c



c
 



 !""!#$% %#"&'"()#"('(*
 +
Q. This was an unusually deep displacement of mud from the well, was it not?
A. It was deeper than normal due to the fact the lockdown sleeve needed weight below it to get set
properly.

 !""!#$% %#"('#")"#*
 +

Q. Well, the additional pressure, given the depth of this well, the displacement of mud with water in a
volume much greater than is standard, is normal?
A. We were going to do a displacement at roughly 8,300 feet. It was a little bit -- well, it was deeper than
normal. We got MMS approval to set the plug deeper, purely so we could set the lockdown hanger
properly and that's it.

,,- !#.!#$% %/0'#&)/ '#

Q. You testified earlier that one of the unusual aspects of the displacement here was down to 83 -- A. 67,
that's true. Usually its 300 feet below the mud line, and 8367 is much further down than usual. Q. When
you say usual, it that what the rig was usually doing, the 300 below mud line and not a -- A. As a general,
yes, 300 feet below the mud line was a pretty typical displacement. Q. So that's another difference? A. It
is. It is.


,,- !#.!#$% %.1'#.)"&
Q. What did you understand the reason to be for the 8367 [foot displacement]?
A. I don't know. Q. You never understood that? A. No.

 2 !"$!#$% %#( '#&)#(/'0

Q: How far below the mud line do you usually displace to sea water?
A: Normally 500 to 800 feet. You usually put the surface plug, the top of the surface plug is normally at
500 feet below the wellhead.
Q: Have you ever gone below 3,000 feet below the mud line in displacing sea water?
A: No, I haven't.
Q: Have you ever known that to be done in any of the negative testing in which you have been involved?
A: No, ma'am.
Q: Have you ever heard of it being done by BP in tests where you were not directly involved? A: No,
ma'am.

 3- !"$!#$% #$'"()##'"

Q. How many lockdown sleeves have you been involved with running before, sir?
A. This would have been my first one to set.

 3- !"$!#$% #('#1)#0

The timing of running a lockdown sleeve was not really a concern of ours.

 3- !"$!#$% " '#.)"/'#

Q. What's your experience running the Dril-Quip casing hanger in the lockdown sleeve? How many have
you in your experience?
A. Well, in my past, I have been through quite a few casing jobs, but I have never ran the casing in the
hangers as far as my responsibility goes.
 3- !"$!#$% (0'1)#1
Q. After displacement was completed, at some point later -- after that fact, after that event, then the
lockdown sleeve was going to be set; is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Now, have you seen it done differently on other rigs; that is, that you set the lockdown sleeve first? A.
In the mud, in the drilling mud. It would have been just another way of doing the same thing.

 3- !"$!#$% (.'#1)"#

Q. In your past experience, have you commonly seen that plug, that cement plug, to be set at a much
shallower depth?
A. Yes, I have seen it set a more shallower depth, and I have also seen it where there's no lockdown
sleeve.

 3- !"$!#$% 1&'/)"&41(' )"(

Q. Did that cause you any concerns with displacing the well before either one of the actuator ring or the
lockdown sleeve are put into play?
A. Not concerned, no. -- safety. Not concerned as far as safety. It might have aggravated, you know, a
little bit because we were not going to do it with the mud when we knew we had everything clean and
swept out. But it was not a safety concern. It was just the possibility of maybe having to make an
additional trip to go in and jet and wash.
Q. And that additional trip that you are referring to takes time. ... you have heard the expression "Time is
money." I assume you have heard that before.
A. We all have.
Q. And that is particularly true on a rig where BP is paying close to $1 million a day; isn't that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And so additional time to make an additional trip is a factor to consider. Do we want to extend the time
or not? That is one of those factors that businessmen look at when they make business decisions.
A. And that is all that was in my mind, because if we have a bad reading, then I would have to stand up
and fight that battle, or my group would, you know, to have an additional trip run.

 3- !"$!#$% %0$' )""

Q. But the displacement was somewhere around 8300 feet, right?
A. Yes.
Q. A lot deeper than you had probably seen before, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And also, this is the first time that you had seen a procedure that calls for displacement before setting
down the lockdown sleeve; right?
A. It stood out with me. But I have a little more interest in this one than I have before, and my concern is I
don't want -- anything to -- that might be -- that could possibly cause some sort of a problem with the
setting of a lockdown sleeve.

 3- !"$!#$% %01'#&)""

A. I asked why couldn't we go ahead and do [the lockdown sleeve] in mud, and I can't even -- I can't tell
you who I was having the discussion with. But it wasn't going to happen. We were going to go through in
the sequence that we were given.
Q. So whoever you were talking to just said this is the way it is going to be done, period.
A. Pretty much


 3- !"$!#$% % ('"1) 1'#0
Q.Mr. Skidmore, did you ever mention to someone on the back deck of the Bankston, the boat that
evacuated you,that at sometime prior to the blowout, that you had send an e-mail to tbe BP office asking
for a snakebite kit? You were overheard saying that. I want to ask you about that, what that means.
A. Oh, I hate it, but I did. ... this would just be in reference to just old sorry luck you might be having at the
time.

5(!"#!#$%6c--- %& '"#)"1-7&/'#)(

I did seek out the driller, the off-tour driller, to ask him his opinion as to what he thought might have
happened. He said that he believed the only possible answer was the seal assembly failed, and with the
riser displaced with just seawater and no mud weight, when the seal assembly failed, the well kicked,
pushing the gas and the mud up through the water and onto the rig floor.

#$! !#$% "$ '.)""

Q. Do you know how many times -- well, have you ever been involved in a well where the negative test
was conducted 3300 feet below the mud line?
A. Not to my recollection.
Q. Are you aware of any other BP well having been negative tested below that mud line?
A. I'm not familiar with all the wells that we do drill.
Q. Are you familiar with any negative test anywhere on any well done that far below the mud line?
A. I personally am not.

