferit
Bey. I met Þakir while conveying cologne back and
forth between the two families. After finishing Robert
College in Ýstanbul, he had gone to London and stud-
ied pharmacology. His older brother, Nejat Bey, had
studied chemistry in Germany. During the Democrat
Party (DP) period, the government had begun an
incentive program to aid the development of Turkish
industry. In order to expand his father's profession,
Nejat Bey took out a loan from the state and estab-
The real friendship between Þakir and me was born
when he started participating in the literature discus-
sions of Sebahattin Eyüboðlu while working at his fac-
tory in Levent. Þakir was a pharmacist by training but
had the spirit of an artist. We busied ourselves with
literature. Yaþar Kemal had come from Anatolia --
that's the kind of a group we were a part of. Þakir had
brought together the literature lover within him and
the pharmaceutical production that he was forced to
conduct at his older brother's behest with a periodical
called Týpta Yenilikler (Innovations in Medicine). It
was a medical journal, but it was more interested in
financing than medicine. We were publishing the
advertisements for the new medicines produced by
Eczacýbaþý. The magazine was actually essentially a lit-
erary magazine. I took photographs for it. As it was,
Þakir had earlier prepared the Vatan daily's arts page
together with Tunç Yalman. He also served as the
magazine's editor.
He was an editor with a fine gift and a frequent
touch. One day, he had hemmed and hawed too
much about photographs I had taken. In situations
ILLUSTRATION: YUNUS EMRE HATUNOÐLU
like that, I swear and say, "If you know so much,

130
OBITUARY SPRING 2010
then do it yourself." Þakir went and got a Leica cam- vals. A rising financial ability wasn't the only thing
era. We started taking pictures together, roaming fueling Þakir's interest in cinema. In 1965 he founded
Ýstanbul street by street. Sometimes we'd walk for the Turkish Cinémathèque Association and served as
kilometers. I remember how exhausted we'd be after its president for 10 years. The reason for this was his
a day of walking all around the Golden Horn step by acquaintance with Henri Langlois, who was, like him-
step. This went on for years. In time, he became a self, a native of Ýzmir. A member of Turkey's Greek
very good photographer. He knew that community, Langlois founded the
photographs began with people. He Þakir was a man to Cinémathèque Française and died in
did something that had been tried in talk about. At times France. The opening of the world's sec-
the West in the 1940s but was we grew angry with ond cinémathèque, in Ýstanbul, was due
unknown in Turkey, and began inten- one another, even to the acquaintance between Þakir and
tionally taking blurry pictures. In this fought. He loved to Henri Langlois. Þakir Eczacýbaþý was a
condition, the photographs resembled curse when he spoke. person who deserved to be called a
paintings. These efforts of his would But I have nobody to friend of the arts. As it was, putting out
become the books "Anlar" (Moments) fight with anymore. Innovations in Medicine constituted an
(1983), "Türkiye Renkleri" (Colors of May God shower an important contribution to the settling of
Turkey, 1997) and "Kapýlar abundance of mercy artistic thought in Turkey. After bidding
Pencereler" (Doors Windows, 2001). upon his soul farewell to his days of journal publish-
But Þakir wasn't one who could be ing, he had thematic photo-almanacs
satisfied by photographs alone. Honestly, neither was published. These almanacs, published under the title
I. In the early 1960s we entered the cultural films busi- "Eczacýbaþý Colour Photograph Almanacs," contained
ness. Þakir himself was not directly involved in this frames captured by young Turkish photographers and
process. With one of the films, Sebahattin Eyüboðlu introduced their work to a wider audience. He also
was the director. I was the art director of the others. had two books prepared, "Türkiye: Bir Portre"
The production director was a Frenchman, Pierre Biro. (Turkey: A Portrait) and "Ýstanbul Görüntüleri"
These films were to win awards at international festi- (Images of Ýstanbul) to which select writers and pho-
132
tographers of ours participated. The two compilations
that he published, one called "Gülen Düþünceler"
(Laughing Thoughts), of Bernard Shaw's works, and
another called "Tutkular, Acýlar, Gülümseyen
Deyiþler" (Passions, Pains and Smiling Sayings), of
Oscar Wilde's works, also invoked significant reaction.
Due to these efforts, he received France's Medal of Art
and Education Cavalier and Turkey's Medal for
Exceptional Service.
Þakir did many things. He took an interest in every-
thing. He busied himself with grand dreams and was-
n't willing to confine himself to being just one thing.
Had he just been a photographer, he could have been
the best. But he also wanted to hold festivals. This was
over, and then it was a music festival. That ended, and
then a jazz festival… French writer Edmond Rostand
has a play called "Cyrano de Bergerac." Sabri Esat
Siyavuþgil had translated its final sentence as "His
name is Cyrano de Bergerac. … As I said, 'I'll become
everything,' nothing was able to become of anything."
Þakir had that kind of a desire, to become everything -
- but it would be an injustice to say that nothing hap-
pened when it came to Þakir. Things happened. For
example, he taught us that art was something impor-
tant. He taught us a new appreciation for art. In the
past, people also used to go to the cinema, but there
133
was no understanding that cinema was an art. Þakir Eczacýbaþý
and Ara Güler
Cinema-going was for amusement. Þakir brought to
made photo-walks
the cinema the knowledge of the art involved. He did at the streets of
the same for photography. In this way, he performed Ýstanbul. They
a beneficial service for Turkey and for Turkish art. were photographed
by Selahaddin Sevi
Of course, his greatest service was the role he in one of their lat-
played in the establishment of the Ýstanbul est photo-walks at
Foundation for Culture and Art (ISKV). This founda- the fishmarket of
tion, for which he served as the executive board presi- Beþiktaþ, Ýstanbul.
dent from 1993 until his death, organizes five yearly PHOTOS: SELAHATTÝN SEVÝ
international art festivals in Ýstanbul. While doing all of
this, he didn't just ensure financing -- money doesn't
handle everything. That was what the Ministry of
Culture was never able to understand. The foundation
would perhaps have been founded much earlier but
for not being able to come to agreement with the
then-minister of culture. More recently, Þakir was
unable to come to the opening of the Þiþhane building
that he had constructed as the foundation's new
headquarters because two days prior to the opening,
on Jan. 24, 2010, he had passed away, at the age of 81.
Þakir was a man to talk about. At times we grew
angry with one another, even fought. He loved to
curse when he spoke. But I have nobody to fight with
anymore. May God shower an abundance of mercy
upon his soul.
SURVEYS SPRING 2010
MetroPOLL: AK
Party foreign policy
A
backed by public
s Turkish public becomes more aware of domestic
and foreign policy issues and the government
becomes more dependent on the public’s views,
opinion polls have become a means to formulate
and sometimes influence political decisions. Recent
opinion polls reveal that the government has the support of
the nation on its foreign policy orientation and legal reforms
BETÜL AKKAYA
A MetroPOLL opinion poll conducted in January 2010
found that more than 56 percent of participants sup-
port the Justice and Development Party (AK Party)
government's foreign policy. Nearly 33 percent said
they do not think the AK Party government is success-
ful in foreign affairs, while 10 percent said they find the
government's foreign policy "very unsuccessful."
There were recent suggestions by some commenta-
tors that Turkey's expanded presence in the foreign
policy arena signifies a shift in foreign policy orienta-
tion. Ankara has consistently rejected such arguments,
calling them reminiscent of a Cold War mentality.
The survey also found that the Turkish public is
reluctant to lend support for ongoing governmental
efforts for settlement of the Kurdish question. Only
38.7 percent of respondents said they support the ini-
tiative while a full 53.8 percent of respondents said
they do not support the initiative at all.
Turkey's Kurdish question has existed since the first
years of the republic, but it turned violent in 1984 after
the establishment of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers'
Party (PKK). More than 40,000 civilians and security
forces have been killed in clashes so far.
134
In addition, more than 55 percent of respondents
said they believe there is a group within the Turkish
Armed Forces (TSK) that seeks to stage a coup.
Thirty-six percent said there is no such group, while
8.9 percent declined to comment.
Respondents were also asked about the possibility of
the TSK staging a coup d'état. Only 26.9 percent said
such a possibility exists. An overwhelming 62.2 per-
cent said the armed forces could not stage a coup.
More than 10 percent said they had no idea.
Unemployment decreases
public support for ruling party
An opinion poll conducted by the SONAR
Research Group in January 2010 showed that increas-
ing rate of unemployment has decreased the public
support for the ruling Justice and Development Party
(AK Party).
According to the survey, if parliamentary elections
were held today, 29.5 percent of the respondents said
they would vote for the AK Party. More than 27 per-
cent said they would vote for the main opposition
Republican People's Party (CHP), while around 20
percent said they would vote for the Nationalist
Movement Party (MHP).
The participants were also questioned about the
most important problems of Turkey. More than 67 of
the respondents pointed to increasing rate of unem-
ployment as Turkey's most challenging issue. More
than 35 percent said it was the government's efforts
to settle the Kurdish question.
Public not willing for early elections, poll shows
A survey conducted by the Konsensus Research
Company in January 2010 suggested that a consider-
able portion of the Turkish public is unwilling about
early parliamentary elections.
A total of 71 percent said they would not like the
government to head for early elections. Twenty-eight
percent, on the other hand, expressed their desire for
early elections. The survey also showed that the pub-
lic is pretty undecided about which political party to
vote for if early elections were to be held.
While 25.9 percent said they did not decide yet
over which party to vote for, 24.9 percent said they
would vote for the Justice and Development Party
(AK Party). Slightly more than 14 percent said they
would vote for the Republican People's Party (CHP)
135
and 8.7 percent said they would vote for the Recent opinion polls
reveal a clear support
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Only 3.3 percent for Turkey's ruling AK
said they would choose the Peace and Democracy Party by means of its
Party (BDP) in the elections. domestic and foreign
Poll verifies public view on existence policy decisions. The
AK Party would also
of pro-coup faction within military
win a clear majority if
According to a separate opinion poll by the general elections, due
MetroPOLL, more than 55 percent of respondents next year, were held
believe there is a group within the Turkish Armed today, an opinion poll
found in early March.
Forces that seeks to stage a coup. The poll was con- PHOTO: KÜRÞAT BAYHAN
ducted in January 2010. However, 36 percent said
there is no such group, while 8.9 percent declined
to comment. The Turkish military has recently
become the center of mounting criticism due to its
protective stance toward many of its members who
are accused of working to overthrow the democrati-
cally elected government. Asked about the possibili-
ty of the TSK staging a coup d'état, only 26.9 per-
cent said such a possibility exists. An overwhelming
62.2 percent said the armed forces could not stage a
coup. In addition, a crushing 66.2 percent said yes
when asked whether they believe in the existence of
SURVEYS SPRING 2010
the deep state in Turkey. Only 23 percent said no,
while 10.8 said they had no idea.
Majority disapproves of treatment of PM's wife
An ANDY-AR Center for Social Research survey con-
ducted in late January and early February revealed that
an overwhelming majority of the Turkish public con-
demns the treatment of the prime minster's wife when
she was denied entry to the Gülhane Military
Academy of Medicine (GATA) due to her headscarf.
The main question of the survey concerned the
recent debate over the treatment of Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdoðan's wife, Emine, at GATA when
she wanted to visit an ailing thespian in 2007. More
than 60 percent of respondents said they disapprove
of the decision to deny Emine Erdoðan entry to
GATA because she wears the Islamic headscarf.
Among the participants, 61.2 percent
said they disagreed with the treat- MetroPOLL: 78.7
ment of Erdoðan, while 13.5 percent percent of Turks
said they approved of the move.
When asked whether they agree
believe that Turkey
with the arguments suggesting needs judicial reform. while 38.2 percent said the existing
that GATA acted intentionally A full 69.8 percent
when it denied Erdoðan entry
thinks that Turkey
because she wears the headscarf
and that GATA might have let her
urgently
in if she was somebody else, 64.3 constitution
percent of respondents agreed,
while 18.2 said they disagreed with this statement.
The respondents were also asked about a controver-
sial headscarf ban that is in place at universities and
public buildings in the country. A total of 50.2 percent
of respondents said they were against the ban, 18.6
percent said they were in favor of it and 11.3 percent
said they partially supported the ban.
Poll: Ýstanbulites disapprove of
parliamentary fistfight
MetroPOLL conducted an opinion poll among resi-
dents of Ýstanbul in February 2010 over their percep-
tion of a recent parliamentary fistfight between
deputies from the Justice and Development Party (AK
Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
The participants of the survey expressed strong disap-
proval of a brawl in Parliament. Twenty-nine percent
of respondents said the MHP was responsible for the
fistfight, while 20.4 percent pointed to the AK Party.
More than 26 percent said both parties were at fault. A
full 21.7 percent declined to comment.
A MHP deputy drew the indignation of AK Party
GRAPHIC: ABDÜLKERÝM KESKÝN
deputies on Feb. 2 when he poked fun at news reports
covering the Gülhane Military Academy of Medicine's
(GATA) refusal to allow the prime minister's wife,
Emine Erdoðan, to enter the hospital to visit a patient
in 2007 because she wears a headscarf. Osman
Durmuþ angered AK Party deputies when he said:
"How dare you not allow the wife of a prime minister
who is accepted as a prophet to enter GATA? Who do
you think you are?" The incident led to a skirmish
between AK Party and MHP deputies.
Ýstanbul residents believe Turkey
needs a new leftist party
A separate MetroPOLL opinion poll in February
found that Ýstanbul residents believe Turkey needs a
new leftist party to meet the political demands of left-
oriented voters in the country, as existing political par-
ties that define themselves as "leftist"
fall short of satisfying their voters.
According to the poll, more than 55
percent of respondents said Turkey is
in need of a new leftist political party
leftist parties meet the country's
needs. Asked whether Turkey needs a
new party on the right, only 37.2 per-
needs a new cent responded "yes." Approximately
56 percent, on the other hand, said
"no." The highest call for a new right-
wing party came from Nationalist Movement Party
(MHP) supporters, at 45.3 percent. Only 28.4 percent
of Justice and Development Party (AK Party) support-
ers said such a party was needed.
One of the questions included in the poll examined
respondents' perception of the CHP. Asked whether
the CHP is a leftist party, 53.7 percent said it is, while
16.9 percent said it is not. The remaining 29.3 percent
declined to comment.
Public does not want early elections, Andy-Ar finds
According to a survey by the Andy-Ar Center for
Social Research in early March, the Turkish public does
not want to head to the ballot box for snap elections.
Nearly 43 percent of respondents said they do not
want early elections while 35.4 percent said they do.
Of the respondents, 71.3 percent voiced the coun-
try's need for a new constitution, while only 11.4 per-
cent opposed the drafting of a new constitution.
Nearly 60 percent said Turkey urgently needs judicial
reform, with 65.4 percent stressing that the judiciary is
neither independent nor impartial in Turkey.
136 137
SURVEYS SPRING 2010

