Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26702 October 18, 1979 (93 SCRA 462)
JUAN AUGUSTO B. PRIMICIAS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA, PANGASINAN, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.
Ambrosio Padilla Law Offices for appellee.
Primicias, Castillo & Macaraeg for appellants.
DE CASTRO, J.:
Facts: On 13 March 1964, Ordinance 3 (Series of 1964) was enacted by the
Municipal Council of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. Ordinance is patterned after and
based on Section 53, 5 paragraph 4 of Act 3992, as amended (Revised Motor
Vehicle Law). On 20 June 1964, RA 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic
Code) became effective. Section 63 explicitly repealed Act 3992.
On 8 February 1965, Juan Augusto B. Primicias was driving his car within
Urdaneta when a member of Urdaneta’s Municipal Police asked him to stop. He
was told, upon stopping, that he had violated Municipal Ordinance 3 (S. 1964),
for overtaking a truck.” The policeman then asked for plaintiff’s license which he
surrendered, and a temporary operator’s permit was issued to him. This incident
took place about 200 meters away from a school building, at Barrio
Nancamaliran, Urdaneta. Thereafter, a criminal complaint was filed in the
Municipal Court of Urdaneta against Primicias for violation of Ordinance 3 (S.
1964).
Due to the institution of the criminal case, Primicias initiated an action for the
annulment of said ordinance with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction
for the purpose of restraining defendants Municipality of Urdaneta, Mayor Perez,
Police Chief Suyat, Judge Soriano and Patrolman Andrada from enforcing the
ordinance. The writ was issued and Judge Soriano was enjoined from further
proceeding in the criminal case. On 29 June 1966, the Court of First Instance
Lingayen held in its decision that the ordinance was null and void and had been
repealed by RA 4136. The writ of preliminary injunction against Judge Soriano
definite and permanent. It also restrained Perez, Suyat, and Andrada from
enforcing said ordinace throughout Urdaneta, ordering them to return the
plaintiff’s driver’s license, and to pay the cost of the suit. The public officials
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the ordinance is valid.
Held: The general rule is that a later law prevails over an earlier law. The
ordinance’s validity should be determined vis-a-vis RA 4136, the “mother statute”
(not Act 3992), which was in force at the time the criminal case was brought
against Primicias. Further, when the Municipal Council of Urdaneta used the
phrase “vehicular traffic” (Section 1, Ordinance) it did not distinguish between
passenger cars and motor vehicles and motor trucks and buses. Considering that
this is a regulatory ordinance, its clearness, definiteness and certainty are all the
more important so that an average man should be able with due care, after
reading it, to understand and ascertain whether he will incur a penalty for
particular acts or courses of conduct. Thus, as the Municipal Council of Urdaneta
did not make any classification of its thoroughfares, contrary to the explicit
requirement laid down by Section 38, RA 4136. The Ordinance refers to only one
of the four classifications mentioned in paragraph (b), Section 35. The
classifications which must be based on Section 35 are necessary in view of
Section 36 which states that no provincial, city or municipal authority shall enact
or enforce any ordinance or resolution specifying maximum allowable speeds
other than those provided in this Act. The ordinance, therefore in view of the
foregoing, is void.
The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision.