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G.R. No.

L-45987 May 5, 1939 The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, (1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;
vs.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant. (2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.

Sinai Hamada y Cariño for appellant. (3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes."
MORAN, J.: It is said that as these less civilized elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of
their rights in a democracy," any attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark
Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of them as inferior or less capable rate or less entitled" will meet with their instant
Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court challenge. As the constitutionality of the Act here involved is questioned for purposes
of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of thus mentioned, it becomes imperative to examine and resolve the issues raised in the
insolvency. On appeal of the Court of First Instance, the following information was filed light of the policy of the government towards the non-Christian tribes adopted and
against him: consistently followed from the Spanish times to the present, more often with sacrifice
and tribulation but always with conscience and humanity.
That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth
of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous
Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, attitude toward these inhabitants, and in the different laws of the Indies, their
unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his concentration in so-called "reducciones" (communities) have been persistently
control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so- attempted with the end in view of according them the "spiritual and temporal benefits"
called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been of civilized life. Throughout the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the Spanish
accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. Government as a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity" to civilize these less
fortunate people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "the
Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the moral and material advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance
facts alleged in the information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons afforded them by the same laws." (Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines,
adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court Jan. 14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected from during the American period.
found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos President McKinley in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900,
(P50) or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is now before said:
this court on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American
a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under which many
ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to
beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should,
and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous
shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or practices and introduce civilized customs.
any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any
such liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the
tribe. problem of determining "those practicable means of bringing about their advancement
in civilization and material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.) "Placed in an alternative of
SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization," the present
shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding government "has chosen to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with
two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the humanity and with the national conscience." (Memorandum of Secretary of the
discretion of the court. Interior, quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, 714.) To this
end, their homes and firesides have been brought in contact with civilized communities Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand
through a network of highways and communications; the benefits of public education in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.
have to them been extended; and more lately, even the right of suffrage. And to
complement this policy of attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has passed Act Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a
No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-
facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality
therefore, in this light that the Act must be understood and applied. of its application.

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or
protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation other duly authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any
based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided in the Constitution. But
must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of
members of the same class. (Borgnis vs. Falk Co., 133 N.W., 209; Lindsley vs. Natural law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true where
Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61; 55 Law. ed., Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to
Phil., 660; People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Vera and Cu particular cases. (McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval in
Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz ., 187.) Rubi vs.Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means simply: (1) that
there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation; (3) that it
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4)
"accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class.
degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal by the United States Supreme
belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54 Law. ed., 1049.) Thus, a person's property may be seized by
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used in
from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This violation of law may be confiscated (U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the
distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case (Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil.,
conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain 439, 442).
members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their
Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said
established. that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the
government. It has been aptly described as a power co-extensive with self-protection
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any measure intended to promote the
receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the
intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity
which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the police power, unless
the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an
among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the individual, the same must be upheld.
observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors
by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-
hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization. Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth
and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino
enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The people with a view to a greater Philippines.
Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the
non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less
capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the
public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in
tht enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there
can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the
government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and
civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in
view of placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is
indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely
asserting themselves in a competitive world," as appellant's attorney impressively
avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and -coming people eager to take their place in the
world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other
professionals educated in the best institutions here and in America. Their active
participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate
duties of government is certainly a source of pride and gratification to people of the
Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or
complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the
prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our
government, this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had
the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of
the policy adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures
enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And,
if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer,
the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema
est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a
certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be
stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which
some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such members must
yield to the paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S.,
25; 24 law. ed., 989).

Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Conception, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 123595 December 12, 1997 placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his
commander.8
SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner,
vs. On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. that a group of Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of
Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990,
likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others attempt to detonate a
grenade. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen chased petitioner and
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
his companions; however, the former were unable to catch any of the latter. Yu further
In an Information 1 filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-86748 before the admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the corner of Quezon
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August 1990. Although they were not creating a
was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, 2 as follows: commotion, since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions
approached them. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered
That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused from petitioner.9
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a
hand grenade, without first securing the necessary license and/or permit therefor from Josefino G. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28 August 1990, petitioner and
the proper authorities. a certain Abdul Casan were brought in by Sgt. Saquilla 10 for investigation. Forthwith,
Serapio conducted the inquest of the two suspects, informing them of their rights to
At arraignment3 on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a remain silent and to be assisted by competent and independent counsel. Despite
plea of not guilty. Serapio's advice, petitioner and Casan manifested their willingness to answer
questions even without the assistance of a lawyer. Serapio then took petitioner's
At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence of Exhibits "A," "A-1,"
uncounselled confession (Exh. "E"), there being no PAO lawyer available, wherein
and "A-2," 4 while the prosecution admitted that the police authorities were not armed
petitioner admitted possession of the grenade. Thereafter, Serapio prepared the
with a search warrant nor warrant of arrest at the time they arrested petitioner.5
affidavit of arrest and booking sheet of petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over
At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following police officers as its the grenade to the Intelligence and Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Explosive
witnesses: Rodolfo Yu, the arresting officer; Josefino G. Serapio, the investigating Ordinance Disposal Unit for examination. 11
officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who examined the grenade.
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioner's confession knowing it
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated was inadmissible in evidence. 12
National Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990,
Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose principal duties
at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he was on
included, among other things, the examination of explosive devices, testified that on 22
foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon
March 1991, he received a request dated 19 March 1991 from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera
Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They
and PO Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a grenade. Ramilo then affixed an orange
chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three
tag on the subject grenade detailing his name, the date and time he received the
to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the
specimen. During the preliminary examination of the grenade, he "[f]ound that [the]
Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "[t]heir eyes. . . moving
major components consisting of [a] high filler and fuse assembly [were] all present,"
very fast."6
and concluded that the grenade was "[l]ive and capable of exploding." On even date, he
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both issued a certification stating his findings, a copy of which he forwarded to Diotoy on 11
groups for about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, August 1991. 13
who then fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with
Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he arrived in Manila on 22
and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation
July 1990 and resided at the Muslim Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the
grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line." 7 Yu's companion, police officer
evening of 27 August 1990, he went to Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air.
Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was
Shortly after, several policemen arrived and ordered all males to stand aside. The
recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu
policemen searched petitioner and two other men, but found nothing in their
possession. However, he was arrested with two others, brought to and detained at 1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SEARCH UPON THE
Precinct No. 3, where he was accused of having shot a police officer. The officer showed PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED
the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained and shouted at petitioner "[i]to ang tama HANDGRENADE FROM HIM "WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST."
mo sa akin." This officer then inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioner's mouth
and said, "[y]ou are the one who shot me." Petitioner denied the charges and explained 2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ACCUSED-
that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other police officers mauled APPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A
him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but PRODUCT OF AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.
nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented. 14
In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid due to absence of any
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to it of the conditions provided for in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily citing People vs. Mengote. 23 As such, the search was illegal, and the hand grenade
being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the status seized, inadmissible in evidence.
quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more information." 15 Probable
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General agreed with the trial court
cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime had been committed, and prayed that its decision be affirmed in toto. 24
however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause
would have been "premature." 16 The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions In its decision of 24 January 1996, 25 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court,
were "[c]onfronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a noting, first, that petitioner abandoned his original theory before the court a quo that
warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence" 17 and the officers "[h]ad to act in the grenade was "planted" by the police officers; and second, the factual finding of the
haste," as petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering the trial court that the grenade was seized from petitioner's possession was not raised as
time, place and "reported cases of bombing." Further, petitioner's group suddenly ran an issue. Further, respondent court focused on the admissibility in evidence of Exhibit
away in different directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus "[i]t is "D," the hand grenade seized from petitioner. Meeting the issue squarely, the Court of
reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of which is not Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the ground that there was probable cause
necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his for the arrest as petitioner was "attempting to commit an offense," thus:
investigation without fear of violence." 18
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in possession of a live grenade
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental and in the company of other suspicious character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking
to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the in Plaza Miranda at a time when political tension ha[d] been enkindling a series of
police investigator for the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store," concluded that terroristic activities, [can] claim that he was not attempting to commit an offense. We
sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. need not mention that Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for being a favorite bomb
site especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere possession of an
In its decision 19 dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the
unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense, Malacat's posture is simply too preposterous
trial court thus found petitioner guilty of the crime of illegal possession of explosives
to inspire belief.
under Section 3 of P.D. No. 186, and sentenced him to suffer:
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioner's failure to rebut the
[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE
testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they received intelligence reports of a bomb
(1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30)
threat at Plaza Miranda; the fact that PO Yu chased petitioner two days prior to the
YEARS OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
latter's arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that petitioner and his companions acted
On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of appeal 20 indicating that he was suspiciously, the "accumulation" of which was more than sufficient to convince a
appealing to this Court. However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of reasonable man that an offense was about to be committed. Moreover, the Court of
Appeals which docketed it as CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 and issued a notice to file Appeals observed:
briefs. 21
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of gross negligence and
In his Appellant's Brief 22 filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner asserted that: dereliction of duty, not to mention of gross incompetence, if they [would] first wait for
Malacat to hurl the grenade, and kill several innocent persons while maiming
numerous others, before arriving at what would then be an assured but moot
conclusion that there was indeed probable cause for an arrest. We are in agreement
with the lower court in saying that the probable cause in such a situation should not The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any person who shall
be the kind of proof necessary to convict, but rather the practical considerations of unlawfully possess grenades is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
everyday life on which a reasonable and prudent mind, and not legal technicians, will perpetua.
ordinarily act.
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum of
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down in People v. Mengote, 26 which the penalty, and not the minimum, is taken into account. Since the maximum of the
petitioner relied upon, was inapplicable in light of "[c]rucial differences," to wit: penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have been to us, and not the
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence report that someone [at] (B.P. Blg. 129), 27 in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, 28 Section 5(2) of
the corner of a busy street [would] be in possession of a prohibited article. Here the Article VIII of the Constitution 29 and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules of
police officers were responding to a [sic] public clamor to put a check on the series of Court. 30 The term "life imprisonment" as used in Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, the
terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and, after receiving intelligence reports about a Judiciary Act of 1948, and Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to include reclusion
bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of the historically notorious Plaza Miranda, they perpetua in view of Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution.
conducted foot patrols for about seven days to observe suspicious movements in the
area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers [had] no personal knowledge that the Petitioner's Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing from the trial court's
person arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an decision to this Court, yet the trial court transmitted the record to the Court of Appeals
offense. Here, PO3 Yu [had] personal knowledge of the fact that he chased Malacat in and the latter proceeded to resolve the appeal.
Plaza Miranda two days before he finally succeeded in apprehending him.
We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having been rendered
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the instant petition and without jurisdiction, and consider the appeal as having been directly brought to us,
assigns the following errors: with the petition for review as petitioner's Brief for the Appellant, the comment thereon
by the Office of the Solicitor General as the Brief for the Appellee and the memoranda
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL of the parties as their Supplemental Briefs.
COURT THAT THE WARRANTIES ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL.
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves convinced that the
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE prosecution failed to establish petitioner's guilt with moral certainty.
VS. MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a grenade was found
In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments below regarding the in and seized from petitioner's possession. Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the
validity of the warrantless arrest and search, then disagrees with the finding of the grenade he allegedly seized. According to him, he turned it over to his commander after
Court of Appeals that he was "attempting to commit a crime," as the evidence for the putting an "X" mark at its bottom; however, the commander was not presented to
prosecution merely disclosed that he was "standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda and corroborate this claim. On the other hand, the grenade presented in court and
Quezon Boulevard" with his eyes "moving very fast" and "looking at every person that identified by police officer Ramilo referred to what the latter received from Lt. Eduardo
come (sic) nearer (sic) to them." Finally, petitioner points out the factual similarities Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not immediately after petitioner's arrest, but
between his case and that of People v. Mengote to demonstrate that the Court of nearly seven (7) months later, or on 19 March 1991; further, there was no evidence
Appeals miscomprehended the latter. whatsoever that what Ramilo received was the very same grenade seized from
petitioner. In his testimony, Yu never declared that the grenade passed on to Ramilo
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we affirm the challenged
decision.. was the grenade the former confiscated from petitioner. Yu did not, and was not made
to, identify the grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the
For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course to the petition. grenade he examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law enforcement
authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so crucial in cases
The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional grounds. To repeat, the such as these.
penalty imposed by the trial court was:
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two days earlier he was
[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY with a group about to detonate an explosive at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his fellow
OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS officers chased, but failed to arrest them, then considering that Yu and his three fellow
OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as police officers, it was then A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has
unnatural and against common experience that petitioner simply stood there in been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been
proximity to the police officers. Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty minutes and described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
must have been close enough to petitioner in order to discern petitioner's eyes "moving
very fast." Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs
searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the grenade during his searches; 33 (5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; 34and (6) a "stop and frisk."35
custodial investigation by police officer Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in
evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop and
Constitution, which provide as follows: frisk" with "the seizure of the grenade from the accused [as an appropriate incident to
his arrest," hence necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to
Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the warrant requirement.
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk"
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches
except in writing and in the presence of counsel. differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and
in their allowable scope.
xxx xxx xxx
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of
be inadmissible in evidence against him. these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the day following his arrest. search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.37 At bottom, assuming a valid
No lawyer was present and Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to assist arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within
petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any
the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit
invalid as it was not in writing, neither was it executed in the presence of counsel. of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the
arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence. 38
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a grenade, the arrest and
search of petitioner were invalid, as will be discussed below. Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding
the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed
officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had
in order to validly effect the same. 31 The Constitutional prohibition against
just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected without a validly
issued warrant, 32 subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid warrantless arrests, Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the
these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which reads, in part: search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer or a private person We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a
policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped . . . the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons A None, sir.
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment . . . 39 Q Neither did you see them create commotion?

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a A None, sir.42
"stop and frisk," 40 it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was
validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's
armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all
has weapons concealed about him. 41 Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold
indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming
interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact,
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances as noted by the trial court:
and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing When the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to aware that a handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any
assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon bulging object in [sic] his person. 43
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of petitioner's rights
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid: solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the Constitution.

First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of
group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of
supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer said Court and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of
who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and petitioner SAMMY
this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released
and search petitioner. If only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, from detention, unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.
contrary to his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased before being
apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A") expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon Costs de oficio.
arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately
SO ORDERED.
collared."
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have
Francisco and Martinez, JJ., concur.
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very
fast" — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were
nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk.
Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not
creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination:

Q And what were they doing?

A They were merely standing.