GRAPHIC: ABDÜLKERÝM KESKÝN

More than 35 percent said they would vote for the poll showed a decrease in the public support to the
AK Party if parliamentary elections were held next constitutional changes after the content of the reform
Sunday. Slightly more than 19 percent voiced support package was revealed from 66 percent to 48 percent.
for the MHP while 17.8 percent would support the Several different opinion polls have been conducted to
CHP. More than 6 percent said they would vote for the learn what the nation would do in the event of a ref-
TDH and 5.1 percent said they would vote for the BDP. erendum. According to a recent survey conducted by
MetroPOLL: Turks strongly back legal PollMark of 5,039 people before the content of the
reform, new constitution package was announced, 41.5 percent of respondents
A MetroPOLL survey in late February showed that said they would say yes to the government's constitu-
78.7 percent of respondents said Turkey needs judicial tional reform package if it goes to referendum, while
reform. A full 69.8 percent of respondents said Turkey 28.2 percent said they would decide according to the
urgently needs a new constitution, the poll found. content of the package. Almost 60 percent of the
The AK Party government plans to bring a reform respondents in the same survey also said Turkey
package to Parliament by the end of March in a bid to needs a new constitution.
restructure Turkish judiciary and replace the current Poll shows Turks dislike opposition's
Constitution. Many segments of society agree that the position on coup probe
current Constitution falls short of meeting the A new MetroPOLL survey has shown that Turks are
demands of today's Turkey. highly disturbed by a position taken by opposition
Asked whether they would vote in favor of judicial party leaders against an ongoing probe into an alleged
reforms if a referendum were held, 66 military plot to overthrow the AK
percent said yes. Twenty-seven per- Party government. According to the
cent, however, said they would vote
Fifty-six percent of poll, 70.4 percent of respondents dis-
against such reforms. Almost 51 per- participants support approve of the position of CHP
cent of respondents said recent devel- the government's for- leader Deniz Baykal on the
opments in the country had under- eign policy. Thirty- Sledgehammer plot probe. The plot
mined their confidence in the judici- Three percent do not was allegedly drafted by members of
ary, while 35.3 percent said recent the military who intended to stage a
think the government
developments had no impact on their coup. Around 21 percent of respon-
confidence in the judiciary. is successful in foreign dents said they approve of Baykal's
In a follow-up poll made on March affairs and 10 percent position on the probe. The CHP
24, MetroPOLL surveyors found that finds its foreign policy leader has alleged on various occa-
the support of the public for the judi- ‘very unsuccessful’ sions that the probe is an attempt by
cial reform continued even after the the AK Party to undermine the TSK.
government disclosed its new reform package, which A full 61 percent of respondents said they do not agree
would amend 26 articles of the current Constitution. with the position of MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli on the
The poll showed that a majority of the Turkish public suspected plot. Only 27.8 percent lent their support to
is critical of the two biggest opposition parties' imme- Bahçeli on the issue. According to the MHP leader, the
diate rejection of the package. According to the poll a Sledgehammer probe is part of a smear campaign by
full 61 percent of respondents said the Republican the ruling party against the armed forces.
People's Party (CHP) was wrong in its disapproval of Poll shows AK Party would win clear majority
the package even before its content was revealed. Turkey's ruling AK Party would win a clear majority if
When asked whether they agreed with the Nationalist general elections due next year were held today, an
Movement Party (MHP), which says the package opinion poll stated early March. The poll, conducted
should be delayed until a new Parliament is formed by the Konsensus polling firm, showed the AK Party
after next parliamentary elections, 56.1 percent replied with 39.6 percent of the vote. In the last election in
that they did not while 36 said they do. The poll was 2007, the AK Party, which was first elected in 2002,
carried out with a representative sample of 1,010 peo- won 46.6 percent of the vote. The main opposition
ple in 31 provinces in Turkey. Despite the public criti- CHP would garner 23.1 percent and the MHP 16.5
cism of the opposition parties' rejectionism the new percent, the Konsensus poll stated.