-758#$! !#$% #(&'##)#/*
 +

Q So in this drilling prognosis that we have here, we have the lock-down sleeve and the lead impression
tool being run ahead of the cement plug and the temporary procedure, temporary abandonment, correct?
A Yes, sir. I believe this was a document that, to my knowledge, was a draft procedure.
 c


c
  72c7%- 

/!"&!#$% %1$'#)#$*9:##+
Q. Have you ever heard of a term called "the bladder effect"?
A. Only in the testimony.
Q. So before you read any of the testimony from these hearings, you had not heard of the bladder effect
as a way to explain why one might find 1400 pounds of pressure on the drill pipe and none on the kill
line?
A. No, I haven't.
 c


c
  72c7-;

--<-1!"/!#$% %0'#.)"1% '#)/
Around 5:00, we were requested by our cement unit for the negative test to monitor the well. After the first
attempt we were unsatisfied with it. I was directed to shut in from the well. At that point pressure
increased to 1,400 PSI. Around five minutes later I was instructed to, by the driller to open up from the
well and got about 15 barrels back and was instructed to shut in from the well again...Probably around
7:00.

,,- !#.!#$: /&'"")"1

I briefly explained to [Kaluza] how the rig had been conducting their negative tests, so he just wanted --
Bob wasn't the regular company man on the Horizon.

,,- !#.!#$% / '")/

Q. So what was your understanding of why Mr. Kaluza was asking you how the rig does a negative test?
Did you see any approved test from BP at all?
A. I didn't see an approved test from BP. I don't know what Mr. Kaluza's state of mind was, so I don't
know why he was asking.

5(!"#!#$%6c--- %(1'&)"1-7(0'#
A. The only thing that I can think of is there was, during the pre tour meeting, confusion as to the
procedure that they were going to use for that particular operation they conducted on the well.
Q. And what operation was it?
A. The setting of the seal assembly and displacing the riser and performing a negative test.
Q. And when was that pretour meeting held?
A. At 11:00, 11 a.m.
Q. And when you say "confusion," do you have any more details about it?
A. The OIM was explaining the procedure one way that he had gotten from BP, and the BP company
man, who was sitting directly beside me, said that that was not the correct procedure, he
had a different procedure; and the driller, Dewey Revette, was saying that we'll just kind of go with it as
we go with it.
Q. And so --
A. "We'll get it worked out. Let's get up there and go to work."

5 !"&!#$% %"&#'")#$

Q. Is that a safety issue if there is a negative pressure in the drill shack?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. Why is it a safety issue?
A. Because the rig floor is considered an intrinsically safe area, but the drill shack is not. Anything inside
the drill shack can create a spark, which would ignite combustible gas.

5=/!"(!#$% #(/'"$)#(.'#
Q. Mr. Winslow, generally speaking, when a negative test is being performed for a Transocean customer
and that customer's company man is present for the test, who decides whether or not the test has been
passed?
A. The customer.

5=/!"(!#$% "&#'"")"&"'&
Q. You were asked very recently about a BP negative test. Were you ever aware that BP in any of the
wells your rigs had been on with BP as the well site owner, have you ever seen a published negative test
protocol from BP?
A. No.

; 81!"/!#$% 0$'#.)0#'#$

A. In our Transocean manual, I don't believe you can find a negative test. This was something that Jimmy
Harrell, as OIM, always insisted on.
Q. That's what he said.
A. Did he? That's the way it was. He was that adamant about doing it. And we knew that he was not
going to deviate from that. And he had some bad experiences on another rig, another time, years back,
I'm not a hundred percent sure, but it taught him a lesson and he said that day he would always do a
negative test. So maybe in some people's mind it could have been overkill, but it was standard procedure
for us to do that. It was something that we felt more comfortable with by doing it.

; 81!"/!#$% 01'#()"(

Q. We have had a lot of discussion with the negative test. The first test wasn't up to the OIM's standards.
What was the difference between the first and second test?
A. Well, I can't tell you anything about the second test, other than the toolpusher told me it was okay. And
then also Don Vidrine told Jimmy that it was a good test, so I have no knowledge of that second test.

;<--1!" !#$% %&$'#1)&1'""

Q. In the course of conducting your negative test, how do you line up your valves? You said Mr. Vidrine
wanted to do a second negative test. How did you conduct the first one?
A. You do it by bleeding off back to Halliburton up your drill pipe. You pump seawater into your tail pipe
and all the way back up to above your annular with your spacer.
Q. Okay. So then what did you do? You close your annular, keep your mud above your annular,
seawater in the back side?
A. Yes. You hold the mud in the riser with the annular closed.
Q. So it is not full, it is not completely to a seawater gradient at that point in time, correct? Because you
have seawater down the drill pipe, but you are holding it down on the back side. You have no common
back -- on the annular all the way back to the surface?
A. You have seawater in the drill pipe, and you have seawater in the kill line. Either one would be seeing
the same pressure as far as from that depth of 8367.
Q. What did he want to do on the second test?
A. He just wanted to come up the kill line, you know. I guess to make sure everything wasn't plugged and
use one line.
Q. If you did it the second time coming up the kill line on the back side, how did you do it the first test?
A. We done it up the drill pipe.
Q. So you had the drill pipe, you had water in the drill pipe all the way down to 83 --
A. That's correct.
Q. -- 67. And then you had it back up to the annular, correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And then you had your annular closed, and you had your choke and kill lines closed?
A. (Witness nods head affirmatively.)
Q. But then putting it up the choke line gave you a seawater gradient on the front side on your drill pipe
and on the back side?
A. That's correct.
Q. So the first test you did didn't give you a true seawater gradient because you were stopping it on the
back side?
A. Well, it would. Still from that depth, I mean, seawater -- you got seawater, if it is going to flow, it will
flow because you have seawater all in the drill pipe.
;<--1!" !#$% #$('#&)"1
Q. That night, were you aware of any test results at the well?
A. I was. Don Vidrine, the company man for BP, told me they had a good negative test for 30 minutes.
Q. Are you aware of any other test results?
A. That is all he told me.
Q. Were you aware of any others, sir?
A. I know the senior toolpusher told me he talked to the toolpusher on the drill floor before I got in the
shower and said they had a good negative test.