Q You are sure of that?

A Yes, sir.

Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they did not create any
commotion.
Separate Opinions bringing marijuana. Without securing a search warrant allegedly because courts were
already closed for the day, the lawmen proceeded early next morning to the city wharf.
About 8:30 a.m., they saw the suspect, carrying two plastic baby chairs, disembark
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion: and thereafter board a tricycle. The police followed immediately and ordered the driver
to stop. After introducing themselves, the policemen asked Encinada to alight and to
I agree with the persuasive ponencia of Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. that: hand over his luggage for inspection. Found between the baby chairs was a bulky
package which was later found to contain marijuana. On these particulars, he was
1. the search conducted on petitioner (a) was not incidental to a lawful arrest and (b) charged, tried and convicted by the trial court for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of RA 6425,
did not constitute a valid stop-and-frisk; thus, the grenade found in his person cannot holding that Encinada was caught in flagrante delicto. Hence, the warrantless search
be admitted as evidence against him; and following his arrest was valid, and the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence.
2. the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from the trial court's Reversing the trial court, this Court stressed the following: Encinada was not
decision. committing a crime in the presence of the police; the latter did not have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that he just committed an offense; and raw intelligence
I wish, however, to correlate the present case with four relevant decisions I authored for
information was not a sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest.5 Furthermore, "[t]he
the Court: Manalili vs. Court of Appeals,1 People vs. Encinada,2 People
prosecution's evidence did nor show any suspicious behavior when the appellant
vs. Lacerna and People vs. Cuizon, all of which were promulgated without any
3 4
disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating
dissenting view. This correlation may be of benefit to the bench, the bar and,
a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare
particularly, to law enforcement officers. Let me first present a background on each.
circumstances." 6 Having known the identity of their suspect the previous day, the law
Manalili Involved a enforcers could have secured a warrant of arrest even within such limited period (per
Valid Stop-and-Frisk Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, s. 1987). In emphasizing the
importance of according respect to every person's constitutional right against illegal
In Manalili, anti-narcotics policemen conducted a surveillance in response to arrests and searches, the Court exhorted:
information that drug addicts were roaming the area fronting the city cemetery of
Kalookan, and chanced upon Manalili who was observed to have reddish eyes and to Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate every law they are expected to enforce. [The
be walking in a wobbly manner. Because his appearance was characteristic of a policeman's] receipt of the intelligence information regarding the culprit's identity, the
person "high on drugs," the lawmen approached him, introduced themselves and particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts underscored the
inquired as to what was in his hands. At first, Manalili resisted but the police prevailed need to secure a warrant for his arrest. But he failed to do so. Such failure or neglect
and he showed them his wallet. The anti-narcotics men found inside what they cannot excuse him from violating a constitutional right of the appellant.7
suspected to be crushed marijuana residue. They took Manalili to their station for
. . . That the search disclosed a prohibited substance in appellant's possession and
further investigation. A chromatographic test of the wallet contents positively affirmed
thus confirmed the police officers' initial information and suspicion, did not cure its
the lawmen's suspicions. Manalili was thus charged, tried and convicted of illegal
patent illegality. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on
possession of the prohibited substance. He subsequently challenged before us the
the strength of the evidence yielded by the search.8
legality of his search and arrest, and the admission of the marijuana as evidence. He
contended that the latter two were products of the illegal search. Consent Validated an Otherwise
Illegal Search in Lacerna
Rejecting his appeal, this Court held that the search was akin to a stop-and-frisk. The
police had sufficient reason to stop Manalili, who "had red eyes and was wobbling like In Lacerna meanwhile, a police officer observed that the occupants of a taxicab bowed
a drunk . . . [in] a popular hangout of drug addicts," in order to investigate if he was their heads and slouched when they passed through the checkpoint he was manning,
actually "high" on drugs. The situation verily called for a stop-and-frisk. making him suspect that something was amiss. He signaled the driver to stop, then
asked permission to search the vehicle. The occupants consented. Found inside a
Lawmen Had Sufficient Opportunity
plastic bag were several blocks wrapped in newspaper, which were later discovered to
to Secure Warrant in Encinada
contain marijuana. Lacerna questioned his warrantless arrest and seizure, claiming
In Encinada, a police officer received late in the afternoon a tip from an informant that that they were violative of his constitutional rights.
the following morning, appellant would be arriving at the Surigao port
The Court, despite declaring that the prior attendant circumstances did not justify a inadmissible for any purpose and in any proceeding, the same being 'the fruit of the
warrantless search and seizure, ruled that the search was valid, not because Lacerna poisonous tree.'" 11
was caught in flagrante delicto, but because he freely consented to the search.
Although appellant and his companion were stopped by the police on mere suspicion The same would have been true as regards Pua and Lee. But Pua effectively waived his
— without probable cause — that they were engaged in a felonious enterprise, the right against the warrantless search when he agreed in writing for the NBI team to
Court stressed that their permission for the search was expressly sought and obtained search his luggage. Besides, he failed to challenge the validity of his arrest and search
by the law enforcers. This consent validated the search, waiver being a generally and the admission of the evidence obtained thereby. However, the case against Lee,
recognized exception to the rule against warrantless search.9 The marijuana, therefore, who could not speak English or Filipino, was remanded for a retrial, because he was
was admissible in evidence. "There was no poisonous tree to speak of." effectively denied his right to counsel; for although he was provided with one, he could
not understand and communicate with him concerning his defense.
Mere Suspicion of Criminal Activity
Did Not Justify Search of Cuizon After reviewing previous decisions on valid warrantless arrests and searches, the Court
underscored in sum that there was need for facts providing probable cause, such as
Lastly, in Cuizon, the NBI, after conducting a surveillance on Cuizon for about a the "distinct odor of marijuana, reports about drug transporting or positive
month, received in the morning a tip from an informant that Cuizon and his wife were identification by informers, suspicious behavior, attempt to flee, [or] failure to produce
arriving at NAIA that same day, bringing a large quantity of shabu. A team was identification papers" to justify warrantless arrests and searches. Likewise, urgency
immediately organized and sent to the airport to intercept the suspect. Shortly after must attend such arrests and searches, as where motor vehicles are used and there is
noon, the Cuizon spouses arrived. While at the airport arrival area, Cuizon handed great probability that the suspect would get away before a warrant can be procured.
four travelling bags to Pua and Lee who thereafter bearded a taxicab, while the Cuizons Most important is that the law enforcers must act immediately on the information
took a different vehicle. The NBI team members posted at the NAIA parking area, received, suspicions raised or probable cause established, and should effect the arrests
however, failed to intercept the suspects. The team merely trailed the taxicab which and searches without any delay. 12
proceeded to the Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati. After identifying themselves to the
suspects in their hotel room, the team asked permission to search their bags in the Instant Case Correlated
presence of the hotel's chief security officer. Pua and Lee consented in writing. Found with Four Cited
inside three of the four bags similar to those handed to them by Cuizon at the airport Now to the correlation with the case at bar.
were plastic packages of white crystalline substances which, upon later examination,
were confirmed to be shabu. Taking with them the two accused (who, however, did not (1) As in Manalili, lawmen were on surveillance in response to information that a
implicate Cuizon), the NBI team proceeded to the Cuizon residence where they found a criminal activity could be in the offing at a specified place. The stark difference,
bag allegedly containing the same substance. The three were charged and convicted of however, is that in Manalili, the reported activity involved drug use and the lawmen
illegal transport of the regulated drug. On appeal, only Cuizon challenged the validity of belonged to the anti-narcotics group, while in the instant case, the police on patrol
his warrantless arrest, search and seizure. were ordinary law enforcers on the lookout for possible bombers. In the former, the law
enforcers concerned may be presumed to possess special knowledge and skill to detect
Reiterating the doctrine that "where a person is searched without a warrant, and under
the physical features exhibited by a current drug user. Thus, when these specially
circumstances other than chose justifying a warrantless arrest . . . , upon a mere
trained enforcers saw Manalili with reddish eyes and walking in a wobbly manner
suspicion that he has embarked on some criminal activity, and/or for the purpose of
characteristic of a person "high" on drugs per their experience, and in a known
discovering if indeed a crime has been committed by him, then the search made of
hangout of drug users, there was sufficient genuine reason to stop and frisk the
such person as well as his arrest [is] deemed illegal," 10 this Court declared unlawful
suspect. It is well to emphasize that under different circumstances, such as where the
the arrest of Cuizon as well as the incidental search and seizure. The warrantless
policemen are not specially trained, and in common places where people ordinarily
arrest and search were not justified by the rules on "in flagrante delicto" or "hot pursuit"
converge, the same features displayed by a person will not normally justify a
for, at the time of his arrest, Cuizon was inside his home resting with his wife and warrantless arrest or search on him.
child. No offense had just been committed or was actually being committed or
attempted by him in the presence of the lawmen, nor did the latter have personal The case before us presents such a situation. The policemen merely observed that
knowledge of facts indicating that Cuizon authored an offense that had just in fact Malacat's eyes were moving very fast. They did not notice any bulges or packets about
been committed. Consequently, any evidence obtained during the illegal search, "even the bodies of these men indicating that they might be hiding explosive paraphernalia.
if tending to confirm or actually confirming the initial suspicion, is absolutely
From their outward look, nothing suggested that they were at the time armed and Mengote Supports
dangerous. Hence, there was no justification for a stop-and-frisk. Present Ponencia

(2) In relation to the cases of Encinada and Cuizon, at the time of the arrests of the Bolstering the invalidity of the arrest and search of Malacat is People
suspects, none of the actions of Accused Encinada and Cuizon were beyond normal as vs. Mengote, 13 another classic on the right against unreasonable searches and
to suggest that they were then engaged in felonious activities. The simple handing over seizures. Upon receiving a telephone call shortly before noon from an informer that
of the baggage by Cuizon to Pua and Lee was far from being indicative of any illegal there were suspicious-looking persons at a certain street corner in Tondo, Manila, the
activity. Such act by itself does not, by any stretch of imagination, even appear to be Western Police District dispatched a surveillance team to said place. There they saw
suspicious. Granting that indeed an offense was committed by Cuizon at the airport, two men "looking from side to side" with one" holding his abdomen." The police
his subsequent arrest cannot even be justified under the rule on "hot pursuit." He did approached them and identified themselves, whereupon the two tried to flee but failed
not attempt to flee, but was actually able to leave the premises and reach his house as other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were searched, and recovered from
unhampered by the police. There was considerable interruption between the supposed Mengote was a fully loaded pistol; from his companion, a fan knife.
commission of the crime and his subsequent arrest in his house where he was already
resting. The Court ruled that the situation was not one calling for a lawful warrantless search
and arrest. As the Court, through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, succinctly put it: "What
Moreover, Encinada and Cuizon had been previously identified and subjected to offense could possibly have been suggested by a person 'looking from side to side' and
surveillance. Police informants themselves, presumably reliable, tipped off their alleged 'holding his abdomen' and in a place not exactly forsaken?"
criminal activity. Specifically with respect to Encinada, there was sufficient time to
priorly obtain a warrant for his arrest. It must be stressed that raw unverified . . . [T]here could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes
intelligence information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest or search. were darting from side to side and he was holding his abdomen. If they excited
That is why it is important to bring one's evidence before a judge who shall suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has
independently determine if probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. It is nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen
not for the police to make such determination. themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of the
telephone call from the informer that there were 'suspicious-looking' persons in that
As regards Cuizon, it was, worse, the ineptness of the NBI team dispatched to intercept vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not
him which foiled his arrest and search. In the present case, if it were true that the explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the
arresting officer saw Malacat two days earlier attempting to detonate a grenade in the impending crime. 14
same vicinity, again it was the policemen's ineptitude that frustrated his valid arrest
there and then and, further, their inability to effectively investigate and identify the In closing, the Court lamented and thus warned:
culprit — so as to have obtained a lawful arrest warrant — that hindered his valid
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched
seizure thereafter.
just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-
(3) In Lacerna, true, the occupants of the taxicab bowed their heads and slouched ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on
when they passed through the police checkpoint. Although such acts could raise suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or
suspicions, they did not provide sufficient reason for the police to stop and investigate attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state
them for possible criminal operation; much less, to conduct an extensive search of where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the
their belongings. A checkpoint search is limited to a roving view within the vehicle. A arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.15
further search may be validly effected only if something probably illegal is within his
Under our rule in Mengote, petitioner's dubious act of moving his eyes swiftly from side
"plain view." In Lacerna, if not for the passengers' free and express consent, the search
to side can in no way justify a stop-and-frisk. To convict a person on the basis only of
would have been undoubtedly declared illegal. Similarly, the fast-moving eyes of
his queer behavior and to sentence him to practically a lifetime in prison would simply
Malacat, although connoting unusual behavior, was not indicative that he was armed be unfathomable. Nothing can be more wrong, unjust and inhuman.
and dangerous as to justify a search on his person.
WHEREFORE, I vote to SET ASIDE the assailed decision and to ACQUIT Petitioner
Sammy Malacat y Mandar.
Separate Opinions About 8:30 a.m., they saw the suspect, carrying two plastic baby chairs, disembark
and thereafter board a tricycle. The police followed immediately and ordered the driver
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion: to stop. After introducing themselves, the policemen asked Encinada to alight and to
I agree with the persuasive ponencia of Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. that: hand over his luggage for inspection. Found between the baby chairs was a bulky
package which was later found to contain marijuana. On these particulars, he was
1. the search conducted on petitioner (a) was not incidental to a lawful arrest and (b) charged, tried and convicted by the trial court for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of RA 6425,
did not constitute a valid stop-and-frisk; thus, the grenade found in his person cannot holding that Encinada was caught in flagrante delicto. Hence, the warrantless search
be admitted as evidence against him; and following his arrest was valid, and the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence.