138 139
columns
SPRING 2010

ILLUSTRATION: YUNUS EMRE HATUNOÐLU

(ATK) convened again and reached the same conclu-
An invitation sion: "It was the product of Çiçek's hand." Some peo-
ple still didn't believe it. After the Gendarmerie
to the truth General Command's Criminal Investigation
Department connected the final dot, the General Staff
Ekrem Dumanlý, Zaman, March 4, 2010
was obliged to admit that the document was authen-
The Sledgehammer plan, the Action tic. So what was the benefit of putting up a front?
Plan to Finish Off the Justice and Was there any need for Chief of General Staff Gen.
Development Party (AK Party) and Ýlker Baþbuð to say it was just a "piece of paper"?
Fethullah Gülen and the Cage Should we be criticizing those who misinformed
Operation Action Plan, all of them have Baþbuð or those who damaged their reputation by
the same qualities: the idolization of giving an unnecessary defense? This issue goes back
power, the inappropriate utilization of that power and to whoever Çiçek reports to. It goes back to the senior
a hatred of the public and democracy. official whom Çiçek can visit in his office at any time.
It is an audacious, aggressive and arrogant mentali- The issue isn't about a colonel who has been caught
ty that considers "everything acceptable." According red-handed; rather the issue is about a confrontation
to those who have this mentality, the state is always at with a particular mentality. The authenticity of this
"risk and in danger." It is for this reason that the person's signature has been confirmed several times,
"domestic threat" warrants any and every "action" yet a politician comes out and says he wants a "fin-
that is carried out against it. How gerprint" as proof. Come on, people,
else can you explain the reason for THE NOTION OF have a heart. Some military person-
framing someone for a crime they nel who try to make themselves
have not committed? It isn't enough
DOMESTIC THREAT more powerful by constantly pre-
for them that citizens pay their taxes, WAS TARGETING ONE senting the state and regime as being
respect the law and are miles away GROUP OF PEOPLE under threat and some civilians who
from "coercion and violence." They YESTERDAY, AND IT IS are at their disposal think it is legiti-
wanted to secretly place weapons in mate to set up a conspiracy against a
homes, prove that the Ergenekon
TARGETING A DIFFER- segment of society. This is the mind-
investigation was just a plot by set- ENT GROUP TODAY. set that plans incidents to intimidate
ting up traps for the police, ambush BUT THE MENTALITY leftists, rightists, religious people,
a political party and remove it from Alevis and Kurds. We need to recon-
IS STILL THE SAME
power and carry out assassinations sider the bloody May 1 of 1977, re-
to incite conflict between Alevis and Sunnis. evaluate the Kahramanmaraþ inci-
Those who seized every opportunity to dilute coup dents that led to sectarian violence and rethink the members, who prompted a crisis by directly interven- people yesterday, and it is targeting a different group
allegations are increasingly shocked as the authentici- political assassinations that led to public unrest from ing in the investigation, are ashamed as well. today. But the mentality is still the same. Expressing
ty of the documents is being confirmed one by one. Is this perspective. According to the indictment, the state's commanders, one's reaction with statements such as "I feel like I
there any other man in the history of Turkish law that Meanwhile, the court has approved the indictment prosecutors and intelligence officers put their heads have been deceived" is far from convincing. In order
has as many criminal reports on his record as Dursun that goes back to the document signed by Çiçek and together and tried to plan a conspiracy against the for people to believe your sincerity, you need to apol-
Çiçek? Reports including police crime lab reports, mentions the incidents that occurred in Erzincan. In people. It is a terrifying situation. ogize to your colleagues, whom you turned into tar-
gendarmerie crime lab reports, Scientific and fact, the indictment was accepted despite pressure One needs to be blind not to see the truth. gets for the armed forces. Do not forget that a trap
Technological Research Council of Turkey (TÜBÝTAK) from the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors Unfortunately, there have always been some people that is set up for certain people today will be set up for
reports and forensic reports. Before the original copy (HSYK) not to do so. The prime suspect is 3rd Army who have taken it upon themselves to protect the other people tomorrow. Those who want to use
of the document was discovered, some people started Commander Gen. Saldýray Berk. The information and state and who abuse their power to set traps for the weapons purchased with taxpayer money against the
an outcry over the document being a "photocopy." documents included in the indictment against one of nation. It is an inhumane decision to act is if nothing people, saying, "I will crack down on Ýstanbul," do not
Then when the original copy came out, they started the army's top commanders is humiliating. The alle- has happened after all the information and documents know that Ýstanbul will "crack down" on anyone who
clinging to the lie that a machine that reproduced wet gations against Erzincan Chief Public Prosecutor Ýlhan that have been exposed. We are confronting an issue tries to crack down on it. In the end, even if people
signatures had been invented in America. But that Cihaner, who is accused of being a member of that is beyond politics. The notion of "domestic threat plan conspiracies against others, the public conscience
didn't hold either. The Council of Forensic Medicine Ergenekon, are bloodcurdling. I wonder if the HSYK and domestic enemy" was targeting one group of is the ultimate court.

140 141
columns
SPRING 2010
Threatening the
internal threat
Hasan Bülent Kahraman, Sabah, Feb. 2, 2010
Even though I am not fond of the
exaggerated descriptions such as
"silent revolution," I dubbed the
developments that started with the
Ergenekon trial and the "cosmic
room" search as such a revolution.
Now I note Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoðan's
move to abolish the Protocol on Cooperation for
Security and Public Order (EMASYA) and dismiss
the notion of internal threat as an extension of this
revolution. In so doing, Turkey may start a process
of genuine civilianization and democratization. I
would like to set this debate aside and focus on the
notion of internal threat.
The Peace of Westphalia, signed in the 17th cen-
tury, noted that states are defined by their borders
and that states are classified as enemies and friends
in terms of external relations. The states perceived
their enemies as external threats. Internal enemies
and internal threats were not included in this
framework.
The distinction between internal threats and
external threats started with the arrival of the Cold
War. The Western world presented itself as the free
world and declared the Eastern Bloc to be the gen-
eral and big external enemy. The commonly held
argument back then stated that the methods of
warfare had dramatically changed and the preva-
lent ideology of the Eastern Bloc would penetrate
the free world through underground groups oper-
ating in these countries under the pretext of
democracy. These enterprises were regarded as
components of the internal threat or enemy. The
critical point to underline here is the transforma-
tion of the threat from an armed enemy into an
ideology.
Such a general framework was unquestionably
recognized by the military in Turkey. It was even
manifest that the military was considered the party
authorized to make decisions with regard to this
matter. Socialism and communism were already
the recognized imminent threats. The military
142
expanded the sphere of threats to include reac-
tionaryism, a fabricated threat not claimed in other
countries. The official documents focusing on inter-
nal security in the 1960s and 1970s make reference
to fundamentalist threats along with separatist and
destructive activities.
Internal threats and reactionaryism have been
cited in the National Security Council's (MGK)
final declarations as priority threats since 1988.
However, the declarations did not provide any def-
inition of reactionaryism. This move created two
interrelated situations. Above all, this model con-
firmed that the state had an ideology and that the
state was acting with the motive of protecting this
ideology. However, the state cannot have an ideol-
ogy. The state has a constitutional framework and
principles. And this, in its broadest sense, refers to
democracy and fundamental rights and freedoms.
The threat against this is countered by the security
establishment and the judiciary. Anything beyond
this bears a different meaning.
That meaning points to the state's direct interfer-
ence in politics and democracy. What does reac-
tionaryism -- or any other similar notion -- mean?
Who makes the decision on how to define this
term? Currently, the state defines what is right or
wrong, what is constitutional or unconstitutional
and what is antidemocratic via the MGK's declara-
tions and instructions. In such a case, is it possible
to talk about democracy and politics, the practiced
form of the first? Put aside the practices introduced
by EMASYA, practices that are not acceptable even
in a non-democratic environment, put aside
democracy, the notion of internal threat itself
means that an organization of the state is beyond
politics and democracy (whether this institution is
constitutional does not make any difference since
each institution must be constitutional; what mat-
ters most is how that institution has became consti-
tutional and under what circumstances).
Nobody should fool themselves. The military did
not go back to their barracks after staging military
coups in Turkey; subsequent to the coups, they
amended the Constitution, thus making themselves
an upper-level decision-making mechanism. The
snowball created within that understanding has
become the avalanche we are coping with today.
Democracy is hard to achieve.
Getting rid of the
pro-coup, pro-junta
tendencies
Hasan Cemal, Milliyet, March 4, 2010
The Balyoz (Sledgehammer) coup plan
was prepared in late 2002 and early
2003; the coup plans, hinted at by the
undersecretary of the National
Intelligence Organization (MÝT) then,
were plotted by the 1st Army.
Currently, 36 military officers, including retired Gen.
Çetin Doðan, the commander of the 1st Army back
then, are currently under arrest in connection with
the Sledgehammer coup. A report that was drafted
by a senior major appointed by the military prosecu-
tor as an expert has been in newspaper headlines.
The Sledgehammer coup plan was followed by other
coup plans bearing interesting names including
Sarýkýz (Blonde Girl), Ayýþýðý (Moonlight), Yakamoz
(Sea Sparkle) and Eldiven (Glove). All the details of
these plans are in the journals of Adm. Özden
Örnek, then-commander of the Naval Forces. Hilmi
Özkök, the chief of General Staff at the time, was
notified about these plans, which have not yet been
denied. In addition, the MÝT undersecretary also
informed related authorities about these plans back
then. The plots and activities to topple the Justice
and Development Party (AK Party) government
have continued in the aftermath of 2004 as well. The
Çankaya wars waged to circumvent the road to the
presidency laid the foundations of the path toward
the Ergenekon case.
The path was lengthy and full of obstacles, includ-
ing the 367 quorum debate and the April 27, 2007
memo, but the attempts failed. The military memo
was countered by a warning from the people, who
extended a huge amount of support to the AK Party,
which received 47 percent of the vote in the subse-
quent general elections. This was a big disappoint-
ment for the military. A judicial coup was plotted to
prevent the rise of the AK Party; a case was filed
with the Constitutional Court demanding its disso-
lution. The AK Party barely survived the case in the
summer of 2008. It did not stop there. The year 2009
143
arrived. In March, a junta within the Naval Forces
drafted a plan called the Cage Operation Action
Plan. The plan sought to create a fertile environment
for a military coup by plotting assassinations, mas-
sacres, kidnappings and the overall destabilization of
Turkey. (Taraf, Nov. 19, 2009).
In April 2009, a new plot was disclosed: the Action
Plan to Fight Reactionaryism. The plot was spon-
sored by Col. Dursun Çicek and prepared at the
General Staff. The plan sought to topple the AK
Party administration and wipe out the Gülen move-
ment by fabricating links between the movement
and arms. (Taraf, June 12, 2009). The indictment
prepared in connection with the plot indicated that
the Action Plan to Fight Reactionaryism was to be
first implemented in Erzincan. The following excerpt
from an indictment in which 3rd Army Commander
Gen. Saldýray Berk is the prime suspect is quite
interesting: "The Action Plan to Fight
Reactionaryism was drafted by Col. Dursun Çicek
and was first to be implemented in Erzincan. To this
end, a clandestine enterprise led by Saldýray Berk,
who works in affiliation with the Ergenekon armed
organization, carried out illegal activities. It has
become evident that the enterprise attempted to
plant guns, drugs and illegal documents in the
schools and institutions of the Fethullah Gülen
movement in an attempt to justify a call for a series
of operations against these places and to make sure
that the movement is considered an armed terror
organization. The statements undersigned by
Dursun Çicek in a document and the handwritten
statements of military officer Ersin Ergut, who works
at the Erzincan Provincial Gendarmerie Command's
Intelligence Department, confirm each other, and
this confirmation is the primary proof of said argu-
ment."
Think for a moment that these are all real and are
links of a chain. They are not fabricated or imagined,
unlike some counterarguments. The unease of the
military with the AK Party administration has
become evident with these incidents. Our military
has long suffered from a vicious habit and illness,
the roots of which can be traced back to the
Ottoman era: a pro-junta and pro-coup attitude.
This is a rather serious illness, and it does not suit
democracy and the rule of law. This is the problem
that we are experiencing today.
columns
SPRING 2010
Judiciary should mind
its own business
Ahmet Altan, Taraf, March 24, 2010
The appellate judiciary has recently
made a number of statements on the
proposed constitutional amendments.
All have been political. You may think
that these are some politicians talking.
They make statements supporting
Republican People's Party (CHP) leader Deniz
Baykal's arguments; they assert that the judiciary will
lose its independence if the draft amendments
become law. We may hear their arguments as if the
judiciary were really independent, but the argument
that the judiciary is genuinely independent does not
sound right. What the CHP and the appellate judici-
ary really want to preserve is the Supreme Board of
Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), which appoints the
judges and the prosecutors. They want the current
structure and composition of this institution to be
maintained. Why are they so eager to preserve it?
This institution relieved the prosecutor who drafted
the indictment in connection with the assassination
plotted by the "good guys" in Þemdinli of his duty.
Did it make this decision "independently"?
No.
The HSYK, which files lawsuits against us [the
Taraf daily] demanding a huge amount of compensa-
tion, will not be able to prove its independence
regardless of how many charges it files. It should be
noted that former Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaþar
Büyükanýt admitted in a TV broadcast that he gave
the order for the removal of the prosecutor from
office. Is it possible to imagine a judicial institution
receiving orders from the General Staff? Both the
CHP and the appellate judiciary want to preserve the
dependence of the HSYK on the military -- as con-
firmed by Büyükanýt -- instead of its independence.
They are seeking to undermine the will of the people
and take control of political activities in cooperation
with the military. Their actual goal is to ensure their
dominance is sustained. [...]
The media gives advice suggesting that the Justice
and Development Party (AK Party) should seek con-
sensus to create a new constitution. What consensus
144
and with whom?
Should it seek a consensus with the conservative
CHP, asking for the continuation of the military order
and the appellate judiciary taking orders from the
General Staff? Should it consult with the
Constitutional Court, which issued controversial rul-
ings on some recent thorny issues? Take a look at the
CHP, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the
appellate judiciary as well as the papers and the TV
stations supporting these actors; do you notice any
criticism urging for the expansion of the sphere of lib-
erties? [...] They do not, they will not. They just want
to prevent any changes. The appellate judiciary is
engaged with political affairs instead of minding its
own business. As a consequence, the whole judicial
system is in a total collapse. Our paper features a new
report today [March 24, 2010]; the appellate judiciary
would try to prevent such legal scandals if it were
really concerned with legality and legal affairs, but
they do not even care.
A placard was displayed at a demonstration in
Diyarbakir. The holders of the placard were sent to
court.
Eventually, both were tried in the Diyarbakir court-
house but in different courtrooms. The result? The
defendant holding the left side of the placard was
sentenced to a six-year jail term whereas the holder
of the other side was acquitted. Should we call this
law and legality? Shall we call it justice delivered by
the impartial and independent judiciary?
Is it possible to imagine such a judiciary? Above all,
the appellate judiciary should monitor its affairs and
take a look at what is going on in the judicial system,
but they do nothing about it. Does the CHP, which
argues that it protects the independence of the judici-
ary, show any interest in this? Is it opposed to the
HYSK taking orders from the General Staff? No. The
CHP's concern is not justice, legality, liberties or
Turkey; its primary concern is sustaining the domina-
tion of the minorities in the country. Seeking consen-
sus with these actors is a waste of time; just ignore
them. This order will be changed; this legal order will
be changed. The judiciary and the military will step
out of the political domain. This will happen tomor-
row, if not today. But this country will eventually
enjoy justice, the rule of law and liberties. This will
happen through integration with people rather than
consensus with those who dream of the old regime.
Erdoðan-Davutoðlu
Avni Özgürel, Radikal, Feb. 7, 2010
Time is passing; a whole year has
passed since I published an article
with the same title. Ahmet Davutoðlu
was not foreign minister back in
February 2009; he was serving as the
chief adviser to the prime minister
and held the title of ambassador. Back then I wrote:
"There is no other adviser in our history who influ-
enced the course of politics and convinced the
leader to handle the dominant notions and princi-
ples of international relations from a different per-
spective. I could even argue that there has been no
foreign minister in our republican history like
Professor Ahmet Davutoðlu." I further argued that
the comments suggesting that Recep Tayyip
Erdoðan was attempting to reverse the course of
Turkey's traditional foreign policy design, the guid-
ing principles of which were laid out by Atatürk, the
founder of the republic, by following the advice of
Davutoðlu were simply wrong. [...]
Following the rejection of the motion in March
2003 seeking to provide free passage for American
troops to Iraq via Turkish territories, the leading fig-
ures of the Turkish press directed their criticism at
Davutoðlu. "Take a look at the current situation
created by some strategy experts; they turned
Turkey into an ordinary and weak actor in the cur-
rent developments in the near abroad. Now they
are attempting to justify their theories by arguing
that Turkey is one of the 30 allies of the US.
Enough is enough! Save your brilliant ideas and
claims of a historical mission for yourself! Sadly, the
only historical opportunity that appeared in such a
sensitive period of time and your attempt to convert
theory into practice proved too costly for Turkey.
Unfortunately, Turkey is becoming the first victim
of post-Saddam era," wrote Ertuðrul Özkök, [then]
editor-in-chief of the Hürriyet daily.
This is not a lone example. Back then we had
prominent colleagues and experts on Middle
Eastern affairs who mocked Davutoðlu by asking,
"Are you the one who knows these affairs best,
given that there are a number of think tanks in the
US where leading strategists work?" A year has
passed since these statements. Now, Davutoðlu is a
star in the eyes of his former critics. He is a star, but
there are still attempts to present the foreign policy
design framed by Davutoðlu and Erdoðan as an
endeavor seeking to create an alliance and coopera-
tion with the Arab and Islamic world alone. A sum-
mit between Turkey, Serbia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina was unimaginable until recently;
Davutoðlu achieved this. Croatia has stated its wish
to participate in a similar meeting. Up until recent-
ly, Bosnia's membership in NATO was not a subject
deemed worthy of attention or consideration by the
Western world. Today, Bosnia's membership in
NATO is under discussion, and this will secure its
territorial integrity. NATO, which has not endorsed
any policy not approved of by the US till now, had
to back up despite the obvious reaction from
Washington. Ankara achieved visible outcomes in
the aftermath of a process of negotiation on
Bosnia's NATO membership -- for which the
Hungarian delegates noted that they felt that
Hungary is a country whose opinion counts thanks
to Turkey's active diplomacy -- despite analysts
arguing before the process that Ankara would not
be able to attract the support of even a single coun-
try for Bosnia's acceptance into NATO. [...]
Undoubtedly, what makes Davutoðlu strong at
the negotiation table is the support extended to him
by Erdoðan. If Turkey is not a country complying
with instructions forwarded by the US and its allies
behind the closed doors of diplomatic fora any-
more, this is mostly due to Erdoðan's brave and
active attitude to frame the content of political
action.
Last week [the end of January 2010], I was in
Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. President
Nursultan Nazarbayev is working hard to make his
country a rising star and a role model for Central
Asian countries. It is possible to observe the out-
comes and results of the emerging style of Turkish
diplomacy there as well. A Kazakh national will
serve as the president of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) and Kazakhstan holds
the chairmanship the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) thanks to Turkey's
initiatives. This means that the Turks of the Central
Asian region will start assuming greater roles in
international politics. Is this insignificant?
145
chronicle
SPRING 2010
JANUARY
January 3 - 5
‘Cosmic search' judge
receives death threats
Judge Kadir Kayan
received a threatening letter and an
envelope containing bullets due to his
investigation into an apparent military
plot to assassinate Deputy Prime
Minister Bülent Arýnç.
January 5:
Davutoðlu warns Bulgaria over
compensation demands
Turkey warned that Bulgaria's
reported demands for compensa-
tion for displaced people in the
early 20th century might harm
bilateral ties.
January 8:
Erdoðan calls expectations for
early elections a 'dream'
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoðan has termed expectations
for early elections as merely a
"dream," underlining that the
next elections would not be
held before 2011.
January 11:
Turkey, Lebanon abolish
visa requirement
Turkey and Lebanon
signed an agreement
to lift visa require-
ments for their nation-
als in a bid to boost
trade, tourism and
economic coopera-
tion.
January 12 - 15
Erdoðan awarded Faisal prize
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoðan won the 2010 King
Faisal International Prize
(KFIP) for service to Islam.
Diplomacy a la Lieberman: Insult
to ambassador shaking ties
Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister
Danny Ayalon was seen telling
cameramen to film him sitting on a
tall chair and Turkish Ambassador
Oðuz Çelikkol on a lower chair
during a meeting. Ayalon's move
angered Turkey, with President
Abdullah Gül asking Israel to offer
an apology for the scandal.
Military launches probe into
'action plan' colonel
The General Staff launched an
investigation into Col. Dursun
Çiçek whose signature was
found on a military plot
detailing a plan to
undermine the govern-
ment and a faith-
based group.
January 17:
Bardakoðlu
expresses sup-
port for Halki Seminary
reopening
The head of Turkey's
Religious Affairs Directorate,
Ali Bardakoðlu, has said
debates surrounding a Greek
Orthodox seminary will be
resolved within the frame-
work of religious freedom.
146
PHOTO: ALÝ ÜNAL
January 20: January 22:
Yet another subversive HRW calls democratization initiative
plot against AK Party 'most hopeful indication' in 2009
exposed Human Rights Watch (HRW) has
A Turkish daily exposed an alleged praised the democratization initia-
military plan to topple the govern- tive, noting that it was committed
ment. Titled the Balyoz to ensuring the human rights of
(Sledgehammer) Security Kurds in Turkey in its World
Operation Plan, the plot included Report 2010.
subversive plans such as bombing
mosques during Friday prayers and January 28: Turkish FM calls for 'Eurasian
crashing a Turkish jet. Barzani urges Turkey's union'
Kurds to support gov't Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet
January 18: January 21: initiative Davutoðlu has called for the estab-
Pope gunman released after three ‘Cosmic' search finally Iraqi Kurdish leader Massoud lishment of an EU-like union
decades in jail ends after 26 days Barzani has encouraged the encompassing the Eurasia region.
Mehmet Ali Aðca, who shot and A civilian search of the Special Kurdish people of Turkey to sup-
injured Pope John Paul II and killed Forces Command's Tactical port a governmental initiative to February 5:
a Turkish journalist, was released Mobilization Unit facilities as part settle the Kurdish question. Ergenekon suspect sentenced to
from prison after more than 29 of an investigation into an alleged four years in prison
years behind bars. military plot to assassinate Deputy January 31: Lt. Col. Mustafa Dönmez was sen-
Prime Minister Bülent Arýnç ended. Cage looms large on EU's tenced to four years in prison and
PHOTO: KÜRÞAT BAYHAN
radar screen expelled from the military on
Top court annuls law on The EU is closely following a secret charges of concealing equipment
military tribunals plan allegedly drafted by some mil- belonging to the Turkish Armed
The Constitutional Court over- itary officials to intimidate Turkey's Forces (TSK).
turned a reform package that non-Muslims, a report has
requires civilian courts to try mem- revealed. February 8:
bers of the military in peacetime. FEBRUARY Council of State once again rules
February 2: against ending coefficient system
European court rules against reli- The 8th Chamber of the Council of
gion box in ID cards State has once again ruled to retain
Fourth indictment demands life
Listing religions on identity cards is a system that uses a lower coeffi-
sentence for 5 naval officers
in violation of human rights, the cient to calculate the university
Ergenekon prosecutors have com-
top European human rights court admission examination scores of
pleted a fourth indictment in case.
has ruled. graduates of vocational high
The new document demands life
schools.
sentences for five naval officers.
February 4:
Gov't finally does away with covert February 10:
January 19:
military protocol European Parliament urges imme-
PHOTO: TURGUT ENGÝN
OSCE: Turkey blocking 3,700 Web
The Interior Ministry has diate pullout from Cyprus
sites, reform needed
announced that the Protocol on Members of the European
Europe's main security and human
Cooperation for Security and Public Parliament endorsed an annual
rights watchdog said that Turkey
Order (EMASYA) has finally been report on Turkey's progress in
was blocking some 3,700 Internet
quashed. The controversial pro- 2009, which calls on Turkey to
sites for "arbitrary and political rea-
tocol empowered the military to immediately begin the withdrawal
sons" and urged reforms to show
intervene in social incidents of Turkish troops from the northern
its commitment to freedom of
on its own initiative. part of the island.
expression.
147
chronicle
SPRING 2010