;<--1!" !#$% %#$0' )#$ '"(

At that pre-tour meeting, I believe you testified there was a discussion between you and the company
man, Mr. Kaluza, about the necessity or desirability of conducting a certain test. Do you recall that?
A. Yeah, a negative test that I didn't see in the plan.
Q. Is it correct that you wanted to have a negative test performed on the drill pipe?
A. I would not displace without a negative test being performed.
Q. Did Mr. Kaluza agree you could perform such a test?
A. Yes. They didn't really have no problem with it. They just left it out of the plan, the forward plan.
Q. Was the negative test that you and Transocean wanted to have performed at that 11:00 a.m. meeting
subsequently performed?
A. Can you repeat that?
Q. Sure.
Was that test performed?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that test a successful test in your judgment?
A. I thought it was. They wanted to do another. I reckon there's nothing wrong with doing a second test.
Q. So the BP person, Mr. Kaluza, wanted a second test?
A. I didn't say that.
Q. Who wanted that?
A. I think Don Vidrine wanted to.
Q. Was that, at the time, then performed?
A. Yes, it was done.
Q. And was that test also successfully passed?
A. Yes. He told me -- I did meet him. He said it was successful for 30 minutes.

/!"&!#$% %# '"#)#/'1*9:>>+

Q. Do you know if there is mandatory pressure function testing on the BOP?
A. Yes. We have to do a function test every seven days, and that's all components on the BOP. We
pressure test the BOP every 14 days.
Q. To your knowledge, had the BOP on the DEEPWATER HORIZON passed all of those tests leading up
to the incident?
A. Yes, they had.

-/!" !#$% #('.)#/*
 +

Q. And is it your understanding -- well, what is your understanding about how a well site leader knows
how to perform a negative test, the actual procedure for it?
A. They develop procedures on the rig, on the specifics, that this gives them the objectives, the depth to
do it at, and they develop specific procedures on the nuts and bolts of how to actually do the negative
test.

-/!" !#$% %#1('#.)""%#11'"1)#10'0*
 +

On original procedure for well calling for negative test w/base oil:
A. My understanding of this is that if you are going to be setting the shallower plug, you would be doing
the negative test at the wellhead with your base oil. ...
Q. So you are actually testing it --it would be a negative test, but it would not be to the same low pressure
as with the base oil?
A. I believe you are correct, yes. The base oil would give you more of a negative test, that is correct.

% !""!#$% #0#'&)#0"'"*
 +

Q You were asked a question about discussions, telephone conversations with the rig on April 20th. I
believe the question was specifically about the negative test, but were you involved in a telephone call
with the rig on the morning of April 20th?
A Yes, we had our 7:30 rig call.
Q All right. And during that 7:30 call, was there any discussion about the negative test that was
anticipated to be performed that day?
A Yes, we did discuss a negative test.
Q All right. What was discussed about the negative test?
A We were clarifying that the negative test -- I'm sorry. I said that wrong. It was brought up that the
negative test was permitted with the MMS to actually be conducted on the kill line, and that was really the
only discussion, was to make sure that we did run the kill line, so we would be in compliance with the
permit that we submitted to the MMS.

 !""!#$% #01'#")"1*
 +

Q All right. So at least in this instance, it was the guidance from shoreside BP personnel that instructed
the rig how to line up this test; is that correct?
A No, that's not actually correct.
Q Well, perhaps you can help me understand then. Did I understand you to testify that in the morning
meeting on April 20th, you and others on the morning call had instructed the rig that based on the permit,
the tests, the negative tests for this well had to be run through the kill line; is that correct?
A They were instructed that they had to monitor the test on the kill line.
Q All right. And so that guidance, that is the guidance that came from BP personnel, correct?
A That is correct.

 !""!#$% %0&'1).*
 +

Q. Did Mr. Kaluza and Mr. Vidrine both approve the negative test that was performed during the
temporary abandonment procedure on this well?
A. Yes, they did.

 !""!#$% #10'0)#0*
 +

Q. So you do not believe that the procedure that was actually followed by your folks as set forth in, and I
think it's an ops note by Mr. Morel on April 20 was, in fact, a deviation?
A. No, ma'am. If the negative test would have been done I'm assuming -- well, if the negative test would
have been done any higher up in the well than 8367 then whenever we did the displacement it would not
be giving an accurate negative test.

 !""!#$% #1 '#()"&*
 +

Q. How does a well site leader know how the negative test should be performed?
A. He gets a procedure.
Q. And who does he get the procedure from?
A. The engineers.
Q. And the engineers, whose engineers?
A. BP's.
,,?- !"$!#$% . '0)#0
Q. Did you participate in a task-specific think plan prior to doing negative test?
A. Yes. . . . To the best of my recollection, it was one of the MI mud engineers [that led the think plan] . . .

,,?- !"$!#$% %./'#")"$

Q. . . . the performance of the negative test. What two different types of negative tests were discussed?
What method did Transocean want to use and what method did BP want to use?
A. To the best of my recollection, Transocean wanted to monitor the test of the drill pipe. BP wanted to
monitor that kill line as per the APD.

,,?- !"$!#$%#$$'.)#"
I discussed [the results of the negative test] with Don Vidrine later in the living quarters, and he said the
test was good, and they would continue with the displacement.

,,?- !"$!#$% %#&$'.)#"
Q. Can you describe the procedures that you observed before leaving the rig floor for the negative test
that you observed? What did you observe was actually done?
A. Displace the choke and kill lines with seawater, displace down the drill pipe with seawater and into the
annulus above the stack, and close the annular.