2. the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from the trial court's Reversing the trial court, this Court stressed the following: Encinada was not
decision. committing a crime in the presence of the police; the latter did not have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that he just committed an offense; and raw intelligence
I wish, however, to correlate the present case with four relevant decisions I authored for information was not a sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest.5 Furthermore, "[t]he
the Court: Manalili vs. Court of Appeals,1 People vs. Encinada,2 People prosecution's evidence did nor show any suspicious behavior when the appellant
vs. Lacerna and People vs. Cuizon, all of which were promulgated without any
3 4
disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating
dissenting view. This correlation may be of benefit to the bench, the bar and, a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare
particularly, to law enforcement officers. Let me first present a background on each. circumstances." 6 Having known the identity of their suspect the previous day, the law
enforcers could have secured a warrant of arrest even within such limited period (per
Manalili Involved a
Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, s. 1987). In emphasizing the
Valid Stop-and-Frisk
importance of according respect to every person's constitutional right against illegal
In Manalili, anti-narcotics policemen conducted a surveillance in response to arrests and searches, the Court exhorted:
information that drug addicts were roaming the area fronting the city cemetery of
Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate every law they are expected to enforce. [The
Kalookan, and chanced upon Manalili who was observed to have reddish eyes and to
policeman's] receipt of the intelligence information regarding the culprit's identity, the
be walking in a wobbly manner. Because his appearance was characteristic of a
particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts underscored the
person "high on drugs," the lawmen approached him, introduced themselves and
need to secure a warrant for his arrest. But he failed to do so. Such failure or neglect
inquired as to what was in his hands. At first, Manalili resisted but the police prevailed
cannot excuse him from violating a constitutional right of the appellant.7
and he showed them his wallet. The anti-narcotics men found inside what they
suspected to be crushed marijuana residue. They took Manalili to their station for . . . That the search disclosed a prohibited substance in appellant's possession and
further investigation. A chromatographic test of the wallet contents positively affirmed thus confirmed the police officers' initial information and suspicion, did not cure its
the lawmen's suspicions. Manalili was thus charged, tried and convicted of illegal patent illegality. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on
possession of the prohibited substance. He subsequently challenged before us the the strength of the evidence yielded by the search.8
legality of his search and arrest, and the admission of the marijuana as evidence. He
contended that the latter two were products of the illegal search. Consent Validated an Otherwise
Illegal Search in Lacerna
Rejecting his appeal, this Court held that the search was akin to a stop-and-frisk. The
police had sufficient reason to stop Manalili, who "had red eyes and was wobbling like In Lacerna meanwhile, a police officer observed that the occupants of a taxicab bowed
a drunk . . . [in] a popular hangout of drug addicts," in order to investigate if he was their heads and slouched when they passed through the checkpoint he was manning,
actually "high" on drugs. The situation verily called for a stop-and-frisk. making him suspect that something was amiss. He signaled the driver to stop, then
asked permission to search the vehicle. The occupants consented. Found inside a
Lawmen Had Sufficient Opportunity plastic bag were several blocks wrapped in newspaper, which were later discovered to
to Secure Warrant in Encinada contain marijuana. Lacerna questioned his warrantless arrest and seizure, claiming
that they were violative of his constitutional rights.
In Encinada, a police officer received late in the afternoon a tip from an informant that
the following morning, appellant would be arriving at the Surigao port The Court, despite declaring that the prior attendant circumstances did not justify a
bringing marijuana. Without securing a search warrant allegedly because courts were warrantless search and seizure, ruled that the search was valid, not because Lacerna
already closed for the day, the lawmen proceeded early next morning to the city wharf.
was caught in flagrante delicto, but because he freely consented to the search. The same would have been true as regards Pua and Lee. But Pua effectively waived his
Although appellant and his companion were stopped by the police on mere suspicion right against the warrantless search when he agreed in writing for the NBI team to
— without probable cause — that they were engaged in a felonious enterprise, the search his luggage. Besides, he failed to challenge the validity of his arrest and search
Court stressed that their permission for the search was expressly sought and obtained and the admission of the evidence obtained thereby. However, the case against Lee,
by the law enforcers. This consent validated the search, waiver being a generally who could not speak English or Filipino, was remanded for a retrial, because he was
recognized exception to the rule against warrantless search.9 The marijuana, therefore, effectively denied his right to counsel; for although he was provided with one, he could
was admissible in evidence. "There was no poisonous tree to speak of." not understand and communicate with him concerning his defense.

Mere Suspicion of Criminal Activity After reviewing previous decisions on valid warrantless arrests and searches, the Court
Did Not Justify Search of Cuizon underscored in sum that there was need for facts providing probable cause, such as
the "distinct odor of marijuana, reports about drug transporting or positive
Lastly, in Cuizon, the NBI, after conducting a surveillance on Cuizon for about a identification by informers, suspicious behavior, attempt to flee, [or] failure to produce
month, received in the morning a tip from an informant that Cuizon and his wife were identification papers" to justify warrantless arrests and searches. Likewise, urgency
arriving at NAIA that same day, bringing a large quantity of shabu. A team was must attend such arrests and searches, as where motor vehicles are used and there is
immediately organized and sent to the airport to intercept the suspect. Shortly after great probability that the suspect would get away before a warrant can be procured.
noon, the Cuizon spouses arrived. While at the airport arrival area, Cuizon handed Most important is that the law enforcers must act immediately on the information
four travelling bags to Pua and Lee who thereafter bearded a taxicab, while the Cuizons received, suspicions raised or probable cause established, and should effect the arrests
took a different vehicle. The NBI team members posted at the NAIA parking area, and searches without any delay. 12
however, failed to intercept the suspects. The team merely trailed the taxicab which
proceeded to the Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati. After identifying themselves to the Instant Case Correlated
suspects in their hotel room, the team asked permission to search their bags in the with Four Cited
presence of the hotel's chief security officer. Pua and Lee consented in writing. Found
inside three of the four bags similar to those handed to them by Cuizon at the airport Now to the correlation with the case at bar.
were plastic packages of white crystalline substances which, upon later examination,
(1) As in Manalili, lawmen were on surveillance in response to information that a
were confirmed to be shabu. Taking with them the two accused (who, however, did not
criminal activity could be in the offing at a specified place. The stark difference,
implicate Cuizon), the NBI team proceeded to the Cuizon residence where they found a
however, is that in Manalili, the reported activity involved drug use and the lawmen
bag allegedly containing the same substance. The three were charged and convicted of
belonged to the anti-narcotics group, while in the instant case, the police on patrol
illegal transport of the regulated drug. On appeal, only Cuizon challenged the validity of
were ordinary law enforcers on the lookout for possible bombers. In the former, the law
his warrantless arrest, search and seizure.
enforcers concerned may be presumed to possess special knowledge and skill to detect
Reiterating the doctrine that "where a person is searched without a warrant, and under the physical features exhibited by a current drug user. Thus, when these specially
circumstances other than chose justifying a warrantless arrest . . . , upon a mere trained enforcers saw Manalili with reddish eyes and walking in a wobbly manner
suspicion that he has embarked on some criminal activity, and/or for the purpose of characteristic of a person "high" on drugs per their experience, and in a known
discovering if indeed a crime has been committed by him, then the search made of hangout of drug users, there was sufficient genuine reason to stop and frisk the
such person as well as his arrest [is] deemed illegal," 10 this Court declared unlawful suspect. It is well to emphasize that under different circumstances, such as where the
the arrest of Cuizon as well as the incidental search and seizure. The warrantless policemen are not specially trained, and in common places where people ordinarily
arrest and search were not justified by the rules on "in flagrante delicto" or "hot pursuit" converge, the same features displayed by a person will not normally justify a
for, at the time of his arrest, Cuizon was inside his home resting with his wife and warrantless arrest or search on him.
child. No offense had just been committed or was actually being committed or
The case before us presents such a situation. The policemen merely observed that
attempted by him in the presence of the lawmen, nor did the latter have personal
Malacat's eyes were moving very fast. They did not notice any bulges or packets about
knowledge of facts indicating that Cuizon authored an offense that had just in fact
the bodies of these men indicating that they might be hiding explosive paraphernalia.
been committed. Consequently, any evidence obtained during the illegal search, "even
From their outward look, nothing suggested that they were at the time armed and
if tending to confirm or actually confirming the initial suspicion, is absolutely dangerous. Hence, there was no justification for a stop-and-frisk.
inadmissible for any purpose and in any proceeding, the same being 'the fruit of the
poisonous tree.'" 11
(2) In relation to the cases of Encinada and Cuizon, at the time of the arrests of the there were suspicious-looking persons at a certain street corner in Tondo, Manila, the
suspects, none of the actions of Accused Encinada and Cuizon were beyond normal as Western Police District dispatched a surveillance team to said place. There they saw
to suggest that they were then engaged in felonious activities. The simple handing over two men "looking from side to side" with one" holding his abdomen." The police
of the baggage by Cuizon to Pua and Lee was far from being indicative of any illegal approached them and identified themselves, whereupon the two tried to flee but failed
activity. Such act by itself does not, by any stretch of imagination, even appear to be as other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were searched, and recovered from
suspicious. Granting that indeed an offense was committed by Cuizon at the airport, Mengote was a fully loaded pistol; from his companion, a fan knife.
his subsequent arrest cannot even be justified under the rule on "hot pursuit." He did
not attempt to flee, but was actually able to leave the premises and reach his house The Court ruled that the situation was not one calling for a lawful warrantless search
unhampered by the police. There was considerable interruption between the supposed and arrest. As the Court, through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, succinctly put it: "What
commission of the crime and his subsequent arrest in his house where he was already offense could possibly have been suggested by a person 'looking from side to side' and
resting. 'holding his abdomen' and in a place not exactly forsaken?"

Moreover, Encinada and Cuizon had been previously identified and subjected to . . . [T]here could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes
surveillance. Police informants themselves, presumably reliable, tipped off their alleged were darting from side to side and he was holding his abdomen. If they excited
criminal activity. Specifically with respect to Encinada, there was sufficient time to suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has
priorly obtain a warrant for his arrest. It must be stressed that raw unverified nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen
intelligence information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest or search. themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of the
That is why it is important to bring one's evidence before a judge who shall telephone call from the informer that there were 'suspicious-looking' persons in that
independently determine if probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. It is vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not
not for the police to make such determination. explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the
impending crime. 14
As regards Cuizon, it was, worse, the ineptness of the NBI team dispatched to intercept
him which foiled his arrest and search. In the present case, if it were true that the In closing, the Court lamented and thus warned:
arresting officer saw Malacat two days earlier attempting to detonate a grenade in the
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched
same vicinity, again it was the policemen's ineptitude that frustrated his valid arrest
just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-
there and then and, further, their inability to effectively investigate and identify the
ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on
culprit — so as to have obtained a lawful arrest warrant — that hindered his valid
suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or
seizure thereafter.
attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state
(3) In Lacerna, true, the occupants of the taxicab bowed their heads and slouched where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the
when they passed through the police checkpoint. Although such acts could raise arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.15
suspicions, they did not provide sufficient reason for the police to stop and investigate
Under our rule in Mengote, petitioner's dubious act of moving his eyes swiftly from side
them for possible criminal operation; much less, to conduct an extensive search of
to side can in no way justify a stop-and-frisk. To convict a person on the basis only of
their belongings. A checkpoint search is limited to a roving view within the vehicle. A
his queer behavior and to sentence him to practically a lifetime in prison would simply
further search may be validly effected only if something probably illegal is within his
be unfathomable. Nothing can be more wrong, unjust and inhuman.
"plain view." In Lacerna, if not for the passengers' free and express consent, the search
would have been undoubtedly declared illegal. Similarly, the fast-moving eyes of WHEREFORE, I vote to SET ASIDE the assailed decision and to ACQUIT Petitioner
Malacat, although connoting unusual behavior, was not indicative that he was armed Sammy Malacat y Mandar.
and dangerous as to justify a search on his person.

Mengote Supports
Present Ponencia

Bolstering the invalidity of the arrest and search of Malacat is People


vs. Mengote, 13 another classic on the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Upon receiving a telephone call shortly before noon from an informer that
G.R. No. 109287 April 18, 1996 The methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" involved in this case is declared
forfeited in favor of the government and is ordered turned over to the Dangerous Drug
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Board for proper disposal.
vs.
ANTOLIN CUIZON y ORTEGA, STEVE PUA y CLOFAS alias "STEPHEN PO y UY" The Facts
or "TOMMY SY" and PAUL LEE y WONG alias "PAUL LEUNG", accused- appellants.
According to the Prosecution

The facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Solicitor General, who
PANGANIBAN, J.:p added the page references to the transcript of stenographic notes as indicated in
brackets, are as follows:6
In deciding the case at bench, the Court reiterates doctrines on illegal searches and
seizures, and the requirements for a valid warrantless search incident to a valid In January 1992, the Reaction Group of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
warrantless arrest. While the Court appreciates and encourages pro-active law gathered an information regarding the drug, activities of accused Antolin Cuizon y
enforcement, it nonetheless upholds the sacredness of constitutional rights and Ortega and his wife, Susan Cuizon. A surveillance was conducted on them. The
repeats the familiar maxim, "the end never justifies the means." residence of the spouses was traced to Caloocan City (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 17-18,
21).
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated January 5, 1993 (Criminal Case No. 92-
0230) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 116,2 Pasay City finding appellants guilty of In the morning of February 21, 1992, the Reaction Group received a report from its
violating Section 15 of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of informant in Hong Kong that accused Cuizon, together with his wife, was arriving on
1972. the same day at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, from the British crown colony, carrying with him a big quantity of "shabu". A
On March 10, 1992, an Information3 was filed against the appellants charging them as team was organized to intercept the suspects. Heading the team was Jose Yap, with
follows: Ernesto Diño, Marcelino Amurao, Jose Bataller and Alfredo Jacinto, as members.
Some belonged to the Narcotics Division and the others to the Reaction Group of the
That on or about February 21, 1992 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the
NBI (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 4, 18).
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully, Arriving at the NAIA shortly before 12:00 noon of February 21, 1992, Diño positioned
unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the country, without lawful himself at the Arrival Area, while Yap and the other members of the team posted
authority, 16 kilograms, more or less, of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, themselves at the parking area of the airport. At about 12:45 in the afternoon of the
also popularly known as "SHABU", a regulated drug. same date, accused Cuizon and his wife, who had just returned from Hong Kong, after
passing through the Immigration and Customs Areas at the NAIA, proceeded to the
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Arrival Area of the airport preparatory to their boarding a car. While there, accused
Upon arraignment, appellant Antolin Cuizon, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not Cuizon, together with his wife, handed four (4) traveling bags to accused Steve Pua y
guilty. During the arraignment of appellants Paul Lee and Steve Pua, the latter Clofas and accused Paul Lee y Wong, who were at the vicinity of the Arrival Area.
translated the information into Chinese-Cantonese for the understanding of appellant Accused Pua and Lee loaded the bags in a taxicab which they boarded in leaving the
Lee, who does not speak nor understand English, Pilipino or any other Philippine airport. Accused Cuizon and his wife took another vehicle (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 4-5,
dialect. Both of them, duly assisted by their counsel, also pleaded not guilty.4 Trial 8-9).
ensued and on January 5, 1993, the court a quo found appellants guilty as charged
and rendered the following disposition:5 At this juncture, Diño, who was observing the activities of the accused, radioed the
group of Yap at the parking area, describing the vehicle boarded by accused Pua and
WHEREFORE, accused Antolin Cuizon y Ortega, Steve Pua y Clofas alias Stephen Po y Lee so that Yap and his companions could apprehend the two. However, the message
Uy or Tommy Sy, and Paul Lee y Wong, alias Paul Leung, are found guilty beyond of Diño was not completely received by his teammates as the radio he was using ran
reasonable doubt of transporting, without legal authority, methamphetamine short of battery power (tsn, May 13, 1992, pp. 25-26).
hydrochloride, or "shabu", a regulated drug, as charged in the aforequoted Information;
Immediately after the vehicle boarded by Pua and Lee had left, Diño proceeded to the
and they are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P20,000.00. place where his companions were stationed for the purpose of giving assistance to
them, believing that they were already in the process of apprehending accused Pua and some companions returned to the hotel. The suspected "shabu" was turned over
and Lee. When he realized that the two accused were not apprehended, Diño told the to them (tsn, May 20, 1992, pp. 19-22).
group of Yap to follow him as he was following the vehicle taken by Pua and Lee which,
according to an earlier tip he learned, was proceeding to the Manila Peninsula Hotel in When examined in the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI, the white crystalline
Makati, Metro Manila (tan, May 19, 1992 pp. 25-26; tsn, May 21, 1992, pp. 6, 15). substance taken from the three (3) travelling bags found in the room of accused Pua
and Lee in the Manila Peninsula hotel, the white crystalline substance retrieved from
Upon arriving at about 2:00 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992, in the Manila the bag confiscated from accused Cuizon in his house in Caloocan City, and the white
Peninsula Hotel, in whose premises the taxicab boarded by accused Pua and Lee crystalline substance hidden in the ceiling of Room 340 of the hotel were confirmed to
entered, Diño and the other members of the team coordinated with Col. Regino be methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", a regulated drug. (Board Regulation
Arellano, Chief Security Officer of the hotel, for the purpose of apprehending the two No. 6, dated December 11, 1972, of the Dangerous Drugs Board) (tsn, May 7, 1992, p.
accused. A verification made by the Chief Security Officer showed that accused Pua 12).
and Lee occupied Room 340 of the hotel. The two accused allowed Diño and Yap,
together with Col. Arellano, to enter their room. Found inside Room 340 were four (4) The Defense's Version(s)
traveling bags, which were similar to the ones handed by accused Cuizon to accused
Appellant Pua, on his part, interposed the defense of alibi. On direct examination, he
Pua and Lee at the Arrival Area of the NAIA. After having introduced themselves as NBI
testified that at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, he and his co-
agents, Diño and Yap were permitted by accused Pua and Lee to search their bags in
appellant Lee were in their room at the Manila Peninsula Hotel.7His version of what
the presence of Col. Arellano. The permission was made in writing. (Exh. I). Three (3) of happened on February 21, 1992 can be summarized as follows:
the four (4) bags each yielded a plastic package containing a considerable quantity of
white crystalline substance suspected to be methamphethamine hydrochloride or At around 9:30 in the morning, he accompanied appellant Paul Lee to check-in at the
"shabu". Each package was sandwiched between two (2) pieces of board which appear Manila Peninsula Hotel for and in behalf of the latter's personal friend named Leong
to be "lawanit" placed at the bottom of each of the three (3) bags. The suspected Chong Chong or Paul Leung, who was expected to arrive that evening because of a
"shabu" contained in one bag weighed 2.571 kilos, that found in the other had a weight delayed flight. Appellant Pua was engaged by appellant Lee to act as interpreter as Lee
of 2.768 kilos, and the suspected "shabu" retrieved from the third bag weighed 2.970 does not know how to speak English and the local language.8
kilos. Pua and Lee were then apprehended by Diño and his companions (tsn, May 20,
1992, pp. 9-13; tsn, May 7, 1992, p. 9, Exh. "F-2", p. 75, Records). While in Room 340, past 1:00 in the afternoon, they received a call from the lobby
informing them of the arrival of Paul Leung's luggage. At Pua's instructions, the said
Immediately thereafter, Diño and the other members of the team proceeded to the luggage were brought to the room by a bellboy. Thereafter, two persons knocked on
house of accused Cuizon in Caloocan City, taking with them accused Pua and Lee and their door, accompanied by a "tomboy" and a thin man with curly hair. The two men
the bags with their contents of suspected dangerous drugs. They reached the place at identified themselves as NBI agents and asked appellant Pua to let them in. He
about 5:50 in the afternoon of the same date of February 21, 1992. Retrieved from declined since he did not know who they were. However, when Col. Arellano, the Chief
accused Cuizon in his residence was another bag also containing a white crystalline Security Officer of the hotel, arrived and identified the two NBI agents, he and Lee
substance weighing 2.695 kilos, likewise believed to be methamphetamine relented and permitted them to enter. Thereafter, he and Lee were told by the agents to
hydrochloride or "shabu". In addition, a .38 Cal. firearm was taken from accused sign a piece of paper. Made to understand that they were merely giving their consent
Cuizon (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 10-11). for the agents to enter their room, Pua and Lee signed the same. Whereupon, the
agents told them that they will open Paul Leung's bags. Again appellant Pua refused,
Pua, Lee, Cuizon and his wife were then brought by the arresting officers to the NBI
saying that the bags did not belong to them. Just the same, the agents, without
headquarters at Taft Avenue, Manila, for further investigation. They were subsequently
appellants Pua and Lee's consent, opened the bags and found the shabu. Pua and Lee
referred to the Prosecution Division of the Department of Justice for inquest. However,
were then apprehended and brought to the NBI headquarters.9
only the present three accused were charged in court (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 12-13,
16-17). Appellant Cuizon, on the other hand, flatly rejected the prosecution's version of the
incident. While admitting that on February 21, 1992, he and his wife Susan did arrive
In the meantime, at about 5:30 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992, Joselito
from Hong Kong with several pieces of luggage, he denied that he met Pua and Lee at
Soriano, roomboy of the Manila Peninsula Hotel, while cleaning Room 340, observed
the arrival area of the airport, much less passed to them the four pieces of luggage.
that a portion of the ceiling was misaligned. While fixing it, he discovered in the ceiling
According to him, only his two-year old son, accompanied by his cousin, Ronald Allan
a laundry bag containing suspected "shabu" of more than five (5) kilos (Exh. "X," p.
Ong, met them outside the airport. Ong fetched them from the airport and brought
110). Informed of the discovery while they were already in their office in the NBI, Yap
them to their home in Caloocan city. They arrived at their house around 3:00 in the The answer to this threshold question determines whether the judgment of the court a
afternoon.10 quo will stand or fall. Consequently, there is a need to resolve first this issue before
endeavoring to consider the other issues raised by appellants.
About two hours later, while he was resting together with his wife and son on his bed,
two NBI agents suddenly barged in and poked a gun at him. They manhandled him in A necessary side issue to be considered is, assuming the searches and arrests to have
front of his wife and son. His hands were tied with a necktie and he was forcibly been illegal, whether failure by appellants Pua and Lee to explicitly assign the same as
brought out of their house while the NBI agents ransacked the place without any errors before this Court amounted to a waiver of their constitutional rights against
warrant. He, his wife Susan, and his cousin Ronald Allan Ong, were afterwards such illegal searches and arrests.
brought to the NBI Headquarters in Manila and there the NBI agents continued
mauling him.11 The Court's Ruling

Appellant Cuizon's wife Susan, his cousin Ronald Allan Ong, and his nephew Nestor General Rule on Warrantless
Dalde, testified in his favor basically reiterating or confirming his testimony.12
Arrests, Searches & Seizures
Unfortunately, appellant Paul Lee, who does not speak or understand a word of
Well entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be
English or Pilipino and only knows Chinese-Cantonese, was not able to take the
made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. So sacred is
witness stand for lack of an interpreter who would translate his testimony to English.
this right that no less than the fundamental law of the
In the hearing set on October 28, 1992, the last trial date allotted to the defense for the
land16 ordains it:
reception of Lee's testimony, his counsel, although notified of the proceedings, did not
appear. Thus, the trial court deemed him and Pua to have waived their right to present The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
additional evidence,13 and the case was considered submitted for decision after the unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be
filing of memoranda. The counsel for Pua and Lee did not ask for the reconsideration of inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
such ruling; neither did he submit any memorandum. Only accused Cuizon, who was cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
assisted by another counsel, was able to submit his memorandum. affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may "produce, and particularly
describing the place to be Searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
The Issues
It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be
In their brief, appellants Pua and Lee made the following assignments of errors:14
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.17
I. The trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused.
However, the right against warrantless arrest and search and seizure is not absolute.
II. The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Thus, under Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court, an arrest without a
Marcelino Amurao, Jose Yap and Ernesto Diño despite contradictions made on warrant may be lawfully made by a peace officer or a private person:
material points.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
III. The trial court erred in not giving accused Paul Lee the opportunity to present his committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
evidence in his defense in violation of his constitutional right to due process.
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
Appellant Cuizon, in a separate brief, essentially reiterates the first two assignments of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
errors above-quoted, and in addition challenges the legality and validity of his
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
warrantless arrest and the search and seizure incidental thereto.15
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
As this Court sees it, the resolution of this case hinges on the pivotal question of the while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
legality of the arrest and search of herein appellants effected by the NBI operatives. Put to another.
differently, were the warrantless arrests and the warrantless searches conducted by
On the occasion of any of the aforementioned instances of legitimate arrest without
the NBI legal and constitutional?
warrant, the person arrested may be subjected to a search of his body and of his
personal effects or belongings, "for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used Par. (b) of the same provision is likewise inapplicable since its equally exacting
as proof of the commission of an offense," likewise without need of a search warrant.18 requirements have also not been met. The prosecution failed to establish that at the
time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officers
However, where a person is searched without a warrant, and under circumstances had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused-appellants had committed it.
other than those justifying a warrantless arrest, as discussed above, upon a mere Appellant Cuizon could not, by the mere act of handing over four pieces of luggage to
suspicion that he has embarked on some criminal activity, and/or for the purpose of the other two appellants, be considered to have committed the offense of "carrying and
discovering if indeed a crime has been committed by him, then the search made of transporting" prohibited drugs. Under the circumstances of the case, there was no
such person as well as his arrest are deemed illegal.19 Consequently, any evidence sufficient probable cause for the arresting officers to believe that the accused were then
which may have been obtained during such search, even if tending to confirm or and there committing a crime. The act per se of handing over the baggage, assuming
actually confirming such initial suspicion, is absolutely inadmissible for any purpose the prosecution's version to be true; cannot in any way be considered a criminal act. It
and in any proceeding,20 the same being "the fruit of the poisonous tree".21 Emphasis is was not even an act performed under suspicious circumstances as indeed, it took
to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incident to a lawful arrest, place in broad daylight, practically at high noon, and out in the open, in full view of the
in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond public.24 Furthermore, it can hardly be considered unusual, in an airport setting, for
cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings. Were travellers and/or their welcomers to be passing, handing over and delivering pieces of
a search first undertaken, then an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the baggage, especially considering the somewhat obsessive penchant of our fellow
search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law. countrymen for sending along ("pakikipadala") things and gifts through friends and
relatives. Moreover, one cannot determine from the external appearance of the luggage
The Instant Case Does Not Fall Under
that they contained "shabu" hidden beneath some secret panel or false bottom. The
The Exceptions for Warrantless Searches, etc. only reason why such act of parting with luggage took on the color and dimensions of a
felonious deed, at least as far as the lawmen were concerned, was the alleged tip that
Re-assessing the factual backdrop of the case at bench, this Court cannot agree with the NBI agents purportedly received that morning, to the effect that appellant Cuizon
and accept the conclusion of the trial court that the appellants were caught in flagrante would be arriving that same day with a shipment of shabu. To quote from another
delicto which would justify the search without a warrant. The shaky reasoning of the decision of like import, "(A)11 they had was hearsay information (from the telephone
court a quo gives away the baselessness of its findings and conclusion: caller), and about a crime that had yet to be committed."25
. . . the search conducted on their bags in the hotel room could still be regarded as In the leading case of People vs. Burgos,26 this Court laid down clear guidelines, as
valid for being incidential to a lawful arrest. . . . The arrest of accused Pua and Lee follows:
without a warrant of arrest was lawful, as they could be considered to have committed
the crime of transporting "shabu" in the presence of the arresting officers from the time Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed,
they received the bags containing the regulated drug in the airport up to the time they is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that
brought the bags to the hotel. Or their arrest without a warrant was legal as falling fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v.
under the situation where an offense had in fact just been committed, and the Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the said accused were
The same decision is highly instructive as it goes on to state:
the ones who committed it. . . .22
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful
Scrutinizing the provisions of Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on lawful arrests
under Section 6 (b) using the test of reasonableness. He submits that the information
without warrant, we note that par. (c) of said section is obviously inapplicable, the
given by Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground (for belief) that
appellants not being escapees from a penal institution at the time of arrest. Par. (a) an
a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
the other hand requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while
he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
presence of the arresting officer(s). These requirements are not present in the case at reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A
bench, for at the time of their arrest, appellants Pua and Lee were merely resting in crime must in fact or actuallyhave been committed first. That a crime has actually
their hotel room, and appellant Cuizon for his part was in bed resting with his wife and been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime
child inside his home. No offense had just been committed, or was being actually may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be
committed or being attempted by any of the accused in the presence of the lawmen.23
undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the illegal and the "shabu" seized thereat cannot but be considered inadmissible in
perpetrator. evidence. More an these points later.

