Garcia – Recio vs Recio

GR 138322, October 2, 2002

Lessons Applicable: divorce

Laws Applicable: Art. 15 and Art. 26 par. 2 FC

FACTS:

Grace J. Garcia-Recio (2nd mariage) ----- Rederick A. Recio  Editha Samson (Wife)

 March 1, 1987: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal
 May 18, 1989: a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family
court
 June 26, 1992: Recio became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of Australian Citizenship"
issued by the Australian government
 January 12, 1994: Recio married Grace j. Garcia, a Filipino, in Cabanatuan City. Recio declared himself as
"single" and "Filipino."
 October 22, 1995: Recio and Grace J. Garcia ak.a. Garcia-Recio begun to live separately without prior
judicial dissolution of their marriage
 May 16, 1996: In accordance to the Statutory Declarations secured in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided
 March 3, 1998: Garcia-Recio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy claiming she only learned of the prior marriage in November, 1997
 Recio prayed in his answer that it be dismissed for no cause of action
 RTC: marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the
Philippines

ISSUE: W/N the divorce between Recio and Samson was valid and proven

HELD: NO. Remand the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the
ground of bigamy

 Divorces:
1. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and
17 of the Civil Code.
2. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry."
3. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective national laws.
 Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it
o legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned
o A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself
 The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country
o Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either:
1. an official publication; or
2. a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:
1. accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and
2. authenticated by the seal of his office
 Since the divorce was a defense raised by Recio, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law
validating it falls squarely upon him
 In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage. But divorces are of different types:
1. absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii - terminates the marriage
2. limited divorce or a mensa et thoro - suspends it and leaves the bond in full force
 Recio presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or provisional judgment of divorce
o On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died)
commits the offence of bigamy."

Tenchavez v Escano (1965)

Facts:
Pastor Tenchavez), 32, married Vicenta Escano, 27, on Feb. 24, 1948, in Cebu City. As of June 1948, the newly-
weds were already estranged. On June 24, 1950, Escano left for the US. On Agugust 22, 1950, she filed a verified
complaint for divorce against the plaintiff in the State of Nevada on the ground of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in
character."
On October 21, 1950, a decree of divorce was issued by the Nevada Court. On September 13, 1954, Escano married
an American Russel Leo Moran in Nevada. She now lives with him in California and by him, has begotten children.
She acquired American citizenship on August 8, 1958. On July 30, 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint for legal
separation and damages against VE and her parents in the CFI-Cebu.
Tenchavez poses the novel theory that Mamerto and Mina Escaño are undeserving of an award for damages
because they are guilty of contributory negligence in failing to take up proper and timely measures to dissuade their
daughter Vicenta from leaving her husband Tenchavez obtaining a foreign divorce and marrying another man
(Moran). This theory cannot be considered: first, because this was not raised in the court below; second, there is no
evidence to support it; third, it contradicts plaintiff's previous theory of alienation of affections in that contributory
negligence involves an omission to perform an act while alienation of affection involves the performance of a positive
act.

Issues:
1. WON at the the time Escano was still a Filipino citizen when the divorce decree was issued.
2. WON the award of moral damages against Escaño may be given to Tenchavez on the grounds of her refusal to
perform her wifely duties, her denial of consortium, and desertion of her husband.

Held:
1. YES
At the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then subject
to Philippine law under Art. 15 of the NCC. Philippine law, under the NCC then now in force, does not
admit absolute divorce but only provides for legal separation.
For Phil. courts to recognize foreign divorce decrees bet. Filipino citizens would be a patent violation of the declared
policy of the State, especially in view of the 3rd par. of Art. 17, NCC. Moreover, recognition would give rise to
scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens to the detriment of those members of our society whose means
do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtain absolute divorce outside the Phils.
Therefore, a foreign divorce bet. Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the effectivity of the NCC, is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction.
2. YES
The acts of Vicenta (up to and including her divorce, for grounds not countenanced by our law, which was hers at the
time) constitute a wilful infliction of injury upon plaintiff's feelings in a manner "contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy" (Civ. Code, Art. 21) for which Article 2219 (10) authorizes an award of moral damages.
It is also argued that, by the award of moral damages, an additional effect of legal separation has been added to
Article 106. It was plain in the decision that the damages attached to her wrongful acts under the codal article (Article
2176) expressly cited.
But economic sanctions are not held in our law to be incompatible with the respect accorded to individual liberty in
civil cases. Thus, a consort who unjustifiably deserts the conjugal abode can be denied support (Art. 178, Civil Code
of the Phil.). And where the wealth of the deserting spouse renders this remedy illusory, there is no cogent reason
why the court may not award damage as it may in cases of breach of other obligations to do intuitu personae even if
in private relations physical coercion be barred under the old maxim "Nemo potest precise cogi and factum".

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;

(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F.
Escaño;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for
damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the
deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, VS. HON. MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding Judge of
Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD
UPTON, respondents
October 8, 1985

FACTS:
Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the
United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they established residence in the Philippines. They had
two children and they were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van
Dorn. The private responded filed against petitioner stating that the petitioner’s business (Galleon Shop) is a conjugal
property of the parties and that respondent is declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved
to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada Court, where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property as of June 11,
1982.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent as petitioner’s husband is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets?

RULING:
The petition is granted. Complaint is dismissed.
The policy against absolute divorce cover only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law.
From the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves marriage, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage between them with the petitioner. Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner’s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before said court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.