,,?- !"$!#$% %#1('# )"(

Q. Did Mr. Vidrine indicate to you whether he viewed this negative test as having passed?
A. That was the short of the discussion, was that the negative test was good, and they were going to
continue with the displacement.


-
-(!" !#$%>-2= %)<@ )
>$$$"#&$0
Each rig does negative tests their own way.

-
-(!" !#$%>-2= %)<@ )
>$$$"#&$0

Target was a hydrostatic pressure reduction of 2350 psi.

-
-(!" !#$%>-2= %)<@ )
>$$$"#&$ 

Ops note directs results of positive test should be sent to Houston but no similar requirement for negative
test.

-
-1!#$!#$%>-2= %)<@ )
>$$$"#&&1

Neg Test: Base oil - why changed to sea water - not enough for what wellbore would actually see if
statement in procedure allows for this and an operations email was sent. Increase ___ to simulate on
shoe under balance.

-
-1!#$!#$%>-2= %)<@ )
>$$$"#&(1

Once they got approval from MMS, did calculation that base oil in choke and kill lines would not give
enough differential pressure at shoe. The sea water to 8,367 would do this. Well Site Leader said we set
better plugs in sea water.

-1!"/!#$% %./'()/
During the negative test, they felt like they lost approximately 60 barrels of mud through the annular. They
increased the regulator pressure to 1900 and it stopped leaking.
c;0!# !#$%,  <-7 --
Our statement refers to . . . our crews were asked to participate within a portion of the negative test.
During the negative test sea water is actually pumped into a number of the tubulars to be able to simulate
a reduction in hydrostatic pressure that will take place once mud is unloaded from the well. Through that
sequence of establishing a sea water column in the well, a request was made to our crew to simply bleed
fluid off. At the direction of the well owner, we bled pressure and fluid back to the tanks on the cement
unit. We then closed the well in. We reported those findings to the well owner and he proceeded with
additional log work on the rig. But in no way were we in an ability to be able to confer either success or
failure from that limited participation in the test.
Q. Are you saying then, that the test was not sufficient or was inadequate to make a determination?
A. In being able to perform a negative test, again . . . a sea water . . . a column of sea water is pumped
into the well and a differential pressure is established. Tubulars are actually sealed off through
performing the negative test. And when a negative test is successfully performed, that differential
pressure can be released and there should be no flow of the well.
Q. That was the case here?
A.We did not have enough information to be able to determine just what was the state of the fluid
columns that had been established in the well. Flow would not be a positive indication of a good test.

A-7!c;0!# !#$%,  <-7 --

%"" )"/
Tommy Roth:
You know, Halliburton did not perform those tests.
Sen. N. Gautreaux:
Who performed those tests?
Tommy Roth:
Those tests were performed under the direction of BP. And as such, we weren¶t in a position to be able
to evaluate . . .
Sen. N. Gautreau:
Who was the subcontractor?
Dan Ferguson:
Transocean and BP performed those tests.
Sen. N. Gautreaux:
Ok. Under their direction, ya¶all performed the test?
Dan Ferguson:
That¶s correct.
Sen. N. Gautreaux:
Based on their specs. Correct?
Dan Ferguson:
Yes.

?B8(!"/!#$%>-2= %)<@ ) $"$"$(4)<@ ) $"$"$#4)<@ ) 

$"$# (
Discussed with Wyman (toolpusher) he was comfortable with negative test procedure on annular; went
through procedure with Wymon.

-758#$! !#$% #1"'.)#1&'(*
 +

Q So that you're having a sea water gradient?
A And that was on the morning of the 20th. Because of this, I think here, there was conversation from the
rig, "Okay. Exactly how are we going to do the negative test," because there was this confusion, and then
basically it was relayed to them through Mark. We discussed it. John Guide and I both concurred to
basically do it the way it was outlined on the "ops" note to clear up this confusion that was floating around
on the procedure.
Q Okay.
A And that basically -- And then I checked with Mr. Hafle after I saw the "ops" note from Mr. Morel to
confirm that we were in compliance -- that the rig was comfortable with everything and that we were in
compliance with what we had submitted to the MMS.

-758#$! !#$% #1&'#()"$*
 +

A I think we were in compliance. I mean, the tests that we performed was the most stringent tests of
everything here. With the sea water down, the base water does not give us the equivalent differential, and
what we did was the most stringent and proper thing to do.

-758#$! !#$% #.0'")#. '0*
 +

Q And you also testified that one of the reasons, if I understood you correctly, that you wanted to confirm
that the rig was okay with this "ops" note was that you had understood that there was some confusion on
the rig?
A In the morning call, the rig had voiced, "Okay. Exactly how do we want to do this?" They had known
about the conversations that were going on, and it was raised to us, "Guys, can you give us" --"let us
know exactly to make sure we're all on the same page concerning how to go forward."
Q Who on the rig expressed that request?
A I'm not sure which company man. It was in the morning call, whoever the company person was that
was handling that there. I'm still new enough that people --that names and voices hadn't quite gotten
there. Q Without a name then, it was your understanding that on the morning of the 20th, the company
man, BP's company man on the rig was asking Houston to clarify how this negative test should be run; is
that correct?
A They were clarifying basically -- Yes, as far as how we wanted to do it, yes.

-758#$! !#$% "$'# )"#' 

Q. I don't mean to put words in my mouth. If I misstate it, correct me. But I understood you to say that
there was some discussion of some uncertainty in the procedures; is that right?
A. Yes. The morning call of the 20th, the well site leader on the morning call had requested him to clarify
exactly what the plans are around the negative testing. And Mr. Hafle was asked to follow up with the rig
and to make sure everybody was in agreement and on the plans forward and also checking regulatory
issues.
Q. Now, you instructed Mr. Hafle to follow up on that, correct?
A. Yes, I did.

-:  !"&!#$% &('#()""

I don't know of any standard [negative test procedure that the industry follows].