In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Comparison Between The Present Case
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime.
They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent and Earlier Decisions of This Court
recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened
For clarity's sake, it is imperative to compare the foregoing holding with previous
wife cannot make the arrest lawful. . . .
decisions by this Court in various drug cases, in which apparently different
The foregoing doctrine was affirmed in the case of Alih vs. Castro,27 where this Court conclusions were reached, in order to distinguish them from the instant case and avoid
ruled that ". . . under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest any potential misunderstanding of the foregoing holding as well as the constitutional
must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case and legal principles on which it is based.
of People v. Burgos."
1. In People vs. Claudio,28 the accused, a passenger on a bus bound for Baguio city,
In the case at bench, not only did the NBI agents rely merely on hearsay information was arrested by a policeman on the same bus because of the distinctive odor of
("tips"), but they were completely uncertain that anything was really "going down" that marijuana emanating from the plastic bag she was carrying. The Court held the
day. That much is undisputed, from a reading of the testimony of Agent Diño: warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be lawful, the search justified and the
evidence thus discovered admissible in evidence.
Q Now, but you were informed by the personnel of the airport that the spouses Cuizon
were going to bring in or transport into the country shabu on February 21, 1992? 2. In People vs. Tangliben,29 the accused, carrying a travelling bag at a bus terminal,
was noticed by lawmen to be acting suspiciously, and was also positively fingered by an
A Yes, sir. informer as carrying marijuana, and so he was accosted by policemen who happened
to be on a surveillance mission; the lawmen asked him to open the bag, in which was
Q Now, you were not sure or your group was not sure that they indeed would bring in found a package of marijuana leaves. It was held that there was a valid warrantless
shabu, is it not? That was only the information relayed to your group? arrest and search incident thereto. The Court in effect considered the evidence on hand
A Yes, sir. sufficient to have enabled the law enforcers to secure a search warrant had there been
time, but as the case "presented urgency," and there was actually no time to obtain a
xxx xxx xxx warrant since the accused was about to board a bus, and inasmuch as an informer
had given information "on the spot" that the accused was carrying marijuana, the
Q But then you were jumping ahead. You were not sure is it not that they were search of his person and effects was thus considered valid.
bringing in shabu?
3. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,30 the accused was seen acting suspiciously, and
A Yes, sir. (TSN, May 19, 1992, pp. 37-38.) when accosted by two members of the Davao INP who identified themselves as
lawmen, he suddenly fled, but was pursued, subdued and placed in custody.
In his testimony, NBI Investigator Jose Justo Yap, who was with Agent Diño during the
The buri bag he was carrying yielded an unlicensed revolver, live ammunition and a
operation, likewise admitted in substantially the same tenor their uncertainty
tear gas grenade. This Court upheld his conviction for illegal possession of firearms,
regarding the commission of the offense (cf. TSN, May 20, 1992, pp. 29 & 34.).
holding that there was under the circumstances sufficient probable cause for a
We therefore hold that under the circumstances obtaining, the prosecution failed to warrantless search.
establish that there was sufficient and reasonable ground for the NBI agents to believe
4. In People vs. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al.,31 agents of the Narcotics Command set up a
that appellants had committed a crime at the point when the search and arrest of Pua
checkpoint on a highway in Atok, Benguet, to screen vehicular traffic on the way to
and Lee were made; hence, said search and arrest do not come under the exception in
Baguio City due to confidential reports from informers that Maspil and a certain
par. (b) of Sec. 5 of Rule 113, and therefore should be deemed illegal. We eight add that
Bagking would be transporting a large quantity of marijuana. At about 2 a.m. of
the search conducted on Pua and Lee was not incident to a lawful warrantless arrest,
November 1, 1986, the two suspects, riding a jeepney, pulled up to the checkpoint and
having preceded the same and produced the justification therefor. On the other hand,
were made to stop. The officers noticed that the vehicle was loaded with some sacks
the search on Cuizon's residence, without the benefit of a search warrant, was clearly
and tin cans, which, when opened, were seen to contain marijuana leaves. The Court
upheld the search thus conducted as being incidental to a valid warrantless arrest.
5. In People vs. Lo Ho Wing, et al.,32 the Court ruled that the search of the appellants' Unexplained Matters in the Instant Case
moving vehicles and the seizure of "shabu" therefrom was legal, in view of the
intelligence information, including notably, clandestine reports by a planted deep In the case before us, the NBI agents testified that they purportedly decided against
penetration agent or spy who was even participating in the drug smuggling activities of arresting the accused-appellants inside the airport as they allegedly wanted to discover
the syndicate, to the effect that appellants were bringing in prohibited drugs into the the identities of the airport immigration, security or customs personnel who might be
country. The Court also held that it is not practicable to secure a search warrant in protecting the accused or otherwise involved in the drug smuggling activities, and also
cases of smuggling with the use of a moving vehicle to transport contraband, because in order to avoid the possibility of an armed encounter with such protectors, which
the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant might result in injuries to innocent bystanders. These excuses are simply
must be sought. unacceptable. They are obviously after-thoughts concocted to justify their rank failure
to effect the arrest within constitutional limits. Indeed, the NBI men failed to explain
6. In People vs. Malmstedt,33 NARCOM agents stationed at Camp Dangwa, Mountain how come they did not apprehend the appellants at the moment Cuizon handed over
Province, set up a temporary checkpoint to check vehicles coming from the Cordillera the baggage to Pua and Lee, or even afterwards, in relative safety. Such arrest would
Region, due to persistent reports that vehicles from Sagada were transporting have been consistent with the settled constitutional, legal and jurisprudential
marijuana and other drugs, and because of particular information to the effect that a precedents earlier cited.
Caucasian would be travelling from Sagada that day with prohibited drugs. The bus in
which accused was riding was stopped at the checkpoint. While conducting an The spouses Cuizon had already passed through the airport security checks allegedly
inspection, one of the NARCOM men noticed that accused, the only foreigner on board, with their contraband cargo undetected in their luggage. Apparently, the NBI agents
had a bulge at the waist area. Thinking it might be a gun, the officer sought accused's did not see (as indeed they did not testify that they saw) anyone from the airport
passport or other identification papers. When the latter failed to comply, the lawman immigration, security or customs who could have escorted the spouses Cuizon, and
directed him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging at his waist. It was a pouch therefore, there was no danger of any "live ammo encounter" with such group(s). The
bag which, when opened by the accused, was found to contain packages of hashish, a alleged drug couriers had already made their way outside the NAIA, had allegedly
derivative of marijuana. Invited for questioning, the accused disembarked from the bus made contact with the accused Pua and Lee, and were in the very act of handing over
and brought along with him two pieces of luggage; found inside were two teddy bears the luggage to the latter. Why the NBI men did not move in and pounce on them at
stuffed with more hashish. The Court held that there was sufficient probable cause in that very instant has not been satisfactorily explained. Instead, one of the agents, Diño,
the premises for the lawmen to believe that the accused was then and there merely watched as Pua and Lee loaded the luggage into a cab and took off for Makati.
committing a crime and/or trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. Said Furthermore, it taxes the imagination too much to think that at the most critical and
probable cause arose not only from the persistent reports of the transport of prohibited climactic moment, when agent Diño radioed his companions for help to close in on the
drugs from Sagada, and the "tip" received by the NARCOM that same day that a suspects, the most amazing and stupendous thing actually happened: Murphy's Law
Caucasian coming from Sagada would be bringing prohibited drugs, but also from the kicked in — whatever could go wrong, did, and at the worst possible time — the
failure of the accused to present his passport or other identification papers when batteries in Agent Diño's hand-held radio supposedly went dead and his message was
confronted by the lawmen, which only triggered suspicion on the part of the law not transmitted. Thus the departing Pua and Lee proceeded merrily and unimpeded to
enforcers that accused was trying to hide his identity, it being the normal thing the Peninsula Hotel, while the spouses Cuizon simultaneously sped off to their
expected of an innocent man with nothing to hide, that he readily present identification residence in Caloocan City, leaving the lawmen empty-handed and scampering madly
papers when asked to do so. The warrantless arrest and search were thus justified. to catch up. Such absolutely astounding and incredible happenstance might find a
place in a fourth-rate movie script, but expecting the courts to swallow it — hook, line
In all the cases discussed hereinabove, there were facts which were found by the Court and sinker — is infinite naivete, if not downright malevolence.
to provide probable cause justifying warrantless arrests and searches, i.e., distinct odor
of marijuana, reports about drug transporting or positive identification by informers, Even granting arguendo that the radio really went dead, nevertheless, the agents were
suspicious behaviour, attempt to flee, failure to produce identification papers, and so not thereby rendered helpless or without recourse. The NBI agents, numbering five in
on. Too, urgency attended the arrests and searches because each of the above- all, not counting their so-called informant, claimed to have piled into three cars (TSN,
mentioned cases involved the use of motor vehicles and the great likelihood that the May 19, 1992) and tailed the suspects Pua and Lee into Makati, keeping a safe two-car
accused would get away long before a warrant can be procured. And, lest it be distance behind (TSN, May 20, 1992). The lawmen and the prosecutors failed to
overlooked, unlike in the case before us now, the law enforcers in the aforementioned explain why the agents did not intercept the vehicle in which Pua and Lee were riding,
cases acted immediately on the information received, suspicions raised, and probable along the way, pull them over, arrest them and search the luggage. And since the
causes established, and effected the arrests and searches without any delay. agents were in three (3) cars, they also could have easily arranged to have agents in one
vehicle follow, intercept and apprehend the Cuizons while the others went after Pua called tip and the results of surveillance, the government officers were still seemingly
and Lee. All or any of these possible moves are mere ordinary, common-sense steps, hesitant, reluctant, uncertain, or perhaps afraid, to arrest and search the accused
not requiring a great deal of intelligence. The NBI men who testified claimed to have appellants, so much so that the NBI agents who went after Pua and Lee at the
conducted or participated in previous drug busts or similar operations and therefore Peninsula Hotel, instead of outrightly cuffing and searching them, as they were
must have been familiar with contingency planning, or at least should have known supposed to, opted instead to play it safe and meekly beseeched the two to sign a
what to do in this situation where their alleged original plan fell through. At any rate, written consent for the agents to search their personal effects! Indeed, this is one for
what the lawmen opted to do, i.e., allow Pua and Lee to freely leave the airport, the books. If this is how confident the agents were about their "hot tips", reliable
allegedly bringing the drug cache to the hotel, and Cuizon to leave unimpededly the informers and undercover surveillance, then we cannot be blamed for failing to
airport and reach his residence with one of the luggage, increased significantly the risk appreciate the existence/sufficiency of probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest
of the suspects (and/or the drugs) slipping through the lawmen's fingers, and puts into and search in this case. There is a whole lot more that can be said on this score, but
question the regularity of performance of their official functions. The agents' alleged we shall leave it at that for now. We shall now dispose of the appeals of the accused-
actions in this case compare poorly with the forthright and decisive steps taken by appellants individually.
lawmen in the cases earlier cited where this Court held the arrests and seizures to be
valid. Re: Appellant Antolin Cuizon

Had the arrests and searches been made in transitu, i.e., had the agents intercepted The search of the house of appellant Cuizon, having been conducted without any
and collared the suspects on the way to Makati and Caloocan, or better yet, at the very warrant, and not on the occasion or as an incident of a valid warrantless arrest, was
moment of the hand-over, then there would not have been any question at all as to the indubitably illegal, and the shabu seized thereat could not be admissible in evidence.
legality of their arrest and search, as they would presumably have been caught red- That is why even the trial judge did not make an effort to hold him liable under such
handed with the evidence, and consequently for that reason and by the very nature seizure. He lamely argued: "(A)t any rate, accused Cuizon is not held criminally liable in
and manner of commission of the offense charged, there would have been no doubt this case in connection with the bag containing "shabu" confiscated from his residence.
also as to the existence of conspiracy among the appellants to transport the drugs. His responsibility is based on the bags containing "shabu" which he handed to Pua
However, because of the way the operation actually turned out, there is no sufficient and Lee at the NAIA. Consequently, even if the bag and its contents of "shabu" taken
proof of conspiracy between Pua and Lee on the one hand, and Cuizon on the other, from his house were not admitted in evidence, the remaining proofs of the prosecution
inasmuch as there is no clear and convincing evidence that the four (4) bags handed would still be sufficient to establish the charge against him." However, contrary to the
by Cuizon to Pua and Lee at the airport were the very same ones found in the trial judge's conclusion, we hold that insofar as Cuizon is concerned, all the evidence
possession of the latter in Room 340 of the Peninsula Hotel. Not one of the NBI agents seized are considered fruit of the poisonous tree and are inadmissible as against him,
when testifying could definitely and positively state that the bags seized from Room 340 and thus, he should be acquitted, since, as shown hereinabove, (i) the warrantless
were the very same ones passed by Cuizon at the airport; at best, they could only say search conducted on Pua and Lee was clearly illegal per se, not being incident to a valid
that they "looked like" the ones they saw at the airport. And even assuming them to be warrantless arrest either; (ii) and even if the search on Pua and Lee were not illegal,
the same bags, there remains doubt and uncertainty as to the actual ownership of the conspiracy as between Cuizon on the one hand and appellants Pua and Lee on the
said bags as at the alleged turnover vis-a-vis the time they were seized by the agents. other had not been established by sufficient proof beyond reasonable doubt; and (iii)
For these reasons, we cannot sustain the finding of conspiracy as between Cuizon on appellant Cuizon had timely raised before this Court the issue of the illegality of his
the one hand and Pua and Lee on the other. Well-settled is the rule that conspiracy own arrest and the search and seizure conducted at his residence, and questioned the
must be proved independently and beyond reasonable doubt.34 admission of the seized shabu in evidence.

Additionally, in light of the foregoing discussion, we find it extremely difficult to Re: Appellant Steve Pua @ "Tommy Sy"
subscribe to the trial court's finding as to the existence and sufficiency of probable
What has been said for Cuizon cannot, alas, be said for appellant Pua. While the
cause in this case, one major component of which would have been the alleged
search and arrest carried out on him and Lee may have been illegal for not being
information or "tip" purportedly received by the agents as to the expected arrival of the
incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, the unfortunate fact is that appellant Pua failed
spouses Cuizon that fateful day with a large cache of "shabu". The question that defies
to challenge the validity of his arrest and search, as well as the admission of the
resolution in our minds is why, if indeed the information or "tip" was genuine and from
evidence obtained thereby; he did not raise the issue or assign the same as an error
a highly reliable source as claimed by the government agents, did they not act on it?
before this Court. Accordingly, any possible challenge thereto based on constitutional
Throw in the alleged month-long surveillance supposedly conducted by some of the
grounds is deemed waived. This Court has upheld and recognized waivers of
NBI people on the Cuizon couple, and the mystery only deepens. Even with the so-
constitutional rights, including, particularly, the right against unreasonable searches prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long
and seizures, in cases such as People vs. Malasugui 35 and De Garcia vs. Locsin.36 as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods
by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name
Additionally, the prosecution had argued and the trial court agreed that by virtue of the of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system
handwritten consent (Exhibit "I") secured by the arresting officers from appellants Pua of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and
and Lee, the latter freely gave their consent to the search of their baggage, and thus, encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and
the drugs discovered as a result of the consented search is admissible in evidence. The security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and
said written permission is in English, and states plainly that they (Pua and Lee) freely within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never
consent to the search of their luggage to be conducted by NBI agents to determine if justifies the means.
Pua and Lee are carrying shabu. It appears that appellant Pua understands both
English and Tagalog; he is born of a Filipino mother, had resided in Vito Cruz, Manila, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused-appellant Antolin
and gave his occupation as that of salesman. He admitted that he was asked to sign Cuizon y Ortega is hereby ACQUITTED on constitutional grounds. His immediate
the written consent, and that he did in fact sign it (TSN, May 28, 1992, pp. 33-34). His release is ordered unless he is detained for other valid causes. Accused-appellant Steve
barefaced claim made during his direct and cross examinations to the effect that he did Pua y Clofas is hereby found GUILTY of the crime of Illegal Transport of Regulated
not really read the consent but signed it right away, and that by signing it he only Drugs, penalized under Section 15, R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby
meant to give permission for the NBI agents to enter the room (and not to search) is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; the Decision appealed from, as
hardly worthy of belief, considering that prior to the search, he seemed to have been herein modified, is hereby affirmed as to appellant Pua. Finally, the case as to appellant
extra careful about who to let into the hotel room. Lee is hereby ordered REMANDED to the trial court in order that said accused may be
given his day in court. The Decision appealed from is also AFFIRMED with respect to
Thus, the full weight of the prosecution's testimonial evidence plus the large amount of the disposition of the prohibited drugs involved in the case.
prohibited drugs found, must be given full force vis-a-vis Pua's claim of innocent
presence in the hotel room, which is weak and not worthy of credence. SO ORDERED.