February 11: February 15: MARCH

PHOTO: MEHMET YAMAN

NGOs launch concerted effort to
promote new constitution
A newly formed organization call-
ing itself the Civilian Solidarity
Platform (SDP) calls for the
replacement of the Constitution
with a new one. The platform is
made up of 350 civil society groups.
February 12:
Armenian gov't authorizes
Sarksyan to rescind signature from
Turkey protocols
The Armenian government
approved draft amendments to the
country's Law on International
Agreements, paving the way for
Armenia to recall its signature on
two protocols signed with Turkey.
February 14:
Ergenekon probe to shed light on
anti-Ecevit plot
February 21:
Olmert: Turkey acted Artists pledge support
responsibly, fair in for democratic initiative
Syria-Israeli talks Prime Minister Recep
Former Israeli Tayyip Erdoðan hosted
Prime Minister the country's leading
Ehud Olmert said artists for a breakfast at
Turkey acted with Prime Ministry to
responsibility and request their support
fairness as a medi- for the democratic ini-
ator in the indirect tiative.
peace negotiations
between Israel and February 22:
Syria. Former force commanders
detained in largest
February 16 - 17 Ergenekon wave
Ergenekon probe A total of 49 retired and
heats up with testimo- active duty military officers
ny of two admirals were detained as part of the
The interrogation of investigation into the
Adm. Kadir Saðdýç and Sledgehammer and Cage
Adm. Mehmet Fatih Ýlðar plans. Among them were
marks the first time two former commanders of the
commanders with the rank of admi-
land, air and naval forces. Seven of
March 1:
Government speeds up work for
visa-free travel to Europe
Prime Minister Erdoðan has said
the government is planning to
make the improvements necessary
for all Turkish citizens to be able to
travel to European Union member
countries without a visa.
PM vows to bring reform package
to Parliament by end of March
Prime Minister Erdoðan has said
that the AK Party plans to submit a
comprehensive constitutional
reform package to Parliament by
the end of March.
March 2:
General Staff acknowledges
authenticity of coup plot
The General Staff has announced
ing of the Roj TV, a mouthpiece
that new evidence has been

PHOTO: ALÝ ÜNAL

A suspected plot to remove former
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit from
office through a fake medical report
is set to be investigated as part of
the Ergenekon probe.
ral testify to civilian prosecutors.
Erzincan prosecutor arrested in
Ergenekon probe
Police arrested Erzincan Chief Public
Prosecutor Ýlhan Cihaner on charges
of "membership in a terrorist organi-
zation." After the arrest, the
Supreme Board of Judges and
Prosecutors (HSYK) stripped four
Erzurum prosecutors of their powers.
February 19:
Baþbuð assigned officers to
Arýnç's house, recording says
Some military officers who were
detained last year on suspicion of
an alleged plot to assassinate
Deputy Prime Minister Bülent
Arýnç were on a mission
assigned to them by Chief of
General Staff Gen. Ýlker
Baþbuð, according to a voice
recording.
the generals were later arrested.
February 24:
Top brass debates state of
military after wave of arrests
Chief of General Staff Gen. Ýlker
Baþbuð gathered generals at an
extraordinary meeting to discuss
the position of the armed forces in
the wake of detentions of military
officers.
February 28:
Thousands gather calling for an
'early finale' to Feb. 28 period
Tens of thousands of people
throughout Turkey denounced
the Feb. 28, 1997 unarmed mili-
tary coup d'état on its 13th
anniversary with mass rallies,
calling for an end to the influence
of the postmodern coup, which
was intended to last for "a thou-
sand years."
acquired pointing to the authentici-
ty of an alleged plot against the AK
Party and the Gülen movement.
General, prosecutor
named as terror sus-
pects in indictment
An indictment into
jailed Erzincan Public Prosecutor
Ýlhan Cihaner accuses the prosecu-
tor and Third Army Commander
Gen. Saldýray Berk of terror
charges.
March 4-5
PKK receives heaviest
blow in Europe
The Belgian police launched
orchestrated raids on premises
suspected to belong to the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
and detained dozens of senior
members of the outlawed group.
Police also halted the broadcast-
of the PKK.
US committee passes
Armenian resolution
The House Foreign Affairs
Committee voted to brand the
killings of Armenians by Ottoman
forces during World War I as
"genocide." Turkey responded by
recalling Ambassador Namýk Tan
to Ankara for consultations.
Turkey recalled its ambassador
from Sweden on March 11 after
the Swedish parliament took a
similar move.
March 8:
41 dead as strong quake
strikes Elazýð
A powerful earthquake with a pre-
liminary magnitude of 6 hit eastern
Turkey on Monday, killing 41 peo-
ple and knocking down houses in
six villages.
March 10:
Gov't advances reform bill on
minors despite opposition
Justice Minister Sadullah Ergin met
with opposition parties to ask for
their support for legal amendments
to improve the condition of minors
who are jailed for participation in
illegal demonstrations. The
planned bill received support --
albeit partial -- from the MHP, but
the CHP claimed that such a regu-
lation will pave the way fort he
retrial of the terrorist head,
Abdullah Öcalan.