-:  !"&!#$% %1&'# )"1

But all of the quantitative data tells us that that kill line has got substantial amounts of this heavy mud in
that are what is holding the pressure back. That we are not doing a test with a line filled with seawater.
We are doing a test with a line that's got this dense stuff in it, which is not what we really wanted to do.

9-(!" !#$%>-2= %)<@ ) $"$&&04)<@ ) $"$&&.4)<@ )

 $"$&("
Transocean guys had dismissed it as anything serious and somewhat joked about [Don's] concern [with
the results of the pressure test]; Another interviewer's notes: "found it humorous that Don was concerned
for a long time; Kaluza convinced first, Don watched kill line then became convinced it was dead (another
notetaker states, "[Don] monitored kill line-finally got comfortable since this line was zero.")
c


c
  72c7%- 

 !""!#$%  '.)# *
 +
Q. Did Mr. Kaluza tell you whether Transocean's personnel had told him during the negative pressure test
that pressure on the drill pipe was something that they had previously seen which was common to them?
A. He said that they saw pressure on the drill pipe during negative tests in the past and it was not
uncommon.

,,?- !"$!#$% .$'"&).#'# 

Q. Who was leading the discussion on what bladder effect was?
A. Jason Anderson, a Transocean toolpusher.
Q. And what was Mr. Anderson trying to describe the bladder effect to be?
A. That the heavier mud in the riser would push against the annular and transmit pressure into the
wellbore, which, in turn, you would see up the drill pipe. . . . From my position, I think it is a valid
explanation. It's the first I'd seen a negative test, so . . .
Q. It was the first time you had ever heard of "bladder effect"?
A. Yes.

,,?- !"$!#$% #.$'#)#.#'#(

Q. When you decided that you thought [Jason Anderson's Bladder Effect explanation] did not make
sense, what new information had you learned and why then didn't it make sense?
A. Because the kill line and the drill pipe are opened up to the same annulus. So, in theory, you should
see the same pressure. . . . The only thing that does not make sense to me today is that the pressure
seen on the drill pipe should also be seen on the kill line.

,,- !#.!#$% #$$'#$)#0

Q. Did you hear something like a bladder effect or some strange explanation [for the 1400 psi negative
pressure test result]?
A. I didn't hear that, no.
Q. Have you ever heard of a bladder effect? A. No. I have not heard of a bladder effect.

-
-(!" !#$%>-2= %)<@ )
>$$$"#&$ 

They (on rig) knew about pressure on the drill pipe but observed no flow from kill line; not reported to
town; toolpusher & driller said it was due to annular BOP affect.

 2 !"$!#$% #1$'#")#(

Q: Have you ever heard of something called a "bladder effect"?
A: Not before this happened.

?B8(!"/!#$%>-2= %)<@ )
>$$$#&.(.(

Jason Anderson said "Don and Bob, this happens all the time" [referring to what he referred to as the
bladder effect, with respect to the pressure building up on the drillpipe].

?B8(!"/!#$%)<@ )
>$$$#&.1$(
Jason Anderson said that annular element will compress the drill pipe. He said all company men do it
differently but this [the bladder effect] happens every time annular puts pressure on fluid below.

?B8(!"/!#$%>-2= %)<@ )
>$$$#&.1$1

Driller (D Revette) said he had seen [the bladder effect] before as well.

?B8(!"/!#$%>-2= %)<@ )
>$$#&.1" 

I believe there is the bladder effect, we didn't get a 2,350 psi negative test so didn't have full test.

9-(!" !#$%>-2= %)<@ ) $"$&&(

Kaluza was told by Sr. Toolpusher; they called in annular compression and said it was normal.

9-(!" !#$%>-2= %)<@ ) $"$&0

When [Don] arrived [at the Drill Floor] there was 1400 psi on DrillPipe. He said they shut the DrillPipe
back in and it had come back up. He questioned this and was told by the team in the driller's doghouse
that this was annular compression-he had heard about this but had not seen it before.
 c


c
  72c7% -


-3<;/!"1!#$% ##'#1)"#
And we did a negative test. And probably about that time, 5:00, 5:30 is when me and Chris Pleasant
made the relief. And we was going to call town and talk to them about maybe possibly doing another
negative test and that's when I left Chris there on the rig floor.



-3<;/!"1!#$% #$&'")#(
Q. It was your understanding from what the toolpusher told you that it was the BP man, Bob Kaluza, who
was going to call town to see about maybe doing another negative test?
A. That's correct.
Q. What did you understand him to mean when he said the BP man was going to call town? What is
town?
A. Call the main office in town, just to tell them what the results were. Whether the pods are negative, I
don't know, and wait on a decision.

-
-(!" !#$%>-2= %)<@ )
>$$$"#&$0

If negative test unsuccessful the decision tree says contact John Guide; on that night Mark Hafle was
called but was unaware of drillpipe pressure; was told they had an issue that was resolved; he got the
impression there was a good negative test.

-
-(!" !#$%>-2= %)<@ )
>$$$"#&# 

Regarding negative test: Minor Decision-Hand; Bigger-John Guide; on Apr 20, they did call Mark Hafle
but was not told about pressure; "First one didn't look just right but second ok."

-1!"/!#$% #$#'1)/
After the negative test, Don told Bob to go call the office and tell them we are going to displace the well.
Bob said okay.

-758#$! !#$% "#$'#.*
 +

Q Did [Vidrine] ever tell you at any time on April 20th, April 21st, May 1st, any time, did he tell you that he
had a conversation with Don Vidrine in which they concluded that there had been a successful negative
pressure test?
A The only conversation I had with Mark was immediately after I had received a call about the casualty
when the event took place asking what was going on. I called Mark to see if he had heard anything, and
in that conversation, he made a comment to me that he was talking to Don, and Don said, "Something is
going on. I got to go," and that's all I knew. So there was something, he conferred with me that he had
had one conversation, but I do not know what it was about.

9-(!" !#$%>-2= %)<@ ) $"$&&1

Monitored flow 30 mins. Called Hafle to discuss.