Re: Appellant Paul Lee @ "Paul Leung" Narvasa, C.J., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Appellant Lee's situation is different from that of Pua. We agree with the Solicitor Davide, Jr., J., concurs in the result.
General when he noted that the trial judge did not exert sufficient effort to make
available compulsory process and to see to it that accused-appellant Lee was given his
day in court. It is clear that appellant Lee was effectively denied his right to counsel, for
although he was provided with one, he could not understand and communicate with
him concerning his defense such that, among other things, no memorandum was filed
on his behalf; further, he was denied his right to have compulsory process to guarantee
the availability of witnesses and the production of evidence on his behalf, including the
services of a qualified and competent interpreter to enable him to present his
testimony.3 7 In sum, he was denied due process. For this reason, we hold that the
case as against Lee must be remanded to the court of origin for a re-trial.

Epilogue

It is evident and clear to us that the NBI agents gravely mishandled the drug bust
operation and in the process violated the constitutional guarantees against unlawful
arrests and illegal searches and seizures. Because of the large haul of illegal drugs that
the government officers claimed to have recovered, this Court agonized over the case
before us and struggled to apply the law with an even hand. In the final analysis, we in
the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-
abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen,
G.R. No. 153254 September 30, 2004 house to implement the search warrant.5 The police officers accompanied by
three barangay tanods, namely: Wilfredo Wasawas, Mansueto Toong and Leonico
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, Sagosa, entered the house, saw appellant and served the warrant on her.6 At that time,
vs. appellant was with her grandmother Elena Rivaral Garcia, the registered owner of the
EDEN DEL CASTILLO, appellant. house, and Servando del Castillo, appellant’s brother, in the living room. The police
DECISION officers "pressed" them by telling them not to move and they were asked to just sit
down while the search was on-going.7
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The raiding team divided themselves into two searching groups. The first group
Eden del Castillo appeals from the decision dated June 27, 20011 of the Regional Trial composed of Bauzon, Toring and one barangay tanod searched the upper portion of
Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-54778, finding her guilty of the house and found three large plastic packs of white crystalline substance.8 The
violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as Dangerous second group, composed of Baclayon and Borinaga, searched the ground floor and
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; and imposing on her the penalty of reclusion perpetua. found eight medium heat-sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance and fifty-
three heat-sealed plastic packets of white crystalline substance; two disposable
She was indicted under an Information dated August 2, 2000 which reads: lighters, one pair of scissors, one tooter, one puller and an improvised
hacksaw.9 Servando voluntarily surrendered five small packs of white crystalline
That on or about the 31st day of July 2000, at about 10:30 A.M., in the City of Cebu,
substance.10 Appellant was arrested and informed of her constitutional rights,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
specifically, the right to counsel to which she replied that she has a lawyer who will
deliberate intent and without being authorized by law, did then and there have in her
represent her.11 Petallar then prepared an inventory of the seized articles and appellant
possession and control or use the following:
was made to sign the same.12 PO3 Bauzon and PO3 Petallar explained that the
A- Three (3) big heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance weighing inventory receipt was dated July 24, 2000 although the raid was conducted on July 31
294.86 grams; because their office had earlier prepared the blank form.13 A copy of the inventory was
given to a tanod14 and thereafter appellant and Servando were brought to the police
B- Eight (8) medium heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance weighing station while the items seized were brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP)
12.33 grams; Crime Laboratory for examination.15

C- Fifty three (53) heat sealed plastic packets of white crystalline substance weighing P/Insp. Mutchit Salinas, chemist of the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office, who
4.75 grams conducted the laboratory test on these substances confirmed that the specimens
submitted for testing were positive for the presence of methamphetamine
locally known as "shabu", containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated hydrochloride known as shabu.16
drug, without the corresponding license or prescription.
The defense presented the following witnesses: Elena R. Garcia, Jaime Garcia and
CONTRARY TO LAW.2 appellant herself who testified to establish the following facts:
Upon her arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to The house subject of the search on July 31, 2000 was owned by Elena, appellant’s
the crime charged.3 Trial thereafter ensued.
grandmother, and her late husband, Jose Garcia, as evidenced by a copy of Tax
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: PO3 Leopoldo Bauzon, PO3 Alfredo Declaration No. 01-30651 in the name of Jose Garcia;17 that only Brent Lepiten,
Petallar, P/Insp. Mutchit Salinas and PO2 Brazilio Borinaga. Their testimonies proved Elena’s grandson, was living in the house while appellant was living with her parents
the following facts: in San Vicente Village, Wireless, Mandaue City, a distance of about five kilometers from
Elena’s place.18 On July 31, 2000, Elena, who was in the upper portion of the house
On July 21, 2000, a search warrant was issued by Judge Isaias Dicdican of the with her son, Jaime, who happened to sleep in her house the night before because he
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City, authorizing the search and seizure had a drinking spree with some friends, went downstairs because of the thudding
of shabu and its paraphernalias in the house of appellant located in M. Borgonia sound from their door.19 Appellant, who was in the house to visit her grandmother,
Street, Hayco, Mabolo, Cebu City.4 At about 10:30 in the morning of July 31, 2000, a was having breakfast when the door was opened. Several men entered the house and
team composed of Police Chief/Insp. Pablo Gacayan Labra II, Bauzon, Petallar and instructed them to sit down. Two of these men carrying an envelope went upstairs and
Borinaga, PO2 Ricardo Baclayon, Jr. and PO1 Jeric Cuyos Toring, went to the subject woke up Jaime Garcia.20 Jaime then went downstairs and these two men without the
envelope followed two minutes later.21Appellant and the other occupants were told to accused. The prosecution then was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
wait for the arrival of the tanods. Then, the same two men who earlier went upstairs reasonable doubt.
went up again with a tanod and when they came down, they had with them an
envelope, the contents of which were spread on the table and were listed Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
down.22 Appellant was then asked to sign a paper where a listing of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. 7659 reads as follows:

contents of the envelope was made but she requested to contact her lawyer which was SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
denied.23 She was forced to sign otherwise she would be handcuffed.24 The list of the death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
inventory was neither read to her nor did they leave a copy for her or to any of the be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the
occupants.25 Appellant declared that the search warrant was served on her but she corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
never read it nor was it read to her.26
Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous
On June 27, 2001, the trial court rendered its assailed decision27 finding appellant Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. 7659 reads as follows:
guilty as charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or
WHEREFORE, finding accused Eden del Castillo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the Instruments of the Crime. – The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of
crime charged, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the
Perpetua. The seized or confiscated items are declared forfeited in favor of the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
government and the same shall be disposed of in the manner allowed by law.28
...
In convicting appellant, the trial court ratiocinated:
3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylampetamine hydrochloride; . . .29
After a careful analysis of the testimonial and documentary evidence on record, the Hence, the instant appeal with the following assignment of errors:30
Court is of the well considered view and so holds that the prosecution was able to
establish the fact that the accused had indeed, with deliberate intent and without I
being authorized by law, in her possession and control or use on or about July 31,
2000 at about 10:30 A.M. the following: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STATE IN ITS JUDGMENT A CLEAR
AND DISTINCT FINDINGS OF FACTS (WHICH) PROVED THAT ACCUSED DID NOT
A - Three (3) big heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance weighing OWN THE HOUSE WHICH WAS SEARCHED.
294.86 grams;
II
B - Eight (8) medium heat sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance weighing
12.33 grams; THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO STATE IN ITS JUDGMENT THAT THE
ARTICLES SEIZED BY VIRTUE OF A SEARCH WARRANT WERE NOT TURNED
C - Fifty three (53) heat sealed plastic packets of white crystalline substance weighing OVER TO THE ISSUING COURT IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW.
4.75 grams
III
locally known as "shabu", containing Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated
drug, without the corresponding license or prescription. The members of the Philippine THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RAIDING TEAM FAILED
National Police (PNP), by virtue of a Search Warrant issued against Eden Garcia del TO ISSUE A DETAILED RECEIPT OF SEIZED ARTICLES AND TO GIVE A COPY
Castillo by Judge Isaias Dicdican and implemented on July 31, 2000 resulted in the THEREOF TO THE LAWFUL OCCUPANT IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW.
acquisition of said items. The items were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for
IV
analysis and the result is positive for the presence of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, or locally known as shabu. No less than the accused signed the Receipt THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT BY THE RAIDING TEAM
for Confiscated Articles signifying that the Raiding Team of the Philippine National ORDERING ACCUSED TO SIGN THE INVENTORY AFTER THE ARREST WITHOUT
Police had actually seized and confiscated certain items or articles from the herein THE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IS VIOLATIVE OF HER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.
V control is an internal act, the same may be presumed from the fact that the dangerous
drugs is in the house or place over which the accused has control or dominion, or
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RAID WAS IN VIOLATION within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.
OF THE PRIVACY OF ELENA R. GARCIA, AS OWNER OF THE HOUSE BEING
SEARCHED, AND NOT THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED EDEN DEL CASTILLO. Prosecution witnesses failed to establish that the house where the shabu and
other shabu paraphernalias were found belongs to appellant. On the other hand,
VI defense evidence clearly showed that the subject house belongs to appellant’s
grandmother, Elena Garcia, who testified in direct examination as follows:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
ATTY. RIVERAL:
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
appellee’s brief praying that the decision under consideration be reversed and set aside Q You stated in your personal circumstances that you are a resident of Mabolo, Cebu
and that the appellant be acquitted. City. Do you own a house?
We agree with the OSG. The appeal is meritorious. A Yes, I owned a house.
Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, provides: Q With whom are you living therewith?
SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua to A My grandson.
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the Q What is the name of your grandson living with you at that house?
corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.
A Brent Lepiten.
The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs are the following:
(a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not Q You stated that you owned a house in Mabolo, Cebu City which was the subject of
authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and, (c) the accused has the search. Do you have any evidence to show that you owned that house?
knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.
A Yes, I have.
In People vs. Tira,31 we explained the concept of possession of regulated drugs, to wit:
Q Showing to you this machine copy which is Tax Declaration No. 01-30651 in the
This crime is mala prohibita, and as such, criminal intent is not an essential element. name of Jose Garcia. Is this the tax declaration evidencing your ownership and
However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess possession of your house?
(animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual A Yes, that is the one.
possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug
is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, Q How are you related to Jose Garcia?
constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place A My husband.
where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot
Q Where is he now?
avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the
contraband is located, is shared with another. A He is already dead.
Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of ATTY. RIVERAL:
non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact of possession
may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference We request Your Honor that the machine copy of the tax declaration be marked as our
drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had Exhibit "1".
knowledge of the existence of the presence of the drug in the place under his control
COURT:
and dominion and the character of the drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the
existence and character of the drugs in the place where he exercises dominion and Mark it.
ATTY. RIVERAL: A This Jaime was able to sleep in the house at that time considering that his wife was
abroad.
Q The house which you mentioned belongs to you, how many storeys are there?
...
A Two storeys.
ATTY. RIVERAL:
ATTY. RIVERAL:
Q That Jaime Garcia you said where did he take his rest that night?
Q You mean the ground floor and the upper portion?
A At our house.
A Yes, sir.
Q In what portion thereof?
Q Where do you usually take your rest in the evening?
A At the upper portion.32
A In the upper portion.
The evidence of the prosecution failed to establish by competent evidence that
Q Do you know accused Eden del Castillo? appellant is the owner or at least shared the ownership of the house where
A Yes, she is one of my grandchildren. the shabu was found. PO3 Petallar testified that based on their own casing operation,
appellant frequented the subject house to eat meals;33 that they were not sure that the
Q Where is she living? house was owned by appellant but only believed that she had belongings therein since
she frequented the same.34 PO2 Borinaga testified it was a public knowledge that
A San Vicente Village, Wireless, Mandaue City. appellant was living in the subject house since she was a child.35Thus, there is no
competent evidence that appellant had control and dominion over the place where
Q Is accused Eden del Castillo still single?
the shabu was found. The claim of appellant that she has her residence in San Vicente
A She is still single. Village, Wireless, Mandaue City and that she was only a visitor in the house that
belongs to her grandmother at the time of the search was not rebutted by convincing
Q With whom is she living with before the arrest? evidence.