PHOTO: KÜRÞAT BAYHAN

148 149
PHOTO: MEHMET YAMAN
chronicle
SPRING 2010
March 11:
Police discover munitions-laden
truck in Turkish capital
Ankara police discovered a muni-
tions-filled truck in Ankara, which
later turned out to be carrying
weapons belonging to the Turkish
Armed Forces (TSK) to a military
facility in the Turkish capital.
March 12:
Abant Platform convenes to discuss
democratization
The Abant Platform convened in
Ankara with the participation of
individuals from every segment of
the society to discuss recent gov-
ernmental efforts for a more demo-
cratic Turkey in a meeting titled
"Democratization for a New
Societal Consensus."
March 14:
PM Erdoðan meets with Roma in
festive atmosphere
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoðan met with nearly
10,000 Roma in Ýstanbul as
part of a government initia-
tive to find solutions to
problems faced by the
ethnic minority with a
festive atmosphere.
March 16:
Venice Commission: Lausanne
doesn't limit Bartholomew's right
to 'ecumenical' title
An advisory body to the Council of
Europe has stated that it sees no
reason, including the 1923 Treaty of
Lausanne, for Turkish authorities
not to address the Fener Greek
patriarch by his historical and gener-
ally recognized title, which is "ecu-
menical."
3 admirals, 30 other suspects
accused of gang membership in
Cage indictment
An Ýstanbul court has started exam-
ining an indictment against suspects
linked to a subversive plan called the
Cage Operation Action Plan that
calls for jail sentences of up to 15
years for three admirals on charges of
membership in a terrorist organiza-
tion. The document also seeks
lengthy prison sentences for 30 other
defendants on similar charges.
March 18:
Gov't takes major step to
remove Sept. 12 coup legacy
The AK Party finalized its work
on the constitutional reform
package. The package contains
strong steps to confront the
remnants of Sept. 12,
1980 coup period.
PHOTO: KÜRÞAT BAYHAN
150
PHOTO: KÜRÞAT BAYHAN
PM's Armenian deportation April 11:
remarks draw ire locally and EU chides judicial, military
abroad
interventions in plot probe
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
The European Union did not mince
Erdoðan's remarks about the possi-
words about the Turkish judiciary
ble deportation of undocumented
and military in its March report.
Armenian workers from Turkey after
Strongly criticizing judicial and mili-
US and Swedish lawmakers passed
tary interventions into ongoing judi-
resolutions branding the World War
cial investigations, the 100-page
I-era killings of Anatolian
report argues that Chief of General
Armenians as genocide have
Staff Gen. Ýlker Baþbuð's remarks
sparked reactions both in Yerevan
will impact the outcome of ongoing
and in Ankara. March 22: Parliament, the last-minute changes
trials.
Gov't visits opposition seeking sup- to which make it possible for mili-
28 detained in new Ergenekon wave port for constitutional reforms
tary top brass to be tried by a civilian April 14:
The National Police Department The AK Party had talks with opposi- Prosecutors complete indictment
court.
detained 28 individuals in raids tion parties on the constitutional on anti-government plot
across nine provinces as part of the reform package to ask for coopera- Civilian prosecutors have completed
Ergenekon probe.
APRIL
tion on the planned changes to the April 1: an indictment regarding a suspected
Constitution. Pakistan and Turkey vow to cooper- military plot against the AK Party
ate in trade, condemn terrorism and the faith-based Gülen move-
March 26: Pakistan and Turkey agreed to ment. The indictment points to for-
Socialist leader Schulz: Package is a enhance their strategic partnership mer Ýstanbul Mayor Bedrettin Dalan
step closer to EU and its values by signing several accords on invest- as the prime suspect in the alleged
The leader of the Socialists in the ment, agriculture and planning dur- plot.
European Parliament, Martin ing President Abdullah Gül's visit to
March 19: Schulz, has said the latest proposal Pakistan. April 18:
Court accepts Cage indictment, first to amend the Turkish Constitution Erdoðan takes up democratic initia-
hearing due in June is a step closer to the European Sledgehammer probe receives tive with prominent writers
An Ýstanbul court ruled to accept an Union and its values. severe blow with releases Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
indictment against suspects linked Twenty-eight suspects in the inves- Erdoðan met with Turkey's leading
to the Cage plan that calls for jail March 29: tigation into the Sledgehammer writers and figures of the world of
sentences of up to 15 years for three Gül hosts jurists, political scientists coup plot have been released, in literature to talk about the govern-
admirals on charges of membership to discuss constitutional reform what has been seen as a major blow ment's democratic initiative pro-
in a terrorist organization. The sus- President Abdullah Gül met with to the probe into retired and active gram, which seeks to expand the
pects will stand trial on June 15. prominent Turkish jurists and politi- duty military officials who allegedly cultural rights of minorities, and
cal scientists at the Çankaya presi- plotted a coup d'état. particularly Kurds.
March 21: dential palace to exchange views on
Democratic initiative yields peace- the government's plans to amend April 8: April 19:
ful Nevruz the Constitution. Military's cover-ups might have led Constitutional amendment
No major incidence of violence to deadly mine blast marathon begins with tension
erupted in Turkey during Nevruz March 30: The Van Chief Public Prosecutor's There was tension in Parliament as
celebrations of this year, particularly Constitutional reform package office has revealed that a land mine deputies started discussing AK Party
thanks to the government's democ- submitted to Parliament explosion which killed seven soldiers 30-article amendment package. The
ratization project, also known as the The government submitted the con- last year was caused by mines plant- debate and voting processes are
Kurdish initiative. stitutional reform package to ed by the Turkish military. expected to take 15 days.
151
DICTIONARY SPRING 2010
PHOTO: TURGUT ENGÝN
Contextualized
dictionary
Balyoz plan
of Turkish
The Balyoz (Sledgehammer) plan
is a military coup plot allegedly pre-
pared by a number of military staff in
cooperation with civilian elements in
bureaucracy, the judiciary, the media
politics
and business circles. The plan, which
seems to be the work of the
Ergenekon terror organization,
aimed to bring chaos to Turkey as a
result of an economic downturn and
public terror, leading to a military
THE DICTIONARY OF TURKISH POLITICS IS A CONSTANTLY EVOLVING intervention in politics. The 5,000-
AND EXPANDING DICTIONARY. WITHOUT KNOWING THE RECENT ENTRIES page plan was disclosed by the Taraf
daily, and the authenticity of the
INTO THIS DYNAMIC DICTIONARY AND WITHOUT TAKING THE SHIFTS IN
documents has been certified. The
THE MEANINGS OF ALREADY EXISTING ENTRIES INTO CONSIDERATION IT
commanders of ground, air, naval
IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE A GRASP OF WHAT IS GOING ON IN
A
and gendarmerie forces in the year
TURKEY. THE TPR PRESENTS 12 NEW ENTRIES IN THIS DICTIONARY. 2003 were all involved in the prepa-
ration of the plan. Former 1st Army
DENIZA SOKOLOVA
Commander Gen. Çetin Doaðan,
ction Plan to Fight Reactionaryism retired Gen. Engin Alan and retired
An alleged military plot devised by the General Staff Operations Division's Information Support Col. Altan Batýbay are among the 50
Department against the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the faith-based Gülen retired and active military officers
movement. A wet signature belonging to Col. Dursun Çiçek appears on the document. A who are accused of taking part in
copy of this document was first made public on June 12, 2009 by the Taraf daily. The mili- preparing the Balyoz plan. The plan
tary prosecutor's office launched in investigation but discontinued the probe, saying the included creating an economic reces-
document was not prepared in any department of the General Staff. Chief of General sion, blowing up mosques during
Staff Gen. Ýlker Baþbuð referred to the document as a "piece of paper" in his initial
Friday prayers, setting off explosives
statements. The original document was sent to the Ýstanbul Prosecutor's Office by an
in a submarine displayed at a muse-
anonymous sender. The authenticity of the signature has been confirmed by the Ýstanbul Council of Forensic
um during a visit by young students,
Medicine (ATK), the Ýstanbul Police Crime Laboratory and the Scientific and Technological Research Council of
turning stadiums into open-air pris-
Turkey (TÜBÝTAK).
ons to hold people who challenge
coup troops and overthrowing the
government.
Cage Operation
Action Plan
Another military plot made public
by the Taraf daily on Nov. 19, 2009
that had Turkey's non-Muslims as its
main target. The Cage plan included
plots to assassinate non-Muslim
community leaders and place bombs
in the offices of minority newspapers
to discredit the AK Party govern-
ment. The Cage plan, allegedly pre-
pared by a group inside the Turkish
Naval Forces, was exposed during a
police raid on the office of retired
Maj. Levent Bektaþ as part of a probe
launched after the discovery of a
large arms cache in Ýstanbul's
Poyrazköy district in April 2009 with-
in the framework of the investigation
into Ergenekon, a clandestine organ-
ization accused of plotting to over-
throw the government. Bombing
museums visited by children and
putting the blame on religious
groups was also one of the steps the
document listed to carry out the
Cage plan. Lt. Col. Ercan Kireçtepe,
whose signature appears on the doc-
ument, was arrested during April's
Poyrazköy investigation. Adm. Kadir
Saðdýç was to operate the cells that
were going to carry out the assassi-
nations.
153
PHOTO: ALÝ ÜNAL
Cosmic room
The name used to refer to facilities
of the General Staff where archived
documents that are classified as state
or military secrets are kept. A limited
number of individuals have authority
to access the cosmic room, which
includes detailed plans that lay out a
strategy during a potential war situa-
tion. In December 2009 a search was
carried out based on a warrant issued
by the Ankara 11th High Criminal
Court in the cosmic room of the
Special Force Command as part of an
investigation into an alleged assassi-
nation attempt against Deputy Prime
Minister Bülent Arýnç. On Dec. 19,
2009 two officers of the Tactical
Mobilization Group of the Special
Forces Command were detained
after being captured as they stood
watch near Arýnç's house in Ankara's
Çukurambar neighborhood. The
search of the cosmic room was con-
ducted by civilian judge Kadir Kayan.
It lasted 26 days.
Democratic initiative
(Kurdish initiative)
This is an initiative to expand the
freedoms of the Kurdish population
in Turkey. The project, which was
started and planned by the AK Party,
aims to solve Turkey's long-standing
Kurdish problem. This initiative
DICTIONARY SPRING 2010
PHOTO: KÜRÞAT BAYHAN