9-(!" !#$%>-2= %)<@ ) $"$&&0%)<@ ) $"$&(&

Hafle called back while displacement +/- 9 pm; not sure why he called. Curious about how things going.
Another interviewer wrote, "Just before sheen test, Hafle calls to check __ tell Hafle negative test was
squirrly(?). Told Hafle no problems."

9-(!" !#$%>-2= %)<@ ) $"$&&.%)<@ ) $"$&( %)<@ )
 $"$&1"
1835-1950 Discussion. Called Hafle about ___ (not 1400). On the interview notes typewritten summary,
it states, "I then went to call Hafle" without description of the call. Another interviewer wrote, "called Hafle
to discuss surface plug, said still watching stripping(?) tank, dripping had stopped and everything looked
fine."

9-(!" !#$%>-2= %)<@ ) $"$&(/

I talked to Hafle about the 1400-said that if there had been a kick in the well we would have seen it.
 c


c
  -


 !""!#$% /$'"&)/#'&*
 +
Q: Had you ever seen a 450-barrel spacer made up of LCM?
A: The spacer- The answer to that is "no," but I need to clarify, that this spacer that was already pre-
mixed in the pits was not a particle-based LCM pill.

 !""!#$% %#(/')#/)#(.'"*
 +

Q. Did you know that these two materials were not designed for spacer applications?
A. Our drilling fluid contractor, M-I, ran pilot tests to insure that they would be adequate for a spacer. And
our in-house BP mud guys also checked to see if it was adequate to use in the spacer and they both
came back and said it was adequate to use as a spacer.

,,?-1!# !#$%>-2= %)<@ ) $"$""0

[From BP notes on 5/17/10]: "why using LCM as spacer - leftover heavy LCM fill instead of dumping it,
used as spacer"

,,- !#.!"$#$% (0'#.)( '""

Q. Why was there such a large spacer?
A. The day I got to the rig I made the two LCM pills. And BP had wanted to use those instead of trying to
build another spacer. And when we combined the two fluids we had a very large spacer. That was vetted
through BP's environmental people. The drilling engineers were involved. Our fluid people were involved
and their fluid people were involved, and so that's why we used so mcuh.
Q. I think you also in that same report indicated that it was 16 pounds per gallon?
A. That is correct.
Q. Is it common to have a loss circulation material as a spacer?
A. Not common.
Q. How common is it? A. It's an idea we had -- I say we, but the rig had kicked around that if we were in
that position. We were in different positions. We were in similar positions in different wells, we just never
had the opportunity to use it.
Q. About how many wells had you used such a large spacer on before? Do you have a working
knowledge of a number?
A. I don't.

,,- !#.!#$% %0/'"")"&%0.'#1)"1

Q. Was [the larger spacer] a joint idea between yourself and BP? «
A. As a joint decision, like I had a say in it?
Q. Yes. A. Or M-I SWACO had a say in it. Ultimately that decision was BP's decision.
Q. Ultimately it was their decision? A. Yes. Q. But you were involved in that decision? A. Yes.

,,- !#.!#$% .$'0).#'"

Q. Who was it that didn't want to keep [both pre-mixed] pills?
A. It's BP.
Q. BP told you it did not want to keep the pills?
A. They didn't want to have to dispose of them, yes.
Q. If you use the pills you testified before that if you used them downhole then you could have an
exemption [under RCRA] as drilling fluid, right?
A. As an exempt waste, from what I understand.
Q. What if you hadn't used them that way, what would the rig have had to do?
A. We would have had to -- I wouldn't know exactly where they would have to send it. I presume Newpark
does disposal, so I imagine it was disposed.
Q. It would be hazardous waste disposal, right?
A. Yes.

,,- !#.!#$% ."'")#.

Q. Are these two [pill] materials, the Form-A-Squeeze and Form-A-Set, are they specifically designed for
application as spacers?
A. No. «
Q. [] Did someone tell you that nonetheless it would be safe to use it for this application?
A. I remember seeing one email from the BP mud specialist saying it would be okay.

,,- !#.!#$% #$ '#&)# 

I believe I sent an email and asked the [BP] environmental people if [the use of a larger pill] was going to
be okay. At the prompting of BP, I sent that email and I believe [John Lebleu of BP's] response was he
didn't see a problem with it.

,,- !#.!#$% #"/'#/)#".'"

Q. You have testified, sir, if I understand correctly, that a Form-A-Set pill was combined with a Form-A-
Squeeze pill to make this spacer; is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Is that standard practice to combine those two different types of spacers?
A. It's not something we have ever done before.

-
-1!#$!#$%)<@ )
>$$$"#&(0
Normally use WBM, couple ppg over mud weight; MI said no issues using LCM pill. Said they would wash
it up. Could also get rid of pill and dumped.

 2 !"$!#$% #" '#) 

I don't know where these pills got into the displacement from. Apparently, the mud engineer talked to their
people in town or BP or somebody, but he come in and said that they had been discussing, having some
discussions about using those two pills as spacers.

 2 !"$!#$% #" '"#)#"/'"

[Leo Lindner] told me that, you know, we had those two 200-barrel pills that was in the pits that we were
going to use for lost circulation pills, and he said we could use those as spacers when we did the
displacement, and I told him, you know, I didn't have a problem with that.

 2 !"$!#$% #"/'.)"(

Q: And would you agree that Form-A-Set and Form-A-Squeeze are not specifically designed for use as a
spacer?
A: I would kind of leave that up to the mud engineers « because they would know more about it than I
would as using it as a spacer, and they're the ones who recommended ... using it as a spacer.
Q: Did you question him about what the potential consequences could be of using those two pills made
up the way they were as a spacer?
A: No, I didn't.