A Together with her auntie Edna Aballe. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by
the person against whom the search warrant is issued, however, there must be
Q How about her parents? sufficient showing that the property is under appellant’s control or possession.36
A Sometime(s) when they traveled at Badian only Eden is in the house together with The prosecution likewise failed to prove appellant’s possession of the shabu at the time
her auntie but they stayed in their house.
of her arrest. It bears stressing that at the time the raiding team conducted the search,
Q On July 31, 2000 in that evening who was sleeping at the upper portion of your appellant and the other occupants were asked to stay in the living room. PO3 Petallar
house? did not find any drugs on appellant’s body nor was there anything unusual or
suspicious noted in her person.37
A Myself and my grandson.
Notably, the policemen testified that they found the shabu in the upper portion of the
Q You are mentioning of Jaime, who is this Jaime? house, however, it was not shown at all in whose room it was found. In fact, the
defense evidence showed that at the time the two policemen went upstairs, Jaime
FISCAL LABORTE: Garcia, appellant’s uncle, was asleep and was awakened by the policemen who asked
him to go down. This was corroborated by PO2 Borinaga who testified on cross-
The witness was only asked who slept at the upper portion and she answered myself
examination that while he was downstairs, there was a person upstairs who came
and my grandson.
down.38 Moreover, it was appellant’s grandmother and the latter’s grandson, Brent,
ATTY. RIVERAL: who were staying in the upper portion of the house. Also, the shabu found at the
ground floor of the house does not conclusively establish that it belongs to appellant
Q You mentioned one Jaime Garcia, why was he there? since it was not found together with the other things of appellant. To reiterate, she was
not the only person who had access to the entire house. In fact, it was also shown by As we have ruled in Eduardo Quintero vs. The National Bureau of Investigation, et al.,
the prosecution that a certain Servando, appellant’s brother, voluntarily surrendered a procedure, wherein members of a raiding party can roam around the raided
five small plastic packs of white crystalline substance. We find that the prosecution premises unaccompanied by any witness, as the only witnesses available as prescribed
failed to prove convincingly that the seized shabu belonged to appellant. by law are made to witness a search conducted by the other members of the raiding
party in another part of the house, is violative of both the spirit and letter of the law.
Moreover, the manner in which the search was conducted on the subject house failed
to comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 8 (formerly Section 7), Rule 126 of That the raiding party summoned two barangay kagawads to witness the search at the
the Rules of Court, which provides: second floor is of no moment. The Rules of Court clearly and explicitly establishes a
hierarchy among the witnesses in whose presence the search of the premises must be
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses – conducted. Thus, Section 8, Rule 126 provides that the search should be witnessed by
No search of a house, room, or any other premise shall be made except in the presence "two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality" only in the
of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the absence of either of the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family.
latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. Thus, the search of appellant’s residence clearly should have been witnessed by his
son Jack Go who was present at the time. The police officers were without discretion to
Clearly, the search of the house must be done in the presence of the lawful occupants
substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the law.
and it is only in the absence of the former that two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality may be called upon to witness the search. While ...
appellant and the other occupants of the house were present during the search, they
were not allowed to actually witness the search of the premises. They were in the words The search conducted by the police officers of appellant’s residence is essentially no
of the policemen "pressed," i.e., they were asked to stay put in the sala where they were different from that in People v. Del Rosario where this Court observed:
seated while the simultaneous search was on-going in the upper and lower portions of
the house.39 They should be the ones that should have accompanied the policemen We thus entertain serious doubts that the shabu contained in a small canister was
while the search was being done and not substituted by the barangay tanods in their actually seized or confiscated at the residence of the accused-appellant. In
stead. We held in People vs. Go:40 consequence, the manner the police officers conducted the subsequent and much
delayed search is highly irregular. Upon barging into the residence of the accused-
As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding team categorically admitted that the appellant, the police officers found him lying down and they immediately arrested and
search of the upper floor, which allegedly resulted in the recovery of the plastic bag detained him in the living room while they searched the other parts of the house.
containing the shabu, did not take place in the presence of either the lawful occupant Although they fetched two persons to witness the search, the witnesses were called in
of the premises, i.e. appellant (who was out), or his son Jack Go (who was handcuffed only after the policeman had already entered accused-appellant’s residence (PP. 22-23,
to a chair on the ground floor). Such a procedure, whereby the witnesses prescribed by tsn, December 11, 1991), and therefore, the policemen had more ample time to plant
law are prevented from actually observing and monitoring the search of the premises, the shabu. Corollary to the Constitutional precept that, in all criminal prosecutions,
violates both the spirit and the letter of the law: the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved (Section 14[2],
Article III, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines) is the rule that in order to
Furthermore, the claim of the accused-appellant that the marijuana was planted is convict an accused the circumstances of the case must exclude all and each and every
strengthened by the manner in which the search was conducted by the police hypothesis consistent with his innocence (People vs. Tanchoco, 76 Phil 463 [1946];
authorities. The accused-appellant was seated at the sala together with Sgt. Yte when People vs. Constante, 12 SCRA 653[1964]; People vs. Jara, 144 SCRA 516[1986]). The
they heard someone in the kitchen uttered "ito na". Apparently, the search of the facts of the case do not rule out the hypothesis that accused-appellant is innocent.
accused-appellant’s house was conducted in violation of Section 7, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court which specifically provides that no search of a house, room or any other We also find that the raiding team failed to comply with the procedures on search and
premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any seizures provided under Sections 11 and 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal
member of his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses Procedure, to wit:
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. This requirement is
mandatory to ensure regularity in the execution of the search warrant. Violation of said SEC. 11. Receipt for the property seized. – The officer seizing the property under the
rule is in fact punishable under Article 130 of the Revised Penal Code. warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the
premises in whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of
such occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found The trial court erred in relying on the receipt of confiscated articles to establish that the
the seized property. raiding team had actually seized the listed items therein. First, it is highly irregular that
the inventory receipt was dated July 24, 2000 when the actual raid was conducted on
SEC. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to the court. – The officer must July 31, 2000. We find the explanation unacceptable given that the receipt was already
forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with prepared earlier than the search. Such discrepancy affects the integrity of the inventory
a true inventory thereof duly verified under oath. receipt. Second, appellant signed the receipt without the assistance of counsel. It was
established that at the time she signed the receipt, she was already under custodial
Clearly, the detailed receipt of the inventory must be given to the lawful occupant. In
investigation. The testimony of PO3 Petallar is revealing:
this case, however, PO3 Petallar admitted that the inventory receipt was given to
the barangay tanod41 despite the presence of the appellant and her grandmother Q When you saw the articles seized you were of the impression that they were illegal?
which is a violation of the rule.
A Yes, sir.
Likewise, the police officers failed to deliver the seized items to the court which issued
the search warrant. It was commanded in the search warrant that the seized articles Q Because of that impression you held Eden del Castillo in custody of the law?
be brought to the court which issued it to be dealt with as the law directs. Under the
rule, the seized property must be delivered by the officer to the judge who issued the A Yes, sir.
warrant. It must be accompanied with a true inventory thereof duly verified. The police Q You handcuffed Eden del Castillo immediately?
officers all testified that the confiscated shabu was brought to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. Faced with the same circumstance, we held in People vs. A No, we do (sic) not handcuffed (sic) Eden del Castillo.
Gesmundo:42
Q Although you do (sic) not handcuffed (sic) Eden del Castillo, the accused but virtually
On the issue of non-delivery of the seized marijuana to the court, the trial court held she was already held in custody of the law?
that it takes judicial notice of the usual practice of the San Pablo City police force of
retaining possession of confiscated specimens suspected of being marijuana by A We effected the arrest.
immediately forwarding them to the NBI or to an NBI accredited physician for
Q So you begun listing down the articles which is supposedly seized?
preliminary examination and/or laboratory examination before filing a case with the
city prosecutor’s office. The mere tolerance by the trial court of such a practice does not A Upon the delivery of the seized articles from the searching parties I began listing.
make it right. Clearly, such practice violates the mandatory requirements of the law
and defeats the very purpose for which they were enacted. Speculations as to the Q You listed the articles in that prepared form, correct?
probability of tampering with the evidence cannot then be avoided.
A Yes, sir.44
The trial judge cites the case of Yee Sue Koy, et al vs. Mariano Almeda , et al. (70 Phil
141) to justify the retention by the police and the NBI of the custody of the allegedly Q In your joint affidavit, you stated in paragraph 7 "That we informed her
Constitutional Right provided under the 1987 Phil. Constitution?"
confiscated specimens. While in said decision, this court recognized the fact that the
objects seized were retained by the agents of the Anti-Usury Board, instead of being A Yes, sir.
turned over to the Justice of the Peace of Sagay, yet the Court also held that it was "for
the reason that the custody of said agents is the custody of the issuing officer or court, Q You informed her of her right under the Constitution because you wanted her to
the retention having been approved by the latter." Thus, approval by the court which claim ownership of the seized articles?
issued the search warrant is necessary for the retention of the property seized by the
police officers; and only then will their custody be considered custody of the court. A We just informed her about her constitutional right.
Absent such approval, the police officers have no authority to retain possession of the
Q So that after informing her of her constitutional right she signed this receipt or
marijuana and more so, to deliver the property to another agency, like the NBI.43
inventory of seized articles, correct?
Moreover, the inventory receipt was not certified under oath by any of the members of
A Yes, sir.
the raiding team as required by the rule but was signed only by appellant and her
brother.
Q So you asked her by interrogation or question whether or not you will concur to the A I never saw.
entries listed in this inventory?
Q So accused would (sic) sign (sic) that instrument without the assistance of counsel?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.45
Q You also asked her that the search was conducted in a very orderly manner?
While PO3 Petallar testified that appellant was read her constitutional right, it was not
A Yes, sir. clearly shown that she was informed of her right not to sign the receipt and that it can
be used as an evidence against her. If appellant was indeed informed of her
Q You also asked her that nothing was destroyed or lost inside the house? constitutional right, it is unusual for her to sign the receipt acknowledging ownership
A Yes, sir. of the seized items without the assistance of counsel considering that she wanted to get
a lawyer. In People vs. Go,46 we found the inventory receipt signed by appellant
Q That you also asked her that the members of the raiding team did not in any inadmissible for being violative of her custodial right to remain silent, thus:
manner subjected (sic) them to unreasonable treatment?
After the inventory had been prepared, PO2 Abulencia presented it to appellant for his
A Yes, sir. signature without any showing that appellant was informed of his right not to sign
such receipt and to the assistance of counsel. Neither was he warned that the same
Q And that they were not exposed to embarrassment? could be used as evidence against him. Faced with similar circumstances, this Court
in People v. Gesmundo stated:
A Yes, sir.
It is true that the police were able to get an admission from the accused-appellant that
Q Since you shoot (sic) several questions and informing her of the constitution(al)
marijuana was found in her possession but said admission embodied in a document
right(s) under the 1987 Constitution did you tell her that you have the right to be
entitled "PAGPAPATUNAY" previously prepared by the police, is inadmissible in
assisted by counsel?
evidence against the accused-appellant for having been obtained in violation of her
A I told her that. rights as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense. The
records show that the accused-appellant was not informed of her right not to sign the
... document; neither was she informed of her right to the assistance of counsel and the
fact that the document may be used as evidence against her.
COURT:
In People vs. Policarpio, this Court held that such practice of inducing suspects to sign
Q After you had told the accused that she is entitled to have counsel now what did the receipts for property allegedly confiscated from their possession is unusual and
accused say, if any? violative of the constitutional right to remain silent, viz:
A She told me that she would get a lawyer.
What the records show is that appellant was informed of his constitutional right to be
ATTY. RIVERAL: silent and that he may refuse to give a statement which may be used against him, that
is why he refused to give a written statement unless it is made in the presence of his
Q In effect, did she get a lawyer? lawyer as shown by the paper he signed to this effect. However, he was made to
acknowledge that the six (6) small plastic bags of dried marijuana leaves were
A Not immediately. confiscated from him by signing a receipt and to sign a receipt for the ₱20.00 bill as
purchase price of the dried marijuana leaves he sold to Pat. Mangila.
...
Obviously the appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign these alleged
Q Thereafter was she able to get a lawyer?
receipts which in effect are extra-judicial confessions of the commission of the offense.
A When we arrived at the camp her sister told us that she had already hired a lawyer. Indeed it is unusual for appellant to be made to sign receipts for what were taken from
him. It is the police officers who confiscated the same who should have signed such
Q In effect, did that lawyer appear in the camp? receipts. No doubt this is a violation of the constitutional right of the appellant to
remain silent whereby he was made to admit the commission of the offense without
informing him of his right. Such a confession obtained in violation of the Constitution
is inadmissible in evidence.

The Inventory Receipt signed by appellant is thus not only inadmissible for being
violative of appellant’s custodial right to remain silent; it is also an indicium of the
irregularity in the manner by which the raiding team conducted the search of
appellant’s residence.

Assuming arguendo that appellant did waive her right to counsel, such waiver must be
voluntary, knowing and intelligent. To insure that a waiver is voluntary and intelligent,
the Constitution47 requires that for the right to counsel to be waived, the waiver must
be in writing and in the presence of the counsel of the accused.48 There is no such
written waiver in this case, much less was any waiver made in the presence of the
counsel since there was no counsel at the time appellant signed the receipt. Clearly,
appellant affixed her signature in the inventory receipt without the assistance of
counsel which is a violation of her right under the Constitution.

In all criminal cases, it is appellant’s constitutional right to be presumed innocent until


the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus in People vs. Del Norte,49 we
said:

We detest drug addiction in our society. However, we have the duty to protect appellant
where the evidence presented shows "insufficient factual nexus" of her participation in
the commission of the offense charged. In People vs. Laxa, we held:

The government’s drive against illegal drugs deserves everybody’s support. But it
cannot be pursued by ignoble means which are violative of constitutional rights. It is
precisely when the government’s purposes are beneficent that we should be most on
our guard to protect these rights. As Justice Brandeis warned long ago, "the greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning
without understanding."

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE on the
ground that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of appellant Eden del Castillo.
She is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged against her and her immediate
release from confinement is hereby ordered unless she is lawfully held in custody for
another cause.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to forthwith implement this


decision and to inform this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date
appellant was actually released from confinement.

The shabu and other shabu paraphernalias seized during the search are forfeited in
favor of the State.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario*, JJ., concur.


G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990 YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE.
HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner, MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED AGAINST
vs. YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents. 4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a
recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner. challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205 which reads:

HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of
arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment. Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and
Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency
The facts are as follows: being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the
xxx xxx xxx means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have —
1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay City, in a (1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to
sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;
for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code
04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito at in relation to Article 38 of the same code.
nagbibigay ng salaysay.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws.
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. — Horty Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.
Salazar — 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita B.
05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang panloloko sa Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty. Jovencio
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo? Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to implement Closure
and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen
S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar. and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today
proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong,
06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?
Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio.
S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako. Kinuha Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain
ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils. ay Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng ibang Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to
company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers —
ko. practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team
confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion
2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom said Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:
6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:

Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, we it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was
respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last January declared that mayors may not exercise this power:
26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was contrary to law
and against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are the following: xxx xxx xxx

1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the
Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law" state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered. No
guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution. longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary
investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus
right of the people "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5) others (including 2 upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
policemen) are the private residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as well oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to our client were without her particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."
consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the
abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and violation of domicile under function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of
Arts. 293 and 128 of the Revised Penal Code. arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced
by the elimination in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible
Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00)
officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973
in all (and which were already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-
Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and
four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil
issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4
and criminal, to protect our client's interests.
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
We trust that you will give due attention to these important matters.
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the
to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral
instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with the
Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836.1 and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of
arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not
sought to be barred are alreadyfait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as
consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved. the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and
indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936
Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5
and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely
raised by the petitioner for the Court's resolution. Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an
amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President
Under the new Constitution, which states: Ferdinand Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative
powers under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers:
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the (c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the power to
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2 recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment. 6
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace
avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the
Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers: Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is
injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the arrest them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569; In re
and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).
investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security
and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is
order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go Tam
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12
authorized to do so. 7
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases,
giving the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well: like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.