PHOTO: ALÝ ÜNAL

PHOTO: KÜRÞAT BAYHAN

People's Party (CHP) Deputy
Chairman Onur Öymen delivered a
speech praising the violent suppres-
sion of the 1938 Dersim Rebellion.
Öymen asked: "Did mothers not
weep during the Dersim Rebellion?
Nobody said 'Don't let mothers
weep' at the time, nobody said 'Let's
stop the fight'." His words were a
retort to the democratic initiative's
unofficial motto, "Don't let mothers
brought up many discussions among
weep" to emphasize the importance
the political elite and the public in
of ending the separatist terrorism of
Turkey, and while the interior minis-
the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
ter calls the initiative a "national
Öymen's words caused widespread
unity project," the opposition parties
reaction in Tunceli, the town where
in Parliament do not support the
the Dersim Rebellion took place.
government on the initiative. In
Posters depicting Öymen as Adolf
order for public skepticism to
Hitler were put up in the streets of
decrease and the AK Party to win
Tunceli, an overwhelmingly Alevi
support for the democratic initiative,
town in the East.
a series of conferences under the title
"Turkey meetings" were organized E- memorandum
across the country. The idea of the The name given to a memoran-
dum that was published on the offi-
"Turkey meeting" was to inform the
cial Web site of the General Staff of
public about the initiative. As part of
the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) on
the democratic initiative (Kurdish ini-
April 27, 2007, warning the govern-
tiative), the government launched a
ment to stop alleged Islamist activi-
state-run Kurdish TV station and
ties. Later, the chief of General Staff
issued a pardon for PKK terrorists
of the time, retired Gen. Yaþar
who did not take part in armed fights
Büyükanýt, said he had penned the
with the Turkish army. The initia-
memorandum. It was largely seen as
tive's reforms, which include easing
restrictions on Kurdish lan-
guage and culture, are also
PHOTO: TURGUT ENGÝN
Wet signature norms. Some say the claim that there
The term refers to Col. Dursun is neighborhood pressure on the sec-
Çiçek's wet signature that appears on ular segments of society is at the
the original copy of an alleged mili- same time neighborhood pressure on
tary plot against the Justice and the religious segments of the same
Development Party (AK Party) gov- society. Thus we "become" what we
ernment and the faith- are. According to him, the meaning
based Gülen movement. of neighborhood pressure, or
The plot in question, titled societal pressure, is an "eye"
the Action Plan to Fight that is skeptical toward
Reactionaryism, was "individualism" or "differen-
an attempt to intervene in the presi- also been accused of meeting with
exposed by the Taraf daily tiation." A study supported
dential election process to block the "Munzur." Lawyers from the
last year. Even though Col. by the Open Society
presidency of Abdullah Gül. It is Erzincan Bar Association and the
Çiçek denied that his sig- Institute (OSI) and Boðazici
viewed as the most intrusive act of Universal Jurists' Platform have filed
nature was on the paper, University aimed to show
the military in politics since the Feb. criminal complaints against Ersin,
the tests conducted by the the harmful effect of neigh-
28, 1997 unarmed military interven- accusing him of pressuring secret
Ýstanbul Council of borhood pressure on secu-
tion that had brought down the witnesses to recant their testimony.
Forensic Medicine (ATK) larists in the Anatolian
then-government in power. Nearly 20 secret witnesses have pro-
and the Scientific and region. The case study
Secret witness vided valuable information to prose-
concluded that many
A secret witness for the Ergenekon cutors in the Ergenekon trial. Technological Research
Council of Turkey secular people living in
case code-named "Munzur" was Ergenekon
The name given to an investiga- (TÜBITAK) contradicted his denial. Anatolia felt obliged to pretend to be
reportedly offered a bribe by a "religious" in order to secure their
The ATK report states that the sig-
Republican People's Party (CHP) tion that was launched with the dis-
nature on the paper had been com- jobs in public offices or bids in public
deputy from Izmir, Ahmet Ersin, to covery of 27 hand grenades in a
pared to and matched with 20 tenders. The study was criticized,
withdraw his testimony. "Munzur" shanty house in Ýstanbul's Ümraniye
other signatures known to belong with people saying that it was not
testified against Col. Çiçek, whose district on June 12, 2007. The house
to Col. Çiçek, all signed on differ- objective because the people inter-
signature was on a military plot belonged to Oktay Yýldýrým, a
ent dates. Chief of General Staff viewed were only secularists and
against the AK Party government retired noncommissioned army offi-
Gen. Ilker Baþbuð attracted much opponents of the AK Party. "Mahalle
and the faith-based Gülen move- cer currently under arrest in relation
criticism for referring to the docu- baskýsý" is difficult to define, but
ment. Ersin has also been accused of to the case. Documents jointly
ment as a "piece of paper" and many claim that although it might
meeting with another secret witness, labeled "Ergenekon-Lobby" were
accusing the Taraf daily of working exist in society, it is not related to the
"Fýrat," who he asked to also seized in Ümraniye during
to undermine the armed forces. AK Party coming to power.
withdraw his testimony. police raids.
"Fýrat" claimed that he was These documents revealed that Neighborhood pressure

important for advancing the given the opportunity to the organization called itself (Mahalle baskýsý)
country's application for meet with Supreme Court "Ergenekon." The investigation is The term "neighborhood pres-
membership in the EU, of Appeals Chief Prosecutor now known as the Ergenekon terror sure" (mahalle baskisi) was
according to the Copenhagen Abdurrahman Yalçýnkaya organization investigation. coined by Professor Serif
criteria. and the court's president, Nationalist circles have been Mardin. He claims that neigh-
The Dersim Rebellion, Hasan Gerçeker, who unnerved by the nomenclature used borhood pressure is a mecha-
Onur Öymen ("Don't would dismiss any future by the members of the organization nism that society uses to
let mothers weep") criminal action against him and the probe, as Ergenekon is the "make" its members.

PHOTO: MUSTAFA KÝRAZLI

In a parliamentary session if he retracted his testimony name of an ancient legend that Through neighborhood
on the government's demo- in the case. Erol Tinastepe, explains how the Turkish nation pressure, the society
cratic initiative, Republican another CHP deputy, has came into being. constructs the

154 155
BOOK REVIEW SPRING 2010
Exclusive dualities and lack
of class dimension in the
politics of economy
EMRE BARCA
In his Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of
Turkey in the 1980s, Galip L. Yalman criticizes
overdependence on state/market and state/society
dualities in explaining societal transformations that
(should) take place in different parts of the world. In
fact "state" and "market" have come to symbolize
not only alternative strategies of capitalist develop-
ment but also rival premises upon which dominant
classes in different capitalist countries have attempt-
ed to build hegemonic strategies so as to maintain
various forms of the state and/or regimes. Yalman
treats both ends of this duality as myths: the myth of
the state that signified the defeat of rational
thought, and the myth of the market as a
self-regulating entity. Yalman's critique
of these conventional dualities is based
Galip L. Yalman, on the absence of a third, but strategic,
Transition to concept, i.e., class. The insertion of
Neoliberalism: The class into the conceptual framework
Case of Turkey in
the 1980s, Ýstanbul:
radically changes the orientation of the
theoretical debate. Of course, Yalman
Ýstanbul Bilgi
University Press, garners the actual data for his theoreti-
2009. 432 pages. cal alternative from the transformations
of the Turkish economy, particularly in
the 1980s.
Operating with non-synonymous
supplements such as state versus civil
society, totalitarianism versus free world
or political versus economic rationality, the dichoto-
mous logic of state/market and state/society is a cen-
tral theme in the history of liberal discourse. But this
dichotomous logic is not as clear and explanatory as
it claims. Needless to say, the clarity manifested by
binary oppositions is only possible in certain histori-
cal conditions since they are necessary for the pres-
entation of politics as the ideal resolution of real
conflicts. In this sense, as an ideological investment,
156
the picture presented via a duality has the advantage
of claiming itself as inevitable, trans-historical and
even natural. But an absolute perception of dualities
may also blur the inescapable relations and interac-
tions between the two ends of the suggested duality.
In fact there is a great deal of confusion about the
nature of state-market relations, stemming from the
fact that they are usually conceived as separately
existing, if not always antagonistic, entities. This
conception has given way to diametrically opposed
modes of explanations that purport to account for
the same historically specific phenomena.
The Jan. 24, 1980 stabilization program widely
accepted as the turning point of the Turkish
economy was nothing but the initial
step for necessary structural adjust-
ments, which were to be seen repeat-
edly throughout the 1980s as well as
the following years. Also, the rhetoric
of structural adjustment as a prescrip-
tion for the problems of the Turkish
economy would remain more or less
the same, with an added dimension of
frequent reference to corruption of pub-
lic economic enterprises and a celebra-
tion of the new market-directed system
and export-oriented economy.
Nevertheless, the reason behind the long life of this
rhetoric in Turkey was the temporary failures in
realization of the project of adjustment. The state
was responsible for these failures since the state was
expected to be the main actor in this process. This
was a paradoxical role for the state as it necessitated
an anti-state state. The state itself was expected to
display a decisive will to leave the realm of economy
to market agents for the sake of the liberal ideals of
the public good. In this context, the unacceptably
strong Turkish state was seen as the main structural,
traditional obstacle against adjustments of the 1980s economy. Defining an autonomous state that is
and the reason behind the stillborn character of free immune to classes and particularly to the bour-
market and civil society, but on the other hand, tak- geoisie, the economic rationale orders the state to
ing the central role in the duality, the state was limit itself vis-à-vis the interest-seeking groups for
responsible for the anti-state policies on the way to the sake of a stable economy and a wealthy society.
a new economy. Nonetheless, in this ideal picture of clear-cut and
Indeed, the state tradition's major role in Turkey's hierarchical dualities, it is hard to understand the
social formation is a subject to be considered both as
one of the primary forces of success and, at the same
time, one of the weakest characteristics. What is at
material reason behind the state's self-limitation, if
we assume that the state is an unnecessarily power-
ful, pure present and autonomous being. The analy-
stake here is not putting into question the centuries- sis of class, with such an established position, makes
long history of state tradition in Turkey, but the sense only in "the end of history." But Yalman
implication of this dichotomous logic that tends to shows, at least for a critical understanding of the
assume that the state is a pure present, all-powerful state and market and their interrelations, how a seri-
and autonomous being in accordance with any ous account of class is still indispensible, since social
appearance of dualities within Western metaphysics. class is not only an entity defined by economy: "In
Moreover, from light and dark to other words, it is crucial to recog-
good and bad, from masculine and nize that classes are formed by the
feminine to white and black, these The judgments of collective struggles which forge the
dualities assume a hierarchical order international finan- unity of their positions as class
in themselves. In this picture, the cial markets on the subjects, which are by no means
state would be a hierarchically dark 'independent' from the processes
power, although paradoxically it has
creditworthiness of of state formation." (p. 17)
the central role of any development, Third World coun- Another significant concealment
even in this new configuration in tries seem to deter- operated by this duality seems to
which it was ordained to limit its be the international and global
mine the fate of
own power. aspects of structural adjustments
Yalman spares a whole chapter their economies, and the subsequent policy changes.
(State and Market: A Critical which are unpre- Ignoring not only the historical
Evaluation of the Empiricist and pared, vulnerable aspect of the concepts and cate-
Subjectivist Approaches) on this gories of state, market and society
and unstable but also history itself, these
duality where he emphasizes the
concealment of a third concept, i.e., accounts have recourse to interna-
class, which seems to have become only an insignifi- tional relations, mostly in daily and technical analy-
cant chapter in the textbooks of social sciences. ses. Neither the mystical stories of globalization told
Insisting on the policy changes predicted and imple- by the experts nor an unquestioned anti-
mented by the rhetoric of structural adjustment, Americanism circulated in the public can provide an
Yalman tries to understand the dynamics of societal understanding of the hand-to-hand relation of glob-
transformations with a certain reference to class alization and liberalization. It is interesting to see
interrelations rather than the aforementioned duali- how this duality and the rhetoric of structural
ties. This would require taking into account the adjustment make these forces visible and invisible at
social and economic practices in a historical perspec- the same time. What is at stake here is not to stress
tive, for human actions do have a historical and the significance of the global character of the
material aspect irreducible to their conceptuality. International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
The dualities in question tend to work without any Bank (WB) but to critically approach the analyses
reference to inequalities of wealth and to social that tend to interpret the policy reforms as almost
classes with conflicting material interests and con- entirely domestic and as if they should be necessari-
ceal the concept of class, which is not tantamount to ly enforced top down by modernizing bureaucrats
interest groups in the analysis of the politics of who have a famous history of reform in Turkey. In
157
BOOK REVIEW SPRING 2010
this context, the global mapping, which excludes
some parts of the world such as Africa and the
Middle East, has assigned the goal of development
and structural adjustment to Turkey as well as to
some Third World countries. The judgments of
international financial markets on the creditworthi-
ness of these countries seem to determine the fate of
their economies, which are unprepared, vulnerable
and unstable.
Indeed, the discourse of globalization has claimed
that liberalization is not only in the interest of the
wealthy Western countries, but also of the develop-
ing countries. Nonetheless, it is hard to understand
the pressures of rapid policy changes over these
countries at the international level. Although it is
one of the model debtors of these international eco-
nomic institutions with its gradually increasing for-
eign debt, one can see the traces of this sort of vul-
nerability in the economic crises in the post-1980
period of the Turkish economy. As the new configu-
ration of the state/market duality requires, the
responsibility of these crises encumbered only the
degenerated institutions and enterprises of the pow-
erful state in the discourses of media experts and
politicians.
It is not surprising to see the ideological invest-
ment that presents democratization and liberaliza-
tion as necessary, complementary, if not synony-
mous, elements, for the wealth of the nation as well
as of the world, Yalman observes. In this manner, as
the descriptions of the sui generis state of Turkey
imply, the political reality of Turkey is defined by the
158
BOOK REVIEW SPRING 2010
lack of a civil society. Leaving aside further discus-
sion of this typically orientalist identification, it has
to be emphasized that civil society had to be
reduced to market agents since it is almost nonexist-
ent in any oriental society. In these accounts of
democratization necessarily complemented by eco-
nomic liberalization, the democratization should
begin from the economic realm and aim to empow-
er the weak market agents against the powerful
political (statist, if not authoritarian) rationality.
As it is seen above, Galip L. Yalman's efforts to
understand the transition of Turkey from a so-called
state-centered system to neoliberalism in the period
of the 1980s include not only the history of the dif-
ferent sides of this societal transformation but also a
rigorous critique of the classical understanding par-
ticularly dominated by the differing but supplemen-
tary dualities mentioned above. Emphasizing the
missing concept of class and focusing on the rela-
tions between the state and the bourgeoisie, Yalman
stresses the significant role of the politics of econo-
my in restructuring the state in Turkey. In this sense,
as we repeatedly discuss the contemporary societal
and political transformations of Turkey via the con-
cepts of state, military intervention, judicial power,
bureaucracy, elitism, center-periphery and so on,
Yalman's approach displays what is missing in our
analyses: class. Despite the theory-dominated con-
tent of the book, 71-page bibliography of the work
alone makes it worth keeping on the bookshelves of
people interested in economics, liberal theory and
the history of the Turkish economy.
Insight Turkey delves into
the depths of Turkish politics
Q
MÜZDELÝFE BÜÞRA KAÇAR not aimed at de-Westernizing. It indi-
uarterly academic journal Insight Turkey cates that the structure of foreign policy
covers topics concerning the current making has changed in the direction of
situation in Turkish domestic and a more civil, transparent and participato-
foreign policy in its 12th volume. ry process. The cultural and regional
An article by Emrah Uslu from Yeditepe dimensions of Turkey's EU accession are
University draws a picture of the Turkish politi- addressed in an article by Elizabeth
cal scene in 2009. It analyzes the leading matters Shakman Hurd of Northwestern
in Turkey as civilian-military relations, the University. The article suggests that
Kurdish question, the issue of conservative doubts about the Turkish candidacy
social networks and the Ergenekon investigation derive from secularism and these hesita-
by placing them against the consequences and tions make obvious European apprehen-
implications of the 2007 national elections. This sion over religion, particularly Islam. The
article claims that the Justice and Development author concludes that for Turkish acces-
Party (AK Party) was formerly allied with liberal sion to the EU to succeed, not only must
intellectuals and the EU by pursuing the EU Turkey achieve European standards but also
reform process to restrict the power of the mili- Europe must redefine itself and modify stan-
tary. With the fact that the AK Party gained a dards to allow for multiple ways of life. Another
high percentage of the Kurdish vote in 2007, a article in the journal written by Adam Balcer of the
common ground was found between the military Demos Europa Centre for European Strategy and
and the governing party to cooperate on the Kurdish Piotr Zalewski of the European Stability Initiative
question. The author assesses the domestic political probes Turkish accession to the EU in terms of the
developments of 2009 as the year of opportunity for latest members of the EU. The article claims that the
approaching the Kurdish question but a lost year for EU's newest members will play a crucial role in
bridging the secular and conservative gap. Turkey's accession if Turkey educates the new mem-
An article by Kýlýç Buðra Kanat from Syracuse ber states' elites and ensures that they remain per-
University examines the changes in Turkish foreign suaded over what might be a long and arduous nego-
policy and answers the question whether these tiation process. From the EU-10 perspective, increased
changes are an indication of turning away from the cooperation with Turkey might create positive results
West. The author agrees that there is a transformation in a number of policy areas, including immigration,
in Turkish foreign policy but says the differences are energy security, trade and foreign affairs.
'Dersaadet: Ýstanbul, The Gate to Bliss'
A
book that appeared in Paris 100 years ago titled ‘Déri Sé'adet ou Stamboul,
Porte du Bonheur’ by Adolphe Thalasso has recently been published in Turkish
and English by Ýstanbul Kültür A.Þ., the Ýstanbul Municipality's publishing house.
The Turkish-English edition is called ‘Dersaadet: Ýstanbul, The Gate to Bliss.’ A
Levantine born in Ýstanbul, Thalasso tells us of the lives of Ýstanbul's inhabitants of
the 19th century. Illustrations by royal artist Fausto Zonaro accompany the writings
of Thalasso. Some of the illustrations scattered throughout the text are preliminary
studies for his well-known paintings, and some leave the impression that they were
created exclusively for the book.
159
 INTERVIEW SPRING 2010
Last word with Henri Barkey
MESUT ÇEVÝKALP
How do you see the latest contention in Turkey?
Some people regard them as a contestation between
the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the
military, but I tend to see them as a contention between
society and the military. This is not something new.
Who came to power in the democratic elections in 1965
after the coup in 1960? The Justice Party (AP), i.e., an
extension of [Adnan] Menderes. In 1980, Kenan Evren
urged to the people not to vote for [Turgut] Özal's
party, but the people carried him to power. The military
should have already understood this resistance.
So you say that nothing has changed?
What is new is Turks' increasing resistance
Prof Henri J. Barkey to military and judiciary conceptions of poli-
thinks that the cur- tics. The resistance comes from a more
rent contestation in
diverse population, a strengthening civil soci-
Turkey is between
the society and the ety and other unlikely characters, the most
military and not important of which is Taraf, a small daily
between the AK Party newspaper that has decided to take them on.
and the military. He
Why is the military so uneasy about this
observes that
Turkish society has
process?
always resisted the In the military, you say "yes, sir" whether
military’s political something is right or wrong. The military has
role. “The military
never been questioned in Turkey. They have
should have already
always had the last word. But now the military is being
understood this
resistance,” Barkey questioned, and this is something difficult to accept.
says. Where will this change take Turkish democracy?
In Turkey, many politicians governed with the secure
knowledge that they had the tanks behind them in case
they messed things up. For this reason, politicians in
Turkey have grown lazy and more importantly irre-
sponsible. As Turkey steers away from military tutelage,
its democracy will develop and people will start to ques-
tion the politicians as well.
Some see this as a secularists vs. Islamists struggle.
This is a change against the pro-status quo elites, not
against secularists. Proponents of the change are not
conservatives only. There are also some liberals, civil
society groups, some segments of the media and for the
first time universities. Arrayed against them is a mental-
ity best encapsulated by the extremely statist, extremely
pro-status quo Republican People's Party (CHP).
Some of the liberals could not position themselves
properly in this struggle. Why?
Actually, all of the liberals are against the status quo,
military tutelage and statism, and they want change, but
160
they cannot find in the AK Party what they are looking
for.
How is the AK Party deficient?
There were both good and bad consequences of the
Ergenekon process. For instance, you cannot explain in
the West how [Mustafa] Balbay was kept in jail for one
year without charging him. On the other hand, children
who throw stones are jailed on charges of being terror-
ists. The AK Party failed to change this archaic and suf-
focating legal system even though it has been in power
for almost eight years.
How will the latest arrests made under the
Sledgehammer (Balyoz) probe affect the process?
It is too early to tell whether these arrests will
solidify the attitudes of hard-line officers who
are itching to topple the government, or that
the era of coups and other forms of unconsti-
tutional attempts at overthrowing the system
is over. All signs do point to the latter; there
is still a significant threshold to cross and that
is the expected change in military command
in August.
Don't you think that there are big defects in
explaining the Ergenekon process to the
world?
I am not sure it is the job of the government per se to
explain the Ergenekon case although if it is causing con-
sternation a better job could have been done through
the Justice Ministry. The main problem is the govern-
ment's attitude to the media in general; the perception
that it is locked in a struggle with Doðan media is a ter-
rible image to project.
How can it be changed?
First, the judicial reform must be implemented. The
judicial reform may turn out to be an opportunity that
will settle many issues both in terms of the EU process
and Ergenekon and the government changing the mis-
conceptions about itself.
What would be the worst mistake the AK Party could
make?
Unless Turkey manages to devise a new constitution
to replace the one imposed by the military in 1982, it
will face increasing instability and likely become prone
to erratic foreign policy behavior.
*Henri J. Barkey is a nonresident visiting scholar at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a
professor of international relations at Lehigh University.