-:  !"&!#$% (#'.)"#

[B]ecause this spacer that was suppose to separate the seawater from the synthetic based mud, all the
evidence is it was not being displaced upward with the water very effectively, that a lot of it was falling
back down through the seawater. And so instead of the well actually -- the annulus -- well, the annulus of
the well being filled from 8300 back to about 5000 feet sea floor with seawater, that space was filled with
a mixture of this heavy mud and seawater that was actually more heavy mud than it was seawater.

-:  !"&!#$% 1('"#)"(

Had you ever seen such a large spacer of about 454 barrels ever pumped before, sir? I don't think so.

-:  !"&!#$% #&$'")#.%#&#'#/)#&&'"

"A major departure from the approved procedure was pumping 454 barrels of 16 ppg LCM spacer. . . .
You believe that the reading on the kill line may well have been influenced by the presence of the spacer,
correct? . . .
A. Almost certainly.
 c


c
 c7

?- !""!#$% %" "'#.)" &'##
Q. Sure. Does this procedure ... the marine riser should already be displaced with seawater, right?
A. Yes.
Q. So that would indicate that BP planned to run the lockdown sleeve afterdisplacing the well to seawater,
wouldn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Does this assume that there would already have been a successful negative pressure test before
starting this procedure?
A. I'm unaware of any of the operations that take place prior to running the lead impression tool.

?- !""!#$% "0.'&)# 

Q. In this interview on April 28, the notes also say, quote, Plan was to install lockdown sleeve on Sunday
but was delayed due to, quote, problems, close quote. Can you tell us what problems you were referring
to that caused a delay of the lockdown sleeve?
A. I don't know the specific problems. I just know that the operations that had to be completed prior to
running the lead impression tool were taking longer than expected.
Q. So do you not know or can you not recall what problems you may have mentioned in this interview?

7-=1!"0!#$% %.&'#.).('#"
« I recall a scrimmage taking place between the company man, the OIM, the toolpusher and driller
concerning the events of the day. The driller was outlining what was going to take place. Whereupon, the
company man stood up and said, "No, we have some changes to that." I really didn't pay attention to what
he was saying. They had to do with displacing the riser for later on that tour and the OIM, the driller and
the toolpusher had a disagreement with that. There was a -- I remember there was a slight argument that
took place and a difference of opinions, and the company man was basically saying, "Well, this is how it's
going to be," and the toolpusher and the OIM reluctantly agreed."

7-=1!"0!#$% #&0'#.)#& '#$

Q. Do you recall Jimmy Harrell after the interaction between the BP person and the OIM, do you recall
Jimmy Harrell as he was walking out saying anything?
A. Yes. He was ±
Q. What did he say and how did he say it?
A. He pretty much grumbled in his manner about, "Well, I guess that's what we have those pincers for."
Q. Repeat that.
A. "I guess that's what we have those pincers for."
Q. Okay. Do you know what he was referring to or why he would have said that?
A. I'm assuming he was referring to the shear rams on the BOP.

7-=0!/!#$%>-2==C--&0$D
Brown: « The company man basically said we have changes to [the drilling plan]. We will be doing
something different. I recall it was something about displacing the riser with sea water for that tower. «
Basically, [the company man] ended up saying, well, this is how it's going to be. And they started
reluctantly agreeing, and -- Cooper: You're saying the guy from BP won the argument basically? He said,
this is how we're going to do it? Brown: Yes. That's what I remember, yes. He basically said, this is how
it's going to be.

-/!" !#$% #&&'#")#&('(*
 +

Q. Well, the program that we saw in Exhibit 10, didn't that effectively have you doing the negative test
before you displaced all the way down and then once you do displace all the way down, you monitor it
again for 30 minutes, isn't that right, according to Page 8 of Exhibit 10?
A. Yes, that's the way that particular procedure is written.
Q. So that was a two-step procedure?
A. There is a change in what is going on is there is an approval to do a deeper plug to 3,000 feet, and if
that approval is not -- was not given by the MMS, then the procedure that you are seeing would have
been done to a shallower depth. So there was an option there and that was referenced in the operations
note.

c--=-(!"#!#$%5-  %"

I overheard upper management talking saying that BP was taking shortcuts by displacing the well with
saltwater instead of mud without sealing the well with cement plugs, this is why it blew out.

 !""!#$% #""'#1)#"&'#(*
 +

Q. This is what I'm ultimately getting to and this is a narrow question. The lockdown sleeve which was
part of the TAplan submitted by BP on April 16 had Step No. 6 set, the nine and seven-eighths inch
lockdown sleeve. Was there any reason why that lockdown sleeve could not have been the first step
taken in the TA procedure?
A. It could have been. However, the reason the lockdown sleeve is set last is because it has two primary
functions. One of the functions is it is an internal seal for the future production equipment that is set on
the -- on top of the well. Therefore, you want to minimize any wire and/or pipe movement through it
because you don't want to get scratches that can affect the seal. The second is that it does provide the
casing from thermally expanding during the production operation. The primary mechanism -- I'm sorry.
The primary function of that lockdown hanger is to provide a sealing surface internally for production-
based equipment at the end of the well when it's completed.



--3:B;/!" !#$% /&'"&)/('#1
Q Okay. Now, are you aware, also, that in addition to the displacement being done before the lock-down
sleeve, the [surface plug] cement job was going to be done before the lock-down sleeve as well? Are you
aware of that? . . .
A Correct. I'm aware of that.
Q So the sequence on the Macondo well was going to be displace down to . . . 8100 feet, then set the
plug at that depth, and then run the lock-down sleeve; is that correct?
A Yes. Before we run the lock-down sleeve, we would have made another run of the lead impression tool,
and then the lock-down sleeve.

--3:B;/!" !#$% /('#0)"#

Q Now, isn't it true, Mr. Kelley, that the lock-down sleeve could have been run first, and then the cement
job done, and then the displacement done?
A That was one of the options that was stated in the procedure.

