1.

In Re: Rodolfo Manzano 166 SCRA 246 (1988)

Facts:
RTC Judge Manzano was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice pursuant to EO 856 as amended by EO 326 by then Governor Rodolfo Farinas. He sent a
letter to the SC stating that before he accepts the appointment, he would like to request for the
issuance of a Resolution (1) authorizing him to accept his appointment and assume and discharge
the powers and duties attached to it (2) that his membership to the said Committee is not violative
of the Independence of the Judiciary or may be considered as an abandonment of his position in
the RTC (3) to consider that his membership in the committee is a part of the primary function of
an Executive Judge. However, on examination of the EO’s, it was revealed that among the
functions of the Committee is to review complaints against any apprehending officer xxx who may
be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper
authority for the appropriate action. Another function is to recommend the revision of any law or
regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice.

Issue:
Whether or not the acceptance of Judge Manzano of his appointment in the Committee will violate
the doctrine of separation of powers

Held:
It is evident from the stated functions of the Committee that it performs functions that are
administrative in nature which are defined as those involving the regulation and control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature xxx.
Quasi-Judicial has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in
the work of any Administrative Agency which adjudicates disputes & controversies involving the
rights of parties within its jurisdiction.
Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct &
affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the Legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by
the organic law of its existence.
Under Art.8, Sec12 of the Constitution, the members of the xxx courts xxx shall not be designated
to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
While the doctrine of separation of powers is xxx not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, xxx it
cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume position xxx which are non-
judiciary in character xxx if he is expected to be confined to the task of adjudication. xxx He is not
a subordinate of an executive or legislative official.
This does not mean that the RTS judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility. An
RTC judge should render assistance to said Committees xxx but only when it may be reasonably
incidental to the fulfilment of their judicial duties. Hence, the request was denied.
 2. Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 PHIL 143

FACTS:
In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of members of the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas. On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of
canvassers proclaimed Angara as member- elect of the National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935,
he took his oath of office. On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which
in effect, fixed the last date to file election protests. On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the
Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among other things, that
Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said
position be nullified. On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6)
stating that last day for filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of
contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction
to hear the case.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
(2) Whether or not the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly
RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle of a system of government. It obtains not
through a single provision but by actual division in our Constitution that each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from that fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely restrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination
in the workings of the various departments of the government. In case of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral and constituent units
thereof. The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational
way. When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in
truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution.

HELD: The Electoral Commission is acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National
Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935,cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of
protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
 3. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC vs POEA
Facts:
Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accident in
Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under Executive Order No. 797 and
Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the
complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but by the Social Security System and should have
been filed against the State Insurance Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after
considering the position papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The decision is
challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the
case as the husband was not an overseas worker.

Issue: Whether or not POEA has jurisdiction

Held: The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under Executive Order
No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the overseas employment of
Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National Seamen Board created earlier under
Article 20 of the Labor Code in1974. Under Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is
vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving
employee-employer relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
contract workers, including seamen."
The award of P180, 000.00 for death benefits and P12, 000.00 for burial expenses was made by
the POEA pursuant to its Memorandum Circular No. 2, which became effective on February 1,
1984. This circular prescribed a standard contract to be adopted by both foreign and domestic
shipping companies in the hiring of Filipino seamen for overseas employment. But the petitioner
questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-
delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given the POEA to
promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization, the regulation represents an
exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation. The model contract prescribed
thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by the employer.
The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract
is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said
authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas
Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices.” The petition is dismissed, with
costs against the petitioner.
 4. Casibang vs Aquino

FACTS:
Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales,
Pangasinan in the 1971 local elections. Herein petitioner filed on November 24, 1971 a protest
against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on the grounds
of as the proceedings continued, the 1973 Constitution was ratified. Yu moved to dismiss the
election protest of petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same
in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which —Section 9 of Article XVII
[Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has intervened in the
case. Respondent Yu contended that "...the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local
governments have been superseded by the 1973Constitution. Therefore, all local government
should adhere to our parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution
under its Article XI." He further submitted that local elective officials have no more four-year term
of office. They are only in office at the pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New
Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII. CFI ruled in favor of Yu.

ISSUE: WON the protest case is a political question

HELD:
No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any act of the incumbent
President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the
respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means
in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure". The
only issue in the electoral protest case dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground of political
question is who between protestant — herein petitioner — and protestee — herein respondent Yu
— was the duly elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally entitled to enjoy the rights,
privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto and to discharge the functions, duties and
obligations of the position. If the protestee’s election is upheld by the respondent Judge, then he
continues in office; otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner. That is the only consequence
of a resolution of the issue therein involved — a purely justiciable question or controversy as it
implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said
right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. Any judgment to be
made on that issue will not in any way collide or interfere with the mandate of Section 9 of Article
XVII. Neither does Section 2 of Article XI stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with
a political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact
a local government code.
 5. Belgica vs. Ochoa, GR 208566, Nov. 19, 2013
NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers
for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office
of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone
into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the
"Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional
G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer
For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of
the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary
funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional
and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the
Court issue a TRO against respondents
UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease
and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino)
and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions
on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d)
accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds,
and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund,
are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the
areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of
powers. Congress ‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny
and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond
that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.
Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly
allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of
powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay
down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President ‘s authority with
respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide
latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows
him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”