(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti,
have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:
authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to
national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and
Minister shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment agency
paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the
and the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed or means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have —
authorized to do so. 8
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment to
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code. recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment;

The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of the New Labor Code
rule in its twilight moments. in relation to Article 38 of the same code.

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing laws. 13
or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it
extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of
is null and void, thus:
no force and effect.
xxx xxx xxx
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-
taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally
Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The search warrants
deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is
valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in 1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo equipment, typewriters,
matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11 cabinets, tables, communications/ recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone
and the like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper
xxx xxx xxx and any and all documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints related to
the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs.
Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be
2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other publications to WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
promote the objectives and purposes of the subversive organizations known as declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to
Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure
Order No. 1205.
3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE FORUM" and other
subversive materials and propaganda, more particularly, No costs.

1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892; SO ORDERED.

2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969; Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;

4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and

5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with marking "Bagong
Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for
"books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and
other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of Texas, and the
operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme
Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in
connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too general,
and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the seizure of any
"paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General
Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general
warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the articles sought to be seized under
the search warrants in question cannot be characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in
English history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the English
Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to search where
they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic
and Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is
not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or publication that
speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and imminent danger to
state security. 14

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other,
who may issue warrants of arrest and search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the
President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final
order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997 xxx xxx xxx

ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, Appellant remained on provisional liberty.7 Atty. Benjamin Razon, counsel for the
vs. defense, filed a Notice of Appeal8dated May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Court9 promulgated its assailed Decision, denying the appeal and affirming the trial
court:10

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is hereby AFFIRMED
PANGANIBAN, J.: in all respects. Costs against appellant.
When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city Respondent Court11 denied reconsideration via its assailed Resolution dated January
streets where unarguably there is no time to secure an arrest or a search warrant, 20, 1994, disposing:
policemen should employ limited, flexible responses — like "stop-and-frisk" — which
are graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the lawmen being ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellant's motion for reconsideration is, as is hereby
ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat cavalierly the citizen's constitutional DENIED.
rights against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure.
The Facts
The Case
Version of the Prosecution
This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:12
April 19, 1993 and its Resolution dated January 20, 1994 in CA G.R. CR No. 07266,
At about 2:10 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from the Anti-
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Alain Manalili y Dizon."
Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were conducting a surveillance along
In an Information dated April 11, 1988,1 Petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon was charged A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen
by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R. Bautista with violation of Section 8, were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold
Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, allegedly committed as follows:2 Enriquez was driving a Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the Police Station
of Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of information that drug
That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM, Philippines and addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without any
authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle.
custody, possession and control crushed marijuana residue, which is a prohibited They then chanced upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on
drug and knowing the same to be such. drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a
swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter
Contrary to Law. approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then
asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried to
Upon his arraignment on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the resist. Pat Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male
charge.3 With the agreement of the public prosecutor, appellant was released after person had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu
filing a P10,000.00 bail bond.4 After trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took the wallet and examined it. He found
Caloocan City, Branch 124, acting as a Special Criminal Court, rendered on May 19, suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana
1989 a decision5convicting appellant of illegal possession of marijuana residue. The contents.
dispositive portion of the decision reads:6
The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused ALAIN Police Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation.
MANALILI Y DIZON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8, Article II, Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its
of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Illegal Possession of Marijuana residue), and suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the accused ALAIN
hereby sentences (sic) said accused to suffer imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE MANALILI y DIZON.
(1) DAY; and to pay a fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.
Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu, Cpl. Fiera which the policemen were riding in. The policemen then bodily searched the
Tamondong wrapped the same with a white sheet of paper on which he wrote accused and the tricycle driver. At this point, the accused asked the policemen why he
"Evidence "A" 4/11/88 Alain Manalili". The white sheet of paper was marked as was being searched and the policemen replied that he (accused) was carrying
Exhibit "E-3". The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet of folded paper. marijuana. However, nothing was found on the persons of the accused and the driver.
(Exhibit "E-4"). The policemen allowed the tricycle driver to go while they brought the accused to the
police headquarters at Kalookan City where they said they would again search the
Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic Chemistry accused.
Section requesting a chemical analysis of the subject marijuana residue (Exhibit "D").
Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of the apprehending policemen On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signalled the
(Exhibit "A"). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the referral slip (Exhibit "D") to the latter to follow him. The neighbor thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City Police
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), including the subject marijuana residue for Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the accused was asked to remove his pants in the
chemical analysis. The signature of Pat. Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of presence of said neighbor and another companion. The policemen turned over the
Exhibit "D". pants of the accused over a piece of bond paper trying to look for marijuana. However,
nothing was found, except for some dirt and dust. This prompted the companion of the
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and the neighbor of the accused to tell the policemen to release the accused. The accused was
subject marijuana residue at 7:40 o'clock in the evening of April 11, 1988 as shown on led to a cell. The policemen later told the accused that they found marijuana inside the
the stamped portion of Exhibit "D". pockets of his pants.
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical examinations of At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was brought
the specimen which she identified. (Exhibit outside the cell and was led to the Ford Fiera. The accused was told by the policemen
"E")13 Mrs. Pascual referred to the subject specimen as "crushed marijuana leaves" in to call his parents in order to "settle" the case. The policemen who led the accused to
her Certification dated April 11, 1988 (Exhibit "F").14 These crushed marijuana leaves the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat. Espiritu and Cpl. Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas
gave positive results for marijuana, according to the Certificate. was the policeman who told the accused to call his parents. The accused did not call
his parents and he told the policemen that his parents did not have any telephone.
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In this
examination, she also found that the "crushed marijuana leaves" gave positive results At about 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was brought in the
for marijuana. She then prepared a Final Report of her examinations (Exhibit "G"). office of an inquest Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal that no marijuana was
found on his person but the Fiscal told the accused not to say anything. The accused
After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a white letter-
was then brought back to the Kalookan City Jail.
envelope and sealed it. (Exhibit "E"). She then wrote identification notes on this letter-
envelope. (Exhibit "E-1"). Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused when he and
the accused were stopped by policemen and then bodily searched on April 11, 1988,
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit "F" from the NBI Forensic
testified. He said that the policemen found nothing either on his person or on the
Chemistry Section to Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong prepared
person of the accused when both were searched on April 11, 1988.
a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of Kalookan City. (Exhibit "C")
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the accused at the
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was
walking in front of the cemetery when he was apprehended.15 Kalookan City Police Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He said that the police searched
the accused who was made to take off his pants at the police headquarters but no
Version of the Defense marijuana was found on the body of the accused.

The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses as follows:16 Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness, presented several
pictures showing that tricycles were allowed to ply in front of the Caloocan Cemetery.17
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI
was aboard a tricycle at A. Mabini street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way The Rulings of the Trail and the Appellate Courts
to his boarding house. Three policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop
The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue largely on
because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger were under the influence of
the strength of the arresting officers' testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were
marijuana. The policemen brought the accused and the tricycle driver inside the Ford
"neutral and disinterested" witnesses, testifying only on what transpired during the Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of the evidence
performance of their duties. Substantially they asserted that the appellant was found against him, (2) the credibility of prosecution witnesses and the rejection by the trial
to be in possession of a substance which was later identified as crushed marijuana and the appellate courts of the defense of extortion, and (3) the sufficiency of the
residue. prosecution evidence to sustain his conviction.

The trial court disbelieved appellant's defense that this charge was merely "trumped The Court's Ruling
up," because the appellant neither took any legal action against the allegedly erring
policemen nor moved for a reinvestigation before the city fiscal of Kalookan City. The petition has no merit.

On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of the trial court was First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized
based on speculations, surmises or conjectures. On the alleged "serious" discrepancies During a Stop-and-Frisk
in the testimonies of the arresting officers, the appellate court ruled that the said
Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his possession,
inconsistencies were insubstantial to impair the essential veracity of the narration. It
contending that they were products of an illegal search. The Solicitor General, in his
further found petitioner's contention — that he could not be convicted of illegal
Comment dated July 5, 1994, which was adopted as memorandum for respondent,
possession of marijuana residue — to be without merit, because the forensic chemist
counters that the inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves was waived because
reported that what she examined were marijuana leaves.
petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he object to their
Issues admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even assuming arguendo that there was no
waiver, the search was legal because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under
Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent Court: Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

I We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-
and-frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio,18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial court. vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s):
II
. . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused (and) in ruling
that the guilt of the accused had been proved (beyond) reasonable doubt. to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
III course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in the testimonies of dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection
the prosecution witnesses were material and substantial and not minor. of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to
IV
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and
The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that the accused was any weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from
framed for the purpose of extorting money. whom they were taken.19

V In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of
effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in
The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when the evidence presented appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal
is consistent with both innocence and guilt. behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest.
This was the legitimate investigative function which Officer McFadden discharged in
VI
that case, when he approached petitioner and his companion whom he observed to
The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution which are have hovered alternately about a street corner for an extended period of time, while not
inadmissible in evidence. waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; and
conferred with a third person. It would have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule
years' experience to have failed to investigate this behavior further. against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,24 the Court held
that there were many instances where a search and seizure could be effected without
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In said case,
Court held that what justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was
the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They found inside petitioner's bag one .38-
dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal.
against him. gun and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that
to require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a search
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable,
warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the circumstances.
obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual
briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be more information, rather than to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to
validated by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure occur.
is unconstitutional and subject to challenge.20 Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, gives this guarantee: In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their
surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath were "high." The policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. marijuana in petitioner's possession:25

Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in FISCAL RALAR:
evidence as a "fruit of the poisonous tree," falling under the exclusionary rule:
Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the Caloocan Cemetery,
Sec. 3. . . . Sangandaan, Caloocan City?

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the preceding section shall be inadmissible A Because there were some informations that some drug dependents were roaming
for any purpose in any proceeding. around at A. Mabini Street in front of the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan City.

This right, however, is not absolute.21 The recent case of People xxx xxx xxx
vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless
Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat. Angel Lumabas and
search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving
one Arnold Enriquez, what happened, if any?
vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused
themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure."22 In People A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the Caloocan Cemetery then
vs. Encinada,23 the Court further explained that "[i]n these cases, the search and when we called his attention, he tried to avoid us, then prompting us to approach him
seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Although and introduce ourselves as police officers in a polite manner.
the term eludes exact definition, probable cause for a search is, at best, defined as a
reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in xxx xxx xxx
themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of
the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when you chanced upon
which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has him?
been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with A That person seems like he is high on drug.
said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched."
Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you chanced upon was acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case,
high on drug? however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure to raise its
violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an
A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying manner. ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal
Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him? is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot
be pleaded for the first time on appeal.27
A He was roaming around, sir.
Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence
Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided you?
Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers' testimony contained "polluted,
A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers in a polite manner, irreconcilable and unexplained" contradictions which did not support petitioner's
sir. conviction.

Q How did you introduce yourselves? We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial court's assessment of
the credibility of witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in
A In a polite manner, sir. this case, is accorded great weight and respect, since it had the opportunity to observe
their demeanor and deportment as they testified before it. Unless substantial facts and
Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?
circumstances have been overlooked or misappreciated by the trial court which, if
A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir. considered, would materially affect the result of the case, we will not countenance a
departure from this rule.28
Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him what he was holding
in his hands? We concur with Respondent Court's ruling:

A He tried to resist, sir. (e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some inconsistencies
in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies, We do not find them substantial enough to
Q When he tried to resist, what did you do? impair the essential veracity of their narration. In People vs. Avila, it was held that —
"As long as the witnesses concur on the material points, slight differences in their
A I requested him if I can see what was he was (sic) holding in his hands. remembrance of the details, do not reflect on the essential veracity of their statements.
Q What was the answer of the person upon your request? However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in the performance of
A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir. duty, the bestowal of full credence on Pat. Espiritu's testimony is justified by tangible
evidence on record. Despite Pat. Lumabas' contradictory testimony, that of Espiritu is
xxx xxx xxx supported by the Joint Affidavit29 signed by both arresting policemen. The question of
whether the marijuana was found inside petitioner's wallet or inside a plastic bag is
Q What was he holding? immaterial, considering that petitioner did not deny possession of said substance.
Failure to present the wallet in evidence did not negate that marijuana was found in
A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a marijuana (sic)
petitioner's possession. This shows that such contradiction is minor and does not
crushed residue.
destroy Espiritu's credibility.30
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that petitioner
Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence
effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to
raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused is in possession of
particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not
concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had drug.31
an actual intention to relinquish the right.26 Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce
The substance found in petitioner's possession was identified by NBI Forensic Chemist Sec. 8. . . . .
Aida Pascual to be crushed marijuana leaves. Petitioner's lack of authority to possess
these leaves was established. His awareness thereof was undeniable, considering that The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a
petitioner was high on drugs when stopped by the policemen and that he resisted fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any
when asked to show and identify the thing he was holding. Such behavior clearly person who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or use Indian hemp.
shows that petitioner knew that he was holding marijuana and that it was prohibited
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper penalty is an
by law.
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given sufficient years.34
grounds to believe the extortion angle in this case. Petitioner did not file any
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby AFFIRMED with
administrative or criminal case against the arresting officers or present any evidence
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS,
other than his bare claim. His argument that he feared for his life was lame and
as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to PAY a FINE of SIX
unbelievable, considering that he was released on bail and continued to be on bail as THOUSAND PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
early as April 26, 1988.32 Since then, he could have made the charge in relative safety,
as he was no longer in the custody of the police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is SO ORDERED.
viewed by this Court with disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate.33
Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
The Proper Penalty

The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No.
4103, as amended) by sentencing petitioner to a straight penalty of six years and one
day of imprisonment, aside from the imposed fine of six thousand pesos. This Act
requires the imposition of an indeterminate penalty:

Sec. 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code,
and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law,
the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of
which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be
less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225.)

Sec. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death
penalty or life-imprisonment; to those convicted of treason; to those convicted of
misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to
those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from confinement
or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already sentenced by final
judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof.
(Emphasis supplied)

The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179, imposes the following
penalty for illegal possession of marijuana:

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