--3:B;/!" !#$% #$ '#&)#$/'(

Q . . . do you defer the decision on when to run the lock-down sleeve to someone else other than your
organization, meaning subsea BP? Does someone in the BP organization on the rig tell you when to run
the lock-down sleeve, before displacement, after displacement? Who makes that decision?
A The fluids that would be in the wellbore at that time we will give a recommendation on, but it will be
made by the drilling team, the wells team on the rig.
Q Do you know who in the drilling team makes the decision?
A It's typically the wells team leader.
-
-1!#$!#$%)<@ )
>$$$"#&&1
Discussion to set cement plug in mud? WSC on Horizon wanted sea water for better cement plug. Long
string versus open hole cement plug.

-
-1!#$!#$%>-2= %)<@ )
>$$$"#&&1

Original plan - lock down, then set plug and then displace. But risk of stinger scratching lock down sleeve
could be damage and ___ Hanger __ surface.

 2 !"$!#$% % /'.)#1

Normally we cemented the hole, open hole, put cement across liner laps, and sometimes we had bridge
plugs, sometimes they didn't set bridge plugs, then we set surface plugs, and then did negative tests
before we displaced the riser with drilling mud with water.

 2 !"$!#$% #. '"1)#./'##

Q: So if you got a long string and you just pump cement on a production interval, you run a lock-down
sleeve, you're in a safer position; is that correct?
A: Yes, you would probably be safer running a lock-down sleeve.
Q: So why wouldn't you run the lock-down sleeve prior to doing the negative test?
A: Because I would have to be an engineer and try to figure out what difference it would make.

 3- !"$!#$% 1&'/)"&%1(' )"(

Q. Did that cause you any concerns with displacing the well before either one of [the actuator ring or the
lockdown sleeve] are put into play?
A. Not concerned Not. -- safety. Not concerned as far as safety. It might have aggravated, you know, a
little bit because we were not going to do it with the mud when we knew we had everything clean and
swept out. But it was not a safety concern. It was just the possibility of maybe having to make an
additional trip to go in and jet and wash.
Q. And that additional trip that you are referring to takes time. ... you have heard the expression "Time is
money." I assume you have heard that before.
A. We all have.
Q. And that is particularly true on a rig where BP is paying close to $1 million a day; isn't that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And so additional time to make an additional trip is a factor to consider. Do we want to extend the time
or not? That is one of those factors that businessmen look at when they make business decisions.
A. And that is all that was in my mind, because if we have a bad reading, then I would have to stand up
and fight that battle, or my group would, you know, to have an additional trip run.

 3- !"$!#$% 0"'"()0&'"(

Q. Did you have any concerns about the casing rising as a result of displacement possibly occuring?
A. You know, we have seen so many casing jobs over the years, when you get to that point, everybody
goes to the mind-set that we're through. This job is done.
Q. Well, what do you mean by that? We're so close, that let's just get it over with or ±
A. No, ma'am. What I mean by that is, when you run that last string of casing, and you have got it
cemented, it's landed out and a test was done on it, then you say, this job, we are at the end of it.
Everything is going to be okay. ... You are thinking ahead to your next job. You're moving on.
Q. I see. So what you are telling me is that once you get that last bit of casing down, you think, Eureka, I
am on the home stretch, right?
A. You are.
 3- !"$!#$% 01'#&)""
A. I asked why couldn't we go ahead and do [the lockdown sleeve] in mud, and I can't even -- I can't tell
you who I was having the discussion with. But it wasn't going to happen. We were going to go through in
the sequence that we were given.
Q. So whoever you were talking to just said this is the way it is going to be done, period.
A. Pretty much


 3- !"$!#$%  ('"1) 1'#0
Q. Mr. Skidmore, did you ever mention to someone on the back deck of the Bankston, the boat that
evacuated you, that at sometime prior to the blowout, that you had send an e-mail to tbe BP office asking
for a snakebite kit? You were overheard saying that. I want to ask you about that, what that means.
A. Oh, I hate it, but I did. ... this would just be in reference to just old sorry luck you might be having at the
time.

?B8(!"/!#$%>-2= %)<@ ) $"$"$$4)<@ ) $"$#/14)<@ )

 $"$# &) (4)<@ )
>$$#&.(.#
The permit was modified for the surface cement plug. It was a different sequence. While running in the
hole I was in the office and Mark Hafle called to ensure I had seen the modified APM. Brian Morel was
on the rig sleeping as he was on the cement job. Mark called to go through the ADP--said I should to talk
to Brian so I went to wake up Brian. The team in town wanted to do something different--Mark was on
vacation.

?B8(!"/!#$%>-2= %)<@ ) $"$"$$4)<@ ) $"$#/14)<@ )

 $"$# &) (
Team in town wanted to do displacement, negative test, but needed to follow APD. Bob asked clerk to
wake up Brian Morel. Brian had a procedure that didn't match APD. Town had decided to deviate. Brian
came in and siad he would straighten this out with Mark Hafle. Mark had been on vacation and other
team members wanted to do a different procedure.

?B8(!"/!#$%>-2= %)<@ ) $"$#/1

Displacement, then negative test; rather than what APD says.

?B8(!"/!#$%>-2= %)<@ ) $"$"$$44<@ ) $"$#/1

Anytime you get behind, they try to speed up. (Referring to deviation from original TA Procedure to do
displacement and negative test together).

?B8(!"/!#$%>-2= %)<@ ) $"$"$$4)<@ ) $"$#/14)<@ )

 $"$# &) (
They (the team in town) decided we could do the displacement and negative test together.

?B8(!"/!#$%>-2= %)<@ )
>$$#&.(.#

___ want to do the displacment then do the negative test- not part of APD. I should talk to Brian. Went to
wake up Brian. The team in town wanted to do something different. Mark [had been] on vacation. We can
do the displacement and the negative test together-don't know why-maybe trying to save time. At the end
of the well sometimes they think about spending __.

?B8(!"/!#$%>-2= %)<@ )
>$$#&.(./

Safest way is to do this with SOBM in the hole. We were making assumptions that things would be ok.
?